ON EAST: EASSU's Undergraduate Academic Journal by Trinh Quan

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

East Asian Studies Undergraduate Journal ISSN 1920-0978

ON EAST:

(de) constructing ASIA

ON EAST is an established academic undergraduate journal under the support, awareness, and approval of the Arts and Science Student Union at the University of Toronto. The ON EAST Academic Journal is an Open Access Journal. This means that anybody may access the contents. It also means that visitors may freely copy, print or download material FOR THEIR PERSONAL USE only. The author retains all rights to his or her intellectual property. As with any publication, print or electronic, the possibility of plagiarism, commercial exploitation or unauthorized use exists. Thus authors should avail themselves of an appropriate level of copyright protection under applicable copyright law. The East Asian Studies Student Union (EASSU) assumes no responsibility or liability for unauthorized use of materials published on The ON EAST website. It must be noted that EASSU does not authorize copies, replications, or republication of any of the materials without express permission from the author(s) of a work or works, except for personal use only. Except for personal use, no material, either text or image, shall be copied without the explicit consent of individual authors. For third parties to obtain permission to further use material the material within the journal, please contact the author or for non-authored material the direct Managing Editor(s) of the relevant publication year. By submitting an academic piece to EASSU and the ON EAST Journal committee, authors implicitly certify that it is wholly the author’s own work, that he/she holds the intellectual property rights to it, and that the author agrees that EASSU has the right to publish the work on its web site, subject to the decisions and policies of the Managing Editor(s) of EASSU: ON EAST Committee. The creator, however, may withdraw the work and such permissions at any time. For copyright purposes, the effective date of the copyright is that of the last amendment to the page excluding amendments to the borders present on the page.

Authors should note the following. EASSU has issued transfer of copyright to all authors, which transfers a one-time copyright from the writer to the journal. Correspondence to this, the form indicated as follows: “I (the author) hereby agree to the first time and one time only publication of my (article) entitled (‘so and so’) in the English language in the (year) publication of the ON EAST Undergraduate Academic Journal. “ However, the author may also add a clause specifying a time limit, beyond which the permission is revoked... This makes it evident that the author retains the right to do what he/she prefers with the material, when he/she likes, and that the journal must seek the author’s permission if it wishes to make further use of their work, such as placing it on a web site, republication, publication elsewhere, serialization, translation, and so forth. Readers and Users should not the following: ON EAST is a free publication sponsored by the Arts and Science Student Union at the University of Toronto, through the editing and compilations of the EASSU ON EAST Committee. Thus, the ‘free’ indicated here is the non-profitable aspect of the journal. Any further usage of any materials within the journal would be a violation to the copyright law of Canada, and consequences may follow. ISSN 1920-0978

ON EAST

STAFF/ COMMITTEE / CONTRIBUTORS

Co-Chairs Michel Marion & Yinsey Wang

Layout Editor/Cover Designer Trinh Quan

Academic Adviser Professor John Edward Stowe, PhD Selection Committee Professor Janet Poole Professor Keirstead Professor John Edward Stowe Professor Rick W. Guisso

Graduate Editing Committee Baryon Tensor Posadas William Hetherington Olga Fedorenko Erik Spigel Yanfei Li

Undergraduate Editing Committee Andrew Campana Lowell Lee Carlotta James Agnieska Baranowska Sponsor/Contributors Arts and Science Student Union Deans Initiative Award East Asian Studies Student Union Publisher Paperland and Design Inc,

Dear Reader,

ON EAST has just begun and the journal already aims to fulfill two grand missions: (De)Constructing Asia and benefit the East Asian Studies Department undergraduate community. There is however a catch. This year, all essays are related to China. The question therefore is: How to (de) construct Asia with only one country this year? We thought that it was definitely a task to be continued in the journalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s future years. For now at least, we gathered several good essays which we hope will enlighten your day, and maybe even give you some ideas for your own intellectual endeavours.

Such a project could not have been harder but the motivation and incredible team work of all those involved in the project allowed it to achieve this goal, or at least mostly. Establishing an academic journal is not necessarily easy. Yet, every step of the process is enjoyable. We had first to find an adviser with some experience in student journal. Then, the time came to gather incredible undergradate students to form the more than essential Editing Committee. As months passed and essays were submitted, the team ultimately came to involve people from the three levels of this university. At all time, however, the benefiters of the project were to be always the same: the undergraduate community. This task was further accomplished, I hope, with the ON EAST Undergraduate Conference. In future years, we hope to be able to surpass what we did this year. Therefore, stay tuned for the journalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s future edition. And in the meantime, it is a pleasure this year to co-introduce the first edition of ON EAST. Michel Marion Co-Chair

ON EAST PREFACE

Dear Reader,

It is my pleasure to co-introduce the very first edition of ON EAST: (De)Constructing Asia. This volume is packed with exciting essays, looking to entice your appetite for learning and challenge you to think in a spectrum of ways. It is an honour for all of us, that you have picked up this particular marvellous collection of essays to quench your thirst for knowledge! ON EAST is an ambitious brainchild of undergraduates, graduates and professors, all whom have worked extremely hard to bring you the most promising work that exemplifies University of Torontoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s undergraduate talent. The teamwork and the collaboration involved has made it a really fulfilling experience for undergraduates to learn from others and actually present their work. I am extremely grateful for all the hard work that everyone has shown in this project for both the journal and conference. It has given many students a chance to engage in all sorts of dialogue on a range of mindboggling topics with some really brilliant academics. For our belief is that everyone has the potential to be a scholar (quite Confucian if I can say so myself) and thus nuturing undergraduate enthusiasm is something we feel is key in opening up opportunities from greater learning at all levels of education. W ith that, I bid you: enjoy reading these essays as they surely display what East Asian Studies students do best, (de)constructing! Yinsey Wang Co-Chair

ON EAST TABLE OF CONTENTS

ON REVOLUTION The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution .......................... 10

Why China Rejected a Second Revolution in 1919 ........................................................................................ 30

ON CULTURE

Military Servitude, Violence and the Colonial Subject: On Orphan of Asia and Other Taiwanese Works .......................................................................................... 44

Survival, Spirit, and Civilization: The Poetics of Tradition, Culture and Life in “The Chess Master” ........................................................................................ 56 Where Art Histories Collided and Converged: A Comparison between the Art of Italian Jesuit Artist Castiglione and Chinese Painting Reformist Lin Fengmian ................................................................................... 76

ON POLITICS

A Case Study in Party Propaganda: Looking at the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake through a Red Lens ......... 96

The Internet in China: Empowerment and Political Impact on State-Society Relations ................................ 108

ON SECOND THOUGHT: COMMENTARY

My Abba’s Blessed Essay ......................................... 128

ON REVOLUTION

EVELYN CHAN

is in her final year as a Joint Specialist in the Peace and Conflict Studies and International Relations program. She will be graduating from the University of Toronto in the spring and will be continuing with her studies at the University of British Columbia in the fall. She looks forward to her time in the west coast.

TAE YEON EOM

is currently a fourth year undergraduate student studying East Asian Studies, Political Science, and History. As getting more interested in complex political situations in East Asian history, he wants to live a simple life but enjoys struggling with contradictions in his daily life.

Evelyn Chan

THE QUESTION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF THE CHINESE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION : THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE AND COALITION-BUILDING

ABSTRACT The Republican Revolution is often treated as a brief, fleeting period in China’s narrative, in which socialism is portrayed as the inevitable path in the modernization of China’s political order. At the same time, Sun Yat Sen still holds an important place in Chinese history, as Father of the Republic. There is a seeming paradox, in which this important historical period of China’s modernization should be so short-lived. What contributes to the failure of the Chinese Republican Revolution? Why does liberalism and constitutionalism fail to take hold with the collapse of the imperial regime? Utilizing a voluntarist framework in revolutionary theory which emphasizes agency, this paper discusses the role of ideology and elite polarization to anlyze the incompleteness of the 1911 Republican Revolution. A central question is how revolutionary were the Republican Revolutionaries? Undermined by its precarious political position in mainland China, the Tong Meng Hui moderated and compromised its political program to secure victory and avoid conflict. While modernization and strengthening the nation was desired by all political elites they were profoundly divided over how to achieve this, ideologically, and institutionally, whether through federal or central means. The rise of Sun Yat Sen’s revolutionary party did put an end to these questions. Support for the Republican resolution to the regime crisis was merely a guise and the anti-dynastic coalition eventually gave way to internal conflict. The paper thus examine the role of the Revolutionary party, and how its weakness contributed to the revolutionary outcome.

EVELYN CHAN

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

The rise and fall of dynastic houses was an endemic part of China’s history, a normal cyclical response to corrupt rule and poor governance. The 1911 Chinese Revolution therefore marked a significant shift. Not only did the Manchu empire lose its legitimacy but the very social and political system was being questioned. In Webberian terms, the process of modernization ushered in China’s transformation from traditional rule to a rational legal one.1 For centuries, China’s Confucianist social and political culture underpinned the legitimacy of the dynasty’s divine right to rule. The Republican revolution therefore challenged these basic precepts and called for a new way to conceive of governance and the state. However China’s experiment in Constitutionalism and brief flirtation with liberalism is treated as an interlude to China’s path to communism. This paper seeks to examine the revolutionary movement led by Sun Yat Sen and nation building in the post dynastic period. In the quest to strengthen and modernize China, why did western models of republican constitutionalism fail to take hold in post revolutionary China? The enthusiasm and hope that marked the overthrow of the Regime soon descended into distrust and internal factionalism that weakened China.2 What factors explain this paradox; that is how could elements of the political community unite to deconstruct a political system but at the same time remain totally divided over how to reconstruct a new order? The success of the Republican revolution can only be measured to the extent that the Manchu rule was overthrown.3 The lack of enduring political institutions and the emergence of internal strife, demonstrate that the 1

See Max Weber. State and Economy: an outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed.Guenther Roch and Claus Wittich, (New York: Bedminister Press Inc, 1968) 2

Young, Earnest. “Yuan Shih-k’ai’s Rise to Presidency” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915, ed Mary Wright. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 419. 3

Mumford, Richard L. “Crane Brinton’s Pattern and Chinese Revolution of 1911” Journal of History of Ideas 42: 721

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Republican revolution was interrupted and unfinished.4 This paper argues that the very strategies that were key to overthrowing the Manchu rule, were however insufficient to building long lasting political institutions envisioned by revolutionaries. Efforts to secure victory, avoid conflict and maintain stability had the effect of moderating the post revolutionary political reconstruction. The first section provides a brief discussion of revolution theory to highlight several factors that contributed to the failure of the Republican Revolution, ideology and elite politics.

Part I: Revolutions – Brief Theoretical Discussion It would be more apt to describe the revolution as a political one versus social. The latter entails a transformation to the society’s class structure, which is accompanied by popular revolt and massive class upheaval.5 The former involves establishing a new political order and new ideology and program. 6 Therefore failure in this paper is conceived of not in terms of how the socioeconomic conditions of the peasant class were not redressed, but why the coalition of revolutionaries and gentry were unable to develop a constitutional-based system. This section presents various approaches to understanding the causes of revolution, which elucidates a key debate between structure and agency in revolutionary theory. The seminal work by Theda Skocpol in States and Social Revolution represents a dominant paradigm, which biased structural arguments, like class conflict as key causal factors.7 While structural theories can 4

Kubota, Bunji “Critical Rethining of Interpretations of the 1911 Revolution: a Comparison with Recent Controversies over the English and French Revolutions” in China’s Republican Revolution, ed Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 256 5

Skocpol, Theda. Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5. 6

Scalpino, Robert A. and George T. Yu. Modern China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order 1850-1920. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 260. 7

Goldstone, Jack. “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory” Annual Reviews Political Science 4: 140

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

explain the vulnerability of the Manchu dynasty, it however cannot provide sufficient explanation as to why the postrevolutionary order descended into internal strife. The crux of the paper is to therefore to not to examine how the revolution occurred, but why did Sun Yat Senâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s republican agenda collapse. To understand the reasons for the aborted republican revolution, a methodological approach that stresses agency over structure may be more useful. For Skocpol and other third generation revolutionary theorists, the collapse of the Manchu dynasty was inevitable and the 1911 Republican revolution was merely a trigger.8 In the face of international competition, foreign wars and the pressures of modernization, the dynastic regime was incapable of reforming and lacked sufficient resources to meet new challenges. 9 Crane Brinton highlights the importance of fiscal wellbeing. A decline in state finances weakens their efficiency and ability to institute reforms.10 They are thus forced to rely on foreign loans or overtax the population, both giving rise to discontent. The riots and provincial opposition to the nationalization of the Szechwan railway precisely highlight growing hostility towards the state and the inability for the imperial regime to modernize. Beijingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s use of foreign loans to purchase the railroads inflamed the anti-imperial sentiments. Efforts by the Qing government to initiate changes to the education system, military and self government were equally not welcomed. The heavy tax exaction for these reforms was the root of peasant uprisings.11 The cost of imperial wars, foreign concessions, internal rebellions and new modernizing projects forced the government to operate at a deficit from 8 9

Skocpol, 145

ibid, 144. Scalpino, Robert A. and George T. Yu. Modern China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order 1850-1920. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) 310. 10 11

Mumford, 708.

Young, Earnest. The Presidency of Yuan Shih-kâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ai. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) 18.

Evelyn Chan

1899 to 1912.12 Emphasis on economic instability, fiscal weakness, corruption and rising population, devastating war losses, highlights that the social economic conditions made it impossible for the Manchu dynasty to legitimately govern. The imperial regime was simply unable to adapt its agrarian structure to the pressures of modernization. Fourth generation revolutionary theorists however emphasize the role of actors and agents over structures in the revolutionary process.13 These authors stress the role of charismatic revolutionary leaders, intra-elite conflict, ideology, culture, collective memory and symbols. Regimes can protect their legitimacy so long as elites view their actions as effective and just and therefore collapse is not necessarily inevitable.14 To delegitimize the state, elites must convince the populace that they offer a more “just” solution and often present their program in more authentic terms.15 Ideology offers a semblance of virtue and new set of values upon which to base state institutions16. A charismatic leader is also crucial to define and promote this new ideology.17 A cult of the heroic revolutionary leader therefore galvanizes a popular following and facilitates collective action. According to Selbin, invoking collective symbols and a discourse that resonates with the population generates mass support.18 Therefore in contrast to a structural approach which posits revolution as inevitable given war losses, internal rebellion and fiscal crisis, an agency approach focuses on the decisive 12 13

Mumford, 708.

Goldstone, 140. Selbin, Eric. “Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In” in Theorizing Revolutions, ed John Foran (London: Routeledge, 1997), 123. 14

Goldstone, Jack A and Ted Robert Gurr. “Comparisons and Policy Implications” in Revolutions of the Late 20th Century ed. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr and Farrokh Moshiri. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 331. 15 16 17 18

Goldstone 142. Goldstone 154.

Scalpino and Yu, 313. Selbin, 125.

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

role of actors and ideology. If we use an agency approach to frame the 1911 Revolution especially that of leadership and ideology, reasons for its failure becomes more apparent. While Sun is admired as the Father of the Republic, this narrative however gives a false impression of the precarious political position of the Revolutionary Party.19 Sun and the Revolutionary Party held moral authority in the fight against the dynasty, for they were leading players in developing a political program that challenged the emperor’s traditional authority. However it is arguable that the provincial governors, gentry-led provincial assemblies and elements of the New Army held the real power and tipped the balance of power in favour of the revolution. Therefore according to Goldstone’s emphasis on elite leadership and the Selbin’s insistence on a heroic revolutionary figure, Sun Yat Sen and the Republican Revolutionary Party (Tong Meng Hui-TMH) fell short in playing this role. It was difficult to gauge who were the leading elites in the narrative of the revolution. This mutual dependency and relative balance of power between elites led to a watered down revolution, which made the post dynastic period more vulnerable to conflict. This moderated revolution and therefore failure to build enduring institutions can be attributed to the lack of a definitive ideological agenda. Moreover, given that elite politics was complicated by the myriad of players and the balance of power among them, there was no victorious elite to lead a new political program, which gave way to partisan politics and a continuation of the same problems that plagued the Qing dynasty. Part II: The Question of Ideology The role of ideology is an important factor, for revolutionaries provide a new vision to base governing institutions. For Sun and the Tong Meng Hui (TMH), national strength and modernization would be achieved through 19

Esherick, Joseph W. Founding a Republic, Electing a President: How Sun Yat Sen Became Guofu” in China’s Republican Revolution ed. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 129.

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a republican form of government, based on universal suffrage, representative government and separation of powers.20 According to Sun, one of the key obstacles to China’s modernization was the lack of civic duty among the populace, whose loyalty to the Emperor and to local clan ties prevented the national sacrifice and unity necessary to defend against imperial powers.21 The Three Principles of the People, nationalism, democracy and socialism became the ideological program of the revolutionary party. However it is questionable whether the party’s ideology had a definitive role in the 1911 victory, especially the question of liberalism, and the installation of democratic institutions. Schriffin notes that Sun’s leadership was marked by an “incredible capacity to change and adjust”, and his ideological program was subject to improvisation.22 Out of necessity, ideology was modified and moderated to secure a necessary anti-state coalition. In search of a new a rational-legal form of legitimacy, intellectuals and elites were mainly divided between a reformist/constitutionalist and revolutionary agenda. In an ideological sense, there was little difference between the two. Liang Qichao, an advocate of a constitutional monarchy was equally anti-traditionalist and supportive of self government and representative democracy. For Liang it was a matter of timing. Given that China lacked a democratic political tradition, rapid transformation would render the country vulnerable to instability and foreign encroachment. 23 Both Liang and Sun commanded equal support from the 20

Jan, George P. “The Doctrine of Nationalism and the Chinese Revolution” in Sun Yat Sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World, ed. Chu-yuan Cheng. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 150. 21 22

ibid, 146.

Schiffrin, Harold Z. “The Enigma of Sun Yat-Sen” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915 ed Mary Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 146 23

Gasster, Michael. “Reform and Revoltuion in China’s Political Modernization” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915 ed Mary Wright. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) 70.

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

overseas Chinese.24 Sun’s success therefore did not stem from a particular appeal of democratic liberalism, for Liang advocated the same ideals. The key difference was Sun’s anti-Manchu nationalism and his call for immediate action over the gradualism that Liang supported.25 In accordance with Schiffrin’s view that Sun tactically adjusted his program, the shift away from anti-imperialism to an antiManchu approach was critically important to separate the Revolutionary agenda from Liang’s as well as to pacify the threat of foreign intervention. 26 The political community and nation was constructed in an exclusive manner that gave rise to a racial consciousness. Injustice and poor governance by the Qing dynasty was translated to mean unfair subjugation of the Han majority by the Manchu minority. 27 Therefore a program of representative democracy and democratic institutions would protect the Han majority, who were perceived as the authentic members of the Chinese nation.28 This was in direct opposition to Liang’s position, who argued that the Manchu had long been assimilated by the Han and that one could not ethnically differentiate the two.29 Therefore the role of ideology, especially the meaning of liberalism, democracy and participation played less of a mobilizing role than an ethnically driven nationalism. AntiManchu sentiment was potent for Sun to mobilize support and discredit a constitutional monarchy.30 A second criticism concerning the role of the revolutionary ideology was that Sun’s Three Principles were too inclusive and encompassed all the political trends at the time.31 There was a lack of clarity as to how these 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Schiffrin 452. Jan, 153.

Gasster, 75. ibid, 76.

Jan, 146.

Gasster, 75. ibid

Schiffrin 463.

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elements, socialism, nationalism and democracy would work to achieve national unity and modernization. The primary aim of the early 1900s was mobilizing support, rather than full understanding and thorough articulation of these broad goals. As Gasster criticizes, they were activists first and theorists later.32 Firstly, the principle of democracy was undermined by Sun’s support of a military dictatorship and a period tutelage. For Sun, democratic governance would help make China an efficient and strong nation.33 Legitimacy based on the consent of the people, would hold the government accountable and would be more effective than coercion or tradition. 34Nevertheless, the ultimate goal was to build a strong and efficient government. For Sun, the precise problem in pre-revolutionary China was that there were too many liberties, comparing the Chinese to a sheet of loose sand.35 Therefore his aim was to protect the liberty of the state rather than that of the individual.36 The objective was to guard China’s freedom from foreign aggression, rather than the individual’s freedom from the state. It was this bias towards the state and collectivism that Sun justified a period of military dictatorship and a period of political tutelage.37 For Sun, the mass population, who were largely poor and uneducated, was unfit and unprepared to participate in a democratic polity. A period of political tutelage under a military dictatorship was necessary to teach and preach the enlightened and superior values of democracy. Unlike the revolutions in England and France, which defended the rights of the individual and sought to 32

Gasster, 74.

ibid, 179

ibid

Ling, Yu-long. (1989) “The doctrine of Democracy and Human Rights” in Sun Yat Sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World, ed Chu-yuan Cheng. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 185. 35

Domes, Jürgen. “China’sModernization and the Doctrine of Democracy” in Sun Yat Sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World ed. Chu-yuan Cheng.. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 208. 37

Ling 189.

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

limit the rule of the state, Sun’s revolutionary agenda was an elite-driven program, rooted in enhancing the power of the state. This lack of coherency in the Sun’s concept of democracy is understandable given the political position of the revolutionary party. Concepts of democracy and liberalism resonated more with Chinese intellectuals overseas, who were not the product of the traditional education system. Sun never gained full respect and trust of the classically-trained scholars in China.38 Furthermore the concept remained foreign and abstract to the mass population. Given the precarious position of Sun’s revolutionary party, whose support stemmed mainly from the Diaspora, Sun took a more Machiavellian approach to the implementation of the democracy principle, whereby democracy could only function properly in times of peace. Monarchial or autocratic rule was necessary to quash opposition.39 Therefore it is difficult to conclude that democracy as an element of Sun’s ideology was a driving and mobilizing force in the Revolution. Given that liberty was conceived of as a priority for the state rather than the individual and that the principles of representative government and popular sovereignty were subsumed by the necessity of military dictatorship, there was a lack of clarity concerning how national strength is a function of democratic governance. Similarly Sun’s principle of people’s livelihood was also marred by a lack of coherency. Sun feared that industrialization and capitalism would lead to gross inequality.40 Influenced by Henry George’s single land tax, Sun advocated that because the value of land would increase as a result of industrialization, the state should set a fixed price, so as to equalize gains from land rents. 38 39 40

Schiffrin, 443. Ling 190. ibid, 192.

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The state would collect the differential revenue.41 However Liang Qichao saw national wealth as a priority over distribution. He argued that Sun’s policies would deprive China of necessary capital and would undermine the incentive for agricultural growth.42 He was thus was an advocate of a free market system. Throughout the early 1900s there was constant evolution and modification of this principle.43 To address the issue of capital development Sun saw that foreign loans, as opposed to Liang’s protectionist policies, were necessary.44 Furthermore, there was a lack of clarity on the issue of equalization of land. Members of the revolutionary party interpreted Sun’s policy differently, which led to calls for nationalization of land along with state absorption of railways and mines.45 It is surprising that the Party would advocate for foreign loans, in light of the population’s repugnance toward concessions and foreign encroachment. As well it was precisely the Qing dynasty’s attempt to nationalize the railway that sparked the uprising in Szechwan. It was therefore not clear how Sun and the Republican Party would reconcile the goal of equality with the need for modernization and industrialization. In any case, this principle of livelihood along with democracy received greater attention and thought after the Revolution rather than serving as a mobilizing force. The revolution thus failed to implement enduring institutions and achieve the revolutionary party’s ideological goals, because their program was ideologically weak to begin with. The overthrow of the dynasty was not driven by the appeal and support for democracy or socialism. It was however driven by anti-Manchu sentiments, which was the only 41

Scalpino and Yu, 202.

Scalpino and Yu, 209.

Min, Tu-ki.“Economic Equality versus National Wealth: the Economic Prioritiesof Sun Yat-sen and Tan Sitong” in China’s Republican Revolution ed. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 198. 44 45

Min, 203.

Scalpino and Yu, 208.

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

consistent component of Sun’s program. While Sun and the revolutionary party commanded a moral authority to the movement, their ideological objectives were however only a guise for other political players who played a greater role in overthrowing the dynasty.46

Part III: The Consequences of Convenient Coalitions According to Goldstone’s analysis, elite polarization along with mass mobilization is key to revolutionary outcome.47 Elite defection alone would just merely lead to a coup d’état.48 Similarly, Scalpino and Yu highlight that coalition politics are endemic to revolutions.49 In order to forge an anti-state coalition, it will have to include remnants of the old regime. It is too idealistic to believe that success lies solely in the hands of “true believers”.50 The 1911 Revolution was particularly marked by its elite-driven quality, coalition building and the lack of involvement from below. Analysis of elite politics in 1911 indicates that there lacked a clear victorious elite faction and a clear division among elites, thus weakening the post-revolution coalition. Firstly Sun and the TMH were dependent on other actors to secure its legitimacy. There was thus a balance of power between revolutionaries who held moral authority in formulating an ideological program, and provincial leaders and old guards, like Yuan Shi-k’ai who held military power. Secondly revolutionaries were equally divided along centrist versus provincial lines. The debate between a unitary versus federal state equally divided revolutionaries, and remained an unresolved issue in the post dynastic period. Post revolutionary instability was inevitable as Beijing politics gave way to partisan politics and followed by the 46

Bergère, Marie-Claire.“The Role of the Bourgeoise” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915 ed Mary Wright. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 244. 47 48 49 50

Goldstone 150. ibid

Scalpino and Yu, 314. Goldstone 150.

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unresolved relationship between the centre and provinces led to another struggle. Sun’s decision to resign as president and cede powers to Yuan appears inconsistent to the dominant narrative of the revolution. While eliminating rivals of the old regime would allow a revolutionary party institute their political program, the TMH could not secure victory without causing instability and civil war.51 The fear that such internal strife would lead to foreign intervention and a loss of foreign loans forced revolutionaries to enter in alliance with Yuan.52 Most of the revolutionary party’s support resided in the south and they could not defeat Yuan and the Peiyang army who controlled the North. Similarly given the revolutionary fervor unleashed by the Wuchan uprising and tremendous unpopularity of the Qing dynasty, it was not to Yuan’s advantage to continue to defend the dynasty.53 Similarly, a mutually beneficial relationship also explains why provincial governments became republican converts. The legitimacy of Sun’s rival government in Nanking was dependent on the support of provincial bodies, whose declaration of independence from Beijing was the driving force of the revolution. Equally these provincial leaders increased their legitimacy by participating in the Republican resolution to the crisis. 54 This mutual dependency created problems in post revolutionary governance in two ways. Firstly at the national level, partisan politics dominated the political scene as revolutionaries sought to use accumulations of state power to check Yuan. Secondly, the instrumental ties that secured provincial bodies to the republican objective resulted in little political change and allowed the gentry to defend their privileges.55 51 52 53 54

Young, 1977, 73. Ibid, 88. Ibid, 73.

Fincher, John. “Provincialism and National Revolution” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915, ed Mary Wright. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 193. 55

Bergère, 259.

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

This reflected a key dilemma, for how could China enhance its national strength achieve national when Yuanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s authority was continually curbed.56 In reconstituting itself as an open party and amalgamating the TMH with other political parties, and forming the Guomindang (GMD), veteran revolutionaries sought to dominate the cabinet and the deliberative national assembly to deprive Yuan of real power.57 The provisional constitution placed greater authority in the cabinet-parliamentary system, which had the authority to elect the president, approve cabinet ministers and appointments.58 Indeed the GMD succeeded in securing a mandate with Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s first national elections in 1912. Efforts were undertaken by Song Jiaoren, a veteran party member of TMH, to use the GMD -dominated assembly to replace the provisional president.59Conflict therefore emerged between the visions of single-leader authority and collective governance. 60Yuan used foreign loans to bribe deputies in order to alter election results and secure appointments. The assassination of Song was a pivotal event that led to disintegration of the frail coalition. Attempts by Yuan to form a new umbrella party under his leadership, followed by bribery, coercion and the split of the GMD into splinter groups contributed to the demise of the Assembly as an effective and representative government.61 Equally in the name of stability and order, the TMH readily accepted the role of provincial assemblies as legitimate post revolutionary governments.62 As already mentioned above, provincial assemblies and governors played a leading role in the revolution and organized military governments whose authority was legitimized by 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

Young, 1977, 83. Ibid, 116.

Scalpino and Yu, 351. ibid. ibid.

Young 1977, 122. Fincher, 192.

Evelyn Chan

TMH’s recognition.63 The key turning point in the revolution was the conversion of military leaders to the side of the republicans, like the defection of 20th and 6th Regiments in the North, and securing the support of more well known leaders, like Li Yuan Huang despite their lack of revolutionary credentials.64 The leadership of radical elements of the New Army was crucial to the uprising, but their role was owed less to TMH than to their own making. Revolutionaries in the New Army, many of whom assumed governorship, were organized by the Literary Institute, who had a tenuous link to Sun Yat Sen and the TMH.65 Therefore because of the TMH’s relatively weak penetration into mainland China and weak position among the gentry, a coalition of convenience was necessary, but at the same time demonstrated the limits to revolutionary change. The discussion concerning the role of provincial bodies raises an important debate about how centre and provincial dynamics contributed to the revolution and post revolutionary instability. Coalition politics is difficult to discern given that reformists and revolutionaries were equally divided over the ways to achieve modernization. Song and Yuan were more centrist in their conception of national strength. However they differed in terms of whether the president or parliament should confer greater authority. Provincial governors, like Hu Han-min, who was also a veteran revolutionary were more provincialist and advocated that national strength is better achieved through provincial-led reforms.66 During the waning years of Qing rule, elites from below filled the power vacuum and claimed greater authority. With the Taiping rebellion, local government organized military forces and they developed associations and organs of self government and they became 63 64 65

ibid, 190.

Begère, 258.

Dutty, Vidya Prakash. (1968) “The First Week of Revoltuion: the Wuchang Upris sing” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915, ed Mary Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press), 416. 66

Young 1977, 94.

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

politically active in organizing boycotts against foreign businesses.67 Fincher and Young argue that the provincialism which emerged at the end of the Qing dynasty was not necessarily centrifugal but was a nationalist expression. The provinces and local regions were better equipped to help China modernize and defend against foreign encroachment. However the post revolutionary political system did not establish a clear relationship between Beijing and the provinces.68 The problem that emerged is that coalition politics never fully addressed the question of provincialism, which further complicated post-Manchu governance. Given the fiscal weakness of Beijing at the end of the Revolution, provincial autonomy meant less revenue to the centre, which jeopardized Yuan’s rule vis à vis hostile provinces and the antagonistic national assembly.69 In an effort to weaken provincial authority, Yuan separated provinces’ civil and military jurisdictions, appointed officials to the position of civil governor, instituted a national tax bureaucracy, and interfered with provincial budgets.70 By 1913, military governors, including Hu Han-min were removed from their posts, which descended into conflict with provincial forces and ultimately the Second Revolution.71 To characterize the post revolutionary instability as an issue of ideology ignores one of the underlying motivations for the Qing’s collapse: that is, the role of provincial governments in the polity. Therefore, failure of the Republican Revolution is attributed to the complicated dynamics of elite politics during the early 1900s. The process of modernization diversified the elite composition; the overseas Chinese (like Sun Yat Sen), commanders of the New Army, the gentry who held a number of professions disassociated from the 67 68 69 70 71

ibid, 94.

ibid, 115.

Young 1977, 102. ibid, 110. ibid, 129.

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dynasty, and members of the old guard were not united in distinctive coalition groups. In addition, provincial and local allegiances further divided elites along centrist and provincial lines. The mutual dependency and balance of power between these groups rendered it difficult for any one to emerge victorious and prevented the success of a particular program and a resolution to the federal question. The narrative of China’s Republican Revolution is rather a simple tale that romanticizes the role of Sun Yat Sen and the TMH. The pressures of modernization at the end of the Qing’s rule had changed the relationship between state and society profoundly, and had altered the composition of elites. Rather than a simple battle fought between revolutionaries and constitutionalists, the vast majority by end of the Wuchan uprising were revolutionaries. However being revolutionary was not necessarily the same as being a republican. The elites were all driven by the same end, that is, to modernize and preserve China’s sovereignty, although with tremendous differences concerning the means. The model proposed by Sun and TMH were a convenient alternative but failed to govern in a manner that would effectively manage the diverse and competing programs to modernization. This paper has argued that failure to build enduring political institutions stemmed from the ultimate compromise and mutual dependency that characterized the Revolution. Although such an alliance was sufficient to overthrow the dynasty, it proved to fall short of rebuilding a unified polity. Firstly ideology played a weak role in the revolutionary movement. It was modified and compromised to fit with the TMH’s political reality and therefore never served as a rallying call for the revolution. Secondly coalition politics was insufficient to unite political groups and gave way to partisan conflict. Furthermore coalition politics obscured a fundamental driving force of the revolution; that is centrist and provincial relations, which gave way to a new political struggle. In a general discussion concerning democracy in China, such western models did not fail because of the absence of a democratic culture, but that democratic institutions were never an end in it of itself.

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

They were not perceived as an adequate solution to the problems that plagued China in the early 20th century. Work Cited

Bergère, Marie-Claire. “The Role of the Bourgeoisie” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915, ed Mary Wright. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)

Domes, Jürgen. “China’s Modernization and the Doctrine of Democracy” in Sun Yat Sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World, ed. Chu-yuan Cheng. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989). Dutty, Vidya Prakash. “The First Week of Revolution: the Wuchang Uprising” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915, ed Mary Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

Esherick, Joseph W. “Founding a Republic, Electing a President: How Sun Yat Sen Became Guofu” in China’s Republican Revolution, ed. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994) Fincher, John. “Provincialism and National Revolution” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915, ed Mary Wright. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Gasster, Michael. “Reform and Revolution in China’s Political Modernization” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915. Ed Mary Wright. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)

Goldstone Jack A. “An Analytical Framework” in Revolutions of the Late 20th Century, ed. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr and Farrokh Moshiri . (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

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Goldstone, Jack A and Ted Robert Gurr. “Comparisons and Policy Implications” in Revolutions of the Late 20th Century, ed. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr and Farrokh Moshiri . (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

Goldstone, Jack A “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory” Annual Reviews Political Science 4 (2001): 139-187.

Hazama, Naoki. “Historical Evaluation of the Three Principles of the People, with Particular Reference to the Principle of Livelihood” in China’s Republican Revolution, ed. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994) Jan, George P. “The Doctrine of Nationalism and the Chinese Revolution” in Sun Yat Sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World, ed. Chu-yuan Cheng. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) Kubota, Bunji “Critical Rethining of Interpretations of the 1911 Revolution: a Comparison with Recent Controversies over the English and French Revolutions” in China’s Republican Revolution, ed. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994)

Ling, Yu-long. “The doctrine of Democracy and Human Rights” in Sun Yat Sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World, ed Chu-yuan Cheng. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989)

Min, Tu-ki. “Economic Equality versus National Wealth: the Economic Priorities of Sun Yat-sen and Tan Sitong” in China’s Republican Revolution, ed. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994) Mumford, Richard L. “Crane Brinton’s Pattern and Chinese

The Question of the Revolutionary Nature of the Chinese Republican Revolution

Revolution of 1911” Journal of History of Ideas 42 (1981)

Moshiri, Farrokh. “Revolutionary Conflict Theory” in Revolutions of the Late 20th Century, ed. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr and Farrokh Moshiri . (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993)

Scalpino, Robert A. and George T. Yu. Modern China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order 1850-1920. (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985) Selbin, Eric. “Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In” in Theorizing Revolutions, ed John Foran (London: Routeledge, 1997)

Schiffrin, Harold Z. “The Enigma of Sun Yat-Sen” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915, ed Mary Wright. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) Weber, Max State and Economy: an outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roch and Claus Wittich, (New York: Bedminister Press Inc, 1968)

Young, Earnest.“Yuan Shih-k’ai’s Rise to Presidency” in China in Revolution: First Phase 1900-1915., ed Mary Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

Young, Earnest. The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977)

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WHY CHINA REJECTED A SECOND REVOLUTION IN 1919

ABSTRACT This paper examines the background of the May Fourth Movement in 1919 as a way to answer the question about why the massive social mobilization did not create another revolution. Through the historical analysis of Shanghai-published newspaper articles from the mid-summer of 1919, it can be realized that the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the Republican Revolution in 1911 did not resolve the unsettled social and political situations within China at least until 1919. In particular, various articles show that international issues dealing with Shandong province after the First World War fueled the domestic chaos and contributed to launching and enhancing Chinese nationalist and communist movements in a more systematic way. Apparently, during the May Fourth period, there were some social atmospheres which might have been able to create another revolution since 1911. Some people might see it as the origin of the foundation of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest communist country or the Chinese Communist Revolution. However, when looking at other newspaper articles from the same period, there were some limited points that prevented another revolution from breaking out even though similar conditions for a revolution appeared in comparison with the later Qing period. This article will discuss overarching themes of the origin of the Chinese Communist Revolution and will try to answer why another revolution did not take place during and after the May Fourth Movement while looking into the background of the massive social movement in 1919 through related newspaper articles.

TAE YEON EOM

Why China Rejected a Second Revolution in 1919

The end of World War I in 1918 submerged China, along with many other countries, into a tumultuous period historically and politically. Although by 1911, China’s imperial supremacy had ended and its republican era had begun, chaos reigned. Moreover, the influence of the great foreign powers that the Qing court had invited to the mainland remained in China. In fact, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 had not actually changed China—it failed to establish a republic representing the whole of China.

Between 1915 and 1920, the New Culture Movement and the May Fourth Movement swept Chinese society. According to authors Bianco and Lieberthal, events surrounding these movements no doubt led to the creation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Chinese nationalist party Guomindang (GMD), and ultimately, the world’s largest communist country ‘The People’s Republic of China.’ However, no significant or revolutionary social change followed these events—unsettled domestic situations became even worse. Why did such massive mobilization not lead to a revolution? After witnessing the limits or failure of the 1911 Revolution, many Chinese intellectuals might have longed for another revolution. The major leaders of the 1911 Revolution were living, and the social atmosphere and conditions for revolution resembled those of the later Qing dynasty: an ineffective government and foreign powers exploiting the Chinese people for profits. An examination of selected newspaper articles from 1919 will provide answers.

Shanghai’s weekly newspaper, Millards Review of the Far East, published articles in mid-August 1919 on the New Culture and May Fourth movements. The articles published at the time illustrate indirectly why another Chinese revolution did not arise from these movements. With the related articles, this essay discusses why the 1919 social movements failed to create another revolution. It also uses selected newspaper articles to point to three major roots of the Chinese Communist Revolution: 1) Chinese nationalism associated with Bolshevik influences; 2) a financially and politically crippled Chinese bureaucracy; and 3) the exploitation of capitalists.

Before diving into the subject, one item of interest

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requires noting. The term May Fourth originally refers to the 1919 student protest that took place on that date in Beijing. However, Bianco seems to talk of the New Culture and May Fourth movements together, under the name May Fourth.1 He states that the May Fourth Movement provided students with intellectual tools to legitimate their politics: students not only pressed for a return to politics but also called for a politics that was for the masses. Furthermore, Elleman elaborates on Bianco’s view in which he calls the May Fourth Movement, in its narrowest sense, a demonstration staged in Beijing to protest the decision of the Paris Peace Conference that transferred Germany’s rights in Shandong province to Japan. In its broadest meaning, Bianco says that the Chinese response represents a movement of cultural renewal and resolution.2 As Lieberthal describes, on the other hand, the term has come to encapsulate other different and interconnected processes: the New Culture movement, which set the stage for the protest, including New Youth calling for an intellectual-cultural upheaval; the May Fourth protest itself, and the strikes and boycotts it inspired; and the spread of the New Culture movement across China after the spring of 1919.3 This implies that the May Fourth came about because of the efforts of New Culture proponents. This essay takes Lieberthal’s view. First, diving into the subject and selected newspaper articles, Jernigan expresses great disappointment and anger with America’s betrayal against Japan over Shandong province.4 According to Elleman, during the early period of World War I, American President Woodrow Wilson pushed 1

Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971), 30-33. 2

Bruce A.Elleman, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 138. 3

Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China : From Revolution through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 28-30. 4

T. R. Jernigan, “President Wilson and Shantung – Observations,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 420-421.

Why China Rejected a Second Revolution in 1919

self-determinism for the U.S.5 His philosophy was based on viewing the settlement of any question—of territory, sovereignty, economy, or politics—upon the free agreement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of national interest of any other nation or people desiring a different settlement. However, Jernigan argues that after the war, in early 1919, Wilson decided to allow Japan Germany’s rights in Shandong province, even though China had joined the Allies and contributed to their victory in World War I.

After Japan’s victories over the Qing and Russia, many Chinese students traveled to Japan, Europe, and America to study Western civilizations as a political or economic model. By 1919, however, it became clear that they had been used by Japan and betrayed by America, leaving the Chinese only once choice—to trust none other than themselves. In Kwang’s related article, it is also often mentioned that since Japan’s promise to return Shandong was published several days after the fourth of May in 1919, most Chinese assumed that Japan had already been granted and received the right to keep this concession forever.6 Furthermore, they doubted that Japan would keep its promise to return the province; they had already seen the Japanese deceive the Koreans by stating that “Japan promised the world that she would return Korea to the Koreans after she had ‘established order’ there.”7 The public’s general perception that Wilson had betrayed China opened the door to Bolshevik influence. In the summer of 1919, the Soviet government restored to the Chinese people, without expecting any compensation, all concessions of natural resources seized by the Tsarist government and Russian capitalists.8 Wilson’s betrayal 5

Bruce A.Elleman, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 73-74. 6

H. K. Kwong, “The Shantung Question,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919) 438 & 440. 7 8

ibid., 438.

Bruce A.Elleman, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002) 156-157.

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led to a Chinese reaction against Western democracy and capitalism—a reaction that ultimately led to closer intellectual and diplomatic ties with Soviet Russia. As a result of the Shandong resolution, such intellectual ties soon formed between Chinese radicals and the Bolshevik Party.9 After all, the Chinese rejected the American model because they believed that Soviet Russia would treat China fairly. This perception eventually led to China’s decision to turn to the Soviet Union as the model for twentiethcentury modernization and development. In other words, the tremendous post-Versailles wave of nationalism, plus the general disillusionment with Woodrow Wilson’s failed principles, sent many Chinese students and intellectuals in search of an alternative to Western liberalism and capitalism. Now it becomes clear when tracing the prevailing social atmosphere to the origins of Chinese communism and of the Chinese communist country. Second, Tong points out China’s serious financial crisis in the newspaper. Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911, land and tax reforms had failed because the Beijing government did not manage the revolutionary changes well as a control tower. Distrust of revolutionary reforms became prevalent and fueled the inclination to blame the Beijing government for the financial crisis. Furthermore, nationwide massive social movements in 1919 made it more difficult for the Chinese government to collect taxes. In particular, Tong points out that tax revenues from the countryside decreased.10 Throughout the country, heavy reparations to the great powers in the later Qing Dynasty and many upheavals after the Chinese Revolution of 1911 necessitated more government expenditures. Financial deficits commonly plagued previous Chinese governments, but not as seriously as in 1919.11 Tong’s article shows a constant increase in monthly government expenditures from $5 million in 1913 to $12 million in 1919. The monthly budget in 1919 9

ibid., 135-140.

Hollington K. Tong, “China’s Serious Financial Crisis,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919) 430. 11

ibid., 427.

Why China Rejected a Second Revolution in 1919

expected to receive $4.2 million and spend $12 million; the majority of monthly tax revenues came from salt.12 The government spent the majority of tax revenues on the army, navy, and administration: $3.1 million on administrative expenditures, $5.7 million on ordinary military expenditures, and $3 million on extraordinary military expenditures.13

Although the war had ended, redeeming military loans and repairing the military necessitated still more spending. However, it could also have meant that the government, which was not at the centre of Chinese politics, invested in the military to maintain power. To cover the astronomical deficit from the unbalanced budget, the government decided to try getting more loans from foreign countries instead of military or tax revenue reforms because it was not easy to find sufficient funds from Chinese banks; at the same time, foreign investors acquired numerous concessions from the Chinese government. Further foreign investment dried up, however, as the unstable situation in China prevailed. In the end, the Chinese government decided to borrow a small amount of short-term capital from Chinese banks as a second option, and most of this went toward soldier’s wages—the Chinese military government in Beijing may have feared desertion or dissatisfaction of soldiers. Although Tong seems to understand the government’s difficulty in saving the chaotic situation and the government’s dilemma between the influx of foreign capital and the protection of domestic industries, he concludes that the ineffective Beijing government had little interest in the future of the country.14 Even worse, their process of giving concessions and leasing territories had not followed legal procedures; the officials had ignored the Chinese parliament in the process. Specifically, Tong criticizes Japan for inciting Chinese officials to political injustice and violating Chinese 12 13

ibid., 429-430.

Hollington K. Tong, “China’s Serious Financial Crisis,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919) 430-432. 14

Hollington K. Tong, “China’s Serious Financial Crisis,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919) 429 & 432.

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sovereignty. This corresponds to what Lieberthal points out that eliminating the traditional deficit, which prevailed in China well into the early twentieth century, was one of the reasons for the Chinese Communist Revolution.15 Third, weekly newspaper articles show that the roots of the Chinese Revolution come from the exploitation of capitalism and difficult economic situations inside and outside China. Many advertisements depict American banks and consumer industries such as General Electric (GE) and natural resource development companies. They include news coverage about railways built by foreign capital and that those railways might fuel the great powers’ exploitation of inland resources. The editorials also mention provincial governments warning residents about selling grain to Japanese.16 In other words, a close association appears with the influx of foreign capital and the exploitation of natural resources.

Editorials quote a banker named Vanderlip and indirectly reveal China’s desperate post-war situation. Vanderlip states that every industry and society in Europe, as well as the entire world, is paralyzed. Beyond the huge unemployed population and the declined value of each country’s currency, lack of food created famine in central Europe and eastern Germany, as well as in China. Vanderlip argues that England’s position as the most industrialized country in the world was due to the British government’s low-wage policy. He concludes with a warning: those surviving serious economic disorder, such as workers and peasants, could expect more exploitation from capitalism and would suffer the greatest deprivation.17 Thus, selected articles reveal more roots of the Chinese Communist Revolution in terms of the exploitation of capitalism. 15

Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China : From Revolution through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 12-14. 16

“Editorial Paragraphs,” Editorial. Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 418-419. 17 “Editorial Paragraphs,” Editorial. Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 419-420.

Why China Rejected a Second Revolution in 1919

Why then, did another revolution not break out despite the above-mentioned reasons for Chinese Communist Revolution? The New Culture and May Fourth movements resulted in massive social movements, but not in revolution. The selected articles from Millards Review also reveal some limits of the massive social movements in 1919.

During the 1919 nationalist movements, some intellectuals suggested passive resistance and strategy by the Chinese against Japanese provocation. In Chinese intellectuals’ terms, diplomatic efforts and cooperation with Japan would provide sound policy. In addition, when some Chinese intellectuals disliked America and capitalism—as did the founders of the CCP in Shanghai in 1921, others appreciated the U.S. for raising the status of diplomacy between the two countries because they thought that China could save face in world politics after losing it later in the Qing dynasty.18 Furthermore, some Chinese welcomed the American judiciary—extraterritoriality seemed to remain in China, at least until 1919.19 Moreover, when some railed against Wilson’s betrayal, others blamed the Japanese more than the American president for making him take the wrong course of action in Paris; they believed that he followed treaties made between the Chinese government and the Japanese government in 1915 and 1918.20 This pro-American sensibility was prevailed a little bit because a large part of the Shanghai market already seemed to be consumed by American capitalism, as witnessed in ads for GE, Ford, and American banks. Ultimately, the pro-American sensibility may have helped repress a revolution after the nationalistic movements of 1919. The division of Chinese intellectuals and regions, furthermore, discouraged the massive social movements of 1919. In the weekly newspaper, Ku disagrees with Hu Shi’s cultural movements. Comparing them to Japanese students 18

T. R. Jernigan, “President Wilson and Shantung – Observations,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919) 425-426. 19

“The United States Court for China,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919) 456. 20

T. R. Jernigan, “President Wilson and Shantung – Observations,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 422.

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who studied abroad, Ku blames Chinese intellectuals and students, including Hu Shi, for abandoning Chinese cultural heritage and for advancing their own social status over national interests.21 Additionally, the paper’s editorials refer to the arrest and oppression of revolutionary intellectuals by the authoritarian intellectuals of the Beijing government on charges of antigovernment activity.22 Moreover, the ineffective Beijing government did not represent China on a whole; strong provincial governments held sway. Separately and independently, several provincial governments arrested and oppressed many people during the May Fourth Movement. Although Millards Review seems to regard the Guangdong government as constitutional and legitimate, it expresses hope for a nationwide Constitutional parliament and government.23 Interestingly, the Shanghai-published newspaper deals with issues from other provinces in the similar form of the international news section—treating other regions of China as they would other countries. In conclusion, from the selected newspaper articles readers can see some major origins of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Simultaneously, the limits of the massive social movements in 1919, such as the dominant American capitalist, pro-American sensibility among some Chinese intellectuals seeking a comfortable life than national salvation, regionalism, and so on, can be found in discussing why another revolution did not take place following the movements, despite good conditions. As discussed above, the May Fourth Movement turned many Chinese intellectuals away from Western democracy and capitalism. In the wake of the Paris Peace Conference, Chinese intellectuals became more receptive to Bolshevik political, economic, and social reforms. Shanghai’s student-led demonstrations and strikes in response to an incompetent Beijing government and exploitation by foreign capitalist, convinced many 21

Hung-ming Ku, “Returned Student and the Literary Revolution - Literacy and Education,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 433-434. 22

“Editorial Paragraphs,” Editorial. Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 417-418. 23

T. R. Jernigan, “President Wilson and Shantung – Observations,” Millards Review of the Far East [Shanghai], 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 427.

Why China Rejected a Second Revolution in 1919

Chinese intellectuals that alliance with the masses was the only road to revolution and regeneration. Those origins ultimately overwhelmed the limits of the social movements in 1919—it did not occur immediately in 1919, though—and created a Chinese communist revolution later. Although Bianco and Lieberthal pay attention to internal causes of the Chinese Revolution, we can summarize that the 1911 Revolution had failed, and limitations preventing another revolution in 1919 set the stage for the foundation and growth of the CCP. Bianco states that Marxism associated with nationalism trampled one of the most liberal social movements in 1919, and created a Chinese communist revolution later.24 In fact, the CCP and GMD arose after 1919, despite the movements’ limitations. Lieberthal also evaluates the movements of 1919 as the beginning of mass politics, appearing as they did for the first time in Chinese politics.25 Based on the historical analysis of the selected newspaper articles in addition to Bianco and Lieberthal’s saying, it becomes more obvious that the frustration and desperation, which some May Fourth intellectuals felt from the abovementioned limitations, represent a major reason why they could not but turn to the radical cause of Communism (after 1919) when trying to save China as a nation in the modern world. They, however, ultimately missed a great opportunity to create a revolution to transform the entire Chinese society into a more unified and better organized society during and after the May Fourth, and also failed to avoid much more chaotic situations such as the Japanese invasion and brutal civil wars between the CCP and GMD. Works Cited Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 19151949. Stanford, (Calif.: Stanford University Press), 1971. 24

Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971) 49-51. 25

Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China : From Revolution through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004) 30.

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“Editorial Paragraphs.” Editorial. Millards Review of the Far East 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 417-420.

Elleman, Bruce A. Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question. Armonk, (NewYork: M. E. Sharpe, 2002). Jernigan, T. R.“President Wilson and Shantung Observations.” Millards Review of the Far East 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 420-427. Ku, Hung-ming. “Returned Student and the Literary Revolution - Literacy and Education.” Millards Review of the Far East 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 432-438.

Kwong, H. K. “The Shantung Question.” Millards Review of the Far East 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 438-444. Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China : From Revolution through Reform. 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton), 2004. “The United States Court for China.” Millards Review of the Far East 16 August – 23 August, (1919), 456.

Tong, Hollington K. “China’s Serious Financial Crisis.” Millards Review of the Far East 16 August – 23 August, (1919) 420-432.

ON CULTURE YINSEY WANG

is currently a third year undergraduate enrolled in East Asian Studies and Economics. She enjoys photography, art, reading, travelling and conversing on obscure and random topics. She practically lives at Robarts Library... itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s her second home!

ATHENA LAM

is a June 2009 survivor of the East Asian Studies specialist programme at University of Toronto. Unfortunately, she discovered Hong Kong film along the way and is considering higher academic ordeals in the near future.

DONG YUE SU

is a fourth year undergraduate student studying visual art, art history and psychology. I love painting and photography, and then I use my knowledge of art history to articulate my ideas in my works, so as to touch the psychology of viewers.

Yinsey Wang

MILITARY SERVITUDE, VIOLENCE AND THE COLONIAL SUBJECT: ON ORPHAN OF ASIA AND OTHER TAIWANESE WORKS

ABSTRACT This essay works to shed light on issues surrounding military service, violence and the colonial subject in relation to literature written in Taiwan during Japanese imperial rule. In particular, it aims to analyze Wu Zhouliu’s “Orphan of Asia,” in terms of the book’s connotations relevant to the colonial subject experience under Japanese control. I examine the significance of military involvement in selected works in Taiwanese colonial subject literature during the 1930s-50s.

YINSEY WANG

Military Servitude, Violence and the Colonial Subject

In this essay I wish to examine the significance of military involvement as a subject of colonial Taiwanese literature during the 1930s-50s. Violence and military servitude are consistent themes of Taiwanese colonial literature. Whereas these themes have been glorified by the “collaborationist”-leaning or komin writers, what makes Wu Zhuoliu’s “Orphan of Asia,” so unique is that the author was writing to dispute the value of serving Japanese military interests at a similar time as the komin writers, writing in secret and in “full risk of danger”.1 For these authors, military service and death, the act of shedding blood defined identity because of the way their identity defined their way of life. Being Japanese and/or Taiwanese was a serious concern among the Taiwanese who had lived under the rule of the Japanese. For them it must have been a sincere reflection of the ethnic and nationalistic hierarchy so strictly defined in the empire. Whereas many komin writers questioned and challenged whether it was truly possible to become Japanese, they did not challenge the conception of a binary of identity, neither did they question the legitimacy of imperialism itself. On the other hand, Hu Taiming, Wu’s protagonist, breaks free from the traps of colonial manipulation and instead he identifies the nakedness of the cruelty of the Japanese regime. In doing so, through “Orphan of Asia,” Wu challenges the Japanese empire’s right to rule over the “barbaric” Taiwanese when in actuality the empire is an irresponsible parent unworthy of its official position unlike many protagonists of the komin writers’. Much of the work of the komin writers have been dismissed by way of an anachronistic application of nationalist leanings in present day Taiwan. Wu’s novel actually challenges this perception and sheds light on the complexities of Japanese imperialism, especially in context of being caught between the two or even three identities of Japanese, Chinese and Taiwanese. Such a struggle becomes a matter of life and 1

Ching, Leo T.S., “Becoming ‘Japanese: The Politics of Identity Formation,’” University of California Press, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: California, 2001), 178.

Yinsey Wang

death itself, as Wu actually questions the value of living as either or as any of these identities. Komin works have value in how they shed light on the psychological condition and the mental dispositions that many Taiwanese faced when forced to define their identity which to the Japanese, was so inextricably linked their supposed allegiance to the regime. Thus works often involved death in a way that it was intertwined to the ideological implications of empire. To be Japanese was to support the regime and to rid oneself of the tainted Taiwanese identity perceived so strongly at the time. Although the komin writers’ works may appear trapped in this framework, it does not mean they do not hold any less value in exposing the condition (especially that of cultural and psychological) and the circumstances that Taiwanese faced under the rule of the Japanese. Wu’s work may be a departure from the more commonplace connotations of accepting Japanese authority, but his narrative clearly evokes many komin ideologies in many of Taiming’s friends and family members. Taiming was denied his subjectivity in being Taiwanese by birth despite his attempts to become Japanese. After confronting the true nature of the Japanese empire, he realizes that the discourse produced by the parent in disciplining its child is parasitical and exploitative, and even through sacrifice, there will never be a closure of difference between the colonizer and the colonized. It is not a matter of one identity or another, of being nationalistic or a traitorous lapdog of the Japanese imperium, but rather these works induce a fluid, violent and manipulative web of relations between that of a political authority over an oppressed and exploited society. Due to the colonial difference between protagonist and colonizer, many characters from colonial subject literary works take extreme means to gain a Japanese identity. This is a consistent theme in many Taiwanese writers’ works during the period, especially those of the komin writers, writers often considered as accommodating to or welcoming of Japanese imperialism. The displacement of the protagonist, even within the “traditional” Taiwanese

Military Servitude, Violence and the Colonial Subject

culture is prevalent in these works. There is a presumption that other Asian cultures are inferior to Japanese culture. During this time, komin writers generally accepted the notion that becoming Japanese was ideal in order to receive adequate respect and dignity as a subject of the empire.2 In the context of the inclusion of Japanese colonial subjects in military service during the 1940s, Zhou Jinpo’s work “Volunteer Soldier,”3 emphasizes Zhang Minggui’s desperate desire to become Japanese. For example, he finds it difficult to communicate with his own parents on the basis that they are “too Taiwanese,” as if it is a trait to be taken in moderation or ideally discouraged. His disregard for the Taiwanese culture is propelled by the distinction that he creates between the hierarchical nature of ethnicity in the context of Japanese rule: “I am fully aware that we have to become Japanese. But I don’t want to be like him – to become simply a horse that pulls the carriage… my life would be totally meaningless if I did not become Japanese”.4 This statement is implicit of a binary and a difference between the colonizer and the colonized, as well as the desire to close off that distance so that he can be rewarded with the right to a dignity. The need of becoming Japanese to him is a given, as his life would be “meaningless”5 if he were unable to attain this ideal. The meaninglessness of his life if he stays unassimilated reprioritizes death. Minghui therefore concludes that risking one’s life serves as a way of ridding oneself from the negatively perceived Taiwanese culture. When his brother-in-law, Gao, enlists for the Japanese army with an application written in his own blood, Minggui shows admiration for him by stating “Jinliu is the kind of person who will truly move Taiwan forward”.6 This story 2

Ching, 177.

ibid., 202.

Kleeman, Faye, “Imperial Subject Literature and Its Discontents,” Under an Imperial Sun: Japanese Colonial Literature of Taiwan and the South. (Honolulu, HI: U of Hawai’I P, 2003), 202-214. 5 6

ibid., 202. ibid., 202.

Yinsey Wang

emphasizes the distance between Taiwanese and Japanese identities. Minghui wishes to close this gap definitively, by becoming Japanese by joining the military and shedding blood for the empire. The act of dying is conceptualized as a way to account for living as an “other” of the Japanese, and reaffirming one’s identity in an action of the most extreme sort, dying as a Japanese subject. To sacrifice one’s life for the empire is to acknowledge the Japanese empire’s legitimacy, which is the last step to becoming truly Japanese. Military service, as Kleeman notes, became something that was seen as vital in the 1940s as a “failure to “volunteer” meant automatic expulsion from school and assignment to forced labor in factories supporting the war effort”.7 Such policies of the Japanese made it extremely difficult to choose whether to participate in the military campaigns of the Japanese or to keep away from the bloodiness and brutality of war but suffer social penalization. Interestingly, to those of the Taiwanese population that were eager to become Japanese, “service in the Japanese military was an honor shared with the Japanese native population”.8 The author Zhou Jinpo even recorded in his diary that “I have never felt so self-confident and joyful as today”.9 He saw it as an opportunity where “transcending the dynamic of unequal power – for becoming one of the masters,” was more possible than ever before and in his own words, “when they bleed can they speak out. Fulfill your obligations, then you can make your demands”. 10 A similar predicament is seen in the work of Chen Huoqian’s “Michi,” where the protagonist Seiman is eager to assimilate a Japanese identity. Well learned in Japanese poetry, one day when he meets a Japanese stranger in a bar. Eager to convince this stranger that he is cultured and adequately versed in Japanese classics, he quotes from Bashō, a 7 8 9

ibid., 204. ibid., 204. ibid., 204.

ibid., 204-5.

Military Servitude, Violence and the Colonial Subject

famous poet from the Tokugawa period. However, much to his disappointment, the Japanese he is conversing with is ignorant of Bashō’s work, and instead lectures Seiman on “the essence of being Japanese,” emphasizing that ‘the Japanese spirit is to die… to die for one’s motherland happily”.11 This destroys the protagonist’s preconceived notions of what it truly means to be Japanese. It is not by simply a case of learning about or mastering its culture, as admiration alone is not sufficient to be a true member of the Japanese empire. He realizes the process of true assimilation is violent but in order to complete this rite of passage, or “circumvent the unbridgeable gorge of ethnicity,”12 he must enlist in the Japanese army. The action of shedding blood is perceived as a way to redeem oneself for having different blood. 13 In comparison to Wu’s protagonist Hu Taiming in “Orphan of Asia,” Seiman from “Michi,” is the type of character that he despises and pities. The story begins with Taiming’s childhood memories when the island was only recently annexed by the Japanese Empire. Hu Taming goes through the Japanese education system and becomes a teacher, feeling empowered by his schooling and status. However he begins to feel somewhat alienated from the local Taiwanese. Unfortunately, his attempts to assimilate with the Japanese colonialists are coldly received, leading him to detest the lack of respect that he receives despite delivering results he deems worthy of the colonizers’ praises, such as improving the grades of the students attending the school he teaches. When he is rejected by his Japanese love interest for being Taiwanese, his tormenting heartbreak forces him to challenge the idea that the Japanese colonizers are superior people. His opinion of the Japanese assimilationist tendencies that arise from many of his Taiwanese friends and family begin to disgust him, pushing him into an unstable mental state. The way that his father supports the military expansion of Japan in South East Asia infuriates the 11 12 13

ibid., 204-5. ibid., 220.

ibid., 220.

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protagonist Taiming, when he hears news of the death of his step brother who had participated in the fighting. At this climatic point of the story, his step brother’s death turns Taiming insane. Prior to his insanity, his nephew Daxiong was also impassioned to join, arguing that “the time had come… for the Taiwanese to endure great tribulations in order to prove that they could become real Japanese”.14 Such a statement reveals the full extent of their orphanage, complemented by the death of his step brother Zhinan whose death ultimately awakens Taiming to the contradictions and hypocrisy that is so deeply rooted in Japanese imperialism, especially regarding the proposed notion of ‘equalization’ of the colonizer and the colonial subject.

As Kleeman points out, the view expressed by protagonists seen in Zhou’s and Chen’s work is often critiqued in a nativist framework as anti-Taiwanese, and anti-nationalistic. However, in the context of the time such works were written, we can see that the “self conscious manipulation of cultural difference and ambiguity”15 in the construction of a Japanese identity through such a desperate means as shedding one’s blood for the empire, should not be simply dismissed as traitorous or collaborationist. We must be aware of a diversity of discourses in Taiwanese literature, and the political and social circumstances in which these works were written to maintain a critical distance. To the more resistant writers, such works would be seen as collaborationist or submissive. However, what we can learn from Wu is that the need to be Japanese was a result of ideologies put in place to expel notions of equality between Japanese, Taiwanese and Chinese identities among the Taiwanese populace. Taiwanese voluntary participation in the military ambitions of the Japanese empire, as Wu implies through his powerful narrative, was through manipulation of binaries, where the backward Taiwanese 14

Wu, Zhuoliu., “Orphan of Asia,” Modern Chinese Literature From Taiwan. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 238. 15

Kleeman, 255.

Military Servitude, Violence and the Colonial Subject

were considered as inferior to the forward looking, highly developed Japanese. This is highlighted by the chapter when Taiming realizes that Zhinan is dead as a result of military service. Taiming declines into madness, unable to contain his emotions and revokes his commitment to political neutrality. This symbolizes the traumatic condition of the colonial subject and can be equated with the “compliant victim”16 complex that Kleeman proposes in her analysis of komin writers’ works. The “compliant victim,” complex embodies the Taiwanese helplessness against the regime due to the power structures and ideological frameworks put in place by the Japanese regime. As Taiming witnesses what he sees as the pitiful compliance of Taiwanese subjects, he begins to realize that they are simply expendables, sucked into the grand master plan of the adoptive parent, Japan. This parent is obviously concerned about its own people and interests rather than that of its adopted child, as expressed by Taiming’s feelings of frustration: “the irresponsibility, the outrageousness of it all, was too much to bear”.17 The “irresponsibility” of the parent for its adopted child is therefore evident to Taiming and he explodes in a rebellious monologue. The outrage at the immoral military use of Taiwanese soldiers by the Japanese, is then regurgitated into a message of “where is the hammer to beat violence?” 18 Taiming’s final resolution is violence, a “hammer,”19 to beat back the coercion of the Taiwanese by the Japanese and to reclaim their homeland. At the end of the book, he chants and even screams out anti-imperialist messages such as “[t] he head of the family is the big brother, the big brother is the head of the thieves, people are skinned, trees are skinned, mountains are skinned,” and “Eee, Yaa, Oii! Bandits, in broad daylight! Nah, Aii, Roh!!” Burdened with the understanding that Japanese colonialism had completely deprived his 16 17 18 19

ibid., 255. Wu, 244.

ibid.. 244. ibid., 244.

Yinsey Wang

homeland of its resources, dignity and the people of their livelihoods, he needed to share his sorrow. The land and people were being pillaged and it was obvious, but to Taiming, the people were blind to this. Whilst he chants, onlookers’ hearts are filled with emotion as they picture the Taiwanese landscapes as stark naked and images of people being skinned alive despite being under the so-called “protection” of “big brother” Japan. Taiming’s exclamations echo the voice of a people who had long been deprived of a means to demand justice for the suffering that they have been subjected to by the mental and physical violence of Japanese imxperialism. Here, Wu reveals his masterful critique of colonial discourse and the ideas propelled by the imperialist propaganda. Although the people still call Taiming “mad,”20 when he attempts to preach a message of resistance against the Japanese, Taiming identifies that what was fed to the Taiwanese populace, even by schooling institutions such as universities that claimed to produce objective knowledge, were simply products of what Taiming sees as the “rationalizations and the psychological weaponry for colonial exploitation”.21 The psychological manipulation that has tamed the Taiwanese people has brought them into a state of submission to the Japanese empire. Wu alludes to the manipulation of knowledge to further exploitation, as Taiming comes to the realization that the education provided by the Japanese that claimed to be a “sanctuary of learning,” was truly a “bestial predator” whose “supreme achievement was to be a stooge for colonial policy”.22 Overall, the tension between life and death, colonizer and colonized, compliance and resistance are binaries summoned to emphasize Wu’s views on the injustices of colonialism. The incompatibility of the colonial subject and his colonizers are shown by Taiming’s decline into insanity, which ironically can be interpreted as a case of 20 21 22

ibid., 244. ibid., 232. ibid., 232.

Military Servitude, Violence and the Colonial Subject

the “Emperor’s new clothes,” paradigm where only he can see what is the truth. Taiwan lies naked and plundered by Japanese imperialism although crowds glorify their colonial overlord’s achievements and presence. Only Taiming, who can see through the deceptive cloak clearly, identifies the naked truth that is inherent in Japanese imperialism. Yet he is perceived as insane according to all that see his actions as deviating from the norm: “talk spread quickly that Taiming had gone mad, and there were quite a few facts to corroborate that conclusion.”23 However it is actually those that conform who have all turned to madness in complying with their irresponsible parent. Taiming was confused, between reality and fiction. His descent to madness is a result of his lifelong denial of the cruelty that is so closely associated with the nature of imperialism. For Taiming, basic justice has been substituted by compliance towards the tyrannical, falsely perceived parent: “punishment for murder is death, But he goes in killing so many”. Thus, Taiming ironically is the only purveyor of reality although he is interpreted as “mad”.24 Contrary to many komin works which appear to acknowledge the ideal and almost unreachable Japanese identity, Taiming disputes the legitimacy of imperialism and actually questions the value and meaning of “living” as a Japanese subject in a way that advocates struggle rather than submission. Military service is an important theme in these works because it brings into the question of a larger context of life, the worth of life itself and the reasons for living. To more compliant writers, the ideal life is that of a Japanese, and one’s life is “meaningless” if he does not assimilate such an identity. On the other hand, Taiming perceives his own life as “incomplete” having been submissive to the Japanese colonizers for so long. As he questions the validity of colonialism, he begins to dispute the value of his Japanese “education” which was the “highest education possible for a Taiwanese,” as he was “useless, impotent”25 in defending 23 24 25

ibid., 244. ibid., 244. ibid., 246.

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the interests of his people. Wu’s work is in some ways complements a Fanonian view on colonialism in that “You do not disorganize a society, no matter how primitive it may be,” and binary of savage (subject) and cultured (overlord) is contradictory.”26 For Taiming, it is the colonizer who can be indeed the most savage having inflicted so much suffering upon the Taiwanese people, despite their claims of parenthood that they so firmly latch onto in defending these actions. The rejection of his impractical education for example, is tied to the recognition and criticism of the epistemological framework, that allowed for “mass murder had taken place during the war had been rationalized and even made heroic in the name of the ‘nation’”27 and modernity. Military service, to Taiming, is not a way to become Japanese, but a way to further reduce the dignity and increase the exploitability of Taiwanese subjects.

It would be interesting to delve into the ideas purveyed by the Japanese in relation to military servitude and assimilation, to improve our understanding of the views of komin writers. It would be equally or even more so fascinating to investigate the consequences of military servitude on post-colonial society and the way it has displaced family members and friends who have loved ones who died in the name of the Japanese empire. Even when the violence is over, its reality remains in the hearts and minds of the colonial subject. Ching cites an example of a recent Yasukuni shrine visit, of which this incident reveals the denying of the subjectivity of the colonized. A group of Taiwanese wives from the Takasago ethnicity went to Japan to claim the souls of their dead husbands who fought in Japan’s Pacific War. Their requests are rejected on the basis of “Japanese customs,” and the imperativeness of them being “understood,”28 even long 26

Fanon, Frantz., “The Wretched of the Earth,” Translated by Richard Philcox, (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 3. 27 28

Wu, 240.

Ching, 3.

Military Servitude, Violence and the Colonial Subject

after the event itself, reflects a “persisting legacy”29 even in the establishment of a post-colonial relationship. After all, “military expenditures almost always exceeded administrative spending, and in most cases [colonies] were acquired for their strategic rather than economic values”30 although contemporary Taiwanese have often looked at Japanese imperialism as having brought administrative and economic benefits. However, to reclaim and rebury the dead, which had been enshrined as a legacy of the Japanese imperium, is something more difficult to achieve. 29 30

ibid. 3.

ibid., 38.

Works Cited

Ching, Leo T.S., “Becoming ‘Japanese: The Politics of Identity Formation,” (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, California, 2001). Fanon, Frantz., “The Wretched of the Earth,” Translated by Richard Philcox, (New York: Grove Press, 2004).

Kleeman, Faye., “Imperial Subject Literature and Its Discontents,” Under an Imperial Sun: Japanese Colonial Literature of Taiwan and the South. (Honolulu, HI: U of Hawai’I P, 2003).

Wu, Zhuoliu., “Orphan of Asia,” Modern Chinese Literature From Taiwan, (Columbia University Press, 2005).

Athena Lam

SURVIVAL, SPIRIT, AND CIVILIZATION: THE POETICS OF TRADITION, CULTURE AND LIFE IN “THE CHESS MASTER”

ABSTRACT In this paper I apply Ming Dong Gu’s theories of fiction to argue for the aesthetic merit of Ah Cheng’s “The Chess Master”. The brevity of “The Chess Master” concentrates the symbolic significance of its reoccurring motifs; its simplicity, rather than a blemish of underdevelopment, leaves the text open to profuse network of possible associations. Its apparent optimism, rather than superficial naivety, not only belies its subversive and contradictory nature, but also gestures to the inherent complexity in ordinary, mundane lives. Its motifs of friendship, chess, and food extend beyond optimistic interpretation as part of “roots literature” to question the nature of culture, modernity, human relationships, and art.

ATHENA LAM

Survival, Spirit, And Civilization

To see the World in a Grain of Sand

Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand

And Heaven in a Wild Flower, And Eternity in an hour.

William Blake “Auguries of Innocence”

Profound literature reveals life’s complexities and shortcomings, but the presence of simplicity and joy is often viewed as superficial optimism or naiveté. Ah Cheng’s1 The Chess Master, however, is an example of simple, yet moving and meaningful fiction. Its brevity and celebration of friendship, food, and chess belie its critiques of communism and modernization and its ambiguity towards human relationships. Its motifs are developed from different perspectives that build multiple layers of contradictory, and often inconclusive, interpretations of topics such as tradition, modernization, communism, class relations, friendship, and meaningful pursuits in life. Recurring signs create networks of multi-directional signification, summarized by Eco as a “labyrinth of ‘coloured ribbons’ … [that weave] a flowering maze of cyclical connection.”2 Readers are privileged to seeing the various perspectives characters take3 that create multiple networks of meaning through their interactions with each other. A great work of fiction open to multiplicity, Gu argues, gives rise to the simulacra, which is a simulated gestalt created from disparate parts joined together, 1

The Chinese University Press edition used for this essay has romanized the pseudonym 阿城 as “A Cheng”, following standard international Pin Yin. Both the Wade-Giles system used exclusively prior to 1979, and the internationally accepted Pin Yin in contemporary scholarship would Romanize the name as “A Cheng”. I have chosen to use “Ah Cheng” because he is still referred to by the latter: academic articles, internet searches, and film credits all use this name. 2

Gu, Ming Dong. Chinese Theories of Fiction: A Non-Western Narrative System (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 206. 3

ibid., 200.

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“realistically nonexistent, anatomically harmonious, aesthetically pleasing, and symbolically polysemous.”4 The sign has the productive power of suggestion, rather than the limiting one of demarcation, and I will explore some of those suggestions that highlight The Chess Master as a grain of sand that captured some truth in the world. Background and Historical Context

The Chess Master was first published in 1984 and is classified as part of the “roots” literature movement during a cultural identity crisis in China following the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 with the death of Mao. While popular “scar literature” seriously depicted the devastation and pain of the recently condemned Cultural Revolution, writers of roots literature a provided a “new perception of rural life and [its] impact on urban youth”5 that made rural life the new source of traditional Chinese culture, to contrast with traditional literati discourses. Ah Cheng came from a cultured family, but his education was disrupted due to his father falling out of political favour as a film critic.6 Beginning in 1968, Ah Cheng spent a decade in the countryside of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan because the universities were closed during the Cultural Revolution. His awareness of his lacking formal education made him self-conscious of his inadequate understanding of traditional Chinese culture.7 The Chess Master’s depiction of the peasants reflects Ah Cheng’s respect for them, having spent a decade in the countryside; however, the narrator’s educated background also reflects his belief that “a deep understanding of culture is the prerequisite of a good piece of literature.”8 Popular culture, as represented by the common people, has replaced the high culture of the 4 5

ibid., 207.

McDougall, Bonnie S.. Fictional Authors, Imaginary Audiences: Modern Chinese Literature in the Twentieth Century (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2003), 193. 6

Ngai Ling-tun. “Introduction,” The Chess Master (Chinese-English Bilingual Edition) (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005), xl. 7 8

ibid., 26. ibid., 26.

Survival, Spirit, And Civilization

literati since the fall of the Qing dynasty. The Chess Master was Ah Cheng’s first published work, and is said to be an inferior transcription of his oral versions9, which were performed for food and cigarettes both publicly with peasants and in private home dinners. While Ah Cheng has written other pieces since, The Chess Master began the “Ah Cheng Craze” and remains his most famous literary work. Plot Summary

The text begins with the narrator departing for the countryside to work. The narrator meets Wang Yisheng on the train, and recalls the “Chess Maniac’s” legend. The reader grows acquainted with both the narrator and Wang through their dialogues and story exchanges. The narrator is from the middle class, before he is orphaned and suffers nearly twenty-four hours without food. Wang Yisheng is the bastard son of an abandoned concubine10, who is used to poverty. The narrator notices that a gradual trust emerges from their shared experiences, particularly over hunger11, and wants to keep in touch even when the two are sent to different places. The second part briefly describes life on the farm before focusing on the action after Wang’s sudden arrival. The narrator and Wang catch up, and there is a feast in honour of Wang, with aubergines and oil from the commune chef12, snakes, and other scavenged food. The narrator introduces Ni Bin, the best chess player in their work unit, to Wang and the two have a blind match. After Wang departs, his friends often chat about him and listen for news about his matches. 9

ibid., 24.

A Cheng. “The Chess Master.” The Chess Master (Chinese-English Bilingual Edition). Trans. W. J. F. Jenner (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005), 57. Traditional-Chinese 2005 Edition. All quotations and paraphrasing are my own translations from the traditional Chinese in The Chess Master, Chinese University Press, 2005 edition unless otherwise noted. Paraphrasing will not be followed by the Chinese text; however, direct quotations will. 11 12

ibid., 19.

ibid., 69.

Athena Lam

The last arc centres on the district chess tournament the friends travel to in hopes of seeing Wang. However, Wang misses the registration and qualifications, but refuses to enter by abusing his connections, when Ni Bin uses his father’s chess set to bribe the Secretary of Education and Culture. Wang, however, establishes his genius when he plays blind chess with nine players simultaneously. He wins eight, and accepts one tie when the champion of the tournament asks for it publicly. The story finishes with Wang’s epiphany about having something to love in order to really live, something which Huters argues is out of character and a slight blemish to the open narrative. Signs and Motifs: Sewing a Pattern

The text is woven together by recurring motifs, such as food and chess, which become signifiers gesturing to an array of possible readings. The mundane topics claim no inherent importance: instead, extended descriptions and constant revisitations reveal invested significance in them. These topics become pivots of narrative suspense by causing disagreements and tensions between the narrator and Wang that are left “without offering any real closure to [an] episode.”13 The narrator and Wang’s developing relationship revolves around their nuanced disagreements over their shared obsessions. The continual lack of resolution in the debates over topics such as food, class background, and a right to make judgments about another person, allows a reader to reflect on the respective viewpoints. The dialogues between the narrator and Wang explore chess as an escape, a hobby, and as spiritual sustenance. Food becomes a spiritual and physical necessity for both. They also reveal mutual class prejudices and unconscious Daoist and Confucianist ideologies despite aiming for modernity. The text is intentionally left vague, without reference to specific locations, dates, or people in history, to allow for a multiplicity of meanings, and an application to various aspects of life. 13

Huters, Theodore. “Speaking of Many Things: Food, Kings, and the National Tradition in Ah Cheng’s ‘The Chess King’”. Modern China. Vol. 14 (Oct., 1988), 400.

Survival, Spirit, And Civilization

Character Foils: Illuminations

Openness and ambiguity are essential to capturing dynamic interactions in life, which makes a piece of fiction its own autonomous reality. A common method of creating space for interpretation, as Gu notes, is contrast, particularly character foils, to reveal relative and contradicting

perspectives. For example, Wang pesters the narrator about how he ate the two years after his parents died. After the narrator opens up, the two agree that stale sesame seed is more filling than stale steamed bread14, as proof of practical experience with hunger. The reader can appreciate the nuances of affinity through the hunger and alienation of the narrator, who reveals to the reader that he prefers not to discuss the details of his experience15 because he feels it is “too sharp a contrast”16 with what he had before, corrupting him and mocking his ideals; for Wang, hunger and worrying about the next meal is a reality—being filled is a luxury, not a given. Wang also reveals his prejudice against the more fortunate by remarking that the previously well-off narrator was greedy for having spiritual concerns when his family situation was good, wanting an even better situation, 你們這些人的特點 “[which is] characteristic of his kind of people.”17

While the two hurl accusations at each other concerning their experiences and viewpoints, Huters notes that such episodes are interrupted just before there is a consequence that would imply a narrative preference for a certain perspective. When the narrator asks in irritation, 「你總是說你們，你們，可你算什麼人？」“You only say you, you, but what type of person are you?”18 Wang avoids 14 15 16

A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 19-21. ibid., 21.

ibid. 20. Since this is a bi-lingual edition, the English translation is on the even pages, and the Chinese text is on the odd pages. There have been discrepancies between the translation and the Chinese in various points that will be noted for subsequent passages. 17 18

ibid., 21. ibid., 23.

Athena Lam

the narrator and eagerly changes the subject, asking for a game of chess. Rather than respond to the narrator’s provocation, Wang only says, 「我當然不同了。我主要是對吃要求得比較實在。」 “Of course I am different. The main thing is that my demands on food are rather practical.”19 Wang and the narrator continually probe and provoke each other, initiating conversations that reveal either similar experiences with different reactions, or similar viewpoints despite their differences in background. Through their exchanges and ambiguous statements, Wang and the narrator become people who suggest more than they present, not merely characters but dynamic individuals. Another example of contrasting views is when Wang visits the narrator, who instinctively complains about the lacking oil, the mass-cooked dishes, and most importantly, the lack of entertainment: no books, no electricity, no films, and his being stuck in the valley, dead bored.20 This gives Wang the chance to voice his view of the “ bad influence/ damage of books” 書害21, because books in the end cannot solve anything, and he concludes:「人要知足，頓頓飽就是福」 “People ought to know [when to be] contented—[to be] full every meal is a luxury.”22 The opposing attitudes toward situations, which reflect life views, allow for a paradoxically greater, yet volatile, friendship. The narrator feels guilty for his dissatisfaction with life because he respects Wang’s argument about his demands being above basic necessity. Yet, even as the narrator seems defeated, asking himself why he is irritated, why he wants to read any book at all, he realizes,「可我隱隱有一種慾望在心裏，說不清楚，但我大致覺出是關於活著的什麼東西。」 "But I vaguely have a desire in my heart [that I] cannot describe clearly, but [I] roughly realized it had something to do with living.”23 By interrogating each other, the two are forced to examine their prior assumptions, and subsequently 19 20 21 22 23

ibid., 23

ibid., 51. ibid., 51. ibid., 51. ibid., 53.

Survival, Spirit, And Civilization

discover their values in life. Art and entertainment are beyond basic physical necessity, but the narrator realizes they are spiritual necessities. It encapsulates a recurring tension between basic sustenance and meaning as opposed to luxury, and the role of the arts in this pursuit. Pursuit of meaning is also personal, and for Wang, it is not in books, but chess. He reveals his hypocrisy when the narrator asks him how he would feel if he could not play or even think about chess: while Wang is correct in saying that no one can take chess from him, since he can play in his head, he reveals the same need for chess as the narrator would have for films or books. In this way, literature and chess are compared as cultural and aesthetic expressions and pursuits. It is not essential to relate to chess, or food and hunger, but rather that individuals can relate to a spiritual craving that is as essential as physical sustenance. Despite their differing backgrounds, Wang and the narrator still pursue life, even if they express it in different ways. Wang admits that he learned to like the narrator’s two stories after reflecting on them: they touched him, despite being foreign texts by Jack London and Balzac24 that Wang initially protested as mocking hunger. This cultural exchange of stories gestures to various aspects of life: the influence of backgrounds and experiences, life’s basic and spiritual necessities, and the role of art and culture to name a few. Ross Chambers calls this technique “narrational embedding,” which is a narrative act within a narrative that implies the internal representation to the fictional framework, thus mirroring the storytelling relation of the narrator-narration-narratee.25 This indicates a self-consciousness in the narrative on its potential suggestions. The contrasts highlight the recurring themes that are continually explored in many circumstances, amplifying their signifying potentials. Chess: The Oxymoron

Chess as prominent topic of description and discussion can be associated with many aspects of life. One direction is its association with individual relations. 24 25

ibid., 27.

Huters, “Speaking of Many Things,” 398.

Athena Lam

Ironically, chess is often seen as a purely mental game, devoid of emotions, and stereotypically played by an eccentric such as Wang, who chose a chess game over his younger sister who came to see him off26, characterizing him as “outside the realm of acceptable behaviour.”27 Chess initially seems alienating and inhuman. Yet, it is chess that introduces Wang to all the other characters, whether it is through a random game, a tournament, or a recommendation (such as the narrator introducing Ni Bin). It comes to embody the Chinese tradition and culture that binds the characters, since most people can play to varying degrees. Wang also uses chess to escape every debate-turned-sour with the narrator, diffusing a tense situation. Spectators become peripheral friends who are often eating companions. No one is really interested in chess, but Ni Bin’s game with Wang draws enthusiasm in a dull communal life and Wang’s simultaneous nine blind games draw “several thousand”28 spectators to the chess hall, who follow his games by making paper chess boards with hundreds of black and red pieces.29 Chess unifies and excites individuals, just as other cultural pursuits such as books do, because Wang’s invested passion influences those around him. It is not the particular pursuit has an inherent interest, but the interested person that draws others in. However, chess also goes beyond a social instigator to becoming a symbol of tradition. Its Daoist manifestations appear early, when Wang tells of how he learned the way of chess from the garbage collector. The collector likens chess to Daoist ideas of change, asking,「我這天撿爛紙是不是撿舊？可我回去把它們分門別纇，賣了錢，養活自己，不是新？」“Is this waste paper that I collect every day old? Yet, when I take it home, sort it out, [and] sell [it for] money [to] support myself, isn’t it new?”.30 Not only is this passage suggesting the concepts of Yin and Yang and eternal change, it also subtly critiques the Cultural 26 27 28 29 30

A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 17.

Huters, “Speaking of Many Things,” 394. A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 113. ibid., 193. ibid., 35.

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Revolution’s naïve discarding of old ideas, culture, customs, and habits in an effort to revolutionize the classes. The old man does not teach Wang chess through traditional Confucian methods of study and rote—thereby suggesting alternative, yet equally important, traditional, and national, discourses—instead, he provides Wang with a tattered handwritten book of games31 and quotes from the Dao De Jing, such as「無為而無不為」“Do nothing, and nothing will not be done”32, that Jenner translates as “you do everything by forcing nothing” in context to chess. Chess flows, and when a player harmonizes his own strategy with it, he cannot lose, just as one can harmonize with the Dao by studying canonical classics. As the narrator realizes, 「棋道與生道難到有什麼不同麼？」“The Dao of chess and the principles of life are the same.”33 Playing chess is a participation in culture, a way of life, and 為棋是養性 “a nourishment of one’s character”34 passed down through generations. It binds Wang and modernity to the garbage collector and tradition. The Daoist idea of “the integrity of things”35, which is indiscriminatory towards classes and backgrounds, respects the “intuitive knowledge and ability, especially among peasants”36 such as Wang, as an alternative to traditional Confucian-influenced literati discourses. Daoism is a mysterious, yet dynamic, cultural legacy that is internalized by even a garbage collector, surviving physical catastrophes such as the Cultural Revolution. People perpetuate culture: Wang’s most valued chess set has no characters, is so abstract that it indicates nothing37, except a nebulous body of tradition that constantly shifts. The player projects significance onto the blank pieces just as various aspects of Chinese culture will appeal to different individuals. A blank set, like tradition, can be interpreted 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

ibid., 35. ibid., 39. ibid., 39. ibid., 39.

McDougall, Fictional Authors, 194. ibid., 194

Louie, Kam. “The Short Stories of Ah Cheng: Daoism, Confucianism and Life”. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs. No. 18 (Jul., 1987), 4.

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differently for every individual, who can choose to share his particular values, as Wang does to the narrator about his particular attachment to his mother’s set. Culture and literature remain important frameworks of expression, even if their definitions are constantly shifting and reinvented.

Chess also becomes a Daoist escape from the politics and turmoil of reality. While Ah Cheng avoids depicting the hardships of class struggle, family separation, labour, or starvation during the Cultural Revolution, the narrative’s focus on the cathartic nature of chess directs readers to what is unsaid. Wang admits, 「一下棋，就什麼都忘了。呆在棋裏舒服。」 “Once [he] plays chess, [he] forgets everything else and is happy.”38 Chess’ vitality is contagious: drawing viewers as a distraction that is more enjoyable than mundane life in communes. The passion and consuming nature of chess contrasts with the dull and artistically barren reality during the Cultural Revolution. This seems to suggest that what Wang calls “luxuries,” literature included, are not frivolous, or simply instruments of political propaganda, but vital expressions of humanity. However, while chess seems to transcend politics, religion, and morals, Wang’s pursuit of it seems to advocate an abandonment of all other considerations in life, like family, income, and perhaps social responsibilities. Is passion, chess, or literature worth such devotion? The story, chess, and other arts seem to exemplify pursuits of what Gu calls “profound principles of life”39, which require extraordinary means of representation, such as Wang’s eccentricity and genius. Successful fiction that is able to access some of these “principles” becomes an autonomous work, self-referential and totalizing—creating its own world out of nothing, that on the other hand is still true to life and it is complexities. Another reading, however, advocates traditional Confucian values. Daoist terminology can support a Confucian ideology.40 Ah Cheng’s belief in a national cultural essence invites a Confucian reading of the text. The 38 39 40

A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 53.

Gu, Chinese Theory of Fiction, 194.

Louie, “The Short Stories of Ah Cheng,” 9.

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traditional Chinese scholar-gentry famous for straddling both Daoist and Confucian views41 is embodied once again in Wang’s blank chess set. His reverence for his mother’s memory upholds traditional filial piety. Wang even extends his filial piety to Ni Bin’s chess set, refusing to use it as a bribe to enter the district tournament42. Ni Bin’s Ming ebony set is not only valuable for its age and attachment to traditional “Han” China, but also as a gift from his father. Yet the educated characters such as the narrator and Ni Bin merely see it as material for exchange, symbolically giving away China’s tangible relics and cultural manifestations without hesitation. Ironically, it is the uneducated brute who values the chess set as an heirloom and by extension, Chinese culture, regardless of its manifestations as blank paper cutouts or in ebony. Huters makes a clear distinction between Wang’s decision out of traditional respect for his mother, and the Communist ideal of a selfless individual sacrificing his desires for the good of the group.43 Wang sacrificed his chance to play because he feels whether he wins or loses, it is his business, and playing under the condition of Ni Bin’s bribe is taking advantage of another’s deal44, rendering his games meaningless. Not only is it not filial, it violates the integrity of life that Wang implicitly pursues through his chess games. Chess is not a distraction or escape from life, but rather is his engagement with it, so it must be on his terms.

However, The Chess Master also uses Wang, an uneducated commoner embodying the trajectory of China’s modernization, to acknowledge change. The cultural identity that Ah Cheng attempts to reconstruct is not in the historical scholar, but rather the “fusion of differences in time and social status, [giving] a reassurance that belonging to the culture has the deepest historical roots and includes everyone from every level of society.”45 While Wang accepts a tie with his scholar opponent, thereby calling a truce 41 42 43 44 45

ibid, 9.

A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 105.

Huters, “Speaking of Many Things,” 410. A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 105.

Huters, “Speaking of Many Things,” 412.

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between past and present, high tradition, and the future the commoners will bring, it is implied that Wang would have won.46 Modernity prevails, but it saves face for tradition out of respect. Wang defeats tradition through the medium (chess) and theory (the Dao) that simultaneously are products and symbols of tradition. Another moment of transition between modernity and tradition is Ni Bin’s (traditional China’s) failure to adapt to the present reflected in his pathetic attempt to play modern (Western) sports as part of the district tournament. Is the text critical of inflexibility, or does it identify with Ni Bin’s conservative shock and the fact that he 總是嚷野蠻，埋怨髒 “can only complain about how barbaric and filthy the players were?”47 Contrary to the reactionary post-Cultural Revolution pursuit of Westernized modernity, The Chess Master grounds modern cultural identity in revitalized cultural traditions while revealing modernity’s alienation of those caught in the transition. Food: In Defense of Happiness and Aesthetics

The Chess Master extends beyond mere cultural examination to address approaches to art and life. It conjures the affects of life, its basic necessities and spiritual endeavours. This fictional story successfully evokes real emotions. While a chess game is a mental battleground, and a topic of philosophical and cultural bonds, food is devoured with friends and the subject of heated debates between the narrator and Wang Yisheng. Food sustains a body, the mind, friendship, and an appreciation of the taste buds. While its presence might be taken for granted by the privileged, like the narrator or Ni Bin, lack of food results in spiritual agitation as well as physical pain.48 While chess might be a passionate escape or an immersion into traditional culture, food is a passionate tasting and participation in life, a relishing of the present. Having known hunger, the narrator keenly reads Wang’s eating habits as a manifestation of his appreciation of food, and by extension, his love of life: 46 47 48

A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 127. ibid., 89. ibid., 21.

Survival, Spirit, And Civilization

拿到飯後，馬上就開始吃，吃得很快，喉節一縮一縮的，臉上繃滿了筋。常常突然停下來，很小心地將嘴邊或下巴上的飯粒兒和湯水油花兒用整個兒食指抹進嘴裏。若飯粒兒落在衣服上，就馬上一按，拈進嘴裏。。。吃完以後，他把兩隻筷子舔了，拿水把飯盒沖滿，先將上面一層油花吸淨，然後就帶著安全抵岸的神色小口小口地呷。 He would start eating fast the moment he got his meal, his Adam’s apple regularly contracting and his facial muscles tensed. He would often pause suddenly [so] all the grains of rice and the soup grease around his mouth and on his chin could be pushed by [his] forefinger into his mouth. Any grain of rice that fell on his clothes would be lifted into his mouth …After he finished eating he sucked his chopsticks clean, [and] got warm water to fill his bowl, [after which he would] first drink all the oil floating on the top with the air of someone who has safely reached his haven, then sip the rest, a little at a time.49

When one is satiated, one can share one’s happiness. As such, eating together allows people to see and appreciate each other’s best, the most optimistic perspective of human nature. However, optimism has its nuances as well, and The Chess Master achieves a poetic quality through what Gu calls “aesthetic suggestiveness”50 that “produces additional meanings beyond the stated meaning.”51 Indeed, food has no determined meaning beyond basic necessity until an individual imbues it with one. Food is pursued as an art by the narrator who turns a scallion, snakes, cloves of wild garlic, ginger, soy sauce, vinegar crystals, and eggplants into a mountain feast. The food is delicious compared to mass49 50 51

ibid., 23.

Gu, Chinese Theories of Fiction, 122. ibid., 122.

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boiled vegetables, satiating not only the stomach, but also delighting the taste buds and spirit. Terrible stenches do not affect edibility, but the narrator is adamant that the snake must be cooked whole so that the meat does not touch the iron.52 The narrator thus aims to impress by introducing animating flavours to their otherwise dull life. When everyone devours the snake, the narrator has succeeded in his art. After it is devoured, the bones are recycled with wild aniseed to make the soup that finishes the meal and begins the conversation.53 The meticulous description of cooking emanates enthusiasm for experiencing life through the food, even though it is not fine dining. Like literature, a meal can have recurring themes, recycled to make the most of one’s limited tools as well as unify the text. Similarly, a few ingredients and inspiration can become a brilliant dish with words that conjure an invigorating flame. There is fulfillment when the narrator’s love of food is expressed, received, and appreciated. Writing, like cooking, has utilitarian uses such as propaganda pamphlets, but the feast indulges the aesthetics of taste just as literature does the aesthetics for the mind.

Moreover, food is used to acknowledge friends: chocolate, malted milk powder, and white noodles54, luxuries in communes, are brought out by Ni Bin as a late night snack to show his appreciation for his friends. Despite the hardships, farming life is depicted as “a golden opportunity for young people to form close relationships”55 by sharing their ways of valuing life with others previously separated by different backgrounds. Just as the narrator expresses himself through his cooking, Ni Bin expresses himself by sharing the only way he knows how: with material wealth. While it can be argued that friendship should not be bought, in this context, Ni Bin’s altruism is undiminished by the fact that he might have acquired his goods more easily. As the narrator knows, having and losing comfort is hard. Sharing what one has learned to savour is opening oneself to another. 52 53 54 55

A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 69. ibid., 71. ibid., 78.

Louie, “The Short Stories of Ah Cheng,” 12.

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Open Imperfections: Poetic Relationships, Signs, and Affects

Analysis of the The Chess Master has tended to focus on friendship and discourse, without addressing its acknowledgement of the individual. Friendship and human relations, after all, are meaningful because of the relation between two individuals. While it is not always comfortable, this inherent awareness of and respect for an Other allows for a genuine friendship between the narrator and Wang Yisheng. The exchanges between the narrator and Wang parallel tensions in real life friendships: after Wang accuses Jack London of mocking hunger when he wrote about it while smoking cigarettes and turning someone who had a clear idea of hunger into a mental case, the narrator can only give a wry smile.56 Yet, whose right is it to write about hunger—the one who starves daily, or the one who never has and suffers it once? The narrator evidently feels more informed than Wang with regards to interpreting Jack London, but is adhering to social norms of complacency, rather than pursuing the issue to the end. Once again, an unresolved debate leaves the text open to both views. While it is possible to exchange ideas, an individual can only put his ideas in the open: forcing them onto someone lacks respect for the other party’s values and ideologies. The narrator accepts Wang for who he is, and because of that, can debate personal issues such as Wang’s obsession with chess. Yet Ah Cheng uses these brief moments of disconnection to heighten the close, yet mysterious, relationship between two apparently opposing characters. It is possible to relate, to accept, even if one cannot understand.

As such, the most moving aspect of The Chess Master is that its characters themselves reveal themselves as being moved: whether by passion for a hobby, by survival instincts, by culture, or by interpersonal exchanges. They have genuine and raw impulses that highlight their cultural background and human nature, free from abstracted political discourses. They are not guided by prevailing ideologies of the time, but rather vaguely embody the ideologies (Daoist, Confucian) that they signify. The Chess Master achieves a 56

A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 27.

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lyrical quality in its description of what merely happens: 寫小說應當是個故事，讓故事自身出說明 “Writing fiction should involve a story, and the story should be allowed to make itself clear, as Zhang Ailing argues.57 Good fiction should vitalize its characters to create an independent story rather than depend on the author’s subsequent explanations.

However, Huters argues that such a positivistic interpretation of The Chess Master, exemplified by Wang’s epiphany about needing something before really living, confines chess to the final determinant in human life as influenced by cultural traditions and values, closing off the initial openness of the text.58 However, this positivism is hard-won through repeated trials that the characters create for each other, and while Wang’s exclamation does highlight a certain theme, it does not bar any other insights to the text. The trials include interpretation clashes and misunderstandings over literature, hunger, chess, lifestyle, familial ties and hobbies between mostly Wang and the narrator. For example, the narrator realizes the dependence of interpreting language and allusion on one’s background after asking how Wang knew Du Kang:「那你怎麼知道「可以解憂，唯有杜康」。。。你把杜康換成象棋，倒也風趣。」“How may melancholy be dispelled save through Du Kang? … You changed ‘Du Kang’ to ‘chess’, and that was rather neat”59, to which Wang responds,「不是。這句話是一個 57

Zhang Ailing 張愛玲. “Ziji de Wenzhang” (自己的文章 My Writing). Liuyan (流言 Written on Water) (Hong Kong: Lili Publishing House, 1969), 21. 58

Huters, “Speaking of Many Things,” 414. Huters’ quote, as well as Jenner’s English translation for The Chess Master, Chinese University Press, 2005 Edition includes the sentences, “I’ve finally understood now. You’ve got to have something before you can really live” (Cheng 128). However, the Chinese in the same Chinese University Press 2005 Edition on the facing page only has two ellipses. Another edition includes the missing lines: “妈，儿今天明白事儿了。人还要有点儿东西，才叫活着。” A Cheng 阿城. Qi Wang《棋王》Beijing: Zuojia Publishing Society, 1999. While the exclusion in the edition this paper might render Huters’ specific argument irrelevant, his attack on positivistic and closed view about culture nonetheless invite discussion as they judge the judge the openness, and therefore literary merit, of the text. 59

A Cheng, “The Chess Master,” 31.

Survival, Spirit, And Civilization

老頭兒說的。」“No, it was something an old man said.”60 Language, a means of exchanging ideas, fails because it is itself an empty signifier, which is given literary connotations, or as Wang intended, none at all. Wang is ignorant of the literary tradition he has inherited in his words. Instead, language finds its mark when it is used to hurt: Wang adds in that the narrator’s parents probably couldn’t bear to let him go after sneering,「你們這些人好日子過慣了，世上不明白的事兒多著呢！」 “Your type of people have gotten used to comfortable lives, [and] do not understand so many things in life”61, not realizing that the narrator is orphaned. When he does, Wang brushes off the narrator’s brief experience with hunger by saying his life must have been good when his parents were still alive. The narrator retorts saying,「你父母在，當然要說風涼話。」“Your parents are alive, so of course you can say such unwarranted remarks.”62 Wang’s mother is dead, and both evidently see each other initially as products of their classes rather than as individuals. The growing friendship does not erase the friction caused by prejudices and misunderstandings, which reflex complex relationships in reality. Do the two remain friends because they grow to understand each other’s perspectives, or despite their misunderstandings? Moreover, while the text is largely reconciliatory between classes, tradition and modernization, basic necessity and spirituality, it nonetheless reveals ruptures and contradictions. The text’s insistence on uplifting and apolitical moments during the Cultural Revolution suggests a backhanded critique of the era. The characters’ distinct identities and appreciation for each other can contest the communist ideal of a selfless individual working for an impersonal, collective, cause. While Wang seems to embody the commoner who carries tradition into the future, the celebration of rustic life seems to counter the technological modernizations that were flooding into China after the late ‘70s. Confucianism and tradition, while carried on, are defeated by modernization just as Ni Bin and the old Confucian scholar are by Wang. There is uncertainty in 60 61 62

ibid., 31. ibid., 17.

ibid., 19.

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the future evolution of tradition, including its discarding, which then affects a historical link to national identity. Lastly, while Wang’s chess skills and appreciation for food are inspiring, such obsessions seem symptomatic of past traumas: an inability to cope with reality, and a haunting fear of starvation. While The Chess Master undeniably makes the effort to remain optimistic, it leaves ample room for questions about the characters, their potential significations, and the possible reading perspectives.

Zhang Ailing wrote, 「力是快樂的，美卻是悲哀的，兩者不能獨立存在。」“Strength is joyful and beauty is sad; so neither can exist alone.”63 Ah Cheng’s The Chess Master has both the inspiring strength of passionate lives, as well as the sad beauty of haunted and inconclusive transitions between tradition and modernity. The textual devotion to the tenacious human pursuit of spirituality, identity, and meaningful relationships has also highlighted the implications of its critical silence on the consequences of the Cultural Revolution. It values tradition as much as it acknowledges the inevitable future, balances physical and spiritual necessities, and questions language and relationships even as it celebrates their binding power. Daily life creates poetic signifiers with surplus meanings. The Chess Master is an “open signifying field”64 that invites a reader to weave associations into a meaningful network of signification and representation. It is a piece of infinite possibilities held in your hand, and an eternity that lingers long after the hour that it took to read it 63 64

Zhang, Liuyan, 18.

Gu, Chinese Theories of Fiction, 209.

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Works Cited

A Cheng 阿城. Qi Wang《棋王》（Beijing: Zuojia Publishing Society, 1999). **Simplified Chinese-English bilingual edition first published in 1999 by Chinese Literature Press and Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing.

A Cheng. “The Chess Master.” The Chess Master (ChineseEnglish Bilingual Edition). Trans. W. J. F. Jenner. (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005). Traditional-Chinese 2005 Edition. Gu, Ming Dong. Chinese Theories of Fiction: A Non-Western Narrative System. (Albany: State University of New York Press Albany, 2006).

Huters, Theodore. “Speaking of Many Things: Food, Kings, and the National Tradition in Ah Cheng’s ‘The Chess King’”. Modern China. Vol. 14 (Oct., 1988), 388-418. Louie, Kam. “The Short Stories of Ah Cheng: Daoism, Confucianism and Life”. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs. No. 18 (Jul., 1987), 1-13. McDougall, Bonnie S.. Fictional Authors, Imaginary Audiences: Modern Chinese Literature in the Twentieth Century. (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press), 2003.

Ngai Ling-tun. “Introduction”. The Chess Master (ChineseEnglish Bilingual Edition). (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005). Zhang Ailing 張愛玲. “Ziji de Wenzhang” (自己的文章 My Writing). Liu Yan (流言 Written on Water). (Hong Kong: Lili Publishing House, 1969). Works Referenced

McDougall, Bonnie S.. The Literature of China in the Twentieth Century. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

Dong Yue Su

WHERE ART HISTORIES COLLIDED AND CONVERGED: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ART OF ITALIAN JESUIT ARTIST CASTIGLIONE AND CHINESE PAINTING REFORMIST LIN FENGMIAN

ABSTRACT The essay compares two artists from different periods of Chinese art history in their attempts to create a kind of hybrid painting that mix Chinese art and Western art. Giuseppe Castiglione is an Italian commissioner artist who served the Qing court, using Western realistic painting techniques to make Chinese painting. Lin Fengmian belongs to the generation of artists at the turn of the Twentieth century who sought to modernize Chinese painting through the borrowing of Western avant-garde concepts. The comparison of these two helps to shed light on how the Chinese art history and Western art history collided and converged over time, and how individual artists were restricted or liberated by art history.

DONG YUE SU

Where Art Histories Collided And Converged

Since the Song dynasty, what was considered authentic Chinese painting had been quite self-contained and exclusive of outsider influence until the Qing dynasty. The first encounter with Western art happened in the Seventeenth Century when Italian Jesuit commissioners brought Renaissance art to China. Giuseppe Castiglione was one of the commissioner artists appointed as a court painter, and humbly served the emperors of Qing dynasty. The significance of his paintings in Chinese art history is that they are the first hybrid of Western Realism and Chinese conceptualism (写意). Their unique style reflects how the Europeans saw the Eastern art at that time, and they set examples, be it good or bad, for many artists that followed who sought to mix East and West artistic style. My paper will compare Castiglione’s paintings with Lin Fengmian, a Chinese painter at the turn of the Twentieth Century China. Chinese painters at Lin’s time were trying earnestly to modernize and/or Westernize Chinese art. I single out Lin Fengmian because he was considered one of the most successful artists by his contemporary critics. The comparison between Castiglione and Lin Fengmian is meaningful in that: on the one side, there is this Western painter working within the framework of Chinese painting with reverence to the Chinese authority and culture; on the other side, there is this Chinese painter working to revise the thousand-year-old Chinese painting by transcending the boundary of Chinese painting and incorporating the revered Western painting style. The contrast explored in this paper will illustrate how the Chinese art history and Western art history collided and converged over time, and how individual artists were restricted or liberated by art history. Furthermore, I would also argue that Lin Fengmian has greatly expanded the parameter of Chinese painting. His approach of blending the spirit of Chinese art with the most up-to-date artistic trend is a good way to rejuvenate Chinese painting for the present time. Under the reign of the Kangxi Emperor (16541722), Qing dynasty was a superpower in the world. Although European Renaissance and the Enlightenment were transforming Europe, China still maintained its strong sense of cultural superiority over the rest of the

Dong Yue Su

world. This East and West power relationship reflecting on Giuseppe Castiglione was that, as a court painter, he had to respect Chinese art as earnestly as bowing to the emperor. Castiglione’s specialty was Renaissance oil painting. His value to the emperor was that Castiglione was able to incorporate two different canons of art into one without threatening the dominance of Chinese cultural superiority. Most of his paintings depicted Chinese objects and themes in a schematic Chinese painting composition. However, the focal points were always rendered in the Western manner such as chiaroscuro, linear perspective and the use of color. These techniques were exactly what Chinese painting was missing. One of the Ten Dogs is a painting painted on the Chinese media of silk with glue pigment1. The composition, the empty negative space, the ambiguous spatial relationship, and the motifs of bamboos and flowers unarguably suggest that this is a Chinese painting. However, upon close look at the details, the clarity of bamboo leafs, the volume of the dog and the bamboo stems are the characteristics of a Renaissance painting. A Chinese painting at this time could never render objects with such clarity and realism. Thus, Castiglione created an uncanny picture that was both familiar and otherworldly to Chinese audience. It is quite evident in One of the Ten Dogs that the aspect of the Chineseness dominates over the Westernness. Castiglione’s reconciliation was to humbly introduce the Western visual language in a subtle way without challenging the overall viewing experience of the Chinese painting. He had to make compromise to cater to his patrons. However, he did have the freedom in applying Western painting technique as long as it would not trespass the parameter of the Chinese painting. Castiglione’s desire to incorporate Western techniques into the Chinese painting must not be considered only to satisfy the Qing emperors for survival. He was a very devoted Jesuit. During his long career in the Qing court, he had never forgotten his mission to introduce Christianity to China. He tried many times to save the lives of other Jesuits’ 1

Glue pigment painting (胶彩画) is a substance used for painting long before Qing dynasty.

Where Art Histories Collided And Converged

lives from nationwide prosecution.2 He wanted to push Western painting forward to Chinese as a means of exerting Christian influence. The Auspicious Objects depicts Chinese objects, but it has the sombre look of Christianity painting in the opaque water and the heaviness of the rocks and pine leaves. At one point, he attempted to persuade the Kangxi Emperor to introduce Western perspective into the training system of Chinese painters, but to no avail.3 He died in Beijing without fulfilling his wish to Christianize Qing Chinese.

Figure 1.0 - One of the Ten Dogs Objects by Castiglione. Ink on silk.

Figure 2.0 - The Auspicious by Castiglione. Ink on silk.

However, his fifty-year career of painting in China did leave some legacy behind, despite the fact that many Chinese considered him as a joke.4 He published a book Shixue5 to introduce perspectives in painting to Chinese 2

Su Liqun, Lang Shining Zhuan Ji, (Beijing: Zhongguo wen xue chu ban she, 1998), 56. 3

zh.wikipedia.org/ on Lang Shining.

shixue视学, On perspective.

Su Liqun, Lang Shining Zhuan Ji, (Beijing: Zhongguo wen xue chu ban she, 1998), 68.

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readers. The Portrait of Qianlong was a typical example of Castiglione’s dialectic of East and West. Qing emperors liked the three dimensional rendering but they did not like the shading on the face because they thought “the shadow looked like disease.”6 Thus, Castiglione innovatively used bright skin color with very subtle tonal change to create volume without a shadow. The outcome must have satisfied the emperor. However, the painting is neither three dimensional enough for the Western portraiture tradition nor flat enough for the Chinese portrait painting. The dragon robe, however, was rendered in a Western manner. So the contradiction between East and West is awkwardly visible. Ren Xiong, a Shanghai School painter in the late Nineteen Century, created a painting that shares some similarities. The tonal range of his face in the Selfportrait resembles that of the Qianlong, and the sketched robe is also awkwardly contrasting the facial rendition.

Figure

3.0 - The Portrait of Qianlong by Castiglione. Ink on silk. 6

Figure   4.0 - The Self-Portrait by Ren Xiong. Ink on paper.

Cecile Beurdeley, Giuseppe Castiglione: A Jesuit Painter at the Court of the Chinese Emperors, 164.

Where Art Histories Collided And Converged

Chinese attitude towards Western art underwent a dramatic change from mere curiosity at Castiglione’s time to vested interest from the late Nineteenth Century to the early Twentieth Century. The collision and reconciliation between Eastern and Western painting was much more significant for Chinese because this practice might hold the key to modernize the whole nation. The impetus of modernization was largely triggered by the humiliating defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese war in 1895, and since then, Chinese artists have attempted to play a large role towards achieving this mission. They wanted to find a way to modernize Chinese art so that it could be in sync with modernism. Lin and his peers lived through this epoch of radical change. They were educated to be a Chinese traditionalist since childhood but went abroad to learn Western arts in their adulthood. As a result, they could truly experience the magnitude of cultural collision, which, inevitably started to subside in the generations to come when Western colonialism ended. After Lin’s generation, China can no longer nurture deep-rooted traditionalists because brush and ink as a daily communication skill was abandoned as well as many traditional values after China became modernized. Additionally, things worsened after the Chinese communists brutally destroyed Chinese traditional elite culture during the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1976.

Figure 5.0 - Farewell My Concubine   by Lin. Ink on paper.

Figure 6.0 - Performer by Lin. Ink on paper.

Dong Yue Su

Although both Castiglione and Lin were injecting Western vocabulary to the Chinese painting, their directions were opposite to each other. While Castiglione used Western techniques to condense Chinese painting inwardly, Lin sought to expand the language of Chinese painting outwardly. Castiglione was well aware what Chinese painting was and cautious not to cross the lines. He offered himself as a remedy to the Chinese painting for its “weak points.” He was simply filling the void with chiaroscuro and colors so that Chinese painting can be “fixed” for the better. Lin, on the other hand, wanted to extend the perception of what Chinese painting was. One of his approaches was to bring about the new media concept in Chinese painting so as to transcend the media of Chinese painting. Before Lin, Chinese painting media always spoke about paper, silk, ink and Chinese pigment; the subject matters had been in a very limited scope, such as mountains, figures, and a few others. Even the most innovative ones, such as Shitao, a very inspiring early Qing artist who advocated selfexpressiveness and liberation from the orthodox painting principles, could not transcend such conventions. All he did was render cliché mountains in a personal distinct way, but his paintings were still about mountains. Lin, however, under the aegis of the trendy European Modernism, brought new media concepts into the Chinese painting. He did this through two ways: one is conceptual and the other is physical. The conceptual media concept meant that Lin was still using traditional Chinese media of ink and paper, but there is a new sense of media awareness conveyed through the depiction of subject matters and the artistic styles being used. His depictions were no longer mountains or flowers or birds, but extended to include the variety of subject matters that were popular in Chinese folk art media, such as ceramic painting, shadow puppet, paper cut, pottery decoration, antique, bronze ware, lacquer, and wax dyeing.7 In one of the examples, Performer, the figure is a shadow puppet. The fuzzy edges of watery ink resemble the quality of a piece of translucent leather, the material that the puppet is made of. 7

Zheng Zhao, Lin Fengmian Yanjiu Wen Ji,(Hanzhou: China Academy of

Fine Art Press: 1995), 36.

Where Art Histories Collided And Converged

In Farewell My Concubine, the form of the figures resembles Chinese paper cut. The sense of a different medium inside the traditional media of paper smartly transcends the boundary of Chinese painting media without changing it or abandoning it. They seem to claim that Chinese painting is no longer restricted to ink on paper, but rather a celebration of multi media interacting with each other. This self-reflexive media awareness in Lin’s painting was learned from Western Modernism. Selfreflexivity was a distinct approach in Modernist art in Europe, prominent in many art movements, ranging from Cubism to avant-garde motion pictures. Moreover, Lin’s works were inspired by collage when he studied in France. Upon a closer look of the two examples mentioned above, the folk art materials are depicted with some detached distance from the background paper, creating a collage effect. (The collaged newspaper on the canvas in Picasso’s painting Bottle of Vieux Marc, Glass, Guitar and Newspaper (1913) may have been the inspiration for Lin.)

Figure 7.0 - Bottle of Vieux, Glass, Guitar and Newspaper. by Picasso. Collage (1913)

Figure 8.0 - Heixuanfeng by Lin. Pigment on ceramic. (1960s)

As for the second way of expanding Chinese painting media, this was explored through the use of new physical media other than paper. It is less important than the conceptual media but still very trendy. In the 1960s, Lin began his experiment of painting on ceramic plate. The Heixuanfeng (黑旋风) was one of them. This attempt of elevating Chinese folk culture to the reign of high culture was

Dong Yue Su

a response to the Pop Art movement in American in 1960s.

The extension to include folk art media allied Lin’s paintings with democracy which the May-Fourth generations were crying for. This was because folk art favoured the people and departed from the literati elitism. In this sense, Lin’s paintings were in sync with modernity. Moreover, the new Western avant-garde looks at the Chinese subjects to keep Chinese paintings at the same pace with its western counterpart in the context of Modernism. Lin’s approach had made it anachronistic for his peer Xu Beihong to advocate Nineteenth-Century European Realism that was phasing out. Compared with Qi Baishi’s paintings which evoked peaceful and down-to-earth peasant life, Lin’s paintings were more urban and bourgeois because of its European appearance. Folk art was as quintessentially Chinese as Chinese painting, so Lin’s expansion of media actually enriched the Chineseness of Chinese painting.

There was a dilemma in the integration of Western painting and Eastern painting that both Castiglione and Lin had to face. Chinese painting seemed to be inherently pre-modern and the Western painting seemed to be all that Chinese painting was not. Chinese painting was so deeply intertwined with the social fabric that it had become very selfcontained and exclusive over time. Incorporating Western painting meant the self-repudiation of the authenticity of Chinese painting, especially at a time when China was proud of its civilization and tried every means to distinguish itself from the Western counterpart. However, in the meantime, Chinese painting naturally gravitated toward Westernization because Western science and its social system were more progressive than China. Thus, how and to what extend should Western techniques and ideas be incorporated without compromising the authenticity of Chinese painting was the tough question for anyone who searched for an answer. Castiglione took this problem literally. The integration was a combination of the typical Western rendering techniques and typical Chinese subject matters and composition. The blending was doomed unsuccessful because these two visual languages did not speak to each other when put in one painting. In the painting of Dog, the

Where Art Histories Collided And Converged

animal at the focal point was at odds with its surrounding environment because the outlined rocks and trees in Chinese style awkwardly contrasted the meticulously detailed dog’s body in Western style. It was even more awkward to have a realistic dog casting no shadow on the ground, setting the dog apart from the background like a collage. Castiglione’s many other paintings had the same mistakes. He probably realized that two-dimensionality and threedimensionality were impossible to be visually integrated, so Castiglione began to make refinements by reducing the effect of volume, such as better results in Eight Prize Steeds (八骏图). However, the painting was still disregarded by then-Chinese commentators probably because its lack of the embodied spirit or sketch conceptualism (xieyi), which could only be achieved through obvious stroke marks.8 This literati taste of embodied spirit had been in place throughout Chinese art history since Xie He (5th century) advocated Spirit Resonance as the number one principle in his revered writing on Six Principles on painting.9

Figure 9.0 - Dog Steeds by Castiglione. Ink on silk.

Figure 10.0 - Eight Prize by Castiglione. Ink on silk.

Su Liqun, Lang Shining Zhuan Ji, (Beijing: Zhongguo wen xue chu ban she, 1998),176. 9

Osvald Siren, The Chinese o The Art of Painting (New York: Library of Congress Publication: 2005), 219.

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Spirit Resonance refers to the self expressive quality that can elicit positive feelings in the viewer. Failing to convey such spirits could not be considered as good art. Therefore, Castiglione’s innovative paintings unfortunately fell into the category of decorative kitsch of artisans, a group that were discriminated by the elite Chinese.

Figure 11.0 - Enjoy the Flowers by Lin. Watercolor.

Lin’s integration was more effective because he had found the   points where Chinese and Western painting converged. Western avant-gardism such as Fauvism, Cubism, Expressionism, and Futurism were intensely subjective, rejecting verisimilitude. This was what Chinese literati painting had been doing for centuries. Lin was shrewd enough to recognize this common ground. This made Lin stand out from many other endeavourers, such as Xu Beihong, who chose to emulate Western realism instead. Lin preferred to use the flatness of Modernist painting and the Impressionistic use of color in his Chinese paintings. The integration was more on the level of ideas rather than techniques. Therefore, the visual discord that failed Castiglione’s paintings was avoided. Enjoy the Flowers is one good example. The female figures in the painting have the flat faces and bodies of Cubism yet the delicate lines of the face are very expressive, conveying

Where Art Histories Collided And Converged

the sketch conceptualism. The dark ink casually created some three-dimensional effects on the stairs and eaves yet they are held back but freestyle crisp lines. The Reed Marshes is another example. The light and color on the background is very Impressionistic, yet it is in harmony with the sketched plant on the foreground. The dry brush strokes create the water reflections resembling that of Impressionism. In The Lady the female figure is reminiscent of Paul Gauguin’s primitivism, yet the curvilinear body is reminiscent of the flying deity (飞天) in Dunhuang caves, and the facial feature evokes Chinese ceramic painting. All these examples show that Lin had internalized Western avant-garde spirit and Chinese sketch conceptualism. These two different concepts complemented each other, instead of competing against one other, and together they made it possible to bridge traditionalism and Modernism.

Figure 12.0 - The Reed Marshes by Lin. Gouache on paper

Figure 13.0 - The Lady by Lin. Gouache on paper.

Another interesting comparison between Castiglione and Lin is the viewpoints in their works. Castiglione’s paintings reflect the Renaissance European way of viewing China. In contrast, Lin’s paintings involve a two-way perspective between the East and the West. Castiglione had to familiarize himself with Chinese objects and their symbolic meanings. Although he was being respectful to Chinese culture, his knowledge on Western visual science of light and color was more “advanced” than Chinese understanding. This allowed him to maintain his

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privileged Western way of viewing Chinese perception. Moreover, his religious background constantly kept him aware of his European world vision. The Qianlong on Horseback reflects his Western conception on heroism. In this painting, the Chinese emperor was depicted sitting on a horseback marching forward. The upright pose of the figure, a galloping horse, and a vast sky with cirrus clouds are the main characteristics in Western discourse to render heroism. However, Castiglione’s Western look is not a comfortable one. The heavy rendered horse seems to be more important than the two-dimensional lightweight emperor. It is as if the superior Western viewpoint is being suppressed by less advanced Chinese views. This might reveal Castiglione’s feeling of displacement in the Qing court where his scientific knowledge had to yield to the less scientific culture. In Qianlong Emperor and Royal Children, the Western perspective of the architecture is rendered in clarity, suggesting a clear air. However, there is thick mist that seems to be right behind the wall just meters away. This reflects the confusion of a Western eye on the spatial relationship in Chinese painting.

Figure 14.0 - Napolean crossing the Alps. by David. Ol on canvas.

1801 - 1805.

Figure 15.0 - The Qianlong on Horseback. by Castiglione. Ink on silk.

Where Art Histories Collided And Converged

To understand Lin’s works, one has to understand his artistic vision first. He believed that it was meaningless to see Chinese art and Western art with different ends. He placed Western art and Eastern art on an equal footing. He advocated for a mission “to introduce Western arts: reorganize Chinese arts; mix Chinese and Western arts; create contemporary arts.”10 This was a transcendental point of view as opposed to the grand narratives of China’s patriotism, which politicized and framed Chinese artistic imagination since the late Nineteenth Century. As C.T. Hsia observes in his essay, there has been an “obsession with China” that has prevented Chinese intellectuals from addressing the universal value of human kind.11 Lin was one of the few exceptions who was free from such limitations. His “art for art sake” allows him to put aside politics and experiment a pure form of integrated art.12

Figure 16.0 - Qianlong and Royal Children. by Castiglione. Ink on silk.

Figure 17.0 - Bao Lian Deng Emperor by Lin. Gouache on paper.

Quoted in Chen Chuanxi, Zhongguo Hui Hua Li Lun Shi, (Taibei: Dong Da tu shu gong si, 1997), 236. 11

C.T. Hsia, A history of Modern Chinese Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 526. 12

Lin Fengmian, To the Art Community Nationwide, ed. Zhu Pu, Lin Fengmian Art Essay, (Shanghai: Shanghai Art and Culture Press: 1999), 150.

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Lin’s integrated art involves both a Western and Eastern way of perception. Bao Lian Deng depicts folklore from China. Three colourful ladies are the character performers in an opera. While the ancient and ritualistic quality of the Chinese figures speaks to the Western stereotype of China, the modernistic geometric forms and exaggerated colors arouse the curiosity of the Chinese audience about Western culture. Thus, the painting looks Chinese from a Western perspective and Western from a Chinese perspective. These two parallel ways of perception are nondiscriminative, free from any competition for superiority. Crane is one example of such. The abstract and rhythmic lines surrounding the crane suggest Western musicality and non-representational Modernism. The sketching lines of the crane dissolve into the vocabulary of abstraction. Thus the painting reflects the European Modernists’ view that Chinese traditional painting was intrinsically abstract and thus modern.13 In the meantime, it reflects the selfawareness of these views by the Chinese artist himself.

Figure 18.0 - Crane by Lin. Ink on paper.

Lin’s French teacher told Lin that Chinese painting had been very modern all the time and that Lin did not have to study European Modernism. ed. Zheng Zhao, Lin Fengmian Yanjiu Wen Ji,(Hanzhou: China Academy of Fine Art Press: 1995), 191.

Where Art Histories Collided And Converged

Although Castiglione devoted his whole life to painting for Chinese, and won the favour of the emperors, his works had never been publicly recognized by his contemporary Chinese because his blending was so obviously wrong for Chinese literati taste. He did not please Westerners neither because his painting did not resonate in the primitive and oriental feeling that colonizing Westerners expected to see in Chinese culture. His “failure” was a combination of power relationships between East and West and his vision of the world confined by art history. Conversely, Modernism gave the opportunity for the world’s two largest civilizations to find a converging point in their traditions of art, and allowed Lin Fengmian to succeed. However, the rupture of Chinese elite culture during the Cultural Revolution stifled Lin’s endeavour to modernize Chinese painting. As David Derwei Wang observes in his essay, Lin Fengmian is the most underestimated and understudied artist who had found a very good way to address the dilemma of modernizing and preserving Chinese painting, a problem that is still puzzling many contemporary Chinese artists nowadays.14 14

Maxwell K. Hearn and Judith G. Smith, Chinese Art Modern Expressions, (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art: 2001), 38.

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Works Cited

Chen Chuanxi, Zhongguo Hui Hua Li Lun Shi, (Taibei: Dong Da tu shu gong si, 1997) Hearn, Maxwell K. and Smith, Judith G.Chinese Art Modern Expressions, (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art: 2001) Hsia, C.T. A history of Modern Chinese Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)

Frances, Andres and Julia A Century in Crisis: Modernity and Tradition in the Art of Twentieth-century China (New York: Guggenheim Museum, 1998)

Fong, Wen C. Between Two Cutures: Late-Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Chinese Paintings from the Robert H. Ellsworth Collection in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York: Yale University Press, 2001) Lu Fusheng et al. Rong Hui Zhongxi de Tansuo, (Shanghai: Shanghai Books and Painting Press, 2000) Qing Xiaoyi, Collected Works of Giuseppe Castiglione, (Taipei: National Palace Museum 1983) Siren, Osvald The Chinese o The Art of Painting (New York: Library of Congress Publication: 2005)

Su Liqun, Lang Shining Zhuan Ji, (Beijing: Chinese Literature Press, 1998) Zheng Zhao et. al. Lin Fengmian Yanjiu Wen Ji,(A Collection of Research on Lin Fengmian) (Hanzhou: National Academy of Fine Art Press, 1995) Zhu Pu, Ling Fengmian Art Essay (Shanghai: Shanghai Art and Culture Press 1999)

ON POLITICS

ANITA Li

is a 4th-year undergraduate student majoring in International Relations and Asia-Pacific Studies, and minoring in English. Her research interests include Sino-American relations, bubble tea, and dumplings.

JAMES N. Tay

is a well-caffeinated 4th year political science specialist and a Hacktivist-in-training at the Citizen Lab, where he can often be found scanning the great firewall of china in his spare time.

Anita Li

A CASE STUDY IN PARTY PROPAGANDA: LOOKING AT THE 2008 SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE THROUGH A RED LENS

ABSTRACT In this essay, the author explores the propaganda system of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); this system is a potent means of power, one that is essential to maintaining the party’s mobilizing force and legitimacy. All political discourse is fixed within parameters that reflect the regime’s policies and claim to legitimacy. To illustrate this, the author performs a case study, assessing CCP-manufactured articles surrounding the Sichuan earthquake.

ANITA LI

A Case Study in Party Propaganda

With the introduction of the Internet and various other forms of new media, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has sought to limit access to these potential sources of dissent. Unlike China’s increasing economic liberalization following Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms, its media, on the contrary, has become increasingly restricted. Indeed, the Chinese government has made it common practice to repress recalcitrant individuals by shutting down their websites and blogs during periodic crackdowns; it has also implemented new and tighter controls to curb greater amounts and flows of information that threaten to become catalysts of online political mobilization.1 According to famed China expert Joseph Fewsmith, China “still maintains a hierarchical system of control over the media.”2 Through such organs as the China Daily Website and People’s Daily Online, China’s Department of Propaganda establishes the appropriate formulations—which Fewsmith terms “tifa”— that people are to use.3 This aforementioned system in which the CCP determines formal language and imposes it on major media outlets, is a potent means of power, one that is essential to maintaining the party’s mobilizing force and legitimacy. One is able to examine the CCP’s application of tifa in articles posted on official government websites; here, all political discourse is fixed within parameters delineated by a set of tifa that reflect the regime’s policies and claim to legitimacy.4 To illustrate this, I will assess CCPmanufactured articles surrounding the Sichuan earthquake. On May 12th 2008, an earthquake measuring 7.9 on the Richter scale hit Sichuan Province in western China, 1

Joseph Fewsmith, “The Changing Methodology of ‘Beijingology’” (Paper presented at the Conference on “Chinese Leadership, Politics, and Policy,” Boston, Massachusetts: November 2, 2005). 2 3 4

Ibid., 3. Ibid.

Ibid., 4.

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resulting in the deaths of thousands of people.5 Governmentmanufactured articles published about this event strive to legitimate CCP rule, and to enhance the Party’s mobilizing power. For the former, the articles focus on international commendation for the CCP’s post-quake relief work, and the general impression that all levels of party government are making a concerted effort to improve the situation in Sichuan. For the latter, the articles evoke a collective sense of mourning and cooperation amongst all classes in order for the government to better foster national unity, and to readily co-opt new groups into its communist regime.

To convey the image of a responsible government, the CCP draws upon international and domestic proof of its legitimacy. In terms of international support, the articles often reiterate messages and acts of compassion from foreign states. A People’s Daily Online article published on June 2nd 2008 states, “More countries and organizations have sent messages of condolence and aid to China following the devastating earthquake;” it cites Tunisia, Pakistan, Laos, Israel, Spain, and Ukraine as some countries that have partaken in the relief efforts.6 In meticulous detail, the article lists the exact cost and number of aid materials that were donated on behalf of each country, thereby emphasizing friendly relations between China and the international community at large, despite various and differing political ideologies. Particular attention is given to positive comments made by Western democratic powers such as that of the United States. In a People’s Daily Online article, U.S. President George W. Bush is said to have commended the strong response from the Chinese government in the wake of the disaster, and is also 5

Jake Hooker and Jim Yardley, “Powerful Quake Ravages China, Killing Thousands,” New York Times, (13 May 2008), <http://www.nytimes. com/2008/05/13/world/asia/13china.html?_r=1&oref=slogin>. 6

“International community continues to offer condolences, aid to quakehit China,” People’s Daily Online, (2 June 2008), <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6422925.html#>.

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quoted as saying that “‘the American people care about the people of China.’”7 Naturally, as the so-called “Leader of the Free World,” Bush’s comments lent legitimacy to the Chinese communist regime. Furthermore, America’s privileged position as China’s most important bilateral partner compels the latter to find ways to cooperate with the former. The CCP therefore recognizes Bush’s comments by publishing them on an official government website, and then reciprocates by quoting China’s ambassador to the United States’ statement that, “the two countries [America and China] are always helping each other in times of need” (a reference to China’s five million dollar donation to the U.S. following the destruction inflicted by Hurricane Katrina). This exchange legitimates the CCP as a reliable government administration, and solidifies Sino-American relations and thus China’s commitment to “global multi-polarity.”8 Overall, these articles featuring international support for China tap into the enduring Chinese desire for international respect and recognition as a great power. As a result, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, propaganda officials, and politicians have become increasingly skillful at manipulating symbols of international diplomacy to achieve this goal.9 Unlike its international counterpart, proof of the CCP’s legitimacy on a domestic level is derived not from rhetoric, but from the regime’s overall performance of meritocratic criteria at all levels of governance. But widespread cynicism persists within the Chinese population that there is pervasive corruption at local, provincial, and national levels of the Party-state. With government corruption a top concern of citizens, regime legitimacy has 7

“Bush impressed by China’s earthquake relief efforts,” People’s Daily Online, (7 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90883/6426258.html#>. 8 9

“China’s policy on Asia: Hu Jintao,” Renmin ribao, (24 July 2000).

David Shambaugh, “The Dynamics of Elite Politics During the Jiang Era,” China Journal (2001), 110.

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suffered setbacks.10 In the case of the Sichuan earthquake, the government media has highlighted the good deeds of both elite and local party officials to reverse this loss of confidence. A People’s Daily Online article lauds the efforts of a “self-giving policewoman [who became] a national model for her devotion to quake victims while her own mother and…daughter died in the…earthquake.”11 Moreover, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are also reported to have “played a model role” throughout reconstruction efforts.12 The “model” to which the article refers is ostensibly the CCP’s socialist-Maoist ideology that espouses collectivism as one of its doctrines, as opposed to Western individualism. With unabashed praise uncharacteristic of objective journalism, another article states, “as nearly 1.8 million members of the Communist Party of China risked their lives on the front line against the major quake…the Party has gained the hearts of 1.3 billion people.”13 It continues to cite unidentified “analysts” who say that “the ability of the CPC leadership to mobilize resources nationwide and launch major rescue work immediately has won it wide support.”14 The aforementioned statements clearly have biased language meant to rally Chinese citizens in support of their government and the latter’s reported post-quake reconstruction work. In an even more blatant attempt at debunking common notions of governmental corruption, one People’s Daily Online article entitled “Ministry of Commerce forbids promotions in guise of earthquake relief” reports on the “prohibition of business which disseminates false propaganda and runs illegal 10 11

ibid., 110.

“Self-giving policewoman in quake relief set national model,” People’s Daily Online, (1 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90785/6422188.html#>. 12

“China moved by CPC members in quake relief,” People’s Daily Online, (2 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90882/6422361.html#>. 13 14

ibid. ibid.

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promotional activities” in the name of earthquake relief.15 Another describes a CCP “discipline watchdog” that has dispatched inspection teams to ensure the proper use of relief materials and funds for quake-affected areas.16 Such articles are preemptive measures for the Party to defend against any accusations of dishonesty and corruption in the aftermath of the quake. Furthermore, the articles act as a sounding board for the government when there are rumours of mismanagement. For example, officials dismissed rumours of water contamination in quakestricken regions as a result of the burial of earthquake victims. In this article, a Ministry of Health spokesperson states that should there be an actual outbreak of disease, “it will be publicized promptly and transparently.”17 Similarly, reports of a nuclear explosion suspected to have caused the Sichuan earthquake were also refuted in an article quoting the Ministry of Environmental Protection, which stated that, “‘all nuclear facilities in Sichuan Province are safe and under control, [and] no radioactive substance leaks into the environment.’”18 It is interesting to note that there are common threads evident throughout these CCPmanufactured articles. First, they never question or take a critical stance against the government; rather, praise— often in the form of statements from CCP officials—is heaped upon the Party. Second, the articles do not take an objective viewpoint; they recount exclusively the party line without getting the other side of the story. Third, 15

“Ministry of Commerce forbids promotions in guise of earthquake relief,” People’s Daily Online, (5 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90884/6425112.html#>. 16

“CPC discipline watchdog tightens supervision over disaster relief fund, goods,” People’s Daily Online, (3 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90785/6423687.html#>. 17

“No mass health problems in quake zone, ministry says,” People’s Daily Online, (2 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90882/6422871.html#>. 18

“China moves all radiation sources in quake zone to safety,” People’s Daily Online, (6 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90882/6426185.html#>.

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many do not have any context, which leaves readers to question why the authors would write on a particular topic (e.g water contamination); here, it is clear that the government is merely refuting speculation of administrative mismanagement—indeed, genuinely transparent media ideally report hard facts, and do not address rumours.

In modern China, rapid socioeconomic transformation has overshadowed official communist ideology. Consequently, the CCP must create collective values to maintain social order, and to encourage compliance with party policy.19 In response, it has promoted nationalism and patriotism as a major source of elite legitimacy. Patriotism acts as a force that unites citizens, an ideological basis of regime legitimacy, and a means of combating Western ideological and cultural intrusions into China.20 Such is the basis behind the Party’s decision to use media to correctly guide public opinion—a critically important factor for cultivating nationalism.21 With article titles such as “China waives fees for cremation of quake victims,” the CCP strives to tug at emotions, and in the process, instill the Chinese people with nationalistic support for their country. This particular article states that a government official noticed online complaints and media criticism of cremation fees being too high, and in response, lowered them. The official is also quoted as saying that the Party “welcome[s] public and media scrutiny, which helps [them] to improve [their] services.”22 These statements achieve two objectives: the first is inducing warm emotions in citizens towards the state’s publicly virtuous actions, thereby resulting in nationalism; 19

Feng Chen, “Rebuilding the Party’s Normative Authority: China’s Socialist Spiritual Civilization Campaign,” Problems of Post-Communism (1998), 33. 20 21 22

ibid., 38.

ibid., 37.

“China waives fees for cremation of quake victims,” People’s Daily Online, (6 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90882/6426174.html#>.

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the second is giving the impression that transparency—and therefore responsible governance—is a top state priority. Nationalism can be stirred up in other ways as well. According to a China Daily Website article, Hollywood film actress Sharon Stone commented that the Sichuan earthquake was a result of karmic retribution for China’s refusal to grant Tibet independence.23 Following wide dissemination of Stone’s comments in the Chinese media, Chinese nationalists rallied together to condemn the actress.24

State-manufactured articles with emotional overtones also strive to encourage the co-optation of new groups into the CCP. Co-optation facilitates adaptation and hence regime durability by bringing into the Party new elites who may revitalize it with new goals and ideas.25 Accordingly, one People’s Daily Online article describes the efforts of a Chinese entrepreneur who both contributed to disaster relief and reconstruction work, in addition to encouraging his fellow businesspeople to do so as well. He is quoted as saying, “‘Wealth is like water. You can keep it to yourself when you have only one cup, but you should share it with others when you have a whole river.’”26 The entrepreneur’s actions and words, as described in the article, paint a picture of a member of a powerful emerging class in Chinese society who—despite his economic individualism—still subscribes to ideological collectivism, and therefore conforms to communist society. Furthermore, the mere mention of the entrepreneur’s class status would be absurd in genuinely transparent media, but reveals the imperative to effectively communicate the Party line in state-led media. In addition 23 �� “Sharon Stone not on China film festival guest,” China Daily Website, (4 June 2008), <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/showbiz/2008-06/04/ content_6738052.htm#>. 24 �ibid. 25

Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2003), 3. 26

“Chinese entrepreneur moves quake debris, and the country,” People’s Daily Online, (4 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90882/6424418.html#>.

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to businesspeople, non-communists are also targeted for co-optation into the Party, possibly to remove any political challenge towards the CCP. A similar article to the aforementioned states that, “members of China’s democratic parties, people without party affiliation, religious personnel, business owners, and overseas Chinese had donated nearly 8 billion yuan to quake-affected areas.”27 In describing this outpouring of support from numerous societal strata, the CCP wants to give the impression that the Party has connections to various types of people, and that co-opting new groups is a natural and encouraged course of action.

Unlike genuinely transparent media, the CCP publishes articles that reflect the regime’s policies and claim to legitimacy, as opposed to hard facts and objective views. For instance, state-run media have largely gone silent on the issue of the poorly built schools that failed to withstand the Sichuan earthquake, resulting in the loss of hundreds of young lives.28 Although Western media reports have blamed the shoddy construction on local government corruption, the Party prohibited domestic media from continuing to publish articles surrounding the controversy.29 Indeed, legitimating CCP rule and enhancing the Party’s mobilizing power— rather than delivering honest news—are the regime’s main goals. To achieve these goals through state-led media, the following is accomplished: for the former, the articles focus on international commendation for China’s post-quake relief work, and the general impression that all levels of party government are making a concerted effort to improve the situation in Sichuan; for the latter, the articles evoke a collective sense of mourning and cooperation amongst all 27

“Non-communists, businesses donate 8 bln yuan to China quake zone,” People’s Daily Online, (4 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90002/94020/6424437.html#>. 28

Andrew Jacobs, “Parents of Quake Victims Protest at Ruined Schools,” New York Times, (2 June 2008), <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/02/ world/asia/02china.html>. 29

ibid.

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classes in order for the government to better foster national unity, and to readily co-opt new groups into its communist regime. It is important to question the nature of China’s staterun media without jumping to oversimplified conclusions: is CCP propaganda a means of tyrannical suppression, a means of Party maintenance, or something in between? Works Cited “Bush impressed by China’s earthquake relief efforts.” People’s Daily Online, (7 June 2008), <http://english. people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6426258. html#>. Chen, Feng. “Rebuilding the Party’s Normative Authority: China’s Socialist Spiritual Civilization Campaign.” Problems of Post-Communism. (1998), 33-41.

“China moved by CPC members in quake relief.” People’s Daily Online, (2 June 2008), <http://english.people. com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6422361.html#>. “China’s policy on Asia: Hu Jintao.” Renmin ribao, (24 July 2000).

“China waives fees for cremation of quake victims.” People’s Daily Online, (6 June 2008), <http://english.people. com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6426174.html#>.

“Chinese entrepreneur moves quake debris, and the country.” People’s Daily Online, (4 June 2008), <http://english. people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6424418. html#>. “CPC discipline watchdog tightens supervision over disaster relief fund, goods.” People’s Daily Online, (3 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90785/6423687.html#>.

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Dickson, Bruce. Red Capitalists in China. (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2003).

Fewsmith, Joseph. “The Changing Methodology of ‘Beijingology.’” Paper Presented at the Conference on “Chinese Leadership, Politics, and Policy,” (Boston, Massachusetts: November 2, 2005). Hooker, Jake and Jim Yardley. “Powerful Quake Ravages China, Killing Thousands.” New York Times, (13 May 2008), <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/ world/asia/13china.html?_r=1&oref=slogin> “International community continues to offer condolences, aid to quake-hit China.” People’s Daily Online, (2 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90883/6422925.html#>.

Jacobs, Andrew. “Parents of Quake Victims Protest at Ruined Schools.” New York Times, (2 June 2008), <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/02/world/ asia/02china.html>. “Ministry of Commerce forbids promotions in guise of earthquake relief.” People’s Daily Online, (5 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90884/6425112.html#>. “No mass health problems in quake zone, ministry says.” People’s Daily Online, (2 June 2008), <http://english. people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6422871. html#>.

“Non-communists, businesses donate 8 bln yuan to China quake zone.” People’s Daily Online, (4 June 2008), <http://english.people.com. cn/90002/94020/6424437.html#>.

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“Self-giving policewoman in quake relief set national model.” People’s Daily Online, (1 June 2008), <http://english. people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6422188. html#>. Shambaugh, David. “The Dynamics of Elite Politics During the Jiang Era.” China Journal, (2001), 101-111.

“Sharon Stone not on China film festival guest,” China Daily Website, (4 June 2008), <http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/showbiz/2008-06/04/content_6738052.htm#>.

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THE INTERNET IN CHINA: EMPOWERMENT AND POLITICAL IMPACT ON STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

ABSTRACT The development of the Internet in China has become an increasingly hot topic in academic and policy circles. Never before has the emergence of a new form of information technology aroused such contentious debate on the potential political impact it may have on China and the consequences it may bring. This paper examines the political impact of the Internet as an empowering force on state-society relations in China. Two areas of impact are identified and analyzed. First, in empowering the state the Internet has accelerated China’s nation-state building efforts, and also become a new source of political legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party. Second, in empowering Chinese civil society, the Internet has enabled the emergence of an online public sphere where public discourse and public opinion has flourished. The paper also analyzes how the Internet has demonstrated the potential to effect political change in Chinese politics through the “HUO” 火 (“Fire” or Information Cascade) phenomenon.

JAMES N. TAY

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Introduction

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Much scholarly debate on the role of the Internet in China, and its political impact on state-society relations have centered on two opposing arguments. The first and more prominent argument is that the Internet empowers Chinese civil society, and that new information technologies such as the Internet will facilitate China’s democratization and transition away from authoritarianism.1 The counterargument is that the Internet empowers the state, and rather than undermining the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) power, the Internet is more likely to consolidate it. Moreover, because the CCP oversees the development of the Internet in China, it has been able to utilize the Internet to not only expand its own interests, but also promote its own priorities, and more importantly, shape the ways in which it is used by economic, political, and civil society actors.2 These two opposing arguments have resulted in a contentious debate on the political impact of the Internet on state-society relations in China, which in essence raises an important question: does the Internet empower Chinese civil society at the expense of the state, or vice versa? This paper addresses this question in two analytical steps, which contend that because power is not a zero-sum commodity, the Internet has empowered the state as well as society in China, and thus its impact has been mutually empowering and not exclusive. The paper begins firstly with an examination of how the Internet has empowered the Chinese state in the context of nation-state building by enabling it to achieve economic prowess through “leapfrog development” and to acquire a new source of political legitimacy. Secondly, it analyzes how the Internet has empowered civil society in two interrelated and significant ways: first, through the rise of an online Chinese public sphere that represents 1

Shanthi Kalathil, and Taylor Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 2

Zheng, Yongnian, Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China (California: Stanford University Press, 2008).

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a “new space” of interaction, where Chinese citizens can engage in public discourse and debate. Secondly, by facilitating the rise of online public opinion, the Internet has empowered civil society, demonstrating the potential to effect political change in Chinese politics through the “huo” 火 (“Fire” or Information Cascade) phenomenon. Empowering the State: The Internet and Nation-State Building

Historically, the development of science and technology has been a fundamental part of building the modern Chinese state. In post-Mao China, China has vigorously pursued a concerted national strategy of increasing industrial and technological modernization through economic reforms.3 It is within this reformist policy framework that the CCP has ardently promoted the Internet and information communication technologies (ICTs) as a strategic priority with two interrelated goals in mind: nationstate building/economic prowess, and political legitimacy. Economic Reform Development

and

the

Notion

Leapfrog

The CCP believes that the rapid development of the Internet and ICTs will allow it to achieve leapfrog development and lead to increased economic prowess.4 The concept of leapfrog development in less developed nations is closely related to the concept of the “advantage of backwardness” that was first formulated by Alexander Gerschenkron in his study of European and Russian 3

Under the aegis of Deng, China sought to achieve the “four modernizations”that is, the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology, through economic reforms. Lieberthal, Kenneth, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 134-136. 4

This belief has been concretely incorporated into policy initiatives like the “Informatisation of the National Economy (INE) program,” in the “Outline of the 10th Five-Year National Economic and Social Development Plan (2001-5) of the People’s Republic of China.”

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industrialization. Gerschenkron’s central thesis was that being backwards afforded certain countries the advantage of being able to short-circuit the expensive contours undergone by developed peer nations, thereby creating the possibility of high-speed economic development with the use of technologically superior equipment reinforced by an abundant supply of labor.5 In examining China’s Internet and ICTs development strategy, the pattern of growth corroborates Gerschenkron’s thesis of leapfrog development and the advantage of backwardness. Whilst industrialized countries that already possessed existing copper wire networks had to engage in an expensive process of switching to broadband fiber optic networks, China was able to jumpstart the process by deploying a nation-wide broadband fiber optic cable network from scratch without spending time and incurring costs reengineering existing networks.6 As a result, the CCP was able to accomplish its development of nation-wide broadband networks in China very rapidly compared to other Western industrialized nations.

The Internet and ICTs have become important drivers of economic growth in China, and have assisted in opening up significant opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs.7 According to China scholars, Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, the development of the Internet, and ICTs have invigorated an independent private sector, and led to the emergence of new domestic business elites.8 At the end of 2003, it was estimated that almost all of the big, 5

Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Belknap, 1962). 6

Xiudian Dai, “ICTs in China’s Development Strategy,” in Christopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, eds., China and the Internet: Politics of the Digital Leap Forward (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). p.13 7

Ding Lu, and Chee kong Wong, China’s Telecommunications Market: Entering a New Competitive Age (Advances in Chinese Economic Series) (Cheltenham; Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2003). 8

Shanthi Kalathil, and Taylor Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

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state-owned enterprises had utilized the Internet to develop their businesses, and some 47 percent of small-medium sized enterprises (SMEs) had connected to the Internet.9

The rapid rise of the number of websites registered under the dot-com.cn (.com.cn) domain can be considered indicative of the Internet’s impact on China’s new economy, with over 140,779 websites in 2003 being dot-com.cn (business websites).10 A survey conducted by the China Internet Network Information Center in 2003 also showed that the largest number of Internet users were from the manufacturing sector, education, public administration, and information technology (IT) sectors. The Internet and Empowering the State: A New Source of Political Legitimacy

As a critical component of the CCP’s nation-state building strategy, the Internet has empowered the Chinese state by enabling it to achieve leapfrog development and economic prowess. However, the Internet has also empowered the state in a more significant way, by enhancing the political legitimacy of the CCP. According to China scholar Zixue Tai, the CCP’s strategy of developing the Internet, and ICTs to promote regime legitimacy has been very successful, especially winning support from Chinese entrepreneurs.11 To the CCP and Chinese entrepreneurs, the Internet and ICTs not only boost economic development and national pride, but also represent a unique opportunity for China. As a senior Chinese government official put it, “We in the government think we missed a lot of the industrial revolution. 9

Zheng, Yongnian, Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China (California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 31-32. 10

China Internet Network Information Center, “China Internet Development and Usage Report (2003),” Available online at http://www. cnnic.net.cn/download/manual/2004/05/20/analysis_report2003.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2008). 11

Zixue Tai, The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society (New York: Routledge, 2006), 95.

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And we don’t want to miss this IT revolution”12 That said, the CCP’s rapid development of information technology, and the adoption of the Internet as a core component of its nationstate building strategy has not only enhanced its political legitimacy, but it has also empowered the state because the Internet has enabled it to sustain economic growth. Empowering Chinese Civil Society: The Internet and the Birth of an Online Public Sphere

Whilst the CCP has successfully utilized the Internet to empower it’s nation-state building efforts, it did not foresee that the Internet would also become an empowering force for Chinese civil society. The Internet has empowered Chinese civil society in two significant ways: firstly, it has given rise to an online public sphere that represents a “new space” of interaction, an alternative source of information, and a platform for communication, where Chinese citizens have engaged in public discourse and debate. Secondly, by facilitating the rise of online public opinion, the Internet has empowered civil society and demonstrated the potential to effect political change in Chinese politics through the “huo” (火) phenomenon.

The meteoric rise of the Internet as a popular tool of communication, and the sheer number of Chinese Internet users13 has contributed to the emergence of an online sphere for public debate and discourse. Indeed, some Chinese scholars such as Zixue Tai have described Chinese cyberspace as essentially a Habermasian public sphere of the twentyfirst century.14 The concept of a public sphere as formulated by Jurgen Habermas consists of three essential elements: first, it is a public composed of autonomous individuals that engage in rational debate; second, it is a space where the public may freely assemble for such debate; and last, a 12

Quoted in Zixue Tai, The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society (New York: Routledge, 2006), 94. 13 14

(253 million)

Zixue, Tai, The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society (New York: Routledge, 2006),183-206.

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media of communication.15 The Chinese online public sphere is made up of a variety of online communication spaces such as blogs and instant messaging, social networking services such as QQ, search engines, RSS aggregation tools such as Baidu (www.baidu.com) and Zhuaxia (www.zhuaxia.com) that have empowered Chinese Internet users with an unprecedented capacity for communication, citizen participation and fostered public discourse; indeed, some China scholars have estimated that online spaces, including blogs, may number in the hundreds of thousands to the millions.16

Blogs have emerged as an important online communication space in the Chinese online public sphere. A survey report conducted by the China Internet Network Information Center in 2007 estimated that the number of blogs on the Chinese Internet was 72.8 million, with the total number of bloggers in China in the range of 47 million.17 While much of the content on blogs are personal, there are increasing numbers of Chinese bloggers writing on public and social issues, and for China scholar Xiao Qiang, such bloggers represent the emergence of a new cohort 15

Habermas, Jurgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). While Habermas’s conception of the public sphere is idealistic, this paper contends that the Chinese online public sphere imperfect as it is, does possess some of these elements, and has arguably transformed China’s traditional communication landscape, evident by the proliferation of online spaces, which have facilitated public discourse, and empowered civil society through new forms of citizen participation. In that sense, this paper emphasizes public sphere as a “new space” for communication, public discourse, and debate, or simply as a sphere of interaction. 16

Yang Guobin, “The Internet and Civil Society: a Preliminary Assessment.” (Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 12, Number 36, August 2003), 453-475. Available online at http://bc.barnard.columbia.edu/~gyang/ Civil%20society%20web.pdf (Accessed June, 15, 2008), 461. 17

China Internet Network Information Center, “CNNIC Releases 2007 Survey Report on China Weblog Market Number of Blog Writers Reaches 47 Million Equaling One Fourth of Total Netizens.” Available online at http://www.cnnic.cn/html/Dir/2007/12/27/4954.htm (Accessed June 20, 2008).

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of public opinion leaders in their local communities.18

Furthermore, blogs have also facilitated public discourse in the Chinese online public sphere. Due to their unique nature, blogs allow netizens to not only post comments to what is written, but at the same time blogs also link to other blogs and websites that in turn further link to numerous other blogs and websites. The result is an interconnected and dynamic community of blogs, the “Chinese blogosphere.” The Rise of Online Public Opinion

In Habermas’s conception, public opinion is vital to the functioning of a viable and healthy public sphere,19 and it is in the Chinese online public sphere, where public opinion in China has flourished, and more importantly, where it is increasingly being expressed. Rising online public opinion through BBS, online forums and blogs have become an increasingly influential force, which has empowered Chinese civil society by providing an outlet for them to speak out, and in a more fundamental way reshaped state-society relations. For instance, a flood of online public opinion in the public sphere regarding breaking news events or major social issues has in the past prompted the state authorities to respond and to take action to address problems and concerns.20 Some scholars have described this process of a sudden flood of online public opinion and interplay between society’s concerns, 18

Xiao Qiang, “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and its Political Impact.” Available online at http://jmsc.hku.hk/blogs/circ/files/2008/06/xiao_ qiang.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2008). 19

Habermas, Jurgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). 20

Zixue, Tai, The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society (New York: Routledge, 2006), 197.

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and the state’s response as the “huo” (火) phenomenon.21 Effecting Political Change: “huo” (火) phenomenon

The “huo” (火) phenomenon occurs when news reports, comments on online forums, photos or videos resonate among Chinese netizens and spread through the online public sphere like “wildfire.” The source of this wildfire can be anything from a simple BBS post, blog story or an article from a local newspaper such as the Southern Weekend. This then generates into a storm of thousands of BBS comments or blog posts and is driven by what dense clusters of Chinese Internet users find engaging or important.22 The political impact of the “huo” phenomenon is not to be underestimated as the speed and sheer volume of messages that reverberate in the online public sphere can place great pressure on the state, and force it to respond like a massive flood whose waves increasingly crash on the walls of the Three Gorges Dam. The case of the Shanxi brick kilns where a single letter published on an online forum sparked off a storm of online public opinion provides excellent insight into the “huo” phenomenon. Defending Rights, and Fighting Injustice, the Shanxi Brick Kilns 21

While the study of information cascades is not new, China scholar Xiao Qiang has adapted the phenomenon to the Chinese context by describing it as a “HUO” 火, “Fire” phenomenon.. Xiao Qiang, “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and its Political Impact.” Available online at http://jmsc.hku.hk/blogs/circ/files/2008/06/xiao_ qiang.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2008). Drezner, Daniel, “Weighing the Scales: The Internet’s Effect on State-Society Relations.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (March 22, 2006). Available online at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_ citation/1/0/0/1/2/pages100121/p100121-1.php (Accessed July 21, 2008). 22

Xiao Qiang, “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and its Political Impact.” Available online at http://jmsc.hku.hk/blogs/circ/files/2008/06/xiao_ qiang.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2008).

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The Shanxi brick kiln case emerged in 2007 after a story broke out about a group of fathers from Henan province that had gone to Shanxi province looking to rescue their children who had been illegally abducted and forced into slave labor. Although the fathers had managed to rescue 40 children out of an estimated 1,000,23 local police who were in league with the kiln owners soon blocked any further rescue efforts. Like the earlier example of Sun Zhigang, the fathers attempted to get help from local authorities but were turned away. Desperate, the fathers of the abducted children published a moving and open letter on June 7, 2007, which they then posted on the popular online forum Tianya Club (http://tianya.cn/).24 The fathers’ online letter would spark a storm of BBS comments and blog posts that spread like wildfire, and the “huo” phenomenon reverberated throughout the Chinese online public sphere. Public discourse flourished furiously on the online public sphere as outraged Chinese Internet users debated the problems of local official corruption, poor governance, and questioned how slavery could still exist in 21st century China.25 Subsequently, the official Chinese media would pick up on the story and began reporting on the atrocities that occurred at the brick kiln. According to China scholar Xiao Qiang, this was a significant step because when information becomes “huo” on the Internet, the traditional media are then given a legitimate reason to 23

Zhu Zhe, “More than 460 Rescued from brick kiln slavery,” China Daily (2007-06-15) Available online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ china/2007-06/15/content_894802.htm (Accessed July 21, 2008). 24

Original of the fathers’ letter on Tianya forum is available here http:// www.tianya.cn/new/publicforum/Content.asp?idWriter=0&Key=0&strIte m=free&idArticle=926643&flag=1 (Accessed July 21, 2008). Translation of the fathers’ letter by China Digital Times can be found here http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/06/who-can-save-our-childrenfathers-of-400-enslaved-children/ (Accessed July 21, 2008). 25

Joel Martinsen, “Political Structure and the Shanxi kiln scandal.” Danwei. Available online at http://www.danwei.org/media_and_advertising/hongdong_emergency_ political_r.php (Accessed July 21, 2008).

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also report it.26 News in the media, together with bloggers’ comments and analysis together with powerful photos of the missing children would circulate throughout the online public sphere. As the public began to raise more and more critical questions, prompted by the surge of public opinion, China’s top leaders, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, ordered an immediate investigation into the case.27

The investigation into the case was rapidly launched, and it revealed that local party officials had been working in tandem with local police and had profited from these slavery operations. With rising online public opinion and under increasing pressure, the authorities moved swiftly to take action sending 35,000 police officers to raid 7,500 kiln sites, and arresting 95 local officials in the process.28 The case of the Shanxi brick kilns illustrates how the Internet empowers civil society by providing an outlet for civil society to speak out. Moreover, the Shanxi brick kilns case is an example of mutual empowerment of both state and society. This is because the state enhanced its political legitimacy by displaying public concern over the issue (Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s public response), thus showing it cared seriously about the public’s concerns. Moreover, it used the opportunity to purge local corrupt officials and to keep its party ranks in check. Conclusion

In assessing the political impact of the Internet on state-society relations, this paper has showed that the Internet has empowered both the state and society. For the 26

Xiao Qiang, “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and its Political Impact.” Available online at http://jmsc.hku.hk/blogs/circ/files/2008/06/xiao_ qiang.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2008). 27

“China Orders Probe into Slavery.” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/ world/archives/2007/06/16/2003365501 (Accessed July 30, 2008). 28

“95 Officials Punished for brickwork slavery.” Available online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/16/content_5436296.htm (Accessed July 30, 2008).

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state, the Internet has empowered its nation-state building efforts and enabled it to achieve economic prowess through leapfrog development. The success of this has resulted in a significant new source of political legitimacy for the state. For civil society, the Internet has empowered it through the rise of an online public sphere, which for Chinese civil society represents an unprecedented “new space” and platform for communication where Chinese netizens have been able to come together to engage in public discourse. At the same time, the Internet has empowered civil society by facilitating the rise of online public opinion, which has shown the potential to effect political change in Chinese politics through the “huo” (火) phenomenon.

The political impact of the Internet in China has been an unprecedented role in reshaping the dynamics between the state and society, and transforming their relations. Whereas in the past, Chinese politics was the sole domain of the CCP, the Internet has now enabled civil society to participate, albeit limitedly in the political process. And as the state comes to terms with a civil society increasingly seeking new forms of participation in public life it has had to respond, and to adapt to this new development in Chinese politics. As noted China scholar Xiao Qiang reflected on the Internet’s impact on Chinese politics: “We are now starting to see the compromise, negotiation, and rule changing behavior in the way the CCP responds to this challenge, indicating the future possibility of more open, and accountable governance, with greater citizen participation.”29 That the state has allowed this new development to take place, and responded positively, is a significant move in and of itself in Chinese politics.

Xiao Qiang, “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and its Political Impact,” Available online at http://jmsc.hku.hk/blogs/circ/files/2008/06/xiao_ qiang.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2008).

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Yang Guobin, “The Internet and Civil Society: a Preliminary Assessment,” Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 12, Number 36, August 2003 http://bc.barnard.columbia.edu/~gyang/ Civil%20society%20web.pdf (Accessed June, 15, 2008). Xinhua Net, “Study Report of Online Public Opinions in 2007, 2008-02-05.

Zheng, Yongnian, Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China (California: Stanford University Press, 2008).

SECOND THOUGHT:

Commentary

WENYUAN CHEN

Armed with International Relations and mounted on East Asian Studies, Wenyuan loves the exploration of existential complexities. The windswept experiences in his nomadic life have since inspired him to raise awareness and widen interest in the Asians dispersed across the world through his newly-founded club - Asian Diaspora.

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MY ABBA’S BLESSED ESSAY

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China has historically been geographically conscious—this trait is best expressed in its historical tradition, in which China places upon itself the position of centrality, as is strongly suggested by its present name which translates to “Middle Kingdom.” However, I would contend that the notion of centrality, although common, is not homogenous among all ethnic Chinese. Foucault’s advocacy of genealogical history provides us with a more incisive approach to understanding China. In this essay, I will use particular historical and geographical interpretations of Chinese nationals and Chinese diaspora to demonstrate the stark contrasts and different strands in perceiving the present China. The crux in understanding these differences among Chinese individuals lies in the historical circumstances that led each to select a specific geographical territory as its centre. Nonetheless, each of their centres is their “China,” the individual’s source of Chinese culture. In turn, with the geographical selection in place, subsequent history is built within such borders. Succinctly, history creates a geographical centre within which history further develops. In this sense, the study of a Chinese individual’s interpretation of subjective history and geography is complementary as each illuminates the other. The most common way of viewing China is to see it as a nation state. Externally, viewing China as circumscribed by its national borders allows us to assess its developments. Borders as delineated after World War 2 are to be kept as such. Any attempts at territorial expansion outside of its borders they will remind us of China’s many historical expansionist attempts. Moreover, China’s political borders are set in the present context of sovereignty as protected through the collective efforts of members of the United Nations. This post-World War 2 historical development of the ideal of peace through collective agreement not only aids our understanding of the geographical limits of China, but in fact largely enforces and thus defines them. It is only within these borders that China can legitimately develop. Therefore, our understanding of China’s internal historical developments are in turn geographically confined. Describing and developing history within confined boundaries mirrors

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the Chinese historical tradition of describing what happens within each dynasty, even considering the differences between the modern conception of a nation state and the conception of China in the dynastic period . Dynasties seek to write their own histories in the tradition of Sima Qian’s Shiji and view only developments within the border as Chinese development. There is an important difference in that then, dynasties had the option of enlarging geographical territory to bring a greater area under “Chinese” historical development. Nevertheless, history defines a space, be it fixed or expandable, within which further history takes place. Naturally, as a result of such confines, a Chinese national may look at China through the lens of national boundaries. Chinese historical developments within are taken unquestionably as national developments, and those without as affairs which may potentially affect China. Even aid rendered to allies would be placed under the category of foreign affairs. Such political configurations may also alter with changing political inclinations and historical developments, but the annexation of allies would be highly unlikely under the overarching notion of sovereignty. To a Chinese national with a less sophisticated analysis, geography has been politically defined and in turn, China’s history will be geographically confined.

Under the prevailing ideology of nationalism, it may seem that such an outlook is the only legitimate means by which to view China. However, the perspectives of members of the Chinese diaspora complicate but deepen the understanding of the mutual illumination of historical and geographical definitions. Like the Joseon Koreans, the diaspora’s China exists even outside the traditional boundaries. The Joseon Koreans, though not considered a diaspora, sought to emulate Ming Chinese culture, and even with the domination of China by the Manchurians under the Qing Dynasty, these Koreans attempted to preserve Chinese culture lost in China and even retained Ming reign titles to establish a temporal and cultural continuity (Secondary 64). In this sense, they have moved China outside of its, then political, confines. A China that was no longer existent in its original location existed in Korea. A similar romantic historical act was mirrored by the Chinese diaspora,

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with their movement of China to their new settlements. China’s cultural geography, as a centre, takes on a new interpretation in the eyes of these migrants. In so doing, they have created a preserve of China outside East Asia, which we should still consider as East Asia because it was precisely such a spatial territory that these immigrants planned to carve out by propagating, like the Koreans, past institutions and beliefs. Within this territory, a new interpretation and development of “China” takes place.

The notion of centrality that China has used in defining its history, the way of viewing people outside the confines of the centre as outsiders, is employed by some of these migrants. This phenomenon is especially conspicuous presently in Malaysia, where the Chinese population is numerically balanced against the indigenous Malays. The political and historical development of the state of Malaysia, with its communalist policies, further enhances the inside/ outside dichotomous view of the Chinese population. From here, we can analyze how the ethnic Chinese created cultural geographies and propagated their version of China from within. To Malaysian Chinese, some of which are fifth generation migrants, China and Chinese culture is now defined within physical centres and embodied in the diaspora’s own being. Physical centres include temples which make possible the continued practice of Chinese folk religion, clan associations which group those who trace their ancestries to a particular common region in China, and Chinese language schools which propagate Chinese language and culture. However, it is not solely within these physical enclaves that their sources of identity lie. More importantly, China and Chinese-ness is deemed to be embodied in the physical bodies and genealogy of the ethnic Chinese. This is why interracial marriage is taboo, as it will disrupt the clear genealogical continuity of their Chinese lineage and heritage. To diasporic Malaysian Chinese who continue to identify themselves as Chinese, China as a centre with which to describe their personal histories is less relevant than these centres which they have identified for themselves. These centres, physical and metaphysical, I would thus argue, are presently their new “China.”

The importance of understanding historical

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circumstances that shape cultural geography can be vividly observed in the conflict that arises when a Chinese national meets a fifth generation migrant in the birthplace of the latter. This conflict can be perceived as the result of different historical and geographical understandings of ”China.” Both parties continue to view themselves as ethnic Chinese, but discrimination occurs as each does not fully view the other as its own kind. Both parties are unable to relate perfectly to each other, as a result of their differing personal histories and cultural geographies. On the other hand, a member of the Chinese diaspora without knowledge of modern Chinese history, upon arrival in China, may be taken aback by the dominant Communist governmental structure and ideology, which stands in contrast to the Confucian social structure and Taoist religious beliefs of the Qing Dynasty China that were in place at the time of their ancestors’ migration. This conflict is similarly expressed when a Korean ship was wrecked in China, and the surprising discovery of the continued use of Ming reign titles was made. The gravity of this difference even led the Qing government to demand an explanation from the Joseon government (Secondary 62). Different historical and political circumstances brought about the creation of different cultural geographies, which then led to different historical events that determined the individual’s understanding of present China. One form of understanding may be an affront to the other. In essence, subjectivity in the understanding of geography and history of present-day China is expressed in the differences between the perspectives of the Chinese national and the Chinese diaspora. This difference is parallelled respectively in the comprehension of China by traditional historians, like Sima Qian, from inside China, and that of the Joseon Koreans from outside China. Chinese diasporas and Joseon Korea are subjects that illustrate how and why dissimilar histories would produce different cultural geographies, that in turn create different subsequent histories. Thus, studying specific historical circumstances of individuals and their particular contexts will illustrate their geographical boundaries. From within these borders, we will be able to explain how individuals’ histories develop in accordance to how they interpret present-day China.