Background papers | Risk review
Corruption risks in the security sector: highly important, under-researched and urgent
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Transparency International (TI) is the civil society organisation leading the global fight against corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, Germany, TI raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption, and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it. For more information, please visit www.transparency.org. The Defence and Security Programme works with governments, defence companies, multilateral organisations and civil society to build integrity and reduce corruption in defence establishments worldwide. The London-based Defence and Security Programme is led by Transparency International UK. Information on Transparency International’s work in the defence and security sector to date, including background, overviews of current and past projects, and publications, is available at the TI-UK Defence and Security Programme website: www.ti-defence.org. While acknowledging the debt TI-UK owes to all those who have contributed to and collaborated in the preparation of this publication, we wish to make it clear that Transparency International UK alone is responsible for its content. Although believed to be accurate at this time, this publication should not be relied on as a full or detailed statement of the subject matter. This publication was made possible thanks to generous support from the UK Department for International Development (DFID).
Transparency International UK Defence and Security Programme 32-36 Loman Street London SE1 0EH United Kingdom +44 (0)20 7922 7969 defence@transparency.org.uk First published in December 2011.
Author: Serhiy Pun Editor: Saad Mustafa Reproduction in whole or in parts is permitted, providing that full credit is given to Transparency International (UK) and provided that any such reproduction, whether in whole or in parts, is not sold unless incorporated in other works. © 2011 Transparency International UK. All rights reserved. Publisher: Transparency International UK Design: Maria Gili © Cover illustration: Luisa Rivera
Preface Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme works with governments, defence companies and civil society organisations to reduce the risk of corruption in defence and security. Our approach is non-partisan, neutral and focused on constructive ways of addressing the issue of corruption.
This report, by Serhiy Pun, arises from this series of secondments. It examines in a very general way the corruption risks within the national security sector. It is based on work done at our offices in London.
Officials and senior officers tell us directly why they care so much about corruption risk in defence and security. In their own words, this is because:
• Corruption wastes scarce resources.
Mark Pyman
• Corruption reduces operational effectiveness.
Programme Director
• Corruption reduces public trust in the armed forces and the security services.
Transparency International UK
• Defence budgets, due to their secrecy, are an easy target for politicians seeking funds. • International companies shun corrupt economies.
We have engaged with Ukraine since 2009, participating in anti-corruption training of defence and security officials, assessments of corruption risk, and leadership reviews. This work has sometimes been in collaboration with NATO, sometimes direct from ourselves. In addition, we have hosted a number of secondees from Ukraine—officers, officials and experts—to spend some months with us at our offices in London, working on projects of common interest. This hosting has been funded by financial support from the UK Ministry of Defence.
International Defence and Security Programme
December 2011
Background National security is customarily understood as the protection of the social values and interests of the individual, the society, and the state. Its preservation is the leading function of the state, and safeguarding it, the primary task of the security sector. Thus problems relating to this sector should be of special interest, not only to the state, but also for society in general. Corruption in the security sector is particularly pernicious due to the double nature of the statesociety relationship with respect to this sphere; society creates and maintains states and its security agencies to protect its own values and interests, yet the activities of the security sector are a priori associated with restrictions of the rights and freedoms of individuals and communities.
is discussions regarding reformation of the security sector in general.3 Corruption in the intelligence and security service is one of the main threats to national, regional, and international security. It undermines the basis of democracy and violates universally recognised human rights and liberties. Recent events testify to this.4 The aim of this article is to raise awareness of the threats posed by corruption in these sectors, and to disclose its nature and causes. This paper concludes by proposing potential mechanisms for solving or at least minimising the problem.
There is no common definition of the delineation between the defence and security sectors in terms of responsibilities, scope and structure—these vary from state to state.1 However, the most widely accepted view, supported by several international organisations, is that the principal organs of the security sector include security and intelligence services, police, armed forces, and border guards.2 The problem of corruption in the armed forces, police, and other law enforcement agencies has been the focus of much research and numerous national and international forums and conferences. Moreover, several international intergovernmental organisations and NGOs operate in this sphere conducting research, raising awareness and developing the necessary mechanisms and tools to address the issue. This notwithstanding, to date the problem of corruption in the security and intelligence services has not received much attention in the literature. The exception to this
1 It is not the aim of the article to correlate the meaning of such definitions as “security sector” and “defence sphere”. This will be made in forthcoming research. 2 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states (resolution 1713), 2005, retrieved May 2010, http://assembly.coe.int/ Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc06/EDOC10972.pdf.
3 Significant work in this sphere is conducted by different international institutions, for example by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (http://assembly.coe.int/Default.asp). 4 J Gethongo Report, retrieved May 2010, http://www.africafocus.org/docs06/git0602.php; PACE, Fair trial issues in criminal cases concerning espionage or divulging state secrets (resolution 1551), 2007, retrieved May 2010, http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf. asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/ERES1551.htm, etc.
Vulnerabilities of the security sector and its consequences Intelligence and security service are vulnerable to corruption for two main reasons:
Critical issues relating to intelligence and security service powers include:
1. The absence of transparency in functioning as a result of secrecy.
a.
The sometimes vague formulation of the legal provisions which defines the mandate of the security agencies. This allows significant room for manoeuvre.
b.
Judicial procedures to allow agencies to more effectively counteract transnational organised crime and terrorism often include the authority to avoid prior legal consent (which would usually be obtained from the Prosecutor) for actions which might restrict human rights.
c.
The reduction in legal process results in less scrutiny of the grounds for action, making it increasingly easy to impose restrictions based on unreliable evidence. This in turn leads to decreased transparency and a blurring of the boundary between the restriction and the violation of human rights and liberties.
2. Wide and significant powers delegated to the services to protect and ensure national security. Secrecy is an obvious aspect of these services. Every country recognises the imperative of national security and therefore ensures that its protection is achieved at all costs. This necessitates the existence of special agencies which act both internally (security service) and externally (intelligence services). Secrecy is an important precondition for the effective functioning of the intelligence and security service, and there is a well-known correlation between secrecy and transparency: more secrecy = less transparency. The issue of secrecy pervades not only the operational aspects of the defence and security service but also their budgetary procedures, which are neither detailed nor transparent and are kept secret in the interests of national security. This absence of independent monitoring leads to an increased risk of corruption. This is particularly worrisome given that the budgets of Western intelligence and security service are equal to the entire budgets of developing states. The protection of human rights and liberties in the course of activities also poses potential corruption risks. New transnational challenges and threats such as organised crime and terrorism cause the intelligence and the security service to be vested with increased powers, usually supported by strong legislation.5 Such powers, which are bestowed by the provisions of the national legislature, rarely take into account human rights and liberties.
5
For example the US PATRIOT Act.
All of these factors create opportunities for corruption and human rights violations. The main functions of these services are collection, analysis, verification, synthesis and transmission of information to state authorities. This information provides the basis for high level state decision-making. Thus, corruption in the security sector might result in external (international) state actions and decisions that could undermine and threaten national and/or international security and stability.
Counter Corruption Measures Taking into consideration the substantial dangers posed by corruption in the activities of intelligence and security service, it is crucial to define the tools to prevent and counteract it. Initial activity should focus on raising awareness of the subject and conducting thorough research. This will provide a foundation to develop effective anticorruption measures. Mechanisms for this might include conferences, roundtables and diagnostic workshops. In essence, the problem should be discussible. To minimise corruption risks, proper financial management and budget transparency is essential. This includes not only the final product, but the process itself. Budgets submitted to Parliament for approval should be detailed and explicit. It is vital to develop an effective mechanism for oversight of budget execution. The delicate balance between confidentiality and accountability can be managed to a certain extent through the principle of deferred transparency—declassifying confidential material after a period of time as proscribed by law.6
Effective internal and external whistle-blowing channels and mechanisms should be developed. The security sector is traditionally extremely resistant to such reforms, however there are optimistic examples of the effectiveness of whistle-blowing procedures, even in the security sector.9 The provisions of the law with regards to the regulation of agency activities should be exact and understandable. This may involve amendments to legislation—specifically when it comes to procedures restricting human rights and liberties, the creation or strengthening of an oversight process, and the proper functioning of the appeals process. The law should also provide adequate protection for whistle-blowers.
Adherence to the democratic process and proper oversight by democratic institutions is essential to reducing corruption in a sector which had traditionally lacked transparency.7 In the same vein, strong parliamentary control over the intelligence and secret services is also important. In parallel, it is necessary to raise the role of civil society and the media to oversee the activities of these agencies. There are several positive examples of the creation of civil councils within intelligence and security service departments which have served as an effective oversight mechanism.8
6 PACE, 2005, op.cit. 7 ibid. 8 For example, in Ukraine civil councils were introduced into the agencies of the security sector. The aim of these councils is to support effectiveness and transparency in the activities of such agencies, perform civil oversight of their activities (for more information, check http://ssu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_ id=51889&cat_id=52170 etc.
9
PACE, 2007, op.cit.
Concluding thoughts Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme conducts research on corruption risk in the security sector—with a particular focus on the defence establishment. That said, the success of many of the counter corruption tools and strategies developed thus far for defence can be quickly and easily adapted for use across the wider security sector, including the intelligence and security service. There are two main reasons for this: Firstly, the defence sphere is a vital component of the state security sector and shares many characteristics with other security institutions. Secondly, in most countries intelligence and security services are military organisations, and in many where they are de jure civil institutions, their structure and activities are the same as military institutions. The most appropriate anti-corruption tools developed by Transparency International for the defence sphere that could also be effectively used in the intelligence and security sectors are:
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Self-Assessment Questionnaires (SAQ)—to define specific corruption risks
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Leadership days
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Integrity pacts to increase transparency in the procurement process (with particularities under certain circumstances—acquisition of special technical devices, etc.)
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Implementation of codes of conduct to minimise corruption risks in the activities of these services through regulation of the behaviour of officers and civil servants.
•
Anti-corruption training courses to raise awareness of the dangers of corruption in the security sphere and disseminate knowledge about anti-corruption issues.
In conclusion, the importance and danger posed by corruption in the security sector is of serious public concern. The problem is highly important, urgent and yet severely under researched.
Bibliography Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states (resolution 1713), 2005, retrieved May 2010, http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/ Doc06/EDOC10972.pdf. J Gethongo Report, retrieved May 2010, http://www. africafocus.org/docs06/git0602.php. PACE, Fair trial issues in criminal cases concerning espionage or divulging state secrets (resolution 1551), 2007, retrieved May 2010, http://assembly.coe. int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/ ERES1551.htm, etc.
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