THE AMERICAN
RAILROAD NETWORK 1861
Studies in
— 1890
Economic History
Published in Cooperation with
The Committee on Research
in
Economic History
The American Railroad Network 1861
— 1890
GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR IRENE D. NEU
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts
©COPYRIGHT, 1956 BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Distributed in Great Britain by
Geoffrey Cumberlege Oxford University Press
London
LIBRARY of CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER 56-8554 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PREFACE
This volume grew out of the realization that the road maps available for the pre-Civil
War
leading picture of the degree of physical integration of American roads.
The
When
this
task attempted
first
was
rail-
years present a seriously mis-
to construct a
rail-
more meaningful map.
was accomplished questions immediately arose: Why the lack American railroad net as late as 1861? When, by
of integration of the
what means, and why did
a unified network
emerge
in the following
Obviously a thoroughgoing answer to these questions
three decades?
would involve
telling the
whole
story of
American economic and transan intention far beyond
portation history in the nineteenth century
the limits of this study.
We
—
have, therefore, contented ourselves with
describing and emphasizing certain significant aspects of the situation and
suggesting some solutions to the problems raised.
The
first five
chapters of this book are primarily the
Rogers Taylor, the a cooperative one
last
work
of George
four of Irene D. Neu. But the project has been
and the authors take
joint responsibility for
what
is
The research on the first five chapters and the drafting of the maps were made possible by a grant from the Joseph B. Eastman Foundapresented.
tion at
Amherst
College.
Work on
the last four chapters
was generously
financed by the Committee on Research in Economic History.
way
Many
At the risk of being invidious, a few bows must be made. Arthur H. Cole from the beginning gave generously of his time and indispensably of encouragement and advice. For aid in clearing up difficult points or in going far beyond the persons assisted the authors in one
call
or another.
of duty in answering letters of enquiry
we
are under special obliga-
Preface
K. Brown, C.
O. William K. Lamb, Paul F. Laning, Walter R. Marvin, Andrew Forest Muir, Richard C. Overton, Robert M. Sutton, Charles W. Turner, and D. W. Yungmeyer. For many hours of assistance in preparing the maps we are indebted to John V. Bowmer and Mary Alice Kallet. G. R. T. I. D. N.
tion to: Robert C. Black, III, C.
J.
Corliss, Elizabeth
Cullen, Charles E. Fisher, G. P. deT. Glazebrook,
VI
CONTENTS
I.
Focusing the Problem Historical
The Dominance The Integration II.
The Railroad
of Local Interests to 1861
of the Railroad Net,
1
861-1890
M.\p, 1861
Construction of the Railroad Sources of
i
Background
8
Map
Map Information
Representation of Gauges
Gauge III.
New
Differences
England and Canada,
Spokes to the
1861
15
Hub
Pordand's Bid for Railroad Empire
Montreal and the Canadian System
IV.
The Middle Atlantic States, New York's Three Systems Philadelphia's Railroad
Baltimore's
B and
1861
Domain
O
Barriers at
Western Gateways: Buffalo and Erie
Barriers at
Western Gateways: Pittsburgh,
Wheeling, and Parkersburg vii
23
1
Contents
V.
The Midwest and South, Gauge
Differences in the
i86i
35
Midwest
City Rivalries in the Midwest
The Beginnings of a Rail Network Gauge Differences in the South
in the
South
Railroad Connections in Southern Cities
VI.
The Trend Toward
Integration,
i
861-1870
49
Early Shipping Patterns Factors Encouraging Railway Integration Effect of the Civil
War
Gauge of the First Transcontinental Railroad Growth of the Grain Trade
VII. Solving
the Gauge Differentials, 1861-1880
58
"Compromise" and Sliding Wheels; Car Hoists "Double" Gauges
Narrow Gauge Railways
VIII.
The
Fast Freight Lines,
i
861-1890
67
Background Early Fast Freight Lines
Cooperative Fast Freight Lines
The Pattern of the Fast Freight Lines Growth and Abuses
IX. Last Steps in Integration,
i
880-1 890
77
Toward a Nation-wide Standard Gauge The South Joins the Union A Footnote on Gauge The Railroad Pattern in 1890 Notes
85
Appendix. Key to Abbreviations of Railroad Lines Appearing on the Maps
10
Index
109 viii
MAPS {at
end
of boo^O
United States and Canadian Railways, April i, 1861, Part I: Canada, New England, and the Middle Atlantic
United States and Canadian Railways, April i, Part II: Canada and the Midwestern States.
1861,
United States and Canadian Railways, April
1861,
Part III: Southern States.
i,
States.
THE AMERICAN RAILROAD NETWORK 1861-1890
FOCUSING THE PROBLEM
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The American economy, fore the Civil
already expanding rapidly be-
War, continued growing with almost
explosive force dur-
ing the following decades. In i860 the United States was a secondary industrial nation
century
it
among
the nations of the world. Before the
had achieved a position of preeminence.
just prior to the
war was only
Its
end of the
pig iron production
a small fraction of that of Great Britain,
and steelmaking had hardly begun. Before the end of the century the
American output of both products exceeded
that of any other country.
It
has been estimated that in i860 the value of manufactured goods in each of the three leading countries, the United
many, was greater than
had not only moved
Kingdom, France, and Ger-
in the United States.
into
first place,
By
1890 the United States
but the value of
its
manufactures
nearly equaled the combined output of the three former leaders.^
Fundamental improvements
in railroad transportation
major factors making possible the post-Civil focuses
War
on only one aspect of those improvements
expansion. This study
— the conversion of the
fragmented and non-unified railroads of 1860 into the
network of three decades
later
Technological improvements in
came
cars.
roadbed, and bridges
efficiency of railroad
rails,
in rapid succession. Steel
transportation.
roadbed, motive power, and rolling rails, first
much less made possible
ing the Civil War, replaced the rails,
relatively integrated
— but there were, of course, other develop-
ments which greatly increased the
stock
were among the
used in this country dur-
satisfactory iron ones. Stronger
the use of heavier engines
and
In i860 locomotives seldom weighed more than about 30 tons where-
The American
Railroad Network,
by 1890 they might weigh as
as
freight cars, about 10 tons in i860,
a
few
cars of
developments air
much
i
as 85 tons.
861-1890
Standard capacity for
had doubled by the
eafly eighties, while
even greater capacity were already in use. facilitated railroad operations: the
brake, improved terminal
facilities,
and the adoption of the block system
A
host of other
automatic coupler, the
increased use of the telegraph,
for controlling traffic. Freight lo-
comotives on the Pennsylvania Railroad hauled on the average 2,100,000
handUng
ton miles of freight in 1870, but were
annum
5,100,000 such units per
eleven years later."
This was the period of most rapid construction of
new
track. In i860
there were 30,626 miles of railway in operation in the United States 2,065
JTiiles
in Canada.
The
total for the
and
two countries combined grew
to
about 175,000 in 1890. Before the war only one railroad had reached the Missouri River. During the following three decades transcontinental lines
were completed in both the United States and Canada, and a great network
had been constructed not only
in the Mississippi Valley west of the river,
but also in Texas, in the Mountain States, and on the Pacific coast. Even in the older area east of the Mississippi
age continued to grow as gaps were
and the Great Lakes, track mile-
filled in,
bridges built, and roads
constructed parallel to existing ones.
This was the period
when
also
into extensive railroad systems, bilt.
smaller companies were consolidated
and when such men
as Cornelius
Vander-
Jay Gould, and CoUis P. Huntington were building their great
road empires. Cutthroat competition put heavy pressure on railroad especially in trunk-line territory. In 1858 the rate for shipping rail
from Chicago
to
fallen to 26.11 cents;
New and
York was
The average
This had fallen to
.941 in 1890.^
it
War was
But the decline was
far
1.925
from uni-
form, for rates tended to remain relatively high where there was
competition from other roads competed for
were
at times
charges
fell
rail
traffic,
lines
as
or
from waterways. Where
between Chicago and
kept up by interline agreements.
drastically,
When
New
sometimes well below operating
little
parallel
York, rates
these broke costs.
competition proved a crushing blow to most inland water routes. traffic
had
rate per ton mile
charged by United States railroads just after the Civil cents.
rates,
wheat by
38.61 cents a bushel; in 1870
in 1890 to 14.3.
rail-
down,
Railroad
Though
continued to grow on the Great Lakes and the Sault Canal, the
weaker canals had succumbed
to railroad competition
during the
forties
Focusing the Problem
and its
fifties.
Before the eighties were over, the tonnage carried had reached
high point even on such major water routes as the Mississippi River and
the Erie Canal.
Tremendous popular enthusiasm for the railroads led to grants of millions of acres of public land and extensive financial aid by federal, state,
and
local
governments. But following the Civil War, and especially turned against the railroads. Stock
after 1873, public opinion gradually
watering, secret rebates, pooling agreements, political bribery, scandals like the Credit Mobilier expose,
and the public-be-damned
attitude of
railroad magnates gave rise to anti-railroad agitation by farmers, merchants,
and investor groups. Criticism of the
in the Granger tion
form
railroads took political
and Anti-Monopoly movements.
Efforts at state regula-
were followed in 1887 by the adoption of the federal
Com-
Interstate
merce Commission Act.
The
very importance of the railroad in the development of the Ameri-
can economy has tended to obscure the fact that
it
was
every stage by the economic environment in which
it
itself
affected at
grew. While no
general survey of these environmental factors will be attempted, this
study does seek to identify the influences which were active
first
in erect-
ing and then in removing barriers to the creation of a physically
inte-
grated system of national railroad transportation. First, the condition of the uncoordinated railroad net of 1861 will be examined; then, the important steps by into a truly integrated
which during the following three decades
work
During the nineteenth century from merchant
some
of
evolved
will be traced.
THE DOMINANCE OF LOCAL INTERESTS TO
transition
it
1861
there took place in this country a gradual
to industrial
and finance
capitalism. This
was a
development which profoundly altered the practices and the outlook of the business community. this
change; on
While
On
the one
the other their
hand
growth was
the railroads helped to effect significantly affected
by
it.
the merchant-dominated capitalism of the eighteenth century
was a decaying
institution
tury, the parochial
during the early decades of the following cen-
viewpoint which
it
engendered in the business leaders
of the day toward transportation development prevailed until about the
time of the Civil War. While merchants ruled the American economy they constituted a business and social
elite.
From
their
counting houses
The American Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
they organized and directed the exchange of goods and services in both
domestic and
foreign
unspeciaHzed in function, they
Largely
trade.
brought together and arranged into an
effective pattern the threads of
an increasingly complex exchange economy. The great merchants not only bought and sold goods in large and small quantities on their
own
account or for others in the capacity of brokers, factors, or agents, but also
performed a host of other eign trade; they
owned
They were bankers and
services.
sold marine insurance; they held
dealers in for-
and warehouses; they bought and to and sometimes operated fishing,
ships, docks, title
mining, or manufacturing ventures; and they became the chief estate
owners and speculators of
The
prosperity of the merchant
volume of the commerce
in his
and distributed from
his ships
real-
their day.
depended in large part upon the
home port and upon the trade carried by his own warehouses. The leaders were
located in the great ports of the Atlantic coast,
which had become in the
Colonial period important centers of world trade. Here the products of
Europe, Africa, and the East, as well as those from the coastal
many
smaller
towns on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, were assembled,
and then
and domestic markets.
in considerable part reexported to foreign
This trade expanded greatly during the Napoleonic Wars, when, not infrequently,
more than
commerce
half the
and Boston consisted of reexports
Following the defeat of Napoleon, the
interior
grew
New
York, Philadelphia,
importance of the
relative
eign reexport trade declined. But coastwise
and trade with the
of
to foreign markets.
commerce
as the frontier
was pushed outward.
There ensued a competitive struggle among the merchants of
who were
for-
greatly expanded
rival cities
striving to capture as large a share as possible of the rapidly
expanding trade of the hinterland. This the inland trade
was an important
intercity competition to
dominate
factor in the early decades of railroad
development.
The
first
railroads in the
the early turnpikes
and
United States were
canals, to serve nearby
the purpose of the early lines radiating
built, as
and
were most of
local needs.
Such was
from Boston. The Boston and
Worcester, for instance, was designed primarily to secure for Boston the trade of the Worcester area
which
led to Providence.
Valley in
New
The
and
to divert
little
it
from the Blackstone Canal
railroads strung out along the
York were constructed
for the
most part with
Mohawk
local capital
Focusing the Problem to provide local transportation for
nearby merchants and farmers.
were financed and
early railroads of eastern Pennsylvania
by owners of coal lands anthracite to
New
who
make
sought to
possible the
The
built largely
movement
of
York and Pennsylvania markets. The 45^-mile Pontwas designed merely
chartrain Railroad, completed in Louisiana in 1831, to facilitate
As
movement between
New
Orleans and the lake of that name.
became more
the possibilities of railway transportation
nized, the roads were looked city chiefly as devices for
upon by
forwarding their
own
areas,
petitors for the
commerce
city.'*
of the Great
Troy and Albany on a smaller rich
A
New
their
own
York and Boston were com-
Lakes and the Erie Canal,
scale.
as
were
Charleston sought to divert the
from Savannah, and Chicago and
commerce
St.
Louis fought for the
of the upper Mississippi.
report of a special committee of the Select
Philadelphia, urging that the city
among merchant groups
and
Common
Council of
government invest generously in the
stock of the proposed Pennsylvania Railroad, petition
Rival groups
while they carefully avoided any development which might
benefit the merchants of another
cotton trade
interests.
which widened
therefore encouraged the building of lines
market
clearly recog-
the business groups in each large
is
in the pre-Civil
illustrative of the
War
period.
com-
The com-
mittee declared, in part:
No
one can shut
his eyes to the fact, that the enterprise involves, for
for woe, the future prospects of Philadelphia.
The
weal or
trade of this city, already re-
tarded by improvements on the North and the South, will be so curtailed by the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
at Pittsburg, and the completion of the railway from New York to Lake Erie, as to drain the public works, and impoverish the city and state. Labour among us will want its reward, business will stagnate, capital will desert our borders, and following this desertion of trade, the interest
of the debt of the
commonwealth
will be unpaid!
On
the other hand,
the means, by furnishing the nearest and best route to
securing an unexampled prosperity to this
city.
Our
we have
and from the West, of
citizens will not only be
enriched, but the real estate and property of the corporation will be enhanced
beyond the amount of the proposed subscription.^
THE INTEGRATION OF THE RAILROAD NET, During and following the less as
or
its
Civil
War,
the railroads
1861-1890
came
to be
regarded
agencies designed to serve the exclusive needs of a particular city
immediate back country and more
as a
coordinated network whose
The American primary function was to
to be
i
861-1890
Though
facilitate transportation.
on and have, indeed,
terests lingered
came
Railroad Network,
over-shadowed by
parochial in-
persisted to the -present time, they
larger, national considerations.
The Civil War itself brought a changed view of The need for through movement of troops and
the role of the railroads. supplies focused atten-
gauge and on the lack of connections between railroads in the leading cities of both the North and the South. The exigention
on
cies of
variations in
war highlighted the advantages which could be had from a stand-
ardized and inter-connected railroad system. But military requirements
momentum
merely reenforced a movement which was gathering
any
in
case.
As long
as population
and agricultural production remained centered
more integrated railway
largely in the seaboard states, pressure for a
system and better interstate
rail
connections was not great. But as the rapid
settlement of the frontier continued and when, with the onset of the Civil
War,
a veritable flood of food
and animal prod-
and importing manufactured products
in exchange, the
West began sending
the
ucts eastward
demand for cheap and expeditious through shipment by became
distances
irresistible.
rail
over long
Shippers of western products sought favor-
able rates without preference for particular cities or their captive railroads. Similarly, producers
and
manufactured products outgrew
distributers of
the nearby market and began to see the prospects of a national outlet for their products. Isolated railroads
which had seemed
advantage of a protected market,
now came
commercial relations with more distant
profitable
At
same time
the
that the
toward railroads
attitude
At
change.
least until
as
an investment underwent a substantial
some time
in the
fifties,
funds for railroad develop-
chiefly
vate or
we have seen, had come public. The incentive for
investment was
returns
from the
the
fifties
by
local sources,
and increasingly
and
less
whether
pri-
the hope of direct
railroads themselves than a belief that indirect benefits
thereafter, the
and merchants. During
motive for investment shifted
to a desire for direct returns: for profits derived
issue or purchase of railroad securities solidation,
from
to local producers, property owners,
more and more
areas.ÂŽ
market was expanding so prodigiously, the
ment, as
would inure
earlier to offer the
be regarded as barriers to
to
security manipulation.
and from
from the
railroad promotion, con-
This development was accompanied
the rise of strong financial interests, especially in
Boston and
New
Focusing the Problem
York, the growth of stock exchanges and speciaHzed banking institutions,
and the emergence of
now
promoters,
Both investors and
so-called "finance capitalism."
looking far beyond the local market areas, sought the
gained from the railroad lines which benefited any part of
profits to be
the continent.
There were indeed many
facets to the evolution of
of railroad transportation in the United States
development would cover
history of this
A
full-length
at the very least: (i) the
and equipment of the
in the physical plant
an integrated system
and Canada.
changes
railroads, including both the
adoption of uniform gauge and the improvement and standardization of techniques and equipment;
ments such
as
through
the evolution of institutional arrange-
(2)
of lading, agreements for the interline ex-
bills
change of rolling stock, the adoption of standard time, consolidations, rate
and
traffic
(3) the rapid
agreements, and the appearance of fast freight lines; and
growth
of the
whole economy, including the settlement of
the West, the revolutionary changes in marketing,
and the
scale of in-
dustrial production.
Such
a detailed study goes far
intention here
is
a limited one.
beyond the scope of
Only one aspect
this
volume. The
of the technological
changes will be discussed: the adoption of a uniform gauge.
The
basic
importance of this development can hardly be overemphasized, for the adoption of a uniform gauge hastened the closing of gaps between
road lines at important junction
on such matters
as
through
sion of through rates,
bills
cities,
of lading
and the exchange
and passenger
is
no attempt
corollary
to
chiefly the
to
examine
tickets, the divi-
of rolling stock,
necessary the adoption of standardized braking
There
rail-
encouraged interline agreements
and soon made
and coupling equipment.
in detail the history of the developments
gauge standardization, but we have noted the pressures,
expansion of the market, which promoted
this
uniformity of
gauge. In this connection, one particular institutional development, the
growth of
fast freight lines in
special attention.
response to market needs,
is
singled out for
II
THE RAILROAD MAP,
1861
CONSTRUCTION OF THE RAILROAD MAP
Maps which show the spread of decade by decade are used so commonly in the
the railroad net
—
study of American
road history that their presence in a book on the subject granted.
The
— often
is
rail-
taken for
effectiveness of this type of visual aid, together with that of
such other devices as charts, graphs, and pictographs also frequently used
by
social scientists,
cannot be questioned. Yet, useful
can frequently confuse rather than
clarify.
as these tools are, they
Most students have become
aware of the errors which may spring from an
uncritical reading of charts
and pictographs. Less well-recognized, however, are the similar dangers which may be encountered when using maps, the
manner
in
which
a
map
is
drawn may give
the historian, erroneous impressions
for,
wholly without intent,
the general reader, or even
and cause him
to
come
to
unwarranted
tells
a story. This
conclusions.
A map is
is,
of course, a
much
simplified picture
which
never the whole story but merely a significant piece for the date indi-
cated.
For example,
for 1900 or 1950
a
good map showing the
may
commerce.
A
similar
map
esting comparison of the extent in the earlier
and
later periods.
and
for indicating the
for i860
earlier
map
may make
and location of the But
if
main
routes of
possible an inter-
railroads that existed
the reader assumes that the
dated i860 shows the possible routes by internal trade, as
United States
prove very useful for showing the extent and loca-
tion of railroad lines in those years
internal
railroads of the
rail for
do the 1900 and 1950 maps, then
his reading of the
promotes error rather than understanding of the actual
8
map
through movement of
situa-
The Railroad Map, tion portrayed.
When
railroads are practically
much
provides
that the rolling stock
information about possible
useful
movement. But those conditions were not Civil
of one gauge, physically
permitted freely to pass over the tracks of another, the
is
map
railroad
all
managed
united by interconnecting tracks, and so of one road
i86i
War, and
for this reason railroad
traffic
fulfilled until well after the
maps
for the
prewar period are
often unsatisfactory and even misleading.
The
three chapters immediately following this one emphasize the lack
of physical integration of the railroads in the United States
on the eve of the
Civil
War. Maps showing
appear at the end of
this
book.
position of the chief junction
They
condition and represent-
this
ing as accurately as possible the railroad net as
and Canada
it
existed
on April
i,
1861,
and location, the and the rail gauge of each
indicate the extent
and terminal
cities,
railroad.
the
If
maps
are to be read profitably, brief attention
to the condition of their preparation. 1
861,
is
somewhat
picture of the of hostilities
arbitrary, but
American
railroad
it
The
must be given
first
choice of the date, April
i,
has the advantage of presenting the
network
just before the actual
between the North and South.^ The Civil
War
outbreak
provides a
convenient dividing point in American railway history, for during that
new construction was curtailed appreciably and thereafter a great new period of expansion and consolidation began. The maps show railroads in operation. For the purposes of this study, a
conflict
railroad considered to be in operation
was one over which persons
modities were transported for commercial purposes; that
company
received
payment
carried commodities of for
its
own
was used
use,
its
but for
in return for
own
sale.
or
com-
the railroad
transportation services, or
it
production (for example, coal) not merely
Thus, a newly
solely to transport materials
upon which an excursion
its
is,
train
built section of track
which
needed for further construction, or
was run
to carry
company
officials
and
leading citizens to celebrate the "opening" of the road, was not, under the definition here adopted, regarded as actually in operation.
Furthermore, although the accompanying maps show in some detail the network of railroads in operation as of April
tempt was made
to include railroads of less
i,
1861,
no
serious at-
than about ten miles in length.
In the interest of simplicity two other omissions were made. Double-track lines
were not indicated
as such.
These were located largely
in
New
Eng-
The American
Railroad Network,
land and the Middle Atlantic
States,
i
861-1890
where the maps already tended
to
maps indicate gauge differshow breaks wherever major waterways remained unbridged, they do not show gaps in cities where lines remained unconnected. Nor,
be most congested. Secondly, although the ences and
needless to say, do they give any indication of important institutional
impediments
through
to
which existed along with the physical
traffic,
discontinuities of the rail network.
SOURCES OF MAP INFORMATION
The
chief obstacle to constructing
from the
arose
difficulty of
map
an accurate railroad
securing reliable information.
It
for 1861
was soon
discovered that contemporary maps, though helpful, are never entirely trustworthy. Their inaccuracies arise, in part, from errors in execution
and, in part, from the mapmakers' lack of data. But equally serious their obscurity. It
the
maps
not always clear whether the railroads
is
And,
were in the course of construction, or merely pro-
finally, the date of a
mean merely collected
shown on maps
are those that were actually in operation, or whether the
also include roads that jected.
is
that the
some time
ning, the end, or
map was
before, or
given
map
is
seldom
definite; for
it
may
printed in that year on the basis of data
it
may
indicate the situation at the begin-
on some intermediate day during the
year.
The best of the contemporary railroad maps were published in the railway guides. These were printed and sold by a number of commercial They The most demaps in this volguides. They are
publishers and issued annually, monthly, or even twice a month.
provided passenger timetables for most operating railroads. tailed
and dependable information
ume came from
for constructing the
the material contained in the railroad
remarkably complete, although information on newly opened or minor roads
is
sometimes missing. In some
which the
train schedule
cases, the
guides gave the date on
was received from the individual
railroad
com-
pany. Unless clear evidence appeared to the contrary, this was accepted as proof that a railroad line
Of
was
in actual operation
on that
date.
the general guides available those consulted chiefly were: Dins-
more's Railroad and Steam Navigation Guide for the United States, Can-
and Appleton's Railway and Steam Navigation Guide. For New England, The Pathfinder Railway Guide for the New England States
ada,
etc.,
contains unusually reliable maps.^
Of 10
the other
maps used
for the period
The Railroad Map,
i86i
under consideration the most useful were those pubUshed by
and Company
of
J.
H. Colton
New York City.
Railroad journals and other commercial publications furnished infor-
mation on the opening of new
who were
But
since the
news items
on optimistic reports sent
publications could be based officials,
lines.
in by
in these
company
not unaware of the effect of such publicity on the
reputation of the company, these media had to be used with caution.
Annual the
reports of the railroad corporations, occasionally useful,
were on
whole disappointing. The limitations of time and energy did not
per-
mit an extensive investigation and use of collections of correspondence, legislative
records,
personal memoirs,
on disputed or obscure points whenever
sources were consulted Finally, a
word must be
road
possible.
proved helpful in a few
Most
cases.
were the more scholarly regional and company providing corroborative evidence on
histories. Besides
and
said concerning secondary sources. State
local histories, especially the latter,
valuable, of course,
and newspapers, although such
rail-
difficult points,
they frequently directed the authors' attention to original materials which
might otherwise have been overlooked. Almost without exception, the proved
texts of these studies
accompany them,
for the
Some
inaccurate and vague.
much more
maps
are
all
than the maps which
reliable
too often poorly drafted,
and are
of the very best railroad histories contain
contemporary maps which are not even dated.^
REPRESENTATION OF GAUGES
One
maps appearing in this chapter is to By "gauge" is meant the disinside to inside. The major gauges measured from
of the chief purposes of the
show gauge
differences as clearly as possible.
tance between the rails are identifiable
on the map by
tions in gauge, fairly
the standard gauge
different colors or symbols.
common
Very small
varia-
in 1861, are not indicated. Thus, while
was normally 4
8V2 inches, individual roads
feet
regarded as standard-gauge roads at the time might vary from this
width by
at least V2
inch,
and such
serious obstacle to through shipment.^ States, 1880, stated that "the
(both inclusive) either
is
may
a deviation
was not considered a
The Tenth Census
gauges from 4
feet
9%
of the United
inches to 4 feet 8 inches
be considered standard, as rolling stock used upon
interchanged without objection."
^
Comprehensive and detailed information on railroad gauges has never II
The American Railroad Network, been compiled and
is
extremely
i
861-1890
difficult to obtain.®
Even when
located
such data are not always dependable and so far as. possible must be
checked against that in other sources. The gauges indicated on the maps here are believed to be correct, but in a few cases a decision about a gauge
width had
to be
flicting records.^
made on the basis of inadequate and sometimes conThe chief sources for information on gauges are the
contemporary railroad directories which were published annually and indicate the gauges for
many
Canada.® Although generally inaccuracies
and
of the railroads of the United States reliable, the directories
contain occasional
which can be discovered only by comparing them with each
other and with other data available. Aside from what publications, information
is
is
contained in these
extremely scattered and must be sought in
contemporary annual railroad reports and other railroad records, reports, railroad
and business
periodicals, newspapers,
and
state
travel accounts.
GAUGE DIFFERENCES
When
railroads
were
first
constructed, their engineers experimented
with different gauges. Each engineer tended
to select the
gauge which
he thought best suited the needs of his particular road. Early British
tramways had been to as
wide
built to varying
as 4 feet 6 inches.®
gauges
— as narrow as 3 feet 4 inches
Benjamin H. Latrobe, reporting
to Albert
Gallatin in 1808, suggested that railroads might be built with a distance of 3V2 to 5 feet
between the
rails.^°
When
George Stephenson
successful steam railroad in England, he finally settled
4 feet SYi inches.
He
was probably influenced
tramway and wagon gauges, but
built his
on a gauge of
in his choice by the English
number of Most of the
different writers present a
explanations for his selection of exactly 4 feet SYi inches.^^ early British railroads adopted this gauge, but
some experimented with
other widths, the most important deviations being those of 5 feet and 7 feet. The latter gauge was adopted by the Great Western on the advice of
its
engineer, Isambard
Kingdom
Brunei, a fanatical advocate of the
broad gauge. The whole gauge controversy came to a head in Great
when a Royal Commission was appointed to study The commission, reporting in 1846, recommended that in
Britain in 1845
matter.
the all
future railroad construction a 4 foot 8 J^ -inch gauge be used, and an Act of Parliament
was passed
to this effect.^^
Throughout Europe
generally,
the early railroads were built to this gauge. But there were exceptions.
12
The Railroad Map,
i86i
In Ireland, 5 feet 3 inches was adopted after some experimentation.
on the continent examples of burg
lines,
with a width of 6
Antwerp, which had
gauge
early deviant gauges are the Basle
in Spain
was
and the
feet 3 inches,
line
and
And
Strass-
from Ghent
to
gauge of 3 feet 9 inches. By i860 the prevailing and Russia's Moscow line was 6 feet.^^
a
5 feet 6 inches
In the United States
all
the early railroads in
New
England
as well as
some of those in the Middle Atlantic States adopted the "Stephenson gauge" of 4
inches.
feet 8^/4
British example, a course
They appear
have been following the
to
which may have been encouraged by the im-
portation and use 01 Stephenson locomotives. But Stephenson engines
were made
to order to
United
An
States.
whatever gauge was
unsigned
This
States.
and many of the
article is
The American Railway Times ^*
article in
offers another explanation for the
United
specified,
used on American lines were manufactured in the
early locomotives
adoption of the standard gauge in the
worth quoting because
includes a plausible
it
explanation for the adoption of another popular early American gauge, that of 4 feet 10 inches. In the early history of railways in America they were laid with timbers runstrips of iron, 3V2 inches wide, nailed or spiked on the top for the wheels to run upon; they were of 5 feet guage, measuring from
ning lengthwise with
centre to centre of the iron or strap
the 4 feet
duced,
it
S'/z
was with
centre to centre of
a
rails
as
two inch
it
was
when
called;
hence the origin of
rail was introguage measuring from
the solid iron
face also, the five foot
hence the origin of the 4 feet 10 inch guage; hence our system of measuring from inside to inside of the
rails;
the conclusion, that
if
had been adopted
been
rail,
inch guage. At a later date,
at first, the
five feet, instead of
uniform guage of
being overrun with so
this
many
such an enormous expense of reloading and changing
country would have
different guages,
cars, besides a great
and
many
other disadvantages attending the break of guages.
As
has been shown, early American railroad promoters looked upon
the railroad as primarily a fore
saw
little
who from
means
for short-haul transportation,
and
there-
need for uniformity of railroad gauge. But there were those
the
first
decade of the railroad-building era stressed the de-
sirability of a national
standard gauge not only from the standpoint of
the cost and convenience of handling
traffic
but also for military reasons.^^
Engineers disagreed, however, about what was the most desirable gauge,^^
and mercantile
interests stimulated the deliberate
gauges.
13
adoption of divergent
The American The
Railroad Network,
general gauge situation as
on the accompanying maps and
it
existed
i
861-1890
on April
i,
1861,
may
be seen
commented upon for each section of the country in the chapters which follow. The statistics on gauges as they were reported on January i, 1861, are shown in the following table. will be
RAILROAD MILEAGE BY GAUGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, JANUARY 1, 1861 " Number
Percentage
of
railroad
companies
of total
Gauge
Miles of road
mileage
6
14
5-3
21
2,8g6
5'
6"
2
182
5'
63
7,267
5'
4" 0-
39
4'
10"
I
3>294 120
210
17,712
4'
'^American Railway Times,
13:186
4'
(May
11,
8.7 .1
21.8 9.9
W
9'A"
1861).
—
The same
.1
—
53-3
data
appear in
The
Merchant's Magazine, 44:672 (May 1861), where it is also stated that most street railways had a gauge of 4 feet 8/4 inches or 4 feet 10 inches, although those of Philadelphia were 5 feet 2'/2 inches.
14
Ill
NEW ENGLAND AND
CANADA,
1861
SPOKES TO THE HUB
By
1
86 1
no part of America was more adequately pro-
New
vided with railroads than southern
England
also, in
Vermont,
New
England. In northern
New
Hampshire, and Maine, substantial prog-
had been made in railway construction
Map
end) Early
rail-
road maps give a more accurate picture of the railway network in
this
ress
(see
I at
.
section of the country than in other areas, for here, with but
exceptions, the
one or two
gauge of the roads was standard. Only the main
Grand Trunk, which angled from Portland Vermont, and some of the roads in the state gauges. Moreover, most of
New
across
New
line of the
Hampshire and
of Maine, were of divergent
England's rivers had been
satisfactorily
bridged and actual physical connections had been effected at appropriate junction points even between rival railroads.
A
gauge of 4 feet 8^2 inches was adopted by the first three railroads New England the Boston and Lowell, the Boston and Worcester,
built in
:
of these roads imported Stephenson
and the Boston and Providence. Each
engines constructed for use on tracks of standard gauge. This pattern for southern
dominant
role in
set
the
New England, for with Boston capital playing a New England railroad construction, no serious
most
consideration appears to have been given to the adoption of any other
gauge. Moreover, as the railroads of eastern gauge, the
New
York City
for the railroads extending rally favored that
interests
New
York were
which had helped
northward into western
gauge.
15
of standard
to supply capital
New
England natu-
The American Compared
New
Railroad Network,
861-1890
to the railroads in other sections of the country, those of
England were not only well unified
tively free
i
from gaps or obstructions
internally, -but
were
also rela-
at points of intersectional connection.
New
York City and Boston via New Haven, Hartford, and Springfield moved without physical obstacle over tracks owned by four different companies. By 1861 most of this route had been double between
Traffic
tracked and though the usual disputes arose over the division of through rates
and the need was recognized
exchange of cars
for systematizing the
among the different companies, traffic moved without serious hindrance.-^ The shore line via New Haven and Providence provided an alternate route between
New York
as bridges
cut or
New
had not
Thames London
and Boston. But
it
was
mouths
yet been erected at the
Rivers.
When
late in
1859,
car ferries
were
more inland one
of either the Connecti-
finally installed at
through shipment was greatly
commerce
Boston's chief bid for intersectional
hoped
inferior to the
to tap the rich trade of the
West
— was
— the
Lyme and
facilitated.^
way by which it Hudson
direct line to the
its
River via the Boston and Worcester and the Western Railroad. This route
had a weak link
at its
the river at Albany.
A
western terminus, for there was no bridge across ferry helped to solve this
the year but even this substitute failed
The
failure to erect a bridge at
merchants of Troy
to
when
terests
ice closed the river.
Albany was caused by the
keep for their
own
city as
trade as possible. First by successful pressure legislature
problem during part of
winter
and then by obstructive court
much
on the
action, the
efforts of the
of the western
New
York
State
Trojan business
in-
delayed the building of the Albany bridge until after the Civil
War.3 Dissatisfied with their
carried
the
Albany connection and
jealous of the traffic
from the Lake region by the Erie Canal, the Hudson River, and York railroads, Boston interests sought a more independent link
New
with the West. This they secured during the
known
as the
by what came to be
fifties
Great Northern Route. Several railroads led northwestward
from Boston toward White River Junction, Vermont, from whence, over three connecting lines, the route proceeded across the northern reaches of
Lake Champlain and westward to Ogdensburg on from the eastern end of Lake Ontario.
the St. Lawrence, not
far
Though
great things were expected of
it,
this route
strong competitor for the trade of the West.
16
The
never proved a very
individual companies
New
England and Canada,
i86i
quarreled over the division of the through
equipment of the Vermont
sector of the
rate, and the roadbed and Hne were inadequate. Even though
Welland Canal, which permitted lake vessels to pass from Lake Erie Lake Ontario, was enlarged, it still did not accommodate the largest
the to
lake vessels nor offer economies sufficient to divert
southern outlets. Also, the
traffic
which did
arrive
much traffic from more on Lake Ontario might
continue by river to Montreal.
The Northern Upper Lakes
middle
in the
Route, for a time, secured some of the
Northern Railway of Canada. This
via the fifties,
permitted the
movement
traffic
line,
from the completed
of goods over the rela-
from Collingwood on Georgian Bay and across the Ontario Peninsula to Toronto and thence by Lake Ontario to Ogdens-
tively short distance
burg. This route carried considerable tonnage for a few years, but far
from
It
at
it
was
satisfactory.^
should also be noted that the Great Northern Route
made
connection
Rouses Point with the Montreal and Champlain Railway, which led
northward
to Montreal,
thus providing an uninterrupted
standard gauge between the Atlantic and the
movement beyond Montreal was ing from that
city
had a
rail
St.
rail
line
of
Lawrence. But through
impossible because the other roads lead-
width of
5 feet 6 inches, a
gauge for which
the enterprising merchants of Portland, Maine, were largely responsible.
PORTLAND'S BED FOR RAILROAD EMPIRE
With
its
available,
ice-free harbor, Portland,
was half
day
a
given the ocean transportation then
closer to British ports
merchants aspired to make their
city
than was Boston. Portland's
a major exporting point for the
produce of the Great Lakes region by achieving a direct connection with projected Canadian railroads.
commercial
city of
The
business interests of Montreal, leading
Canada, preferred
the St. Lawrence, but as this avenue
to trade directly
was closed by
year, they sought a satisfactory winter outlet.
eagerly courted the Canadians
ice
with Europe via
during part of the
Boston merchants, of course,
and urged the Canadian
railroads to adopt
the standard gauge so that through shipment to the Massachusetts port
would be to the
possible by the Great
more
Northern Route. But the greater distance
southerly port, the fear that Boston interests with their inde-
pendent western connections on the Hudson and prove
less allies
than
rivals,
at
Ogdensburg would
and the importunities of persuasive spokesmen 17
The American for the
Maine
Railroad Network,
on the
led the merchants
city,
i
861-1890
St.
Lawrence
to favor
an
alHance with Portland.^
Backed by municipal
credit
and prodded by
promoter, John Alfred Poor, Pordand ing the Atlantic and
New
across
had succeeded in
Lawrence Railroad westward from
Hampshire and Vermont
line joined the St.
built
St.
that indefatigable railroad
interests
build-
their city
Canadian border. Here
to the
Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad,
a
their
Montreal project
with substantial help from the Canadian government. Soon
after
construction was completed in 1853, both roads were taken over by the
Grand Trunk Railway spanning the only a direct
St.
rail
of Canada.
Lawrence
River opposite Port
By
Montreal was finished, Portland had not
at
all
the
way
to Sarnia
on the
Trunk Clair
St.
Huron, Michigan.
1861 Portland
had achieved the
nection of any American line caused
in i860, the Victoria Bridge
connection with Montreal but also with the Grand
which extended westward
line
When,
city.
by waterways or
best intersectional railroad
With no change
city barriers,
of
con-
gauge or gaps in the
and under the auspices of only
moved freely without breaking bulk over a The city of Portland was at the eastern end owned by a single company in the world, and for
one railroad company,
trains
route about 800 miles long. of the longest railroad
a time her trade benefited appreciably.ÂŽ
Portland's venture in railroad building provides a typical example of
the limited outlook of merchant capitalism.
Boston had been connected by a largely
As
early as 1843 Portland
by grandiose plans for the future of their
own
satellite city.
not, be-
city as a
ocean port, feared that Boston would capture their trade and
merely a
might well
interests
an advantageous development had they
this as
and
standard-gauge railroads financed
by Boston promoters. Portland's commercial
have regarded
mused
series of
leading
make them
Therefore, while providing themselves with an
uninterrupted route to the west, the Portland merchants sought means to prevent
Boston traders from sharing the expected
ventive steps were taken,
what was
from diverting the expected flow piers
and bringing
it
to
to
keep the grasping
of western products
Boston wharves via their
extended southward from Portland? In order to
own
Maine
Hub
St.
no pre-
merchants
from Portland's railroads
forestall
velopment, the charter secured by the Atlantic and the
benefits. If
which
any such de-
Lawrence from
legislature provided that the legislature could authorize rail-
18
New road connections with
England and Canada, i86i
this
road "only on the easterly side."
of the
company took
gauge
for their road, thereby preventing
^
The
directors
the further precaution of choosing a 5 foot 6-inch
through shipment from Canada
Boston without change of bulk. By agreement with the Canadian
to
terests the
Montreal
gauge of the to the
gauge pattern
St.
Vermont
for the
The promoters
Lawrence and border,
The
St.
also 5 feet 6 inches.
This
set the
whole Grand Trunk system.
of the Portland—Montreal line attempted to justify to
the public their selection of the
neer of
was
in-
which extended from
Atlantic,
broad gauge, a report by the chief engi-
Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad making an elaborate
effort to this end. Printed in
Portland for distribution in pamphlet form,
the statement stressed the technical advantages claimed for the broad
gauge: improved performance by the locomotive; a lower center of gravity for rolling stock; the lessening of resistance
on curves derived from the
use of shorter trains; decreased danger of accident because of greater steadiness of the cars in motion;
Many
and the roominess
of these technical points were
the engineers of that time, but the pamphlet credulity of
its
of passengers, to
when
readers even in that day
which would be necessary
of the passenger cars.
matters of serious dispute
still
stated that the transfer
it
at points
where the gauge changed
another width, would be positively advantageous because
to the variety of the trip
and because
it
without adding
would permit
a
among
must have stretched the
it
would add
to the passengers' inconvenience,
change from dusty
cars to well-cleaned
and
ventilated ones.^
These claims were very largely window dressing. The main reason for
adopting the wide gauge was clearly reflected at every stage. Poor,
writing in 1848, declared:
"The
of Maine,
state
position, has, naturally, less connection
from
its
geographical
with the neighboring States than
with the British Provinces. Her railway system,
now
partially developed,
based upon the natural laws of trade, has but few relations to the other railways of plete
New
England, and has been projected upon a plan of com-
independence
to
them
all." ^
Boston interests might lay a third
When rail
on
ing southward from Portland so as to to their
wharves, the Maine legislature
promptly passed an
rumors were
move broad-gauge
at the behest of
rail
road lead-
cars directly
Portland merchants
from changing
their
without the express permission of the
legis-
act prohibiting these railroads
gauge or adding a third
afloat in i860 that
their standard-gauge
19
The American Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
but this restriction did not apply to railroads east of Pordand.
lature,
law was
entitled
"An
no one was deceived
The adoption brought
as to
its
on
safety of travel
Maine
interests that
The
railroads," but
real purpose.^"
of the wide gauge by the Atlantic
to the state of
The same
promote
act to
a legacy of
and
mixed gauges. (See
backed the Atlantic and
St.
St.
Map
Lawrence I
at end.)
Lawrence were
also
behind the building of two other Maine roads of similar gauge, the Androscoggin and Kennebec and the Penobscot and Kennebec.
was
built
Lawrence Railroad, to
to Waterville,
Town and
Bangor, Old
as the capital city,
gauge
cities
With
railroad.
made with
the standard-gauge
oldest railroads in the state.
which were not on the broad-gauge
Augusta, had their
and resented the
led by Poor.
St.
Milford, which had been built largely by Boston
and was one of the
Important Maine
centers
first
and the second on beyond Waterville
Bangor. At Bangor a "connection" was
capital
The
eastward from Danville, which was on the Atlantic and
activities of the
own
line,
such
hopes of becoming railroad
Portland broad-gauge enthusiasts
the aid of Boston capital, they constructed a standard-
This followed the coast eastward from Portland
to the
Kennebec River, and there turning northward, passed through Augusta, crossed the broad-gauge line at Waterville,
The standard-gauge rolhng stock
at
line
and went on
had the great advantage
to
Skowhegan.
of being able to exchange
Portland with the Portland, Saco and Portsmouth, which
ran to the southwest along the coast and connected with lines leading to Boston.
The
struggle between the backers of the broad-gauge roads and
the standard-gauge ones
the
two roads refused
between
to facilitate the transfer of passengers
their lines until forced to
was the one
War,
was continuous. At Portland and Waterville,
New
suffered
England
state
do so by
legislative action.
and
freight
Maine, then,
which, until some years after the Civil
from an uncoordinated railroad system.^^
MONTREAL AND THE CANADIAN SYSTEM In Canada, the business leaders of Montreal were even more dominant in their area than were the Boston merchants in sult
was
that
Canada had by
New
England. The
re-
1861 a remarkably well-integrated railroad
system. Backed by British capital, and with influence sufficient to secure
favorable charters as well as substantial financial aid from the Canadian
20
New
England and Canada,
government, the Montreal
interests
serious artificial obstacles
to
Canadian
earliest
railroads,
were able
prevent the creation of
to
within the province.
The
which used Stephenson engines, were
built
railroad traffic
standard gauge, as were those of
to
i86i
New
England. But the decision,
in-
fluenced by Portland, to construct the St. Lawrence and Atlantic to a 5 foot 6-inch
gauge committed the Montreal promoters
railroads to that width.
Not only did made sure
to building their
Grank Trunk
they construct the
the wide gauge, but they
also that other
to
important Canadian
roads were so built, including the Great Western of Canada which stretched
from the Suspension Bridge
at
Niagara
Windsor opposite
to
Detroit.
The American tral
lines
which
later
combined
to
form the
New
invested about $500,000 in the stock of the Great Western.
York Central group, which was interested troit and Chicago, and whose railroads were 8 J/2 inches, insisted
The New
built to the
interests
brought
sufficient
through their connections with the Canadian government,
sure,
the Great
The
Western
make
pres-
to force
to lay its rails to the 5 foot 6-inch gauge.^^
made
suggestion has sometimes been
ment adopted
De-
in this direct route to
width of 4 feet that that gauge be adopted for the Great Western. But
Montreal-Grand Trunk
the powerful
York Cen-
Canadian govern-
that the
the broad gauge as a defense measure, believing
invasion from the United States
more
difficult.
No
it
would
documentary
confirmation of this theory has come to the attention of the authors, but this
argument was used
variant gauge.
A
at times as a justification for the
adoption of the
leading Canadian railroad authority, writing in 1862,
urged that the building of a railroad westward from Montreal
Huron was
desirable
differences
in
Canada were not
The two standard-gauge
were primarily engaged
in
to the river for loading onto barges,
mertime.
The two
seriously
roads north of the
Lawrence and Inmoving lumber from the interior down
Lawrence, the Ottawa and Prescott and the
dustry,
real
American depradations.^^
which did appear
disruptive of internal trade. St.
Lake
on military grounds and regarded the broad gauge
as a protective device against possible
The gauge
to
St.
and they operated only
in the
sum-
standard-gauge roads leading southward from Mont-
were merely extensions of roads of similar gauge from below the
border.
By
1861
Canada had
1881 miles of railroad in operation.
21
Only
The American Railroad Network,
The remainder had
147 miles were standard gauge.
nadian gauge" of 5
As by
1
the reader
the so-called "Ca-
feet 6 inches.-^*
may
see
ard gauge established in
Map
from
on railroad building
861
1861-1890
Nova
I,
beginning had been made
a
Maritime Provinces, with the stand-
in the
Scotia
and the
5 foot 6-inch
width in
New
Brunswick. Although the Grand Trunk had reached Riviere du Loup
on the
St.
Lawrence,
it
was not
until well after the
that either this line or extensions of the
Maine
American
railroads
Civil
made
War
contact
with those of the Maritime Provinces.^^ Except for the road to Portland, Maine, the uniformly wide gauge within Canada formed an
artificial
Montreal was connected by
rail
hindrance to trade across the border.
with both
New
York and Boston, but
by standard-gauge roads, which made interchange of rolling stock the Canadian
city impossible.
At
Bridge brought standard-gauge cars onto Canadian
had
freight
gauge.
at
the Niagara gateway the Suspension soil,
but there
all
to be transferred to rolling stock built to a 5 foot 6-inch
At Fort
Erie, Ontario, the cars of the Buffalo
and Lake Huron
Railway crossed the Niagara River on "the Company's Floating Steam Bridge"
^ÂŽ
but could proceed no further because of the gauge difference.
Similar obstacles hindered through
The Great Western Detroit, but as
of
traffic to
the westward.
operated a steam car ferry between Windsor and
Michigan railroads were of standard width, no exchange
Grand Trunk made use of a Port Huron, Michigan, and leased the American line running
of rolling stock ferry to
movement
was
from Port Huron change of bulk
at
possible.
At Sarnia
to Detroit, but the
Port Huron.^'^
22
the
difference in
gauge required a
IV
THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC
STATES,
1861
NEW If
YORK'S THREE SYSTEMS
New
England and Canada had
internal railroad
at least fairly well integrated, the
same cannot be
both
networks which were said for the
Middle Atlantic
ing centers.
New
autonomous
own
States.
There, merchants in the chief compet-
York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, fought to establish
railroad empires.
They opposed connections between
their
roads and those which led to rival ports, and introduced gauge dif-
ferences to secure transportation monopolies in their expanding hinterlands.
ern
The
New
result
was a very
different railroad pattern
from that of south-
England.
Benefiting from the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825, and enjoy-
ing the most rapidly growing foreign trade in the country, the merchants of
New
York City were slow
the railroads
method
might
play.
at first to recognize the vital role
But once convinced of the
of transportation,
and alarmed
at the successful
steam railroads by Boston and Baltimore, 1840's to create their
own
new
pioneering with
Yorkers began in the
By 1861 they had surpassed all had bound to themselves by iron
railroad empire.
their rivals in the extent to rails
New
which
feasibility of the
which they
not only the nearby countryside but especially the rich back country
toward the west. They accomplished
this
by establishing three great
rail
systems which were largely shut off from through connections with lines
terminating in rival
cities.
The
roads which converged on
New
York
were "systems" in the sense that they had for the most part a uniform 23
The American
Railroad Network,
861-1890
i
gauge, thus permitting interchange of roUing stock where advantageous,
common
but not in the sense that there was
The
when many
period
companies had only
owndVship or operation.
small railroad lines were consolidated into larger
just
begun, although
New
already gone farther in central
it
may
York than
be noted that
it
had
in any other part of the
country.
Each of the three systems was of
Hudson River from New York
a different gauge.
two
of standard gauge, consisted of
lines
The most
from Albany
This network was made up for the most part of
agricultural interests.
which was
With
New
largely a
which had been consolidated
stem.-^
Mohawk and Hud-
project, the ten
New
form the
in 1853 to
main
of local commercial
the exception of the
York City
its
relatively short roads
which had been constructed under the sponsorship son,
York
to Buffalo; and
the lines connecting with this railroad to the northward of
and
New
City to Albany; a line (the
Central) which extended across the state
extensive,
and paralleling the
east of
short lines
York Central
Railroad had been promoted and financed chiefly by merchants in the
growing commercial example, the
centers
the business interests of
came
stock soon
— on
or not far
from the Erie Canal. For
Auburn and Syracuse Railroad was two terminal
its
cities,
to rest in the strong boxes of
The Schenectady and Troy
originally financed by
York
financed by that
In the
city's
1850's, these railroads
down
the
New
York
Hudson, or
River Railroad
via
to
became feeders
Troy and Albany proceeded east of the
Railroad,
promoters and, despite the lack of a bridge tant link in
New
Even though for the
Hudson
had been at
New
York,
in large part
east of the river to
Hudson by New York
River, the built
Albany, formed an impor-
York's chain of control over the inland trade.
the standard-gauge^ railroad system of
most part
Troy and
of
for the port of
one of the two railroads
The two lines and the Harlem
City.
its
government.^
produce they carried
for the
of
City investors.
Railroad was a full-fledged municipal enter-
constructed to promote the commercial interests
prise,
much
even though
New
originally built by local interests,
it
New
York was
was presently cap-
made tributary to New York City merchants and their allies. The New York and Erie Railroad, on the other hand, was from the beginning a New York project. It was built from Piermont on the Hudson to Dunkirk on Lake Erie and was the longest railroad under tured by and
24
The Middle Atlantic
States, i86i
ownership when completed across the
single
New
promoted by southern
This hne was
interests in order to secure the trade of the
counties and also to acquire for the metropolis a second
tier of
through route
York
state in 1851.
Great Lakes.
to the
The merchants and
farmers of the
southern counties were eager to have a railroad and assisted with their capital
and with
their influence in the legislature, thereby helping to
obtain substantial financial aid from the state.
So concerned were the promoters of the their city should
monopolize the resultant
New
York and Erie road
that
trade, that they not only
had
the line built to the unusual gauge of six feet, but they also accepted a
provision in the charter to the
that the charter itself should be
efifect
made connection with any railroad leading into Ohio, Jersey.^ The unusually wide gauge, it is true, was the 1830's when engineers in both England and the
forfeited if the Erie
Pennsylvania, or
decided upon in
New
United States were
still
debating the relative advantages of different
gauges, and the chief engineer of the Erie believed sincerely in the desirability of the
broad gauge. Nevertheless, the president of the Erie, Eleazar
Lord, along with his mercantile associates in
New
York
City,
was un-
doubtedly interested in building a road which could not aid the commercial ambitions of any rival port.^
The
were not well chosen, but by 1861 an
outlet
in the west Erie's
To
New
had been secured
at Jersey City in the east. In addition to its
broad gauge reached northward to
with the
and
and
original terminals of the Erie
make
at Buffalo
main
the
line,
contact at strategic points
York Central system.
the south other broad-gauge railroads extended into Pennsylvania
New
Jersey.
The
chief one of these
was the Delaware, Lackawanna
and Western Railroad. Starting from Great Bend
angled through the
it
and on into New Jersey where it New Hampton. From there, first on the Jersey New Jersey Railroad, the broad-gauge cars of
coal country of northeast Pennsylvania
joined the Jersey Central at
Central and then on the the
Lackawanna were
carried by
means
of a third rail
all
way
the
through to Jersey City.ÂŽ
The third system which fed traffic into the port of New York was made up of the railroads of northern New Jersey. This network was not as completely
under
Central systems and
New it
York
suffered
control as were the Erie and
from some confusion
important line in the northern part of the
25
state,
the
New
York
of gauges, but
New
one
Jersey Central,
The American Railroad Network, was standard gauge. Through
i
861-1890
connection with the Lehigh Valley
its
permitted exchange of rolling stock with the Pennsylvania
Railroad,
it
railroads
and, via Harrisburg and Pittsburgh, gave
amounted
Except for the
New
southward from the
known
of 4 feet 10 inches,
most of the Jersey as the
been originally adopted by the
Camden and Amboy. The
"New
earliest
was accepted
railroads
a rail
width
gauge had
major railroad in the
state,
the
but once having been adopted,
clear,
most of the railroads in the
for
had
Jersey gauge." This
reasons for the selection of the slightly diver-
gent width of track are not entirely it
York what
and the broad-gauge roads reaching
Jersey Central
Erie,
New
WestJ
to a third rail route to the
state.
Built largely by business interests in the cities on the lines, the railroads of northern
New
an important tidewater outlet for
Jersey furnished
Pennsylvania coal and
New
farm produce.
Jersey
PHILADELPHIA'S RAILROAD DOMAIN
The Pennsylvania
railroads of 1861
may
be separated into two divisions:
and northwest of Phila-
(i) those in the eastern part of the state, north
most part anthracite roads; and (2) those which led westward and were designed to give Philadelphia control of delphia, which were
the trade of the
for the
Susquehanna Valley and western Pennsylvania,
as to provide, via Pittsburgh,
as well
an avenue of commerce with the Ohio
Valley.
Although mercantile influence was
present,
it
was often subordinated
to investor interests in the building of the anthracite railroads. ers of the coal lands,
in considerable part,
who were
Philadelphia and
promoted the building
of raising the sale value of their property
product as cheaply and
New
The own-
York merchants
of the coal roads in the
hope
market
their
and
efficiently as possible.
in order to
Hence, the railroads which
they financed led from the anthracite beds to Philadelphia and also north-
ward
to
New
York and eastward
Although most
across
New
Jersey to
of these anthracite roads (including
into Philadelphia),
New
all
York
harbor.
of those leading
were standard gauge, one important coal road, the
Lackawanna, belonged
to the
broad-gauge system dominated by the Erie.
Philadelphia mercantile interests had not originally raised serious im-
pediments
to the
two
slight dips
which the main Erie
line
made
into
Pennsylvania nor to the construction of the broad-gauge roads across
26
The Middle Atlantic
which were
the northeast corner of their state
wanna. But when they
induced their
direction, they
quire
all
awakened
later
States, i86i
to
to
become the Lacka-
the competition
from
this
1852 henceforth to re-
state legislature in
roads constructed in the state (except in a designated area along
the border of Ohio) to have a gauge of 4 feet 8V2 inches.^
No
made
attempt has been
to indicate
Many were
of short coal lines in Pennsylvania.
of both the
were
They were
the intricate
maze
solely or in part gravity
from the mine
roads, designed merely to carry coal
transportation.
map
on the
to the nearest water
occasionally of unusual gauge. Thus, the tracks
Delaware and Hudson and the Pennsylvania Coal Company
built to a 4 foot 3-inch gauge.^
The standard-gauge Susquehanna Valley by to the western
which led from Philadelphia
system,
gateway
a
number
of routes
and then by
into
a single
the
stem
at Pittsburgh, constituted Philadelphia's bid for
commercial preeminence.
No
gauge difference separated
this
railroad
system from that of Baltimore to the south, and Philadelphia merchants repeatedly brought pressure to bear on their state legislature to prevent
connections with the Maryland railroads. ultimately failed to prevent,
They succeeded
the building of the
in delaying, but
Baltimore-controlled
Northern Central Railroad from Baltimore up into the Susquehanna Valley .^^ This strategic line gave Baltimore a share of the trade of central Pennsylvania, effected a connection Railroad's line to Pittsburgh,
tapped the coal trade.
Harrisburg with the Pennsylvania
and through
The Northern
into Philadelphia territory, difficulties late in
at
was
finally
extension to Sunbury in 1861
unwelcome
tamed when
came under
i860 and
its
Central, an
it
fell
interloper
into financial
the control of the Pennsylvania
Railroad.^^
Philadelphia commercial interests were surprisingly slow to appreciate the threat of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad
reached Cumberland, Maryland,
permit
it
delphians
to build across
now
and sought
a
until in 1842 that line
charter
which would
southwestern Pennsylvania to Pittsburgh. Phila-
declared the Baltimore and
project, "designed for their
Ohio Railroad
a Baltimore
aggrandizement by our impoverishment, and
enabling them to reap private advantages whilst they bear no portion of the public burden."
helped raise the road,
which was
^^
To ward
money and to
off this threat the
Quaker City merchants
secured a charter for the Pennsylvania Rail-
extend from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh.^^ They lobbied
27
The American
Railroad Network, 1861-1890
so successfully against the Baltimore
and Ohio
that
it
was prevented from
securing a satisfactory charter from the state legislature.
the pre-Civil
War
a result,
Ohio River terminus
Baltimore's road had to be satisfied with an
Wheeling, Virginia. The influence of
As
at
merchants had again thwarted
local
development of a coordinated railroad network.^*
Pennsylvania's railway system was isolated to a considerable extent
from the
railroad Hnes of adjoining states; moreover, the city of Phila-
which appears from the
delphia,
map
railroad
to
be a connecting point
for intersystem lines, proved on the contrary to be a major obstacle to
the through
Amboy
The
delphia.
which
movement
of passengers
Railroad terminated in
led to
Camden
tracks of the Philadelphia
New York,
of Philadelphia.
freight.
across the
The Camden and
Delaware from Phila-
and Trenton, the other
extended no farther than Kensington,
And, although the
the Philadelphia,
and
railroad
just
north
tracks of both the Pennsylvania
Wilmington and Baltimore
and
railroads entered the city,
they did not connect with each other or with the Philadelphia and Tren-
The
moving goods from any one cars drawn through on poorly maintained rail lines owned by the street
ton line to the north.
only means of
was by drays or horse
of these three roads to another
congested railway
city streets
company .-^^
Only when under pressure from unusual demands for expeditious service during the Civil War, and when there was a threat in 1863 of a line to be federally subsidized and built from Washington, D. C. through
New
York City, were arrangements finally made for connecting the railroads which terminated in Philadelphia. Various factors had contrib-
to
uted to the continuation of this anomalous situation; unquestionably,
commercial cupidity played an important
part.
Thus
a pamphleteer of
Philadelphia wrote in 1862:
A
strange misapprehension pervades the community, to the effect that a
continuous line of railway between the North and Washington would detrimentally affect the interests of this
city
and make Philadelphia a mere way-
side station.-*^^
At
the
petition
same time
that Philadelphia merchants feared the outside
which would
result
merchants sought persistently ton.
from through to obtain a
The New York Chamber
to the
United States
of
rail
Commerce
Congress on December
28
connections.
through
rail
route to
stated in a 5,
1861:
com-
New
York Washing-
communication
The Middle Atlantic
States, i86i
We believe they [those who shipped goods or travelled between New York and Philadelphia] are deprived, in an unjust and illiberal manner, of one of the most sacred rights of a free people the right of a free and unrestricted highway for the transaction of every description of communication and public traffic. There can be, in the opinion of your memorialists, but one reason advanced for the principal broken links in this line of conveyance, that reason being unquestionably the local profit derived by the large towns on the route from the delay forced upon travellers by a compulsory stoppage in those
—
places.-'-'^
Southward from Philadelphia, Baltimore extended to the the
city of
the
Philadelphia,
Wilmington and
Baltimore. But there was one break at
Susquehanna River. The road on both
sides of the river
was owned
by a single company which by 1861 had instituted a car ferry for the transfer of both passenger
there
was delayed not
so
and
much
freight cars.
The
construction of a bridge
by commercial jealousy as by expense and
technical difficulties.-^*
BALTIMORE'S B Baltimore merchants were
among
AND O
the earliest in the United States to
appreciate the commercial potentialities of the railroad. of the Baltimore
and Ohio were
laid in 1829,
The
first
tracks
although more than two
By The
decades passed before construction to the Ohio River was completed. 1
861 the city of Baltimore
main
line of the
nals at
had become an important railroad
center.
Baltimore and Ohio led to the Ohio River with termi-
Wheeling and Parker sburg; an extension
of the
same
railroad
ran from Baltimore to Washington; the Northern Central, as previously noted, reached finally,
the
up into the Susquehanna Valley of Pennsylvania, and,
Philadelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore
led
directly
to
Philadelphia. Promoted and financed by business interests in Baltimore
and helped repeatedly by both the
Ohio and
city
and the
state,
the Northern Central were the lighting
the Baltimore
weapons
and
of Baltimore
commerce and were generally recognized as such. A speaker before the Committee on Railroads of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York in 1869 summed up the situation: Both the Pennsylvania Central and Baltimore and Ohio Railroads, were from motives of state and city policy. A profitable investment for capital was not the moving cause for the construction of either: they were constructed for the promotion of the interests of their respective States and cities where built
29
The American Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
they terminate. Their destiny cannot be fulfilled, excepting by taking to their a large share of the trade of the West.^^
cities
The to
railroad situation at Baltimore offered the
through shipment
same kind
as those described for Philadelphia.
of obstacles
The two
rail-
roads which entered the city from the north, the Northern Central and the
Wilmington and Baltimore, made no
Philadelphia,
direct
connection
with each other or with the Baltimore and Ohio. Exchange of rolling
among
stock to
these railroads
haul cars through the
system.^^
made
The
on the tracks
end of the
laid to the
of the
mules
of the street railway
goods from vessel
possible the direct transfer of
more terminal still
possible only by using horses or
Baltimore and Ohio had excellent terminal
had been
rails
was
city streets
facilities
which
to freight car, for
pier in Baltimore harbor.
The
Balti-
Northern Central Railroad, on the other hand, was
from the harbor
located over a mile
in 1861.
There were obvious
advantages to Baltimore and Ohio interests in keeping the Northern Central Railroad from a waterfront terminal, for by means of
its
connec-
Northern Central competed for
tion with the Pennsylvania Railroad, the
the western trade. Baltimore merchants sought to enlarge their western trade but they preferred that
it
move
over a route which they
owned and
controlled themselves.^-^ B.\RRIERS
The
AT
GATEWAYS: BUFFALO AND ERIE
foregoing survey of the railroads of the Middle Atlantic States
indicates the extent to
were
\\'ESTERN
isolated
which the systems dominated by the various ports
from each
sectional trade, they
other. Serious as
were these hindrances
were equaled or exceeded by the
to intra-
difficulties of
through
trade between the Middle Atlantic States and adjoining regions. This least true of intercourse
between
New
York and
though the lack of a bridge over the Hudson venience, the railroads of
connection with those of
New New
York
at
New
England,
Albany was a
east of the
rail
of
was even
real incon-
Hudson made
England and no change
involved. Elsewhere, however, through
for,
direct
gauge was
movement between
sections
without change of bulk was impossible.
The need
for a railroad
the railroads in the
from
BufTalo,
New
York,
to
Cleveland, Ohio,
New
York Central and the Erie Railroads with Lake States, was met early in the 1850's by the con-
which would connect the
struction of four short connecting lines.
30
These were: The Buffalo and
The Middle Atlantic
States, i86i
its name; The Erie and NorthYork border to Erie; the Hne of the Franklin Canal Company which led from Erie to the Ohio border; and
State Line
whose
location
the Cleveland, Painesville
Cleveland.
was the
The
indicated by
is
which ran from the
East,
New
and Ashtabula which completed the
second link in
this line, the Erie
was
to be completed. It
first
built
line to
and North-East Railroad,
with a 6-foot gauge in the
expectation of connecting with an extension of the Erie and with the
hope of
adding a third
later
rail to
provide a standard-gauge connection
New
York Central. But the Erie was unable to extend its tracks to the state of financial difficulties, and presently Ohio and New York with the
terests
combined
New
Buffalo and 10 inches,
to
line because
railroad in-
complete the other three links in the route between
Ohio gauge, 4 feet no advanErie or the standard-gauge New York Central.
York. These links were
and made Buffalo the
tage to either the 6-foot
all
of the
transfer point while giving
In order to secure a through route of uniform 4 foot lo-inch gauge from Buffalo to Erie, the control of the Erie and North-East Railroad was
management
secured by the to convert
of the three other lines
and plans were
laid
to the 4 foot lo-inch gauge.
it
This development alarmed the people of Erie and Harbor Creek, the
two terminals of the broad-gauge Erie and North-East Railroad. The break in gauge had become a vested interest giving employment to labor
and
profit to
food
sellers
and
porters.
Determined not
to lose their ad-
vantage, the citizens of the area appealed to the Pennsylvania legislature to prevent the
gauge change. That body, ever anxious
merce of Philadelphia and the
interests
to protect the
com-
of the Pennsylvania Railroad
New
York competition, gave prompt assistance by passing a law (March 1851), which provided that railroads west of Erie should use
against
the 4 foot
This
1 0-inch
legislation
gauge and those
east,
6 feet or 4 feet 8 V2 inches.^^
was repealed the following
year,
possibly,
as
was
charged, as the result of unusual activity by out-of-state pressure groups.^^
At any of Erie
rate,
disappointed but quite unwilling to admit defeat, the citizens
and Harbor Creek then took matters into
Whenever work was begun on changing East, they tore
up the
tracks
their
own
the gauge of the Erie
and destroyed bridges. The
hands.
and North-
city council of
Erie adopted an ordinance forbidding any change of gauge. Legal battles
ensued and
local officers of the
law aided and abetted the mobs in destroy31
The American
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
joined in defying the United ing railroad property. Leading citizens locked in the city jail. Public was Marshal who, on one occasion, States
supported Erie's defiance of sentiment in Philadelphia appears to have governor of Pennsylvania exout-of-state railroad interests and the
the
of Erie. pressed his sympathy with the citizens taking place in the The contest continued into 1856, the chief action
courts
and the
but with sporadic acts of violence whenthe to change the six-foot gauge. Finally,
state legislature
ever any attempt
was made
broad-gauge line. After prolonged bargainstate took over control of the of Erie and the state of Pennsylvania ing, as a result of which the city from the out-of-state railroad interests, the Erie
wrung
costly concessions
the gauge of ^its and North-East Railroad was permitted to change gauge of the rest of the route.^* to conform to the 4 foot lo-inch
rails
was much more than a local Erie af!air. between New York merchants, In its larger aspects, it was a struggle West, and Philadelsought improved connections with the Middle
The "War
of the Gauges,"
who
phia businessmen,
who were determined
Pennsylvania Railroad. Spokesmen for
to discourage rivals of their
New
York
own
attacked the dog-in-
and threatened to supthe-manger policy of the Philadelphia merchants what they regarded as an port federal measures that would overcome with interstate trade. They even let it be known
interference remove the might support national legislation designed to they that of Trade by mint from Philadelphia. The Philadelphia Board
illegal
federal
legitimate commerce. unanimous vote denied any wish to interfere with York] speculators" New But they roundly condemned "foreign [that is.
Erie may be fully mainand expressed the hope that "the just rights of the grasping policy of certain tained and completely protected against are unjustly interfering with their interests,
railroad corporations
who
and who
no means
will stop at
to
accomplish their ends."
^^
BARRIERS AT WESTERN GATEWAYS: PITTSBURGH, WHEELING, AND PARKERSBURG Railroad at Pittsburgh and the Baltimore and Ohio York encountered the same gauge barrier as did their New
The Pennsylvania at
Wheeling
rivals at Buffalo.
The Allegheny River had been bridged
at Pittsburgh
Railroad in 1857,^'' and by by the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad at that Pennsylvania the 1858 a connection had been made with
32
The Middle Atlantic city.
The Fort Wayne
Chicago but of
a
line
provided a 4 foot lo-inch route
break of bulk was usually necessary
differences. In time a
gauge
States, i86i
way was found
gauge were moved
8 V^ -inch
despite the fact that
some the
all
the
way
to
and those
built
with
cases, cars constructed to the 4 foot
way from
from Indianapolis
rails built for rolling
all
Pittsburgh because
to interchange rolling
stock between railroads having a standard gauge
the 4 foot lo-inch gauge."" In
at
Louis to Philadelphia,
St.
to Pittsburgh they traveled over
stock having a wheel spread of 4 feet 10 inches,
but this practice never proved completely satisfactory.
For a short time
after the
Fort
Wayne
line
had completed
over the Allegheny and entered the city of Pittsburgh,
its
its
bridge
tracks stopped
200 feet short of those of the Pennsylvania. Local interests believed their
advantage to do everything in their
movement and the
of freight,
city council.
for only a
merchants were able
of Philadelphia merchants
Company
for a
through route
At Wheeling,
it
to
oppose the through
to delay the closing of this
few months. They were not strong enough
demands
as the
to
and the merchants were supported by the mayor But despite court orders and even with recourse
to violence, Pittsburgh
gap
power
the Baltimore
Pennsylvania Railroad
to defeat the
and of the Pennsylvania Railroad
to the West.^^
and Ohio faced the same gauge
difficulty
at Pittsburgh, for the tracks of the
Ohio
on the Ohio River opposite WheelCentral, which ing, were built to a 4 foot lo-inch gauge. The transfer problem was even more serious here, however, than at Pittsburgh, for there was no railroad terminated at Bellaire
bridge across the Ohio, and passengers and freight ahke had to be shuttled across the river.^^
The
Baltimore and Ohio, via the Northern Virginia Railroad, had a
second connection with the West at Parkersburg, Virginia,
From
Belpre
opposite Parkersburg, the Marietta and Cincinnati Railroad led to Cincinnati.
But here again there was no through movement of trains before War, for, although the Marietta and Cincinnati Hke the Balti-
the Civil
more and Ohio was a standard-gauge road, there was no bridge across the Ohio until 1870 and car ferries were not used before 1867.^'^ Thus, on every rail route between the Middle Atlantic States and Ohio, gauge differences or unbridged efficient
rivers presented serious obstacles to the
transportation of passengers
and
freight.
No
wonder
that the
Erie Canal continued to ofTer efTective competition until well after the
33
The American Civil
War, and
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
that the development of through railroad traffic
disappointment to the hopes of railroad promoters in eastern
was a
cities.
For
the five years ending September 30, i860, the percentage of total tonnage
which represented through freight carried by each of three of the main was reported as follows: the Pennsylvania carried east 14 per cent,
routes
west loYz per cent; the Baltimore and Ohio carried east west 7 14 per cent; and the west 5% per cent.^^
New
York Central
34
16% per
cent,
carried east 25 V4 per cent,
THE MIDWEST AND SOUTH,
1861
GAUGE DIFFERENCES IN THE MIDWEST
made
Railroad construction in the Middle West had
hardly more than a beginning in the decade of the 1840's, and by 1850
equaled only about 1200 miles. But during
total construction in this area
the following decade
more
track
was
than in any other section
laid in this
of the country, with the result that by the outbreak of the Civil
north of the Ohio River were crisscrossed with
states
aggregating more than 10,000 miles of track.
many
The Ohio and
Rivers were connected with the Great Lakes, and the larger
two
rivers
were
also joined
by
rail.
Beyond the
and Iowa, the great building era was and
had reached the Missouri
struction in
The
The
Minnesota had not yet begun.
first
Ohio
railroad, the
of 4 feet 10 inches, because,
which was acquired
in
it
New
of that gauge.^ Other early
Ohio
on the
Mississippi, in Missouri
under way; many lines One road, the Hannibal River. The era of actual con-
unity of the midwestern railroad net
gauge.
Mississippi
cities
just getting
to stretch out
Joseph,
the
toward the West.
were beginning St.
War
railroads,
legislature passed a
was
Mad
was marred by
said, its first locomotive.
Jersey,
Ohio
differences in
River and Lake Erie, had a width
was designed
The Sandus\y,
to operate
on a track
railroads copied this gauge,
law on February
11, 1848,
and the
providing that
all
roads built within the state should have a 4 foot lo-inch gauge.^ This law was modified appreciably in 1852 when the legislature, without prescribing a particular width, merely required that any railroad in
Ohio
should have "one uniform gauge or width of track from end to end."
Yet even before the passage of
this act other
35
^
gauges had been author-
The American ized; of
two
to be constructed to a
any railroad with which
the
i
861-1890
railroad charters granted in 1851, one permitted the Franklin
and Warren Railroad to
Railroad Network,
Ohio and
it
gauge necessary
Railroad might lay
Mississippi
to
conform
might connect; and the other provided that tracks
its
to
a
6-foot
gauge.*
By
1
861 the
gauge pattern of Ohio had become more confused than
Lake
that of any other state. Lines south of to
Toledo and westward, were
Erie, leading
from Cleveland
built to the 4 foot S^z-inch width, as
was the Marietta and Cincinnati
in southern Ohio.
The Fremont and
Indiana in northern Ohio connected a standard-gauge road with a 4 foot 1
0-inch one but
was
itself
of 4 feet 9V4 inches.
constructed to the so-called "compromise gauge"
Two
lines,
one southward from Sandusky and the
other northward from Portsmouth on the Ohio, were constructed to the
unusual width of 5 feet 4 inches. Finally, the broad-gauge Ohio and all the way from the Mississippi opposite St. Louis across
Mississippi led
southern
Illinois
and Indiana and terminated
was
road, influenced by the Erie, third rail
was added from Cincinnati
interchange of nati,
traffic
which had
its
Ohio. This
at Cincinnati,
gauge throughout; a Lawrenceburg in order to permit
built to a 6-foot
to
with the standard-gauge Indianapolis and Cincin-
southern terminal at Lawrenceburg.
As may be seen from Map II, the pattern of railroad gauges in the Middle West was simplest in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa, where all lines
were standard gauge. Most of the Indiana railroads were
standard gauge, but the Ohio influence lines
which appear
in the east
is
also of
reflected in the 4 foot lo-inch
and north. Moreover, the
6-foot
Ohio and
Missouri Railroad crossed the southern part of the Hoosier State. In 1861 the Illinois section of the latter railroad of standard gauge. It
and Elgin
is
(later a part of the
built to the Erie width, but 1855.^
The two gauges
state; in
was the only
line in that state not
true that one other Illinois railroad, the Chicago
Northwestern system), originally had been it
had been changed
to standard in
June
in Missouri indicate the border position of that
northern Missouri the railroads were standard gauge, like those in the southern part the 5 foot 6-inch
of Iowa;
gauge followed the
Arkansas pattern.^
There
is
no indication that the confusion of railroad gauges
and Ohio was planned deliberately. ried over
from the confused
no agreement on the most
It
situation in the East. Engineers satisfactory gauge,
36
in Indiana
appears to have been merely car-
and the
had reached
first
short lines
The Midwest and constructed in the forties and early
South, i86i
fifties
were designed primarily
to
serve local needs.
As
the
the middle
the
unplanned confusion of gauges continued, although
fifties
tempo
of railroad construction increased during
by the end of the decade the disadvantages were becoming manifest. CITY RIVALRIES IN
THE MIDWEST
City rivalries did not tend in Indiana and Ohio, as they often did in
and South,
the East to
through
promote gauge differences or other impediments
to
common
Rivalries were just as
traffic.
in this region," but
only in one instance, the opposition to the bridging of the Ohio, do they
appear to have resulted in any appreciable
ment
of freight
and passengers.
War
Before the Civil
Ohio River presented
the
east-west as well as to north-south trade, for river
until a bridge
neering
through move-
effort to restrain
difficulties
was completed
and the large
at
a serious obstacle to
no railroad crossed the
Steubenville in
1862-63. Engi-
was required
capital investment that
help to account for this delay, especially on the lower reaches of the river.
However, on the upper
river
commercial
rivalries
played a part.
Pittsburgh shipping and steamboat interests strongly opposed any bridg-
ing of the Ohio.
When
1849, they declared
it
a
highway bridge was erected
a
menace
court and legislative fight against across the
With
Ohio
at Steubenville
it;
a proposal for
was strongly opposed
the foregoing exception, both local
must be remembered
nated by agriculture, and the cheapness
and
its
a
in
prolonged
a railroad bridge in Wheeling.^
and outside pressures in Ohio
and Indiana discouraged the development of railroad development. It
WheeUng
to
and conducted
to navigation
restrictive policies against
that this
was an area domi-
prosperity depended in no small part on
with which merchants were able
to send raw and bring back processed goods. Even if city had sought to capture this traffic by erect-
efficiency
materials to eastern markets the traders of a particular
ing barriers to through effectively.
The
rail
movement, they could not have done
trade of no very appreciable area could be
for the rush of railroad building in the fifties to the East,
terrain
and additional
which was
lines
had created
so
monopoHzed,
alternate routes
could easily have been built through
relatively favorable to railroad construction.
In neither Ohio nor Indiana, nor for that matter elsewhere in the Midwest, were gaps in railroad lines deliberately created or maintained within
37
The American In
city limits.
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
through railroad connections in midwest
fact,
were
cities
effected at a very early date in railroad development. In 1850 railroads
entering Indianapolis completed the construction of "the
Railway; three years
same companies had
later these
Union Track union
built the first
passenger station in the United States.^
A
gap
There
in rail transportation did exist, however, at Cincinnati.
Miami
the Little
made no
Railroad, terminating in the eastern part of the
city,
connection with either the Indianapolis and Cincinnati or the
Ohio and
Mississippi, both of
East-West
rail
one terminal
which entered from the west. Through
shipments had to be carted through the
down may have
connecting tracks were finally laid
to the other until
end of the Civil War. Some
shortly before the
from
city streets
gained from the break in the line and
local interests
might have been
this
a factor in
retention; but the persistence of this city gap appears to have been
its
make the necessary investment in a demand for through shipment
caused more by reluctance to
when
tion before a time
No
less
arose.-^*^
convinced than the people of Ohio and Indiana of the desira-
of through railroad
bility
connec-
strong
movement were
the eastern interests
which
played an increasingly important role in western railroad development.
The
building of the early railroads in Ohio and Indiana had been largely
a local venture and, for the fore,
when
most
part,
not a very profitable one. There-
the eastern railroads reached
and
in the early fifties,
nections, they
their
Lake Erie and the Ohio River
promoters began looking
found the roads in these
for western con-
states typically
capital starved,
poorly equipped, and often uncompleted over projected routes. the
New
York
Central, the Pennsylvania,
By
1861
and the Baltimore and Ohio,
by furnishing capital and expert management, had greatly extended their influence over the lines across the
The in
New
Ohio and Indiana
two
states to the
York Central group,
promoting the construction
railroads
and had developed
traffic
commercial centers farther west. as has already
been shown, was active
of the lines both north
Erie which connected with roads leading to Chicago.
and south
of
Lake
The Pennsylvania
Railroad gave assistance to and gradually came to control the Pittsburgh,
Fort
Wayne and
4 foot a
1
Chicago.
Made up
of a combination of short lines this
0-inch road finally reached Chicago in 1858
route of uniform gauge from Pittsburgh
38
and thereby provided
to Chicago.-^^
The Midwest and
From
South, i86i
Ohio River opposite Wheeling
the
the 4 foot lo-inch Central
led
westward and northwestward, and by connecting with roads
of similar
gauge reached Chicago, Indianapolis, and Cleveland. Both the
Ohio
Pennsylvania and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroads were interested in
By autumn
this line.^^
called St.
of i860 freight cars equipped with wheels of so-
"compromise gauge" were moving
all
way through from
the
East
Louis (then Illinois-town) to Bellaire, Ohio, the eastern terminal of
Ohio Central Railroad. This was accomplished by using the standardgauge tracks of the Terre Haute and Alton and the Terre Haute and the
Richmond
and a
as far as Indianapolis
from
St.
foot lo-inch roads
series of 4
from thence eastward.^^ Goods could be sent
way
via this route all the
Louis to Baltimore, but they had to be transshipped across the
Ohio River
to
Wheeling.
A second feeder line from
and Cincinnati, served the Baltimore and Ohio. direct route
from Cincinnati
and Cincinnati,
like the
to the Atlantic Coast.
the west, the Marietta
provided the most
It
Although the Marietta
Baltimore and Ohio, was of standard gauge, a
break of bulk was necessary because the Ohio River had not yet been
bridged at Parkersburg.^^
Outside pressures then, in the form of the
New
York
Central, the
Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio, operated to integrate the
rail
networks of Ohio and Indiana. All three of these eastern roads were standard gauge and, although they did not succeed immediately in changing over the tracks of their midwest
own
gauge, at
least
they did not add further to the complexity of the gauge pattern.
Un-
fortunately, the interests, allied
6-foot
same cannot be
allies to their
said for the Erie influence. Financial
with the Erie Railroad, completed in 1864 a Hne with
a
gauge which angled across Ohio and connected the Erie with the
broad-gauge Ohio and Mississippi
at
Cincinnati. In this one instance,
outside influence further complicated the railroad
when sentiment was soon
to favor a
Throughout the other midwestern operated in a
way
map
of
Ohio
at a
states,
both local and outside factors
very similar to that just described for
Ohio and Indiana.
Outside promotion and financing played a major role in the newer
from the very beginning of the fluence
is
reflected in the very
time
uniform gauge.
railroad era
and the extent of
states
their in-
wide adoption of the standard gauge. At-
tention will be confined here to one important instance in
39
which com-
The American Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
mercial rivalry tended to retard the completion of the railroad net in this area.^^
The commercial
rivalry
between
St.
sembled that between Philadelphia and
Louis and Chicago somewhat
New
York. For decades
St.
re-
Louis
merchants had dominated the rich trade of the upper Mississippi and the Missouri region, but in the early
fifties
the merchants of Chicago
emerged as serious rivals for this commerce. Railroad lines from Chicago were
built north,
connections were
west and south into rich lumber and farming areas;
made with
railroads entering
from the
east; radiating
Unes reached one after another of the Mississippi River ports north of St.
Louis and began to syphon away a portion of the down-river trade.^^
The
Illinois
Central Railroad, built southward to the Ohio River at Cairo,
also threatened to develop a north-south
commerce which would com-
pletely by-pass St. Louis.
To meet
the threat of Chicago interests to a trade
own, the businessmen of
as their
St.
which they regarded
Louis adopted two expedients.
First,
they gave their support to the construction of a railroad line from the east
bank of the Mississippi opposite
and Indiana River at
St.
the time. at this
to
Cincinnati.
The
St.
Louis, across southern Illinois
question of bridging the Mississippi
Louis does not seem to have been seriously considered
The
great cost
and the
difficulty of
point doubtless account for
Louis steamboat interests
may
this,
although the opposition of
well have been a factor.
At any
lines across the
St.
rate, busi-
ness leaders in St. Louis allied themselves with the merchants speculators of southern Illinois to
at
spanning the wide river
and land
promote the construction of railroad
southern part of that
In the ensuing struggle in
state.
the lUinois legislature over the chartering of cross-state railroads, Chicago
supported by Alton and other up-river rivals of
interests,
posed the proposal. But the legislative battle interests
tion
and
their allies in southern Illinois,
was merely
Ohio and
Louis, op-
St.
was won by the
and the
St.
Louis
result of the opposi-
to delay temporarily the securing of a charter for the
Mississippi Railroad.^^ This line gave St. Louis a rail route to
the east, although one
and by the lack
which was handicapped both by
its
unusual gauge
of a bridge across the Mississippi.-^^
Further to thwart the Chicago bid for the trade of the Mississippi valley,
the St. Louis
allied trading
Chamber
and steamboat
of
Commerce, representing
the closely
interests of the city, strove persistently to
40
The Midwest and South,
i86i
prevent the construction of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi be-
tween Iowa and
IlHnois.
Even
after a bridge
had been completed
at
Rock
Island in 1856, St. Louis merchants vigorously but unsuccessfully sought its
removal through court action.^ÂŽ The bitterness of
illustrated
Chamber
attorney for the St. Louis into
of
and charged with conspiring
jail,
He was
this controversy
by an incident which took place at Chicago in i860,
later acquitted.^^
A
Commerce was to
arrested,
of
thrown
burn the Rock Island Bridge.
second bridge over the Mississippi was not
completed until 1865. Apparently the persistent attacks by the
Chamber
is
when an
Commerce upon
the legality of the
first
St.
Louis
bridge served as a
temporary deterrent to the construction of others.^^
THE BEGINNINGS OF A RAIL NETWORK Railroad construction in the southern great rapidity in the decade of the
work was
less
the Mississippi. to
fifties.
states
IN
THE SOUTH
had gone forward with
Nevertheless, the southern net-
developed in 1861 than that in any other area east of It
was most complete
in the seaboard states
from Virginia
Georgia where population was densest and where most of the
earliest
construction had taken place. Railroad lines fanned out into the back
country from the principal port or ports of each
by commercial considerations as well as by the of the sea
and the broad
Interconnections
so inadequate that
most
pattern dictated
bridging arms
estuaries of the rivers. North-south transporta-
tion over appreciable distances continued to vessels.
state, a
difficulty of
among
depend
chiefly
on coastwise
the state-oriented railroad systems
interstate rail traffic
had
to
move by
were
indirect
and
roundabout routes.
Commercial the Charleston
and Hamburg, the
and one of the
first
of
Commerce,
of the
southern ports strongly influenced
interests in the leading
the original railroad pattern. This
in the country.
this line
well illustrated in the building of
is
earliest
was designed primarily
Chamber
of
to divert the rich trade
A
report of a com-
Commerce urging
the construction
Savannah River from Savannah
mittee of the Charleston
important railroad in the South
Promoted by the Charleston Chamber to Charleston.
of this road typifies the spirit of urban rivalry: Charleston will and must be the great commercial mart of the surrounding states.
No
petition
local jealousies
can interrupt her march to wealth.
impede her progress
No
rival
com-
to her 'Destined Elevation,' if her citizens are
41
The American Railroad Network, own
but faithful to their
interest
and
seize
1861-1890
with a becoming energy those ad-
vantages which providence has placed at their disposal, -and cultivate those vast resources of trade
The
which
lay invitingly within their reach.^^
southern seaboard state systems
west by only two
rail routes.
One
made through
connections to the
led to the southwest across Virginia
through Knoxville, Tennessee; the other proceeded
to the
and
northwest from
way of Atlanta. These lines converged at Memphis and Charleston Railroad provided a Memphis on the Mississippi River and afforded con-
Charleston and Savannah by
Chattanooga, whence the
through route
to
nections with most of the north-south railroads in this area. east-west route leading
A
second
from Atlanta through Montgomery and Selma
Vicksburg on the Mississippi was only partly completed in
to
1861.
In Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi the chief railroad
building effort had been directed toward completing north-south Hnes.^^
Here, as in the Old Northwest, mercantile groups strove not so erect exclusive systems as to construct roads
own
city
with distant markets. Thus, the two leading gulf
Orleans and Mobile, sponsored
through Mississippi
make
to
rival
lines
much
which would connect cities.
to
their
New
which extended northward
connections with the roads of Tennessee and
Kentucky.^'* Louisville, the most aggressive of the
southward through Bowling Green
to
Kentucky
cities,
reached
complete connections not only
with these roads but, via Chattanooga, with Atlanta, Savannah, and Charleston.
Elsewhere in the South the railroad era was
just
beginning in 1861,
and only fragments of construction appear on the map. Florida had nearly completed nections.
West
two
cross state lines, but these
out-of-state con-
Houston, Texas, are the beginnings
on the map, but only in the
vicinity of
of the network which was
to develop after the
Some
had no
of the Mississippi a rash of unconnected rail lines appears
war even suggested.
of the striking discontinuities of the southern railroad system
which appear on the map are explainable by the newness of development and were not deliberately created by any
These hindrances rapidly as capital
to the
became
movement available
For example, the remaining gaps burg and Atlanta and
railroad
interest group.
of traffic were being eliminated as
and construction
difficulties
in the east-west route
also the short
42
overcome.
between Vicks-
gap between Corinth, Mississippi,
The Midwest and
South, i86i
and Jackson, Tennessee, were on the way
being closed
to
when
war
the
broke out in 1861.
On
the other hand, several of the breaks in the southern railroad net
resulted
from commercial
rivalries.
The
failure to connect the Florida
war was
railroads with those of Georgia prior to the
in part because of
might
the fear of Florida business interests that the trade of their state
be monopolized by Savannah instead of benefiting their
own
ports.^'
Again, a continuous line southward through the piedmont region of
North Carolina was broken by
the lack of a railroad between Greensboro,
North Carolina, and Danville, Virginia. The need
of a connection per-
Richmond had long been
recognized, but com-
mitting through
traffic to
mercial interests in North Carolina, especially those at such port as
New
Bern and Wilmington, defeated
from the North Carolina
for such a road
The
all
legislature until Civil
made
its
terior
North Carolina would be diverted
from the
construction imperative.
state's
own
Although
a
width of 4
feet 6 inches
Hamburg
IN
that the trade
Richmond and
needs
from
thus
in-
away
THE SOUTH
had been
originally advised for the
Railroad, Horatio Allen,
engineer of the road in September 1829,
on the
was
to
War
seaports.^^
GAUGE DIFFERENCES
Charleston and
fear
cities
attempts to obtain a charter
basis of engineering considerations.^^
who became
chief
recommended a 5-foot gauge As will be seen from Map III,
the decision to adopt this gauge greatly influenced railroad construction
throughout most of the South. Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee railroads adopted
it
exclusively,
and
it
was the predominant gauge
Kentucky, Mississippi, and Alabama. So far rolling stock could be
moved
all
the
as
in
gauge was concerned,
way from such
Atlantic ports as
Norfolk, Charleston, and Savannah to Louisville, Memphis, and
New
Orleans. Nevertheless, a glance at the
was bedeviled by
serious
map
gauge
will
show
variations.
A
that the South as a
number
whole
of Virginia rail-
roads were standard gauge, as were most of those of North Carolina.
Kentucky, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas had short
lines of this gauge.
In Mississippi, the line leading eastward from Vicksburg had the distinction, it
unique for the South, of having a 4 foot lo-inch gauge.^^ Finally, from the map of the Southern railroads that most of the
will be seen
43
The American
Railroad Network,
track in the South west of the Mississippi
was
i
861—1890
built to a 5 foot 6-inch
width.
For the most part these gauge variations appear
to reflect
merely indi-
vidual differences in judgment and a failure to appreciate the future of the railroad as a
means
for the long-distance transportation of freight
and passengers. The adoption is
of the standard
gauge in the border
states
not surprising in view of the prevalence of this gauge to the north.
But the building of roads
bama and from the
to
gauges other than that of 5
Mississippi seems logically incomprehensible.
available records
why most
feet in Ala-
Nor
is
clear
it
of the Southern roads west of the
Mississippi selected a width of 5 feet 6 inches.
To
return to the East, the gauge pattern in
determined. Citizens of that
deliberately
North Carolina was more especially
state,
those in the
seaboard counties, had long resented the tendency of their commerce to flow south to Charleston or north to Petersburg, Richmond, and Ports-
mouth
rather than to
of the railroad
North Carolina's own
seemed
to
many North
The coming
Carolina businessmen a real oppor-
and an
tunity to correct this situation,
inferior seaports.
early convention, held at Raleigh
in 1833, adopted a resolution declaring that the state should utilize
resources "in creating and improving markets within her
the construction of railroads."^ the
The
tracks of the
first
own
its
limits" by
railroad in the state,
Wilmington and Raleigh, were standard gauge, and though most
the roads in southern Virginia and a width of 5 feet, the state of
own
all
in
South Carolina were
North Carolina adhered
of
have
to
persistently to
its
gauge.
There was opposition, but the cially the
head
citizens of the coastal counties,
merchants of such ports
City,
the roads of the state, with only
gauge.
They not only prevented
and Danville, Virginia, ing of one, but also
when
standard gauge, despite
lature
Wilmington,
two minor
New
the
its
Bern, and More-
legislation requiring
exceptions, to be standard
war needs
to accede to the build-
Piedmont Railroad was constructed
upon
the legislature to require that
connection
at
which
this
it
for
be
Danville with the 5-foot gauge
Richmond and Danville. Military necessity finally forced of North Carolina to approve changing the gauge to 5
the act by
espe-
a rail connection between Greensboro
until forced by
this purpose, they prevailed
of the
as
were consistently successful in securing
and
the legisfeet,
but
change was authorized carefully provided that the
44
The Midwest and gauge would have
months
South, i86i
be changed back to standard width within six
to
after the close of the war.^°
RAILROAD CONNECTIONS IN SOUTHERN CITIES
Not apparent on
map, but
the
differences to through railroad traffic in the South,
network
railroad
many
in
gauge
at least as serious a barrier as
southern
cities.
were the gaps
in the
Sometimes these gaps accom-
panied gauge differences. At Montgomery, Alabama, through shipment
was impeded not only because one
railroad
was standard gauge and the
other 5 foot, but also because their terminals were separated by several city blocks.^^ Serious
problems
of the South Atlantic States
and seaport
also arose in other river
where merchants
cities
in rival centers sought to
build exclusive commercial empires.
When
railroads
were
first built
in these states, they
were looked upon
primarily as vehicles for trade with the nearby back country.
nished an avenue of commerce the smoke,
and the
to,
not through, the port
city streets,
the early railroads to these port towns often
had
Frequently, they
As
made no connection with
from
and consequently
other
fifties
and with both freight and passenger
greatly increased, the need to permit the railroads to traverse the
streets of the port cities
became apparent. Spark
arresters attached to the
smokestacks of locomotives reduced the danger of
fires,
and the advan-
tages of bringing the railroads into the commercial sections
wharves influenced most towns
to the less,
in the chief river
railroads
and seaport
were not permitted
to
make
and down
to permit the practice. Neverthe-
cities
of the
South Atlantic States the
the actual connections
permit an exchange of rolling stock or
one
leaving
rail lines
where goods could be
freight cars to barges or sailing vessels.
the rail net spread in the
traffic
fur-
their terminals at the out-
the city, nor did they extend to the waterfront transferred directly
They
Their noise,
hazard of sparks showering from their wood-
fire
burning engines were unwelcome on the
skirts.
city.
which would
facilitate transfer of freight
from
line to another.
This
restriction
were twofold: retail
was enforced by
first,
local business groups.
Their
interests
tavern keepers, teamsters, porters, forwarding agents,
merchants, and others developed a vested interest in the transfer
business
which was dependent upon preserving
line; second, the
a
gap in the railroad
wholesale merchants wished to increase the business of
45
The American their ports both for
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
importing and exporting. As in the case of the mer-
chants of Philadelphia, the Southern business groups did not wish their
become way
cities to
through.
The
stations
with freight and passengers merely passing
reasoning was quite similar to that of merchants who, until
fairly late in the
automobile age, objected to the construction of high-
ways which would by-pass the business
districts of
towns along a main
road.
In contrast, the leading railroad centers in the South Atlantic States
which were located inland and not on important waterways formed genuine junction points shifted
from one
where
rail lines
were connected and rolling stock was
and Columbia,
line to another. Burkesville, Virginia,
South Carolina, for example, were important junctions permitting through
movement of freight, as were such important inland Georgia Macon and Atlanta. The terminal of the Central of Georgia Railroad was on the Savannah from
side of
road.^^
Only
Company
after
cities
opposite
Albany and Gulf
that of the Savannah,
as
Rail-
prolonged opposition was the South Carolina Railroad
granted the privilege of building a bridge over the Savannah
River and making a connection with the Georgia Railroad. Local commercial interests prevented the Augusta and Savannah line from forming
The Ashley River
a junction with other railroads entering the city.^^
separated the tracks of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad at Charles-
ton from those of the two other railroads entering the
mington, North Carolina, the Cape Fear River
city,
and
Wil-
at
gauge
as well as a
dif-
ference blocked through rail movement.^^
The map shows Wilmington two port interests
to
cities,
a series of standard-gauge railroads leading north
Aquia Creek on the Potomac
River.
On
Petersburg and Richmond. In both of these
prevented the union of railroad
lines,
Four
cities
local
a position which was sup-
ported by an act of the Virginia legislature permitting railroad companies to use their streets.
from
this route lay
cities
to forbid
railroads entered Petersburg
from south of the Appomattox River. None of these made connections with each other and, more important river
still,
they were
all
separated by the
from the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad which terminated
at
Pocahontas opposite Petersburg. Although railroad interests sought to close these gaps, only the pressure of the Civil
46
War was
sufficient to over-
The Midwest and South,
1861
RAILROADS ENTERING
RICHMOND, VA 1861
come
the "great repugnance
.
.
.
felt
by the citizens of Petersburg to any
connection between the roads in question by means of which produce and
merchandise would pass through Petersburg
The
to
and from Richmond."
^^
Richmond was closely parallel. None of the three railRichmond north of the James River made connections
situation at
roads entering
with each other or with the three railroads entering from the south, despite the fact that all
The
but the Raleigh and Danville were standard gauge.
local opposition to
through connections was so
connections were forced because of the Civil
bitter here that
War
when
they were allowed
with the provision that such links could be used for military purposes only.^*'
Finally, not only
were southern railroads largely without internal
47
in-
The American tegration, but they
were
Railroad Network,
also completely
with any other part of the nation.
The
i
861-1890
without direct
rail
connections
lack of bridges over the Mississippi
proved a barrier to the West as the unbridged Ohio River did to the North.
And there
in northern Virginia,
was not
where gauges were the same
a single direct connection
as in
Maryland,
with northern railroads, for
at
Alexandria and Aquia Creek the only means of transferring either goods or passengers
was by steamboat.
48
VI
THE TREND TOWARD INTEGRATION,
1861-1870
EARLY SHIPPING PATTERNS
During
the pre-railroad age in
keepers
made semiannual
for the
coming
goods
season,
visits to
America western
and personally supervised the shipment of
to their stores in the interior.
For example,
a
1825, arranged first for
to Detroit.
shipment via the Erie Canal
its
transfer to a lake boat
At Detroit he arranged
wagons which If a
its
finally carried his
Albany
to Buffalo.
in
At
on which he took passage
for transshipment to his
new
their
merchant from one
of the small settlements in Michigan, purchasing his stock in
Buffalo he supervised
store-
the cities of the East, bought supphes
own
or hired
stock to his place of business.
western merchant was unable to
make
his regular trip to the East,
he had the alternative of sending a partner or other trustworthy substitute or of arranging with agents to act for him. Usually these agents
quaintances in the fer points
cities in
which he made
his purchases
and
himself,
Buffalo,
would doubtless have been consigned
who would have gone down
ment, and had
it
to
to
ac-
at the trans-
along the route by which his goods were sent to the West.
shipment of the Michigan merchant, had he been unable it
were
The
accompany
an acquaintance in
to the canal, collected the consign-
delivered to a lake boat, after having bargained with
the captain as to the charges.
Another acquaintance of the merchant would
have supervised the transshipment
at Detroit.-^
Early in the history of the westward movement, transfer or forwarding agents appeared at the principal points of transshipment, chiefly in
49
re-
The American
Railroad Network,
produce to market. At
chants
who
some
least
861-1890
who were
sponse to the needs of western shippers their
i
unable to accompany
were commission mer-
of these
received consignments, forwarded the produce to market,
and arranged
for
The advent
its sale.
of the railroad effected
no immediate change
in the ship-
ping pattern of internal America. Far from introducing through shipment, the early railways created additional obstacles to the free flow of
Those
arising
from
There were many
differences in
others, for the
which had
the railways
traffic.
gauge are merely the most obvious.
same limited view on the function of
led to the deliberate construction of roads of vary-
ing gauges also affected early railroad management. Thus, in the beginning, neither physical nor institutional means were provided for interline
exchange. Each short railroad operated without any attempt to co-
ordinate
its
services
specifically as
with those of other companies unless they were
allied extensions.
httle attention to
what adjoining
built
Train schedules were drawn up with lines
might do. Neither the passenger
nor freight cars of a company operated beyond the limits of the company's
own tracks. This
latter state of affairs persisted
lieved. In 1847, after the
when Boston the port of
for
some
New York
much
longer than
is
Hudson River had been bridged
years
had been engaged
in a
generally beat
Troy and
grim struggle with
for the trade of the West, the Boston
and Worcester
and the Western Railroad, both Boston controlled, were not as yet interchanging cars with roads of the same gauge west of the Hudson.^ Noting the disadvantages resulting
roUing stock even
when
from the unwillingness of
of the
railroads to exchange
same gauge, George Dartnell, writing
in
1858, strongly advocated the establishment of a railroad clearing house.
He It
writes in urging this proposal:
would save many unnecessary transhipments,
as
such would only be
re-
quired where there was a break of gauge; cars would invariably run through
when
fully laden, and be loaded on their return, either for a part or for the whole distance; the companies to whom they belonged receiving payment by a mileage toll for the distance traveled loaded; they would also be entitled to demurrage for additional time occupied in transit.
The many
transhipments of freight are
known
to be the chief cause of
and damages, besides adding greatly to the working expenses in labor and clerk-hire, and requiring large and costly accommodations for the performance of the service; the expense of an ordinary transhipment delays, overcharges,
50
The Trend Toward is
not
less
There
Integr.\tion,
i
861-1870
than 25 cents per ton, and the delay but little under 24 hours, if any. no reason why the running of cars through, should increase the
is
mileage of "Empties," as foreign cars might be loaded from point to point, so long as they
The is
were not taken
off the line of route
by which they were received.
interchange of passenger and freight cars under the present system
not only exceedingly limited, but
is
believed to be generally very unsatis-
and there can be but little doubt that if it were made usual with roads having the same gauge, it would tend to increase through traffic by railroads, to give greater confidence and satisfaction to the public, and to add to the factory;
revenues of the companies interested.^
In the course of the Senate debates in February 1863 on the question
gauge of the
of the
that the
good
first
running of "strange" cars over
railroad
was made
transcontinental railroad, the statement
was something
their roads
that
managers would not permit.
something that ought never to be required, and never can be required company is sufficient for its business. It is an advantage to the road itself as an independent road that it is not to be interrupted It is
if
the rolling stock of the
by other roads running into
it
or disturbing
its
own
rolling stock.
.
.
.
They
can better afford to break gauge and pay the expenses themselves.'* This, to be sure,
gauge
of
had of
at the
of a senator
on short
terests.
.
.
." ^
as "a
advocated a break
matter of convenience in keeping certain running so as not to
lines of road,
New
York and
transfer at Cincinnati, not because of
Ohio and
cinnati
and
St.
commingle
the various in-
In 1866 passengers on at least some of the trains running on
the broad-gauge route between
the
who
admit that railroads frequently transshipped even where no break
to
gauge occurred
stock
was the argument
Missouri River, but even his most articulate opponent
Mississippi Railroad,
Louis, refused to
St.
Louis were forced to
any physical obstacle but because
which formed the link between Cin-
let its
cars leave
its
ing the situation at the close of the Civil War,
own S.
line.^
Morton
SummarizPeto,
who
traveled widely in the United States, wrote: "Scarcely any attempts are
made
to
render the working of lines convenient to travellers by working
the trains of one
company
in conjunction with another.
'^ .
.
."
Matching the conservatism of railroad management was the long-continued parochialism of the the uninterrupted
cities.
movement
To
local
of freight
merchants
it
seemed
clear that
and passengers through
their
municipality contributed to the prosperity of a rival city where a trackage
break occurred. Moreover, a forced transfer of through freight led to the
51
:
The American
Railroad Network,
i
861—1890
development of forwarding companies and created jobs for the
The
workers.
"Erie
result of attempts
War"
of 1855—56
to interfere
city's
was simply the most spectacular
with the vested interests that grew up
wherever transshipment was necessary.^ In denying, during the course of the debates referred to in the preceding paragraph, that he
was
influ-
enced by local interests in advocating that the gauge of the Pacific Railroad match that of the Iowa
lines,
Senator James B. Grimes of Iowa
explained
...
if
was controlled by any
I
local interests,
break of gauge, because wherever there a large
amount
around that
place; but .^
As
.
late as the
I
trust that
summer
I
should be in favor of the
a break in the
gauge there
is
always
town immediately springs up
of business to be done, and a
of view.
.
is
look at the question in a national point
I
of 1871 the city of Louisville extended "certain
desirable privileges" to the Louisville, Cincinnati
and Lexington Railroad,
a road of 5-foot gauge on the south side of the Ohio, in consideration of
the road's changing transfers to be
made
its
gauge
to 4 feet 9 inches
and thus compelling
which might otherwise be made
in Louisville
in
Cincinnati.-^*'
FACTORS ENCOURAGING RAILWAY INTEGRATION Despite continued local efforts to profit by the difTerences in gauge
and breaks
new
in track, by the decade of the i86o's there
order for America's railroads. Satisfying as such
were signs of a
traffic
breaks might
be to local interests, they placed a heavy tax on through freight. class of freight
obstacles
became more important, the need
became imperative, and uniformity
the railroads of the United States
By
the outbreak of the Civil
as yet
and Canada.
War,
the very eastern merchants
who had
development in America
prepared to give up any real or imagined ad-
vantages arising from trackage breaks in their plaining of the costs of transfers
and of the overcharges
this
gauge was forced upon
of
been responsible for the early pattern of railway
and who were not
As
to eliminate physical
on the
own
lines over
cities
were com-
which they shipped
of forwarding agents. In 1863
it
was estimated
that a single transshipment cost an average of seven cents a ton.
The
Boston Board of Trade maintained in 1866 that such costs on the roads
between
their city
and Chicago amounted 52
to $500,000 a year.^^
The Trend Toward
Integration,
i
861-1870
Agitation on the part of the seaboard merchants for the
handhng
led to substantial advances
which
i86o's
network.
more
efficient
of through freight coincided with other developments of the
One
was the
of these
Civil
movement
necessity of large-scale
of
toward an integrated railroad
War, which brought with it the troops and supplies. Another was
the decision of Congress that the newly chartered Pacific Railroad should
be of standard gauge, thus assuring that the railway system west of the
Missouri River would develop as part of the nation's system, not as a separate system.
A
third significant development of this period affecting
the railroad pattern
was the growth of the grain trade from the West. EFFECT OF THE CIVIL
WAR
Technological and institutional innovations of the war years in
re-
sponse to military needs resulted for some areas of the country in a
breakdown
of the carefully isolated railway systems of the rival
com-
mercial interests.^^ In the South, for instance, the railroads entering Rich-
mond were
joined by tracks laid through the streets. This
was
in direct
The
response to miHtary needs and over the opposition of local interests. roads entering Petersburg were also
joined, and the gap was
finally closed
between Greensboro, North Carolina, and Danville, Virginia.^^ Legislatures
sometimes carefully stipulated that tracks laid for miHtary purposes
were
to be
badly
removed
damaged
after the
war. But
railroads of the
and European
capital,
it
was
when
South were
the
war was over and the
rebuilt, partly
with Northern
possible to ignore local pressures.
In the North, the war years saw the inauguration of through railroad service
between
need for
fast
New
and
York and Washington. With
efficient rail service
the greatly increased
along the eastern seaboard, the per-
sistence of Philadelphia interests in preventing rail connections at that city
became
intolerable.
road in the world
comfort
as that
is
A New
Yor\ Times
between
New
York and Washington,"
^*
outgrown the
.
village peevishness manifested at Erie."
Beginning in 1862 a car ferry crossing the Delaware River connected the
Camden and Amboy and
and Baltimore Railroads. The
ferry
the Philadelphia,
53
dis-
.
.
has not
^^
at
Camden
Wilmington
permitted some direct
of rolling stock, but not very effectively, for the service
"rail-
and
and, referring to
the earlier gauge dispute at Erie, stated that: "Philadelphia entirely
no
editorial declared
in so shameless a condition of inefficiency
movement
was inadequate
The American
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
and the gauge difference of 1V2 inches between the two roads caused difficulties.^^ Finally, in 1863, the railroads secured through service from north to south by connections around Philadelphia, and the need for
changing cars in that of the Philadelphia,
was eliminated. The president and
city
Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad
report of that year to the stockholders that "this
(the elimination of the
traffic
.
.
.
the Junction, the Pennsylvania Central, .
.
though by no means
.
most desirable object"
break in the City of Brotherly Love) had
been achieved "by using a part of
arrangement
The
Philadelphia and Reading,
and the West Chester." "This perfect,"
the report continued,
"thus far gives great satisfaction to the traveling public." great satisfaction to the railroad
New York, Baltimore, and
directors
stated in their
managements concerned
^^
gave
It also
as well as to the
Washington merchants who had been demand-
ing such through service for some time.^ÂŽ
Throughout the war,
efforts to
improve the Northern trunkline
sys-
tems went forward. Built during this period was the Atlantic and Great Western, a road of 6-foot gauge which connected with the Erie
New
manca,
at Sala-
York, and with the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton
Dayton, Ohio. In 1864 the
latter
road completed a "straddle track" lo-inch rails
— in
at
—a
order to
broad-gauge track placed outside
its
accommodate the
and the Atlantic and Great Western.
At
cars of the Erie
Hamilton and Dayton connected with the
Cincinnati, the Cincinnati,
6-foot
Ohio and
4-foot
Mississippi, thus completing a broad-gauge line without
a single physical obstacle between the eastern seaboard St. Louis.^^
River opposite
By
and the Mississippi
the end of 1865 the 5-foot 6-inch Great
Western of Canada, which formed the connecting link between the
York Central and was laying
roads),
gauge
New
the Michigan Central railroads (both standard-gauge a third rail for the future
accommodation of standard-
cars.^*^
In reporting these improvements the Boston Board of Trade com-
mented
:
...
New
in
stood. lines
is
.
.
.
York
.
.
.
the advantages of uniform gauge are well under-
constantly going forward;
the contrary, breaking bulk will car
when once
than
it
gauge on the Central and Western and whatever interested parties may say to soon come to be no more tolerated in a freight
this process of assimilation in
loaded at the West with produce destined to the sea-board,
would be
in a canal boat similarly laden.
54
The Trend Toward
Integration,
i
861-1870
It becomes the people of Boston then, to look carefully with the West.2^
to their connections
GAUGE OF THE FIRST TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD The determination of eastern interests not to tolerate new imposed
barriers to the free flow of traffic
is
artificially
evident from the circumstances
surrounding the fixing of the gauge of the Pacific Railroad.
It is
some-
times assumed that American railroads have a standard gauge of 4 feet 8/2 inches because that gauge was chosen by Congress for the first trans-
continental hne, and
it
is
thought that
this decision forced
conformity
upon connecting roads and subsequently upon all roads. An examination of the Senate debates on the matter,^^ however, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the gauge of the
Union Pacific-Central Pacific was set measurement already predominated
at 4 feet 81/2 inches largely because this
in the country. In other words, standard gauge
had been determined for America before Congress acted on the gauge of the Pacific Railroad. The first Pacific Railroad Act of July i, 1862, left the decision concerning the gauge of the transcontinental hne to President Lincon, Lincoln, after consulting engineers
of the Interior,
and
the gauge at five feet,^^
The
and railroad
after discussing the
railroad interests
men
through the Department
matter with his
full cabinet, set
which was the gauge of the California railroads. of die East and Midwest, already largely com-
mitted to standard gauge, resolved not to accept the president's decision but to use the overwhelming power of their sections in Congress to set it aside. Accordingly, in January 1863, James Harlan, senator from Iowa, introduced into the Senate a
road
bill to
establish the
gauge of the
Pacific Rail-
at 4 feet 8V2 inches.^*
The
debates which ensued are reveahng not only of sectional interests but also of the state of opinion concerning the desirability and the prac-
uniform railroad gauge for the entire country. Proponents of leaned heavily in their arguments on the advantages of interhne exchange, especially in times of war advantages which would be lost ticabihty of a
the
bill
—
if
the gauge of the Pacific Railroad were allowed to stand at five feet. They pointed to the preponderance of the standard gauge throughout the North
and the Middle West (an estimated 20,567 miles to 1,199 miles of roads of other gauge), and to the large investments which had been made in the construction of those roads ($849,000,000 to $60,000,000 for lines).
Not
a road in the Northwest, they maintained,
55
all
would be
other
able to
The American
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
exchange equipment with the transcontinental hne, line
were
the gauge of that
if
five feet.
Opponents of the
bill
scoffed at the idea of sending cars, either pas-
senger or freight, over long distances without change. Transshipment, they said, was necessary for purposes of cleanliness and safety. Cars should
be aired and merchandise examined
were safely
at regular intervals.
Moreover, there
which both locomotives and
limits to the distance
run without allowing the equipment
to cool.
One
cars could be
senator
was
of
the opinion that since the Missouri River could probably never be bridged, it
was
was
a matter of
no importance whether the gauge of the
Pacific Railroad
in conformity with that of the connecting roads to the east. Therefore
he urged that the President's choice of gauge be allowed to stand.
When was
the vote on Senator Harlan's
taken. Eastern interests
in favor of the
bill.
The
The
passed the
providing for standard gauge
easy victory, the count being 23 to 9 senators from California and Oregon were joined
in dissent by only five senators bill
bill
won an
from
states east of the
Missouri River.^^
House without debate and without a record
vote.^^
GROWTH OF THE GRAIN TRADE
When first
8^
inches for the
transcontinental railroad line, they were undoubtedly mindful of the
traffic
of
Eastern interests dictated a gauge of 4 feet
which
in grain
Omaha. For
in the near future
would flow from
several generations after the first white
barrier of the Appalachians, western produce
markets via the Mississippi vessels to Atlantic ports.
By
to
New
had found
the area west
men
its
way
defied the to eastern
Orleans and from there by ocean
the outbreak of the Civil
War, however,
the
western carrying trade had been almost completely reoriented, relatively direct east-west canal
and railroad routes having replaced the old
cuitous river and sea route.^^ the Galena mines or corn
Heavy
by
rail.
to
move
for the
most part by water,
Great Lakes, the Erie Canal, and the Hudson River.^^ Less
weighty or bulky freight such east
cir-
from
and wheat from the upper Mississippi Valley
and the Old Northwest continued chiefly via the
or bulky products such as lead
The
commerce, was
as hides
and animals was usually taken
carrying trade in flour, an important item in internal
fairly evenly
divided between water and land carriage,
365,000 barrels being shipped eastward by lake in 1859,
by railroad.^^
56
and 307,000
barrels
The Trend Toward
Integration,
Although grain moved from the West
i
861-1870
to the eastern
by water, the railroads played an auxiliary role in the
was open the railways were
the water route
wheat and corn from the
seaboard chiefly
traffic.
So long
as
largely confined to hauling
interior to a lake port
and from Buffalo
to
internal markets, but after the close of navigation in the fall or early
winter, surplus grain sent
all
the
way
which had piled up
market by
to
railroads' role in the grain trade,
in the lake cities
beginning
freight earnings of the eastern trunk lines to reflect
an increasing
at least as early as i860, the
and
their connections
from the West, some
traffic
was frequently
Despite the limited character of the
rail.
of
it
began
in grain. In Sep-
tember i860 the American Railway Review noted that the superintendent of the
and
New
York Central had ordered
"The
Buffalo.
Eastern market,
send
it
freight gathering at those places, destined for the
immense, and will require the entire rolling stock
is
forward."
spare cars to Suspension Bridge
all
^"
During
that
same year shipments
delphia increased by 300,000 bushels, nearly
wheat.
Some
of
it
moved
all
the
way from
all
the
of the increase being in
West by
rail,
for according
Board of Trade, the Pennsylvania Central and
to the Philadelphia
to
of grain to Phila-
con-
its
nections were "provided with a complete equipment of cars for bringing
grain in bulk from Chicago without transshipment." It
was not
that the rails at this date
the water routes, but rather that the that
Civil
it
strained
War and
all
^^
were taking business away from
demand
for shipping
transportation facilities to capacity.
the cutting off of the southern
market
was
so
heavy
Then came
the
for western produce.
This coincided with increased demands for such produce from the rapidly industrializing eastern United States
poor harvests.
The
authority that not
result
was
more than
and from
Europe plagued with
a
that in February 1865
it
was
stated
on good
two-thirds of the grain crop of the North-
west, with all the transportation then available, could reach an eastern
market that
year.^^
In the period following the Civil
War
the railroads were to absorb an
ever larger portion of the carrying trade in grain.^^ In adapting plant and services to this traffic as well as to the general increase in internal
merce, American railway
management was
to
forge from the
com-
many
small lines of the pre-war period a truly national, not to say international, railroad system.
57
VII
SOLVING THE GAUGE DIFFERENTIALS, 1861-1880
"COMPROMISE" AND SLIDING WHEELS; CAR HOISTS Preceding chapters have shown that by the time Lincoln entered the
White House regional
tegration along railroad routes
had
rivalries
which were
centers of the East.
While attempting by means
gauge differences
keep business from their
place
had worked
to
for an
unhindered flow of
ticularly
the
war
The first,
own
city.
Civil
The
trend toward
War
by the growth of the trade from the West, but
period, par-
at the close of
and Canada was
still
the next twenty-five years
was
the railway pattern of the United States its
disjointedness.
task of railroad
management over
an integrated network. This called for action on two
levels:
a struggle with the vested interests at transfer points, entailing a
long-drawn-out battle between entrenched local businessmen and fathers
on the one hand and shippers and
railroad interests
process of integration.
in the
the purpose of this chapter to deal with the
development.
The at
It is
city
on the other;
and second, the solution of the technological problems involved
latter
and
merchants of each
over the ever-lengthen-
traffic
was accelerated by the events of the
characterized by
to build
of trackage breaks
rivals, the
ing transportation lines radiating from their integration
led to a degree of in-
tributary to the commercial
joining of the tracks of two or
more
railroads within a
town or
junction points was simple so long as the roads were of the same gauge.
58
Solving the Gauge Differentials,
Where was
to
861-1880
i
a difiference of gauge existed the obvious
and
inevitable solution
bring the gauges of the roads into conformity. This, however, was
gauge involved not only the mov-
prohibitively expensive, for change of
ing of the
could afford to pay the
through
Few
but also the change-over of rolHng stock.
rails,
traffic to
railroads
but neither could they afford to surrender
bill,
other lines.
The
was
result
that a
number
of tempo-
were devised which permitted interchange of equipment
rary expedients
between Hues of different gauge and eliminated the necessity of
trans-
shipment.
There were
at least three
such expedients. Most simple was the "com-
promise car" having wheels with 5-inch surfaces which permitted the car
run over tracks with a gauge
to
broad as 4
feet 10 inches.
there were thousands of
Such
narrow
as
cars
were in use
compromise
as early as i860.
scribed the use of such wheels as "questionable,
number At best,
than
wide
whom
de-
^
for
not dangerous,"
of accidents could be traced to the broad treads. to
gauges no wider
means
of interchanging
with compromise wheels were limited
cars
and were of no use
4 feet 10 inches,
traffic
if
as
By 1870
cars in service,^ although the
wheels were frowned upon by careful railroad men, one of
a
and
as 4 feet 8/4 inches
as a
between roads of standard and of 5-foot or 6-foot gauge.
Two
other
devices were developed to meet this situation. In 1863 the railroads ex-
perimented with cars having wheels designed to
These
cars could be
and could be
accommodated
easily shifted
to
slide
on
their
axles.
both standard and broad gauge
from one gauge
to the other if at junction
widened or narrowed gradually. The wheels of the
points the track
cars
were loosened by means of a simple, hand-operated mechanism, the cars were run slowly onto the connecting
new
locked in the
track,
November
position. In
and the wheels were then
1863 a car of this description
was run over the standard-gauge Eastern Railroad there over the
Grand Trunk,
Pond, where
was loaded with
it
to
Portland and from
a road of 5 foot 6-inch gauge, to Island flour for Boston.
The
car reached Boston
without mishap, having for a second time negotiated the transfer from a broad to a standard-gauge road.
Tisdale, the car
was a
of the officers of the roads over
community of
gauge
of Boston,
at that city,
According
"perfect success,"
still
which
it
to its inventor,
had
jealous of Portland
traveled.
The commercial
and resentful of the break
took a deep interest in the
59
Charles S.
and had received the approval
new
car,
although they
:
The American
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
regarded any advantage arising from the use of cars with adjustable wheels as only a "mitigation" of the "evil" of diverse gauges.^
By to
the early 1870's the
have in operation
perform well
cars failed to
number
Grand Trunk and
many
as
of accidents in
either because the
the fastenings
as a
its
connections were reported
thousand cars with sliding wheels. The
in service,
however, for
time went on the
which they were involved increased alarmingly,
wheel fastenings were secured
worked
as
The
loose in running.
result
carelessly or because
was
that during 1873
and 1874 the Grand Trunk, at great expense, narrowed the gauge of entire line some 1300 miles of track to standard width in order
—
conform
and
—
to the
gauge of
connections at Portland,
its
its
to
John, Buffalo,
St.
Detroit.^
More
successful than sliding wheel cars
to in their
points to
day
as "elevating
were car
The
machines."
hoists, usually referred
were used
hoists
at transfer
the bodies of cars, either passenger or freight, while trucks
lift
of one gauge were exchanged for those of another, without sary to unload the cars.
mid-1870's exchanged
By means
being neces-
it
of such a hoist the 6-foot Erie in the
with the standard-gauge Great Western of
traffic
Canada.^ At the same date there were
at least
along the Ohio, one at Cairo,
the other at Henderson, Kentucky,
Illinois,
two
car hoists in operation
where the prevailing standard gauge of the North met the
5-foot
gauge
of the South.®
The
Henderson was
hoist at
two passenger
cars. It
and was powered by
built to raise either
was constructed according
one freight car or
to the
a small stationary steam engine.
A
screw principle
was hoisted
car
more than
in less than half a minute, while changing the trucks took not five or six
minutes.
A
contemporary observer has
left
a description of
the operation
The trucks are shifted by means of two transverse tables, one at each end. These tables run upon tracks and carry the trucks to a siding. and bring back those of different gauge. [By] this arrangement, when two cars of different gauges are changed at the same time, the trucks of one car are simply run forward under the body of the other. .
.
.
.
.
."^
.
According in 1874 by a
to
Captain H.
W.
.
Tyler, a railway expert
group of English stockholders
and operations of the
Erie, car hoists
to
had not
60
make
who was
hired
a survey of the plant
yet, at that date,
been tried
Solving the Gauge Differentials, 1861-1880
on a large the Erie,
But Tyler had
scale.
if
faith in their efficiency, suggesting that
reluctant to assume the expense (estimated at $8,500,000) of
changing the road's gauge from broad tional hoists to facilitate the
might invest
to standard,
movement
between
of traffic
its
in addi-
road and
roads of narrower gauge. In another context Tyler placed the cost of each
such hoist at $3000.^
By
become familiar
1880 elevating machines had
America. Early in the decade a foreign
sights to travelers in
visitor reported
steam hoists
at
Cincinnati, Ohio, and Lynchburg, Virginia, and described their operation in
some
detail.^
such machines
By at
1886 the Louisville and Nashville Railroad alone had
nine different transfer points: Louisville, East Louis-
Rowland, Nortonville, and Henderson, Kentucky; Evansville,
ville,
New
diana; Milan, Tennessee; Mobile, Alabama; and
"Each point
ana.^°
countries'
.
.
.
of connection
." ^^
The
trucks,"
some
a 'frontier'
.
.
.
between two 'foreign
tracks at such junction points
accommodate the
rails to
was
In-
Orleans, Louisi-
had three or four
cars of different gauges, while "acres of extra
some
of one gauge,
of another, stood in the yards.^^
"DOUBLE" GAUGES
Car
hoists functioned efficiently
enough
so long as traffic
was
light.
This accounts in part for their long use by the southern railroads. But
where
traffic
five or six
was heavy,
as
on the trunk
minutes required
tolerable delays
and
tie-ups.
to
lines
and
their connections, the
change the trucks of each car caused
Here
car hoists
had but
slight,
if
tarding effect on the change to standard gauge. This statement illustrated
"men
is
well
by the experience of the Erie.
of capital
New
York maintained as engaged in the management
Senator Ira Harris of that
in-
any, re-
early as
February 1863
of the Erie" were seri-
ously considering taking up the road's rails and adopting the narrow (that
is,
standard) gauge for the sake of economy .^^
nouncing that an eventual change
to
Ten
years later, in an-
standard gauge had been decided
upon, the directors of the Erie reported to the stockholders:
Not only
change demanded for the purpose of reducing working exwe cannot, so long as our gauge is not in conformity with that of our Western, Eastern and Southern connections, secure a large amount of traffic now offered to us, if we could receive and transport it without breakis
this
penses, but because
ing bulk.-^^
61
The American
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
In 1874, by which year the principal point of interchange between the Erie and
its
western connections had been transferred from Dunkirk to
East Buffalo, the Company's yard for eastbound business at the
latter
place contained twenty tracks, altogether about fifteen miles long, "and .
.
.
large transfer-sheds for changing goods between
gauge
cars."
There was
and the changing of
also a
"Dodd's machine"
trucks.^^ It will be
in his report to the English stockholders
remembered
whom
the installation of additional car hoists as a
ment was another During a third their
own. The
case of the Great
The
changing
number
its
gauge.^^
of roads laid
Western of Canada was noted
June
1873, after attempts to
come
from which the Erie
started to put
Managerial and financial
to nothing.^^
suffered chronically in the seventies, de-
layed the completion of the project until
made unhindered
in the
down make broad gauge con-
had
Erie, as a matter of fact,
nections with Chicago had
this line
also pointed out that
of standard-gauge equip-
possible alternative to the Erie's
rail prior to
difficulties,
accommodation
order to accommodate equipment of a gauge other than
preceding chapter. a third
of overcoming the dis-
He
the three decades subsequent to i860 a
rail in
that Captain Tyler
he represented suggested
means
advantages arising from the Erie's broad gauge. the laying of a third rail for the
narrow and broad
for the hoisting of cars
December
connections with
all
1878. After that date
the roads
on which
its
foreign business originated, and was at last in a position to compete
with the
New
York Central
for
through
traffic
from the
lines
both north
and south of the Great Lakes.^^
The management for the indefinite
usually
had four
seldom regarded a track of three rails as and junction railways which were designed
of a road
permanent. Sections of
lines
accommodation of equipment rails in
two
different gauges
order that the weight of the rolling stock and
consequently the wear on the of a third rail
of
rails
might be evenly
distributed.
was more often than not but an intermediate
changing of a road's gauge of a third rail were two:
to standard.^^ In this respect the
first,
it
The
laying
step in the
advantages
allowed an immediate interchange of
equipment with the road's connections while the use of the road's old rolling stock
on
in
its
no way interfering with
own
Hne; and second,
it
permitted a gradual changeover of the road's equipment to standard gauge, thus saving the company the expense of changing
ment
at once.
62
all its
equip-
Solving the Gauge Differentials,
Broad and standard-gauge
861-1880
and locomotives could be operated over
cars
a three-rail line with equal efficiency.
mixed equipment were run. Shortly was completed
i
in 1867, the general
On
one road,
after the
manager
at least, trains
Great Western's third
of rail
of the Blue Line, a fast freight
hne running over the road, reported: "The third
from Windsor
rail
to
Suspension Bridge, which enables the Great Western Railway to run their
Broad Gauge Cars Cars, has
.
.
in the
same
silent as to operational details.
with three
rails
More
^°
Unfortunately the report
transfer points, the
was begun
of a road's rolling stock
With
but the cost of
is
usually trains operating over a road
was completed. Cars were adapted
ing the trucks.
to the
as
soon as the
new gauge by
chang-
the use of a steam hoist such as those in service at
change could be made
new
trucks
where there was
the new, such conversion
at the rate of ten cars
was a considerable drain upon
power
resources. Conversion of motive cult that
with 'Blue Line' or Narrow Gauge
were made up of equipment of uniform gauge.^^
The changeover third rail
train
proved a perfect success."
.
to a
a
an hour,^^
company's
narrower gauge was so
diffi-
between the old gauge and
a large difference
was considered inexpedient.^^ These
facts ac-
count for the long transitional period during which a number of roads operated with a third
By
rail.
1880 there were perhaps 2800 miles of double gauge railroad in the
United
States.
"A
large proportion of the double gauges," the census of
that year stated, "are
formed by means of
a third rail."
Most roads
of
double gauge represented efforts to accommodate broad-gauge lines to standard-gauge equipment, or vice versa. But perhaps 400 miles of such road
made
possible the interchange of traffic
between
lines of standard
gauge and of 3-foot or narrow gauge, of which approximately 5000 miles
had been constructed during the "narrow gauge fever" of the
1870's.^*
NARROW GAUGE RAILWAYS At to
the very time that old established roads
standard gauge, a
number
usually 3-foot, gauge. States before 1870.
new
of
Roads of
this
gauge were unknown in the United
Enthusiasm for them
from a paper, "The Gauge
were changing from broad
roads were being built to a narrow,
here, as in
England, stemmed
for the 'Railways of the Future,' " read that
year by Robert F. Fairlie at the British Railway Association's annual meeting.^^
The arguments
of Fairlie
and
63
his followers,
it
must be admitted,
The American Railroad Network, were
A
plausible.
road of 3 foot 6-inch gauge, they claimed, was both
cheaper to build and
A
or broad gauge.
1861-1890
less
expensive to maintain than
similar claim could be
made
only
common
traffic
to
was
better adapted to
Some proponents
of the
and
out, a
was
it
equipment where
narrow gauge were even ready traffic areas.
Armed
with
number of might be moved by
they sought to prove that by simply increasing the
and locomotives the same volume of freight
cars
was pointed
mountainous regions, while
defend the usefulness of their system in heavy
statistics,
it
sense to build a road designed for lighter
light.
road of standard
for the construction
operation of narrow-gauge equipment. Moreover,
narrow track was
a-
narrow-gauge
as
by standard or broad-gauge roads. Further,
this could
be done without excessive wear and tear on the right of way, for the lighter cars
The
now
and locomotives would be
on the
easier
subject of narrow-gauge railways
is
rails.^^
one of the most interesting ones
before the public [remarked the editor of the Baltimore American in the
late spring of 1871], for if the
plan succeeds as well here as
Europe it will undoubtedly carry railroad facilities would otherwise be deprived of them for years.^^
The
editor of the Boston
of the country
new and
is
to the
sparsely settled regions,
mountainous, and the
sufficient to justify
many
it
has done in
localities
which
Commercial Bulletin was of the opinion
narrow-gauge roads were especially adapted the resources of
to
work
that
of opening
up
"where the topography
initial traffic to
be secured
the outlay required for building a broad
not
is
[that
is,
standard] gauge road." Also, narrow-gauge roads might be cheap feeders to the
The
trunk
lines.^^
entire railway
world seemed
to split into
merits of the narrow gauge, for the claims of
unchallenged.
The
battle
was fought
journals, at local, regional,
in the
its
two
factions over the
promoters did not go
newspapers and the trade
and national meetings. The
narrow-gauge mania were armed with
their
own
ported to show the real inefficiency of the narrow gauge.
ing argument of this of interchanging
side,
traffic
critics
figures
of the
which pur-
The most
however, was concerned with the
tell-
difficulties
with roads of broader gauge. Here they could
present contemporary examples of the inconveniences experienced at such transfer points as
the
Potomac
Dunkirk, Buffalo, and the towns along the Ohio and
Rivers. Since there
was no refuting the evidence, the advo-
64
Solving the Gauge Differentials, 1861-1880 cates of the
narrow gauge were inclined
minor importance."
as "practically of
it
of transfer
would represent but
to ignore the issue or to
Some maintained
"^
a small fraction of the
mark
that the costs
amount
ultimately
saved in construction, equipment, and maintenance.
The
first
great impetus given the narrow-gauge
was the decision
States
movement
Rio Grande Railroad Company, which in the early
United
was building
1870's
Other new roads followed the example of the D. and
line in Colorado.
its
November
R. G. By
in the
gauge made by the Denver and
to adopt the 3-foot
1874
it
was reported that 1677 miles of narrow-gauge
roads had been built in the Union, and that such roads were to be found
and
in almost every state
territory,
"but as a rule for short distances only."
The Denver and Rio Grande, with "about 150 miles" of track, was the By January i, 1878, the nation had 2862 miles of narrow-gauge
longest.^*^
railroad.
About
half of
it
was
the Mississippi, 350 miles of
to be it
found in the
west of
were in Ohio, which had 271 miles,
the greatest narrow-gauge mileages
Pennsylvania, which had 261 miles, and
By
lightly settled area
in Colorado alone. East of the Mississippi,
Illinois,
which had 202
miles.^^
1880 the narrow-gauge trackage figure for the United States had
climbed to the neighborhood of 5200, representing about 5 per cent of the total railroad trackage of the country.^" In the single year 1882 some 2000 miles of narrow gauge track were laid.^^ This was the high point.
Before another year had passed, the Railroad Gazette, which had always
been opposed editorially to the building of narrow-gauge roads, reported not without satisfaction that, although the narrow gauge
still
had many
adherents, "the influence of this remarkable delusion has probably ex-
pended the of
itself." ^*
By
the spring of 1884 the pioneer narrow-gauge line,
Denver and Rio Grande, had
its
road, the section between
tion of the standard-gauge
The narrow-gauge
lines
laid a third rail over the oldest part
Denver and Pueblo,
equipment of
its
for the
accommoda-
eastern connections.^^
were but repeating the experience of the Erie
and other broad-gauge roads in the northeastern United States and Canada.
It
could be argued that the costs of transshipment were insignificant
when compared narrow-gauge bill.
to the
lines,
Moreover,
as
money saved
but the shipper
in the construction still
and operation
thought of himself
as
of
paying the
Captain Tyler discovered in the case of the Erie in
1874, both travelers
gauge were known
and shippers tended to exist.^^
to
shun roads on which breaks of
Like the broad-gauge roads, narrow-gauge
65
The American Railroad Network, lines that
were in competition for through
i
861-1890
traffic had to make arrangeaccommodation of standard-gauge equipment or lose the business to standard-gauge lines. By the middle of the 1880's this hard fact had tempered the enthusiasm for narrow gauge.
ments
for the
^
VIII
THE FAST FREIGHT
LINES,
1861-1890
BACKGROUND
The ways weighed
costs
and inconveniences of transshipment had
particularly heavily
on the
traffic
being both bulky and highly susceptible to
quent handling. In 1869
it
from the Mississippi
New
to
from the West,
its
and damage from
loss
cost 52^4 cents to transport a bushel of
York, sending
from there over the Great Lakes-Erie Canal
it
by
rail
to
al-
produce fre-
wheat
Chicago and
route. Actual freight
and
toll
charges amounted to only 40 cents; inspection and insurance absorbed
another
cents. Storage, handling, elevator charges,
i5/2
accounted for the remaining
10%
cents.^
Thus
and commissions
the cost of the services
tendant upon transshipment equaled about 20 per cent of the
at-
total cost of
shipping by this route.
The
ability of the railroads to cut the costs
and
to eliminate the incon-
veniences of transshipment by offering through service was one factor in the
phenomenal
increase in the
period following the Civil
volume of grain moving
War. Another
factor
east by rail in the
was the
ability of the
roads to offer year-round service. In 1869 the directors of the Michigan
Central Railroad remarked that "the transportation of grain in bulk to the seaboard has occurred during the past winter to a very large extent for the
first
Four years is
time in the history of the railroads of the country.
later the
now moved
The Michigan grain
traffic
same
authorities reported:
half the year, mainly by
rail,
"The grain
and
largely at
.
.
." ^
of the country all
times."
^
Central directors gave entire credit for the increased
of the railroads to the fast freight lines,^ organizations
67
which
The American had
Railroad Network,
861-1890
i
arisen in response to the need for through service
bers of
new
These nineteenth-century
freight cars.
to be distinguished
from what are known
and
for large
num-
Hnes are
fast freight
as "fast freights" today, the
being simply specially expedited, often regularly scheduled, trains
latter
which
running preferences over ordinary "tonnage" freight
are given
The
order to facilitate shipment, often of particular commodities.
were independent of the
fast freight lines
and operated over any number of roads. Their hne went through from
the cars of the
owned
railroads,
service
their
was
in
original
own
cars,
"fast" in that
their point of pick-up to their
destination without breaking bulk, thus eliminating delays at transfer points.
Prior to this time, it is true, there had been some interchange of equipment between roads. As early as 1855, for instance, the Buffalo and Erie was regularly accepting the cars of western roads for transit over its line so that
produce might go through
handhng.^ But
this
all roads. Moreover, differences in
ment
without the necessity of
to Buffalo
was an enlightened
attitude that
gauge continued
was not shared by to
make
transship-
necessary.
The advantage of the fast freight lines to the shipper was that they controlled their own cars which, when necessary, were equipped with "compromise" or adjustable wheels that could be accommodated without the necessity of transshipping,'^
made
interline
Canada
large differences in
The
to offer in many instances forced the management make adjustments for the accommodation of the fast
third rail
which went into
in 1867, for instance,
cars of the Blue
was
on the Great Western
service
laid to
Line from the tracks of the
permit the passage of the
New
York Central
pension Bridge (Niagara) to those of the Michigan Central
An
authority
of the 1880's,
gauge
came
of deviant lines to
of
Where
exchange impossible, the volume of business which the
fast freight lines
freight cars.
to small
gauge and that could therefore be sent over most roads
differences in
on the history of American
was
at Sus-
at Detroit.'^
railroads, writing at the
end
of the opinion that
only a very small proportion of the through-rail freight movements of the
country would ever have been possible without the
.
.
.
freight lines, because
was mainly, and almost exclusively, through them, that the transfer of freight from one set of cars to another set of cars, at the connecting point between .^ two lines, was abolished. it
.
.
68
The Fast Freight
Lines,
i
861-1890
EARLY FAST FREIGHT LINES
The a
earliest fast freight
usually cited as the 1856.
One
first
New
York Central and
The
latter
Company and was
"merged
in operation at least as early as January, 1856,
all classes." ^^
ern Dispatch, operating over the Erie Railway and
Yet another
Transportation
Company (known
over the Pennsylvania and
although
it
freight
fast
its
The Great West-
connections, dated
its
Western Insurance and
the
line,
later as the Star
connections,
was not organized
when
of goods at Chicago in twelve days, at
the uniform price of $2.10 a hundred for
1857.
into the Merchants'
Hne was an outgrowth of the American Express
was "guaranteeing the delivery
from
connections and
its
of them, seems to have appeared about 1855 or
authority states that this line later
Dispatch."^
it
hnes predate the Civil War. Kasson's Dispatch,
Hne operating over the
Union Line), operating
was chartered before the war,
The
until 1864.^^
other fast freight lines,
exceeding perhaps forty in number, belong to the post-war period. Since the original fast freight lines (later called "noncooperative" lines)
were independent stock companies,
way management
might properly be asked what
it
stood to gain by interposing an outside organization
and the shipper. There
between
itself
demand
for the large
number
of
financial condition of
many
are
new
carry the increased western business
two answers
came
at a
made it The
railroads
device as the freight lines was to
let
to this. First, the
freight cars that
themselves to purchase cars in quantity.
time
were needed
when
roads these
which the
men were
to
the unstable
impossible for the roads alternative to
some such
business go begging. Secondly, the
promoters and stockholders of the freight lines were often the the railroads over
rail-
officers of
lines operated. In their role as officers of the
in a position to give extremely favorable terms to
the freight lines, thus increasing their
own
earnings as stockholders in
the fast freights at the sacrifice of the earnings of the railroads' stockholders.
A New
notable example of such duafism and
England, where in the
its
consequences was found in
1870's the stocks of the fast freight lines
Vermont and Canada, the Grand owned mainly companies. The fact that the freight lines
operating over the Central Vermont, the
Trunk, the Boston and Lowell, and other railways were by the
officers of the railroad
were paying ten
to twelve per cent to their stockholders
69
while the Ver-
:
The mont Central was lic
Americ^-N" Railro.m3 in the
i
861—1890
hands of a receiver might well have
to questioning such close
elicited the
Network,
community
of interests.
A
that a nimiber of freight-Une cars
had been
sold to the freight lines at scarcely
A
the pub-
legislative inquiry
information that not only were the cars of the freight lines
given running privileges over the \'^ermont Central's
and
set
own
cars but also
built In the railroad's shops
more than
cost.^
committee of the United States Senate which investigated the
fast
freight lines in 1S74 reported
The inducements on
the part of railway companies to contraa with such companies are ostensibly to secure the large aggregate of traffic thev claim to control, but in a great many cases a division of profits between the officers of the railway company and the persons entering into these con[fast freight]
tracts
ejected by a judicious distribution of their stock.^^
is
The
contracts of the fast freight lines with the railroads varied, but in
they usually pro\ided that the freight lines pay
the early years, at
least,
the roads a certain
flat rate
per car, the rate being based on an estimated
amount of freight of all classes in the general traffic of the road. In a number of cases the rate per car was based on a fixed tonnage that was somewhat less than the car's average of the
capacit\
from
tariff received
from a
like
In turn, the railroads paid the freight lines a mileage rate ranging
.
1V2 cents to 3 cents a mile for the use of the line's cars.^^
Such contracts
left
room
profit of the freight lines
amount
for a
the lines collected
railroads,
it
was
to the
number
of abuses. First,
was represented by the
inasmuch
as the
difference between the
from shippers and the amount they paid the
advantage of the
Lines to soHcit
and
to give prefer-
ence to the higher classes of freight, leaNing anv lower-class freight which
could not be accommodated in the through cars for the railroads to carry in their
own
cars.
The consequence was
that while the freight lines
grew
prosperous through carrying higher-class freight the railroads failed to
break even on the only paying, as they were, a less
to
than the
traffic left to
flat rate
car's capadt}'.
overload — a
them. Moreover, the freight
per car and that rate based on something
were tempted not only to load
practice that
lines,
to capacit)', but
enhanced the freight company's earnings,
but also increased wear and tear on track and roadbed.^^
As a result of criticism of these practices, a nimiber of the freight lines made new contracts with the railroads. According to the terms of the 70
The Fast Freight new
contracts, the lines
cars
and
for
payment was usually on
mileage
a
which, consequently, came to be
bad
861-1890
soHciting freight.
western roads
the
was generally paid
known
effect of the
On
as
"commission"
the freight lines,
To many
lines.'^'^
second plan was, in a great
as that of the first," for, because of the
community
from the
profits
quote cases,
of interests be-
tween railroad management and the stockholders in the freight
ways of siphoning
their
but in the East a percentage of
basis,
the tariff collected by the railroads
as
i
were simply paid by the roads for the use of
their services in
one authority, "The
Lines,
lines,
railroads to the freight lines
new were
soon discovered.^^
COOPERATIVE FAST FREIGHT LINES Beginning tion
in the late i86o's the
and management of the
demand
for
reform in the organiza-
fast freight lines led to the
development of
what were known
as "cooperative" freight lines. The first of these was Red Line which dated from 1866 and ran between Chicago in the west and New York and Boston in the east, via Toledo, Buffalo and Albany. The second cooperative line to go into operation was the Blue
the
Line which opened for business on January terminals as the
The
Red Line but
its
i,
1867;
it
served the same
route lay north of the Great Lakes.^^
cooperative lines differed from the original fast freight lines in
that they
were not separate corporations but merely administrative
or-
ganizations under the authority of the railroad companies cooperating in the line.
owned
While the
cars of the line
were operated
South, at the time of Louisville
St.
Green Line, the principal
its
and Nashville,
Chattanooga and
trolled 3404 cars.
nooga and
St.
fast freight line in the
organization in 1868 was divided as follows: 25; Nashville
and Northwestern,
Louis, 31; Western and Atlantic, 28.^^
teen southern roads were associated in the
few
were
individually by the cooperating railroads. For instance, the owner-
ship of the 96 cars of the
as
in a pool, they
Over 1000 were
Louis.
One
as 2 cars to the line.^*^
12; Nashville,
By
1881 nine-
Green Line, which then con-
the property of the Nashville, Chatta-
road, the Northeastern Georgia, contributed
The same
system prevailed on the
fast freight
lines
north of the Ohio and Potomac: the quotas of cars furnished the
lines
by the roads were determined according to the length of the indi-
vidual road or according to the
through
amount
trafl&c.^^
71
of revenue the road derived
from
The American Each cooperative
Railroad Network,
fast freight line
had a Board of Directors composed
a representative from each cooperating road.
was
to decide policy for the line,
tive's
vote
was decided
either
861-1890
i
and the
on the
The
weight of each representa-
relative
basis of the length of his road or
the basis of the proportion of line business which
had no
This board
carried.
it
on
jurisdiction over freight rates; such rates continued to be set by
among
the individual railroads or by agreement
A
of
function of the Board
general
the roads in the line.^^
all
was maintained by each cooperative
office
over by a general manager.
It
employed
and was presided
line,
a staff of clerks,
and functioned
as
a clearing house. Headquarters of the Blue Line, for instance, were in Detroit; both the
Red and White
D. Hayes, general manager
J.
had general
lines
offices in Buffalo.^^
(which
of the Blue Line
may
be regarded
as typical of the cooperative lines), testifying before a Senate
in 1873, outlined the
work
of his
office.
According
to
Committee
Hayes, copies of
Blue Line waybills were sent to Detroit where the earnings of the
on each shipment were computed and prorated roads according to agreement. Hayes's balances.
Each cooperating road paid
Blue Line car not
its
own
i
had charge of mileage
office also
mile for the use of each
Yi cents a
that passed over
road. Likewise, any road
its
outside the line that received the line's cars paid mileage of
were struck once a month.^^ The monthly income of the
from
tral's
its
V2 cents to the
owe
York Cen-
less
any car mileage the
other roads (or alternatively, plus any mileage other roads
might owe the Central, depending upon which the Central's share of the Line's general office
Within a very short time lines
New
participation in the Blue Line, therefore, equaled the Cen-
pro rata share of the earnings of the line
road might
less
i
A record of car movements was kept by the central office and balances
line.
tral
line
to the cooperating rail-
became remarkably
after their first
efficient.
were carrying "substantially
all"
By
total
and
was the
larger),
agents' expenses.
appearance the
fast freight
1874 they blanketed the nation and
through freight that moved by
rail.^^
THE PATTERN OF THE FAST FREIGHT LINES
The
principal fast freight lines of the 1870's
might be grouped accord-
ing to the trunk lines over which they operated. In 1874 the
New
York
Central participated in four cooperative freight lines: the Red, Blue,
White, and International, while the Merchants' Dispatch, a non-cooperative line, also operated over the Central's tracks.
72
A
witness appearing be-
The Fast Freight fore a Congressional
of Buffalo over the
down
the Toledo
what might be
Lines,
i
861-1890
committee described the Red Line as running by way Lake Shore and Michigan Southern to Chicago, also
and Wabash and
its
branches, "and to various points in
called the central part of the Southwest."
The Blue
Line,
according to the same authority, ran over the Great Western and Michigan Central to Chicago and into "what might be called the Northwest."
The White Line
diverged from the Lake Shore at Cleveland and pro-
ceeded through central and southern Ohio, Indiana, and Louis.'^
The Merchants' Dispatch
White, and Blue
^^
lines.
Illinois
to St.
covered the same territory as the Red,
After 1878 the cooperative lines operating over the
Central were confined to procuring freight in the west for eastern ship-
ment, while the Merchants' Dispatch took charge of the west bound freight over the Vanderbilt lines.^^
The Red,
Blue,
and White
lines
ran to Boston as well as to
New
York,
way
leaving the tracks of the Central at Albany and proceeding east by
and the Boston and Worcester. About 1878 the Hoosac
of the Western
Tunnel Line was organized
for the procuring of business for the route
through the tunnel. West of Albany
this freight line
ran over the
York Central and Lake Shore. Also serving Boston was patch-Grand Trunk
The
New
the National Dis-
route.^^
fast freight lines in
which the Erie was
chiefly
concerned were the
Great Western Dispatch and the Erie and North Shore Dispatch. Associated with the Erie in the Great
the Cleveland,
Columbus and
ern; the Indianapolis
and
St.
Western Dispatch were the Lake Shore;
Cincinnati; the Atlantic and Great West-
Louis; the Ohio and Mississippi; "and a few
lateral lines." ^^
The Erie and North Shore Dispatch, the moved west through Canada, dated from 1872, the year
cars of
in
which
which the
Niagara Falls branch of the Erie Railway was completed. In 1876 three smaller fast freight lines, the
Commercial Express, the Diamond, and the
Erie and Milwaukee, were absorbed by the Erie and North Shore.^^
The
prinicipal fast freight lines
the Star Union,
the
New
on the Pennsylvania were the Empire,
and the National Lines. According
to a correspondent of
York World, writing in 1878, each of these lines had its distinct West in which to procure freight for eastern shipment over
field in the
the Pennsylvania Railroad.^^
The
Continental Fast Freight Line, a cooperative in which the Balti-
more and Ohio,
the Marietta
and Cincinnati, and the Ohio and Mississippi
73
The American
Railroad Network,
i
861-1890
Railroads were associated was the chief fast freight line operating over the
By
B. and O.
the time of
its
organization in 1871, the Ohio River had been
bridged at Parkersburg and the gauge of the Ohio and Mississippi had
been narrowed
to
conform with that of
its
eastern connections. Thus, with
the inauguration of the Continental Fast Freight Line, "an unbroken
communication
is
opened between Baltimore and
Atlantic port to the
The
.
.
West and Southwest."
.
Louis, giving a
St.
new
^^
principal fast freight line in the area south of trunk line territory
was the Green Line, which had been organized
in 1868.
The
original
cooperating railroads were the Louisville and Nashville; the Nashville
and Northwestern; the Nashville, Chattanooga and
Louis; and the
St.
Western and Atlantic. By 1873 there were twenty-one corporations associated in the Green Line.^* At this same date there were at least two other fast freight lines in the
Line and the Great Southern, a
The
fast freight lines
line
made
Orleans)
running along the Atlantic seaboard.^^
mentioned by name in
this section
do not
An
tute a complete roster of such lines, even for the 1870's.
been
New
South, the Crescent (or Mobile and
consti-
attempt has
which were the most important. Nor should
to note only those
the impression that the lines operated only over the roads that have been
mentioned
as cooperating roads be allowed to stand.
freight lines ran by agreement over a great
associated in the lines. In the railroads
month
of
number
November,
The
of roads not actually
1872,
when
were actually cooperating in the Blue Line, the
ran over 124 different roads.^^ In 1873
it
was noted
cars of all the
that
only twenty
cars of the line
no southern
rail-
road of importance east of the Mississippi Valley was unaffected by the traffic
of the Green Line.^^
GROWTH AND ABUSES Largely as a result of the superior functioning of the the
amount
year. Rail
of grain diverted
from water
shipment was encouraged,
freight in contrast to high rates
on
fast freight lines
to all-rail routes increased each rates
on through
local traffic to lake ports,
but the ob-
to be sure,
by low
vious convenience and relative speed of the fast freights were important factors in their success.^^
which the
Other factors were the institutional reforms for
fast freight lines
were responsible. Most important of these was
the regular issuing of through bills of lading, commercial instruments
which were
largely
unknown
before 1860.^ÂŽ Prior to that time
74
it
had been
The Fast Freight
Lines,
861-1890
i
the custom of railroads to issue bills of lading for their
In the few cases in which through
bills
little
wrought
Not
fast freight lines
of lading
is
an index
was
made
The
fact that
were guaranteeing the
ac-
to the revolution that they
in shipping.
only did the fast freight lines take over an ever-increasing share of
from the Great Lakes and Erie Canal, but by the mid-
the grain traffic 1870's,
hedged
with the necessity of transshipping, which had
by the end of the 1870's the bills
so
practical value.^" It
the services of a forwarding firm indispensable to a shipper.
curacy of their
roads only.
were issued they were
about with restrictions that they proved of this situation, together
own
they had also absorbed a considerable
by coastwise
had been
vessel.
The
amount
of
once moved
traffic
route of the grain trade to Boston, for instance,
entirely changed. Before the time of the freight lines, grain
way of the Great Lakes, the New York where it was trans-
destined for that city had been shipped by
Hudson River
Erie Canal, and the
shipped to coastwise
vessels.
to
In 1874, however, the great bulk of grain was
West in through cars.'*^ By 1889 the fast freight lines had at their command some 60,000 cars,^^ most of which were engaged in hauling grain from the West. During the following reaching Boston directly from the
decade the railroads took away virtually
all
grain
traffic
from even the
Erie Canal.^^ 1877 the earlier non-cooperative fast freight lines had given
By
completely to either cooperative or
company
lines.
belong the Empire, the Union, and the National Hues,
all
the stock of
which had been purchased by the Pennsylvania Railroad. By
this date
most of the stock of the Merchants' Dispatch was in the hands of
also
the
way
In the latter category
New
York
Central.^^
Although most
cooperative fast freight lines were an tive,
before long
arose principally selves. The number of
run the
critics
early observers agreed that the
improvement over the non-coopera-
discovered evils in the
from competition among the
new
system. These evils
fast freight
lines
them-
large grain traffic of the i88o's led to a multiplication of the freight lines, for
risk of losing
no railroad or combination of roads could
through freight to a
rival
road or system. By 1891,
Boston, one of the most important grain shipping ports, was being served
by thirty-one ping
facilities
fast freight lines.^^
were limited and
In the early days of the lines, traffic
was
to
the necessary cars, the cooperative lines apparendy
75
when
ship-
be had simply by providing
had had no
freight
The American Railroad Network, agents of their
own
ing roads.^^ Later, lines,
i
861-1890
but had depended upon the agents of their cooperat-
when
they found themselves in competition with other
the cooperative lines, like the non-cooperative, hired agents, par-
ticularly in the
western
In January 1891,
than 20
it
cities.
was reported, there were
fast freight line offices,
in
Chicago alone "more
each supporting a force of soliciting agents
and
clerks." ^^
and
solicitors,
and
solicitors of 10 fast freight lines that
The same authority maintained that in St. Louis, a city with a smaller number of initial roads, fully as many fast freight line offices were maintained as in Chicago. One road with a terminus in St. Louis was not only at the expense of maintaining its own freight agency
point.^ÂŽ
but also paid
its
proportion of the expenses of the agencies
These "armies of agents" came
operated over
to
road from that
its
have considerable discretion in
the matter of rates, feeling themselves free to undercut the quotations of their competitors. In
single cause
1886 one observer questioned whether any other
was more responsible
for the demoralization of freight rates
than the competitive bidding of the freight lines for
Long
before the turn of the century a
number
cate the latter-day evils of the freight lines,
ment
traffic.^^
of critics,
hoping
were urging
in favor of a nation-wide clearing-house system that
the interchange of the cars of
all
roads.
76
their
to eradi-
abandon-
would permit
IX
LAST STEPS IN INTEGRATION, 1880-1890
TOWARD A NATION-WIDE STANDARD GAUGE During the of the standard gauge
rapid progress toward the adoption
1870's,
was made
all
over America except in that part of
A
the South east of the Mississippi River. less
than three per cent of
total
a
little
United States mileage, by 1880 had
complished the change by using a third of once divergent gauge
few roads, representing
rail.
ac-
But a number of railroads
had made an abrupt change
to the standard
gauge. This course was taken, for instance, by the 5 foot 6-inch Grand Trunk of Canada in 1874 and by the 6-foot Delaware, Lackawanna and
Western
in 1876.^
By
1880 practically
all
Canadian roads had shifted from
the 5 foot 6-inch gauge to standard. In the United States this
gauge, which had been
common
in Missouri
and other
same broad
states
south of
Missouri and west of the Mississippi River, had also virtually disappeared.^ Similarly, the 4 foot lo-inch gauge, previously so
and Ohio, had, except
for 52 miles, been
1880 nearly 81 per cent of
was equipped
to
accommodate
II per cent of total tical
all
common
changed
New
Jersey
By
the railroad mileage in the United States rolling stock of standard gauge.
Of
this,
mileage was of 4 foot 9-inch gauge, which for prac-
purposes was also standard, since equipment was usually exchanged
between roads of these two gauges "without objection." in the South
made up
the 3-foot lines
from
in
to standard gauge.
11. 4
per cent of the
and about 3 per cent
2 to 6 feet.*
77
total,
^
The
5-foot
gauge
leaving 4.8 per cent for
for miscellaneous gauges ranging
The American Railroad Network, As
1861-1890
the data given above indicate, the gauge developments in the South
between 1861 and 1880 were quite different on the two sippi River. In the trans-Mississippi Southwest,
roads had been broad gauge, post-Civil
And
gauge.
the older roads gradually
to facilitate interHne
exchange with
War
sjdes of the Missis-
where most of the
narrowed
their trackage in order
standard-gauge connections.
their
Pacific Railroad of Missouri, originally of 5-foot 6-inch gauge,
standard as early as 1869.
Of
the
earlier
construction was of standard
more than 2900 miles
The
had adopted
of railroad in the
Missouri in 1873, only 310 miles were of other than 4-foot 8V2inch gauge. At the same time not a single mile of broad gauge was to be state of
found in Texas.^ But
east of the Mississippi,
where the
5-foot
gauge had been most com-
mon, the tendency immediately following the war was toward sion of this gauge.
Not only was
construction, but a
few roads which had been
now
were
converted to a
struggle in
which
rail
this
width of track used
spread of 5
8/4 -inch gauge of the
the exten-
much new gauge
built to the standard
feet.
local mercantile interests
for
Thus,
after a
prolonged
sought to retain the 4-foot
North Carolina Railroad, northern
investors finally
gained control and forced a change to a 5-foot gauge which would itate interstate trade.^
7,267;
by 1880
it
facil-
In i860 the total miles of 5-foot gauge track was
had increased
to 12,137.^
Nevertheless, the rapid spread of the standard gauge outside the South
and the need
to facilitate
North-South trade tended gradually
to
extend
the mileage of standard gauge track, especially in southern border states.
The
first
railroad bridge across the
cinnati in 1870.
The
Ohio River was completed
inauguration of through
and the gradual completion of other bridges the pressure
on southern
at
Ohio River points increased
railroads to adopt the standard gauge. Chiefly
as a result of standard-gauge construction in Virginia,
Kentucky the percentage of South declined
slightly
at Cin-
across this bridge
traffic
total railroad
between i860 and
West
Virginia, and
mileage of 5-foot gauge in the
1880.^ Finally,
during the decade
of the eighties, the needs of through intersectional trade led to the almost
complete abandonment of the divergent southern gauge. In July 188 1, the gauge of the Kentucky Central Railroad was changed
from
5 feet to standard because the road
formed the link between the
standard-gauge Chesapeake and Ohio and the standard-gauge roads which
converged on Cincinnati. The Railroad Gazette, in accounting for the
78
Last Steps in Integration,
change gave
full credit to the
i
880-1 890
eastward-flowing grain and provision
traffic
which made uniformity of gauge "almost indispensable." Further, the
same source implied
that the
standard would force
tral to
change of the gauge of the Kentucky Cen-
Kentucky
the railroads in
all
to
gauge, for "with a standard-gauge road giving Kentucky outlet to the sea,
it
will be desirable that all
interchange cars with
among all
it."
Nor would
the
adopt that shortest
its
roads should be able to
its
Kentucky roads be unique
the railroads of the South in changing to standard. "Probably
purchases of rolling stock for Southern roads hereafter," prophesied
the Railroad Gazette, "will be
made with regard
to a possible future
^
change of gauge."
In 1884 the Illinois Central lines south of the Ohio adopted the standard
gauge, bringing the southern end of the Illinois Central into conformity
with the northern end and eliminating the necessity of changing the trucks on the cars at Cairo.
Mobile and Ohio
"Under the pressure changed
in July 1885, also
its
of competition," the
line to standard.
This
Nashville and the Cincinnati Southern, with no choice but to
make
similar change or be at a disadvantage in bidding for through
Other roads in the South perforce had ville
and the Cincinnati
February
trolled
with the Louisville and Nash-
JOINS
THE UNION
1886, representatives of all the
2,
hues in the South met effecting a
to act
a
traffic.
Southern.-^^
THE SOUTH
On
left
and Ohio, the Louisville and
the most direct competitors of the Mobile
at Atlanta,
important broad-gauge
Georgia, to discuss ways and means of
change of gauge on the more than 13,000 miles of track con-
by their companies.
the changeover
Monday, May
on
31,
all
It
was decided
the lines.
The
and Tuesday, June
at this
meeting
to synchronize
dates chosen for the project were i,
1886.^^
In line with the prediction of the Railroad Gazette, for some time prior to 1886,
southern roads had purchased equipment with an eye to
vertibility to a
narrower
gauge."^^
During
the beginning of February and the end of stock of the roads
was changed
to the
its
con-
the four-month period between
May
new gauge
1886, part of the rolling so that a supply of cars
and motive power would be available when the track gauge was changed.
The to
locomotives of the Southern roads could be more easily converted
standard gauge than could those of the broad gauge roads to the north,
79
The American Railroad Network, i 861-1890 for the
change in gauge for the Southern roads involved a change of only
three inches/^ as
compared with
a
change of 9V2 inches on the Canadian
roads and 15 V2 inches on the Erie. Another factor which kept cost of
down
the
changing the Southern gauge was that the Southern roads, on the
whole, had cost of
less rolling stock
than the Northern roads.^^ Nonetheless, the
changing the gauge of the Southern railroads was estimated
$150 a mile, "and on a
number
of lines
more than
at
was
half of the outlay
^^
for changes in the rolling stock."
In altering the track gauge over such a large area the experience of other roads which had changed gauge in the past was
one
rail,
of course,
while the other
was moved,
rail
was
left
that rail being shoved
undisturbed. Careful preparation was
before the day designated for the changeover.
May
each road assigned crews to smoothing
moving It
a
number
of spikes
drawn upon. Only
inward three inches
from the
rail
About
ties
and roadbed and
was marked
that
should be explained, perhaps, that in the days before
used the base of the
While
side.
rail
was held
made
the beginning of to re-
for shifting.
tie plates
were
by two spikes, one on either
to each tie
the outside spikes were left untouched by the
workmen,
two-thirds of the inside ones on straight track and every other one on
curves were drawn. Then, the distance that the
was
rail
to be set over
measured and new inside spikes driven into every third
new
line.
On to
tie
was
along the
All this was accomplished before the end of May.^ÂŽ
the date of the changeover at least three
each mile of track.
men
On
the Louisville
Where
workmen were
assigned
and Nashville the quota was
at
number of curves or bridges and trestles the quota was raised to five men. As a result of the careful preparations, all that had to be done was to draw the few spikes that remained to hold the rail in its old position, shove the base of the rail under least
four
to a mile.
there were a
new
the spikes that had been driven on the inside of the
minimum
in a
maining work was
An
gauge, and drive
of spikes to secure the outside of the shifted left to
be finished after
traffic
rail.
The
re-
had been resumed.^^
example of the speed with which the changeover was accomplished
was the record of a
Louisville
and Nashville
section
who changed eleven miles of track in four and Ten roads made the changeover on May 31st: ville;
the Nashville, Chattanooga
ton; the
and
Alabama Great Southern;
St.
foreman and
his
gang
a half hours.^^ the Louisville
Louis; the
and Nash-
Memphis and
Charles-
the Cincinnati Southern; the Cincin-
80
Last Steps in Integration, nati,
880-1 890
i
Selma and Mobile; the Montgomery and Eufala; the Southwestern
and Georgia; the Pensacola and Atlanta; and the Florida Railway and Navigation Company. All other main lines were changed on June
The in
event was an occasion for a holiday, people traveling
some
cases to
A.M. and
ments were suspended. June
I,
1886, the
On
watch the work crews.
pleted between 3:30
American
which time
was resumed
traffic
railroad system ".
a physically integrated network.^^
.
all train
after 4:00
had become
move-
P.M. on
for the first time
[A] passenger or
.
ist.
miles
both days the work was com-
4 P.M., during
When
many
freight car
could leave Portland, Maine, or Portland, Oregon; San Francisco, Chicago, or any prominent railway centre,
and
traverse without change of
New
trucks or bulk every mile of southern road leading to or Florida."
Orleans, Texas,
2^
A FOOTNOTE ON GAUGE Complete uniformity of gauge, however, had not quite been attained by the changeover of the Southern roads to "standard," for the "standard" adopted by those roads in 1886 was 4 sylvania Railroad system.^^
had
The
feet 9 inches, the
gauge of the Penn-
reason for this was that most of the roads
with the East and Northeast, and
their largest interchange business
consequently with the Pennsylvania and
connections.
its
As was pointed
out at that time, "there must necessarily be a large interchange of cars
with that road, and
would follow
it
admit Pennsylvania Railroad
cars,
that the
and
that
.
.
gauge used should readily .
[Southern] cars must be
acceptable to that road."^^ For the benefit of the unenlightened, the
Charleston
News and
lateral play" ficiently
gauge
A
all tracks,
a
gauge of 4
feet 9 inches
was
suf-
over the country."^ Nonetheless, in the interests of efficiency and
Southern roads in 1886 adopted the "limit gauge" of the Penn-
safety, the
less
was allowed on
near the northern gauge to permit the use of a uniform wheel
all
sylvania
Courier explained that since "a certain amount of
and voted
than the limits decade
to reject all cars
having wheel gauges which measured
set.^^
later, in
October 1896, the Committee on Standard Wheel
and Track Gauges of the American Railway Association recommended that 4 feet roads.
As
8|/4
inches be adopted as the track gauge for
late as 1899,
of 4 foot 9-inch
however, there were
gauge in the United 81
still
some
all
American
rail-
25,000 miles of track
States. In that year the
Master Car
The American Railroad Network, Builders' Association
i
861-1890
announced that railroad companies representing 82
per cent of the railroad mileage in the United States, Canada, and Mexico
had adopted the M. C. B. standard
car gauge. This car gauge, while in-
tended as a compromise which would be acceptable to both 4 foot S'/z-inch
and 4 foot 9-inch roads, as finally "improved and perfected" was admittedly designed for the narrower gauge. The only course left to the 4 foot
was
9-inch roads
to
draw
in their track
gauge
to the 4 foot 8 J/^ -inch stand-
ard.25
The
actual lessening of the
gauge of the 4 foot 9-inch roads by half an made whenever
inch took place without fanfare, the adjustment being track
had
to be replaced.
So gradually was the change accomplished that
the precise time at which
it
was completed
is
apparently
In the case of one road, the Louisville and Nashville,
have occurred sometime during the year 1900."
THE RAILROAD PATTERN During the States
now unknown. would seem
to
^^
IN 1890
thirty years following i860 railroad
grew more
"it
mileage in the United
rapidly than during any other period of comparable
length in the nation's history.
The
30,626 miles of line
could claim just prior to the Civil
War had
which the country
expanded by 1890
to almost
160,000 miles.
This striking expansion pares a railroad
map
is
immediately apparent
to
anyone who com-
of 1890 with one of i860. Moreover, the
map
of 1890,
unlike that for the earlier date, gives a fair representation of actual conditions, for
on maps
fact quite separate,
of i860 railroads
which seemed
to
ments had effected a virtual integration of the railroad ning of the
and
last
in cities
be joined were in
but by 1890 technological and institutional improvenet.
By
the begin-
decade of the nineteeth century trackage breaks
had been
all
at rivers
but eliminated. Most of the great streams had
been repeatedly bridged; where bridges proved unfeasible, as between Detroit and Windsor, efficient car ferries had been introduced. Tracks had
been joined in the towns; belt lines had been built through and around the great cities; terminals
had been improved; and many
double-tracked to care for increased
traffic.
By
1890, also,
lines
had been
only a negligible
percentage of the country's railroads were of other than standard gauge.
Rolling stock, both passenger and freight, increasingly equipped with standardized coupling and braking equipment,
82
moved smoothly from
Last Steps in Integration,
i
880-1 890
line to line. Physical obstacles to the free flow of traffic
had been
largely
eliminated. Institutional advances
Of
had kept pace with technological improvements.
these only the development of the fast freight lines has been
sized in the preceding chapters. But there were, of course,
the adoption of standard time belts
by use of different
empha-
many
others:
which replaced the confusion caused
local times; the issue of
through
tickets
good over con-
necting roads and often without the need to change cars, and the practice of using through bills of lading for freight shipments. Again, after the
war, most of the small railroad companies steadily became absorbed into great railroad empires. These giant organizations, though subject to re-
curring financial
difficulties
and suffering
the struggle between various promoters
made
at
and
times from being
pawns
in
speculators, over the period
substantial strides in perfecting railroad engineering, accounting,
and management.
We
have seen in the
chapters of this study
first five
limited markets before the Civil to the building of railroads
of the great market
work. The
War
how
in the age of
the forces of competition
had led
designed to serve the exclusive needs of each
The
result was an uncoordinated railroad patchshow how this patchwork was converted into network. Under the leadership of financiers and procities.
later chapters
a well-integrated
moters whose interests transcended local tional
economy which, on
roads,
and which, on the
the one hand, other,
moulded
unified transportation system.
83
loyalties,
was made
there
emerged a na-
possible by the rail-
the railroads themselves into a
NOTES I.
FOCUSING THE PROBLEM
1. L. C. A. Knowles, Economic Development in the Nineteenth Century (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1932), p. 201; Twelfth Census of the United
Manufactures, part i, pp. Iv and Ivii; and Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, The United States in the Twentieth Century (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company,
States, 1900,
1906), pp. 256-257.
On
2.
technical
Commerce
Nimmo, Jr., Report on the Internal (Washington: Government Printing Office, L. Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in
improvements
see:
Joseph
of the United States, 1881-82
1884), pp. 297-302; and J. the United States (Philadelphia, 1888), pp. 318-347.
Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, i8gg (Washington:
3.
Government Printing ica.
Office, 1900), pp. 659—662.
This restricted mercantile viewpoint was by no means to be found only in Amer-
4.
Frederic Bastiat devoted one of his most effective
terests in
Bordeaux who sought
through that
city.
See
to perpetuate a
"Un Chemin de Fer
satiric essays to the business in-
break in the railroad which passed
Negatif," in
Oeuvres Completes de
Frederic Bastiat (Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, Libraires, 1854), I, 93-94. 5. Report of the foint Special Committee in Relation to the Pennsylvania Railroad,
(pamphlet in the Lehigh University Library). This pamphlet confrom various merchant houses stressing the need for the railroad and also a minority report opposing participation by the city, largely on financial grounds. 6. For an interesting early expression of this viewpoint see Speech of T. G. Cary on the Use of the Credit of the State for the Hoosac Tunnel, Massachusetts Senate, May 18, 1853 (pamphlet in the Lehigh University Library). July
2,
1846, p. 8
tains letters
IL
THE RAILROAD MAP,
1861
1. A few important lines were completed during April 1861. For example: The Memphis, Clarksville and Louisville was connected to the Louisville and Nashville at Bowling Green; and the segment of the Mobile and Ohio between Corinth, Mississippi, and Jackson, Tennessee, went into operation. 2. The authors used chiefly the maps in the railroad guides for 1861 and 1862. The titles of the guides changed slightly from year to year. 3. A few good regional maps are available for dates just before or just after the war. See, for example, Frederic L. Paxson, "The Railroads of the 'Old Northwest' before the Civil War," Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, vol. XVII, part I (Madison, 1914), p. 266; E. Merton Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, i86$-i8yy, vol. VIII of A History of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1947), facing page 236. Special reference
85
Notes to Chapter should be
made
to
Robert C. Black,
III,
II
The Railroads
of the Confederacy (Chapel
North Carolina Press, 1952). This excellent, work, which appeared after the maps for diis study had been prepared, contains a very good map of southern railroads showing gauges. The map has proved helpful for purposes of comparHill: University of
ison.
Even
4.
tremely
if it
were desirable
difficult in
many
to
show
gauge variations, it would be exand detailed information is lacking.
these small
cases because reliable
5.
Tenth Census of the United
6.
References to gauges in the literature on the subject are not always reliable:
States, 1880, vol.
IV: Transportation,
p. 294.
thus Caroline E. MacGill in History of Transportation in the United States before i860 (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), p. 550, assigns a 5l/2-foot
gauge
to the
Ohio and
Mississippi instead of a 6-foot gauge.
Perhaps the most common error concerns the gauge of the New York Central. The gauge of this road was 4 feet 8V2 inches, not 4 feet 8 inches. Nor was it changed during the Civil War. See, for example, C. R. Fish, "The Northern Railroads, 1861," American Historical Review, 22:785 (July 1917); and Thomas Weber, The North-
(New York: King's Crown Press, 1952), apparentiy the result of a misprint on p. 70 in some but not
ern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-186^
The
p. 7.
confusion
is
and an error on p. 64 in AshRailway Directory for 1862. 7. This was especially true in the cases of some of the short railroads in Louisiana and Texas. The gauge of the Southern (Mississippi) Railroad was apparently changed from 4 feet 10 inches to 5 feet, either just before or during the war. The evidence is conflicting. See, for example. The Engineer, 1:97 (Nov. 8, i860); Burgess' Railway Directory for 1861, p. 180; and Ashcraft's Railway Directory for 1862, p. 140. all
copies of Burgess' Railway Directory for 1861
craft's
The
were Ashcraft's Railway Directory, Burgess RailLow and Burgess' Railway Directory. Useful for checking and comparison were King's Railway Directory for i86y (New York: A. H. King, 1867) James H. Lyles, Official Railway Manual of the Railroads of North America for i86g-yo (New York: Thitchener and Glastaeter, 1870), and Henry Varnum Poor, History of the Railroads and Canals of the United States (New York: John H. Schultz and Co., i860). 9. Henry Grote Lewin, Early British Railways (New York: Spon and Chamberlain, 1925), pp. 5, 8, 12, 26, and 89. Undoubtedly greater extremes existed in both directions. In 1846 the gauge of British tramways was reported to vary from 2 feet 8.
way
directories used chiefly
Directory, Low's Railway Directory, and
;
.
.
.
to 4 feet 8V2 inches. Journal of the Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania,
Third 10.
(November 1846), quoting the Mining Journal. American State Papers, Miscellaneous, I (Washington: Gales and Sea ton, 1834),
Series, 12:298
916. 1 1.
See, for example. Journal of the Fran\lin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania,
quoting The London Railway MagaDepartment of Agriculture, i8gg (Washington: Standard Government Printing Office, 1900), p. 652; Robert R. Brown, "Gauges and Otherwise," The Railway and Locomotive Historical Society, Bulletin No. 88
Third
Series,
13:15-16
(January
1847),
zine; Yearbook of the United States
—
(May 1953), p. 81; MacGill, History of Transportation in the United States before i860, p. 313; Richard B. Osborne, Is There any Reason Why the Present Gauge of our Iron Roads should be Adopted on our Future Railways? (Baltimore: Kelly, Piet
86
New
England and Canada,
i86i
and Co., 1871), p. 3 (pamphlet in Baker Library of Harvard University); and Horatio Allen, The Railroad Era, First Five Years of its Development (New York: 1884), pp. 30-31 (pamphlet). Considerable attention was paid in the United States to
12.
this controversy. See,
for example, Journal of the Fran\lin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania,
13.
12:298 14. 15.
vocate, 16.
(November 1846), and American Railway Review, 2:326 (May 31, i860). The American Railway Times, 13:186 (May 11, 1861). American Rail-Road Journal, 1:51 (January 21, 1832); and The Rail-Road Ad1:138-139 (February 28, 1832), and 1:145 (March 15, 1832). American Railway Review, 2:326 (May 31, i860).
III.
1.
Third
12:225-234 (October 1846), and continued in subsequent numbers. Journal of the Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania, Third Series,
Series,
NEW ENGLAND AND CANADA,
1861
Boston Board of Trade, Third Annual Report (Boston, 1857), p. 28; and EdCities and Transportation (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
ward Chase Kirkland, Men, University Press, 1948),
I,
139-147.
American Railway Review, 2:4 (December i, 1859). 3. Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation, I, 137-138; and Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston, 1856), p. 17. During the summer westward shipments from Boston were also made by a circuitous route through Rutland, Vermont, and then to Schenectady where they continued via the Eria Canal. Ibid., 2.
p.
20.
4. Ibid., pp. 20-21; Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation, I, 158-191; and G. P. de T. Glazebrook, A History of Transportation in Canada (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1938), p. 165. 5. The story of railroad development in Maine is well told in Kirkland, Men,
Cities 6.
and Transportation, I, chapter vii. American Railway Review, 1:10 (November
17,
1859), quoted
from Boston
November 8, 1859. Edmund F. Webb, ed. The Railroad Laws
Transcript,
of Maine (Pordand, Maine: DresMcLellan and Co., 1875), p. 14. 8. A. C. Morton, Report on the Gauge for the St. Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad (Portland: Thurston and Co., 1847). 9. Laura Elizabeth Poor, ed., The First International Railway and the Colonization of New England: Life and Writings of John Alfred Poor (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892), pp. 50-51. 10. Webb, ed.. The Railroad Laws of Maine, p. 629. See also John A. Poor, No Restrictions on Railway Transit. Argument of John A. Poor before the Joint Standing Committee on Railroads, Ways and Bridges (Bangor, Maine: David Bugbee and Co., 1865), pp. 6-7, 24-25; and Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report 7.
ser,
(Boston, 1865), pp. 40-42. 11.
Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation,
I,
215-218.
Frank Walker Stevens, The Beginnings of the New Yor\ Central Railroad (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926), pp. 342-346; Thomas C. Keefer, "Travel and Transportation" in Eighty Years' Progress of British North America (Toronto: 12.
87
Notes to Chapter
III
Henry B. Gibson to Erastus Corning, Canandaigua, and same to same, June 14, 1852, in- Corning Papers, Albany Institute of History and Art, Albany, New York. 13. Keefer, "Travel and Transportation" in Eighty Years' Progress of Briiisk North America, pp. 245-246. 14. Ibid., pp. 194 and 253. 15. On the early railroads of Canada and the Maritime Provinces see Glazebrook, A History of Transportation in Canada, chapter v; and Norman Thompson and Major J. H. Edgar, Canadian Railway Development from the Earliest Times (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1933). 16. Low and Burgess' Railway Directory, i860, p. 176. 17. American Railway Review, 1:6 (November 17, 1859), and 2:6 (December L. Stebbins, 1863), pp. 253-254;
New
I,
York, March
24, 1852,
1859).
IV.
THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES,
1
861
But not including the Ogdensburg Railroad (also called The Northern), for formed part of the rival New England system. New York merchants had gone to considerable lengths to prevent the building of a bridge to carry this railroad across the northern end of Lake Champlain. See J. B. Varnum, "Railroad Legislation of New York in 1849," Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 21:171-177 (August 1849). 2. Frank Walker Stevens, The Beginnings of the New Yor\ Central Railroad, A History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926); Harry H. Pierce, Railroads of New Yor\, A Study of Government Aid, i8^6-i8y^ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), especially chapters i and 4; and David Maldwyn Ellis, "Albany Commercial Rivals," New Yor\ History, 24:484-511 (October 1943). and Troy Some of the roads which united to form the New York Central were not 3. originally built to a gauge of 4 feet 8/4 inches. Thus, the Mohawk and Hudson had been constructed with its rails 4 feet 9 inches apart. Stevens, The Beginnings of the 1.
this line, as already indicated,
—
New 4. 5.
Yor\ Central Railroad, p. 33. But the legislature soon granted exceptions to this restriction. Edward Harold Mott, Between the Ocean and the La\es, The Story
(New York: John S. were being made for gineer for the road
Collins,
1901), pp. 44-45.
When
in the
of Erie
middle 1840's plans
building the Western Division of the Erie, the consulting en-
recommended
a five-foot gauge, but the board of directors voted
and Horatio Allen, The Railroad Era, First Five Years of its Development (New York: 1884), p. 31 (pamphlet). 6. Jules I. Bogen, The Anthracite Railroads (New York: The Ronald Press, 1927), pp. 83-84; Wheaton J. Lane, From Indian Trail to Iron Horse, Travel and
against any change. Ibid., p. 45;
Transportation in
New
fersey
1620-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1939), P- 3877. On New Jersey railroads, see especially Lane, From Indian Trail to Iron Horse, Travel and Transportation in New Jersey 1620-1860. The Camden and Adantic Railroad, another standard-gauge railroad, connected Philadelphia and Adantic City. It belonged to the Philadelphia system, however, rather than to that of New York. 8. L. 1852, No. 36. Cf. Frederick A. Cleveland and Fred Wilbur Powell, Railroad Promotion and Capitalization in the United States (New York: Longman's,
The Middle Atlantic
States, i86i
Green, and Co., 1909), p. 126; Edward Hungerford, Men of Erie (New York: RanHouse, 1946), pp. 34-37; and Robert J. Casey and W. A. S. Douglas, The
dom
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book
LacJ^awatuia Story
On
9.
Progress, History of the
Lyon Company, 10.
Co., 1951), chapters 8
and
The Anthracite Railroad, and A Century Delaware and Hudson Company 182^-1^2^ (Albany: J.
the coal roads, see Bogen,
10.
of B.
1925),
The southern
came
counties
to the support of Baltimore.
James Weston Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry I/801860 (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1947), chapters vi and vii; and George H. Burgess and Miles C. Kennedy, Centennial His11.
Company
tory of the Pennsylvania Railroad
(Philadelphia:
The Pennsylvania
Rail-
road Company, 1949), pp. 128-138. 12.
Ibid., p. 37.
13.
But by no means did
all
the funds
come from
private sources.
It
was
re-
ported in the Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Feb. 2, 1857, p. 6, that nearly one-half of the company's stock was owned by the city of Philadel-
phia and Allegheny County.
Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Feb. 2, 1857, and Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, i82y-ig2y (New York: G. P. Pumam's Sons, 1928), I, 249-250; Niles' National Reg14.
See
pp. 35-39;
ister,
69:96 (October 11, 1845). History of the Railway Mail Service, 48th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate
15.
Document No. 40, p. 59; and Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, February 7, 1859, pp. 3-5 and 15-16. 16. Improved Railway Connections in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: James H.
Exec.
Bryson, 1863), 17.
p. 3
(pamphlet in the Boston Public Library).
The Merchants' Magazine,
way Connections
in
Philadelphia;
46:39 (January 1862). See also Improved RailThe Merchants' Magazine, /[Gij^—y^ (January
1862); William Ferguson, America by River and Rail (London: James Nisbet and Company, 1856), pp. 94, 223; Joseph P. Bradley, William Wheeler Hubbell, and George Ashmun, Considerations upon the Question Whether Congress Should Authorize a New Railroad between Washington and New Yor\ (New York: G. S. Gideon and Company, 1863) Congressional Globe, February 7, 1863, p. 773, and February 11, 1863, p. 886; and Statement Made by the Railroad Companies Owning the Lines between Washington and New Yor\ to the Postmaster General (Wash;
ington: Gideon and Pearson, 1863).
American Railroad Journal, 17:6 (January 5, 1861), and 17:301 (April 13, and Rail, p. 98. 19. John W. Brooks, The Pro Rata Question, What is the True Policy of the State of New Yor](? (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1869), p. 15. 20. John W. Garrett, President, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, February 9, 1862, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, House Exec. Document No. 79, p. 4. 21. See especially Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, vol. I; Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry, chapters vii and viii; Burgess and Kennedy, Centennial History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, pp. 128-138; and Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston 1856), 18.
1861); Ferguson, America by River
pp. 14-15.
89
Notes to Chapter IV 22.
L.
1
85 1, No. 122.
This repeal was stoutly denounced by Philadelphia merchants. See Philadelphia Board of Trade, Twenty-First Annual Report, February 6, ^854, pp. 5-6. 24. This story has been told often. One of the best accounts is to be found in 23.
Donald H. Kent, "The Erie
War
of the Gauges," Pennsylvania History, 15:253-275
(October 1948). 25.
Annual Report, February
Philadelphia Board of Trade, Twenty-First
PP- 35-36; see also, pp. 5, 6, 20-23, and 34-36. 26. After some delay caused by local interests. See Tenth
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, February 27. 28.
(New 29.
2,
1854,
6,
Annual Report
of the
1857, p. 13.
See pp. 59-60.
Rolland Harper Maybee, Railroad Competition and the Oil Trade i8^^-i8y^ York: Extension Press, Central State Teachers' College, 1940), p. 81. Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, I, 265-266, 293;
Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston, 1856), pp. 14-16, and Third Annual Report (Boston, 1857), p. 22.
Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, I, 293-296; Jr., Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States (Washington: Government Printing OflSce, 1881), Appendix, pp. 234-235. 31. The Merchants' Magazine, 44:370 (March 1861). 30.
Joseph
Nimmo,
V. 1.
MIDWEST AND SOUTH,
See, for example, Charles Frederick Carter,
1861
When
Railroads
Were
New (New
York: Simons-Boardman Publishing Co., 1926), pp. 220-222; Robert L. Black, The Little Miami Railroad (Cincinnati, Ohio: n.d.), p. 32; and J. E. Glover, The Clicf^ of the Rails (Jackson, Tenn.: The Railroader, Publishers, 1929), p. 15. 2. Annual Report of the (Ohio) Commission of Railroads and Telegraphs for the year i8yo (Columbus, Ohio: Nevins and Myers, 1870), I, 21. 3.
Ibid., p. 27.
4.
Ibid., pp.
5.
The Engineer,
(December 6.
532 and 561. 1:61 (October
4,
i860); and
The Railroad Record, 8:510-511
i860).
13,
The General Railroad Law
of the state of Missouri, adopted February 24,
roads to be built to a gauge of 5 feet 6 inches but, like the similar legislation which established an oflBcial gauge for Ohio, seems to have had littie 1853, required
effect.
An
Act
all
to
Authorize the Formation of Railroad Associations
Missouri Democrat, 1854), p. 7. Charles Henry Ambler, dale, California:
(St.
Louis:
The
14.
A History
The Arthur H. Clark
Ohio Valley (Glenand Louis C. Hunter,
of Transportation in the
Co., 1932), pp. 211-212;
Steamboats on the Western Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), PP- 594-5958.
9.
Ambler, A History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley, pp. 212-230, Wylie J. Daniels, The Village at the End of the Road, A Chapter in Early
In-
diana Railroad History (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1938), pp. 99-100. 10. Walter Smith, Annual Review of the Commerce of Cincinnati (Cincinnati: 1864), p. 12.
90
Midwest and South,
i86i
11. Boston Board of Trade, Third Annual Report (Boston, 1857), pp. 23-24; George H. Burgess and Miles C. Kennedy, Centennial History of the Pennsylvania
Company (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1949), pp. Through shipment from Buffalo to Chicago without change of gauge was possible via the so-called Cleveland, Crestline and Chicago Route. The gauge
Railroad 176-179. also
of this route, which used the tracks of the Cleveland, Cresdine and Chicago Railroad from Cleveland to Cresdine, and that of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago from Crestline to Chicago, was 4 feet 10 inches throughout. American Railway Review, 2:7 (December i, 1859). 12. Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston, 1856), pp. 14-15; Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), I, 325-326. 13. American Railway Review, 3:251 (October 25, i860). 14. Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio, I, 298-301. 15. Though Missouri railroads were of two gauges, no evidence has come to light which would indicate that this situation was deliberately created or continued
because of commercial rivalry.
Frank Haigh Dixon, A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System 16. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 32. 17. Arthur Charles Cole, The Era of the Civil War, 1848-1870, vol. Ill of The Centennial History of Illinois (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois Centennial Commission, 1919), pp. 32-36, 43-46; Wyatt Winton Belcher, The Economic Rivalry between St. Louis and Chicago 18^0-1880 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947),
pp. 92-95.
Whether St. Louisians favored the 6-foot gauge adopted for this road, and whether for motives of excluding competition, is not known. 19. W. B. Baker, Annual Statement of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis for the Year 18^8 (St. Louis, Missouri: Baker and Hildreth, 1859), pp. 5-6. See also American Railway Review, 3:245 (October 25, i860); and William F. Switzler, Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States, part II of Commerce and Navigation, Special Report on the Commerce of the Mississippi, Ohio, and Other Rivers, and of the Bridges Which Cross Them, Treasury Department Document No. 1039b, Bureau of Statistics (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888), pp. 19-25. 20. American Railway Review, 3:87 (August 16, i860), and 3:393 (December 18.
if so,
27, i860). 21.
Bessie Louise Pierce,
41—43; Belcher, 18^0-1880, pp. 62-64. 1940), 22. rick,
II,
Charleston Courier,
A
History of Chicago
(New York:
The Economic Rivalry Between March
13, 1828, as
quoted
in
St.
Alfred A. Knopf,
Louis and Chicago
Samuel Melanchthon Der-
Centennial History of South Carolina Railroad (Columbia, S.C:
Co., 1930), p. 19.
On
The
State
the role of local interests in the early construction of Southern
"North American Railroads: Public Railroad Conand the Development of Private Enterprise in the South Before 1861," Journal of Economic History, Supplement X (1950), 43-45. railroads see Milton S. Heath,
struction
23.
The
point probably should be made, as suggested by Robert
M.
Sutton, that
the federal land grant of 1850 to Illinois, Mississippi, action taken by the
and Alabama was the only which even remotely suggested
government before the Civil War Here was an attempt
a national transportation policy.
91
to provide rail transportation
Notes to Chapter
V
between the Lakes and the Gulf. But the policy was not fully realized because there was a difference in gauge between the Illinois Central and the southern roads and because it was necessary to resort to the river between Columbus and Cairo. 24. A small gap between Corinth and Jackson remained on the Mobile and Ohio until April 22, 1861. On New Orleans-Mobile rivalry see R. S. Cotterill, "Southern Railroads, 1850-1860," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 10:396-401 (March 1924). 25. American Railroad Journal, 17:264 (March 30, 1861); and U. B. Phillips, A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to i860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), pp. 359-361.
Kenneth Brown,
Cecil
26.
The
Hill:
A. Ashe
A
State
Movement
in Railroad
Development (Chapel
University of North Carolina Press, 1928), pp. 66-69, 164-165; Samuel
et
eds..
al.,
Biographical History of North Carolina (Greensboro, N.C.:
Van Noppen, 1917), VIII, 33. Horatio Allen, The Railroad Era, First
Charles L. 27.
York, 1884),
Five Years of
its
Development (New
(pamphlet); Derrick, Centennial History of South
31
p.
Carolina
Railroad, p. 40. 28.
This was changed to 5
feet just before or
during the war. The exact date
has proved impossible to determine.
A
29.
Brown,
30.
Ibid., pp.
State
Movement
in Railroad
Development,
18-19, 22-23, 365 137, 166-168, 179-181;
p. 18.
and "A History
of the
Piedmont Railroad Company," North Carolina Historical Review, 3:198-222 (April 1926). 31.
Robert C. Black,
III,
North Carolina
versity of
The Railroads
of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: Uni-
Press, 1952), pp. 9, 73-74.
(New York: J. H. Col ton and Co., 1855), and Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1891-1895), plate 70. 32.
vol.
I,
33.
See Colton's Atlas of the World
plate 28;
Letter
from Major W, S. Ashe to Jefferson Davis, November 27, 1861. C. S. War Department Collection of Confederate Records, War Rec-
Railroad Documents,
ords Division, National Archives, cited in Robert C. Black,
Confederacy, road, pp.
p.
8-1 19; Phillips,
1 1
A
W.
of the
History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt
to i860, pp. 162-163, 207-208, 216;
cited in C.
The Railroads
See also Derrick, Centennial History of South Carolina Rail-
9.
and Savannah Republican, November
1861,
11,
Ramsdell, "Confederate Government and the Railroads," American
Historical Review, 22:797 (July 1917)34.
See Atlas to
Armies, plates 35.
23, 25
The War
Accompany
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
and 132; and Coltons Atlas
of the Rebellion,
Union and Confederate Armies,
A
of the
World,
vol.
i,
plate 28.
Compilation of the Official Records of the
series IV, vol.
I,
p. 486; see also pp. 394,
405-406,
417-418, 484-486. 36.
lem.
The
On
Richmond probThomas J. Werten-
references in the preceding footnote also deal with the
the position of Norfolk in these inter-city rivalries see
baker, Norfolk^: Historic Southern Port
(Durham: Duke University
pp. 192-203.
92
Press,
1931),
The Trend Toward VI.
i
861-1870
THE TREND TOWARD INTEGRATION,
1861-1870
For a first-hand account of shipping methods in this period, see the testimony D. Worcester in 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307,
1.
of E.
Part
Integration,
2, p.
130.
A. C. Morton, Report on the Gauge for the St. Lawrence and Atlanta Railroad (Pordand: Thurston and Company, 1847), pp. 20-21. George Dartnell, A Proposed Plan for a Rail Road Clearing House (Buffalo: 3. Clapp, Matthews and Co's Steam Printing House, 1858), pp. 11-12. Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part 2, p. 1048. 4. 2.
5.
Ibid., p. 1046.
6.
Patrick Barry, Over the Atlantic
Low,
and Great Western Railway (London:
S.
&
Marston, 1866), pp. 62-64, 66-67. The Resources and Prospects of America Ascertained during a Visit to the 7. States in the Autumn of 186^ (London and New York, 1866), p. 277. son,
See pp. 31-32. Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part
8.
9.
10. 11.
2, p.
1047.
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 13:210 (August 12, 1871). Boston Board of Trade, Third Annual Report (Boston, 1857), p. 27; Twelfth
Annual Report (1866),
p. 70;
Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part
may well have been on the George Dartnell stated in 1858 that the cost of transshipment was twentyfive cents a ton and the delay amounted to about twenty-four hours. A Proposed Plan for a Rail Road Clearing House, p. 11. 1048.
2, p.
low
Seven cents a ton for the cost of transshipment
side.
Robert C. Black, III, The Railroads of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: UniNorth Carolina Press, 1952), and Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads the Civil War, 1861-186^ (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 12.
versity of in
1952), cover this period in detail. 13. Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy, pp. 72-77, 148-163, discusses the building of these and other links in the South during the war years.
14.
New
Yorl{ Times, February
6,
1863.
January 21, 1863. 16. Ibid., January 21, and February 5 and 6, 1863; and Improved Railway Connections in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: James H. Bryson, 1863), pamphlet in Boston 15.
Ibid.,
Public Library. 17.
Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the President and Directors to the Stock-
holders of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company (Philadelphia: James H. Bryson and Son, 1864), p. 14. See also J. L. Ringwalt, Develop-
ment
of Transportation Systems in the United States (Philadelphia:
Railway World
Office, 1888), pp. 188-189. 18. On the use of steam engines on city streets in Boston and New York see American Railway Times, 16:166 (May 21, 1864), and American Railroad Journal,
18:537 (July 12, 1862). 19. Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report (Boston, 1865), pp. 40-41; Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-186^, pp. 15-17. Chapter II of Weber's volume is concerned with railroad construcdon in the North during
the war. 20.
Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report (Boston, 1865),
93
p. 41.
Notes to Chapter VI
I
21.
Ibid.
22.
Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part
2,
pp. 958-960,
and
046- I 049.
23. Ibid., p. 959. See also Silas Seymour, A Review of the Theory of Narrow Gauges (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1871), pp. 23-24. 24.
Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part
25.
Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part
26.
Ibid., p. 1484.
i, p.
2, p.
492. 1049.
27. George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 181^-1860, The Economic History of the United States, IV (New York: Rinehart and Company,
1951), p. 167.
New York in 1870 were 26.11 cents by rail and water. Yearboo\ of the United States Department of Agriculture, i8gg (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), Freight rates on wheat from Chicago to
28.
a bushel by rail
and
19.58 cents
p. 660.
The Transportation Revolution, 181^-1860,
29.
Taylor,
30.
American Railway Review, 3:155 (September, i860). Philadelphia Board of Trade, Twenty-eighth Annual Report (Philadelphia,
31.
p. 167.
1861), pp. 63-64.
Philadelphia Board of Trade, Thirty-second
32.
Annual Report
(Philadelphia,
1865), p. 39.
See Louis Bernard Schmidt,
33.
Iowa fournal of History and 1921), and 20:70-131 (January
"The
Internal
States,"
Politics,
(July
1922).
SOLVING THE GAUGE DIFFERENTIALS,
VII.
In 1876 the
1.
Grain Trade of the United
19:196-245 (April 1921), 19:414-455
Empire and
the
1860-1880
Green Fast Freight Lines, both controlled by the
owned
over 4500 cars of compromise gauge. Theory and Practice of the American System of Through Fast Freight Transportation as Illustrated in the Operation of the Empire Transportation Company (Philadelphia: Hel-
Pennsylvania Railroad,
Lewis and Greene, 1876), p. 16. Seymour, A Review of the Theory of Narrow Gauges (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1871), p. 23. 3. Charles S. Tisdale to Lorenzo Sabine, Boston, November 2, 1863, as quoted in Boston Board of Trade, Tenth Annual Report (Boston, 1864), pp. 33-34; Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report (Boston 1865), p. 40. 4. American Railroad fournal, 29:1329 (October 18, 1873), and 30:1572-1573 (December 5, 1874) Edward C. Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation (Cam-
fenstein,
Silas
2.
;
bridge:
Harvard University
Carlton
6.
J.
(New York:
tral
I,
445.
ist Session
Creative
Quarto Volume (April 7.
Press, 1948),
(1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 117. Corliss, Main Line of Mid-America; the Story of the Illinois Cen-
43rd Congress,
5.
Age
Press,
1950), pp. 205-206; Railroad Gazette, Fifth
12, 1873), p. 146.
Ibid.
American Railroad fournal, 30:1573 (December 5, 1874); Edward Harold Mott, Between the Ocean and the La\es, the Story of Erie (New York: John S. 8.
CoUins, 1901), pp. 227, 234.
94
Solving the Gauge Differentials, E. Lavoinne et E. Pontzen, Les
9.
i
861—1880
Chemins de Fer en Amerique
braire des Corps des Ponts et Chaussees et des Mines, 1882), 10.
Kincaid A. Herr, The Louisville Magazine, 1943), p. 46.
L&
ville:
&
I,
(Paris: Li-
425-426.
Nashville Railroad, 18^0-1^42 (Louis-
N
11.
Ibid.
12.
Ibid., pp. 46, 76;
and Railroad Gazette, Nineteenth Quarto Volume (Octo-
ber 14, 1887), p. 668. 13.
Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Part
14.
American Railroad Journal, 29:928 (June 21, 1873). Ibid., 30:1541 (December 5, 1874). Ibid., 30:1573 (December 5, 1874). Ibid., 29:928 (June 21, 1873); Mott, Between the Ocean and the La\es, pp.
15.
16. 17.
2, p.
959.
147-148. 18. 2,
American Railroad Journal, 33:36 (January
13,
1877);
ibid.,
36:25 (January
1880).
19. Ibid., 29:928 (June 21, 1873); Alfred F. Sears, On Small Gauge Railroads: A Paper read before the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania and Sodus Bay Railroad Company (Seneca Falls, 1871), pp. 7-8.
20.
Blue Line, General Manager's Report for the Year i86y (Detroit, 1868),
p. 10.
Boston Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report (Boston, 1865), p. 41. American Railroad Journal, 29:1329 (October 18, 1873). 23. For a description of the method used by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to narrow the gauge of their locomotives in 1886 see Herr, Louisville & Nash21.
22.
Railroad, pp. 47, 48.
ville
Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p. 294. gauge had been formed by means of a third rail, the compilers of the census reduced the third rail to equivalent track (that is, divided the length of the rail by two) and added that figure to the trackage of the railroad. Therefore, doublegauge mileage was considerably less than it would appear to have been from a hasty first reading of the census figures. Adjustments have been made in the statis24.
When
tics
a double
given above. 25.
Railroad Gazette, Fifteenth Quarto
26.
The
literature of this subject
Financial Chronicle, 15:52 (July
13,
is
Volume (October
12, 1883), p. 674.
voluminous. See especially Commercial and
1872); and American Railroad Journal, 28:939
(July 27, 1872).
10,
American Railroad Journal, 27:598 (June
27.
Quoted
28.
Ibid.,
28:875 (July
29.
New
Yor\ Times,
I
in
3,
1871).
13, 1872).
as
quoted in American Railroad Journal, 27:629 (June
871).
30.
American Railroad Journal, 30:1467 (November
31.
Ibid.,
34:492
(May
4,
32.
Tenth Census of the United
33.
Railroad Gazette, Fifteenth Quarto
34.
Ibid., p. 674.
35.
36.
1874).
14,
1878). States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p. 294.
Volume (October
Ibid., Sixteenth Quarto Volume (April 11, 1884), American Railroad Journal, 30:1573 (December
95
12,
p. 281. 5,
1874).
1883), p. 674.
Notes to Chapter VIII
THE FAST FREIGHT
VIII.
1.
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 8:584 (May
2.
Michigan Central Railroad Company, Annual Report (Detroit, 1869),
(Italics
8,
1869). p.
6.
added.)
3.
Ibid.,
4.
I bid., 1869, p. 6.
5.
Buffalo Board of Trade,
6.
The
1873, p. 21.
Annual Statement
(Buffalo, 1855), p. 38.
1000 cars with sliding wheels which were operating over the Grand
Trunk and
connections in the early 1870's were the property of the National
its
Dispatch, a fast freight
line.
Edward
(Cambridge: Harvard University
C. Kirkland,
Press, 1948),
I,
Men,
Cities
and Transportation
445.
Blue Line, General Manager's Report for the Year i86y (Detroit, 1868), p. cars were transported across the river between Winsor and Detroit by means
7.
10.
LINES, 1861-1890
The
of a steam ferry. 8.
L. Ringwalt,
J.
Development
(Philadelphia: Railway
World
of Transportation Systems in the United States
Office, 1888), p. 193.
D. H. Weld, 'Trivate Freight Cars and American Railways," Columbia XXXI, No. i (1908), p. 76. 10. Boston Board of Trade, Second Annual Report (Boston, 1856), p. 19; Railway World, 4:745 (August 3, 1878). 11. Railway Review, 30:22 (January 11, 1890); Weld, "Private Freight Cars and American Railways," p. 76; Grover G. Huebner and Emory R. Johnson, The Railroad Freight Service (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1926), p. 94. For a detailed account of the Star Union Line see Huebner and Johnson, pp. 94-96. 12. Huebner and Johnson, The Railroad Freight Service, p. 97; Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation, I, 441-442. 13. 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part i, p. 77. L.
9.
Universit\', Studies in Political Science, vol.
14.
Hudson
Democrat
E. Bridge,
With a
Stock^h older s: (St.
The
Pacific Railroad Controversy,
an Open Letter to the
Series of Articles Originally Published in the Daily Missouri
Louis: Missouri
Democrat Printing House,
1869), pp. 15-21 (second
pagination); Testimony of G. R. Blanchard, 2nd vice-president, Erie Railway pany, 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 362; Huebner and Johnson, The Railroad Freight Service, pp. 96-97.
The
Pacific Railroad Controversy, pp. 15-21
15.
Bridge,
16.
Testimony of Joseph D.
Congress, ist
Johnson, 17.
Com-
pp. 361-
(second pagination).
Empire Fast-Freight Line, 43rd Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 26; Huebner and
The Railroad Freight
president.
Potts,
Service, pp. 96-97.
Testimony of G. R. Blanchard, 2nd
43rd Congress, 18.
2,
ist Session
vice-president, Erie
Railway Company,
(1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part
2, p.
Boston Board of Trade, Twelfth Annual Report (Boston, 1866),
ican Railroad Journal, 23:703
(July 27,
1867).
The
362.
p. 69;
Amer-
cooperative lines were often,
though not always, designated by a color, such as the Red Line, the Blue Line, or the Green Line. The White Line, which ran west of St. Louis over the Pacific Railroad, was organized and operated for some time as a non-cooperative line. Bridge,
The
Pacific Railroad Controversy, pp.
14-15 (second pagination).
96
The
Fast Freight Lines, 1861-1890
William H. Joubert, Southern Freight Rates
19.
in Transition (Gainesville:
Uni-
versity of Florida Press, 1949), p. 32.
Charles A. Sindall, "The Development of the Traffice between the Southern and the Northern and Northwestern States," 49th Congress, 2nd Session (1886-87), House Executive Document No. 7, Part 2, p. 681. 21. Railroad Gazette, Third Quarto Volume (November 29, 1873), p. 478; 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part i, p. 77. An exception to this occurred in the South where freight rates on some 22. through traffic carried by the Green Line were set by a committee composed of six men selected by the officials of the member roads. Joubert, Southern Freight Rates 20.
States
in Transition, p. 34. 23. Testimony of E. D. Worcester, 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 127. 24. 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, pp. 2-3. Ibid., p. 131.
25.
Testimony of E. D. Worcester, 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 126. 27. For maps of the trunk line systems and their through freight line connections see Joseph Nimmo, Jr., Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States i8y6 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1877), maps No. 4, 5, 6 and 7. Although valuable because they are the best available, these maps are unfortunately incomplete and not always accurate in detail. 28. Railway World, 4:745 (August 3, 1878). 29. Boston Board of Trade, Thirteenth Annual Report (Boston, 1867), pp. 39-40; the Boston and Albany Railroad Company vs. the Boston and Lowell Railroad Company, I. Interstate Commerce Commission Reports: Decisions, 163 (1887-1888); Railway World, 4:745 (August 3, 1878). 30. Testimony of G. R. Blanchard, 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 363. 31. 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 364; [Hepburn New York, Proceedings of the Special Committee on Railroads. Committee], vol. V, p. 16 of part of volume devoted to exhibits. 32. Quoted in Railway World, 4:746 (August 3, 1878). 33. American Railroad Journal, 27:877 (August 12, 1871). 34. For a complete account of the Green Line see Joubert, Southern Freight 26.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Rates in Transition, pp. 31-40. 35.
Testimony of Thomas E. Walker, general claim-agent. Green Line, 43rd ist Session (1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 780. 43rd Congress, ist Session (1873—74), Senate Report No. 307, Part i, pp. 119-
Congress, 36.
120. 37.
Joubert, Southern Freight Rates in Transition, p. 32.
38.
Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation,
39.
Ibid., p. 501.
The
I,
499.
secretary of the Cincinnati
Chamber
of
Commerce
stated
between Cincinnati and Adantic ports occurred in 1853. Joseph Nimmo, Jr., Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States, 1880 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), Appendix, p. 234. that the first use of through bills of lading
40.
Huebner and Johnson, The Railroad Freight
41.
43rd Congress,
ist Session
Service, p. 92.
(1873-74), Senate Report No. 307, Part
97
i, p.
31.
Notes to Chapter VIII Albert
42.
S. Bolles, Industrial
History of the United States (Norwich, Connecti-
Henry Bill Publishing Company, 1889), p. 662. 43. David M. Ellis, "New York and the Western Trade,"
cut:
New
Yor\ History,
33:388 (October, 1952). 44. American Railroad Journal, 33:1189 (September 22, 1877); Railway World, 4:745 (August 3, 1878). After a freight line had been purchased by a railroad it was
operated as a freight department within the railroad company.
Boston Chamber of Commerce, Sixth Annual Report (Boston, 1891), pp.
45. 1 1
8-1 19.
46. Testimony of E. D. Worcester, 43rd Congress, Report No. 307, Part 2, p. 127. 47. Railway Review, 31:57 (January 24, 1891).
ist Session
(1873-74), Senate
48.
Ibid.
49.
Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United States, p.
193-
IX.
1. J.
LAST STEPS IN INTEGRATION,
1880-1890
American Railroad Journal, 30:1572-1573 (December
Casey and
195O,
W.
A.
S.
Douglas, The Lackawanna Story
5,
1874); and Robert
(New York: McGraw-Hill,
P- 94-
two short lines representing a total length of 128 miles remained. Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p. 294. About 1880 the Pennsylvania, a road of 4 foot 9-inch gauge, adopted what it called a "limit gauge." Plagued by numerous tie-ups, which were caused by cars with too narrow a gauge for its tracks, the road set up rigid specifications and all cars were inspected as they came onto its line. Those that failed to fall within the specifications were rejected. There was apparently no similar "limit gauge" on any other line at this time, but in the opinion of some railroad men there should have been. Railroad Gazette, Fourteenth Quarto Volume (March 3, 1882), p. 133. 4. Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p. 294. 5. Edward Vernon, American Railroad Manual for the United States and the Dominion (New York: American Railroad Manual Company, 1873), pp. 371, 500, 2.
In 1880, only
3.
501, 502.
Cecil Kenneth Brown, A State Movement in Railroad Development (Chapel The University of North Carolina Press, 1928), pp. 174-181. Throughout this study much light is thrown on the parochial viewpoint of merchant capitalism as 6.
Hill:
against the unifying tendencies
changed from standard Alabama. 7.
The Merchants' Magazine,
United
capitalism. Another road which was gauge was the Montgomery and West Point in
of finance
to five-foot
44:672
(June 1861), and Tenth Census of the
States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, p.
137.
80 per cent to 77 per cent, if West Virginia is included with the South for both dates. Computed from The Merchants' Magazine, 44:672 (June 1861); Eighth Census of the United States, i860, p. 331; and Tenth Census of the United 8.
From about
States, 1880, vol. IV, Transportation, pp. 9.
10.
300 and 488-492.
Railroad Gazette, Thirteenth Quarto Ibid.,
Volume
Nineteenth Quarto Volume (October
98
(July 15, 1881), pp. 387-388.
14, 1887), p. 668.
Last Steps in Integration, 1880— 1890 11.
William
Part
"Report on the Internal Commerce of the United 2nd Session (1886-87), House Executive Document No. 7,
Switzler,
F.
States," 49th Congress, 2, p. 72.
"Of the engine builders, the Baldwin Locomotive Works had probably been most far-seeing. For twenty years they had looked forward to this change, and had during that time so constructed their frames and fire-boxes that, by using new driving wheel centres, the change could be made without changing other parts." Railroad Gazette, Nineteenth Quarto Volume (November 11, 1887), p. 732. 13. The original shift was to 4 feet, 9 inches, not 4 feet, 8'/4 inches. 14. Railroad Gazette, Thirteenth Quarto Volume (July 15, 1881), pp. 387-388; Nineteenth Quarto Volume (November 11, 1887), p. 732; J. L. Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United States (Philadelphia: Railway World 12.
the
Office, 1888), p. 358. 15. 16.
Ibid.
News and
Charleston
Commerce.
Courier, as quoted in Switzler, "Report on the In-
&
Kincaid A. Herr, The Louisville Nashville Rail& N. Magazine, 1943), p. 47. 17. Ibid., pp. 47-48; Charleston News and Courier, as quoted in Switzler, "Re," port on the Internal Commerce. pp, 72-73. A highly technical account of the problems involved in the change of gauge on the Southern roads is to be found in ternal
.
.
,"
p. 73;
road, 18^0-1 g42 (Louisville: L.
.
an
.
by C. H. Hudson in the Journal of the Association of Engineering Soreprinted in the Railroad Gazette, Nineteenth Quarto Volume (October 14,
article
cieties,
1887), p. 668,
and (November
18.
Herr, Louisville
19.
Charleston
Commerce.
nal
20.
.
.
&
11, 1887), pp. 731-733. Nashville Railroad, p. 48.
News and ,"
Courier, as quoted in Switzler, "Report on the Inter-
pp. 72-73; Herr, Louisville
&
Nashville Railroad,
p. 48.
Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United States,
p.
358. 21.
Ibid.
The
Illinois Central,
the Mobile
and Ohio, and the Cincinnati,
New
Orleans and Texas changed to a gauge of 4 feet 8V2 inches. Railroad Gazette, Eighteenth Quarto Volume (June 4, 1886), p. 386. 22.
Ibid.,
Nineteenth Quarto Volume (October
14,
1887), p. 668.
"Report on the Internal Commerce. 24. Railroad Gazette, Nineteenth Quarto Volume (October 23.
25.
Quoted
in Switzler,
Ibid., Thirty-first
Quarto Volume (March
99
.
," p. 72.
1887), p. 668.
31, 1899), p. 221; Ibid.
ber 15, 1899), pp. 644-645. 26. Herr, Louisville Nashville Railroad, pp. 76-^7.
&
.
14,
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INDEX
INDEX Alabama Great Southern Railroad, 80 Alabama, railroads, 42, 43, 44 Albany (N. Y.), 5, 16, 24, 71, 73
Car
"compromise gauge," 39, 59, 68;
American Express Company, 69 Androscoggin and Kennebec Railroad, 20
Adanta (Ga.), 42, 46 Adantic and Great Western Railroad, 54, 73 Adantic and St. Lawrence Railroad, 18, 20
Chattanooga (Tenn.), 42 Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, 78 Chicago and Elgin Railroad, 36 Chicago (111.), 5, 40-41, 76 Cincinnati (Ohio), 36, 39, 51, 54, 61, 78 Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad,
Adantic City (N. J.), 88 Auburn and Syracuse Railroad, 24 Augusta (Mc.)> 20 Baltimore (Md.), 27, 29-30, 39 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 5, 27-28, 29,
54 Cincinnati,
30, 32, 33>38, 39. 73 Bellaire (Ohio), 33,
Milford Railroad, 20
New
Orleans and Texas Railroad,
99 Cincinnati, Selma and Mobile Railroad, 80-
39
Belpre (Ohio), 33 Bills of lading, 7, 74-75, 97
81 Cincinnati Southern Railroad, 79, 80 City rivalries, 5, 18-20, 23, 26-30, 31, 37,
Blue Line (fast freight), 63, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74 Boston (Mass.), 4, 5, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18, 50,
54-55 Boston and Lowell Railroad, 15, 69 Boston and Providence Railroad, 15 Boston and Worcester Railroad, 4,
40-47, 51-52, 59 Civil
War,
effect,
on
railroads, 6, 28,
44-45,
46-47, 53-54 Clearing house, demand
15,
16,
for, 50-51, 76 Cleveland (Ohio), 36, 39, 73 Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati
Rail-
road, 73
50,73 Bowling Green (Ky.), 42, 85
Cleveland, Cresdine
Bridges, 18, 22, 32, 33, 37, 40, 41, 50, 78 Brunei, Isambard Kingdom, 12
91 Cleveland,
Buffalo (N. Y.), 24, 25, 30, 31, 57, 60, 71,
and Chicago Railroad,
Painesville
and Ashtabula
Rail-
road, 31
Collingwood (Ont.), 17
73 Buffalo and Erie Railroad, 68
Buffalo and Lake
Huron Railway, 22
Buffalo and State Line Railroad, 31 Burkesville (Va.), 46
Cairo
interline
Central of Georgia Railroad, 46 Charleston (S. C), 5, 41-42, 43, 44 Charleston and Hamburg Railroad, 41, 43 Charleston and Savannah Railroad, 46
Arkansas, railroads, 36
Town and
60-61, 62, 63
exchange, 26, 33, 50-51, 56, 68, 77, 81, 82-83, 98
Allen, Horatio, 43
Bangor, Old
hoists,
Cars, railroad, 2, 82; changing gauge, 63, 79,
(III.),
40, 60, 79
Colorado, railroads, 65
Columbia (S. C), 46 Commercial Express (fast
freight line), 73 Competition, railroad, with water routes, 23, 4, 33-34, 56-57, 67, 74-75 Connections, interline, 16-18, 20, 24-27, 32-
33, 39, 42, 46, 53-54, 59-63, 65, 68. See names of individual railroads and
California, railroads, 55 Camden and Amboy Railroad, 26, 28, 53 Camden and Adantic Railroad, 88
Camden
also
cities
28, 53 Canada, railroads, 2, 17, 20-22, 77
Consolidation, railroad,
Car
Corinth (Miss.), 42, 85
(N.
J.),
ferries, 16, 22,
29, 33, 53-54, 82
2, 83 Continental Line (fast freight), 73-74
109
Index Crescent Line (fast freight), 74
77, 82.
Crestline (Ohio), 91
roads and states
Cumberland (Md.)) 27
See also names of individual
rail-
Georgia, railroads, 41^42, 43, 46 Jay, 2
Gould, Danville (Me.), 20
Government
Danville (Va.), 43, 44. 53 Dartnell, George, 50
Grain trade, 56-57, 67, 74, 75, 79 Grand Trunk Railway, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22,
Dayton (Ohio), 54 Delaware and Hudson Railroad, 27 Delaware, Lackawanna and Western
59, 60, 69, 77 Great Bend (Pa.), 25 Great Britain, early railroads, 12 Great Northern Route, 16-17
Rail-
road, 25, 26, 27, 77
aid to railroads, 3, 24,
91-92
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, 65
Great Southern Line (fast freight), 74
Detroit (Mich.), 21, 22, 60
Great Western Dispatch
Diamond Line
(fast freight),
(fast
freight
line),
69, 73
73
Directories, railroad, 12
Great Western Railway (Can.), 21, 22, 54,
Dunkirk (N. Y.),
60, 62, 63, 68, 73 Great Western Railway (Eng.), 12
24, 62
East Buffalo (N. Y.), 62
Green Line
East
Greensboro (N. C), 43, 44, 53 Grimes, James B., 52
Louis
St.
(III.),
39
Eastern Railroad, 59
Empire Line
(fast freight), 73, 75,
(fast freight), 71, 74,
Guides, railroad,
94
97
10
Erie (Pa.), 31-32
Milwaukee Line
Erie and
(fast freight),
73
Harbor Creek
Erie and Northeast Railroad, 31-32
Harlem
73
Railroad,
Harris, Ira,
Erie Railroad, 24-25, 26, 30, 31, 39, 54, 60, 61, 62, 69, 73, 88
Fairlie,
Robert
F.,
Hayes,
63
company
J.
D.,
72
Henderson (Ky.), 60, 61 Hoosac Tunnel Line (fast Houston (Tex.), 42
Fast freight lines, 7, 67-76; abuses, 69-71,
75-76;
24
61
Harrisburg (Pa.), 26, 27 Hartford (Conn.), 16
Europe, early railroads, 12-13 Evansville (Ind.), 61
(Pa.), 31
Harlan, James, 55
Erie and North Shore Dispatch (fast freight),
lines,
75,
94,
98;
co-
Hudson River
freight), 73
Railroad, 24
Huntington, Collis
P.,
2
operative lines, 71-72, 75, 76; noncooperative lines, 69-71, 75, 76 Florida, railroads, 42, 43
Florida
Illinois
Railway and Navigation Company,
Fort Erie (Ont.), 22 Forwarding agents, 49-50, 52, 75 Franklin and Warren Railroad, 36
Company
Indianapolis and Cincinnati Railroad, 36, 38 Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad, 73 Interline agreements, 2, 3, 7 Internal trade, U. S., 4, 56-57.
Railroad, 31
Freight rates, 2, 67
City
Fremont and Indiana Railroad, 36
rivalries;
International Line Interstate
Gallatin, Albert, 12
Gauge,
9,
11-14, 22, 26, 27, 31-32, 35-37,
39, 52, 54, 58-66, 68, 77; broad gauge,
"double gauge," 36, 54, 6263, 65, 77; gauge in the South, 43-45, 79-81; narrow gauge, 12, 63-66; standard gauge, II, 12-13, 36, 39> 53, 55-56, 12,
40-41, 65
Indiana, railroads, 36-38, 39 Indianapolis (Ind.), 38, 39
81
Franklin Canal
Central Railroad, 40, 79, 99
Illinois, railroads, 36, 38, 39,
Competition;
(fast freight),
Commerce Commission
Iowa, railroads, 36, 52 Ireland, railroads, 13
19, 21;
Jackson (Tenn.), 42, 85 Jersey City (N. J.), 25
Journals, railroad, 11
IIO
See also
Grain
trade
72 Act, 3
Index Montgomery and Eufala Railroad, 81 Montgomery and West Point Railroad, 98
Kasson's Dispatch (fast freight line), 69
Kentucky Central Railroad, 78-79 Kentucky, railroads, 42, 43, 78-79 Knoxville (Tenn.), 42
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern
Montreal (Que.), 17, 20-21 Montreal and Champlain Railway, 17 Morehead City (N. C), 44 Rail-
road, 73 Land grants, 3, 91-92 Latrobe, Benjamin H., 12
Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, 71, 74 Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Rail-
Lawrenceburg (Ind.), 36 Lehigh Valley Railroad, 26 Lincoln, Abraham, 55
National Dispatch (fast freight line), 73 National Line (fast freight), 73, 75
road, 71, 74
New New New
Litde Miami Railroad, 38 Locomotives, 1-2, 13; changing gauge, 63, 79-80, 95, 99 Lord, Eleazer, 25
5^1? also
74, 79, 80, 82, 95
and Lexington
Rail-
road, 52
Lyme
(Conn.), 16
Lynchburg (Va.), 61
Mad
New
River and Lake Erie Railroad, 35
York and Erie Railroad.
See Erie
York Central
Railroad, 21, 24, 25, 30,
31, 38, 39> 54, 57, 62, 72, 73, 75, 86, 88
New York
i
railroad, description, 8-1 1, 15,
State, railroads, 4-5, 15,
23-26,
30 Niagara Falls (Ont.), 21, 22 Norfolk (Va.), 43
97
Marietta and Cincinnati Railroad, 33, 36, 39, 73 Maryland, railroads, 27, 29â&#x20AC;&#x201D;30 Memphis (Tenn.), 42, 43
North Carolina Railroad, 78 North Carolina, railroads, 43, 44-45,
Memphis and Charleston
Northeastern Georgia Railroad, 71
Memphis,
Clarksville
Railroad, 42, 80
Mercantile capitalism, 3-5 Merchants' Dispatch (fast freight line), 69,
Nortonville (Ky.), 61
Nova
72, 73. 75
Michigan Central Railroad, 54, 67, 73 Michigan, railroads, 22, 36 Milan (Tenn.), 61
46, 78
Northern Central Railroad, 27, 29, 30 Northern Railway, 17, 88 Northern Virginia Railroad, 33
and Louisville Rail-
road, 85
Scotia, railroads,
22
Mileage, railroad, 2, 82
Ogdensburg (N. Y.), 17 Ogdensburg Railroad, 88 Ohio and Mississippi Railroad,
Mississippi, railroads, 42, 43, 44 Missouri, railroads, 35, 36, 40-41, 77, 78,
40, 51, 54, 73, 86 Ohio Central Railroad, 33, 39
36, 38, 39,
Ohio, railroads, 33, 35-39, 65
90, 91
Mobile (Ala.), 42, 61 Mobile and New Orleans Line
Ottawa and Prescott Railroad, 21 (fast freight),
74 Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 79, 85, 99 Mohawk and Hudson Railroad, 24
Montgomery
24,
Railroad
(Ga.), 46
Maine, railroads, 15, 17-20, 22 Manufactures, growth of in U. S.,
Maps,
of individual states
28, 32, 93
New Macon
names
New Hampshire, railroads, 15, i8 New Hampton (N. J.), 25 New Haven (Conn.), 16 New Jersey Central Railroad, 25, 26 New Jersey Railroad, 25 New London (Conn.), 16 New Orleans (La.), 5, 42, 43, 61 New York (N. Y.), 4, 5, 6-7, 15, 23,
Louisiana, railroads, 5, 42, 43, 86 Louisville (Ky.), 42, 43, 52, 61 Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 61, 71, Louisville, Cincinnati
Bern (N. C), 43, 44 Brunswick, railroads, 22 England, railroads, 15-20, 30, 69-70.
(Ala.), 42, 45
Pacific Railroad, 52, 53,
55-56
Pacific Railroad of Missouri,
78 Parkersburg (Va.), 29, 33 Pennsylvania Coal Company Railroad, 27
III
Index Pennsylvania Railroad,
Selma (Ala.), 42
2, 5, 28, 29, 30, 31,
Shipping, pre-railroad, 49
33. 38, 39> 54> 57, 69, 73> 75. 81, 89, 98.
Pennsylvania, railroads,
5, 25,
Skowhegan (Me.), 26
26-29, 31-33,
65 Penobscot and Kennebec Railroad, 20
South, railroads, 41-48, 77-81. See also
Pensacola and Atlanta Railroad, 81
South Carolina Railroad, 46 South Carolina, railroads, 41-42, 43, 44, 46 Southern (Mississippi) Railroad, 86 Southwestern and Georgia Railroad, 81
names
Petersburg (Va.). 44. 46-47. 53 Peto, S. Morton, 51
Philadelphia (Pa.), 4, 14, 26-29, 32, 53-54,
Spain, railroads, 13
57, 88, 89
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, 54 Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad, 28 Philadelphia,
Springfield (Mass.), i6
Standard time,
Wilmington and Baltimore
Star
Sunbury
Wayne and Chicago
road, 32-33, 38, 91
Terminal facilities, 30, 38, 62 Terre Haute and Alton Railroad, 39 Terre Haute and Richmond Railroad, 39
(Mich.), 18, 22
Texas, railroads,
Pordand (Me.), 15, 17-20, 60 Pordand, Saco and Portsmouth Railroad, 20
16
16, 34;
86
demand
for,
6,
28-29, 37, 52-55, 65-66; obstacles to, 16, 22, 31-34, 42-43, 45. 47-48, 50-52, 64See also Fast freight lines Tisdale, Charles S., 59
Pueblo (Colo.), 65 Railroads, as investments, 6-7;
2, 42, 43, 78,
Through shipment,
Portsmouth (Ohio), 36 Portsmouth (Va.), 44 I.), 4,
(Pa.), 27
Technological improvements, 1-2, 45, 82 Tennessee, railroads, 42, 43
Pontchartrain Railroad, 5 Poor, John Alfred, i8, 19, 20
Providence (R.
75
Rail-
Pittsburgh (Pa.), 5, 26, 27, 32-33, 37 Pocahontas (Va.), 46
Huron
83
(fast freight), 69, 73,
Steubenville (Ohio), 37
Piermont (N. Y.), 24 Pittsburgh, Fort
7,
Union Line
Stephenson, George, 12
Railroad, 28, 29, 30, 53, 54 Piedmont Railroad, 44-45
Port
of individual states
first in
U.
S.,
4-5, 41
Red Line (fast freight), 71, 72, 73 Richmond and Danville Railroad, 44 Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, 46 Richmond (Va.), 43, 44, 46-47, 53 Riviere du Loup (Que.), 22 Rock Island (111.), 41
Toledo (Ohio), 36, 71 Toledo and Wabash Railroad, 73 Toronto (Ont.), 17 Trackage breaks in cities, 28, 30, 31, 33, 38, 45-47, 51-52 Transcontinental railroads, cific
2.
See also Pa-
Railroad
Transshipment, cost
of,
50-51, 52, 65, 67
Troy (N. Y.), 5, 16, 24, 50 Tyler, H. W., 60-61, 62, 65
Rouses Point (N. Y.), 17
Rowland (Ky.), 61
Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 2
Russia, railroads, 13
Vermont and Canada Railroad, 69 Vermont Central Railroad, 69-70
Rudand
(Vt.), 87
Vermont, St.
John (N. B.), 60 Lawrence and Adantic Railroad, 18, 19
St.
Lawrence and Industry Railroad, 21
St.
Louis (Mo.),
railroads, 15, 16, 18
Vicksburg (Miss.), 42, 43 Virginia, railroads, 29, 33, 41, 43, 44,
46-47, 78
39, 40-41, 76 Salamanca (N. Y.), 54
Washington (D. C),
Sandusky (Ohio), 36
Waterville (Me.), 20
Sarnia (Ont.), 18, 22
West Chester
Savannah, Albany and Gulf Railroad, 46 Savannah (Ga.), 5, 42, 43, 46 Schenectady and Troy Railroad, 24
Western and Adantic Railroad, 71, 74 Western Insurance and Transportation Company (fast freight line), 69
St.
5,
112
28, 29, 53
Railroad, 54
Index Western Railroad,
White River Junction (Vt.), 16 Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad, 44 Wilmington (N. C), 43, 44, 46 Windsor (Ont.), 21, 22
i6, 50, 73
West Virginia, railroads, 78 Wheeling (Va.), 28, 33, 37, 39 Wheels, sliding, 59-60. See also Cars, road,
rail-
"compromise gauge"
White Line
(fast freight), 72, 73,
Wisconsin, railroads, 36 Worcester (Mass.), 4
96
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