The american railroad network 1861-1890

Page 1



THE AMERICAN

RAILROAD NETWORK 1861

Studies in

— 1890

Economic History

Published in Cooperation with

The Committee on Research

in

Economic History



The American Railroad Network 1861

— 1890

GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR IRENE D. NEU

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

PRESS

Cambridge, Massachusetts


©COPYRIGHT, 1956 BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE

Distributed in Great Britain by

Geoffrey Cumberlege Oxford University Press

London

LIBRARY of CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER 56-8554 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


PREFACE

This volume grew out of the realization that the road maps available for the pre-Civil

War

leading picture of the degree of physical integration of American roads.

The

When

this

task attempted

first

was

rail-

years present a seriously mis-

to construct a

rail-

more meaningful map.

was accomplished questions immediately arose: Why the lack American railroad net as late as 1861? When, by

of integration of the

what means, and why did

a unified network

emerge

in the following

Obviously a thoroughgoing answer to these questions

three decades?

would involve

telling the

whole

story of

American economic and transan intention far beyond

portation history in the nineteenth century

the limits of this study.

We

—

have, therefore, contented ourselves with

describing and emphasizing certain significant aspects of the situation and

suggesting some solutions to the problems raised.

The

first five

chapters of this book are primarily the

Rogers Taylor, the a cooperative one

last

work

of George

four of Irene D. Neu. But the project has been

and the authors take

joint responsibility for

what

is

The research on the first five chapters and the drafting of the maps were made possible by a grant from the Joseph B. Eastman Foundapresented.

tion at

Amherst

College.

Work on

the last four chapters

was generously

financed by the Committee on Research in Economic History.

way

Many

At the risk of being invidious, a few bows must be made. Arthur H. Cole from the beginning gave generously of his time and indispensably of encouragement and advice. For aid in clearing up difficult points or in going far beyond the persons assisted the authors in one

call

or another.

of duty in answering letters of enquiry

we

are under special obliga-


Preface

K. Brown, C.

O. William K. Lamb, Paul F. Laning, Walter R. Marvin, Andrew Forest Muir, Richard C. Overton, Robert M. Sutton, Charles W. Turner, and D. W. Yungmeyer. For many hours of assistance in preparing the maps we are indebted to John V. Bowmer and Mary Alice Kallet. G. R. T. I. D. N.

tion to: Robert C. Black, III, C.

J.

Corliss, Elizabeth

Cullen, Charles E. Fisher, G. P. deT. Glazebrook,

VI


CONTENTS

I.

Focusing the Problem Historical

The Dominance The Integration II.

The Railroad

of Local Interests to 1861

of the Railroad Net,

1

861-1890

M.\p, 1861

Construction of the Railroad Sources of

i

Background

8

Map

Map Information

Representation of Gauges

Gauge III.

New

Differences

England and Canada,

Spokes to the

1861

15

Hub

Pordand's Bid for Railroad Empire

Montreal and the Canadian System

IV.

The Middle Atlantic States, New York's Three Systems Philadelphia's Railroad

Baltimore's

B and

1861

Domain

O

Barriers at

Western Gateways: Buffalo and Erie

Barriers at

Western Gateways: Pittsburgh,

Wheeling, and Parkersburg vii

23


1

Contents

V.

The Midwest and South, Gauge

Differences in the

i86i

35

Midwest

City Rivalries in the Midwest

The Beginnings of a Rail Network Gauge Differences in the South

in the

South

Railroad Connections in Southern Cities

VI.

The Trend Toward

Integration,

i

861-1870

49

Early Shipping Patterns Factors Encouraging Railway Integration Effect of the Civil

War

Gauge of the First Transcontinental Railroad Growth of the Grain Trade

VII. Solving

the Gauge Differentials, 1861-1880

58

"Compromise" and Sliding Wheels; Car Hoists "Double" Gauges

Narrow Gauge Railways

VIII.

The

Fast Freight Lines,

i

861-1890

67

Background Early Fast Freight Lines

Cooperative Fast Freight Lines

The Pattern of the Fast Freight Lines Growth and Abuses

IX. Last Steps in Integration,

i

880-1 890

77

Toward a Nation-wide Standard Gauge The South Joins the Union A Footnote on Gauge The Railroad Pattern in 1890 Notes

85

Appendix. Key to Abbreviations of Railroad Lines Appearing on the Maps

10

Index

109 viii


MAPS {at

end

of boo^O

United States and Canadian Railways, April i, 1861, Part I: Canada, New England, and the Middle Atlantic

United States and Canadian Railways, April i, Part II: Canada and the Midwestern States.

1861,

United States and Canadian Railways, April

1861,

Part III: Southern States.

i,

States.



THE AMERICAN RAILROAD NETWORK 1861-1890



FOCUSING THE PROBLEM

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The American economy, fore the Civil

already expanding rapidly be-

War, continued growing with almost

explosive force dur-

ing the following decades. In i860 the United States was a secondary industrial nation

century

it

among

the nations of the world. Before the

had achieved a position of preeminence.

just prior to the

war was only

Its

end of the

pig iron production

a small fraction of that of Great Britain,

and steelmaking had hardly begun. Before the end of the century the

American output of both products exceeded

that of any other country.

It

has been estimated that in i860 the value of manufactured goods in each of the three leading countries, the United

many, was greater than

had not only moved

Kingdom, France, and Ger-

in the United States.

into

first place,

By

1890 the United States

but the value of

its

manufactures

nearly equaled the combined output of the three former leaders.^

Fundamental improvements

in railroad transportation

major factors making possible the post-Civil focuses

War

on only one aspect of those improvements

expansion. This study

— the conversion of the

fragmented and non-unified railroads of 1860 into the

network of three decades

later

Technological improvements in

came

cars.

roadbed, and bridges

efficiency of railroad

rails,

in rapid succession. Steel

transportation.

roadbed, motive power, and rolling rails, first

much less made possible

ing the Civil War, replaced the rails,

relatively integrated

— but there were, of course, other develop-

ments which greatly increased the

stock

were among the

used in this country dur-

satisfactory iron ones. Stronger

the use of heavier engines

and

In i860 locomotives seldom weighed more than about 30 tons where-


The American

Railroad Network,

by 1890 they might weigh as

as

freight cars, about 10 tons in i860,

a

few

cars of

developments air

much

i

as 85 tons.

861-1890

Standard capacity for

had doubled by the

eafly eighties, while

even greater capacity were already in use. facilitated railroad operations: the

brake, improved terminal

facilities,

and the adoption of the block system

A

host of other

automatic coupler, the

increased use of the telegraph,

for controlling traffic. Freight lo-

comotives on the Pennsylvania Railroad hauled on the average 2,100,000

handUng

ton miles of freight in 1870, but were

annum

5,100,000 such units per

eleven years later."

This was the period of most rapid construction of

new

track. In i860

there were 30,626 miles of railway in operation in the United States 2,065

JTiiles

in Canada.

The

total for the

and

two countries combined grew

to

about 175,000 in 1890. Before the war only one railroad had reached the Missouri River. During the following three decades transcontinental lines

were completed in both the United States and Canada, and a great network

had been constructed not only

in the Mississippi Valley west of the river,

but also in Texas, in the Mountain States, and on the Pacific coast. Even in the older area east of the Mississippi

age continued to grow as gaps were

and the Great Lakes, track mile-

filled in,

bridges built, and roads

constructed parallel to existing ones.

This was the period

when

also

into extensive railroad systems, bilt.

smaller companies were consolidated

and when such men

as Cornelius

Vander-

Jay Gould, and CoUis P. Huntington were building their great

road empires. Cutthroat competition put heavy pressure on railroad especially in trunk-line territory. In 1858 the rate for shipping rail

from Chicago

to

fallen to 26.11 cents;

New and

York was

The average

This had fallen to

.941 in 1890.^

it

War was

But the decline was

far

1.925

from uni-

form, for rates tended to remain relatively high where there was

competition from other roads competed for

were

at times

charges

fell

rail

traffic,

lines

as

or

from waterways. Where

between Chicago and

kept up by interline agreements.

drastically,

When

New

sometimes well below operating

little

parallel

York, rates

these broke costs.

competition proved a crushing blow to most inland water routes. traffic

had

rate per ton mile

charged by United States railroads just after the Civil cents.

rates,

wheat by

38.61 cents a bushel; in 1870

in 1890 to 14.3.

rail-

down,

Railroad

Though

continued to grow on the Great Lakes and the Sault Canal, the

weaker canals had succumbed

to railroad competition

during the

forties


Focusing the Problem

and its

fifties.

Before the eighties were over, the tonnage carried had reached

high point even on such major water routes as the Mississippi River and

the Erie Canal.

Tremendous popular enthusiasm for the railroads led to grants of millions of acres of public land and extensive financial aid by federal, state,

and

local

governments. But following the Civil War, and especially turned against the railroads. Stock

after 1873, public opinion gradually

watering, secret rebates, pooling agreements, political bribery, scandals like the Credit Mobilier expose,

and the public-be-damned

attitude of

railroad magnates gave rise to anti-railroad agitation by farmers, merchants,

and investor groups. Criticism of the

in the Granger tion

form

railroads took political

and Anti-Monopoly movements.

Efforts at state regula-

were followed in 1887 by the adoption of the federal

Com-

Interstate

merce Commission Act.

The

very importance of the railroad in the development of the Ameri-

can economy has tended to obscure the fact that

it

was

every stage by the economic environment in which

it

itself

affected at

grew. While no

general survey of these environmental factors will be attempted, this

study does seek to identify the influences which were active

first

in erect-

ing and then in removing barriers to the creation of a physically

inte-

grated system of national railroad transportation. First, the condition of the uncoordinated railroad net of 1861 will be examined; then, the important steps by into a truly integrated

which during the following three decades

work

During the nineteenth century from merchant

some

of

evolved

will be traced.

THE DOMINANCE OF LOCAL INTERESTS TO

transition

it

1861

there took place in this country a gradual

to industrial

and finance

capitalism. This

was a

development which profoundly altered the practices and the outlook of the business community. this

change; on

While

On

the one

the other their

hand

growth was

the railroads helped to effect significantly affected

by

it.

the merchant-dominated capitalism of the eighteenth century

was a decaying

institution

tury, the parochial

during the early decades of the following cen-

viewpoint which

it

engendered in the business leaders

of the day toward transportation development prevailed until about the

time of the Civil War. While merchants ruled the American economy they constituted a business and social

elite.

From

their

counting houses


The American Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

they organized and directed the exchange of goods and services in both

domestic and

foreign

unspeciaHzed in function, they

Largely

trade.

brought together and arranged into an

effective pattern the threads of

an increasingly complex exchange economy. The great merchants not only bought and sold goods in large and small quantities on their

own

account or for others in the capacity of brokers, factors, or agents, but also

performed a host of other eign trade; they

owned

They were bankers and

services.

sold marine insurance; they held

dealers in for-

and warehouses; they bought and to and sometimes operated fishing,

ships, docks, title

mining, or manufacturing ventures; and they became the chief estate

owners and speculators of

The

prosperity of the merchant

volume of the commerce

in his

and distributed from

his ships

real-

their day.

depended in large part upon the

home port and upon the trade carried by his own warehouses. The leaders were

located in the great ports of the Atlantic coast,

which had become in the

Colonial period important centers of world trade. Here the products of

Europe, Africa, and the East, as well as those from the coastal

many

smaller

towns on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, were assembled,

and then

and domestic markets.

in considerable part reexported to foreign

This trade expanded greatly during the Napoleonic Wars, when, not infrequently,

more than

commerce

half the

and Boston consisted of reexports

Following the defeat of Napoleon, the

interior

grew

New

York, Philadelphia,

importance of the

relative

eign reexport trade declined. But coastwise

and trade with the

of

to foreign markets.

commerce

as the frontier

was pushed outward.

There ensued a competitive struggle among the merchants of

who were

for-

greatly expanded

rival cities

striving to capture as large a share as possible of the rapidly

expanding trade of the hinterland. This the inland trade

was an important

intercity competition to

dominate

factor in the early decades of railroad

development.

The

first

railroads in the

the early turnpikes

and

United States were

canals, to serve nearby

the purpose of the early lines radiating

built, as

and

were most of

local needs.

Such was

from Boston. The Boston and

Worcester, for instance, was designed primarily to secure for Boston the trade of the Worcester area

which

led to Providence.

Valley in

New

The

and

to divert

little

it

from the Blackstone Canal

railroads strung out along the

York were constructed

for the

most part with

Mohawk

local capital


Focusing the Problem to provide local transportation for

nearby merchants and farmers.

were financed and

early railroads of eastern Pennsylvania

by owners of coal lands anthracite to

New

who

make

sought to

possible the

The

built largely

movement

of

York and Pennsylvania markets. The 45^-mile Pontwas designed merely

chartrain Railroad, completed in Louisiana in 1831, to facilitate

As

movement between

New

Orleans and the lake of that name.

became more

the possibilities of railway transportation

nized, the roads were looked city chiefly as devices for

upon by

forwarding their

own

areas,

petitors for the

commerce

city.'*

of the Great

Troy and Albany on a smaller rich

A

New

their

own

York and Boston were com-

Lakes and the Erie Canal,

scale.

as

were

Charleston sought to divert the

from Savannah, and Chicago and

commerce

St.

Louis fought for the

of the upper Mississippi.

report of a special committee of the Select

Philadelphia, urging that the city

among merchant groups

and

Common

Council of

government invest generously in the

stock of the proposed Pennsylvania Railroad, petition

Rival groups

while they carefully avoided any development which might

benefit the merchants of another

cotton trade

interests.

which widened

therefore encouraged the building of lines

market

clearly recog-

the business groups in each large

is

in the pre-Civil

illustrative of the

War

period.

com-

The com-

mittee declared, in part:

No

one can shut

his eyes to the fact, that the enterprise involves, for

for woe, the future prospects of Philadelphia.

The

weal or

trade of this city, already re-

tarded by improvements on the North and the South, will be so curtailed by the

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad

at Pittsburg, and the completion of the railway from New York to Lake Erie, as to drain the public works, and impoverish the city and state. Labour among us will want its reward, business will stagnate, capital will desert our borders, and following this desertion of trade, the interest

of the debt of the

commonwealth

will be unpaid!

On

the other hand,

the means, by furnishing the nearest and best route to

securing an unexampled prosperity to this

city.

Our

we have

and from the West, of

citizens will not only be

enriched, but the real estate and property of the corporation will be enhanced

beyond the amount of the proposed subscription.^

THE INTEGRATION OF THE RAILROAD NET, During and following the less as

or

its

Civil

War,

the railroads

1861-1890

came

to be

regarded

agencies designed to serve the exclusive needs of a particular city

immediate back country and more

as a

coordinated network whose


The American primary function was to

to be

i

861-1890

Though

facilitate transportation.

on and have, indeed,

terests lingered

came

Railroad Network,

over-shadowed by

parochial in-

persisted to the -present time, they

larger, national considerations.

The Civil War itself brought a changed view of The need for through movement of troops and

the role of the railroads. supplies focused atten-

gauge and on the lack of connections between railroads in the leading cities of both the North and the South. The exigention

on

cies of

variations in

war highlighted the advantages which could be had from a stand-

ardized and inter-connected railroad system. But military requirements

momentum

merely reenforced a movement which was gathering

any

in

case.

As long

as population

and agricultural production remained centered

more integrated railway

largely in the seaboard states, pressure for a

system and better interstate

rail

connections was not great. But as the rapid

settlement of the frontier continued and when, with the onset of the Civil

War,

a veritable flood of food

and animal prod-

and importing manufactured products

in exchange, the

West began sending

the

ucts eastward

demand for cheap and expeditious through shipment by became

distances

irresistible.

rail

over long

Shippers of western products sought favor-

able rates without preference for particular cities or their captive railroads. Similarly, producers

and

manufactured products outgrew

distributers of

the nearby market and began to see the prospects of a national outlet for their products. Isolated railroads

which had seemed

advantage of a protected market,

now came

commercial relations with more distant

profitable

At

same time

the

that the

toward railroads

attitude

At

change.

least until

as

an investment underwent a substantial

some time

in the

fifties,

funds for railroad develop-

chiefly

vate or

we have seen, had come public. The incentive for

investment was

returns

from the

the

fifties

by

local sources,

and increasingly

and

less

whether

pri-

the hope of direct

railroads themselves than a belief that indirect benefits

thereafter, the

and merchants. During

motive for investment shifted

to a desire for direct returns: for profits derived

issue or purchase of railroad securities solidation,

from

to local producers, property owners,

more and more

areas.ÂŽ

market was expanding so prodigiously, the

ment, as

would inure

earlier to offer the

be regarded as barriers to

to

security manipulation.

and from

from the

railroad promotion, con-

This development was accompanied

the rise of strong financial interests, especially in

Boston and

New


Focusing the Problem

York, the growth of stock exchanges and speciaHzed banking institutions,

and the emergence of

now

promoters,

Both investors and

so-called "finance capitalism."

looking far beyond the local market areas, sought the

gained from the railroad lines which benefited any part of

profits to be

the continent.

There were indeed many

facets to the evolution of

of railroad transportation in the United States

development would cover

history of this

A

full-length

at the very least: (i) the

and equipment of the

in the physical plant

an integrated system

and Canada.

changes

railroads, including both the

adoption of uniform gauge and the improvement and standardization of techniques and equipment;

ments such

as

through

the evolution of institutional arrange-

(2)

of lading, agreements for the interline ex-

bills

change of rolling stock, the adoption of standard time, consolidations, rate

and

traffic

(3) the rapid

agreements, and the appearance of fast freight lines; and

growth

of the

whole economy, including the settlement of

the West, the revolutionary changes in marketing,

and the

scale of in-

dustrial production.

Such

a detailed study goes far

intention here

is

a limited one.

beyond the scope of

Only one aspect

this

volume. The

of the technological

changes will be discussed: the adoption of a uniform gauge.

The

basic

importance of this development can hardly be overemphasized, for the adoption of a uniform gauge hastened the closing of gaps between

road lines at important junction

on such matters

as

through

sion of through rates,

bills

cities,

of lading

and the exchange

and passenger

is

no attempt

corollary

to

chiefly the

to

examine

tickets, the divi-

of rolling stock,

necessary the adoption of standardized braking

There

rail-

encouraged interline agreements

and soon made

and coupling equipment.

in detail the history of the developments

gauge standardization, but we have noted the pressures,

expansion of the market, which promoted

this

uniformity of

gauge. In this connection, one particular institutional development, the

growth of

fast freight lines in

special attention.

response to market needs,

is

singled out for


II

THE RAILROAD MAP,

1861

CONSTRUCTION OF THE RAILROAD MAP

Maps which show the spread of decade by decade are used so commonly in the

the railroad net

—

study of American

road history that their presence in a book on the subject granted.

The

— often

is

rail-

taken for

effectiveness of this type of visual aid, together with that of

such other devices as charts, graphs, and pictographs also frequently used

by

social scientists,

cannot be questioned. Yet, useful

can frequently confuse rather than

clarify.

as these tools are, they

Most students have become

aware of the errors which may spring from an

uncritical reading of charts

and pictographs. Less well-recognized, however, are the similar dangers which may be encountered when using maps, the

manner

in

which

a

map

is

drawn may give

the historian, erroneous impressions

for,

wholly without intent,

the general reader, or even

and cause him

to

come

to

unwarranted

tells

a story. This

conclusions.

A map is

is,

of course, a

much

simplified picture

which

never the whole story but merely a significant piece for the date indi-

cated.

For example,

for 1900 or 1950

a

good map showing the

may

commerce.

A

similar

map

esting comparison of the extent in the earlier

and

later periods.

and

for indicating the

for i860

earlier

map

may make

and location of the But

if

main

routes of

possible an inter-

railroads that existed

the reader assumes that the

dated i860 shows the possible routes by internal trade, as

United States

prove very useful for showing the extent and loca-

tion of railroad lines in those years

internal

railroads of the

rail for

do the 1900 and 1950 maps, then

his reading of the

promotes error rather than understanding of the actual

8

map

through movement of

situa-


The Railroad Map, tion portrayed.

When

railroads are practically

much

provides

that the rolling stock

information about possible

useful

movement. But those conditions were not Civil

of one gauge, physically

permitted freely to pass over the tracks of another, the

is

map

railroad

all

managed

united by interconnecting tracks, and so of one road

i86i

War, and

for this reason railroad

traffic

fulfilled until well after the

maps

for the

prewar period are

often unsatisfactory and even misleading.

The

three chapters immediately following this one emphasize the lack

of physical integration of the railroads in the United States

on the eve of the

Civil

War. Maps showing

appear at the end of

this

book.

position of the chief junction

They

condition and represent-

this

ing as accurately as possible the railroad net as

and Canada

it

existed

on April

i,

1861,

and location, the and the rail gauge of each

indicate the extent

and terminal

cities,

railroad.

the

If

maps

are to be read profitably, brief attention

to the condition of their preparation. 1

861,

is

somewhat

picture of the of hostilities

arbitrary, but

American

railroad

it

The

must be given

first

choice of the date, April

i,

has the advantage of presenting the

network

just before the actual

between the North and South.^ The Civil

War

outbreak

provides a

convenient dividing point in American railway history, for during that

new construction was curtailed appreciably and thereafter a great new period of expansion and consolidation began. The maps show railroads in operation. For the purposes of this study, a

conflict

railroad considered to be in operation

was one over which persons

modities were transported for commercial purposes; that

company

received

payment

carried commodities of for

its

own

was used

use,

its

but for

in return for

own

sale.

or

com-

the railroad

transportation services, or

it

production (for example, coal) not merely

Thus, a newly

solely to transport materials

upon which an excursion

its

is,

train

built section of track

which

needed for further construction, or

was run

to carry

company

officials

and

leading citizens to celebrate the "opening" of the road, was not, under the definition here adopted, regarded as actually in operation.

Furthermore, although the accompanying maps show in some detail the network of railroads in operation as of April

tempt was made

to include railroads of less

i,

1861,

no

serious at-

than about ten miles in length.

In the interest of simplicity two other omissions were made. Double-track lines

were not indicated

as such.

These were located largely

in

New

Eng-


The American

Railroad Network,

land and the Middle Atlantic

States,

i

861-1890

where the maps already tended

to

maps indicate gauge differshow breaks wherever major waterways remained unbridged, they do not show gaps in cities where lines remained unconnected. Nor,

be most congested. Secondly, although the ences and

needless to say, do they give any indication of important institutional

impediments

through

to

which existed along with the physical

traffic,

discontinuities of the rail network.

SOURCES OF MAP INFORMATION

The

chief obstacle to constructing

from the

arose

difficulty of

map

an accurate railroad

securing reliable information.

It

for 1861

was soon

discovered that contemporary maps, though helpful, are never entirely trustworthy. Their inaccuracies arise, in part, from errors in execution

and, in part, from the mapmakers' lack of data. But equally serious their obscurity. It

the

maps

not always clear whether the railroads

is

And,

were in the course of construction, or merely pro-

finally, the date of a

mean merely collected

shown on maps

are those that were actually in operation, or whether the

also include roads that jected.

is

that the

some time

ning, the end, or

map was

before, or

given

map

is

seldom

definite; for

it

may

printed in that year on the basis of data

it

may

indicate the situation at the begin-

on some intermediate day during the

year.

The best of the contemporary railroad maps were published in the railway guides. These were printed and sold by a number of commercial They The most demaps in this volguides. They are

publishers and issued annually, monthly, or even twice a month.

provided passenger timetables for most operating railroads. tailed

and dependable information

ume came from

for constructing the

the material contained in the railroad

remarkably complete, although information on newly opened or minor roads

is

sometimes missing. In some

which the

train schedule

cases, the

guides gave the date on

was received from the individual

railroad

com-

pany. Unless clear evidence appeared to the contrary, this was accepted as proof that a railroad line

Of

was

in actual operation

on that

date.

the general guides available those consulted chiefly were: Dins-

more's Railroad and Steam Navigation Guide for the United States, Can-

and Appleton's Railway and Steam Navigation Guide. For New England, The Pathfinder Railway Guide for the New England States

ada,

etc.,

contains unusually reliable maps.^

Of 10

the other

maps used

for the period


The Railroad Map,

i86i

under consideration the most useful were those pubUshed by

and Company

of

J.

H. Colton

New York City.

Railroad journals and other commercial publications furnished infor-

mation on the opening of new

who were

But

since the

news items

on optimistic reports sent

publications could be based officials,

lines.

in by

in these

company

not unaware of the effect of such publicity on the

reputation of the company, these media had to be used with caution.

Annual the

reports of the railroad corporations, occasionally useful,

were on

whole disappointing. The limitations of time and energy did not

per-

mit an extensive investigation and use of collections of correspondence, legislative

records,

personal memoirs,

on disputed or obscure points whenever

sources were consulted Finally, a

word must be

road

possible.

proved helpful in a few

Most

cases.

were the more scholarly regional and company providing corroborative evidence on

histories. Besides

and

said concerning secondary sources. State

local histories, especially the latter,

valuable, of course,

and newspapers, although such

rail-

difficult points,

they frequently directed the authors' attention to original materials which

might otherwise have been overlooked. Almost without exception, the proved

texts of these studies

accompany them,

for the

Some

inaccurate and vague.

much more

maps

are

all

than the maps which

reliable

too often poorly drafted,

and are

of the very best railroad histories contain

contemporary maps which are not even dated.^

REPRESENTATION OF GAUGES

One

maps appearing in this chapter is to By "gauge" is meant the disinside to inside. The major gauges measured from

of the chief purposes of the

show gauge

differences as clearly as possible.

tance between the rails are identifiable

on the map by

tions in gauge, fairly

the standard gauge

different colors or symbols.

common

Very small

varia-

in 1861, are not indicated. Thus, while

was normally 4

8V2 inches, individual roads

feet

regarded as standard-gauge roads at the time might vary from this

width by

at least V2

inch,

and such

serious obstacle to through shipment.^ States, 1880, stated that "the

(both inclusive) either

is

may

a deviation

was not considered a

The Tenth Census

gauges from 4

feet

9%

of the United

inches to 4 feet 8 inches

be considered standard, as rolling stock used upon

interchanged without objection."

^

Comprehensive and detailed information on railroad gauges has never II


The American Railroad Network, been compiled and

is

extremely

i

861-1890

difficult to obtain.®

Even when

located

such data are not always dependable and so far as. possible must be

checked against that in other sources. The gauges indicated on the maps here are believed to be correct, but in a few cases a decision about a gauge

width had

to be

flicting records.^

made on the basis of inadequate and sometimes conThe chief sources for information on gauges are the

contemporary railroad directories which were published annually and indicate the gauges for

many

Canada.® Although generally inaccuracies

and

of the railroads of the United States reliable, the directories

contain occasional

which can be discovered only by comparing them with each

other and with other data available. Aside from what publications, information

is

is

contained in these

extremely scattered and must be sought in

contemporary annual railroad reports and other railroad records, reports, railroad

and business

periodicals, newspapers,

and

state

travel accounts.

GAUGE DIFFERENCES

When

railroads

were

first

constructed, their engineers experimented

with different gauges. Each engineer tended

to select the

gauge which

he thought best suited the needs of his particular road. Early British

tramways had been to as

wide

built to varying

as 4 feet 6 inches.®

gauges

— as narrow as 3 feet 4 inches

Benjamin H. Latrobe, reporting

to Albert

Gallatin in 1808, suggested that railroads might be built with a distance of 3V2 to 5 feet

between the

rails.^°

When

George Stephenson

successful steam railroad in England, he finally settled

4 feet SYi inches.

He

was probably influenced

tramway and wagon gauges, but

built his

on a gauge of

in his choice by the English

number of Most of the

different writers present a

explanations for his selection of exactly 4 feet SYi inches.^^ early British railroads adopted this gauge, but

some experimented with

other widths, the most important deviations being those of 5 feet and 7 feet. The latter gauge was adopted by the Great Western on the advice of

its

engineer, Isambard

Kingdom

Brunei, a fanatical advocate of the

broad gauge. The whole gauge controversy came to a head in Great

when a Royal Commission was appointed to study The commission, reporting in 1846, recommended that in

Britain in 1845

matter.

the all

future railroad construction a 4 foot 8 J^ -inch gauge be used, and an Act of Parliament

was passed

to this effect.^^

Throughout Europe

generally,

the early railroads were built to this gauge. But there were exceptions.

12


The Railroad Map,

i86i

In Ireland, 5 feet 3 inches was adopted after some experimentation.

on the continent examples of burg

lines,

with a width of 6

Antwerp, which had

gauge

early deviant gauges are the Basle

in Spain

was

and the

feet 3 inches,

line

and

And

Strass-

from Ghent

to

gauge of 3 feet 9 inches. By i860 the prevailing and Russia's Moscow line was 6 feet.^^

a

5 feet 6 inches

In the United States

all

the early railroads in

New

England

as well as

some of those in the Middle Atlantic States adopted the "Stephenson gauge" of 4

inches.

feet 8^/4

British example, a course

They appear

have been following the

to

which may have been encouraged by the im-

portation and use 01 Stephenson locomotives. But Stephenson engines

were made

to order to

United

An

States.

whatever gauge was

unsigned

This

States.

and many of the

article is

The American Railway Times ^*

article in

offers another explanation for the

United

specified,

used on American lines were manufactured in the

early locomotives

adoption of the standard gauge in the

worth quoting because

includes a plausible

it

explanation for the adoption of another popular early American gauge, that of 4 feet 10 inches. In the early history of railways in America they were laid with timbers runstrips of iron, 3V2 inches wide, nailed or spiked on the top for the wheels to run upon; they were of 5 feet guage, measuring from

ning lengthwise with

centre to centre of the iron or strap

the 4 feet

duced,

it

S'/z

was with

centre to centre of

a

rails

as

two inch

it

was

when

called;

hence the origin of

rail was introguage measuring from

the solid iron

face also, the five foot

hence the origin of the 4 feet 10 inch guage; hence our system of measuring from inside to inside of the

rails;

the conclusion, that

if

had been adopted

been

rail,

inch guage. At a later date,

at first, the

five feet, instead of

uniform guage of

being overrun with so

this

many

such an enormous expense of reloading and changing

country would have

different guages,

cars, besides a great

and

many

other disadvantages attending the break of guages.

As

has been shown, early American railroad promoters looked upon

the railroad as primarily a fore

saw

little

who from

means

for short-haul transportation,

and

there-

need for uniformity of railroad gauge. But there were those

the

first

decade of the railroad-building era stressed the de-

sirability of a national

standard gauge not only from the standpoint of

the cost and convenience of handling

traffic

but also for military reasons.^^

Engineers disagreed, however, about what was the most desirable gauge,^^

and mercantile

interests stimulated the deliberate

gauges.

13

adoption of divergent


The American The

Railroad Network,

general gauge situation as

on the accompanying maps and

it

existed

i

861-1890

on April

i,

1861,

may

be seen

commented upon for each section of the country in the chapters which follow. The statistics on gauges as they were reported on January i, 1861, are shown in the following table. will be

RAILROAD MILEAGE BY GAUGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, JANUARY 1, 1861 " Number

Percentage

of

railroad

companies

of total

Gauge

Miles of road

mileage

6

14

5-3

21

2,8g6

5'

6"

2

182

5'

63

7,267

5'

4" 0-

39

4'

10"

I

3>294 120

210

17,712

4'

'^American Railway Times,

13:186

4'

(May

11,

8.7 .1

21.8 9.9

W

9'A"

1861).

—

The same

.1

—

53-3

data

appear in

The

Merchant's Magazine, 44:672 (May 1861), where it is also stated that most street railways had a gauge of 4 feet 8/4 inches or 4 feet 10 inches, although those of Philadelphia were 5 feet 2'/2 inches.

14


Ill

NEW ENGLAND AND

CANADA,

1861

SPOKES TO THE HUB

By

1

86 1

no part of America was more adequately pro-

New

vided with railroads than southern

England

also, in

Vermont,

New

England. In northern

New

Hampshire, and Maine, substantial prog-

had been made in railway construction

Map

end) Early

rail-

road maps give a more accurate picture of the railway network in

this

ress

(see

I at

.

section of the country than in other areas, for here, with but

exceptions, the

one or two

gauge of the roads was standard. Only the main

Grand Trunk, which angled from Portland Vermont, and some of the roads in the state gauges. Moreover, most of

New

across

New

line of the

Hampshire and

of Maine, were of divergent

England's rivers had been

satisfactorily

bridged and actual physical connections had been effected at appropriate junction points even between rival railroads.

A

gauge of 4 feet 8^2 inches was adopted by the first three railroads New England the Boston and Lowell, the Boston and Worcester,

built in

:

of these roads imported Stephenson

and the Boston and Providence. Each

engines constructed for use on tracks of standard gauge. This pattern for southern

dominant

role in

set

the

New England, for with Boston capital playing a New England railroad construction, no serious

most

consideration appears to have been given to the adoption of any other

gauge. Moreover, as the railroads of eastern gauge, the

New

York City

for the railroads extending rally favored that

interests

New

York were

which had helped

northward into western

gauge.

15

of standard

to supply capital

New

England natu-


The American Compared

New

Railroad Network,

861-1890

to the railroads in other sections of the country, those of

England were not only well unified

tively free

i

from gaps or obstructions

internally, -but

were

also rela-

at points of intersectional connection.

New

York City and Boston via New Haven, Hartford, and Springfield moved without physical obstacle over tracks owned by four different companies. By 1861 most of this route had been double between

Traffic

tracked and though the usual disputes arose over the division of through rates

and the need was recognized

exchange of cars

for systematizing the

among the different companies, traffic moved without serious hindrance.-^ The shore line via New Haven and Providence provided an alternate route between

New York

as bridges

cut or

New

had not

Thames London

and Boston. But

it

was

mouths

yet been erected at the

Rivers.

When

late in

1859,

car ferries

were

more inland one

of either the Connecti-

finally installed at

through shipment was greatly

commerce

Boston's chief bid for intersectional

hoped

inferior to the

to tap the rich trade of the

West

— was

— the

Lyme and

facilitated.^

way by which it Hudson

direct line to the

its

River via the Boston and Worcester and the Western Railroad. This route

had a weak link

at its

the river at Albany.

A

western terminus, for there was no bridge across ferry helped to solve this

the year but even this substitute failed

The

failure to erect a bridge at

merchants of Troy

to

when

terests

ice closed the river.

Albany was caused by the

keep for their

own

city as

trade as possible. First by successful pressure legislature

problem during part of

winter

and then by obstructive court

much

on the

action, the

efforts of the

of the western

New

York

State

Trojan business

in-

delayed the building of the Albany bridge until after the Civil

War.3 Dissatisfied with their

carried

the

Albany connection and

jealous of the traffic

from the Lake region by the Erie Canal, the Hudson River, and York railroads, Boston interests sought a more independent link

New

with the West. This they secured during the

known

as the

by what came to be

fifties

Great Northern Route. Several railroads led northwestward

from Boston toward White River Junction, Vermont, from whence, over three connecting lines, the route proceeded across the northern reaches of

Lake Champlain and westward to Ogdensburg on from the eastern end of Lake Ontario.

the St. Lawrence, not

far

Though

great things were expected of

it,

this route

strong competitor for the trade of the West.

16

The

never proved a very

individual companies


New

England and Canada,

i86i

quarreled over the division of the through

equipment of the Vermont

sector of the

rate, and the roadbed and Hne were inadequate. Even though

Welland Canal, which permitted lake vessels to pass from Lake Erie Lake Ontario, was enlarged, it still did not accommodate the largest

the to

lake vessels nor offer economies sufficient to divert

southern outlets. Also, the

traffic

which did

arrive

much traffic from more on Lake Ontario might

continue by river to Montreal.

The Northern Upper Lakes

middle

in the

Route, for a time, secured some of the

Northern Railway of Canada. This

via the fifties,

permitted the

movement

traffic

line,

from the completed

of goods over the rela-

from Collingwood on Georgian Bay and across the Ontario Peninsula to Toronto and thence by Lake Ontario to Ogdens-

tively short distance

burg. This route carried considerable tonnage for a few years, but far

from

It

at

it

was

satisfactory.^

should also be noted that the Great Northern Route

made

connection

Rouses Point with the Montreal and Champlain Railway, which led

northward

to Montreal,

thus providing an uninterrupted

standard gauge between the Atlantic and the

movement beyond Montreal was ing from that

city

had a

rail

St.

rail

line

of

Lawrence. But through

impossible because the other roads lead-

width of

5 feet 6 inches, a

gauge for which

the enterprising merchants of Portland, Maine, were largely responsible.

PORTLAND'S BED FOR RAILROAD EMPIRE

With

its

available,

ice-free harbor, Portland,

was half

day

a

given the ocean transportation then

closer to British ports

merchants aspired to make their

city

than was Boston. Portland's

a major exporting point for the

produce of the Great Lakes region by achieving a direct connection with projected Canadian railroads.

commercial

city of

The

business interests of Montreal, leading

Canada, preferred

the St. Lawrence, but as this avenue

to trade directly

was closed by

year, they sought a satisfactory winter outlet.

eagerly courted the Canadians

ice

with Europe via

during part of the

Boston merchants, of course,

and urged the Canadian

railroads to adopt

the standard gauge so that through shipment to the Massachusetts port

would be to the

possible by the Great

more

Northern Route. But the greater distance

southerly port, the fear that Boston interests with their inde-

pendent western connections on the Hudson and prove

less allies

than

rivals,

at

Ogdensburg would

and the importunities of persuasive spokesmen 17


The American for the

Maine

Railroad Network,

on the

led the merchants

city,

i

861-1890

St.

Lawrence

to favor

an

alHance with Portland.^

Backed by municipal

credit

and prodded by

promoter, John Alfred Poor, Pordand ing the Atlantic and

New

across

had succeeded in

Lawrence Railroad westward from

Hampshire and Vermont

line joined the St.

built

St.

that indefatigable railroad

interests

build-

their city

Canadian border. Here

to the

Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad,

a

their

Montreal project

with substantial help from the Canadian government. Soon

after

construction was completed in 1853, both roads were taken over by the

Grand Trunk Railway spanning the only a direct

St.

rail

of Canada.

Lawrence

River opposite Port

By

Montreal was finished, Portland had not

at

all

the

way

to Sarnia

on the

Trunk Clair

St.

Huron, Michigan.

1861 Portland

had achieved the

nection of any American line caused

in i860, the Victoria Bridge

connection with Montreal but also with the Grand

which extended westward

line

When,

city.

by waterways or

best intersectional railroad

With no change

city barriers,

of

con-

gauge or gaps in the

and under the auspices of only

moved freely without breaking bulk over a The city of Portland was at the eastern end owned by a single company in the world, and for

one railroad company,

trains

route about 800 miles long. of the longest railroad

a time her trade benefited appreciably.ÂŽ

Portland's venture in railroad building provides a typical example of

the limited outlook of merchant capitalism.

Boston had been connected by a largely

As

early as 1843 Portland

by grandiose plans for the future of their

own

satellite city.

not, be-

city as a

ocean port, feared that Boston would capture their trade and

merely a

might well

interests

an advantageous development had they

this as

and

standard-gauge railroads financed

by Boston promoters. Portland's commercial

have regarded

mused

series of

leading

make them

Therefore, while providing themselves with an

uninterrupted route to the west, the Portland merchants sought means to prevent

Boston traders from sharing the expected

ventive steps were taken,

what was

from diverting the expected flow piers

and bringing

it

to

to

keep the grasping

of western products

Boston wharves via their

extended southward from Portland? In order to

own

Maine

Hub

St.

no pre-

merchants

from Portland's railroads

forestall

velopment, the charter secured by the Atlantic and the

benefits. If

which

any such de-

Lawrence from

legislature provided that the legislature could authorize rail-

18


New road connections with

England and Canada, i86i

this

road "only on the easterly side."

of the

company took

gauge

for their road, thereby preventing

^

The

directors

the further precaution of choosing a 5 foot 6-inch

through shipment from Canada

Boston without change of bulk. By agreement with the Canadian

to

terests the

Montreal

gauge of the to the

gauge pattern

St.

Vermont

for the

The promoters

Lawrence and border,

The

St.

also 5 feet 6 inches.

This

set the

whole Grand Trunk system.

of the Portland—Montreal line attempted to justify to

the public their selection of the

neer of

was

in-

which extended from

Atlantic,

broad gauge, a report by the chief engi-

Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad making an elaborate

effort to this end. Printed in

Portland for distribution in pamphlet form,

the statement stressed the technical advantages claimed for the broad

gauge: improved performance by the locomotive; a lower center of gravity for rolling stock; the lessening of resistance

on curves derived from the

use of shorter trains; decreased danger of accident because of greater steadiness of the cars in motion;

Many

and the roominess

of these technical points were

the engineers of that time, but the pamphlet credulity of

its

of passengers, to

when

readers even in that day

which would be necessary

of the passenger cars.

matters of serious dispute

still

stated that the transfer

it

at points

where the gauge changed

another width, would be positively advantageous because

to the variety of the trip

and because

it

without adding

would permit

a

among

must have stretched the

it

would add

to the passengers' inconvenience,

change from dusty

cars to well-cleaned

and

ventilated ones.^

These claims were very largely window dressing. The main reason for

adopting the wide gauge was clearly reflected at every stage. Poor,

writing in 1848, declared:

"The

of Maine,

state

position, has, naturally, less connection

from

its

geographical

with the neighboring States than

with the British Provinces. Her railway system,

now

partially developed,

based upon the natural laws of trade, has but few relations to the other railways of plete

New

England, and has been projected upon a plan of com-

independence

to

them

all." ^

Boston interests might lay a third

When rail

on

ing southward from Portland so as to to their

wharves, the Maine legislature

promptly passed an

rumors were

move broad-gauge

at the behest of

rail

road lead-

cars directly

Portland merchants

from changing

their

without the express permission of the

legis-

act prohibiting these railroads

gauge or adding a third

afloat in i860 that

their standard-gauge

19


The American Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

but this restriction did not apply to railroads east of Pordand.

lature,

law was

entitled

"An

no one was deceived

The adoption brought

as to

its

on

safety of travel

Maine

interests that

The

railroads," but

real purpose.^"

of the wide gauge by the Atlantic

to the state of

The same

promote

act to

a legacy of

and

mixed gauges. (See

backed the Atlantic and

St.

St.

Map

Lawrence I

at end.)

Lawrence were

also

behind the building of two other Maine roads of similar gauge, the Androscoggin and Kennebec and the Penobscot and Kennebec.

was

built

Lawrence Railroad, to

to Waterville,

Town and

Bangor, Old

as the capital city,

gauge

cities

With

railroad.

made with

the standard-gauge

oldest railroads in the state.

which were not on the broad-gauge

Augusta, had their

and resented the

led by Poor.

St.

Milford, which had been built largely by Boston

and was one of the

Important Maine

centers

first

and the second on beyond Waterville

Bangor. At Bangor a "connection" was

capital

The

eastward from Danville, which was on the Atlantic and

activities of the

own

line,

such

hopes of becoming railroad

Portland broad-gauge enthusiasts

the aid of Boston capital, they constructed a standard-

This followed the coast eastward from Portland

to the

Kennebec River, and there turning northward, passed through Augusta, crossed the broad-gauge line at Waterville,

The standard-gauge rolhng stock

at

line

and went on

had the great advantage

to

Skowhegan.

of being able to exchange

Portland with the Portland, Saco and Portsmouth, which

ran to the southwest along the coast and connected with lines leading to Boston.

The

struggle between the backers of the broad-gauge roads and

the standard-gauge ones

the

two roads refused

between

to facilitate the transfer of passengers

their lines until forced to

was the one

War,

was continuous. At Portland and Waterville,

New

suffered

England

state

do so by

legislative action.

and

freight

Maine, then,

which, until some years after the Civil

from an uncoordinated railroad system.^^

MONTREAL AND THE CANADIAN SYSTEM In Canada, the business leaders of Montreal were even more dominant in their area than were the Boston merchants in sult

was

that

Canada had by

New

England. The

re-

1861 a remarkably well-integrated railroad

system. Backed by British capital, and with influence sufficient to secure

favorable charters as well as substantial financial aid from the Canadian

20


New

England and Canada,

government, the Montreal

interests

serious artificial obstacles

to

Canadian

earliest

railroads,

were able

prevent the creation of

to

within the province.

The

which used Stephenson engines, were

built

railroad traffic

standard gauge, as were those of

to

i86i

New

England. But the decision,

in-

fluenced by Portland, to construct the St. Lawrence and Atlantic to a 5 foot 6-inch

gauge committed the Montreal promoters

railroads to that width.

Not only did made sure

to building their

Grank Trunk

they construct the

the wide gauge, but they

also that other

to

important Canadian

roads were so built, including the Great Western of Canada which stretched

from the Suspension Bridge

at

Niagara

Windsor opposite

to

Detroit.

The American tral

lines

which

later

combined

to

form the

New

invested about $500,000 in the stock of the Great Western.

York Central group, which was interested troit and Chicago, and whose railroads were 8 J/2 inches, insisted

The New

built to the

interests

brought

sufficient

through their connections with the Canadian government,

sure,

the Great

The

Western

make

pres-

to force

to lay its rails to the 5 foot 6-inch gauge.^^

made

suggestion has sometimes been

ment adopted

De-

in this direct route to

width of 4 feet that that gauge be adopted for the Great Western. But

Montreal-Grand Trunk

the powerful

York Cen-

Canadian govern-

that the

the broad gauge as a defense measure, believing

invasion from the United States

more

difficult.

No

it

would

documentary

confirmation of this theory has come to the attention of the authors, but this

argument was used

variant gauge.

A

at times as a justification for the

adoption of the

leading Canadian railroad authority, writing in 1862,

urged that the building of a railroad westward from Montreal

Huron was

desirable

differences

in

Canada were not

The two standard-gauge

were primarily engaged

in

to the river for loading onto barges,

mertime.

The two

seriously

roads north of the

Lawrence and Inmoving lumber from the interior down

Lawrence, the Ottawa and Prescott and the

dustry,

real

American depradations.^^

which did appear

disruptive of internal trade. St.

Lake

on military grounds and regarded the broad gauge

as a protective device against possible

The gauge

to

St.

and they operated only

in the

sum-

standard-gauge roads leading southward from Mont-

were merely extensions of roads of similar gauge from below the

border.

By

1861

Canada had

1881 miles of railroad in operation.

21

Only


The American Railroad Network,

The remainder had

147 miles were standard gauge.

nadian gauge" of 5

As by

1

the reader

the so-called "Ca-

feet 6 inches.-^*

may

see

ard gauge established in

Map

from

on railroad building

861

1861-1890

Nova

I,

beginning had been made

a

Maritime Provinces, with the stand-

in the

Scotia

and the

5 foot 6-inch

width in

New

Brunswick. Although the Grand Trunk had reached Riviere du Loup

on the

St.

Lawrence,

it

was not

until well after the

that either this line or extensions of the

Maine

American

railroads

Civil

made

War

contact

with those of the Maritime Provinces.^^ Except for the road to Portland, Maine, the uniformly wide gauge within Canada formed an

artificial

Montreal was connected by

rail

hindrance to trade across the border.

with both

New

York and Boston, but

by standard-gauge roads, which made interchange of rolling stock the Canadian

city impossible.

At

Bridge brought standard-gauge cars onto Canadian

had

freight

gauge.

at

the Niagara gateway the Suspension soil,

but there

all

to be transferred to rolling stock built to a 5 foot 6-inch

At Fort

Erie, Ontario, the cars of the Buffalo

and Lake Huron

Railway crossed the Niagara River on "the Company's Floating Steam Bridge"

^ÂŽ

but could proceed no further because of the gauge difference.

Similar obstacles hindered through

The Great Western Detroit, but as

of

traffic to

the westward.

operated a steam car ferry between Windsor and

Michigan railroads were of standard width, no exchange

Grand Trunk made use of a Port Huron, Michigan, and leased the American line running

of rolling stock ferry to

movement

was

from Port Huron change of bulk

at

possible.

At Sarnia

to Detroit, but the

Port Huron.^'^

22

the

difference in

gauge required a


IV

THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC

STATES,

1861

NEW If

YORK'S THREE SYSTEMS

New

England and Canada had

internal railroad

at least fairly well integrated, the

same cannot be

both

networks which were said for the

Middle Atlantic

ing centers.

New

autonomous

own

States.

There, merchants in the chief compet-

York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, fought to establish

railroad empires.

They opposed connections between

their

roads and those which led to rival ports, and introduced gauge dif-

ferences to secure transportation monopolies in their expanding hinterlands.

ern

The

New

result

was a very

different railroad pattern

from that of south-

England.

Benefiting from the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825, and enjoy-

ing the most rapidly growing foreign trade in the country, the merchants of

New

York City were slow

the railroads

method

might

play.

at first to recognize the vital role

But once convinced of the

of transportation,

and alarmed

at the successful

steam railroads by Boston and Baltimore, 1840's to create their

own

new

pioneering with

Yorkers began in the

By 1861 they had surpassed all had bound to themselves by iron

railroad empire.

their rivals in the extent to rails

New

which

feasibility of the

which they

not only the nearby countryside but especially the rich back country

toward the west. They accomplished

this

by establishing three great

rail

systems which were largely shut off from through connections with lines

terminating in rival

cities.

The

roads which converged on

New

York

were "systems" in the sense that they had for the most part a uniform 23


The American

Railroad Network,

861-1890

i

gauge, thus permitting interchange of roUing stock where advantageous,

common

but not in the sense that there was

The

when many

period

companies had only

owndVship or operation.

small railroad lines were consolidated into larger

just

begun, although

New

already gone farther in central

it

may

York than

be noted that

it

had

in any other part of the

country.

Each of the three systems was of

Hudson River from New York

a different gauge.

two

of standard gauge, consisted of

lines

The most

from Albany

This network was made up for the most part of

agricultural interests.

which was

With

New

largely a

which had been consolidated

stem.-^

Mohawk and Hud-

project, the ten

New

form the

in 1853 to

main

of local commercial

the exception of the

York City

its

relatively short roads

which had been constructed under the sponsorship son,

York

to Buffalo; and

the lines connecting with this railroad to the northward of

and

New

City to Albany; a line (the

Central) which extended across the state

extensive,

and paralleling the

east of

short lines

York Central

Railroad had been promoted and financed chiefly by merchants in the

growing commercial example, the

centers

the business interests of

came

stock soon

— on

or not far

from the Erie Canal. For

Auburn and Syracuse Railroad was two terminal

its

cities,

to rest in the strong boxes of

The Schenectady and Troy

originally financed by

York

financed by that

In the

city's

1850's, these railroads

down

the

New

York

Hudson, or

River Railroad

via

to

became feeders

Troy and Albany proceeded east of the

Railroad,

promoters and, despite the lack of a bridge tant link in

New

Even though for the

Hudson

had been at

New

York,

in large part

east of the river to

Hudson by New York

River, the built

Albany, formed an impor-

York's chain of control over the inland trade.

the standard-gauge^ railroad system of

most part

Troy and

of

for the port of

one of the two railroads

The two lines and the Harlem

City.

its

government.^

produce they carried

for the

of

City investors.

Railroad was a full-fledged municipal enter-

constructed to promote the commercial interests

prise,

much

even though

New

originally built by local interests,

it

New

York was

was presently cap-

made tributary to New York City merchants and their allies. The New York and Erie Railroad, on the other hand, was from the beginning a New York project. It was built from Piermont on the Hudson to Dunkirk on Lake Erie and was the longest railroad under tured by and

24


The Middle Atlantic

States, i86i

ownership when completed across the

single

New

promoted by southern

This hne was

interests in order to secure the trade of the

counties and also to acquire for the metropolis a second

tier of

through route

York

state in 1851.

Great Lakes.

to the

The merchants and

farmers of the

southern counties were eager to have a railroad and assisted with their capital

and with

their influence in the legislature, thereby helping to

obtain substantial financial aid from the state.

So concerned were the promoters of the their city should

monopolize the resultant

New

York and Erie road

that

trade, that they not only

had

the line built to the unusual gauge of six feet, but they also accepted a

provision in the charter to the

that the charter itself should be

efifect

made connection with any railroad leading into Ohio, Jersey.^ The unusually wide gauge, it is true, was the 1830's when engineers in both England and the

forfeited if the Erie

Pennsylvania, or

decided upon in

New

United States were

still

debating the relative advantages of different

gauges, and the chief engineer of the Erie believed sincerely in the desirability of the

broad gauge. Nevertheless, the president of the Erie, Eleazar

Lord, along with his mercantile associates in

New

York

City,

was un-

doubtedly interested in building a road which could not aid the commercial ambitions of any rival port.^

The

were not well chosen, but by 1861 an

outlet

in the west Erie's

To

New

had been secured

at Jersey City in the east. In addition to its

broad gauge reached northward to

with the

and

and

original terminals of the Erie

make

at Buffalo

main

the

line,

contact at strategic points

York Central system.

the south other broad-gauge railroads extended into Pennsylvania

New

Jersey.

The

chief one of these

was the Delaware, Lackawanna

and Western Railroad. Starting from Great Bend

angled through the

it

and on into New Jersey where it New Hampton. From there, first on the Jersey New Jersey Railroad, the broad-gauge cars of

coal country of northeast Pennsylvania

joined the Jersey Central at

Central and then on the the

Lackawanna were

carried by

means

of a third rail

all

way

the

through to Jersey City.ÂŽ

The third system which fed traffic into the port of New York was made up of the railroads of northern New Jersey. This network was not as completely

under

Central systems and

New it

York

suffered

control as were the Erie and

from some confusion

important line in the northern part of the

25

state,

the

New

York

of gauges, but

New

one

Jersey Central,


The American Railroad Network, was standard gauge. Through

i

861-1890

connection with the Lehigh Valley

its

permitted exchange of rolling stock with the Pennsylvania

Railroad,

it

railroads

and, via Harrisburg and Pittsburgh, gave

amounted

Except for the

New

southward from the

known

of 4 feet 10 inches,

most of the Jersey as the

been originally adopted by the

Camden and Amboy. The

"New

earliest

was accepted

railroads

a rail

width

gauge had

major railroad in the

state,

the

but once having been adopted,

clear,

most of the railroads in the

for

had

Jersey gauge." This

reasons for the selection of the slightly diver-

gent width of track are not entirely it

York what

and the broad-gauge roads reaching

Jersey Central

Erie,

New

WestJ

to a third rail route to the

state.

Built largely by business interests in the cities on the lines, the railroads of northern

New

an important tidewater outlet for

Jersey furnished

Pennsylvania coal and

New

farm produce.

Jersey

PHILADELPHIA'S RAILROAD DOMAIN

The Pennsylvania

railroads of 1861

may

be separated into two divisions:

and northwest of Phila-

(i) those in the eastern part of the state, north

most part anthracite roads; and (2) those which led westward and were designed to give Philadelphia control of delphia, which were

the trade of the

for the

Susquehanna Valley and western Pennsylvania,

as to provide, via Pittsburgh,

as well

an avenue of commerce with the Ohio

Valley.

Although mercantile influence was

present,

it

was often subordinated

to investor interests in the building of the anthracite railroads. ers of the coal lands,

in considerable part,

who were

Philadelphia and

promoted the building

of raising the sale value of their property

product as cheaply and

New

The own-

York merchants

of the coal roads in the

hope

market

their

and

efficiently as possible.

in order to

Hence, the railroads which

they financed led from the anthracite beds to Philadelphia and also north-

ward

to

New

York and eastward

Although most

across

New

Jersey to

of these anthracite roads (including

into Philadelphia),

New

all

York

harbor.

of those leading

were standard gauge, one important coal road, the

Lackawanna, belonged

to the

broad-gauge system dominated by the Erie.

Philadelphia mercantile interests had not originally raised serious im-

pediments

to the

two

slight dips

which the main Erie

line

made

into

Pennsylvania nor to the construction of the broad-gauge roads across

26


The Middle Atlantic

which were

the northeast corner of their state

wanna. But when they

induced their

direction, they

quire

all

awakened

later

States, i86i

to

to

become the Lacka-

the competition

from

this

1852 henceforth to re-

state legislature in

roads constructed in the state (except in a designated area along

the border of Ohio) to have a gauge of 4 feet 8V2 inches.^

No

made

attempt has been

to indicate

Many were

of short coal lines in Pennsylvania.

of both the

were

They were

the intricate

maze

solely or in part gravity

from the mine

roads, designed merely to carry coal

transportation.

map

on the

to the nearest water

occasionally of unusual gauge. Thus, the tracks

Delaware and Hudson and the Pennsylvania Coal Company

built to a 4 foot 3-inch gauge.^

The standard-gauge Susquehanna Valley by to the western

which led from Philadelphia

system,

gateway

a

number

of routes

and then by

into

a single

the

stem

at Pittsburgh, constituted Philadelphia's bid for

commercial preeminence.

No

gauge difference separated

this

railroad

system from that of Baltimore to the south, and Philadelphia merchants repeatedly brought pressure to bear on their state legislature to prevent

connections with the Maryland railroads. ultimately failed to prevent,

They succeeded

the building of the

in delaying, but

Baltimore-controlled

Northern Central Railroad from Baltimore up into the Susquehanna Valley .^^ This strategic line gave Baltimore a share of the trade of central Pennsylvania, effected a connection Railroad's line to Pittsburgh,

tapped the coal trade.

Harrisburg with the Pennsylvania

and through

The Northern

into Philadelphia territory, difficulties late in

at

was

finally

extension to Sunbury in 1861

unwelcome

tamed when

came under

i860 and

its

Central, an

it

fell

interloper

into financial

the control of the Pennsylvania

Railroad.^^

Philadelphia commercial interests were surprisingly slow to appreciate the threat of the Baltimore

and Ohio Railroad

reached Cumberland, Maryland,

permit

it

delphians

to build across

now

and sought

a

until in 1842 that line

charter

which would

southwestern Pennsylvania to Pittsburgh. Phila-

declared the Baltimore and

project, "designed for their

Ohio Railroad

a Baltimore

aggrandizement by our impoverishment, and

enabling them to reap private advantages whilst they bear no portion of the public burden."

helped raise the road,

which was

^^

To ward

money and to

off this threat the

Quaker City merchants

secured a charter for the Pennsylvania Rail-

extend from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh.^^ They lobbied

27


The American

Railroad Network, 1861-1890

so successfully against the Baltimore

and Ohio

that

it

was prevented from

securing a satisfactory charter from the state legislature.

the pre-Civil

War

a result,

Ohio River terminus

Baltimore's road had to be satisfied with an

Wheeling, Virginia. The influence of

As

at

merchants had again thwarted

local

development of a coordinated railroad network.^*

Pennsylvania's railway system was isolated to a considerable extent

from the

railroad Hnes of adjoining states; moreover, the city of Phila-

which appears from the

delphia,

map

railroad

to

be a connecting point

for intersystem lines, proved on the contrary to be a major obstacle to

the through

Amboy

The

delphia.

which

movement

of passengers

Railroad terminated in

led to

Camden

tracks of the Philadelphia

New York,

of Philadelphia.

freight.

across the

The Camden and

Delaware from Phila-

and Trenton, the other

extended no farther than Kensington,

And, although the

the Philadelphia,

and

railroad

just

north

tracks of both the Pennsylvania

Wilmington and Baltimore

and

railroads entered the city,

they did not connect with each other or with the Philadelphia and Tren-

The

moving goods from any one cars drawn through on poorly maintained rail lines owned by the street

ton line to the north.

only means of

was by drays or horse

of these three roads to another

congested railway

city streets

company .-^^

Only when under pressure from unusual demands for expeditious service during the Civil War, and when there was a threat in 1863 of a line to be federally subsidized and built from Washington, D. C. through

New

York City, were arrangements finally made for connecting the railroads which terminated in Philadelphia. Various factors had contrib-

to

uted to the continuation of this anomalous situation; unquestionably,

commercial cupidity played an important

part.

Thus

a pamphleteer of

Philadelphia wrote in 1862:

A

strange misapprehension pervades the community, to the effect that a

continuous line of railway between the North and Washington would detrimentally affect the interests of this

city

and make Philadelphia a mere way-

side station.-*^^

At

the

petition

same time

that Philadelphia merchants feared the outside

which would

result

merchants sought persistently ton.

from through to obtain a

The New York Chamber

to the

United States

of

rail

Commerce

Congress on December

28

connections.

through

rail

route to

stated in a 5,

1861:

com-

New

York Washing-

communication


The Middle Atlantic

States, i86i

We believe they [those who shipped goods or travelled between New York and Philadelphia] are deprived, in an unjust and illiberal manner, of one of the most sacred rights of a free people the right of a free and unrestricted highway for the transaction of every description of communication and public traffic. There can be, in the opinion of your memorialists, but one reason advanced for the principal broken links in this line of conveyance, that reason being unquestionably the local profit derived by the large towns on the route from the delay forced upon travellers by a compulsory stoppage in those

—

places.-'-'^

Southward from Philadelphia, Baltimore extended to the the

city of

the

Philadelphia,

Wilmington and

Baltimore. But there was one break at

Susquehanna River. The road on both

sides of the river

was owned

by a single company which by 1861 had instituted a car ferry for the transfer of both passenger

there

was delayed not

so

and

much

freight cars.

The

construction of a bridge

by commercial jealousy as by expense and

technical difficulties.-^*

BALTIMORE'S B Baltimore merchants were

among

AND O

the earliest in the United States to

appreciate the commercial potentialities of the railroad. of the Baltimore

and Ohio were

laid in 1829,

The

first

tracks

although more than two

By The

decades passed before construction to the Ohio River was completed. 1

861 the city of Baltimore

main

line of the

nals at

had become an important railroad

center.

Baltimore and Ohio led to the Ohio River with termi-

Wheeling and Parker sburg; an extension

of the

same

railroad

ran from Baltimore to Washington; the Northern Central, as previously noted, reached finally,

the

up into the Susquehanna Valley of Pennsylvania, and,

Philadelphia,

Wilmington and Baltimore

led

directly

to

Philadelphia. Promoted and financed by business interests in Baltimore

and helped repeatedly by both the

Ohio and

city

and the

state,

the Northern Central were the lighting

the Baltimore

weapons

and

of Baltimore

commerce and were generally recognized as such. A speaker before the Committee on Railroads of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York in 1869 summed up the situation: Both the Pennsylvania Central and Baltimore and Ohio Railroads, were from motives of state and city policy. A profitable investment for capital was not the moving cause for the construction of either: they were constructed for the promotion of the interests of their respective States and cities where built

29


The American Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

they terminate. Their destiny cannot be fulfilled, excepting by taking to their a large share of the trade of the West.^^

cities

The to

railroad situation at Baltimore offered the

through shipment

same kind

as those described for Philadelphia.

of obstacles

The two

rail-

roads which entered the city from the north, the Northern Central and the

Wilmington and Baltimore, made no

Philadelphia,

direct

connection

with each other or with the Baltimore and Ohio. Exchange of rolling

among

stock to

these railroads

haul cars through the

system.^^

made

The

on the tracks

end of the

laid to the

of the

mules

of the street railway

goods from vessel

possible the direct transfer of

more terminal still

possible only by using horses or

Baltimore and Ohio had excellent terminal

had been

rails

was

city streets

facilities

which

to freight car, for

pier in Baltimore harbor.

The

Balti-

Northern Central Railroad, on the other hand, was

from the harbor

located over a mile

in 1861.

There were obvious

advantages to Baltimore and Ohio interests in keeping the Northern Central Railroad from a waterfront terminal, for by means of

its

connec-

Northern Central competed for

tion with the Pennsylvania Railroad, the

the western trade. Baltimore merchants sought to enlarge their western trade but they preferred that

it

move

over a route which they

owned and

controlled themselves.^-^ B.\RRIERS

The

AT

GATEWAYS: BUFFALO AND ERIE

foregoing survey of the railroads of the Middle Atlantic States

indicates the extent to

were

\\'ESTERN

isolated

which the systems dominated by the various ports

from each

sectional trade, they

other. Serious as

were these hindrances

were equaled or exceeded by the

to intra-

difficulties of

through

trade between the Middle Atlantic States and adjoining regions. This least true of intercourse

between

New

York and

though the lack of a bridge over the Hudson venience, the railroads of

connection with those of

New New

York

at

New

England,

Albany was a

east of the

rail

of

was even

real incon-

Hudson made

England and no change

involved. Elsewhere, however, through

for,

direct

gauge was

movement between

sections

without change of bulk was impossible.

The need

for a railroad

the railroads in the

from

BufTalo,

New

York,

to

Cleveland, Ohio,

New

York Central and the Erie Railroads with Lake States, was met early in the 1850's by the con-

which would connect the

struction of four short connecting lines.

30

These were: The Buffalo and


The Middle Atlantic

States, i86i

its name; The Erie and NorthYork border to Erie; the Hne of the Franklin Canal Company which led from Erie to the Ohio border; and

State Line

whose

location

the Cleveland, Painesville

Cleveland.

was the

The

indicated by

is

which ran from the

East,

New

and Ashtabula which completed the

second link in

this line, the Erie

was

to be completed. It

first

built

line to

and North-East Railroad,

with a 6-foot gauge in the

expectation of connecting with an extension of the Erie and with the

hope of

adding a third

later

rail to

provide a standard-gauge connection

New

York Central. But the Erie was unable to extend its tracks to the state of financial difficulties, and presently Ohio and New York with the

terests

combined

New

Buffalo and 10 inches,

to

line because

railroad in-

complete the other three links in the route between

Ohio gauge, 4 feet no advanErie or the standard-gauge New York Central.

York. These links were

and made Buffalo the

tage to either the 6-foot

all

of the

transfer point while giving

In order to secure a through route of uniform 4 foot lo-inch gauge from Buffalo to Erie, the control of the Erie and North-East Railroad was

management

secured by the to convert

of the three other lines

and plans were

laid

to the 4 foot lo-inch gauge.

it

This development alarmed the people of Erie and Harbor Creek, the

two terminals of the broad-gauge Erie and North-East Railroad. The break in gauge had become a vested interest giving employment to labor

and

profit to

food

sellers

and

porters.

Determined not

to lose their ad-

vantage, the citizens of the area appealed to the Pennsylvania legislature to prevent the

gauge change. That body, ever anxious

merce of Philadelphia and the

interests

to protect the

com-

of the Pennsylvania Railroad

New

York competition, gave prompt assistance by passing a law (March 1851), which provided that railroads west of Erie should use

against

the 4 foot

This

1 0-inch

legislation

gauge and those

east,

6 feet or 4 feet 8 V2 inches.^^

was repealed the following

year,

possibly,

as

was

charged, as the result of unusual activity by out-of-state pressure groups.^^

At any of Erie

rate,

disappointed but quite unwilling to admit defeat, the citizens

and Harbor Creek then took matters into

Whenever work was begun on changing East, they tore

up the

tracks

their

own

the gauge of the Erie

and destroyed bridges. The

hands.

and North-

city council of

Erie adopted an ordinance forbidding any change of gauge. Legal battles

ensued and

local officers of the

law aided and abetted the mobs in destroy31


The American

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

joined in defying the United ing railroad property. Leading citizens locked in the city jail. Public was Marshal who, on one occasion, States

supported Erie's defiance of sentiment in Philadelphia appears to have governor of Pennsylvania exout-of-state railroad interests and the

the

of Erie. pressed his sympathy with the citizens taking place in the The contest continued into 1856, the chief action

courts

and the

but with sporadic acts of violence whenthe to change the six-foot gauge. Finally,

state legislature

ever any attempt

was made

broad-gauge line. After prolonged bargainstate took over control of the of Erie and the state of Pennsylvania ing, as a result of which the city from the out-of-state railroad interests, the Erie

wrung

costly concessions

the gauge of ^its and North-East Railroad was permitted to change gauge of the rest of the route.^* to conform to the 4 foot lo-inch

rails

was much more than a local Erie af!air. between New York merchants, In its larger aspects, it was a struggle West, and Philadelsought improved connections with the Middle

The "War

of the Gauges,"

who

phia businessmen,

who were determined

Pennsylvania Railroad. Spokesmen for

to discourage rivals of their

New

York

own

attacked the dog-in-

and threatened to supthe-manger policy of the Philadelphia merchants what they regarded as an port federal measures that would overcome with interstate trade. They even let it be known

interference remove the might support national legislation designed to they that of Trade by mint from Philadelphia. The Philadelphia Board

illegal

federal

legitimate commerce. unanimous vote denied any wish to interfere with York] speculators" New But they roundly condemned "foreign [that is.

Erie may be fully mainand expressed the hope that "the just rights of the grasping policy of certain tained and completely protected against are unjustly interfering with their interests,

railroad corporations

who

and who

no means

will stop at

to

accomplish their ends."

^^

BARRIERS AT WESTERN GATEWAYS: PITTSBURGH, WHEELING, AND PARKERSBURG Railroad at Pittsburgh and the Baltimore and Ohio York encountered the same gauge barrier as did their New

The Pennsylvania at

Wheeling

rivals at Buffalo.

The Allegheny River had been bridged

at Pittsburgh

Railroad in 1857,^'' and by by the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad at that Pennsylvania the 1858 a connection had been made with

32


The Middle Atlantic city.

The Fort Wayne

Chicago but of

a

line

provided a 4 foot lo-inch route

break of bulk was usually necessary

differences. In time a

gauge

States, i86i

way was found

gauge were moved

8 V^ -inch

despite the fact that

some the

all

the

way

to

and those

built

with

cases, cars constructed to the 4 foot

way from

from Indianapolis

rails built for rolling

all

Pittsburgh because

to interchange rolling

stock between railroads having a standard gauge

the 4 foot lo-inch gauge."" In

at

Louis to Philadelphia,

St.

to Pittsburgh they traveled over

stock having a wheel spread of 4 feet 10 inches,

but this practice never proved completely satisfactory.

For a short time

after the

Fort

Wayne

line

had completed

over the Allegheny and entered the city of Pittsburgh,

its

its

bridge

tracks stopped

200 feet short of those of the Pennsylvania. Local interests believed their

advantage to do everything in their

movement and the

of freight,

city council.

for only a

merchants were able

of Philadelphia merchants

Company

for a

through route

At Wheeling,

it

to

oppose the through

to delay the closing of this

few months. They were not strong enough

demands

as the

to

and the merchants were supported by the mayor But despite court orders and even with recourse

to violence, Pittsburgh

gap

power

the Baltimore

Pennsylvania Railroad

to defeat the

and of the Pennsylvania Railroad

to the West.^^

and Ohio faced the same gauge

difficulty

at Pittsburgh, for the tracks of the

Ohio

on the Ohio River opposite WheelCentral, which ing, were built to a 4 foot lo-inch gauge. The transfer problem was even more serious here, however, than at Pittsburgh, for there was no railroad terminated at Bellaire

bridge across the Ohio, and passengers and freight ahke had to be shuttled across the river.^^

The

Baltimore and Ohio, via the Northern Virginia Railroad, had a

second connection with the West at Parkersburg, Virginia,

From

Belpre

opposite Parkersburg, the Marietta and Cincinnati Railroad led to Cincinnati.

But here again there was no through movement of trains before War, for, although the Marietta and Cincinnati Hke the Balti-

the Civil

more and Ohio was a standard-gauge road, there was no bridge across the Ohio until 1870 and car ferries were not used before 1867.^'^ Thus, on every rail route between the Middle Atlantic States and Ohio, gauge differences or unbridged efficient

rivers presented serious obstacles to the

transportation of passengers

and

freight.

No

wonder

that the

Erie Canal continued to ofTer efTective competition until well after the

33


The American Civil

War, and

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

that the development of through railroad traffic

disappointment to the hopes of railroad promoters in eastern

was a

cities.

For

the five years ending September 30, i860, the percentage of total tonnage

which represented through freight carried by each of three of the main was reported as follows: the Pennsylvania carried east 14 per cent,

routes

west loYz per cent; the Baltimore and Ohio carried east west 7 14 per cent; and the west 5% per cent.^^

New

York Central

34

16% per

cent,

carried east 25 V4 per cent,


THE MIDWEST AND SOUTH,

1861

GAUGE DIFFERENCES IN THE MIDWEST

made

Railroad construction in the Middle West had

hardly more than a beginning in the decade of the 1840's, and by 1850

equaled only about 1200 miles. But during

total construction in this area

the following decade

more

track

was

than in any other section

laid in this

of the country, with the result that by the outbreak of the Civil

north of the Ohio River were crisscrossed with

states

aggregating more than 10,000 miles of track.

many

The Ohio and

Rivers were connected with the Great Lakes, and the larger

two

rivers

were

also joined

by

rail.

Beyond the

and Iowa, the great building era was and

had reached the Missouri

struction in

The

The

Minnesota had not yet begun.

first

Ohio

railroad, the

of 4 feet 10 inches, because,

which was acquired

in

it

New

of that gauge.^ Other early

Ohio

on the

Mississippi, in Missouri

under way; many lines One road, the Hannibal River. The era of actual con-

unity of the midwestern railroad net

gauge.

Mississippi

cities

just getting

to stretch out

Joseph,

the

toward the West.

were beginning St.

War

railroads,

legislature passed a

was

Mad

was marred by

said, its first locomotive.

Jersey,

Ohio

differences in

River and Lake Erie, had a width

was designed

The Sandus\y,

to operate

on a track

railroads copied this gauge,

law on February

11, 1848,

and the

providing that

all

roads built within the state should have a 4 foot lo-inch gauge.^ This law was modified appreciably in 1852 when the legislature, without prescribing a particular width, merely required that any railroad in

Ohio

should have "one uniform gauge or width of track from end to end."

Yet even before the passage of

this act other

35

^

gauges had been author-


The American ized; of

two

to be constructed to a

any railroad with which

the

i

861-1890

railroad charters granted in 1851, one permitted the Franklin

and Warren Railroad to

Railroad Network,

Ohio and

it

gauge necessary

Railroad might lay

Mississippi

to

conform

might connect; and the other provided that tracks

its

to

a

6-foot

gauge.*

By

1

861 the

gauge pattern of Ohio had become more confused than

Lake

that of any other state. Lines south of to

Toledo and westward, were

Erie, leading

from Cleveland

built to the 4 foot S^z-inch width, as

was the Marietta and Cincinnati

in southern Ohio.

The Fremont and

Indiana in northern Ohio connected a standard-gauge road with a 4 foot 1

0-inch one but

was

itself

of 4 feet 9V4 inches.

constructed to the so-called "compromise gauge"

Two

lines,

one southward from Sandusky and the

other northward from Portsmouth on the Ohio, were constructed to the

unusual width of 5 feet 4 inches. Finally, the broad-gauge Ohio and all the way from the Mississippi opposite St. Louis across

Mississippi led

southern

Illinois

and Indiana and terminated

was

road, influenced by the Erie, third rail

was added from Cincinnati

interchange of nati,

traffic

which had

its

Ohio. This

at Cincinnati,

gauge throughout; a Lawrenceburg in order to permit

built to a 6-foot

to

with the standard-gauge Indianapolis and Cincin-

southern terminal at Lawrenceburg.

As may be seen from Map II, the pattern of railroad gauges in the Middle West was simplest in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa, where all lines

were standard gauge. Most of the Indiana railroads were

standard gauge, but the Ohio influence lines

which appear

in the east

is

also of

reflected in the 4 foot lo-inch

and north. Moreover, the

6-foot

Ohio and

Missouri Railroad crossed the southern part of the Hoosier State. In 1861 the Illinois section of the latter railroad of standard gauge. It

and Elgin

is

(later a part of the

built to the Erie width, but 1855.^

The two gauges

state; in

was the only

line in that state not

true that one other Illinois railroad, the Chicago

Northwestern system), originally had been it

had been changed

to standard in

June

in Missouri indicate the border position of that

northern Missouri the railroads were standard gauge, like those in the southern part the 5 foot 6-inch

of Iowa;

gauge followed the

Arkansas pattern.^

There

is

no indication that the confusion of railroad gauges

and Ohio was planned deliberately. ried over

from the confused

no agreement on the most

It

situation in the East. Engineers satisfactory gauge,

36

in Indiana

appears to have been merely car-

and the

had reached

first

short lines


The Midwest and constructed in the forties and early

South, i86i

fifties

were designed primarily

to

serve local needs.

As

the

the middle

the

unplanned confusion of gauges continued, although

fifties

tempo

of railroad construction increased during

by the end of the decade the disadvantages were becoming manifest. CITY RIVALRIES IN

THE MIDWEST

City rivalries did not tend in Indiana and Ohio, as they often did in

and South,

the East to

through

promote gauge differences or other impediments

to

common

Rivalries were just as

traffic.

in this region," but

only in one instance, the opposition to the bridging of the Ohio, do they

appear to have resulted in any appreciable

ment

of freight

and passengers.

War

Before the Civil

Ohio River presented

the

east-west as well as to north-south trade, for river

until a bridge

neering

through move-

effort to restrain

difficulties

was completed

and the large

at

a serious obstacle to

no railroad crossed the

Steubenville in

1862-63. Engi-

was required

capital investment that

help to account for this delay, especially on the lower reaches of the river.

However, on the upper

river

commercial

rivalries

played a part.

Pittsburgh shipping and steamboat interests strongly opposed any bridg-

ing of the Ohio.

When

1849, they declared

it

a

highway bridge was erected

a

menace

court and legislative fight against across the

With

Ohio

at Steubenville

it;

a proposal for

was strongly opposed

the foregoing exception, both local

must be remembered

nated by agriculture, and the cheapness

and

its

a

in

prolonged

a railroad bridge in Wheeling.^

and outside pressures in Ohio

and Indiana discouraged the development of railroad development. It

WheeUng

to

and conducted

to navigation

restrictive policies against

that this

was an area domi-

prosperity depended in no small part on

with which merchants were able

to send raw and bring back processed goods. Even if city had sought to capture this traffic by erect-

efficiency

materials to eastern markets the traders of a particular

ing barriers to through effectively.

The

rail

movement, they could not have done

trade of no very appreciable area could be

for the rush of railroad building in the fifties to the East,

terrain

and additional

which was

lines

had created

so

monopoHzed,

alternate routes

could easily have been built through

relatively favorable to railroad construction.

In neither Ohio nor Indiana, nor for that matter elsewhere in the Midwest, were gaps in railroad lines deliberately created or maintained within

37


The American In

city limits.

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

through railroad connections in midwest

fact,

were

cities

effected at a very early date in railroad development. In 1850 railroads

entering Indianapolis completed the construction of "the

Railway; three years

same companies had

later these

Union Track union

built the first

passenger station in the United States.^

A

gap

There

in rail transportation did exist, however, at Cincinnati.

Miami

the Little

made no

Railroad, terminating in the eastern part of the

city,

connection with either the Indianapolis and Cincinnati or the

Ohio and

Mississippi, both of

East-West

rail

one terminal

which entered from the west. Through

shipments had to be carted through the

down may have

connecting tracks were finally laid

to the other until

end of the Civil War. Some

shortly before the

from

city streets

gained from the break in the line and

local interests

might have been

this

a factor in

retention; but the persistence of this city gap appears to have been

its

make the necessary investment in a demand for through shipment

caused more by reluctance to

when

tion before a time

No

less

arose.-^*^

convinced than the people of Ohio and Indiana of the desira-

of through railroad

bility

connec-

strong

movement were

the eastern interests

which

played an increasingly important role in western railroad development.

The

building of the early railroads in Ohio and Indiana had been largely

a local venture and, for the fore,

when

most

part,

not a very profitable one. There-

the eastern railroads reached

and

in the early fifties,

nections, they

their

Lake Erie and the Ohio River

promoters began looking

found the roads in these

for western con-

states typically

capital starved,

poorly equipped, and often uncompleted over projected routes. the

New

York

Central, the Pennsylvania,

By

1861

and the Baltimore and Ohio,

by furnishing capital and expert management, had greatly extended their influence over the lines across the

The in

New

Ohio and Indiana

two

states to the

York Central group,

promoting the construction

railroads

and had developed

traffic

commercial centers farther west. as has already

been shown, was active

of the lines both north

Erie which connected with roads leading to Chicago.

and south

of

Lake

The Pennsylvania

Railroad gave assistance to and gradually came to control the Pittsburgh,

Fort

Wayne and

4 foot a

1

Chicago.

Made up

of a combination of short lines this

0-inch road finally reached Chicago in 1858

route of uniform gauge from Pittsburgh

38

and thereby provided

to Chicago.-^^


The Midwest and

From

South, i86i

Ohio River opposite Wheeling

the

the 4 foot lo-inch Central

led

westward and northwestward, and by connecting with roads

of similar

gauge reached Chicago, Indianapolis, and Cleveland. Both the

Ohio

Pennsylvania and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroads were interested in

By autumn

this line.^^

called St.

of i860 freight cars equipped with wheels of so-

"compromise gauge" were moving

all

way through from

the

East

Louis (then Illinois-town) to Bellaire, Ohio, the eastern terminal of

Ohio Central Railroad. This was accomplished by using the standardgauge tracks of the Terre Haute and Alton and the Terre Haute and the

Richmond

and a

as far as Indianapolis

from

St.

foot lo-inch roads

series of 4

from thence eastward.^^ Goods could be sent

way

via this route all the

Louis to Baltimore, but they had to be transshipped across the

Ohio River

to

Wheeling.

A second feeder line from

and Cincinnati, served the Baltimore and Ohio. direct route

from Cincinnati

and Cincinnati,

like the

to the Atlantic Coast.

the west, the Marietta

provided the most

It

Although the Marietta

Baltimore and Ohio, was of standard gauge, a

break of bulk was necessary because the Ohio River had not yet been

bridged at Parkersburg.^^

Outside pressures then, in the form of the

New

York

Central, the

Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio, operated to integrate the

rail

networks of Ohio and Indiana. All three of these eastern roads were standard gauge and, although they did not succeed immediately in changing over the tracks of their midwest

own

gauge, at

least

they did not add further to the complexity of the gauge pattern.

Un-

fortunately, the interests, allied

6-foot

same cannot be

allies to their

said for the Erie influence. Financial

with the Erie Railroad, completed in 1864 a Hne with

a

gauge which angled across Ohio and connected the Erie with the

broad-gauge Ohio and Mississippi

at

Cincinnati. In this one instance,

outside influence further complicated the railroad

when sentiment was soon

to favor a

Throughout the other midwestern operated in a

way

map

of

Ohio

at a

states,

both local and outside factors

very similar to that just described for

Ohio and Indiana.

Outside promotion and financing played a major role in the newer

from the very beginning of the fluence

is

reflected in the very

time

uniform gauge.

railroad era

and the extent of

states

their in-

wide adoption of the standard gauge. At-

tention will be confined here to one important instance in

39

which com-


The American Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

mercial rivalry tended to retard the completion of the railroad net in this area.^^

The commercial

rivalry

between

St.

sembled that between Philadelphia and

Louis and Chicago somewhat

New

York. For decades

St.

re-

Louis

merchants had dominated the rich trade of the upper Mississippi and the Missouri region, but in the early

fifties

the merchants of Chicago

emerged as serious rivals for this commerce. Railroad lines from Chicago were

built north,

connections were

west and south into rich lumber and farming areas;

made with

railroads entering

from the

east; radiating

Unes reached one after another of the Mississippi River ports north of St.

Louis and began to syphon away a portion of the down-river trade.^^

The

Illinois

Central Railroad, built southward to the Ohio River at Cairo,

also threatened to develop a north-south

commerce which would com-

pletely by-pass St. Louis.

To meet

the threat of Chicago interests to a trade

own, the businessmen of

as their

St.

which they regarded

Louis adopted two expedients.

First,

they gave their support to the construction of a railroad line from the east

bank of the Mississippi opposite

and Indiana River at

St.

the time. at this

to

Cincinnati.

The

St.

Louis, across southern Illinois

question of bridging the Mississippi

Louis does not seem to have been seriously considered

The

great cost

and the

difficulty of

point doubtless account for

Louis steamboat interests

may

this,

although the opposition of

well have been a factor.

At any

lines across the

St.

rate, busi-

ness leaders in St. Louis allied themselves with the merchants speculators of southern Illinois to

at

spanning the wide river

and land

promote the construction of railroad

southern part of that

In the ensuing struggle in

state.

the lUinois legislature over the chartering of cross-state railroads, Chicago

supported by Alton and other up-river rivals of

interests,

posed the proposal. But the legislative battle interests

tion

and

their allies in southern Illinois,

was merely

Ohio and

Louis, op-

St.

was won by the

and the

St.

Louis

result of the opposi-

to delay temporarily the securing of a charter for the

Mississippi Railroad.^^ This line gave St. Louis a rail route to

the east, although one

and by the lack

which was handicapped both by

its

unusual gauge

of a bridge across the Mississippi.-^^

Further to thwart the Chicago bid for the trade of the Mississippi valley,

the St. Louis

allied trading

Chamber

and steamboat

of

Commerce, representing

the closely

interests of the city, strove persistently to

40


The Midwest and South,

i86i

prevent the construction of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi be-

tween Iowa and

IlHnois.

Even

after a bridge

had been completed

at

Rock

Island in 1856, St. Louis merchants vigorously but unsuccessfully sought its

removal through court action.^ÂŽ The bitterness of

illustrated

Chamber

attorney for the St. Louis into

of

and charged with conspiring

jail,

He was

this controversy

by an incident which took place at Chicago in i860,

later acquitted.^^

A

Commerce was to

arrested,

of

thrown

burn the Rock Island Bridge.

second bridge over the Mississippi was not

completed until 1865. Apparently the persistent attacks by the

Chamber

is

when an

Commerce upon

the legality of the

first

St.

Louis

bridge served as a

temporary deterrent to the construction of others.^^

THE BEGINNINGS OF A RAIL NETWORK Railroad construction in the southern great rapidity in the decade of the

work was

less

the Mississippi. to

fifties.

states

IN

THE SOUTH

had gone forward with

Nevertheless, the southern net-

developed in 1861 than that in any other area east of It

was most complete

in the seaboard states

from Virginia

Georgia where population was densest and where most of the

earliest

construction had taken place. Railroad lines fanned out into the back

country from the principal port or ports of each

by commercial considerations as well as by the of the sea

and the broad

Interconnections

so inadequate that

most

pattern dictated

bridging arms

estuaries of the rivers. North-south transporta-

tion over appreciable distances continued to vessels.

state, a

difficulty of

among

depend

chiefly

on coastwise

the state-oriented railroad systems

interstate rail traffic

had

to

move by

were

indirect

and

roundabout routes.

Commercial the Charleston

and Hamburg, the

and one of the

first

of

Commerce,

of the

southern ports strongly influenced

interests in the leading

the original railroad pattern. This

in the country.

this line

well illustrated in the building of

is

earliest

was designed primarily

Chamber

of

to divert the rich trade

A

report of a com-

Commerce urging

the construction

Savannah River from Savannah

mittee of the Charleston

important railroad in the South

Promoted by the Charleston Chamber to Charleston.

of this road typifies the spirit of urban rivalry: Charleston will and must be the great commercial mart of the surrounding states.

No

petition

local jealousies

can interrupt her march to wealth.

impede her progress

No

rival

com-

to her 'Destined Elevation,' if her citizens are

41


The American Railroad Network, own

but faithful to their

interest

and

seize

1861-1890

with a becoming energy those ad-

vantages which providence has placed at their disposal, -and cultivate those vast resources of trade

The

which

lay invitingly within their reach.^^

southern seaboard state systems

west by only two

rail routes.

One

made through

connections to the

led to the southwest across Virginia

through Knoxville, Tennessee; the other proceeded

to the

and

northwest from

way of Atlanta. These lines converged at Memphis and Charleston Railroad provided a Memphis on the Mississippi River and afforded con-

Charleston and Savannah by

Chattanooga, whence the

through route

to

nections with most of the north-south railroads in this area. east-west route leading

A

second

from Atlanta through Montgomery and Selma

Vicksburg on the Mississippi was only partly completed in

to

1861.

In Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi the chief railroad

building effort had been directed toward completing north-south Hnes.^^

Here, as in the Old Northwest, mercantile groups strove not so erect exclusive systems as to construct roads

own

city

with distant markets. Thus, the two leading gulf

Orleans and Mobile, sponsored

through Mississippi

make

to

rival

lines

much

which would connect cities.

to

their

New

which extended northward

connections with the roads of Tennessee and

Kentucky.^'* Louisville, the most aggressive of the

southward through Bowling Green

to

Kentucky

cities,

reached

complete connections not only

with these roads but, via Chattanooga, with Atlanta, Savannah, and Charleston.

Elsewhere in the South the railroad era was

just

beginning in 1861,

and only fragments of construction appear on the map. Florida had nearly completed nections.

West

two

cross state lines, but these

out-of-state con-

Houston, Texas, are the beginnings

on the map, but only in the

vicinity of

of the network which was

to develop after the

Some

had no

of the Mississippi a rash of unconnected rail lines appears

war even suggested.

of the striking discontinuities of the southern railroad system

which appear on the map are explainable by the newness of development and were not deliberately created by any

These hindrances rapidly as capital

to the

became

movement available

For example, the remaining gaps burg and Atlanta and

railroad

interest group.

of traffic were being eliminated as

and construction

difficulties

in the east-west route

also the short

42

overcome.

between Vicks-

gap between Corinth, Mississippi,


The Midwest and

South, i86i

and Jackson, Tennessee, were on the way

being closed

to

when

war

the

broke out in 1861.

On

the other hand, several of the breaks in the southern railroad net

resulted

from commercial

rivalries.

The

failure to connect the Florida

war was

railroads with those of Georgia prior to the

in part because of

might

the fear of Florida business interests that the trade of their state

be monopolized by Savannah instead of benefiting their

own

ports.^'

Again, a continuous line southward through the piedmont region of

North Carolina was broken by

the lack of a railroad between Greensboro,

North Carolina, and Danville, Virginia. The need

of a connection per-

Richmond had long been

recognized, but com-

mitting through

traffic to

mercial interests in North Carolina, especially those at such port as

New

Bern and Wilmington, defeated

from the North Carolina

for such a road

The

all

legislature until Civil

made

its

terior

North Carolina would be diverted

from the

construction imperative.

state's

own

Although

a

width of 4

feet 6 inches

Hamburg

IN

that the trade

Richmond and

needs

from

thus

in-

away

THE SOUTH

had been

originally advised for the

Railroad, Horatio Allen,

engineer of the road in September 1829,

on the

was

to

War

seaports.^^

GAUGE DIFFERENCES

Charleston and

fear

cities

attempts to obtain a charter

basis of engineering considerations.^^

who became

chief

recommended a 5-foot gauge As will be seen from Map III,

the decision to adopt this gauge greatly influenced railroad construction

throughout most of the South. Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee railroads adopted

it

exclusively,

and

it

was the predominant gauge

Kentucky, Mississippi, and Alabama. So far rolling stock could be

moved

all

the

as

in

gauge was concerned,

way from such

Atlantic ports as

Norfolk, Charleston, and Savannah to Louisville, Memphis, and

New

Orleans. Nevertheless, a glance at the

was bedeviled by

serious

map

gauge

will

show

variations.

A

that the South as a

number

whole

of Virginia rail-

roads were standard gauge, as were most of those of North Carolina.

Kentucky, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas had short

lines of this gauge.

In Mississippi, the line leading eastward from Vicksburg had the distinction, it

unique for the South, of having a 4 foot lo-inch gauge.^^ Finally, from the map of the Southern railroads that most of the

will be seen

43


The American

Railroad Network,

track in the South west of the Mississippi

was

i

861—1890

built to a 5 foot 6-inch

width.

For the most part these gauge variations appear

to reflect

merely indi-

vidual differences in judgment and a failure to appreciate the future of the railroad as a

means

for the long-distance transportation of freight

and passengers. The adoption is

of the standard

gauge in the border

states

not surprising in view of the prevalence of this gauge to the north.

But the building of roads

bama and from the

to

gauges other than that of 5

Mississippi seems logically incomprehensible.

available records

why most

feet in Ala-

Nor

is

clear

it

of the Southern roads west of the

Mississippi selected a width of 5 feet 6 inches.

To

return to the East, the gauge pattern in

determined. Citizens of that

deliberately

North Carolina was more especially

state,

those in the

seaboard counties, had long resented the tendency of their commerce to flow south to Charleston or north to Petersburg, Richmond, and Ports-

mouth

rather than to

of the railroad

North Carolina's own

seemed

to

many North

The coming

Carolina businessmen a real oppor-

and an

tunity to correct this situation,

inferior seaports.

early convention, held at Raleigh

in 1833, adopted a resolution declaring that the state should utilize

resources "in creating and improving markets within her

the construction of railroads."^ the

The

tracks of the

first

own

its

limits" by

railroad in the state,

Wilmington and Raleigh, were standard gauge, and though most

the roads in southern Virginia and a width of 5 feet, the state of

own

all

in

South Carolina were

North Carolina adhered

of

have

to

persistently to

its

gauge.

There was opposition, but the cially the

head

citizens of the coastal counties,

merchants of such ports

City,

the roads of the state, with only

gauge.

They not only prevented

and Danville, Virginia, ing of one, but also

when

standard gauge, despite

lature

Wilmington,

two minor

New

the

its

Bern, and More-

legislation requiring

exceptions, to be standard

war needs

to accede to the build-

Piedmont Railroad was constructed

upon

the legislature to require that

connection

at

which

this

it

for

be

Danville with the 5-foot gauge

Richmond and Danville. Military necessity finally forced of North Carolina to approve changing the gauge to 5

the act by

espe-

a rail connection between Greensboro

until forced by

this purpose, they prevailed

of the

as

were consistently successful in securing

and

the legisfeet,

but

change was authorized carefully provided that the

44


The Midwest and gauge would have

months

South, i86i

be changed back to standard width within six

to

after the close of the war.^°

RAILROAD CONNECTIONS IN SOUTHERN CITIES

Not apparent on

map, but

the

differences to through railroad traffic in the South,

network

railroad

many

in

gauge

at least as serious a barrier as

southern

cities.

were the gaps

in the

Sometimes these gaps accom-

panied gauge differences. At Montgomery, Alabama, through shipment

was impeded not only because one

railroad

was standard gauge and the

other 5 foot, but also because their terminals were separated by several city blocks.^^ Serious

problems

of the South Atlantic States

and seaport

also arose in other river

where merchants

cities

in rival centers sought to

build exclusive commercial empires.

When

railroads

were

first built

in these states, they

were looked upon

primarily as vehicles for trade with the nearby back country.

nished an avenue of commerce the smoke,

and the

to,

not through, the port

city streets,

the early railroads to these port towns often

had

Frequently, they

As

made no connection with

from

and consequently

other

fifties

and with both freight and passenger

greatly increased, the need to permit the railroads to traverse the

streets of the port cities

became apparent. Spark

arresters attached to the

smokestacks of locomotives reduced the danger of

fires,

and the advan-

tages of bringing the railroads into the commercial sections

wharves influenced most towns

to the less,

in the chief river

railroads

and seaport

were not permitted

to

make

and down

to permit the practice. Neverthe-

cities

of the

South Atlantic States the

the actual connections

permit an exchange of rolling stock or

one

leaving

rail lines

where goods could be

freight cars to barges or sailing vessels.

the rail net spread in the

traffic

fur-

their terminals at the out-

the city, nor did they extend to the waterfront transferred directly

They

Their noise,

hazard of sparks showering from their wood-

fire

burning engines were unwelcome on the

skirts.

city.

which would

facilitate transfer of freight

from

line to another.

This

restriction

were twofold: retail

was enforced by

first,

local business groups.

Their

interests

tavern keepers, teamsters, porters, forwarding agents,

merchants, and others developed a vested interest in the transfer

business

which was dependent upon preserving

line; second, the

a

gap in the railroad

wholesale merchants wished to increase the business of

45


The American their ports both for

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

importing and exporting. As in the case of the mer-

chants of Philadelphia, the Southern business groups did not wish their

become way

cities to

through.

The

stations

with freight and passengers merely passing

reasoning was quite similar to that of merchants who, until

fairly late in the

automobile age, objected to the construction of high-

ways which would by-pass the business

districts of

towns along a main

road.

In contrast, the leading railroad centers in the South Atlantic States

which were located inland and not on important waterways formed genuine junction points shifted

from one

where

rail lines

were connected and rolling stock was

and Columbia,

line to another. Burkesville, Virginia,

South Carolina, for example, were important junctions permitting through

movement of freight, as were such important inland Georgia Macon and Atlanta. The terminal of the Central of Georgia Railroad was on the Savannah from

side of

road.^^

Only

Company

after

cities

opposite

Albany and Gulf

that of the Savannah,

as

Rail-

prolonged opposition was the South Carolina Railroad

granted the privilege of building a bridge over the Savannah

River and making a connection with the Georgia Railroad. Local commercial interests prevented the Augusta and Savannah line from forming

The Ashley River

a junction with other railroads entering the city.^^

separated the tracks of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad at Charles-

ton from those of the two other railroads entering the

mington, North Carolina, the Cape Fear River

city,

and

Wil-

at

gauge

as well as a

dif-

ference blocked through rail movement.^^

The map shows Wilmington two port interests

to

cities,

a series of standard-gauge railroads leading north

Aquia Creek on the Potomac

River.

On

Petersburg and Richmond. In both of these

prevented the union of railroad

lines,

Four

cities

local

a position which was sup-

ported by an act of the Virginia legislature permitting railroad companies to use their streets.

from

this route lay

cities

to forbid

railroads entered Petersburg

from south of the Appomattox River. None of these made connections with each other and, more important river

still,

they were

all

separated by the

from the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad which terminated

at

Pocahontas opposite Petersburg. Although railroad interests sought to close these gaps, only the pressure of the Civil

46

War was

sufficient to over-


The Midwest and South,

1861

RAILROADS ENTERING

RICHMOND, VA 1861

come

the "great repugnance

.

.

.

felt

by the citizens of Petersburg to any

connection between the roads in question by means of which produce and

merchandise would pass through Petersburg

The

to

and from Richmond."

^^

Richmond was closely parallel. None of the three railRichmond north of the James River made connections

situation at

roads entering

with each other or with the three railroads entering from the south, despite the fact that all

The

but the Raleigh and Danville were standard gauge.

local opposition to

through connections was so

connections were forced because of the Civil

bitter here that

War

when

they were allowed

with the provision that such links could be used for military purposes only.^*'

Finally, not only

were southern railroads largely without internal

47

in-


The American tegration, but they

were

Railroad Network,

also completely

with any other part of the nation.

The

i

861-1890

without direct

rail

connections

lack of bridges over the Mississippi

proved a barrier to the West as the unbridged Ohio River did to the North.

And there

in northern Virginia,

was not

where gauges were the same

a single direct connection

as in

Maryland,

with northern railroads, for

at

Alexandria and Aquia Creek the only means of transferring either goods or passengers

was by steamboat.

48


VI

THE TREND TOWARD INTEGRATION,

1861-1870

EARLY SHIPPING PATTERNS

During

the pre-railroad age in

keepers

made semiannual

for the

coming

goods

season,

visits to

America western

and personally supervised the shipment of

to their stores in the interior.

For example,

a

1825, arranged first for

to Detroit.

shipment via the Erie Canal

its

transfer to a lake boat

At Detroit he arranged

wagons which If a

its

finally carried his

Albany

to Buffalo.

in

At

on which he took passage

for transshipment to his

new

their

merchant from one

of the small settlements in Michigan, purchasing his stock in

Buffalo he supervised

store-

the cities of the East, bought supphes

own

or hired

stock to his place of business.

western merchant was unable to

make

his regular trip to the East,

he had the alternative of sending a partner or other trustworthy substitute or of arranging with agents to act for him. Usually these agents

quaintances in the fer points

cities in

which he made

his purchases

and

himself,

Buffalo,

would doubtless have been consigned

who would have gone down

ment, and had

it

to

to

ac-

at the trans-

along the route by which his goods were sent to the West.

shipment of the Michigan merchant, had he been unable it

were

The

accompany

an acquaintance in

to the canal, collected the consign-

delivered to a lake boat, after having bargained with

the captain as to the charges.

Another acquaintance of the merchant would

have supervised the transshipment

at Detroit.-^

Early in the history of the westward movement, transfer or forwarding agents appeared at the principal points of transshipment, chiefly in

49

re-


The American

Railroad Network,

produce to market. At

chants

who

some

least

861-1890

who were

sponse to the needs of western shippers their

i

unable to accompany

were commission mer-

of these

received consignments, forwarded the produce to market,

and arranged

for

The advent

its sale.

of the railroad effected

no immediate change

in the ship-

ping pattern of internal America. Far from introducing through shipment, the early railways created additional obstacles to the free flow of

Those

arising

from

There were many

differences in

others, for the

which had

the railways

traffic.

gauge are merely the most obvious.

same limited view on the function of

led to the deliberate construction of roads of vary-

ing gauges also affected early railroad management. Thus, in the beginning, neither physical nor institutional means were provided for interline

exchange. Each short railroad operated without any attempt to co-

ordinate

its

services

specifically as

with those of other companies unless they were

allied extensions.

httle attention to

what adjoining

built

Train schedules were drawn up with lines

might do. Neither the passenger

nor freight cars of a company operated beyond the limits of the company's

own tracks. This

latter state of affairs persisted

lieved. In 1847, after the

when Boston the port of

for

some

New York

much

longer than

is

Hudson River had been bridged

years

had been engaged

in a

generally beat

Troy and

grim struggle with

for the trade of the West, the Boston

and Worcester

and the Western Railroad, both Boston controlled, were not as yet interchanging cars with roads of the same gauge west of the Hudson.^ Noting the disadvantages resulting

roUing stock even

when

from the unwillingness of

of the

railroads to exchange

same gauge, George Dartnell, writing

in

1858, strongly advocated the establishment of a railroad clearing house.

He It

writes in urging this proposal:

would save many unnecessary transhipments,

as

such would only be

re-

quired where there was a break of gauge; cars would invariably run through

when

fully laden, and be loaded on their return, either for a part or for the whole distance; the companies to whom they belonged receiving payment by a mileage toll for the distance traveled loaded; they would also be entitled to demurrage for additional time occupied in transit.

The many

transhipments of freight are

known

to be the chief cause of

and damages, besides adding greatly to the working expenses in labor and clerk-hire, and requiring large and costly accommodations for the performance of the service; the expense of an ordinary transhipment delays, overcharges,

50


The Trend Toward is

not

less

There

Integr.\tion,

i

861-1870

than 25 cents per ton, and the delay but little under 24 hours, if any. no reason why the running of cars through, should increase the

is

mileage of "Empties," as foreign cars might be loaded from point to point, so long as they

The is

were not taken

off the line of route

by which they were received.

interchange of passenger and freight cars under the present system

not only exceedingly limited, but

is

believed to be generally very unsatis-

and there can be but little doubt that if it were made usual with roads having the same gauge, it would tend to increase through traffic by railroads, to give greater confidence and satisfaction to the public, and to add to the factory;

revenues of the companies interested.^

In the course of the Senate debates in February 1863 on the question

gauge of the

of the

that the

good

first

running of "strange" cars over

railroad

was made

transcontinental railroad, the statement

was something

their roads

that

managers would not permit.

something that ought never to be required, and never can be required company is sufficient for its business. It is an advantage to the road itself as an independent road that it is not to be interrupted It is

if

the rolling stock of the

by other roads running into

it

or disturbing

its

own

rolling stock.

.

.

.

They

can better afford to break gauge and pay the expenses themselves.'* This, to be sure,

gauge

of

had of

at the

of a senator

on short

terests.

.

.

." ^

as "a

advocated a break

matter of convenience in keeping certain running so as not to

lines of road,

New

York and

transfer at Cincinnati, not because of

Ohio and

cinnati

and

St.

commingle

the various in-

In 1866 passengers on at least some of the trains running on

the broad-gauge route between

the

who

admit that railroads frequently transshipped even where no break

to

gauge occurred

stock

was the argument

Missouri River, but even his most articulate opponent

Mississippi Railroad,

Louis, refused to

St.

Louis were forced to

any physical obstacle but because

which formed the link between Cin-

let its

cars leave

its

ing the situation at the close of the Civil War,

own S.

line.^

Morton

SummarizPeto,

who

traveled widely in the United States, wrote: "Scarcely any attempts are

made

to

render the working of lines convenient to travellers by working

the trains of one

company

in conjunction with another.

'^ .

.

."

Matching the conservatism of railroad management was the long-continued parochialism of the the uninterrupted

cities.

movement

To

local

of freight

merchants

it

seemed

clear that

and passengers through

their

municipality contributed to the prosperity of a rival city where a trackage

break occurred. Moreover, a forced transfer of through freight led to the

51


:

The American

Railroad Network,

i

861—1890

development of forwarding companies and created jobs for the

The

workers.

"Erie

result of attempts

War"

of 1855—56

to interfere

city's

was simply the most spectacular

with the vested interests that grew up

wherever transshipment was necessary.^ In denying, during the course of the debates referred to in the preceding paragraph, that he

was

influ-

enced by local interests in advocating that the gauge of the Pacific Railroad match that of the Iowa

lines,

Senator James B. Grimes of Iowa

explained

...

if

was controlled by any

I

local interests,

break of gauge, because wherever there a large

amount

around that

place; but .^

As

.

late as the

I

trust that

summer

I

should be in favor of the

a break in the

gauge there

is

always

town immediately springs up

of business to be done, and a

of view.

.

is

look at the question in a national point

I

of 1871 the city of Louisville extended "certain

desirable privileges" to the Louisville, Cincinnati

and Lexington Railroad,

a road of 5-foot gauge on the south side of the Ohio, in consideration of

the road's changing transfers to be

made

its

gauge

to 4 feet 9 inches

and thus compelling

which might otherwise be made

in Louisville

in

Cincinnati.-^*'

FACTORS ENCOURAGING RAILWAY INTEGRATION Despite continued local efforts to profit by the difTerences in gauge

and breaks

new

in track, by the decade of the i86o's there

order for America's railroads. Satisfying as such

were signs of a

traffic

breaks might

be to local interests, they placed a heavy tax on through freight. class of freight

obstacles

became more important, the need

became imperative, and uniformity

the railroads of the United States

By

the outbreak of the Civil

as yet

and Canada.

War,

the very eastern merchants

who had

development in America

prepared to give up any real or imagined ad-

vantages arising from trackage breaks in their plaining of the costs of transfers

and of the overcharges

this

gauge was forced upon

of

been responsible for the early pattern of railway

and who were not

As

to eliminate physical

on the

own

lines over

cities

were com-

which they shipped

of forwarding agents. In 1863

it

was estimated

that a single transshipment cost an average of seven cents a ton.

The

Boston Board of Trade maintained in 1866 that such costs on the roads

between

their city

and Chicago amounted 52

to $500,000 a year.^^


The Trend Toward

Integration,

i

861-1870

Agitation on the part of the seaboard merchants for the

handhng

led to substantial advances

which

i86o's

network.

more

efficient

of through freight coincided with other developments of the

One

was the

of these

Civil

movement

necessity of large-scale

of

toward an integrated railroad

War, which brought with it the troops and supplies. Another was

the decision of Congress that the newly chartered Pacific Railroad should

be of standard gauge, thus assuring that the railway system west of the

Missouri River would develop as part of the nation's system, not as a separate system.

A

third significant development of this period affecting

the railroad pattern

was the growth of the grain trade from the West. EFFECT OF THE CIVIL

WAR

Technological and institutional innovations of the war years in

re-

sponse to military needs resulted for some areas of the country in a

breakdown

of the carefully isolated railway systems of the rival

com-

mercial interests.^^ In the South, for instance, the railroads entering Rich-

mond were

joined by tracks laid through the streets. This

was

in direct

The

response to miHtary needs and over the opposition of local interests. roads entering Petersburg were also

joined, and the gap was

finally closed

between Greensboro, North Carolina, and Danville, Virginia.^^ Legislatures

sometimes carefully stipulated that tracks laid for miHtary purposes

were

to be

badly

removed

damaged

after the

war. But

railroads of the

and European

capital,

it

was

when

South were

the

war was over and the

rebuilt, partly

with Northern

possible to ignore local pressures.

In the North, the war years saw the inauguration of through railroad service

between

need for

fast

New

and

York and Washington. With

efficient rail service

the greatly increased

along the eastern seaboard, the per-

sistence of Philadelphia interests in preventing rail connections at that city

became

intolerable.

road in the world

comfort

as that

is

A New

Yor\ Times

between

New

York and Washington,"

^*

outgrown the

.

village peevishness manifested at Erie."

Beginning in 1862 a car ferry crossing the Delaware River connected the

Camden and Amboy and

and Baltimore Railroads. The

ferry

the Philadelphia,

53

dis-

.

.

has not

^^

at

Camden

Wilmington

permitted some direct

of rolling stock, but not very effectively, for the service

"rail-

and

and, referring to

the earlier gauge dispute at Erie, stated that: "Philadelphia entirely

no

editorial declared

in so shameless a condition of inefficiency

movement

was inadequate


The American

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

and the gauge difference of 1V2 inches between the two roads caused difficulties.^^ Finally, in 1863, the railroads secured through service from north to south by connections around Philadelphia, and the need for

changing cars in that of the Philadelphia,

was eliminated. The president and

city

Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad

report of that year to the stockholders that "this

(the elimination of the

traffic

.

.

.

the Junction, the Pennsylvania Central, .

.

though by no means

.

most desirable object"

break in the City of Brotherly Love) had

been achieved "by using a part of

arrangement

The

Philadelphia and Reading,

and the West Chester." "This perfect,"

the report continued,

"thus far gives great satisfaction to the traveling public." great satisfaction to the railroad

New York, Baltimore, and

directors

stated in their

managements concerned

^^

gave

It also

as well as to the

Washington merchants who had been demand-

ing such through service for some time.^ÂŽ

Throughout the war,

efforts to

improve the Northern trunkline

sys-

tems went forward. Built during this period was the Atlantic and Great Western, a road of 6-foot gauge which connected with the Erie

New

manca,

at Sala-

York, and with the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton

Dayton, Ohio. In 1864 the

latter

road completed a "straddle track" lo-inch rails

— in

at

—a

order to

broad-gauge track placed outside

its

accommodate the

and the Atlantic and Great Western.

At

cars of the Erie

Hamilton and Dayton connected with the

Cincinnati, the Cincinnati,

6-foot

Ohio and

4-foot

Mississippi, thus completing a broad-gauge line without

a single physical obstacle between the eastern seaboard St. Louis.^^

River opposite

By

and the Mississippi

the end of 1865 the 5-foot 6-inch Great

Western of Canada, which formed the connecting link between the

York Central and was laying

roads),

gauge

New

the Michigan Central railroads (both standard-gauge a third rail for the future

accommodation of standard-

cars.^*^

In reporting these improvements the Boston Board of Trade com-

mented

:

...

New

in

stood. lines

is

.

.

.

York

.

.

.

the advantages of uniform gauge are well under-

constantly going forward;

the contrary, breaking bulk will car

when once

than

it

gauge on the Central and Western and whatever interested parties may say to soon come to be no more tolerated in a freight

this process of assimilation in

loaded at the West with produce destined to the sea-board,

would be

in a canal boat similarly laden.

54


The Trend Toward

Integration,

i

861-1870

It becomes the people of Boston then, to look carefully with the West.2^

to their connections

GAUGE OF THE FIRST TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD The determination of eastern interests not to tolerate new imposed

barriers to the free flow of traffic

is

artificially

evident from the circumstances

surrounding the fixing of the gauge of the Pacific Railroad.

It is

some-

times assumed that American railroads have a standard gauge of 4 feet 8/2 inches because that gauge was chosen by Congress for the first trans-

continental hne, and

it

is

thought that

this decision forced

conformity

upon connecting roads and subsequently upon all roads. An examination of the Senate debates on the matter,^^ however, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the gauge of the

Union Pacific-Central Pacific was set measurement already predominated

at 4 feet 81/2 inches largely because this

in the country. In other words, standard gauge

had been determined for America before Congress acted on the gauge of the Pacific Railroad. The first Pacific Railroad Act of July i, 1862, left the decision concerning the gauge of the transcontinental hne to President Lincon, Lincoln, after consulting engineers

of the Interior,

and

the gauge at five feet,^^

The

and railroad

after discussing the

railroad interests

men

through the Department

matter with his

full cabinet, set

which was the gauge of the California railroads. of die East and Midwest, already largely com-

mitted to standard gauge, resolved not to accept the president's decision but to use the overwhelming power of their sections in Congress to set it aside. Accordingly, in January 1863, James Harlan, senator from Iowa, introduced into the Senate a

road

bill to

establish the

gauge of the

Pacific Rail-

at 4 feet 8V2 inches.^*

The

debates which ensued are reveahng not only of sectional interests but also of the state of opinion concerning the desirability and the prac-

uniform railroad gauge for the entire country. Proponents of leaned heavily in their arguments on the advantages of interhne exchange, especially in times of war advantages which would be lost ticabihty of a

the

bill

—

if

the gauge of the Pacific Railroad were allowed to stand at five feet. They pointed to the preponderance of the standard gauge throughout the North

and the Middle West (an estimated 20,567 miles to 1,199 miles of roads of other gauge), and to the large investments which had been made in the construction of those roads ($849,000,000 to $60,000,000 for lines).

Not

a road in the Northwest, they maintained,

55

all

would be

other

able to


The American

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

exchange equipment with the transcontinental hne, line

were

the gauge of that

if

five feet.

Opponents of the

bill

scoffed at the idea of sending cars, either pas-

senger or freight, over long distances without change. Transshipment, they said, was necessary for purposes of cleanliness and safety. Cars should

be aired and merchandise examined

were safely

at regular intervals.

Moreover, there

which both locomotives and

limits to the distance

run without allowing the equipment

to cool.

One

cars could be

senator

was

of

the opinion that since the Missouri River could probably never be bridged, it

was

was

a matter of

no importance whether the gauge of the

Pacific Railroad

in conformity with that of the connecting roads to the east. Therefore

he urged that the President's choice of gauge be allowed to stand.

When was

the vote on Senator Harlan's

taken. Eastern interests

in favor of the

bill.

The

The

passed the

providing for standard gauge

easy victory, the count being 23 to 9 senators from California and Oregon were joined

in dissent by only five senators bill

bill

won an

from

states east of the

Missouri River.^^

House without debate and without a record

vote.^^

GROWTH OF THE GRAIN TRADE

When first

8^

inches for the

transcontinental railroad line, they were undoubtedly mindful of the

traffic

of

Eastern interests dictated a gauge of 4 feet

which

in grain

Omaha. For

in the near future

would flow from

several generations after the first white

barrier of the Appalachians, western produce

markets via the Mississippi vessels to Atlantic ports.

By

to

New

had found

the area west

men

its

way

defied the to eastern

Orleans and from there by ocean

the outbreak of the Civil

War, however,

the

western carrying trade had been almost completely reoriented, relatively direct east-west canal

and railroad routes having replaced the old

cuitous river and sea route.^^ the Galena mines or corn

Heavy

by

rail.

to

move

for the

most part by water,

Great Lakes, the Erie Canal, and the Hudson River.^^ Less

weighty or bulky freight such east

cir-

from

and wheat from the upper Mississippi Valley

and the Old Northwest continued chiefly via the

or bulky products such as lead

The

commerce, was

as hides

and animals was usually taken

carrying trade in flour, an important item in internal

fairly evenly

divided between water and land carriage,

365,000 barrels being shipped eastward by lake in 1859,

by railroad.^^

56

and 307,000

barrels


The Trend Toward

Integration,

Although grain moved from the West

i

861-1870

to the eastern

by water, the railroads played an auxiliary role in the

was open the railways were

the water route

wheat and corn from the

seaboard chiefly

traffic.

So long

as

largely confined to hauling

interior to a lake port

and from Buffalo

to

internal markets, but after the close of navigation in the fall or early

winter, surplus grain sent

all

the

way

which had piled up

market by

to

railroads' role in the grain trade,

in the lake cities

beginning

freight earnings of the eastern trunk lines to reflect

an increasing

at least as early as i860, the

and

their connections

from the West, some

traffic

was frequently

Despite the limited character of the

rail.

of

it

began

in grain. In Sep-

tember i860 the American Railway Review noted that the superintendent of the

and

New

York Central had ordered

"The

Buffalo.

Eastern market,

send

it

freight gathering at those places, destined for the

immense, and will require the entire rolling stock

is

forward."

spare cars to Suspension Bridge

all

^"

During

that

same year shipments

delphia increased by 300,000 bushels, nearly

wheat.

Some

of

it

moved

all

the

way from

all

the

of the increase being in

West by

rail,

for according

Board of Trade, the Pennsylvania Central and

to the Philadelphia

to

of grain to Phila-

con-

its

nections were "provided with a complete equipment of cars for bringing

grain in bulk from Chicago without transshipment." It

was not

that the rails at this date

the water routes, but rather that the that

Civil

it

strained

War and

all

^^

were taking business away from

demand

for shipping

transportation facilities to capacity.

the cutting off of the southern

market

was

so

heavy

Then came

the

for western produce.

This coincided with increased demands for such produce from the rapidly industrializing eastern United States

poor harvests.

The

authority that not

result

was

more than

and from

Europe plagued with

a

that in February 1865

it

was

stated

on good

two-thirds of the grain crop of the North-

west, with all the transportation then available, could reach an eastern

market that

year.^^

In the period following the Civil

War

the railroads were to absorb an

ever larger portion of the carrying trade in grain.^^ In adapting plant and services to this traffic as well as to the general increase in internal

merce, American railway

management was

to

forge from the

com-

many

small lines of the pre-war period a truly national, not to say international, railroad system.

57


VII

SOLVING THE GAUGE DIFFERENTIALS, 1861-1880

"COMPROMISE" AND SLIDING WHEELS; CAR HOISTS Preceding chapters have shown that by the time Lincoln entered the

White House regional

tegration along railroad routes

had

rivalries

which were

centers of the East.

While attempting by means

gauge differences

keep business from their

place

had worked

to

for an

unhindered flow of

ticularly

the

war

The first,

own

city.

Civil

The

trend toward

War

by the growth of the trade from the West, but

period, par-

at the close of

and Canada was

still

the next twenty-five years

was

the railway pattern of the United States its

disjointedness.

task of railroad

management over

an integrated network. This called for action on two

levels:

a struggle with the vested interests at transfer points, entailing a

long-drawn-out battle between entrenched local businessmen and fathers

on the one hand and shippers and

railroad interests

process of integration.

in the

the purpose of this chapter to deal with the

development.

The at

It is

city

on the other;

and second, the solution of the technological problems involved

latter

and

merchants of each

over the ever-lengthen-

traffic

was accelerated by the events of the

characterized by

to build

of trackage breaks

rivals, the

ing transportation lines radiating from their integration

led to a degree of in-

tributary to the commercial

joining of the tracks of two or

more

railroads within a

town or

junction points was simple so long as the roads were of the same gauge.

58


Solving the Gauge Differentials,

Where was

to

861-1880

i

a difiference of gauge existed the obvious

and

inevitable solution

bring the gauges of the roads into conformity. This, however, was

gauge involved not only the mov-

prohibitively expensive, for change of

ing of the

could afford to pay the

through

Few

but also the change-over of rolHng stock.

rails,

traffic to

railroads

but neither could they afford to surrender

bill,

other lines.

The

was

result

that a

number

of tempo-

were devised which permitted interchange of equipment

rary expedients

between Hues of different gauge and eliminated the necessity of

trans-

shipment.

There were

at least three

such expedients. Most simple was the "com-

promise car" having wheels with 5-inch surfaces which permitted the car

run over tracks with a gauge

to

broad as 4

feet 10 inches.

there were thousands of

Such

narrow

as

cars

were in use

compromise

as early as i860.

scribed the use of such wheels as "questionable,

number At best,

than

wide

whom

de-

^

for

not dangerous,"

of accidents could be traced to the broad treads. to

gauges no wider

means

of interchanging

with compromise wheels were limited

cars

and were of no use

4 feet 10 inches,

traffic

if

as

By 1870

cars in service,^ although the

wheels were frowned upon by careful railroad men, one of

a

and

as 4 feet 8/4 inches

as a

between roads of standard and of 5-foot or 6-foot gauge.

Two

other

devices were developed to meet this situation. In 1863 the railroads ex-

perimented with cars having wheels designed to

These

cars could be

and could be

accommodated

easily shifted

to

slide

on

their

axles.

both standard and broad gauge

from one gauge

to the other if at junction

widened or narrowed gradually. The wheels of the

points the track

cars

were loosened by means of a simple, hand-operated mechanism, the cars were run slowly onto the connecting

new

locked in the

track,

November

position. In

and the wheels were then

1863 a car of this description

was run over the standard-gauge Eastern Railroad there over the

Grand Trunk,

Pond, where

was loaded with

it

to

Portland and from

a road of 5 foot 6-inch gauge, to Island flour for Boston.

The

car reached Boston

without mishap, having for a second time negotiated the transfer from a broad to a standard-gauge road.

Tisdale, the car

was a

of the officers of the roads over

community of

gauge

of Boston,

at that city,

According

"perfect success,"

still

which

it

to its inventor,

had

jealous of Portland

traveled.

The commercial

and resentful of the break

took a deep interest in the

59

Charles S.

and had received the approval

new

car,

although they


:

The American

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

regarded any advantage arising from the use of cars with adjustable wheels as only a "mitigation" of the "evil" of diverse gauges.^

By to

the early 1870's the

have in operation

perform well

cars failed to

number

Grand Trunk and

many

as

of accidents in

either because the

the fastenings

as a

its

connections were reported

thousand cars with sliding wheels. The

in service,

however, for

time went on the

which they were involved increased alarmingly,

wheel fastenings were secured

worked

as

The

loose in running.

result

carelessly or because

was

that during 1873

and 1874 the Grand Trunk, at great expense, narrowed the gauge of entire line some 1300 miles of track to standard width in order

conform

and

to the

gauge of

connections at Portland,

its

its

to

John, Buffalo,

St.

Detroit.^

More

successful than sliding wheel cars

to in their

points to

day

as "elevating

were car

The

machines."

hoists, usually referred

were used

hoists

at transfer

the bodies of cars, either passenger or freight, while trucks

lift

of one gauge were exchanged for those of another, without sary to unload the cars.

mid-1870's exchanged

By means

being neces-

it

of such a hoist the 6-foot Erie in the

with the standard-gauge Great Western of

traffic

Canada.^ At the same date there were

at least

along the Ohio, one at Cairo,

the other at Henderson, Kentucky,

Illinois,

two

car hoists in operation

where the prevailing standard gauge of the North met the

5-foot

gauge

of the South.®

The

Henderson was

hoist at

two passenger

cars. It

and was powered by

built to raise either

was constructed according

one freight car or

to the

a small stationary steam engine.

A

screw principle

was hoisted

car

more than

in less than half a minute, while changing the trucks took not five or six

minutes.

A

contemporary observer has

left

a description of

the operation

The trucks are shifted by means of two transverse tables, one at each end. These tables run upon tracks and carry the trucks to a siding. and bring back those of different gauge. [By] this arrangement, when two cars of different gauges are changed at the same time, the trucks of one car are simply run forward under the body of the other. .

.

.

.

.

."^

.

According in 1874 by a

to

Captain H.

W.

.

Tyler, a railway expert

group of English stockholders

and operations of the

Erie, car hoists

to

had not

60

make

who was

hired

a survey of the plant

yet, at that date,

been tried


Solving the Gauge Differentials, 1861-1880

on a large the Erie,

But Tyler had

scale.

if

faith in their efficiency, suggesting that

reluctant to assume the expense (estimated at $8,500,000) of

changing the road's gauge from broad tional hoists to facilitate the

might invest

to standard,

movement

between

of traffic

its

in addi-

road and

roads of narrower gauge. In another context Tyler placed the cost of each

such hoist at $3000.^

By

become familiar

1880 elevating machines had

America. Early in the decade a foreign

sights to travelers in

visitor reported

steam hoists

at

Cincinnati, Ohio, and Lynchburg, Virginia, and described their operation in

some

detail.^

such machines

By at

1886 the Louisville and Nashville Railroad alone had

nine different transfer points: Louisville, East Louis-

Rowland, Nortonville, and Henderson, Kentucky; Evansville,

ville,

New

diana; Milan, Tennessee; Mobile, Alabama; and

"Each point

ana.^°

countries'

.

.

.

of connection

." ^^

The

trucks,"

some

a 'frontier'

.

.

.

between two 'foreign

tracks at such junction points

accommodate the

rails to

was

In-

Orleans, Louisi-

had three or four

cars of different gauges, while "acres of extra

some

of one gauge,

of another, stood in the yards.^^

"DOUBLE" GAUGES

Car

hoists functioned efficiently

enough

so long as traffic

was

light.

This accounts in part for their long use by the southern railroads. But

where

traffic

five or six

was heavy,

as

on the trunk

minutes required

tolerable delays

and

tie-ups.

to

lines

and

their connections, the

change the trucks of each car caused

Here

car hoists

had but

slight,

if

tarding effect on the change to standard gauge. This statement illustrated

"men

is

well

by the experience of the Erie.

of capital

New

York maintained as engaged in the management

Senator Ira Harris of that

in-

any, re-

early as

February 1863

of the Erie" were seri-

ously considering taking up the road's rails and adopting the narrow (that

is,

standard) gauge for the sake of economy .^^

nouncing that an eventual change

to

Ten

years later, in an-

standard gauge had been decided

upon, the directors of the Erie reported to the stockholders:

Not only

change demanded for the purpose of reducing working exwe cannot, so long as our gauge is not in conformity with that of our Western, Eastern and Southern connections, secure a large amount of traffic now offered to us, if we could receive and transport it without breakis

this

penses, but because

ing bulk.-^^

61


The American

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

In 1874, by which year the principal point of interchange between the Erie and

its

western connections had been transferred from Dunkirk to

East Buffalo, the Company's yard for eastbound business at the

latter

place contained twenty tracks, altogether about fifteen miles long, "and .

.

.

large transfer-sheds for changing goods between

gauge

cars."

There was

and the changing of

also a

"Dodd's machine"

trucks.^^ It will be

in his report to the English stockholders

remembered

whom

the installation of additional car hoists as a

ment was another During a third their

own. The

case of the Great

The

changing

number

its

gauge.^^

of roads laid

Western of Canada was noted

June

1873, after attempts to

come

from which the Erie

started to put

Managerial and financial

to nothing.^^

suffered chronically in the seventies, de-

layed the completion of the project until

made unhindered

in the

down make broad gauge con-

had

Erie, as a matter of fact,

nections with Chicago had

this line

also pointed out that

of standard-gauge equip-

possible alternative to the Erie's

rail prior to

difficulties,

accommodation

order to accommodate equipment of a gauge other than

preceding chapter. a third

of overcoming the dis-

He

the three decades subsequent to i860 a

rail in

that Captain Tyler

he represented suggested

means

advantages arising from the Erie's broad gauge. the laying of a third rail for the

narrow and broad

for the hoisting of cars

December

connections with

all

1878. After that date

the roads

on which

its

foreign business originated, and was at last in a position to compete

with the

New

York Central

for

through

traffic

from the

lines

both north

and south of the Great Lakes.^^

The management for the indefinite

usually

had four

seldom regarded a track of three rails as and junction railways which were designed

of a road

permanent. Sections of

lines

accommodation of equipment rails in

two

different gauges

order that the weight of the rolling stock and

consequently the wear on the of a third rail

of

rails

might be evenly

distributed.

was more often than not but an intermediate

changing of a road's gauge of a third rail were two:

to standard.^^ In this respect the

first,

it

The

laying

step in the

advantages

allowed an immediate interchange of

equipment with the road's connections while the use of the road's old rolling stock

on

in

its

no way interfering with

own

Hne; and second,

it

permitted a gradual changeover of the road's equipment to standard gauge, thus saving the company the expense of changing

ment

at once.

62

all its

equip-


Solving the Gauge Differentials,

Broad and standard-gauge

861-1880

and locomotives could be operated over

cars

a three-rail line with equal efficiency.

mixed equipment were run. Shortly was completed

i

in 1867, the general

On

one road,

after the

manager

at least, trains

Great Western's third

of rail

of the Blue Line, a fast freight

hne running over the road, reported: "The third

from Windsor

rail

to

Suspension Bridge, which enables the Great Western Railway to run their

Broad Gauge Cars Cars, has

.

.

in the

same

silent as to operational details.

with three

rails

More

^°

Unfortunately the report

transfer points, the

was begun

of a road's rolling stock

With

but the cost of

is

usually trains operating over a road

was completed. Cars were adapted

ing the trucks.

to the

as

soon as the

new gauge by

chang-

the use of a steam hoist such as those in service at

change could be made

new

trucks

where there was

the new, such conversion

at the rate of ten cars

was a considerable drain upon

power

resources. Conversion of motive cult that

with 'Blue Line' or Narrow Gauge

were made up of equipment of uniform gauge.^^

The changeover third rail

train

proved a perfect success."

.

to a

a

an hour,^^

company's

narrower gauge was so

diffi-

between the old gauge and

a large difference

was considered inexpedient.^^ These

facts ac-

count for the long transitional period during which a number of roads operated with a third

By

rail.

1880 there were perhaps 2800 miles of double gauge railroad in the

United

States.

"A

large proportion of the double gauges," the census of

that year stated, "are

formed by means of

a third rail."

Most roads

of

double gauge represented efforts to accommodate broad-gauge lines to standard-gauge equipment, or vice versa. But perhaps 400 miles of such road

made

possible the interchange of traffic

between

lines of standard

gauge and of 3-foot or narrow gauge, of which approximately 5000 miles

had been constructed during the "narrow gauge fever" of the

1870's.^*

NARROW GAUGE RAILWAYS At to

the very time that old established roads

standard gauge, a

number

usually 3-foot, gauge. States before 1870.

new

of

Roads of

this

gauge were unknown in the United

Enthusiasm for them

from a paper, "The Gauge

were changing from broad

roads were being built to a narrow,

here, as in

England, stemmed

for the 'Railways of the Future,' " read that

year by Robert F. Fairlie at the British Railway Association's annual meeting.^^

The arguments

of Fairlie

and

63

his followers,

it

must be admitted,


The American Railroad Network, were

A

plausible.

road of 3 foot 6-inch gauge, they claimed, was both

cheaper to build and

A

or broad gauge.

1861-1890

less

expensive to maintain than

similar claim could be

made

only

common

traffic

to

was

better adapted to

Some proponents

of the

and

out, a

was

it

equipment where

narrow gauge were even ready traffic areas.

Armed

with

number of might be moved by

they sought to prove that by simply increasing the

and locomotives the same volume of freight

cars

was pointed

mountainous regions, while

defend the usefulness of their system in heavy

statistics,

it

sense to build a road designed for lighter

light.

road of standard

for the construction

operation of narrow-gauge equipment. Moreover,

narrow track was

a-

narrow-gauge

as

by standard or broad-gauge roads. Further,

this could

be done without excessive wear and tear on the right of way, for the lighter cars

The

now

and locomotives would be

on the

easier

subject of narrow-gauge railways

is

rails.^^

one of the most interesting ones

before the public [remarked the editor of the Baltimore American in the

late spring of 1871], for if the

plan succeeds as well here as

Europe it will undoubtedly carry railroad facilities would otherwise be deprived of them for years.^^

The

editor of the Boston

of the country

new and

is

to the

sparsely settled regions,

mountainous, and the

sufficient to justify

many

it

has done in

localities

which

Commercial Bulletin was of the opinion

narrow-gauge roads were especially adapted the resources of

to

work

that

of opening

up

"where the topography

initial traffic to

be secured

the outlay required for building a broad

not

is

[that

is,

standard] gauge road." Also, narrow-gauge roads might be cheap feeders to the

The

trunk

lines.^^

entire railway

world seemed

to split into

merits of the narrow gauge, for the claims of

unchallenged.

The

battle

was fought

journals, at local, regional,

in the

its

two

factions over the

promoters did not go

newspapers and the trade

and national meetings. The

narrow-gauge mania were armed with

their

own

ported to show the real inefficiency of the narrow gauge.

ing argument of this of interchanging

side,

traffic

critics

figures

of the

which pur-

The most

however, was concerned with the

tell-

difficulties

with roads of broader gauge. Here they could

present contemporary examples of the inconveniences experienced at such transfer points as

the

Potomac

Dunkirk, Buffalo, and the towns along the Ohio and

Rivers. Since there

was no refuting the evidence, the advo-

64


Solving the Gauge Differentials, 1861-1880 cates of the

narrow gauge were inclined

minor importance."

as "practically of

it

of transfer

would represent but

to ignore the issue or to

Some maintained

"^

a small fraction of the

mark

that the costs

amount

ultimately

saved in construction, equipment, and maintenance.

The

first

great impetus given the narrow-gauge

was the decision

States

movement

Rio Grande Railroad Company, which in the early

United

was building

1870's

Other new roads followed the example of the D. and

line in Colorado.

its

November

R. G. By

in the

gauge made by the Denver and

to adopt the 3-foot

1874

it

was reported that 1677 miles of narrow-gauge

roads had been built in the Union, and that such roads were to be found

and

in almost every state

territory,

"but as a rule for short distances only."

The Denver and Rio Grande, with "about 150 miles" of track, was the By January i, 1878, the nation had 2862 miles of narrow-gauge

longest.^*^

railroad.

About

half of

it

was

the Mississippi, 350 miles of

to be it

found in the

west of

were in Ohio, which had 271 miles,

the greatest narrow-gauge mileages

Pennsylvania, which had 261 miles, and

By

lightly settled area

in Colorado alone. East of the Mississippi,

Illinois,

which had 202

miles.^^

1880 the narrow-gauge trackage figure for the United States had

climbed to the neighborhood of 5200, representing about 5 per cent of the total railroad trackage of the country.^" In the single year 1882 some 2000 miles of narrow gauge track were laid.^^ This was the high point.

Before another year had passed, the Railroad Gazette, which had always

been opposed editorially to the building of narrow-gauge roads, reported not without satisfaction that, although the narrow gauge

still

had many

adherents, "the influence of this remarkable delusion has probably ex-

pended the of

itself." ^*

By

the spring of 1884 the pioneer narrow-gauge line,

Denver and Rio Grande, had

its

road, the section between

tion of the standard-gauge

The narrow-gauge

lines

laid a third rail over the oldest part

Denver and Pueblo,

equipment of

its

for the

accommoda-

eastern connections.^^

were but repeating the experience of the Erie

and other broad-gauge roads in the northeastern United States and Canada.

It

could be argued that the costs of transshipment were insignificant

when compared narrow-gauge bill.

to the

lines,

Moreover,

as

money saved

but the shipper

in the construction still

and operation

thought of himself

as

of

paying the

Captain Tyler discovered in the case of the Erie in

1874, both travelers

gauge were known

and shippers tended to exist.^^

to

shun roads on which breaks of

Like the broad-gauge roads, narrow-gauge

65


The American Railroad Network, lines that

were in competition for through

i

861-1890

traffic had to make arrangeaccommodation of standard-gauge equipment or lose the business to standard-gauge lines. By the middle of the 1880's this hard fact had tempered the enthusiasm for narrow gauge.

ments

for the

^


VIII

THE FAST FREIGHT

LINES,

1861-1890

BACKGROUND

The ways weighed

costs

and inconveniences of transshipment had

particularly heavily

on the

traffic

being both bulky and highly susceptible to

quent handling. In 1869

it

from the Mississippi

New

to

from the West,

its

and damage from

loss

cost 52^4 cents to transport a bushel of

York, sending

from there over the Great Lakes-Erie Canal

it

by

rail

to

al-

produce fre-

wheat

Chicago and

route. Actual freight

and

toll

charges amounted to only 40 cents; inspection and insurance absorbed

another

cents. Storage, handling, elevator charges,

i5/2

accounted for the remaining

10%

cents.^

Thus

and commissions

the cost of the services

tendant upon transshipment equaled about 20 per cent of the

at-

total cost of

shipping by this route.

The

ability of the railroads to cut the costs

and

to eliminate the incon-

veniences of transshipment by offering through service was one factor in the

phenomenal

increase in the

period following the Civil

volume of grain moving

War. Another

factor

east by rail in the

was the

ability of the

roads to offer year-round service. In 1869 the directors of the Michigan

Central Railroad remarked that "the transportation of grain in bulk to the seaboard has occurred during the past winter to a very large extent for the

first

Four years is

time in the history of the railroads of the country.

later the

now moved

The Michigan grain

traffic

same

authorities reported:

half the year, mainly by

rail,

"The grain

and

largely at

.

.

." ^

of the country all

times."

^

Central directors gave entire credit for the increased

of the railroads to the fast freight lines,^ organizations

67

which


The American had

Railroad Network,

861-1890

i

arisen in response to the need for through service

bers of

new

These nineteenth-century

freight cars.

to be distinguished

from what are known

and

for large

num-

Hnes are

fast freight

as "fast freights" today, the

being simply specially expedited, often regularly scheduled, trains

latter

which

running preferences over ordinary "tonnage" freight

are given

The

order to facilitate shipment, often of particular commodities.

were independent of the

fast freight lines

and operated over any number of roads. Their hne went through from

the cars of the

owned

railroads,

service

their

was

in

original

own

cars,

"fast" in that

their point of pick-up to their

destination without breaking bulk, thus eliminating delays at transfer points.

Prior to this time, it is true, there had been some interchange of equipment between roads. As early as 1855, for instance, the Buffalo and Erie was regularly accepting the cars of western roads for transit over its line so that

produce might go through

handhng.^ But

this

all roads. Moreover, differences in

ment

without the necessity of

to Buffalo

was an enlightened

attitude that

gauge continued

was not shared by to

make

transship-

necessary.

The advantage of the fast freight lines to the shipper was that they controlled their own cars which, when necessary, were equipped with "compromise" or adjustable wheels that could be accommodated without the necessity of transshipping,'^

made

interline

Canada

large differences in

The

to offer in many instances forced the management make adjustments for the accommodation of the fast

third rail

which went into

in 1867, for instance,

cars of the Blue

was

on the Great Western

service

laid to

Line from the tracks of the

permit the passage of the

New

York Central

pension Bridge (Niagara) to those of the Michigan Central

An

authority

of the 1880's,

gauge

came

of deviant lines to

of

Where

exchange impossible, the volume of business which the

fast freight lines

freight cars.

to small

gauge and that could therefore be sent over most roads

differences in

on the history of American

was

at Sus-

at Detroit.'^

railroads, writing at the

end

of the opinion that

only a very small proportion of the through-rail freight movements of the

country would ever have been possible without the

.

.

.

freight lines, because

was mainly, and almost exclusively, through them, that the transfer of freight from one set of cars to another set of cars, at the connecting point between .^ two lines, was abolished. it

.

.

68


The Fast Freight

Lines,

i

861-1890

EARLY FAST FREIGHT LINES

The a

earliest fast freight

usually cited as the 1856.

One

first

New

York Central and

The

latter

Company and was

"merged

in operation at least as early as January, 1856,

all classes." ^^

ern Dispatch, operating over the Erie Railway and

Yet another

Transportation

Company (known

over the Pennsylvania and

although

it

freight

fast

its

The Great West-

connections, dated

its

Western Insurance and

the

line,

later as the Star

connections,

was not organized

when

of goods at Chicago in twelve days, at

the uniform price of $2.10 a hundred for

1857.

into the Merchants'

Hne was an outgrowth of the American Express

was "guaranteeing the delivery

from

connections and

its

of them, seems to have appeared about 1855 or

authority states that this line later

Dispatch."^

it

hnes predate the Civil War. Kasson's Dispatch,

Hne operating over the

Union Line), operating

was chartered before the war,

The

until 1864.^^

other fast freight lines,

exceeding perhaps forty in number, belong to the post-war period. Since the original fast freight lines (later called "noncooperative" lines)

were independent stock companies,

way management

might properly be asked what

it

stood to gain by interposing an outside organization

and the shipper. There

between

itself

demand

for the large

number

of

financial condition of

many

are

new

carry the increased western business

two answers

came

at a

made it The

railroads

device as the freight lines was to

let

to this. First, the

freight cars that

themselves to purchase cars in quantity.

time

were needed

when

roads these

which the

men were

to

the unstable

impossible for the roads alternative to

some such

business go begging. Secondly, the

promoters and stockholders of the freight lines were often the the railroads over

rail-

officers of

lines operated. In their role as officers of the

in a position to give extremely favorable terms to

the freight lines, thus increasing their

own

earnings as stockholders in

the fast freights at the sacrifice of the earnings of the railroads' stockholders.

A New

notable example of such duafism and

England, where in the

its

consequences was found in

1870's the stocks of the fast freight lines

Vermont and Canada, the Grand owned mainly companies. The fact that the freight lines

operating over the Central Vermont, the

Trunk, the Boston and Lowell, and other railways were by the

officers of the railroad

were paying ten

to twelve per cent to their stockholders

69

while the Ver-


:

The mont Central was lic

Americ^-N" Railro.m3 in the

i

861—1890

hands of a receiver might well have

to questioning such close

elicited the

Network,

community

of interests.

A

that a nimiber of freight-Une cars

had been

sold to the freight lines at scarcely

A

the pub-

legislative inquiry

information that not only were the cars of the freight lines

given running privileges over the \'^ermont Central's

and

set

own

cars but also

built In the railroad's shops

more than

cost.^

committee of the United States Senate which investigated the

fast

freight lines in 1S74 reported

The inducements on

the part of railway companies to contraa with such companies are ostensibly to secure the large aggregate of traffic thev claim to control, but in a great many cases a division of profits between the officers of the railway company and the persons entering into these con[fast freight]

tracts

ejected by a judicious distribution of their stock.^^

is

The

contracts of the fast freight lines with the railroads varied, but in

they usually pro\ided that the freight lines pay

the early years, at

least,

the roads a certain

flat rate

per car, the rate being based on an estimated

amount of freight of all classes in the general traffic of the road. In a number of cases the rate per car was based on a fixed tonnage that was somewhat less than the car's average of the

capacit\

from

tariff received

from a

like

In turn, the railroads paid the freight lines a mileage rate ranging

.

1V2 cents to 3 cents a mile for the use of the line's cars.^^

Such contracts

left

room

profit of the freight lines

amount

for a

the lines collected

railroads,

it

was

to the

number

of abuses. First,

was represented by the

inasmuch

as the

difference between the

from shippers and the amount they paid the

advantage of the

Lines to soHcit

and

to give prefer-

ence to the higher classes of freight, leaNing anv lower-class freight which

could not be accommodated in the through cars for the railroads to carry in their

own

cars.

The consequence was

that while the freight lines

grew

prosperous through carrying higher-class freight the railroads failed to

break even on the only paying, as they were, a less

to

than the

traffic left to

flat rate

car's capadt}'.

overload — a

them. Moreover, the freight

per car and that rate based on something

were tempted not only to load

practice that

lines,

to capacit)', but

enhanced the freight company's earnings,

but also increased wear and tear on track and roadbed.^^

As a result of criticism of these practices, a nimiber of the freight lines made new contracts with the railroads. According to the terms of the 70


The Fast Freight new

contracts, the lines

cars

and

for

payment was usually on

mileage

a

which, consequently, came to be

bad

861-1890

soHciting freight.

western roads

the

was generally paid

known

effect of the

On

as

"commission"

the freight lines,

To many

lines.'^'^

second plan was, in a great

as that of the first," for, because of the

community

from the

profits

quote cases,

of interests be-

tween railroad management and the stockholders in the freight

ways of siphoning

their

but in the East a percentage of

basis,

the tariff collected by the railroads

as

i

were simply paid by the roads for the use of

their services in

one authority, "The

Lines,

lines,

railroads to the freight lines

new were

soon discovered.^^

COOPERATIVE FAST FREIGHT LINES Beginning tion

in the late i86o's the

and management of the

demand

for

reform in the organiza-

fast freight lines led to the

development of

what were known

as "cooperative" freight lines. The first of these was Red Line which dated from 1866 and ran between Chicago in the west and New York and Boston in the east, via Toledo, Buffalo and Albany. The second cooperative line to go into operation was the Blue

the

Line which opened for business on January terminals as the

The

Red Line but

its

i,

1867;

it

served the same

route lay north of the Great Lakes.^^

cooperative lines differed from the original fast freight lines in

that they

were not separate corporations but merely administrative

or-

ganizations under the authority of the railroad companies cooperating in the line.

owned

While the

cars of the line

were operated

South, at the time of Louisville

St.

Green Line, the principal

its

and Nashville,

Chattanooga and

trolled 3404 cars.

nooga and

St.

fast freight line in the

organization in 1868 was divided as follows: 25; Nashville

and Northwestern,

Louis, 31; Western and Atlantic, 28.^^

teen southern roads were associated in the

few

were

individually by the cooperating railroads. For instance, the owner-

ship of the 96 cars of the

as

in a pool, they

Over 1000 were

Louis.

One

as 2 cars to the line.^*^

12; Nashville,

By

1881 nine-

Green Line, which then con-

the property of the Nashville, Chatta-

road, the Northeastern Georgia, contributed

The same

system prevailed on the

fast freight

lines

north of the Ohio and Potomac: the quotas of cars furnished the

lines

by the roads were determined according to the length of the indi-

vidual road or according to the

through

amount

trafl&c.^^

71

of revenue the road derived

from


The American Each cooperative

Railroad Network,

fast freight line

had a Board of Directors composed

a representative from each cooperating road.

was

to decide policy for the line,

tive's

vote

was decided

either

861-1890

i

and the

on the

The

weight of each representa-

relative

basis of the length of his road or

the basis of the proportion of line business which

had no

This board

carried.

it

on

jurisdiction over freight rates; such rates continued to be set by

among

the individual railroads or by agreement

A

of

function of the Board

general

the roads in the line.^^

all

was maintained by each cooperative

office

over by a general manager.

It

employed

and was presided

line,

a staff of clerks,

and functioned

as

a clearing house. Headquarters of the Blue Line, for instance, were in Detroit; both the

Red and White

D. Hayes, general manager

J.

had general

lines

offices in Buffalo.^^

(which

of the Blue Line

may

be regarded

as typical of the cooperative lines), testifying before a Senate

in 1873, outlined the

work

of his

office.

According

to

Committee

Hayes, copies of

Blue Line waybills were sent to Detroit where the earnings of the

on each shipment were computed and prorated roads according to agreement. Hayes's balances.

Each cooperating road paid

Blue Line car not

its

own

i

had charge of mileage

office also

mile for the use of each

Yi cents a

that passed over

road. Likewise, any road

its

outside the line that received the line's cars paid mileage of

were struck once a month.^^ The monthly income of the

from

tral's

its

V2 cents to the

owe

York Cen-

less

any car mileage the

other roads (or alternatively, plus any mileage other roads

might owe the Central, depending upon which the Central's share of the Line's general office

Within a very short time lines

New

participation in the Blue Line, therefore, equaled the Cen-

pro rata share of the earnings of the line

road might

less

i

A record of car movements was kept by the central office and balances

line.

tral

line

to the cooperating rail-

became remarkably

after their first

efficient.

were carrying "substantially

all"

By

total

and

was the

larger),

agents' expenses.

appearance the

fast freight

1874 they blanketed the nation and

through freight that moved by

rail.^^

THE PATTERN OF THE FAST FREIGHT LINES

The

principal fast freight lines of the 1870's

might be grouped accord-

ing to the trunk lines over which they operated. In 1874 the

New

York

Central participated in four cooperative freight lines: the Red, Blue,

White, and International, while the Merchants' Dispatch, a non-cooperative line, also operated over the Central's tracks.

72

A

witness appearing be-


The Fast Freight fore a Congressional

of Buffalo over the

down

the Toledo

what might be

Lines,

i

861-1890

committee described the Red Line as running by way Lake Shore and Michigan Southern to Chicago, also

and Wabash and

its

branches, "and to various points in

called the central part of the Southwest."

The Blue

Line,

according to the same authority, ran over the Great Western and Michigan Central to Chicago and into "what might be called the Northwest."

The White Line

diverged from the Lake Shore at Cleveland and pro-

ceeded through central and southern Ohio, Indiana, and Louis.'^

The Merchants' Dispatch

White, and Blue

^^

lines.

Illinois

to St.

covered the same territory as the Red,

After 1878 the cooperative lines operating over the

Central were confined to procuring freight in the west for eastern ship-

ment, while the Merchants' Dispatch took charge of the west bound freight over the Vanderbilt lines.^^

The Red,

Blue,

and White

lines

ran to Boston as well as to

New

York,

way

leaving the tracks of the Central at Albany and proceeding east by

and the Boston and Worcester. About 1878 the Hoosac

of the Western

Tunnel Line was organized

for the procuring of business for the route

through the tunnel. West of Albany

this freight line

ran over the

York Central and Lake Shore. Also serving Boston was patch-Grand Trunk

The

New

the National Dis-

route.^^

fast freight lines in

which the Erie was

chiefly

concerned were the

Great Western Dispatch and the Erie and North Shore Dispatch. Associated with the Erie in the Great

the Cleveland,

Columbus and

ern; the Indianapolis

and

St.

Western Dispatch were the Lake Shore;

Cincinnati; the Atlantic and Great West-

Louis; the Ohio and Mississippi; "and a few

lateral lines." ^^

The Erie and North Shore Dispatch, the moved west through Canada, dated from 1872, the year

cars of

in

which

which the

Niagara Falls branch of the Erie Railway was completed. In 1876 three smaller fast freight lines, the

Commercial Express, the Diamond, and the

Erie and Milwaukee, were absorbed by the Erie and North Shore.^^

The

prinicipal fast freight lines

the Star Union,

the

New

on the Pennsylvania were the Empire,

and the National Lines. According

to a correspondent of

York World, writing in 1878, each of these lines had its distinct West in which to procure freight for eastern shipment over

field in the

the Pennsylvania Railroad.^^

The

Continental Fast Freight Line, a cooperative in which the Balti-

more and Ohio,

the Marietta

and Cincinnati, and the Ohio and Mississippi

73


The American

Railroad Network,

i

861-1890

Railroads were associated was the chief fast freight line operating over the

By

B. and O.

the time of

its

organization in 1871, the Ohio River had been

bridged at Parkersburg and the gauge of the Ohio and Mississippi had

been narrowed

to

conform with that of

its

eastern connections. Thus, with

the inauguration of the Continental Fast Freight Line, "an unbroken

communication

is

opened between Baltimore and

Atlantic port to the

The

.

.

West and Southwest."

.

Louis, giving a

St.

new

^^

principal fast freight line in the area south of trunk line territory

was the Green Line, which had been organized

in 1868.

The

original

cooperating railroads were the Louisville and Nashville; the Nashville

and Northwestern; the Nashville, Chattanooga and

Louis; and the

St.

Western and Atlantic. By 1873 there were twenty-one corporations associated in the Green Line.^* At this same date there were at least two other fast freight lines in the

Line and the Great Southern, a

The

fast freight lines

line

made

Orleans)

running along the Atlantic seaboard.^^

mentioned by name in

this section

do not

An

tute a complete roster of such lines, even for the 1870's.

been

New

South, the Crescent (or Mobile and

consti-

attempt has

which were the most important. Nor should

to note only those

the impression that the lines operated only over the roads that have been

mentioned

as cooperating roads be allowed to stand.

freight lines ran by agreement over a great

associated in the lines. In the railroads

month

of

number

November,

The

of roads not actually

1872,

when

were actually cooperating in the Blue Line, the

ran over 124 different roads.^^ In 1873

it

was noted

cars of all the

that

only twenty

cars of the line

no southern

rail-

road of importance east of the Mississippi Valley was unaffected by the traffic

of the Green Line.^^

GROWTH AND ABUSES Largely as a result of the superior functioning of the the

amount

year. Rail

of grain diverted

from water

shipment was encouraged,

freight in contrast to high rates

on

fast freight lines

to all-rail routes increased each rates

on through

local traffic to lake ports,

but the ob-

to be sure,

by low

vious convenience and relative speed of the fast freights were important factors in their success.^^

which the

Other factors were the institutional reforms for

fast freight lines

were responsible. Most important of these was

the regular issuing of through bills of lading, commercial instruments

which were

largely

unknown

before 1860.^ÂŽ Prior to that time

74

it

had been


The Fast Freight

Lines,

861-1890

i

the custom of railroads to issue bills of lading for their

In the few cases in which through

bills

little

wrought

Not

fast freight lines

of lading

is

an index

was

made

The

fact that

were guaranteeing the

ac-

to the revolution that they

in shipping.

only did the fast freight lines take over an ever-increasing share of

from the Great Lakes and Erie Canal, but by the mid-

the grain traffic 1870's,

hedged

with the necessity of transshipping, which had

by the end of the 1870's the bills

so

practical value.^" It

the services of a forwarding firm indispensable to a shipper.

curacy of their

roads only.

were issued they were

about with restrictions that they proved of this situation, together

own

they had also absorbed a considerable

by coastwise

had been

vessel.

The

amount

of

once moved

traffic

route of the grain trade to Boston, for instance,

entirely changed. Before the time of the freight lines, grain

way of the Great Lakes, the New York where it was trans-

destined for that city had been shipped by

Hudson River

Erie Canal, and the

shipped to coastwise

vessels.

to

In 1874, however, the great bulk of grain was

West in through cars.'*^ By 1889 the fast freight lines had at their command some 60,000 cars,^^ most of which were engaged in hauling grain from the West. During the following reaching Boston directly from the

decade the railroads took away virtually

all

grain

traffic

from even the

Erie Canal.^^ 1877 the earlier non-cooperative fast freight lines had given

By

completely to either cooperative or

company

lines.

belong the Empire, the Union, and the National Hues,

all

the stock of

which had been purchased by the Pennsylvania Railroad. By

this date

most of the stock of the Merchants' Dispatch was in the hands of

also

the

way

In the latter category

New

York

Central.^^

Although most

cooperative fast freight lines were an tive,

before long

arose principally selves. The number of

run the

critics

early observers agreed that the

improvement over the non-coopera-

discovered evils in the

from competition among the

new

system. These evils

fast freight

lines

them-

large grain traffic of the i88o's led to a multiplication of the freight lines, for

risk of losing

no railroad or combination of roads could

through freight to a

rival

road or system. By 1891,

Boston, one of the most important grain shipping ports, was being served

by thirty-one ping

facilities

fast freight lines.^^

were limited and

In the early days of the lines, traffic

was

to

the necessary cars, the cooperative lines apparendy

75

when

ship-

be had simply by providing

had had no

freight


The American Railroad Network, agents of their

own

ing roads.^^ Later, lines,

i

861-1890

but had depended upon the agents of their cooperat-

when

they found themselves in competition with other

the cooperative lines, like the non-cooperative, hired agents, par-

ticularly in the

western

In January 1891,

than 20

it

cities.

was reported, there were

fast freight line offices,

in

Chicago alone "more

each supporting a force of soliciting agents

and

clerks." ^^

and

solicitors,

and

solicitors of 10 fast freight lines that

The same authority maintained that in St. Louis, a city with a smaller number of initial roads, fully as many fast freight line offices were maintained as in Chicago. One road with a terminus in St. Louis was not only at the expense of maintaining its own freight agency

point.^ÂŽ

but also paid

its

proportion of the expenses of the agencies

These "armies of agents" came

operated over

to

road from that

its

have considerable discretion in

the matter of rates, feeling themselves free to undercut the quotations of their competitors. In

single cause

1886 one observer questioned whether any other

was more responsible

for the demoralization of freight rates

than the competitive bidding of the freight lines for

Long

before the turn of the century a

number

cate the latter-day evils of the freight lines,

ment

traffic.^^

of critics,

hoping

were urging

in favor of a nation-wide clearing-house system that

the interchange of the cars of

all

roads.

76

their

to eradi-

abandon-

would permit


IX

LAST STEPS IN INTEGRATION, 1880-1890

TOWARD A NATION-WIDE STANDARD GAUGE During the of the standard gauge

rapid progress toward the adoption

1870's,

was made

all

over America except in that part of

A

the South east of the Mississippi River. less

than three per cent of

total

a

little

United States mileage, by 1880 had

complished the change by using a third of once divergent gauge

few roads, representing

rail.

ac-

But a number of railroads

had made an abrupt change

to the standard

gauge. This course was taken, for instance, by the 5 foot 6-inch Grand Trunk of Canada in 1874 and by the 6-foot Delaware, Lackawanna and

Western

in 1876.^

By

1880 practically

all

Canadian roads had shifted from

the 5 foot 6-inch gauge to standard. In the United States this

gauge, which had been

common

in Missouri

and other

same broad

states

south of

Missouri and west of the Mississippi River, had also virtually disappeared.^ Similarly, the 4 foot lo-inch gauge, previously so

and Ohio, had, except

for 52 miles, been

1880 nearly 81 per cent of

was equipped

to

accommodate

II per cent of total tical

all

common

changed

New

Jersey

By

the railroad mileage in the United States rolling stock of standard gauge.

Of

this,

mileage was of 4 foot 9-inch gauge, which for prac-

purposes was also standard, since equipment was usually exchanged

between roads of these two gauges "without objection." in the South

made up

the 3-foot lines

from

in

to standard gauge.

11. 4

per cent of the

and about 3 per cent

2 to 6 feet.*

77

total,

^

The

5-foot

gauge

leaving 4.8 per cent for

for miscellaneous gauges ranging


The American Railroad Network, As

1861-1890

the data given above indicate, the gauge developments in the South

between 1861 and 1880 were quite different on the two sippi River. In the trans-Mississippi Southwest,

roads had been broad gauge, post-Civil

And

gauge.

the older roads gradually

to facilitate interHne

exchange with

War

sjdes of the Missis-

where most of the

narrowed

their trackage in order

standard-gauge connections.

their

Pacific Railroad of Missouri, originally of 5-foot 6-inch gauge,

standard as early as 1869.

Of

the

earlier

construction was of standard

more than 2900 miles

The

had adopted

of railroad in the

Missouri in 1873, only 310 miles were of other than 4-foot 8V2inch gauge. At the same time not a single mile of broad gauge was to be state of

found in Texas.^ But

east of the Mississippi,

where the

5-foot

gauge had been most com-

mon, the tendency immediately following the war was toward sion of this gauge.

Not only was

construction, but a

few roads which had been

now

were

converted to a

struggle in

which

rail

this

width of track used

spread of 5

8/4 -inch gauge of the

the exten-

much new gauge

built to the standard

feet.

local mercantile interests

for

Thus,

after a

prolonged

sought to retain the 4-foot

North Carolina Railroad, northern

investors finally

gained control and forced a change to a 5-foot gauge which would itate interstate trade.^

7,267;

by 1880

it

facil-

In i860 the total miles of 5-foot gauge track was

had increased

to 12,137.^

Nevertheless, the rapid spread of the standard gauge outside the South

and the need

to facilitate

North-South trade tended gradually

to

extend

the mileage of standard gauge track, especially in southern border states.

The

first

railroad bridge across the

cinnati in 1870.

The

Ohio River was completed

inauguration of through

and the gradual completion of other bridges the pressure

on southern

at

Ohio River points increased

railroads to adopt the standard gauge. Chiefly

as a result of standard-gauge construction in Virginia,

Kentucky the percentage of South declined

slightly

at Cin-

across this bridge

traffic

total railroad

between i860 and

West

Virginia, and

mileage of 5-foot gauge in the

1880.^ Finally,

during the decade

of the eighties, the needs of through intersectional trade led to the almost

complete abandonment of the divergent southern gauge. In July 188 1, the gauge of the Kentucky Central Railroad was changed

from

5 feet to standard because the road

formed the link between the

standard-gauge Chesapeake and Ohio and the standard-gauge roads which

converged on Cincinnati. The Railroad Gazette, in accounting for the

78


Last Steps in Integration,

change gave

full credit to the

i

880-1 890

eastward-flowing grain and provision

traffic

which made uniformity of gauge "almost indispensable." Further, the

same source implied

that the

standard would force

tral to

change of the gauge of the Kentucky Cen-

Kentucky

the railroads in

all

to

gauge, for "with a standard-gauge road giving Kentucky outlet to the sea,

it

will be desirable that all

interchange cars with

among all

it."

Nor would

the

adopt that shortest

its

roads should be able to

its

Kentucky roads be unique

the railroads of the South in changing to standard. "Probably

purchases of rolling stock for Southern roads hereafter," prophesied

the Railroad Gazette, "will be

made with regard

to a possible future

^

change of gauge."

In 1884 the Illinois Central lines south of the Ohio adopted the standard

gauge, bringing the southern end of the Illinois Central into conformity

with the northern end and eliminating the necessity of changing the trucks on the cars at Cairo.

Mobile and Ohio

"Under the pressure changed

in July 1885, also

its

of competition," the

line to standard.

This

Nashville and the Cincinnati Southern, with no choice but to

make

similar change or be at a disadvantage in bidding for through

Other roads in the South perforce had ville

and the Cincinnati

February

trolled

with the Louisville and Nash-

JOINS

THE UNION

1886, representatives of all the

2,

hues in the South met effecting a

to act

a

traffic.

Southern.-^^

THE SOUTH

On

left

and Ohio, the Louisville and

the most direct competitors of the Mobile

at Atlanta,

important broad-gauge

Georgia, to discuss ways and means of

change of gauge on the more than 13,000 miles of track con-

by their companies.

the changeover

Monday, May

on

31,

all

It

was decided

the lines.

The

and Tuesday, June

at this

meeting

to synchronize

dates chosen for the project were i,

1886.^^

In line with the prediction of the Railroad Gazette, for some time prior to 1886,

southern roads had purchased equipment with an eye to

vertibility to a

narrower

gauge."^^

During

the beginning of February and the end of stock of the roads

was changed

to the

its

con-

the four-month period between

May

new gauge

1886, part of the rolling so that a supply of cars

and motive power would be available when the track gauge was changed.

The to

locomotives of the Southern roads could be more easily converted

standard gauge than could those of the broad gauge roads to the north,

79


The American Railroad Network, i 861-1890 for the

change in gauge for the Southern roads involved a change of only

three inches/^ as

compared with

a

change of 9V2 inches on the Canadian

roads and 15 V2 inches on the Erie. Another factor which kept cost of

down

the

changing the Southern gauge was that the Southern roads, on the

whole, had cost of

less rolling stock

than the Northern roads.^^ Nonetheless, the

changing the gauge of the Southern railroads was estimated

$150 a mile, "and on a

number

of lines

more than

at

was

half of the outlay

^^

for changes in the rolling stock."

In altering the track gauge over such a large area the experience of other roads which had changed gauge in the past was

one

rail,

of course,

while the other

was moved,

rail

was

left

that rail being shoved

undisturbed. Careful preparation was

before the day designated for the changeover.

May

each road assigned crews to smoothing

moving It

a

number

of spikes

drawn upon. Only

inward three inches

from the

rail

About

ties

and roadbed and

was marked

that

should be explained, perhaps, that in the days before

used the base of the

While

side.

rail

was held

made

the beginning of to re-

for shifting.

tie plates

were

by two spikes, one on either

to each tie

the outside spikes were left untouched by the

workmen,

two-thirds of the inside ones on straight track and every other one on

curves were drawn. Then, the distance that the

was

rail

to be set over

measured and new inside spikes driven into every third

new

line.

On to

tie

was

along the

All this was accomplished before the end of May.^ÂŽ

the date of the changeover at least three

each mile of track.

men

On

the Louisville

Where

workmen were

assigned

and Nashville the quota was

at

number of curves or bridges and trestles the quota was raised to five men. As a result of the careful preparations, all that had to be done was to draw the few spikes that remained to hold the rail in its old position, shove the base of the rail under least

four

to a mile.

there were a

new

the spikes that had been driven on the inside of the

minimum

in a

maining work was

An

gauge, and drive

of spikes to secure the outside of the shifted left to

be finished after

traffic

rail.

The

re-

had been resumed.^^

example of the speed with which the changeover was accomplished

was the record of a

Louisville

and Nashville

section

who changed eleven miles of track in four and Ten roads made the changeover on May 31st: ville;

the Nashville, Chattanooga

ton; the

and

Alabama Great Southern;

St.

foreman and

his

gang

a half hours.^^ the Louisville

Louis; the

and Nash-

Memphis and

Charles-

the Cincinnati Southern; the Cincin-

80


Last Steps in Integration, nati,

880-1 890

i

Selma and Mobile; the Montgomery and Eufala; the Southwestern

and Georgia; the Pensacola and Atlanta; and the Florida Railway and Navigation Company. All other main lines were changed on June

The in

event was an occasion for a holiday, people traveling

some

cases to

A.M. and

ments were suspended. June

I,

1886, the

On

watch the work crews.

pleted between 3:30

American

which time

was resumed

traffic

railroad system ".

a physically integrated network.^^

.

all train

after 4:00

had become

move-

P.M. on

for the first time

[A] passenger or

.

ist.

miles

both days the work was com-

4 P.M., during

When

many

freight car

could leave Portland, Maine, or Portland, Oregon; San Francisco, Chicago, or any prominent railway centre,

and

traverse without change of

New

trucks or bulk every mile of southern road leading to or Florida."

Orleans, Texas,

2^

A FOOTNOTE ON GAUGE Complete uniformity of gauge, however, had not quite been attained by the changeover of the Southern roads to "standard," for the "standard" adopted by those roads in 1886 was 4 sylvania Railroad system.^^

had

The

feet 9 inches, the

gauge of the Penn-

reason for this was that most of the roads

with the East and Northeast, and

their largest interchange business

consequently with the Pennsylvania and

connections.

its

As was pointed

out at that time, "there must necessarily be a large interchange of cars

with that road, and

would follow

it

admit Pennsylvania Railroad

cars,

that the

and

that

.

.

gauge used should readily .

[Southern] cars must be

acceptable to that road."^^ For the benefit of the unenlightened, the

Charleston

News and

lateral play" ficiently

gauge

A

all tracks,

a

gauge of 4

feet 9 inches

was

suf-

over the country."^ Nonetheless, in the interests of efficiency and

Southern roads in 1886 adopted the "limit gauge" of the Penn-

safety, the

less

was allowed on

near the northern gauge to permit the use of a uniform wheel

all

sylvania

Courier explained that since "a certain amount of

and voted

than the limits decade

to reject all cars

having wheel gauges which measured

set.^^

later, in

October 1896, the Committee on Standard Wheel

and Track Gauges of the American Railway Association recommended that 4 feet roads.

As

8|/4

inches be adopted as the track gauge for

late as 1899,

of 4 foot 9-inch

however, there were

gauge in the United 81

still

some

all

American

rail-

25,000 miles of track

States. In that year the

Master Car


The American Railroad Network, Builders' Association

i

861-1890

announced that railroad companies representing 82

per cent of the railroad mileage in the United States, Canada, and Mexico

had adopted the M. C. B. standard

car gauge. This car gauge, while in-

tended as a compromise which would be acceptable to both 4 foot S'/z-inch

and 4 foot 9-inch roads, as finally "improved and perfected" was admittedly designed for the narrower gauge. The only course left to the 4 foot

was

9-inch roads

to

draw

in their track

gauge

to the 4 foot 8 J/^ -inch stand-

ard.25

The

actual lessening of the

gauge of the 4 foot 9-inch roads by half an made whenever

inch took place without fanfare, the adjustment being track

had

to be replaced.

So gradually was the change accomplished that

the precise time at which

it

was completed

is

apparently

In the case of one road, the Louisville and Nashville,

have occurred sometime during the year 1900."

THE RAILROAD PATTERN During the States

now unknown. would seem

to

^^

IN 1890

thirty years following i860 railroad

grew more

"it

mileage in the United

rapidly than during any other period of comparable

length in the nation's history.

The

30,626 miles of line

could claim just prior to the Civil

War had

which the country

expanded by 1890

to almost

160,000 miles.

This striking expansion pares a railroad

map

is

immediately apparent

to

anyone who com-

of 1890 with one of i860. Moreover, the

map

of 1890,

unlike that for the earlier date, gives a fair representation of actual conditions, for

on maps

fact quite separate,

of i860 railroads

which seemed

to

ments had effected a virtual integration of the railroad ning of the

and

last

in cities

be joined were in

but by 1890 technological and institutional improvenet.

By

the begin-

decade of the nineteeth century trackage breaks

had been

all

at rivers

but eliminated. Most of the great streams had

been repeatedly bridged; where bridges proved unfeasible, as between Detroit and Windsor, efficient car ferries had been introduced. Tracks had

been joined in the towns; belt lines had been built through and around the great cities; terminals

had been improved; and many

double-tracked to care for increased

traffic.

By

1890, also,

lines

had been

only a negligible

percentage of the country's railroads were of other than standard gauge.

Rolling stock, both passenger and freight, increasingly equipped with standardized coupling and braking equipment,

82

moved smoothly from


Last Steps in Integration,

i

880-1 890

line to line. Physical obstacles to the free flow of traffic

had been

largely

eliminated. Institutional advances

Of

had kept pace with technological improvements.

these only the development of the fast freight lines has been

sized in the preceding chapters. But there were, of course,

the adoption of standard time belts

by use of different

empha-

many

others:

which replaced the confusion caused

local times; the issue of

through

tickets

good over con-

necting roads and often without the need to change cars, and the practice of using through bills of lading for freight shipments. Again, after the

war, most of the small railroad companies steadily became absorbed into great railroad empires. These giant organizations, though subject to re-

curring financial

difficulties

and suffering

the struggle between various promoters

made

at

and

times from being

pawns

in

speculators, over the period

substantial strides in perfecting railroad engineering, accounting,

and management.

We

have seen in the

chapters of this study

first five

limited markets before the Civil to the building of railroads

of the great market

work. The

War

how

in the age of

the forces of competition

had led

designed to serve the exclusive needs of each

The

result was an uncoordinated railroad patchshow how this patchwork was converted into network. Under the leadership of financiers and procities.

later chapters

a well-integrated

moters whose interests transcended local tional

economy which, on

roads,

and which, on the

the one hand, other,

moulded

unified transportation system.

83

loyalties,

was made

there

emerged a na-

possible by the rail-

the railroads themselves into a



NOTES I.

FOCUSING THE PROBLEM

1. L. C. A. Knowles, Economic Development in the Nineteenth Century (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1932), p. 201; Twelfth Census of the United

Manufactures, part i, pp. Iv and Ivii; and Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, The United States in the Twentieth Century (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company,

States, 1900,

1906), pp. 256-257.

On

2.

technical

Commerce

Nimmo, Jr., Report on the Internal (Washington: Government Printing Office, L. Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in

improvements

see:

Joseph

of the United States, 1881-82

1884), pp. 297-302; and J. the United States (Philadelphia, 1888), pp. 318-347.

Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, i8gg (Washington:

3.

Government Printing ica.

Office, 1900), pp. 659—662.

This restricted mercantile viewpoint was by no means to be found only in Amer-

4.

Frederic Bastiat devoted one of his most effective

terests in

Bordeaux who sought

through that

city.

See

to perpetuate a

"Un Chemin de Fer

satiric essays to the business in-

break in the railroad which passed

Negatif," in

Oeuvres Completes de

Frederic Bastiat (Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, Libraires, 1854), I, 93-94. 5. Report of the foint Special Committee in Relation to the Pennsylvania Railroad,

(pamphlet in the Lehigh University Library). This pamphlet confrom various merchant houses stressing the need for the railroad and also a minority report opposing participation by the city, largely on financial grounds. 6. For an interesting early expression of this viewpoint see Speech of T. G. Cary on the Use of the Credit of the State for the Hoosac Tunnel, Massachusetts Senate, May 18, 1853 (pamphlet in the Lehigh University Library). July

2,

1846, p. 8

tains letters

IL

THE RAILROAD MAP,

1861

1. A few important lines were completed during April 1861. For example: The Memphis, Clarksville and Louisville was connected to the Louisville and Nashville at Bowling Green; and the segment of the Mobile and Ohio between Corinth, Mississippi, and Jackson, Tennessee, went into operation. 2. The authors used chiefly the maps in the railroad guides for 1861 and 1862. The titles of the guides changed slightly from year to year. 3. A few good regional maps are available for dates just before or just after the war. See, for example, Frederic L. Paxson, "The Railroads of the 'Old Northwest' before the Civil War," Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, vol. XVII, part I (Madison, 1914), p. 266; E. Merton Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, i86$-i8yy, vol. VIII of A History of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1947), facing page 236. Special reference

85


Notes to Chapter should be

made

to

Robert C. Black,

III,

II

The Railroads

of the Confederacy (Chapel

North Carolina Press, 1952). This excellent, work, which appeared after the maps for diis study had been prepared, contains a very good map of southern railroads showing gauges. The map has proved helpful for purposes of comparHill: University of

ison.

Even

4.

tremely

if it

were desirable

difficult in

many

to

show

gauge variations, it would be exand detailed information is lacking.

these small

cases because reliable

5.

Tenth Census of the United

6.

References to gauges in the literature on the subject are not always reliable:

States, 1880, vol.

IV: Transportation,

p. 294.

thus Caroline E. MacGill in History of Transportation in the United States before i860 (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), p. 550, assigns a 5l/2-foot

gauge

to the

Ohio and

Mississippi instead of a 6-foot gauge.

Perhaps the most common error concerns the gauge of the New York Central. The gauge of this road was 4 feet 8V2 inches, not 4 feet 8 inches. Nor was it changed during the Civil War. See, for example, C. R. Fish, "The Northern Railroads, 1861," American Historical Review, 22:785 (July 1917); and Thomas Weber, The North-

(New York: King's Crown Press, 1952), apparentiy the result of a misprint on p. 70 in some but not

ern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-186^

The

p. 7.

confusion

is

and an error on p. 64 in AshRailway Directory for 1862. 7. This was especially true in the cases of some of the short railroads in Louisiana and Texas. The gauge of the Southern (Mississippi) Railroad was apparently changed from 4 feet 10 inches to 5 feet, either just before or during the war. The evidence is conflicting. See, for example. The Engineer, 1:97 (Nov. 8, i860); Burgess' Railway Directory for 1861, p. 180; and Ashcraft's Railway Directory for 1862, p. 140. all

copies of Burgess' Railway Directory for 1861

craft's

The

were Ashcraft's Railway Directory, Burgess RailLow and Burgess' Railway Directory. Useful for checking and comparison were King's Railway Directory for i86y (New York: A. H. King, 1867) James H. Lyles, Official Railway Manual of the Railroads of North America for i86g-yo (New York: Thitchener and Glastaeter, 1870), and Henry Varnum Poor, History of the Railroads and Canals of the United States (New York: John H. Schultz and Co., i860). 9. Henry Grote Lewin, Early British Railways (New York: Spon and Chamberlain, 1925), pp. 5, 8, 12, 26, and 89. Undoubtedly greater extremes existed in both directions. In 1846 the gauge of British tramways was reported to vary from 2 feet 8.

way

directories used chiefly

Directory, Low's Railway Directory, and

;

.

.

.

to 4 feet 8V2 inches. Journal of the Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania,

Third 10.

(November 1846), quoting the Mining Journal. American State Papers, Miscellaneous, I (Washington: Gales and Sea ton, 1834),

Series, 12:298

916. 1 1.

See, for example. Journal of the Fran\lin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania,

quoting The London Railway MagaDepartment of Agriculture, i8gg (Washington: Standard Government Printing Office, 1900), p. 652; Robert R. Brown, "Gauges and Otherwise," The Railway and Locomotive Historical Society, Bulletin No. 88

Third

Series,

13:15-16

(January

1847),

zine; Yearbook of the United States

—

(May 1953), p. 81; MacGill, History of Transportation in the United States before i860, p. 313; Richard B. Osborne, Is There any Reason Why the Present Gauge of our Iron Roads should be Adopted on our Future Railways? (Baltimore: Kelly, Piet

86


New

England and Canada,

i86i

and Co., 1871), p. 3 (pamphlet in Baker Library of Harvard University); and Horatio Allen, The Railroad Era, First Five Years of its Development (New York: 1884), pp. 30-31 (pamphlet). Considerable attention was paid in the United States to

12.

this controversy. See,

for example, Journal of the Fran\lin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania,

13.

12:298 14. 15.

vocate, 16.

(November 1846), and American Railway Review, 2:326 (May 31, i860). The American Railway Times, 13:186 (May 11, 1861). American Rail-Road Journal, 1:51 (January 21, 1832); and The Rail-Road Ad1:138-139 (February 28, 1832), and 1:145 (March 15, 1832). American Railway Review, 2:326 (May 31, i860).

III.

1.

Third

12:225-234 (October 1846), and continued in subsequent numbers. Journal of the Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania, Third Series,

Series,

NEW ENGLAND AND CANADA,

1861

Boston Board of Trade, Third Annual Report (Boston, 1857), p. 28; and EdCities and Transportation (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard

ward Chase Kirkland, Men, University Press, 1948),

I,

139-147.

American Railway Review, 2:4 (December i, 1859). 3. Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation, I, 137-138; and Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston, 1856), p. 17. During the summer westward shipments from Boston were also made by a circuitous route through Rutland, Vermont, and then to Schenectady where they continued via the Eria Canal. Ibid., 2.

p.

20.

4. Ibid., pp. 20-21; Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation, I, 158-191; and G. P. de T. Glazebrook, A History of Transportation in Canada (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1938), p. 165. 5. The story of railroad development in Maine is well told in Kirkland, Men,

Cities 6.

and Transportation, I, chapter vii. American Railway Review, 1:10 (November

17,

1859), quoted

from Boston

November 8, 1859. Edmund F. Webb, ed. The Railroad Laws

Transcript,

of Maine (Pordand, Maine: DresMcLellan and Co., 1875), p. 14. 8. A. C. Morton, Report on the Gauge for the St. Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad (Portland: Thurston and Co., 1847). 9. Laura Elizabeth Poor, ed., The First International Railway and the Colonization of New England: Life and Writings of John Alfred Poor (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892), pp. 50-51. 10. Webb, ed.. The Railroad Laws of Maine, p. 629. See also John A. Poor, No Restrictions on Railway Transit. Argument of John A. Poor before the Joint Standing Committee on Railroads, Ways and Bridges (Bangor, Maine: David Bugbee and Co., 1865), pp. 6-7, 24-25; and Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report 7.

ser,

(Boston, 1865), pp. 40-42. 11.

Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation,

I,

215-218.

Frank Walker Stevens, The Beginnings of the New Yor\ Central Railroad (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926), pp. 342-346; Thomas C. Keefer, "Travel and Transportation" in Eighty Years' Progress of British North America (Toronto: 12.

87


Notes to Chapter

III

Henry B. Gibson to Erastus Corning, Canandaigua, and same to same, June 14, 1852, in- Corning Papers, Albany Institute of History and Art, Albany, New York. 13. Keefer, "Travel and Transportation" in Eighty Years' Progress of Briiisk North America, pp. 245-246. 14. Ibid., pp. 194 and 253. 15. On the early railroads of Canada and the Maritime Provinces see Glazebrook, A History of Transportation in Canada, chapter v; and Norman Thompson and Major J. H. Edgar, Canadian Railway Development from the Earliest Times (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1933). 16. Low and Burgess' Railway Directory, i860, p. 176. 17. American Railway Review, 1:6 (November 17, 1859), and 2:6 (December L. Stebbins, 1863), pp. 253-254;

New

I,

York, March

24, 1852,

1859).

IV.

THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES,

1

861

But not including the Ogdensburg Railroad (also called The Northern), for formed part of the rival New England system. New York merchants had gone to considerable lengths to prevent the building of a bridge to carry this railroad across the northern end of Lake Champlain. See J. B. Varnum, "Railroad Legislation of New York in 1849," Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 21:171-177 (August 1849). 2. Frank Walker Stevens, The Beginnings of the New Yor\ Central Railroad, A History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926); Harry H. Pierce, Railroads of New Yor\, A Study of Government Aid, i8^6-i8y^ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), especially chapters i and 4; and David Maldwyn Ellis, "Albany Commercial Rivals," New Yor\ History, 24:484-511 (October 1943). and Troy Some of the roads which united to form the New York Central were not 3. originally built to a gauge of 4 feet 8/4 inches. Thus, the Mohawk and Hudson had been constructed with its rails 4 feet 9 inches apart. Stevens, The Beginnings of the 1.

this line, as already indicated,

—

New 4. 5.

Yor\ Central Railroad, p. 33. But the legislature soon granted exceptions to this restriction. Edward Harold Mott, Between the Ocean and the La\es, The Story

(New York: John S. were being made for gineer for the road

Collins,

1901), pp. 44-45.

When

in the

of Erie

middle 1840's plans

building the Western Division of the Erie, the consulting en-

recommended

a five-foot gauge, but the board of directors voted

and Horatio Allen, The Railroad Era, First Five Years of its Development (New York: 1884), p. 31 (pamphlet). 6. Jules I. Bogen, The Anthracite Railroads (New York: The Ronald Press, 1927), pp. 83-84; Wheaton J. Lane, From Indian Trail to Iron Horse, Travel and

against any change. Ibid., p. 45;

Transportation in

New

fersey

1620-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1939), P- 3877. On New Jersey railroads, see especially Lane, From Indian Trail to Iron Horse, Travel and Transportation in New Jersey 1620-1860. The Camden and Adantic Railroad, another standard-gauge railroad, connected Philadelphia and Adantic City. It belonged to the Philadelphia system, however, rather than to that of New York. 8. L. 1852, No. 36. Cf. Frederick A. Cleveland and Fred Wilbur Powell, Railroad Promotion and Capitalization in the United States (New York: Longman's,


The Middle Atlantic

States, i86i

Green, and Co., 1909), p. 126; Edward Hungerford, Men of Erie (New York: RanHouse, 1946), pp. 34-37; and Robert J. Casey and W. A. S. Douglas, The

dom

(New York: McGraw-Hill Book

LacJ^awatuia Story

On

9.

Progress, History of the

Lyon Company, 10.

Co., 1951), chapters 8

and

The Anthracite Railroad, and A Century Delaware and Hudson Company 182^-1^2^ (Albany: J.

the coal roads, see Bogen,

10.

of B.

1925),

The southern

came

counties

to the support of Baltimore.

James Weston Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry I/801860 (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1947), chapters vi and vii; and George H. Burgess and Miles C. Kennedy, Centennial His11.

Company

tory of the Pennsylvania Railroad

(Philadelphia:

The Pennsylvania

Rail-

road Company, 1949), pp. 128-138. 12.

Ibid., p. 37.

13.

But by no means did

all

the funds

come from

private sources.

It

was

re-

ported in the Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Feb. 2, 1857, p. 6, that nearly one-half of the company's stock was owned by the city of Philadel-

phia and Allegheny County.

Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Feb. 2, 1857, and Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, i82y-ig2y (New York: G. P. Pumam's Sons, 1928), I, 249-250; Niles' National Reg14.

See

pp. 35-39;

ister,

69:96 (October 11, 1845). History of the Railway Mail Service, 48th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate

15.

Document No. 40, p. 59; and Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, February 7, 1859, pp. 3-5 and 15-16. 16. Improved Railway Connections in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: James H.

Exec.

Bryson, 1863), 17.

p. 3

(pamphlet in the Boston Public Library).

The Merchants' Magazine,

way Connections

in

Philadelphia;

46:39 (January 1862). See also Improved RailThe Merchants' Magazine, /[Gij^—y^ (January

1862); William Ferguson, America by River and Rail (London: James Nisbet and Company, 1856), pp. 94, 223; Joseph P. Bradley, William Wheeler Hubbell, and George Ashmun, Considerations upon the Question Whether Congress Should Authorize a New Railroad between Washington and New Yor\ (New York: G. S. Gideon and Company, 1863) Congressional Globe, February 7, 1863, p. 773, and February 11, 1863, p. 886; and Statement Made by the Railroad Companies Owning the Lines between Washington and New Yor\ to the Postmaster General (Wash;

ington: Gideon and Pearson, 1863).

American Railroad Journal, 17:6 (January 5, 1861), and 17:301 (April 13, and Rail, p. 98. 19. John W. Brooks, The Pro Rata Question, What is the True Policy of the State of New Yor](? (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1869), p. 15. 20. John W. Garrett, President, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, February 9, 1862, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, House Exec. Document No. 79, p. 4. 21. See especially Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, vol. I; Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry, chapters vii and viii; Burgess and Kennedy, Centennial History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, pp. 128-138; and Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston 1856), 18.

1861); Ferguson, America by River

pp. 14-15.

89


Notes to Chapter IV 22.

L.

1

85 1, No. 122.

This repeal was stoutly denounced by Philadelphia merchants. See Philadelphia Board of Trade, Twenty-First Annual Report, February 6, ^854, pp. 5-6. 24. This story has been told often. One of the best accounts is to be found in 23.

Donald H. Kent, "The Erie

War

of the Gauges," Pennsylvania History, 15:253-275

(October 1948). 25.

Annual Report, February

Philadelphia Board of Trade, Twenty-First

PP- 35-36; see also, pp. 5, 6, 20-23, and 34-36. 26. After some delay caused by local interests. See Tenth

Pennsylvania Railroad Company, February 27. 28.

(New 29.

2,

1854,

6,

Annual Report

of the

1857, p. 13.

See pp. 59-60.

Rolland Harper Maybee, Railroad Competition and the Oil Trade i8^^-i8y^ York: Extension Press, Central State Teachers' College, 1940), p. 81. Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, I, 265-266, 293;

Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston, 1856), pp. 14-16, and Third Annual Report (Boston, 1857), p. 22.

Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, I, 293-296; Jr., Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States (Washington: Government Printing OflSce, 1881), Appendix, pp. 234-235. 31. The Merchants' Magazine, 44:370 (March 1861). 30.

Joseph

Nimmo,

V. 1.

MIDWEST AND SOUTH,

See, for example, Charles Frederick Carter,

1861

When

Railroads

Were

New (New

York: Simons-Boardman Publishing Co., 1926), pp. 220-222; Robert L. Black, The Little Miami Railroad (Cincinnati, Ohio: n.d.), p. 32; and J. E. Glover, The Clicf^ of the Rails (Jackson, Tenn.: The Railroader, Publishers, 1929), p. 15. 2. Annual Report of the (Ohio) Commission of Railroads and Telegraphs for the year i8yo (Columbus, Ohio: Nevins and Myers, 1870), I, 21. 3.

Ibid., p. 27.

4.

Ibid., pp.

5.

The Engineer,

(December 6.

532 and 561. 1:61 (October

4,

i860); and

The Railroad Record, 8:510-511

i860).

13,

The General Railroad Law

of the state of Missouri, adopted February 24,

roads to be built to a gauge of 5 feet 6 inches but, like the similar legislation which established an oflBcial gauge for Ohio, seems to have had littie 1853, required

effect.

An

Act

all

to

Authorize the Formation of Railroad Associations

Missouri Democrat, 1854), p. 7. Charles Henry Ambler, dale, California:

(St.

Louis:

The

14.

A History

The Arthur H. Clark

Ohio Valley (Glenand Louis C. Hunter,

of Transportation in the

Co., 1932), pp. 211-212;

Steamboats on the Western Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), PP- 594-5958.

9.

Ambler, A History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley, pp. 212-230, Wylie J. Daniels, The Village at the End of the Road, A Chapter in Early

In-

diana Railroad History (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1938), pp. 99-100. 10. Walter Smith, Annual Review of the Commerce of Cincinnati (Cincinnati: 1864), p. 12.

90


Midwest and South,

i86i

11. Boston Board of Trade, Third Annual Report (Boston, 1857), pp. 23-24; George H. Burgess and Miles C. Kennedy, Centennial History of the Pennsylvania

Company (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1949), pp. Through shipment from Buffalo to Chicago without change of gauge was possible via the so-called Cleveland, Crestline and Chicago Route. The gauge

Railroad 176-179. also

of this route, which used the tracks of the Cleveland, Cresdine and Chicago Railroad from Cleveland to Cresdine, and that of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago from Crestline to Chicago, was 4 feet 10 inches throughout. American Railway Review, 2:7 (December i, 1859). 12. Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston, 1856), pp. 14-15; Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), I, 325-326. 13. American Railway Review, 3:251 (October 25, i860). 14. Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio, I, 298-301. 15. Though Missouri railroads were of two gauges, no evidence has come to light which would indicate that this situation was deliberately created or continued

because of commercial rivalry.

Frank Haigh Dixon, A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System 16. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 32. 17. Arthur Charles Cole, The Era of the Civil War, 1848-1870, vol. Ill of The Centennial History of Illinois (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois Centennial Commission, 1919), pp. 32-36, 43-46; Wyatt Winton Belcher, The Economic Rivalry between St. Louis and Chicago 18^0-1880 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947),

pp. 92-95.

Whether St. Louisians favored the 6-foot gauge adopted for this road, and whether for motives of excluding competition, is not known. 19. W. B. Baker, Annual Statement of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis for the Year 18^8 (St. Louis, Missouri: Baker and Hildreth, 1859), pp. 5-6. See also American Railway Review, 3:245 (October 25, i860); and William F. Switzler, Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States, part II of Commerce and Navigation, Special Report on the Commerce of the Mississippi, Ohio, and Other Rivers, and of the Bridges Which Cross Them, Treasury Department Document No. 1039b, Bureau of Statistics (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888), pp. 19-25. 20. American Railway Review, 3:87 (August 16, i860), and 3:393 (December 18.

if so,

27, i860). 21.

Bessie Louise Pierce,

41—43; Belcher, 18^0-1880, pp. 62-64. 1940), 22. rick,

II,

Charleston Courier,

A

History of Chicago

(New York:

The Economic Rivalry Between March

13, 1828, as

quoted

in

St.

Alfred A. Knopf,

Louis and Chicago

Samuel Melanchthon Der-

Centennial History of South Carolina Railroad (Columbia, S.C:

Co., 1930), p. 19.

On

The

State

the role of local interests in the early construction of Southern

"North American Railroads: Public Railroad Conand the Development of Private Enterprise in the South Before 1861," Journal of Economic History, Supplement X (1950), 43-45. railroads see Milton S. Heath,

struction

23.

The

point probably should be made, as suggested by Robert

M.

Sutton, that

the federal land grant of 1850 to Illinois, Mississippi, action taken by the

and Alabama was the only which even remotely suggested

government before the Civil War Here was an attempt

a national transportation policy.

91

to provide rail transportation


Notes to Chapter

V

between the Lakes and the Gulf. But the policy was not fully realized because there was a difference in gauge between the Illinois Central and the southern roads and because it was necessary to resort to the river between Columbus and Cairo. 24. A small gap between Corinth and Jackson remained on the Mobile and Ohio until April 22, 1861. On New Orleans-Mobile rivalry see R. S. Cotterill, "Southern Railroads, 1850-1860," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 10:396-401 (March 1924). 25. American Railroad Journal, 17:264 (March 30, 1861); and U. B. Phillips, A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to i860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), pp. 359-361.

Kenneth Brown,

Cecil

26.

The

Hill:

A. Ashe

A

State

Movement

in Railroad

Development (Chapel

University of North Carolina Press, 1928), pp. 66-69, 164-165; Samuel

et

eds..

al.,

Biographical History of North Carolina (Greensboro, N.C.:

Van Noppen, 1917), VIII, 33. Horatio Allen, The Railroad Era, First

Charles L. 27.

York, 1884),

Five Years of

its

Development (New

(pamphlet); Derrick, Centennial History of South

31

p.

Carolina

Railroad, p. 40. 28.

This was changed to 5

feet just before or

during the war. The exact date

has proved impossible to determine.

A

29.

Brown,

30.

Ibid., pp.

State

Movement

in Railroad

Development,

18-19, 22-23, 365 137, 166-168, 179-181;

p. 18.

and "A History

of the

Piedmont Railroad Company," North Carolina Historical Review, 3:198-222 (April 1926). 31.

Robert C. Black,

III,

North Carolina

versity of

The Railroads

of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: Uni-

Press, 1952), pp. 9, 73-74.

(New York: J. H. Col ton and Co., 1855), and Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1891-1895), plate 70. 32.

vol.

I,

33.

See Colton's Atlas of the World

plate 28;

Letter

from Major W, S. Ashe to Jefferson Davis, November 27, 1861. C. S. War Department Collection of Confederate Records, War Rec-

Railroad Documents,

ords Division, National Archives, cited in Robert C. Black,

Confederacy, road, pp.

p.

8-1 19; Phillips,

1 1

A

W.

of the

History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt

to i860, pp. 162-163, 207-208, 216;

cited in C.

The Railroads

See also Derrick, Centennial History of South Carolina Rail-

9.

and Savannah Republican, November

1861,

11,

Ramsdell, "Confederate Government and the Railroads," American

Historical Review, 22:797 (July 1917)34.

See Atlas to

Armies, plates 35.

23, 25

The War

Accompany

the Official Records of the Union and Confederate

and 132; and Coltons Atlas

of the Rebellion,

Union and Confederate Armies,

A

of the

World,

vol.

i,

plate 28.

Compilation of the Official Records of the

series IV, vol.

I,

p. 486; see also pp. 394,

405-406,

417-418, 484-486. 36.

lem.

The

On

Richmond probThomas J. Werten-

references in the preceding footnote also deal with the

the position of Norfolk in these inter-city rivalries see

baker, Norfolk^: Historic Southern Port

(Durham: Duke University

pp. 192-203.

92

Press,

1931),


The Trend Toward VI.

i

861-1870

THE TREND TOWARD INTEGRATION,

1861-1870

For a first-hand account of shipping methods in this period, see the testimony D. Worcester in 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307,

1.

of E.

Part

Integration,

2, p.

130.

A. C. Morton, Report on the Gauge for the St. Lawrence and Atlanta Railroad (Pordand: Thurston and Company, 1847), pp. 20-21. George Dartnell, A Proposed Plan for a Rail Road Clearing House (Buffalo: 3. Clapp, Matthews and Co's Steam Printing House, 1858), pp. 11-12. Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part 2, p. 1048. 4. 2.

5.

Ibid., p. 1046.

6.

Patrick Barry, Over the Atlantic

Low,

and Great Western Railway (London:

S.

&

Marston, 1866), pp. 62-64, 66-67. The Resources and Prospects of America Ascertained during a Visit to the 7. States in the Autumn of 186^ (London and New York, 1866), p. 277. son,

See pp. 31-32. Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part

8.

9.

10. 11.

2, p.

1047.

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 13:210 (August 12, 1871). Boston Board of Trade, Third Annual Report (Boston, 1857), p. 27; Twelfth

Annual Report (1866),

p. 70;

Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part

may well have been on the George Dartnell stated in 1858 that the cost of transshipment was twentyfive cents a ton and the delay amounted to about twenty-four hours. A Proposed Plan for a Rail Road Clearing House, p. 11. 1048.

2, p.

low

Seven cents a ton for the cost of transshipment

side.

Robert C. Black, III, The Railroads of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: UniNorth Carolina Press, 1952), and Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads the Civil War, 1861-186^ (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 12.

versity of in

1952), cover this period in detail. 13. Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy, pp. 72-77, 148-163, discusses the building of these and other links in the South during the war years.

14.

New

Yorl{ Times, February

6,

1863.

January 21, 1863. 16. Ibid., January 21, and February 5 and 6, 1863; and Improved Railway Connections in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: James H. Bryson, 1863), pamphlet in Boston 15.

Ibid.,

Public Library. 17.

Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the President and Directors to the Stock-

holders of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company (Philadelphia: James H. Bryson and Son, 1864), p. 14. See also J. L. Ringwalt, Develop-

ment

of Transportation Systems in the United States (Philadelphia:

Railway World

Office, 1888), pp. 188-189. 18. On the use of steam engines on city streets in Boston and New York see American Railway Times, 16:166 (May 21, 1864), and American Railroad Journal,

18:537 (July 12, 1862). 19. Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report (Boston, 1865), pp. 40-41; Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-186^, pp. 15-17. Chapter II of Weber's volume is concerned with railroad construcdon in the North during

the war. 20.

Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report (Boston, 1865),

93

p. 41.


Notes to Chapter VI

I

21.

Ibid.

22.

Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part

2,

pp. 958-960,

and

046- I 049.

23. Ibid., p. 959. See also Silas Seymour, A Review of the Theory of Narrow Gauges (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1871), pp. 23-24. 24.

Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part

25.

Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part

26.

Ibid., p. 1484.

i, p.

2, p.

492. 1049.

27. George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 181^-1860, The Economic History of the United States, IV (New York: Rinehart and Company,

1951), p. 167.

New York in 1870 were 26.11 cents by rail and water. Yearboo\ of the United States Department of Agriculture, i8gg (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), Freight rates on wheat from Chicago to

28.

a bushel by rail

and

19.58 cents

p. 660.

The Transportation Revolution, 181^-1860,

29.

Taylor,

30.

American Railway Review, 3:155 (September, i860). Philadelphia Board of Trade, Twenty-eighth Annual Report (Philadelphia,

31.

p. 167.

1861), pp. 63-64.

Philadelphia Board of Trade, Thirty-second

32.

Annual Report

(Philadelphia,

1865), p. 39.

See Louis Bernard Schmidt,

33.

Iowa fournal of History and 1921), and 20:70-131 (January

"The

Internal

States,"

Politics,

(July

1922).

SOLVING THE GAUGE DIFFERENTIALS,

VII.

In 1876 the

1.

Grain Trade of the United

19:196-245 (April 1921), 19:414-455

Empire and

the

1860-1880

Green Fast Freight Lines, both controlled by the

owned

over 4500 cars of compromise gauge. Theory and Practice of the American System of Through Fast Freight Transportation as Illustrated in the Operation of the Empire Transportation Company (Philadelphia: Hel-

Pennsylvania Railroad,

Lewis and Greene, 1876), p. 16. Seymour, A Review of the Theory of Narrow Gauges (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1871), p. 23. 3. Charles S. Tisdale to Lorenzo Sabine, Boston, November 2, 1863, as quoted in Boston Board of Trade, Tenth Annual Report (Boston, 1864), pp. 33-34; Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report (Boston 1865), p. 40. 4. American Railroad fournal, 29:1329 (October 18, 1873), and 30:1572-1573 (December 5, 1874) Edward C. Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation (Cam-

fenstein,

Silas

2.

;

bridge:

Harvard University

Carlton

6.

J.

(New York:

tral

I,

445.

ist Session

Creative

Quarto Volume (April 7.

Press, 1948),

(1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 117. Corliss, Main Line of Mid-America; the Story of the Illinois Cen-

43rd Congress,

5.

Age

Press,

1950), pp. 205-206; Railroad Gazette, Fifth

12, 1873), p. 146.

Ibid.

American Railroad fournal, 30:1573 (December 5, 1874); Edward Harold Mott, Between the Ocean and the La\es, the Story of Erie (New York: John S. 8.

CoUins, 1901), pp. 227, 234.

94


Solving the Gauge Differentials, E. Lavoinne et E. Pontzen, Les

9.

i

861—1880

Chemins de Fer en Amerique

braire des Corps des Ponts et Chaussees et des Mines, 1882), 10.

Kincaid A. Herr, The Louisville Magazine, 1943), p. 46.

L&

ville:

&

I,

(Paris: Li-

425-426.

Nashville Railroad, 18^0-1^42 (Louis-

N

11.

Ibid.

12.

Ibid., pp. 46, 76;

and Railroad Gazette, Nineteenth Quarto Volume (Octo-

ber 14, 1887), p. 668. 13.

Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part

14.

American Railroad Journal, 29:928 (June 21, 1873). Ibid., 30:1541 (December 5, 1874). Ibid., 30:1573 (December 5, 1874). Ibid., 29:928 (June 21, 1873); Mott, Between the Ocean and the La\es, pp.

15.

16. 17.

2, p.

959.

147-148. 18. 2,

American Railroad Journal, 33:36 (January

13,

1877);

ibid.,

36:25 (January

1880).

19. Ibid., 29:928 (June 21, 1873); Alfred F. Sears, On Small Gauge Railroads: A Paper read before the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania and Sodus Bay Railroad Company (Seneca Falls, 1871), pp. 7-8.

20.

Blue Line, General Manager's Report for the Year i86y (Detroit, 1868),

p. 10.

Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report (Boston, 1865), p. 41. American Railroad Journal, 29:1329 (October 18, 1873). 23. For a description of the method used by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to narrow the gauge of their locomotives in 1886 see Herr, Louisville & Nash21.

22.

Railroad, pp. 47, 48.

ville

Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p. 294. gauge had been formed by means of a third rail, the compilers of the census reduced the third rail to equivalent track (that is, divided the length of the rail by two) and added that figure to the trackage of the railroad. Therefore, doublegauge mileage was considerably less than it would appear to have been from a hasty first reading of the census figures. Adjustments have been made in the statis24.

When

tics

a double

given above. 25.

Railroad Gazette, Fifteenth Quarto

26.

The

literature of this subject

Financial Chronicle, 15:52 (July

13,

is

Volume (October

12, 1883), p. 674.

voluminous. See especially Commercial and

1872); and American Railroad Journal, 28:939

(July 27, 1872).

10,

American Railroad Journal, 27:598 (June

27.

Quoted

28.

Ibid.,

28:875 (July

29.

New

Yor\ Times,

I

in

3,

1871).

13, 1872).

as

quoted in American Railroad Journal, 27:629 (June

871).

30.

American Railroad Journal, 30:1467 (November

31.

Ibid.,

34:492

(May

4,

32.

Tenth Census of the United

33.

Railroad Gazette, Fifteenth Quarto

34.

Ibid., p. 674.

35.

36.

1874).

14,

1878). States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p. 294.

Volume (October

Ibid., Sixteenth Quarto Volume (April 11, 1884), American Railroad Journal, 30:1573 (December

95

12,

p. 281. 5,

1874).

1883), p. 674.


Notes to Chapter VIII

THE FAST FREIGHT

VIII.

1.

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 8:584 (May

2.

Michigan Central Railroad Company, Annual Report (Detroit, 1869),

(Italics

8,

1869). p.

6.

added.)

3.

Ibid.,

4.

I bid., 1869, p. 6.

5.

Buffalo Board of Trade,

6.

The

1873, p. 21.

Annual Statement

(Buffalo, 1855), p. 38.

1000 cars with sliding wheels which were operating over the Grand

Trunk and

connections in the early 1870's were the property of the National

its

Dispatch, a fast freight

line.

Edward

(Cambridge: Harvard University

C. Kirkland,

Press, 1948),

I,

Men,

Cities

and Transportation

445.

Blue Line, General Manager's Report for the Year i86y (Detroit, 1868), p. cars were transported across the river between Winsor and Detroit by means

7.

10.

LINES, 1861-1890

The

of a steam ferry. 8.

L. Ringwalt,

J.

Development

(Philadelphia: Railway

World

of Transportation Systems in the United States

Office, 1888), p. 193.

D. H. Weld, 'Trivate Freight Cars and American Railways," Columbia XXXI, No. i (1908), p. 76. 10. Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston, 1856), p. 19; Railway World, 4:745 (August 3, 1878). 11. Railway Review, 30:22 (January 11, 1890); Weld, "Private Freight Cars and American Railways," p. 76; Grover G. Huebner and Emory R. Johnson, The Railroad Freight Service (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1926), p. 94. For a detailed account of the Star Union Line see Huebner and Johnson, pp. 94-96. 12. Huebner and Johnson, The Railroad Freight Service, p. 97; Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation, I, 441-442. 13. 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part i, p. 77. L.

9.

Universit\', Studies in Political Science, vol.

14.

Hudson

Democrat

E. Bridge,

With a

Stock^h older s: (St.

The

Pacific Railroad Controversy,

an Open Letter to the

Series of Articles Originally Published in the Daily Missouri

Louis: Missouri

Democrat Printing House,

1869), pp. 15-21 (second

pagination); Testimony of G. R. Blanchard, 2nd vice-president, Erie Railway pany, 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 362; Huebner and Johnson, The Railroad Freight Service, pp. 96-97.

The

Pacific Railroad Controversy, pp. 15-21

15.

Bridge,

16.

Testimony of Joseph D.

Congress, ist

Johnson, 17.

Com-

pp. 361-

(second pagination).

Empire Fast-Freight Line, 43rd Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 26; Huebner and

The Railroad Freight

president.

Potts,

Service, pp. 96-97.

Testimony of G. R. Blanchard, 2nd

43rd Congress, 18.

2,

ist Session

vice-president, Erie

Railway Company,

(1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part

2, p.

Boston Board of Trade, Twelfth Annual Report (Boston, 1866),

ican Railroad Journal, 23:703

(July 27,

1867).

The

362.

p. 69;

Amer-

cooperative lines were often,

though not always, designated by a color, such as the Red Line, the Blue Line, or the Green Line. The White Line, which ran west of St. Louis over the Pacific Railroad, was organized and operated for some time as a non-cooperative line. Bridge,

The

Pacific Railroad Controversy, pp.

14-15 (second pagination).

96


The

Fast Freight Lines, 1861-1890

William H. Joubert, Southern Freight Rates

19.

in Transition (Gainesville:

Uni-

versity of Florida Press, 1949), p. 32.

Charles A. Sindall, "The Development of the Traffice between the Southern and the Northern and Northwestern States," 49th Congress, 2nd Session (1886-87), House Executive Document No. 7, Part 2, p. 681. 21. Railroad Gazette, Third Quarto Volume (November 29, 1873), p. 478; 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part i, p. 77. An exception to this occurred in the South where freight rates on some 22. through traffic carried by the Green Line were set by a committee composed of six men selected by the officials of the member roads. Joubert, Southern Freight Rates 20.

States

in Transition, p. 34. 23. Testimony of E. D. Worcester, 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 127. 24. 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, pp. 2-3. Ibid., p. 131.

25.

Testimony of E. D. Worcester, 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 126. 27. For maps of the trunk line systems and their through freight line connections see Joseph Nimmo, Jr., Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States i8y6 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1877), maps No. 4, 5, 6 and 7. Although valuable because they are the best available, these maps are unfortunately incomplete and not always accurate in detail. 28. Railway World, 4:745 (August 3, 1878). 29. Boston Board of Trade, Thirteenth Annual Report (Boston, 1867), pp. 39-40; the Boston and Albany Railroad Company vs. the Boston and Lowell Railroad Company, I. Interstate Commerce Commission Reports: Decisions, 163 (1887-1888); Railway World, 4:745 (August 3, 1878). 30. Testimony of G. R. Blanchard, 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 363. 31. 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 364; [Hepburn New York, Proceedings of the Special Committee on Railroads. Committee], vol. V, p. 16 of part of volume devoted to exhibits. 32. Quoted in Railway World, 4:746 (August 3, 1878). 33. American Railroad Journal, 27:877 (August 12, 1871). 34. For a complete account of the Green Line see Joubert, Southern Freight 26.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Rates in Transition, pp. 31-40. 35.

Testimony of Thomas E. Walker, general claim-agent. Green Line, 43rd ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 780. 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873—74), Senate Report No. 307, Part i, pp. 119-

Congress, 36.

120. 37.

Joubert, Southern Freight Rates in Transition, p. 32.

38.

Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation,

39.

Ibid., p. 501.

The

I,

499.

secretary of the Cincinnati

Chamber

of

Commerce

stated

between Cincinnati and Adantic ports occurred in 1853. Joseph Nimmo, Jr., Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States, 1880 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), Appendix, p. 234. that the first use of through bills of lading

40.

Huebner and Johnson, The Railroad Freight

41.

43rd Congress,

ist Session

Service, p. 92.

(1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part

97

i, p.

31.


Notes to Chapter VIII Albert

42.

S. Bolles, Industrial

History of the United States (Norwich, Connecti-

Henry Bill Publishing Company, 1889), p. 662. 43. David M. Ellis, "New York and the Western Trade,"

cut:

New

Yor\ History,

33:388 (October, 1952). 44. American Railroad Journal, 33:1189 (September 22, 1877); Railway World, 4:745 (August 3, 1878). After a freight line had been purchased by a railroad it was

operated as a freight department within the railroad company.

Boston Chamber of Commerce, Sixth Annual Report (Boston, 1891), pp.

45. 1 1

8-1 19.

46. Testimony of E. D. Worcester, 43rd Congress, Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 127. 47. Railway Review, 31:57 (January 24, 1891).

ist Session

(1873-74), Senate

48.

Ibid.

49.

Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United States, p.

193-

IX.

1. J.

LAST STEPS IN INTEGRATION,

1880-1890

American Railroad Journal, 30:1572-1573 (December

Casey and

195O,

W.

A.

S.

Douglas, The Lackawanna Story

5,

1874); and Robert

(New York: McGraw-Hill,

P- 94-

two short lines representing a total length of 128 miles remained. Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p. 294. About 1880 the Pennsylvania, a road of 4 foot 9-inch gauge, adopted what it called a "limit gauge." Plagued by numerous tie-ups, which were caused by cars with too narrow a gauge for its tracks, the road set up rigid specifications and all cars were inspected as they came onto its line. Those that failed to fall within the specifications were rejected. There was apparently no similar "limit gauge" on any other line at this time, but in the opinion of some railroad men there should have been. Railroad Gazette, Fourteenth Quarto Volume (March 3, 1882), p. 133. 4. Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p. 294. 5. Edward Vernon, American Railroad Manual for the United States and the Dominion (New York: American Railroad Manual Company, 1873), pp. 371, 500, 2.

In 1880, only

3.

501, 502.

Cecil Kenneth Brown, A State Movement in Railroad Development (Chapel The University of North Carolina Press, 1928), pp. 174-181. Throughout this study much light is thrown on the parochial viewpoint of merchant capitalism as 6.

Hill:

against the unifying tendencies

changed from standard Alabama. 7.

The Merchants' Magazine,

United

capitalism. Another road which was gauge was the Montgomery and West Point in

of finance

to five-foot

44:672

(June 1861), and Tenth Census of the

States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p.

137.

80 per cent to 77 per cent, if West Virginia is included with the South for both dates. Computed from The Merchants' Magazine, 44:672 (June 1861); Eighth Census of the United States, i860, p. 331; and Tenth Census of the United 8.

From about

States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, pp. 9.

10.

300 and 488-492.

Railroad Gazette, Thirteenth Quarto Ibid.,

Volume

Nineteenth Quarto Volume (October

98

(July 15, 1881), pp. 387-388.

14, 1887), p. 668.


Last Steps in Integration, 1880— 1890 11.

William

Part

"Report on the Internal Commerce of the United 2nd Session (1886-87), House Executive Document No. 7,

Switzler,

F.

States," 49th Congress, 2, p. 72.

"Of the engine builders, the Baldwin Locomotive Works had probably been most far-seeing. For twenty years they had looked forward to this change, and had during that time so constructed their frames and fire-boxes that, by using new driving wheel centres, the change could be made without changing other parts." Railroad Gazette, Nineteenth Quarto Volume (November 11, 1887), p. 732. 13. The original shift was to 4 feet, 9 inches, not 4 feet, 8'/4 inches. 14. Railroad Gazette, Thirteenth Quarto Volume (July 15, 1881), pp. 387-388; Nineteenth Quarto Volume (November 11, 1887), p. 732; J. L. Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United States (Philadelphia: Railway World 12.

the

Office, 1888), p. 358. 15. 16.

Ibid.

News and

Charleston

Commerce.

Courier, as quoted in Switzler, "Report on the In-

&

Kincaid A. Herr, The Louisville Nashville Rail& N. Magazine, 1943), p. 47. 17. Ibid., pp. 47-48; Charleston News and Courier, as quoted in Switzler, "Re," port on the Internal Commerce. pp, 72-73. A highly technical account of the problems involved in the change of gauge on the Southern roads is to be found in ternal

.

.

,"

p. 73;

road, 18^0-1 g42 (Louisville: L.

.

an

.

by C. H. Hudson in the Journal of the Association of Engineering Soreprinted in the Railroad Gazette, Nineteenth Quarto Volume (October 14,

article

cieties,

1887), p. 668,

and (November

18.

Herr, Louisville

19.

Charleston

Commerce.

nal

20.

.

.

&

11, 1887), pp. 731-733. Nashville Railroad, p. 48.

News and ,"

Courier, as quoted in Switzler, "Report on the Inter-

pp. 72-73; Herr, Louisville

&

Nashville Railroad,

p. 48.

Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United States,

p.

358. 21.

Ibid.

The

Illinois Central,

the Mobile

and Ohio, and the Cincinnati,

New

Orleans and Texas changed to a gauge of 4 feet 8V2 inches. Railroad Gazette, Eighteenth Quarto Volume (June 4, 1886), p. 386. 22.

Ibid.,

Nineteenth Quarto Volume (October

14,

1887), p. 668.

"Report on the Internal Commerce. 24. Railroad Gazette, Nineteenth Quarto Volume (October 23.

25.

Quoted

in Switzler,

Ibid., Thirty-first

Quarto Volume (March

99

.

," p. 72.

1887), p. 668.

31, 1899), p. 221; Ibid.

ber 15, 1899), pp. 644-645. 26. Herr, Louisville Nashville Railroad, pp. 76-^7.

&

.

14,

(Septem-



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INDEX



INDEX Alabama Great Southern Railroad, 80 Alabama, railroads, 42, 43, 44 Albany (N. Y.), 5, 16, 24, 71, 73

Car

"compromise gauge," 39, 59, 68;

American Express Company, 69 Androscoggin and Kennebec Railroad, 20

Adanta (Ga.), 42, 46 Adantic and Great Western Railroad, 54, 73 Adantic and St. Lawrence Railroad, 18, 20

Chattanooga (Tenn.), 42 Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, 78 Chicago and Elgin Railroad, 36 Chicago (111.), 5, 40-41, 76 Cincinnati (Ohio), 36, 39, 51, 54, 61, 78 Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad,

Adantic City (N. J.), 88 Auburn and Syracuse Railroad, 24 Augusta (Mc.)> 20 Baltimore (Md.), 27, 29-30, 39 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 5, 27-28, 29,

54 Cincinnati,

30, 32, 33>38, 39. 73 Bellaire (Ohio), 33,

Milford Railroad, 20

New

Orleans and Texas Railroad,

99 Cincinnati, Selma and Mobile Railroad, 80-

39

Belpre (Ohio), 33 Bills of lading, 7, 74-75, 97

81 Cincinnati Southern Railroad, 79, 80 City rivalries, 5, 18-20, 23, 26-30, 31, 37,

Blue Line (fast freight), 63, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74 Boston (Mass.), 4, 5, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18, 50,

54-55 Boston and Lowell Railroad, 15, 69 Boston and Providence Railroad, 15 Boston and Worcester Railroad, 4,

40-47, 51-52, 59 Civil

War,

effect,

on

railroads, 6, 28,

44-45,

46-47, 53-54 Clearing house, demand

15,

16,

for, 50-51, 76 Cleveland (Ohio), 36, 39, 73 Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati

Rail-

road, 73

50,73 Bowling Green (Ky.), 42, 85

Cleveland, Cresdine

Bridges, 18, 22, 32, 33, 37, 40, 41, 50, 78 Brunei, Isambard Kingdom, 12

91 Cleveland,

Buffalo (N. Y.), 24, 25, 30, 31, 57, 60, 71,

and Chicago Railroad,

Painesville

and Ashtabula

Rail-

road, 31

Collingwood (Ont.), 17

73 Buffalo and Erie Railroad, 68

Buffalo and Lake

Huron Railway, 22

Buffalo and State Line Railroad, 31 Burkesville (Va.), 46

Cairo

interline

Central of Georgia Railroad, 46 Charleston (S. C), 5, 41-42, 43, 44 Charleston and Hamburg Railroad, 41, 43 Charleston and Savannah Railroad, 46

Arkansas, railroads, 36

Town and

60-61, 62, 63

exchange, 26, 33, 50-51, 56, 68, 77, 81, 82-83, 98

Allen, Horatio, 43

Bangor, Old

hoists,

Cars, railroad, 2, 82; changing gauge, 63, 79,

(III.),

40, 60, 79

Colorado, railroads, 65

Columbia (S. C), 46 Commercial Express (fast

freight line), 73 Competition, railroad, with water routes, 23, 4, 33-34, 56-57, 67, 74-75 Connections, interline, 16-18, 20, 24-27, 32-

33, 39, 42, 46, 53-54, 59-63, 65, 68. See names of individual railroads and

California, railroads, 55 Camden and Amboy Railroad, 26, 28, 53 Camden and Adantic Railroad, 88

Camden

also

cities

28, 53 Canada, railroads, 2, 17, 20-22, 77

Consolidation, railroad,

Car

Corinth (Miss.), 42, 85

(N.

J.),

ferries, 16, 22,

29, 33, 53-54, 82

2, 83 Continental Line (fast freight), 73-74

109


Index Crescent Line (fast freight), 74

77, 82.

Crestline (Ohio), 91

roads and states

Cumberland (Md.)) 27

See also names of individual

rail-

Georgia, railroads, 41^42, 43, 46 Jay, 2

Gould, Danville (Me.), 20

Government

Danville (Va.), 43, 44. 53 Dartnell, George, 50

Grain trade, 56-57, 67, 74, 75, 79 Grand Trunk Railway, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22,

Dayton (Ohio), 54 Delaware and Hudson Railroad, 27 Delaware, Lackawanna and Western

59, 60, 69, 77 Great Bend (Pa.), 25 Great Britain, early railroads, 12 Great Northern Route, 16-17

Rail-

road, 25, 26, 27, 77

aid to railroads, 3, 24,

91-92

Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, 65

Great Southern Line (fast freight), 74

Detroit (Mich.), 21, 22, 60

Great Western Dispatch

Diamond Line

(fast freight),

(fast

freight

line),

69, 73

73

Directories, railroad, 12

Great Western Railway (Can.), 21, 22, 54,

Dunkirk (N. Y.),

60, 62, 63, 68, 73 Great Western Railway (Eng.), 12

24, 62

East Buffalo (N. Y.), 62

Green Line

East

Greensboro (N. C), 43, 44, 53 Grimes, James B., 52

Louis

St.

(III.),

39

Eastern Railroad, 59

Empire Line

(fast freight), 73, 75,

(fast freight), 71, 74,

Guides, railroad,

94

97

10

Erie (Pa.), 31-32

Milwaukee Line

Erie and

(fast freight),

73

Harbor Creek

Erie and Northeast Railroad, 31-32

Harlem

73

Railroad,

Harris, Ira,

Erie Railroad, 24-25, 26, 30, 31, 39, 54, 60, 61, 62, 69, 73, 88

Fairlie,

Robert

F.,

Hayes,

63

company

J.

D.,

72

Henderson (Ky.), 60, 61 Hoosac Tunnel Line (fast Houston (Tex.), 42

Fast freight lines, 7, 67-76; abuses, 69-71,

75-76;

24

61

Harrisburg (Pa.), 26, 27 Hartford (Conn.), 16

Europe, early railroads, 12-13 Evansville (Ind.), 61

(Pa.), 31

Harlan, James, 55

Erie and North Shore Dispatch (fast freight),

lines,

75,

94,

98;

co-

Hudson River

freight), 73

Railroad, 24

Huntington, Collis

P.,

2

operative lines, 71-72, 75, 76; noncooperative lines, 69-71, 75, 76 Florida, railroads, 42, 43

Florida

Illinois

Railway and Navigation Company,

Fort Erie (Ont.), 22 Forwarding agents, 49-50, 52, 75 Franklin and Warren Railroad, 36

Company

Indianapolis and Cincinnati Railroad, 36, 38 Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad, 73 Interline agreements, 2, 3, 7 Internal trade, U. S., 4, 56-57.

Railroad, 31

Freight rates, 2, 67

City

Fremont and Indiana Railroad, 36

rivalries;

International Line Interstate

Gallatin, Albert, 12

Gauge,

9,

11-14, 22, 26, 27, 31-32, 35-37,

39, 52, 54, 58-66, 68, 77; broad gauge,

"double gauge," 36, 54, 6263, 65, 77; gauge in the South, 43-45, 79-81; narrow gauge, 12, 63-66; standard gauge, II, 12-13, 36, 39> 53, 55-56, 12,

40-41, 65

Indiana, railroads, 36-38, 39 Indianapolis (Ind.), 38, 39

81

Franklin Canal

Central Railroad, 40, 79, 99

Illinois, railroads, 36, 38, 39,

Competition;

(fast freight),

Commerce Commission

Iowa, railroads, 36, 52 Ireland, railroads, 13

19, 21;

Jackson (Tenn.), 42, 85 Jersey City (N. J.), 25

Journals, railroad, 11

IIO

See also

Grain

trade

72 Act, 3


Index Montgomery and Eufala Railroad, 81 Montgomery and West Point Railroad, 98

Kasson's Dispatch (fast freight line), 69

Kentucky Central Railroad, 78-79 Kentucky, railroads, 42, 43, 78-79 Knoxville (Tenn.), 42

Lake Shore and Michigan Southern

Montreal (Que.), 17, 20-21 Montreal and Champlain Railway, 17 Morehead City (N. C), 44 Rail-

road, 73 Land grants, 3, 91-92 Latrobe, Benjamin H., 12

Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, 71, 74 Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Rail-

Lawrenceburg (Ind.), 36 Lehigh Valley Railroad, 26 Lincoln, Abraham, 55

National Dispatch (fast freight line), 73 National Line (fast freight), 73, 75

road, 71, 74

New New New

Litde Miami Railroad, 38 Locomotives, 1-2, 13; changing gauge, 63, 79-80, 95, 99 Lord, Eleazer, 25

5^1? also

74, 79, 80, 82, 95

and Lexington

Rail-

road, 52

Lyme

(Conn.), 16

Lynchburg (Va.), 61

Mad

New

River and Lake Erie Railroad, 35

York and Erie Railroad.

See Erie

York Central

Railroad, 21, 24, 25, 30,

31, 38, 39> 54, 57, 62, 72, 73, 75, 86, 88

New York

i

railroad, description, 8-1 1, 15,

State, railroads, 4-5, 15,

23-26,

30 Niagara Falls (Ont.), 21, 22 Norfolk (Va.), 43

97

Marietta and Cincinnati Railroad, 33, 36, 39, 73 Maryland, railroads, 27, 29—30 Memphis (Tenn.), 42, 43

North Carolina Railroad, 78 North Carolina, railroads, 43, 44-45,

Memphis and Charleston

Northeastern Georgia Railroad, 71

Memphis,

Clarksville

Railroad, 42, 80

Mercantile capitalism, 3-5 Merchants' Dispatch (fast freight line), 69,

Nortonville (Ky.), 61

Nova

72, 73. 75

Michigan Central Railroad, 54, 67, 73 Michigan, railroads, 22, 36 Milan (Tenn.), 61

46, 78

Northern Central Railroad, 27, 29, 30 Northern Railway, 17, 88 Northern Virginia Railroad, 33

and Louisville Rail-

road, 85

Scotia, railroads,

22

Mileage, railroad, 2, 82

Ogdensburg (N. Y.), 17 Ogdensburg Railroad, 88 Ohio and Mississippi Railroad,

Mississippi, railroads, 42, 43, 44 Missouri, railroads, 35, 36, 40-41, 77, 78,

40, 51, 54, 73, 86 Ohio Central Railroad, 33, 39

36, 38, 39,

Ohio, railroads, 33, 35-39, 65

90, 91

Mobile (Ala.), 42, 61 Mobile and New Orleans Line

Ottawa and Prescott Railroad, 21 (fast freight),

74 Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 79, 85, 99 Mohawk and Hudson Railroad, 24

Montgomery

24,

Railroad

(Ga.), 46

Maine, railroads, 15, 17-20, 22 Manufactures, growth of in U. S.,

Maps,

of individual states

28, 32, 93

New Macon

names

New Hampshire, railroads, 15, i8 New Hampton (N. J.), 25 New Haven (Conn.), 16 New Jersey Central Railroad, 25, 26 New Jersey Railroad, 25 New London (Conn.), 16 New Orleans (La.), 5, 42, 43, 61 New York (N. Y.), 4, 5, 6-7, 15, 23,

Louisiana, railroads, 5, 42, 43, 86 Louisville (Ky.), 42, 43, 52, 61 Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 61, 71, Louisville, Cincinnati

Bern (N. C), 43, 44 Brunswick, railroads, 22 England, railroads, 15-20, 30, 69-70.

(Ala.), 42, 45

Pacific Railroad, 52, 53,

55-56

Pacific Railroad of Missouri,

78 Parkersburg (Va.), 29, 33 Pennsylvania Coal Company Railroad, 27

III


Index Pennsylvania Railroad,

Selma (Ala.), 42

2, 5, 28, 29, 30, 31,

Shipping, pre-railroad, 49

33. 38, 39> 54> 57, 69, 73> 75. 81, 89, 98.

Pennsylvania, railroads,

5, 25,

Skowhegan (Me.), 26

26-29, 31-33,

65 Penobscot and Kennebec Railroad, 20

South, railroads, 41-48, 77-81. See also

Pensacola and Atlanta Railroad, 81

South Carolina Railroad, 46 South Carolina, railroads, 41-42, 43, 44, 46 Southern (Mississippi) Railroad, 86 Southwestern and Georgia Railroad, 81

names

Petersburg (Va.). 44. 46-47. 53 Peto, S. Morton, 51

Philadelphia (Pa.), 4, 14, 26-29, 32, 53-54,

Spain, railroads, 13

57, 88, 89

Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, 54 Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad, 28 Philadelphia,

Springfield (Mass.), i6

Standard time,

Wilmington and Baltimore

Star

Sunbury

Wayne and Chicago

road, 32-33, 38, 91

Terminal facilities, 30, 38, 62 Terre Haute and Alton Railroad, 39 Terre Haute and Richmond Railroad, 39

(Mich.), 18, 22

Texas, railroads,

Pordand (Me.), 15, 17-20, 60 Pordand, Saco and Portsmouth Railroad, 20

16

16, 34;

86

demand

for,

6,

28-29, 37, 52-55, 65-66; obstacles to, 16, 22, 31-34, 42-43, 45. 47-48, 50-52, 64See also Fast freight lines Tisdale, Charles S., 59

Pueblo (Colo.), 65 Railroads, as investments, 6-7;

2, 42, 43, 78,

Through shipment,

Portsmouth (Ohio), 36 Portsmouth (Va.), 44 I.), 4,

(Pa.), 27

Technological improvements, 1-2, 45, 82 Tennessee, railroads, 42, 43

Pontchartrain Railroad, 5 Poor, John Alfred, i8, 19, 20

Providence (R.

75

Rail-

Pittsburgh (Pa.), 5, 26, 27, 32-33, 37 Pocahontas (Va.), 46

Huron

83

(fast freight), 69, 73,

Steubenville (Ohio), 37

Piermont (N. Y.), 24 Pittsburgh, Fort

7,

Union Line

Stephenson, George, 12

Railroad, 28, 29, 30, 53, 54 Piedmont Railroad, 44-45

Port

of individual states

first in

U.

S.,

4-5, 41

Red Line (fast freight), 71, 72, 73 Richmond and Danville Railroad, 44 Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, 46 Richmond (Va.), 43, 44, 46-47, 53 Riviere du Loup (Que.), 22 Rock Island (111.), 41

Toledo (Ohio), 36, 71 Toledo and Wabash Railroad, 73 Toronto (Ont.), 17 Trackage breaks in cities, 28, 30, 31, 33, 38, 45-47, 51-52 Transcontinental railroads, cific

2.

See also Pa-

Railroad

Transshipment, cost

of,

50-51, 52, 65, 67

Troy (N. Y.), 5, 16, 24, 50 Tyler, H. W., 60-61, 62, 65

Rouses Point (N. Y.), 17

Rowland (Ky.), 61

Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 2

Russia, railroads, 13

Vermont and Canada Railroad, 69 Vermont Central Railroad, 69-70

Rudand

(Vt.), 87

Vermont, St.

John (N. B.), 60 Lawrence and Adantic Railroad, 18, 19

St.

Lawrence and Industry Railroad, 21

St.

Louis (Mo.),

railroads, 15, 16, 18

Vicksburg (Miss.), 42, 43 Virginia, railroads, 29, 33, 41, 43, 44,

46-47, 78

39, 40-41, 76 Salamanca (N. Y.), 54

Washington (D. C),

Sandusky (Ohio), 36

Waterville (Me.), 20

Sarnia (Ont.), 18, 22

West Chester

Savannah, Albany and Gulf Railroad, 46 Savannah (Ga.), 5, 42, 43, 46 Schenectady and Troy Railroad, 24

Western and Adantic Railroad, 71, 74 Western Insurance and Transportation Company (fast freight line), 69

St.

5,

112

28, 29, 53

Railroad, 54


Index Western Railroad,

White River Junction (Vt.), 16 Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad, 44 Wilmington (N. C), 43, 44, 46 Windsor (Ont.), 21, 22

i6, 50, 73

West Virginia, railroads, 78 Wheeling (Va.), 28, 33, 37, 39 Wheels, sliding, 59-60. See also Cars, road,

rail-

"compromise gauge"

White Line

(fast freight), 72, 73,

Wisconsin, railroads, 36 Worcester (Mass.), 4

96

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