Trinity Agora Winter 2014

Agora

Trinity

INSIDE: UK Federalism Women in Iran Brazil’s Election

Democracy in Hong Kong Trinity College Dublin’s Political Magazine

Winter 2014

From Our Editor At Trinity Agora, we pride ourselves on our particular offbeat brand of journalism; we take perspectives you have never encountered on the headlines of the day as well as issues you have just plainly never heard of and show you why they matter. We didn’t start the fire (it was always burning since the world’s been turning), but we can show you shapes in it that you never knew existed.

To this end, this issue looks at everything from how Iranian women are coping under the Islamic Republic to whether, or how, Ireland remembers its war dead. The ideas range from simple and straightforward, exploring how a better road might bring Northern Ireland and the Republic closer together, to the intricate, with a piece on how and why contemporary counterinsurgency tactics are ill equipped to deal with the myriad of conflicts nations find themselves embroiled in. The world is brimming with political challenges; from the refugee crises in the Mediterranean and North Africa, to European economic stagnation, to the cries for democracy from the streets of Hong Kong. We have articles on all of these too.

With the pace of news somehow managing to increase year on year, the Agora presents an opportunity for mature consideration; some of the topics we cover are urgent, some are not, but all are important. We have extensive analysis on the possibility of Kurdistan, a decades-old dream that is just as poignant to the Kurdish people as it was 50 years ago. We aim to continue to give voice to things like this, motivated by the idea that if something resonates so strongly with a group of people, however small, it can prove just as compelling to the public at large given the right platform. I hope, at least in a small way, we have succeeded in this.

Thanks, as ever, are owed to our whole production team, they have done a fantastic job putting together a magazine that I am positively enthusiastic about showing people. Kevin Threadgold has once again outdone himself in making a publication about politics better looking than it has any right to be, and the section editors have continued the tradition of gathering extremely high quality articles that challenge and inform. I hope you take as much pleasure in reading this as we did putting it together.

Jonathan McKeon Editor-in-Chief

Section Editors James Prendergast Camille Maye Disha Patel Tony O’Connor Fionn McGorry William Foley General Manager Conor McGlynn Treasurer William Hugh Dunne

Design/Photo Editor Kevin Threadgold Cartoonist Taylor Smariga Photo Credits p.3: Brian Higgins p.8: Fry1989 p.9: David Iliff p.10: JLogan p.15-17: Pasu Au Yeung p.25: Caomhan27 p.27: Fabio Rodrigues Pozzebom/ Agencia Brasil

Thanks to Grehan Printers; KC Peaches; Trinity Publications; the Ecumenics and Economics departments; MDP programme; particular thanks to our writers.

The opinions expressed in this magazine are of the respective authors and not necessarily those of the magazine.

Contents

4 A New Challenge for the Euro?

We analyse the impact of the emergence of local European microcurrencies.

7 The F in UK

Federalism is now a hot topic in British politics, rich in detail and intrigue.

10 “What’s the Matter with Europe?”

The meaning of ‘European’ in a political economy context has changed in recent times.

12 Libya, Egypt & the Challenge for Africa

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, we evaluate its two most promising revolutions.

15 The Umbrella Revolution: Democracy Central?

A fascinating insight into the popular movement that has made the world take notice.

18 The Women of Iran

We invite you to rethink your conception of female life in post-revolution Iran.

20 The Case for Kurdistan

Thrown into the spotlight by upheaval in Iraq, the Kurdish nation is moving closer to autonomy …

22 Understanding Kurdistan

… but how exactly would this burgeoning state be constituted?

23 The Road to Reconciliation

Moving on from a damaging past, good transport infrastructure can make good neighbours.

24 The Republic Remembers

Sybolism, amnesia, and bloodshed complicate Ireland’s relationship with WWI commemoration.

26 The Dilma Dilemma

Brazil’s re-elected president has promised to do better than previously. Will she deliver?

28 Sea of Death - A Refugee Crisis

On Europe’s southern border, thousands of people are risking their lives for a better future.

30 The Complexity of Counterinsurgency

Most global military conflicts now involve tough attempts to suppress internal uprisings.

Get involved - write for Trinity Agora Send submissions to agoratrinity@gmail.com Find us on Facebook Follow us on twitter: @AgoraTrinity

A New Challenge for the Euro?

Black Monday, September 16, 2008. Ever since the criticisms against the euro haven’t stopped. For a long time they remained only theorical, politicians keep using the threat of leaving the Euro zone as campaign promises, but now the euro has to face a new challenge with the appearance of local currencies. And the number of countries seduced by this idea keeps getting bigger: Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom... Though is this new trend a threat for the euro?

First of all, considering the euro aims to be the currency in-between the member States, local currencies do not have a global objective, not even at a State level. Their extent is rather narrowed to a regional scale. Even the State monopoly to issue a currency is not challenged insofar as it is run by local associations.

Nonetheless their importance should not be overlooked: local currencies do provide benefits the euro hasn’t been able to bring. Most importantly it acts as an incentive for local economy: because the money issued in local currency cannot be saved up, and because the stores able to deal with that currency need to meet some criteria, the people tend to spend more in local places and change their traditional shopping areas. The idea of regional identity also acts as a driving force for many people to take the step and use the local currency. That happened in the Basque Country where the Eusko, issued in January 2013, enjoys great success.

In addition to encouraging consumption, local currencies act as a regulation policy on the market. The merchants wishing to use it need to meet some criteria decided by the associations, such as waste sorting, encouraging sustainable development, being an independent store; concepts that people want to adopt today in order to be a responsible consumer.

Those ideas seem convincing in theory but, does it actually work? In fact, besides modern-day examples, the issue of such a currency has already worked in a similar context. When in 1929 Europe started to face one of the biggest economic crises of the century, the Wörgl was issued in Austria. And the result did not take long to be noticeable: unemployment decreased by 25% within two years. Though the currency stopped being issued, it was not because of its ineffectiveness. On the contrary, it worked so well that the Austrian Central Bank feared it would achieve a monopoly.

Nowadays though the configuration of local currencies makes it difficult to challenge the monopoly of the Euro, the European Central Bank itself accepts and tolerates this practice. The results appear mostly positive for the moment, and it seems to be a creative solution to struggle against the crisis.

Camille Maye LLM, European Law

“In addition to encouraging consumption, local currencies act as a regulation policy on the market … the results appear mostly positive for the moment, and it seems to be a creative solution to struggle against the crisis.”

4 | Agora

Europe | 5

printers

grehan

printers

grehan

The team behind the print production of the Irish Pharmacy Union Yearbook and Diary

High Quality Printing & Design • • • • •

student discount 7% Available in all four locations Nassau Street, Pearse Street, Dame Street and St Stephens Green during the academic year.

Graphic Design Lithographic Printing Digital Printing Business Stationery Large Format Printing

design

• • • • •

printing

Posters & Flyers Magazines & Brochures Point of Sale Wedding Stationery Invitations

finishing

tel: 01 677 5111

“Many of the UK’s

closest neighbours have federal systems … yet any attempts to reform the British constitution have been viewed with intense suspicion.”

“Whatever form

the new framework takes, it is clear that the UK must alter soon and significantly if it is to survive another three centuries.”

Is it time to put …

The F in UK? Three hundred years after it was cobbled together, the political structure of the United Kingdom no longer works – that much at least is clear, almost two months after the Scottish people voted to remain within this ailing union. In doing so, they threw the constitutional future of the UK wide open.

Scotland’s pro-union vote occurred after the leaders of the main national parties vowed to devolve greater powers to Holyrood, but the sincerity of these vows was called into doubt the very morning after the referendum as Prime Minister David Cameron immediately began hedging his promises around with retrospective qualifications.

Ever since devolution was first mooted in the 1970s, it has been dogged by the intractable issue of the West Lothian question: should Scottish MPs be able to vote in Westminster on issues devolved to the Scottish parliament, and in which they therefore had no stake. It was on the condition of solving this problem, once referred to by former Conservative Party

leader Iain Duncan Smith as a ‘democratic monstrosity’, that Cameron agreed to carry out his pre-referendum vow to devolve further powers to Holyrood.

Cameron’s proposal of ‘English votes for English laws’ would certainly solve this issue but at the expense of further alienating Scotland from national government by relegating their representatives to a secondary level. Even more divisive is his proposal that all income tax decisions be devolved to Scotland.

If implemented, this would call into question not only the voting rights of Scottish MPs on the UK budget, but also their right to continue receiving additional funding through the Barnett formula from a central

Europe | 7

government to whose tax receipts they would no longer be contributing.

These issues are not unique to Scotland – Wales, Northern Ireland and London all have elected assemblies with various devolved powers, and regional authorities across the rest of England are pressing for greater autonomy.

Any solution to this constitutional crisis must encompass the entirety of Britain, not just Edinburgh and London. The Labour Party has long been committed to this programme of regional devolution, but seems to be missing a rather obvious trick. In a recent article for the Guardian, former PM Gordon Brown lambasted Cameron’s cynical revision of his earlier promises. Brown, defending Scotland’s plenipotentiary Westminster MPs, cited a wide range of countries in which slight democratic imbalances were tolerated as the price for fair representation of small regions

8 | Agora

at a national level. Nearly every example he cited was of a federal state, yet the word itself hardly appeared in his article. This is symptomatic of a Westminster lexicon in which the f-word is given a wide berth. Many of the UK’s closest neighbours, as well as a significant number of former British colonies, have federal systems allowing them to better balance regional and national interests, yet any attempts to reform the British constitution have traditionally been viewed with intense suspicion. As Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of European Studies at the University of Oxford, recently noted, ‘Britain is like a man who has left a trail of puddles behind him, and lives at sea, but keeps insisting that he doesn’t like water’. This is a particular shame as the water really could be lovely.

Over the past two decades, Britain has already transferred an unprecedented level of power to regional governments which function on a quasi-federal basis, but what form could we expect a fully federal UK to take? It is impossible to answer this question definitively as there has been little debate on this topic on a national political level, but we can perhaps attempt to sketch a broad outline. A 2012 pamphlet for the Federal Trust by Andrew Blick and George Jones from the University of London laid out some of the chief problems confronting a federal UK, foremost amongst them being English demographic and economic dominance. Containing 85% of Britain’s population, England would either be subdivided into component regions or counterbalanced by a USstyle federal upper house if it is to be prevented from becoming overly dominant. Certain core competencies would be maintained by the federal government while many powers would be devolved to

the regional governments. A Scottish Liberal Democrat green paper, drawing on the experience of Canada, Germany and Australia also proposed maintaining ‘partnership powers’, requiring co-operation between federal and regional governments on such policy areas as research, welfare and energy. If the House of Lords is maintained as a federal upper house, it would certainly only be after considerable reform of the manner of its appointment, completing the exclusion of the hereditary peerage begun in 1999. Such radical changes would present an opportunity to create a written constitution untangling

Better apart?: David Cameron (left) and Nigel Farage (right) have come out in favour of limited forms of federalism, whereas Gordon Brown (centre) staunchly opposes the idea. the Gordian knot of British constitutionalism.

Such a system would offer a neat solution to the current tension between central government and demands for regional devolution and give political expression to the regional identities which currently awkwardly cohabit the UK’s part-centralised, part-devolved system of government.

Standardised regional government and taxation would resolve the West Lothian question and protect federal subsidisation of poorer regions. Bringing political decision-making closer to the people it affects might also play a role in curbing the UK’s growing tide of voter apathy. The Hansard Society’s annual Audit of Political Engagement has shown faith in and engagement with national politics reaching a nadir under the current government. However, they also show a significantly larger popular appetite for local politics, where people are more likely to feel they have some sort of impact, over national politics, where they don’t.

If a federal system would bring all these benefits, why is it

not more widely considered? It would be overly simplistic, not to say cynical, to attribute the defence of Westminster’s political hegemony by establishment parties as being motivated purely by self-interest. There are significant problems with this proposal, besides the purely logistical. Those calling most vociferously for increased devolution or full federalism are, unsurprisingly, those who would benefit most – local representatives, businessmen, and populist politicians like Nigel Farage (a surprising recent convert to the cause of British federalism) and Alex Salmond, seeking to present themselves as true representatives of regional nationalisms. The British public is a good deal less enthusiastic about decentralisation. Leaving aside Scotland, where the unionists enjoyed a steady if narrow majority even before the promises of further devolution, we see little evidence of an appetite for further devolution elsewhere in Britain. The last Labour government’s efforts to extend devolution to elected local assemblies in England were derailed in 2004 after a referendum in the

North East, the region thought to be most amenable to the proposal, rejected it by 78%.

However, there is evidence that views are changing. The Scottish referendum gave the rest of Britain pause to appreciate the implications of UK membership, both good and bad. Recent polls in Wales suggest that as enthusiasm for independence falls to an all-time low, support for further devolution is rising. Comparable polling has yet to take place in England, but the calls from local authorities for increased powers are widespread and mounting. A federal Britain is still a pipe dream, but hopefully one that will feature increasingly prominently in national political discourse as Britain goes about redrawing its constitutional framework. Whatever form the new framework takes, it is clear that the UK must alter soon and significantly if it is to survive another three centuries.

David Briscoe SS History

Europe | 9

“Government passivity and withdrawal from the economy in certain circumstances is now perceived as a particularly “European” phenomenon.”

When comparisons are made between different regions of the “developed world”, and particularly between the United States and Europe, the most common feature which distinguishes European countries is often said to be their commitment to government intervention in the economy, as opposed to the pure “free market” ideology of the United States.

There are plenty of reasons for this. European countries have higher levels of taxation, higher levels of government spending and higher levels of government-driven redistribution of incomes.

What’s more, this is a difference that is very historically embedded.

Europe’s ideological and practical affinity towards more active intervention in economy and society goes back to well over a hundred years ago and has been noticed for just as long – albeit allowing for some caveats such as higher protection of trade by the United States in many periods.

10 | Agora

But in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, something rather strange has happened.

While in the initial phase of the crisis governments on both sides of the Atlantic not only poured money into their faltering banking systems but also engaged in extensive Keynesian-style stimulus packages to hold up their economies, since 2009 a divergence has emerged.

The United States implemented a wide-ranging, though by many accounts still inadequate, fiscal stimulus package in 2009 and largely retained its spending levels since then, in spite of major political disputes and congressional deadlock over the issue. In the last year, meanwhile, the conservative government of Japan has engaged in an ambitious project of fiscal stimulus and monetary easing aimed at reviving Japan’s stagnant economy.

In Europe on the other hand, both European national governments and EU and Eurozone-level institutions have been

comparatively passive with respect to reacting to the economic crisis, even as it has become, to paraphrase an old term, the sick man of the global economy since 2010.

In fact, in contrast to much of the rest of the world, the economic discourse among Europe’s leaders and governing bodies has become dominated by calls for economic retrenchment and a general sense that, either in terms of its fiscal excess or its stifling regulations, government was the problem not the solution. European institutions and leaders demanded more and more ferocious cuts in the budgets of peripheral countries even as it was evidently driving them further into recession and even as the historically austerity-happy IMF shouted stop. In consequence, European “recovery” in the aftermath of the 2008-9 financial crisis has been noticeably slower and more problematic than the United States and most of the rest of the world.

The most striking current contrast is perhaps the attitude to inflation. Although excessive inflation can be an objective economic issue, the emphasis given to concerns over often moderate levels of inflation can betray particular ideological biases on the appropriate relationship between business, labour and the state and for or against expansionary monetary or fiscal government intervention in the economy. Higher levels of inflation are targeted by sceptics of government intervention or excessive worker power, as it tends to be associated with government activities that expand the amount of money in the economy and/or quickly rising wages, while particularly hurting those who hold large stocks of wealth rather than simply relying on a salary – in other words the especially rich. Aside from largely marginal complaints from elements of the Tea Party and right-wing economists, any concern over inflation in the United States have so far been fairly conclusively superseded by the overriding desire to increase and maintain demand for goods and services in the post-crisis economy. Having suffered from years of deflationary stagnation, the Japanese government is currently prioritising an increased rate of inflation above all other economic policies.

There have meanwhile been growing fears of a “Japanese scenario” – in which activity in the economy and economic growth rates are undermined by continuously stagnating prices - in Europe for over a year now, as inflation continues to be well below the 2% rate targeted by the European Central Bank. Yet up until the beginning of 2014, even the notion that inflation being too low was a major problem to be tackled didn’t seem to occur to European institutions and their leaders. In its An-

nual Growth Survey for the end of 2013, the European Commission merely noted that inflation continued to be low, so there was nothing to worry about on that front.

Instead it continued to emphasise economic remedies such as labour market deregulation, “competitive” wages and “fiscal consolidation” all of which themselves have the potential to be deflationary.

Up until a few years ago, if a leading American columnist wrote an article entitled “What’s the matter with Europe?”, comparing it unfavourably with the United States, you could be fairly well assured that it was a conservative figure attacking it for its overbearing state interventions, powerful labour interests or spending largesse. But in fact it is the liberal Keynesian economist Paul Krugman who is criticising its heavily deflationary approach and contrasting it with US. While Mitt Romney was still attacking Barack Obama for “European ideas” in the 2012 US presidential election, unfavourable comparisons to Europe from overseas have at times started to take on a different ideological bent. The Labor Party in Australia has taken to warning against “European-style austerity” and even some commentators in the rightwing Forbes magazine in the US adopted a similar line during the “fiscal cliff ” budget negotiations there last year. So we have a peculiar reversal of traditional roles whereby government passivity and withdrawal from the economy in certain circumstances is now perceived as a particularly “European” phenomenon.

It’s not exactly clear what explains all of this. Partly it may be the result of the institutional framework of the European Union – constitutionally “pro-market” and with a central bank that is mandated to prioritise price sta-

bility over other targets - although those institutions have shown capacity for change when necessary in other circumstances. The historically stronger role of government in Europe may make it an easier target than in the US, though this makes little sense once the details are considered. Additionally the EU’s consensual decision-making structures make active or innovative policy more difficult. More important may be the dominance of German “ordo-liberal” economic philosophy, which prioritises marketization and a dogma individual responsibility over government initiative,. in EU policy-making.

Most importantly, however, the EU’s decision-making bodies have become heavily influenced by and to some extent embedded in the interests of trans-European business and finance while more grassroots interests such as labour, social or environmental groups do not have the equivalent resources to enable adequate lobbying or an extensive presence at the European level. So it is that until this imbalance is addressed and as real decision-making increasingly has to be made on a pan-European level, the historically stronger balance in European countries between the interests of capital and the interests of other citizens is lost and the political bias towards capital suddenly becomes in some quarters among the strongest in the developed world. The consequence will continue to be seen in decisions that are made against the interests of large portions of the European populace.

Neil Warner MPhil, History

Europe | 11

Libya, Egypt & the Challenge for Africa Egypt and Libya represent two very different yet linked outcomes of the Arab Spring revolts. The rebellion in Libya, which toppled longstanding dictator Muammar Gaddafi, unleashed violent rivalries between regionally and religiously divided militias; effectively shattering the country into warring factions. In Egypt by contrast, the revolution first brought the ostensibly Islamist Muslim Brotherhood to power, which in turn triggered a backlash against the revolution, bringing in a new military dictatorship under President (and former General) Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Both of these outcomes, the uncontrolled chaos of Libya and the return to brutal despotism in Egypt, were shaped by the specific forces and circumstances acting within each country. Both outcomes represent a serious challenge both to the West and to the rest of Africa. For the West, particularly for Europe, disorder in Libya and to a lesser extent in Egypt, has resulted in tens of thousand people being trafficked across the Mediterranean. Despite thousands having died in the last year alone, the power vacuum and continuing violence in Libya results in people traffickers acting with impunity, loading hundreds of people onto dangerous, overcrowded and barely seaworthy boats and shipping them over to Italy, Malta and Greece.

For America, in particular the Obama Administration, Libya and Egypt represent comprehensive policy failures. The American led and inspired air operation in Libya, which effectively helped to win the revolution against Gaddafi, has not led to Western style liber-

12 | Agora

al democracy as intended. Instead, Western intervention has helped to blast Libya apart, leaving Obama trying to justify his actions in the light of the attacks on the US embassy in Benghazi and other unpleasant incidents which have occurred following his air campaign.

Meanwhile, in Egypt, after his forthright demands that the former military ruler Hosni Mubarak resign, Obama now finds himself compelled to forge an alliance with Mubarak’s even more brutal replacement. Obama is constrained by the fact that he needs Sisi’s help to prevent more weapons reaching Hamas in Gaza, and also in light of the fact that with the rise of the Islamic State, military despots like Sisi are considered preferable to the Islamist alternatives.

For the rest of Africa and the African Union (AU), Libya and Egypt represent significant challenges to stability and growth.

Libya’s disintegration threatens all of its neighbours, as it is becoming a haven for renegades and Islamist fighters, who use the country as a base to launch attacks in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria among others.

Increasing chaos in Libya increases the risk of the violence proliferating, especially in countries like Chad, Mali and Algeria, which already possess their own domestic Islamist insurgencies. The threat of terrorism across the region is increased by the presence of safe-havens in Libya for Al-Qaeda affiliates and other groups.

The AU is currently running several major peacekeeping operations in different countries, most notably Somalia, the Central African Republic and Mali.

Somalia offers a glimpse of what an attempted peacekeeping inter-

vention in Libya might look like.

Despite victories on the ground

by AU troops supported by government forces, Somalia is still plagued by suicide bombings and Islamist attacks. Progress in rebuilding the country is slow, and likely to take many more years.

Even if the AU intervened in Libya now, the country could be looking at many more years of constant violence, not to mention there two separate governments both claiming to be the legitimate representatives of the Libyan people for the AU to choose between.

Egypt is a subtler problem for the AU. Many of Africa’s leaders engage in shady governmental practices like forced disappearances, mass detentions and criminalising dissent and so they will no doubt sympathise with President Sisi in his struggles to impose his rule while handling criticism from abroad. At the same time, Sisi’s regime, with its origins in the unconstitutional coup-d’état against Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected President, and its decidedly militaristic nature make the country a sore point for the Union. The inclusion of an anti-democratic regime like Sisi’s in the AU tarnishes the whole organisation. This is even more acute as the AU first suspended Egypt after the coup against Morsi and then reversed the decision under pressure from the Sisi regime.

Egypt’s political and economic clout almost certainly helped reverse its suspension, setting a worrying precedent for other members of the AU. At the same time Sisi’s robust response to Islamist terrorism make him palatable to the West and to countries like Nigeria and Algeria who are cur-

“For the rest of the African Union, Libya and Egypt represent significant challenges to stability and growth. Libya’s disintegration threatens all of its neighbours. Egypt is a subtler problem.� rently battling their own insurgencies and like Sisi resorting to less than democratic practices to defeat them. The AU suffers from something of a personality crisis when it comes to Egypt, and this is unlikely to get any better in the immediate future.

Taken together, Egypt and Libya represent a major trouble spot internationally, akin to the

situation in Iraq and Syria. As the chaos in Libya deepens, the AU and the West, lacking any stomach to intervene directly, will be left to watch from the sidelines and try to contain the spillover from the conflict as best they can. Meanwhile, both will have to hold their noses and continue to do business with Egypt, balancing their distaste for the Sisi regimes brutality with their

desire to avoid seeing the country sink down to a Libyan level of anarchy. Like the deserts of the region itself, the shifting sands of North African politics are throwing up plenty of problems and no clear solutions.

Niall McGlynn Alumnus, Science & History

Africa | 13

The Master in Development Practice (Joint M.Sc./P.Grad.Dip) (MDP) is a two-­‐year fulltime programme that offers professional training and education in development practice at graduate level. The MDP is an interdisciplinary graduate degree programme that addresses the challenges of sustainable develop-­‐ ment. It consist of coursework in four intersecting disciplines -­‐ health, natural, social, and management sciences -­‐ combined with field training and internships.

The MDP is part of a global network of Master’s in Development Practice, headquartered at Columbia University, New York. The MDP is delivered jointly by Trinity College Dublin (TCD) School of Natural Science and University College Dublin (UCD) School of Politics and International Relations in collaboration with a wide number of national and international organisations with specialist skills in development practice and policy.

We are now accepting applications for the 2015/16 intake. Classes will begin the week of 31st August 2015 with an Introduction to Economics “bootcamp”. Applications can be made online at : http://www.tcd.ie/courses/postgraduate/az/course.php?id=DPTNS-­‐DPRA-­‐1F09

Further Information:

Elaine Elders MDP Administrator elderse@tcd.ie Tel: +353 1 896 2414

Web: http://naturalscience.tcd.ie/postgraduate/dev-­‐pract/

The Umbrella Revolution: Democracy Central?

Hong Kong; an international city that guarantees citizens’ rights, democracy and freedom. This definition has become illusory since the city’s return to China in 1997.

Though promising the people of Hong Kong their right to choose, China as a communist country has continually tried to control Hong Kong in some way. The freedom and right to choose for Hong Kong is a farce that China has little interest in hiding. Despite the appearance of Hong Kong’s own law and government, the candidates running for Chief Executive in the 2017 election are to be nominated

by the 1200 strong Election Committee. This group is largely made of Chinese Officials with strong ties to Beijing where public opinion is completely ignored. How are any of the values associated with Hong Kong upheld in an election which is essentially rigged in favour of the Chinese government from the start? Beijing claims that this gives the people the choice of a Chief Executive who loves both China and Hong Kong; however, there is no choice, and that is why the people of Hong Kong have had no other option but to take to the streets.

Let us look at the nomination process in terms of numbers. The population of Hong Kong is estimated to be approximately 7.2 million and is still increasing. As a hub for democracy, freedom and international finance in the East, is it quite ridiculous that only 1.67% of Hong Kongers have the right to truly vote for the Chief Executive. However, the story does not end there. A large proportion with the right to choose are not residents of Hong Kong, but are merely named by the Chinese Government creating a menagerie of officials whose reasons for election to the committee

Asia/Pacific | 15

“The appearance of a more democratic process is fooling no one.”

are inconsistent. Up until this point it was the Election Committee who elected the Chief Executive if they got the majority of the 1200 votes.

The appearance of a more democratic process whereby the public is allowed to vote, but only for candidates vetted by this committee, is fooling no one. The farce of a democratic process has spurred the citizen to realize that it is our inherent right to choose. This is why the people of Hong Kong have been fighting for the right of all 7.2 million people to vote since the early 2000s.

This is not a situation we expected to be a part of, as the China National People’s Congress promised in 2007 that Hong Kong could have a general election by 2017. However, seven years later on the 31st of August 2014, as the people of Hong Kong awaited

16 | Agora

the general election in 2017, the China National People’s Congress announced that the candidates in future elections still need to be nominated by the 1200 strong Election Committee. The candidates need to get 601 votes from the Election Committee to become official candidates. This simulation of a democratic process has angered the people of Hong Kong who feel ignored and deceived by China. Those who are pro-government may argue that Hong Kong is a part of China, and so it must listen to the Chinese Government but in 1993 it was they who promised the people of Hong Kong that no matter what happens in the future, the Chinese government would not interfere in their governance. But now citizens of Hong Kong face a radically different reality. Our liberty and rule of law have

been impaired, that’s why we are so desperate to have a democratic system to safeguard our fundamental rights.

This is why the people of Hong Kong initiated a period of civil disobedience on the 26th of September 2014. Known as the umbrella revolution, it has already seen more than 1.1 million Hong Kong people partake in peaceful protest including main road sitins and demonstrations. The aim is to get the Chinese government to withdraw the 2017 Chief Executive Election Standing Committee determined by the National People’s Congress and the 2016 Legislative Council election rule and nomination scheme. The umbrella revolution is also fighting for the right to nominate the candidates running for Chief Executive in the city election and for the abolition of

“I don’t know when the revolution will end but this time I know that the people of Hong Kong are not going to give up easily.”

the Legislative Council functional constituency.

The reaction of the Chinese government to a peaceful protest has been utterly shameful and has incited further anger in the people of Hong Kong. Unarmed protesters were attacked with large amounts of tear gas and pepper spray by a police force who even threatened to open fire on the unarmed protesters. A large group of police cornering individual protesters has also been a common occurrence.

Pro-government parties used fake pictures to fabricate false stories of violence against the police and most recently the barrage of fake names used on the anti-protest petition. Some pro-government citizens have even revealed they were paid to create trouble in the revolution. This has only incensed the people of Hong Kong further,

which has led to even more citizens taking a stand against the government. Thus the occupation spread from Admiralty, Central and Wan Chai to Causeway Bay, Mong Kok and Tsim Sha Tsu. The occupation has become a revolution, the first of its kind in Hong Kong’s history, and after a month shows no signs of abating.

I don’t know when the revolution will end but this time I know that the people of Hong Kong are not going to give up easily. They are disillusioned and tired of China’s control and want real freedom. The Chinese government knows the risk that Hong Kong represents in demonstrating to the Chinese people what can happen if they stand together. For this reason they have been trying their best to quash the revolution. Nonetheless the people of Hong Kong are not scared this

time; if this had happened in the past, people would have stopped the occupation after a week but the people of Hong Kong are sick of being deceived by China. Living abroad I cannot really do anything to help, but we did hold a protest on the 1st of October in Dublin to support the people of Hong Kong.

I can only hope that this protest only ends when the Chinese government has fulfilled its promises to us for the real democratic general election that we deserve. The spirit of the people of Hong Kong will not be destroyed by the violent acts of the riot police.

Gallen Leung JF BESS

Asia/Pacific | 17

TheWomen of Iran Although the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 aimed to restrict and reverse the rights that women had achieved throughout Iranian history, it invigorated the consciousness of Iranian women and shaped a multi-faceted movement towards empowerment. The image of Iranian women as oppressed victims of the Islamic state is a gross misconception shaped by cultural relativism and a western bias.

Women acted alongside men in advancing the Islamic Revolution and had already been indispensible actors in the public sphere before it. The revolution had revealed the strong potential for women’s influence and Ayatollah Khomeini aimed to divide any pre-existing movement by segregating women from the public space and retiring them to their homes to reinforce their traditional, subservient role. Although, the first decade after the Islamic Republic can be viewed as one of the most oppressive periods for women’s rights, women did not disappear from the public sphere but rather changed the way they interacted with it.

This new involvement in the Islamic state combined with the unexpected restrictions imposed on solely women invigorated an autonomous female conscience in Iran, which was previously submerged by its dependence on political parties or male-dominated organizations. Female activism took on a “self-reflective dimension” through which women began to act as their own agents by reinterpreting the imposed structures and their relationship to the state.

As a result, women applied their private actions and appear-

18 | Agora

ances to confront the new rules of the state and encourage change from within its restrictions. The mere color of a scarf and the use of lipstick became a political weapon and any prohibited activity only became more popular. When women were banned from jogging in public parks, the number of women that began to jog in defiance grew so rapidly that the authorities were forced to approve outdoor sporting activities for women in certain parks.

Women become extremely aware of their condition and subtly attempt to blur the lines between tolerable and intolerable conduct in the Islamic Republic by consistently compromising with the political imposition on their personal life. After the removal of the Family Protection Law thousands of letters were written to leading clerics and female members of parliament to raise advocacy. Women also targeted education as a primary tool of empowerment. Enrollment in girls’ primary schools increased by 50% during the first decade after the revolution and from 19791990 four times as many women enrolled in mathematics and completed health and medicine at a higher level.

By positioning the movement within, rather than against the institutional framework and developments of the Islamic Republic, women could gradually achieve increasing public tolerability and social legitimation through political and cultural activity. Their consistent awareness of the political conditions in the Islamic republic allowed women to identify the ideal opportunity to push for their rights. With the growing popularity of the reformists in 1997, the so-

cio-political environment became more malleable and women used their role as constituents to aid in the success of Mohammad Khatami who supported the inclusion of women in society.

Female lawyers like Shirin Ebadi have successfully reformed divorce laws and ensured that women received compensation for the years in which they provided housework during their marriage; a privilege not even western women receive after divorcing. Iranian women have resourcefully applied their status in society in the context of political and international circumstances to incrementally dilute the restrictions of the state.

Aside from their political activism, women infiltrated the public sphere through numerous cultural mediums to challenge state laws. Female novelists and women’s magazines allowed women to find ways to transmit their voice by sharing their personal experiences and thereby find a common ground to act on. The censorship laws in Iran have caused women to become exceedingly creative in concealing their political opinions through different avenues, which highlights how the restrictive environment fuels the foundation of a stronger female identity as women manipulate their environment to create spaces for themselves. Magazines such as Zanan target taboo subjects, such as AIDS and runaway girls and thus challenge the confines on what is acceptable discourse. This allows literate women across Iran can not only become more aware of their circumstances, but they can also empower themselves by becoming heroines of their own stories and reach out to women who can relate to them.

In both literature and cinema, narratives are created within a hierarchical society, which is meant to revolve around male dominance. But it is the active presence of women that changes the conventional course of men’s lives. This narrative applies equally to how women in Iran have developed their relationship to the Islamic Republic as they continue to accept living within its constraints, because they are able to neutralize and curve them through their increasing presence in the public sphere.

Women are able to change their social landscapes as different areas of the movement pave way for activities in other avenues, because the high rate of interaction between women in the public sphere has shaped a multiplying effect that cannot be reversed by the government. Through negotiation and patience, women in Iran manipulate the restrictive codes of the Islamic Republic to their own advantage. This has resulted in a perpetually evolving freedom that

allows female expression to resonate in all facets of society, without needing to be forceful or radical; but rather functions through the art of subtlety and modesty.

Iranian women must be viewed as being powerful actors in an oppressive environment where they derive their influence and instigate changes through the conditions of inequality, which define their status.

In 2001 there were 500,000 women either managing a business or supervising other personnel in major industries in Iran. The same year 22% of women in Iran had graduate degrees, while only 7% of Iranian men did. In the applied physics department of Azad University, 70% of the graduates are women, a statistic rarely seen in Western universities. Contrary to stereotypical expectations that Islamisation led to a decline in female employment and education, the opposite has been occurring in Iran.

Since the Islamic revolution was led by strong religious motivations, western countries have the tendency to view Iran as a backward state whose traditional values repress the existence of women. Western In order to understand how women have found their voice in Iranian society, one should not focus on their need to liberate themselves from an Islamic Republic, but rather on how we can liberate ourselves from our western imposition of beliefs and our obstructive orientalist bias.feminists have described Iranian women as “victims of an immobilizing faith locked up inside their mandatory veil.� In order to understand how women have found their voice in Iranian society, one should not focus on their need to liberate themselves from an Islamic Republic, but rather on how we can liberate ourselves from our western imposition of beliefs and our obstructive orientalist bias.

Elisabeth Pipic JS History & Political Science

Middle East | 19

The Case for Kurdistan When we think of Iraq we think of war, division and religious violence. This would be true of about two thirds of the country; stretching all the way from Najaf to Kirkuk we have a region plagued by sectarianism, ethnic cleansing and extremism. If you look about one hundred miles to the North East there is a comparative oasis around the city of Erbil. This is where Iraq’s economy is strongest in terms of employment and output. It is the place in the region where there are high levels of security and prosperity compared to the rest of Iraq and, in recent years, Syria.

The region that this city resides in is known as Iraqi Kurdistan. This region has only been able to gain prosperity through a decades-long struggle of the Kurdish people against the violent repression of the Iraqi Baath party government and the encroachment of various extreme Islamist groups such as Ansar al Islam and currently Islamic State, a fight which continues as this group attempts to gain control over the southern reaches of the region.

It has been argued loudly during the current Iraqi crisis that the geographical integrity of Iraq as a state should be the number one goal of the international community; this it seems would make the same mistake that created the state of Iraq in the first place out of British Mesopotamia. That being to create and maintain an area for convenience and continued European dominance rather than taking account of the conditions on the ground, the internal tensions that exist and most importantly of all the stability of the region. What has been witnessed in Iraqi Kurdistan shocked many observers in terms of the sheer success this downtrodden people were able to achieve with no outside assistance or aid.

It was suggested by some in the media and by some western and many Turkish politicians that Kurdish autonomy would lead to the repression of non-Kurds within the region, potentially leading to a Middle Eastern Srebenica around Erbil. This suggestion was blown out of the water in the late 1990s and early 2000s where the Kurdish armed forces known as the Peshmerga were able to all but drive out the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and set up what is now regarded as the most stable and prosperous part of the immediate region, attracting immigrants from all over Iraq and even Turkey to take advantage of the high employment and plurality of democratic Kurdish rule.

Fears of Kurdish violence against minorities may not have been unfounded when we look at the history of groups given autonomy around the world. This would be particularly relevant when one looks at the violent repression the Kurdish people have had to deal with in recent years. The chemical attacks of Halabja, the Iraqi military’s near extirpation of them using conventional weapons, and death squads in the Republican guard and Special Security Organisation killing around one hundred thousand of the Kurdish people. Conventional wisdom would suggest that the Kurds might have something of a beef with outsiders in what was, in their minds, essentially their own country. Conventional wisdom, however, fails to take even a second look at the Kurds as a people.

When the media reported the state of Iraq post-invasion, where sectarian violence filled the power vacuum left by Saddam Hussein, they claimed that there were three groups of people living within its borders: the Sunnis, the Shias and the Kurds. Let me tell you something you maybe did not know; almost every Kurd is a Sunni Muslim. This misinformation by the news media did quite a lot to confuse any casual observer of the Iraqi conflicts. Unlike the other active groups in Iraq, the Kurdish people deplore extremism and acts of terror in Iraq and have left themselves out of the power struggle in the southern and western areas of Iraq between Sunni and Shia militias as well as their religious violence. The Kurdish Peshmerga has never sought to set up a religious state, as is the goal of the other parties at play. Their goal rather was some form of recognition of their right to self-determination and to have a true say in their own internal affairs.

20 | Agora

“Conventional wisdom would suggest that the Kurds might have something of a beef with outsiders in what was, in their minds, essentially their own country.

Conventional wisdom, however, fails to take even a second look at the Kurds as a people.�

In light of these facts, is it not about time to allow the Iraqi Kurds to have their own state, finally undo a small part of the damage of post-World War One European colonial powers, and divide Iraq into more stable and sustainable states?

This could herald the end of wrangling with the volatile and transient Iraqi central government over economic rights and allow the two potential countries to have their own show with one less political row going on. Another virtue would be the creation of a more workable partnership for the rest of the international community in dealings with the two regions, allowing the Kurdish authority to finally step outside of their obfuscated constitutional place within Iraq. It would also serve to create a more open dialogue with Turkey over continuing abuses of Kurdish human rights in the southeast of that country.

With the current situation in the region this goal could be reached sooner than originally envisioned. The Kurdish Peshmerga has taken over the bulk of the fighting against Islamic State in the North of Iraq and has been able to assert itself as a more cohesive force than even the Iraqi military. The capital of the Kurdish region, Erbil and the surrounding areas have also proven to be a safe haven for thousands of refugees during the fighting who are, if the reports are to be believed, having a much better time than those that crossed into Turkey. This says nothing of the Kurdish armed forces preventing the mass killing of Yazidis on Mount Sinjar.

The only real barriers to what should be a rubber stamp operation for an already de facto country are the desire of the Iraqi government to make itself look inclusive to the international community after accusations of ethnic cleansing against Sunni Arabs in the south of the country and a lack of credibility among the international community after years of turmoil and the lightning advance of IS within its borders to within 40 miles of Baghdad.

There is a larger obstacle though, that being Turkey. Turkey has itself a large Kurdish minority who also seek recognition and greater autonomy, the difference between the Iraqi government and the Turkish being that the Turkish policy of official repression of Kurdish language, culture, and identity is an ongoing trouble. The Turkish have been rebuked once by the European Union over the arrest and detention of Kurdish activist and Member of Parliament in Turkey Leyla Zana who was imprisoned for a decade for her activism for the Kurdish people. This along with a string of offences against human rights including the criminalisation of the Kurdish language and the forced relocation of thousands of Kurds in an attempt to dilute their claim to the territory and forcibly assimilate them into Turkish culture.

If the Iraqi Kurds are recognised, which, as the rest of Iraq falls apart at the seams looks more and more likely, the second largest military power in NATO will certainly have something to say. It seems like these forgotten people need more support from the west. At the very least some information should be given by the media as to who exactly these people are and why they have been fighting our battles against extremism and dictatorship for decades now with no assistance or recognition.

Guy Bell JS PPES

Middle East | 21

Understanding Kurdistan Recent events in Iraq have finally brought the plight of Kurdistan into the forever-wavering gaze of the public eye. However, many fail to understand the complex nature of the Kurdish self-determination movement and its place in the larger crises facing the Middle East today. There is now no doubt, given the Iraqi army’s severe incompetence in dealing with the threat posed by ISIS and its associated groups so far, that the Kurds will ultimately be on the front line in the fight against the so-called Islamic State for the majority of the conflict, despite this being a war the Kurds did not ask for, but rather, were dragged into by their precarious position at the heart of the Middle East.

Kurdistan straddles the borders of four of the great modern nationalities in the region, namely Turkish, Syrian, Iranian and Iraqi. Furthermore, each of the four Kurdish regions that would theoretically make up an independent country remain at different levels of progress in regards to this goal, with Iraqi Kurdistan having already achieved semi-autonomous status and Syrian Kurdistan having been abandoned by the central government after the outbreak of civil war, essentially leaving the Kurds to govern themselves. In contrast, the Iranian controlled regions have been plagued by religious division and large-scale indifference to autonomy among the population, with many Shi’a Kurds preferring the direct rule of Tehran instead.

Moreover, Kurdistan lacks overall political unity, with various Kurdish groups, among them the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and its affiliates, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), vying for influence and power in each of the regions. In Syria, the major factions have signed cooperation agreements since Assad’s retreat, effectively creating a governing body despite continuing tensions between political factions. In Iraq, this tension has in the past resulted in civil war between the PUK and KDP for control of the oil rich region, with the conflict drawing in factions from other Kurdish provinces, as well as incursions by the Turkish army. The consequences of this violent episode can still be seen today, with traditional hostility between the two biggest factions, the leftist PKK and the centrist KDP, remaining despite official reconciliation efforts. However, with the advance of ISIS, these rival groups have been forced to cooperate, most notably in the rescue of thousands of Yazidi refugees who had been besieged on Mount Sinjar by ISIS militants. For the first time in recent memory, it appears that all the major political factions of Kurdistan are united in common cause, against an external danger in the form of ISIS, which they view as a serious threat to the political gains they have made in both Syria and Iraq since the advent of the Arab Spring.

The United States and Europe generally take an ambiguous view of the Kurdish move for autonomous selfrule, on the one hand supporting Iraqi Kurdistan, while on the other calling for cooperation between the Kurds and the federal Iraqi government and continuing to list other Kurdish groups, such as the PKK, as terrorists.

Unwilling to upset its strategically important Turkish ally, the west has restricted its ability to cooperate with the Kurds, which may become problematic considering the Kurdish Peshmerga (the official armed forces of Iraqi Kurdistan), and other Kurdish factions such as the PKK and its Syrian ally, the YPG, are the only effective fighting forces that have continuously shown their ability to defend against, and defeat ISIS. Regardless, ISIS advances in Iraq and Syria have undoubtedly strengthened the Kurdish Regional Government, as the Iraqi central regime displayed its almost impressive level of incompetence in the face of the ultra-militant Jihadists. The Kurds have seized control of key towns in Iraq, such as Kirkuk, which they regard as their historical capital, from the central government, while at the same time providing reinforcements to besieged YPG fighters in Kobanê, despite the political differences between the two factions. The Kurds, having suffered genocide, political repression and widespread discrimination for generations, seem to have found themselves in a favourable strategic position; having been forced into direct confrontation with the Islamic State, their willingness to resist and confront barbarism has earned them worldwide support for their cause and right to self-determination. If it can rout ISIS and maintain the loose alliance currently in place between the leftist factions and the centrists, perhaps then Kurdistan can achieve its much hoped for goal of self-rule.

Deepkamal Virk JS BESS

22 | Agora

The Road to Reconciliation The N2 begins in Dublin. It passes by Slane in Meath before weaving north through Monaghan, on up to the border at Moy Bridge. Across the border, the A5 begins. This road goes from Tyrone, through Strabane and Omagh, to its endpoint in the city of Derry. These two roads represent the main artery connecting the two jurisdictions on the island.

Policy makers North and South have laid out plans for upgrading this connection. While some sections of the route are motorway or dual carriageway many are still single lane, and north of the border the road still does not bypass certain towns and bottlenecks. There have been repeated calls from political parties on the island for the entire route to be upgraded to dual carriageway.

Since the start of the 2008 recession, however, such large scale infrastructure projects have been put on hold or abandoned altogether. Politically, it is difficult to justify such spending when households are facing austerity budgets, and there are few interest groups that will protest such cuts. Behavioural economics tells us that people always find it easier to give up what they don’t have.

That long term and far-sighted projects such as this are the first to be abandoned is one of the most underreported, and most damaging, consequences of the economic crisis. The benefits of greater cross border transport links might not be felt immediately, but they would be of great advantage in the long run. The advantages of improving the cross-border road link are both economic, in terms of increased trade flows, and social, in terms of tightening the personal and cultural links on the island.

The economic benefits of improving the road are obvious. Better roads lead to more flows of goods and people, and more contact between North and South. Producers have access to larger markets for their wares, and consumers have easier access to more and more choice in the market, as well as cheaper goods. One of the main drivers of Irish economic growth during the Celtic Tiger was the increased funding, much of it from the European Union, that went into road building projects in the 1990s. The National Development Plan prioritised the building of motorways and dual carriageways, a move which brought the economic benefits of development to all parts of the Republic. Good transport links are essential for economic growth, and should be invested in to bring abundance to everyone on the island.

The social benefits of improving cross-border road links are potentially far greater. Easier movement of people leads to stronger cultural and political links between communities. Increased exposure creates a greater level of understanding between those holding opposing viewpoints. Interaction with the Other makes it more difficult to hold onto prejudices and hatred, and creates common ground on which both sides can build trust and respect. Increased social links can help break down the walls that have separated the different communities on the island since Independence.

Improved infrastructure is not a panacea for all of the ills of Ireland. It won’t create peace and prosperity on the island overnight. However, forward looking politicians will recognise what it can do in the long run to better the economic, social, and political situation on the island. With an economic recovery kicking off, perhaps they can prioritise such projects once again.

Conor McGlynn SS Economics & Philosophy

Ireland | 23

The Republic Remembers ​ ar is the ultimate test for the state. A government W asks citizens to make the supreme sacrifice, and in doing so asserts the state’s coercive power. The tragedy inherent in the unprecedented fatalities of the Great War preceded a profound shift in attitudes to war generally. A call to arms in defence of whatever realm one inhabited had been par for the course in the preceding centuries, with various models of armed forces, conscripted or mercenary, having existed in private hands or in the hands of the state since it became apparent that coercive force was necessary for the state to survive. With the end of the Great War, people began to question the legitimacy of an appeal to nationalism in justifying conscription or compulsion to participate in warfare. Such appeals are rational on the part of the state in order to protect its existence in to the future, but place the lives of those who give the state their consent in the direct path of danger. ​If war is inherently political, the memory of it is necessarily so. Ireland’s relationship with the Great War is fraught with political difficulties which are tarred by a post-Independence amnesia of those political realities which led hundreds of thousands of Irish men to service, resulting in 49,000 Irish deaths, with many more in divisions and regiments in other parts of the Empire. Both major forces in Irish politics in 1914, the Irish Parliamentary Party and the Unionists, advocated participation in the war. Ireland was, at least officially, on the cusp of Home Rule, with legislation having been placed on statute books. With Unionist influence assuring that Ulster would find some level of exception to Home Rule, it was clearly in the interests of both sides of politics in Ireland to prove that their conceptions of nation included a military commitment to the imperial effort. With John Redmond’s call on members of the Irish Volunteers to go “wherever the firing line extends” in order to

assuage British governmental qualms that a Home Rule Ireland would act contrary to the influence of the rest of the United Kingdom, Ireland’s political leadership was clearly committed to the war. This memory was clearly undermined in the official narrative encouraged by successive post-Independence governments. ​ The memory of the war therefore, is one that is influenced by the origins of the political parties which rule Ireland. Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael derive from Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Fein, and both De Valera and Collins were involved in the 1916 Rising, which was absolutely a product of the Great War, and the clearest turning point in 20th century Irish history, shifting the goalposts from Home Rule to a Republic. With the end of the war and the 1918 elections died the Redmondite cause. After their completion, Ireland’s own National War Memorial Gardens at Islandbridge lay neglected for the better part of half a century, with Sir Edwin Lutyen’s magnificent designs left to wither and dilapidate at the fringe of the city centre, before being officially opened in 1988.

The decision on the part of the Irish government to have a representative lay a wreath at the Remembrance Sunday ceremony at the Cenotaph in London, for the first time since 1939, marks a different stage in modern Ireland’s attitudes to its past. ​War is a question of state, and in England, church is also a question of state. Thus the simplicity of the Cenotaph as a secular monument, devoid of religious iconography or paraphernalia, is striking. Its location in the city which ruled the Empire in whose name Irish soldiers fought serves as a reminder, rather than an endorsement, of the effect that Empire had. Ireland’s soldiers fought alongside millions of others, whose memories have been commemorated since in their respective countries as well as in London. Though Ireland may have attended the event in

“It is fitting that at this point the memory of those events of a century ago is commemorated with a level of gravitas and reflection.”

24 | Agora

“Ireland’s relationship with the Great War is fraught with political difficulties which are tarred by a post-Independence amnesia of political realities.” previous years, the wreath-laying at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday is an event that encapsulates the political environment of the time, making it easier for us to understand why Ireland’s political leaders compelled citizens to enlist. While there are many legitimate complaints that commemoration may, if the tone is not right, glorify the war, there is a clear necessity to remember that hundreds of thousands of people perished in the name of the politics of their time.

Some object to the use of poppies, which are seen to be a symbol of jingoism, or to have assumed a greater role in commemorating participation in wars that Ireland did not participate in. However, the images of a solitary Irish Ambassador Dan Mulhall laying a wreath of leaves, standing clear against the wreaths of poppies, have an inherent gravity which symbolises the clear difference between the Irish experience and that of the other nations represented, both in politics,

and in memory. Questions of symbols are overcome and Ireland’s war dead take their place at the Cenotaph alongside the soldiers they served with. ​If, therefore, Ireland’s political amnesia of the First World War was tied up in questions of political narratives, it is fitting that at this point the memory of those events of a century ago is commemorated with a level of gravitas and reflection. The aim should be to highlight the distance that Ireland has come; the distance the world has come, while lamenting the ongoing violence in the world, and the distance yet to travel to achieve some level of peace.

Fionn McGorry JS History & Political Science

MSc in ECONOMICS The School of Social Sciences and Philosophy at Trinity College invites applications for admission to the MSc in Economics. This course is available on a full-time (one year) or a part-time basis (two years).

The course focuses on the technical skills needed to undertake Economics research and emphasises active and problem-based learning to ensure mastery of the basic skills. The objective is to provide well-qualified graduates in Economics and related disciplines ( for example Business, Computer Science, Statistics, Mathematics , Engineering and Physics) with the training required to enter PhD programmes in Economics or to work as Economists in government or private sector organisations.

Further details from: Colette Ding Email: economics@tcd.ie

Telephone: +353 1 896 1325 Website: http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/postgraduate/msc-economics/ Applications will be accepted up to and including 30th June 2015.

Ireland | 25

The Dilma Dilemma So another four years of “Dilma” it is. On October 26th the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil was re-elected in a second-round run-off against conservative challenger Aécio Neves.

However, the second term of office for Ms Rousseff and the fourth consecutive term of her Workers’ Party (PT), may yet prove to be quite a bumpy ride.

With results of 51.6% to Neves’ 48.4%, Ms Rousseff won the election with the narrowest margin since 1989. In fact, the result was so narrow that immediately after the announcement, allegations of electoral fraud were widespread on social media. The close result of a fierce race, with two polarised camps fighting bitterly until the last moment, leaves the country divided. It is understandable, therefore, that the words the incumbent president chose after her re-election were of dialogue and unity, stating a promise to be “a much better president than I have been until now.”

The results of the run-off display divisions along the lines of race, social class, and geography. While the PT could secure large parts of the poor North and Northeast regions, Neves’ Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) won easily in many of the wealthy southern states. Many people have taken to the streets in the past two years, especially from the middle-class, demanding reform and protesting against corruption in the political élite. However, the legacy of the PT, especially under the Lula administration of 200310, seems to have outweighed individual shortcomings of the present government of Brazil’s first female president.

26 | Agora

With social programmes, such as Fome Zero (No Hunger) or the Bolsa Família scheme which provides financial aid to poor Brazilians, conditional on children being vaccinated and attending school, the PT has significantly reduced poverty, and increased literacy and life expectancy. The party continues to pursue ambitious social policies such as the social housing scheme Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My House, My Life).

These welfare policies are accompanied by an economic programme, with the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) at its centre. This major infrastructure programme comprises of large scale investment to boost economic growth. The presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva saw Brazil become the world’s eighth-largest economy, with more than 20 million people emerging from poverty.

expectations of the government rise. Dilma’s first period in office resulted in recession, above-target inflation and increased public debt.

What is more, an electoral reform is overdue: there are now 28 parties in Congress, more than ever before, making it increasingly difficult to form stable coalitions.

With the slim margin of the recent victory it will be hard for Dilma to get support for much-needed reforms, from her alliance With the Strength of the People.

Moreover, though the PT has managed to lift millions out of extreme poverty, it has not managed to narrow inequality of income and of geography, between the divided north and south. The result of the vote shows that voters have become lost confidence in the left-wing government’s ability to tackle the problem, but do not trust Aécio to offer a better alter-

“It is now important to interpret the result of the vote and translate it in to the correct policy measures. It is not enough to explain Dilma’s victory as a mysterious trend in Latin American presidential elections” However, economic growth has slowed under Dilma, and the 2014 Football World Cup, and upcoming Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, which initially caused excitement and a feeling of progress, have now sparked criticism and protests. The middle class, which continually grew under the Lula administration, is demanding better public services and less corruption. With growing wealth,

native. Dilma must go some way to regain the trust of those who voted for Neves, with calls for an independent south being voiced on Social Media.

It is now important to interpret the result of the vote and translate it in to the correct policy measures. It is not enough to explain Dilma’s victory, as the Economist did on 1 November, as a mysterious trend in Latin Ameri-

“The middle class is demanding better public services and less corruption. With growing wealth, expectations of the government rise. Dilma’s first period in office resulted in recession, above-target inflation and increased public debt.”

can presidential elections by which “odds are stacked in favour of incumbents, with all the machinery of power and patronage at their disposal” and Neves’ failure to win Minas Gerais, the state “where he served two successful terms as governor in 2003-10” as “a strange defeat that probably cost him the presidency”. As a friend of mine remarked on social media, “maybe Minas voted Dilma because they

know Aécio.” And although it may be an interesting exercise on the part of the Economist in the same article, to find out “how capital voted”, by suggesting that if each state had their electoral weight based on GDP rather than its population, Neves would have won at a margin of 6%, this simply isn’t how democracy works.

Mr Neves’ alliance Brazil Can Do More did not manage to

win, but did narrow the margin.

Ms Rousseff now needs to draw the lessons from the elections, perhaps by returning to some of the policies of her predecessor Lula da Silva, and by listening more closely to the concerns of the people.

Hermann Koerner JS PPES

Americas | 27

Sea of Death - A Refugee Crisis On the 3rd of September, in Calais on the northern coast of France, scores of African migrants attempted to storm a ferry destined for the UK. Their attempt was unsuccessful, as the crew drew up the ramp and and stopped the rest with a shot of water from a fire hose.

Though the migrants did not reach their desired destination, they certainly got further than most who embark upon the treacherous journey. On September 7th this year, a ship with 450 migrants on board was rammed because the passengers refused the smugglers’ demand to move on to a less seaworthy vessel. Only eleven survived. A year previously, some 300 migrants making the crossing from anarchic Libya to Europe died when their boat capsized near the Italian island of Lampedusa.

However, while the British turned a hose on migrants in Calais, the Italians threw them a rope in the Mediterranean. After the Lampedusa shipwreck, the

28 | Agora

Italian navy launched the “Mare Nostrum� operation, which is now ending. Although circa 3,000 have still drowned this year, the navy has saved around 150,000 people at sea.

There is no sign that the surge of illegal migrants into the EU is beginning to taper. This year alone, the number of those who have successfully made the journey has already exceeded 180,000.

This figure is more than double the number of illegal migrants in 2011, the year of the Arab Spring.

While 80 per cent of these migrants have arrived into Europe via Italy, the problem extends to many other countries on the Mediterranean. Illegal migrants have begun to target Spain, Greece and Bulgaria as potential entry points.

The Spanish case is particularly instructive of the kind of problems that arise. While the Strait of Gibraltar is only 14km wide, Spain and Morocco are contiguous states due to the Spanish ex-

claves of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast. Large fences have been established around these small territories.

However, that the six-metre wire was barbed did not stop 1,000 migrants from rushing it.

400 succeeded in jumping the fence. Earlier in the year, 15 migrants drowned while trying to swim into Ceuta from a nearby beach, partly due to being under fire from Spanish rubber bullets.

That the scale of migration is not higher is mainly due to the cooperation of the Moroccan government, who impede the growth and easy operation of trafficking networks. In fact, on August 15th this year, the importance of Morocco in controlling migration was illustrated when the Spanish had to intercept a flotilla of inflatable dinghies attempting to cross the Strait.

In those two days, the Spanish had intercepted as many illegal migrants as they had in the

entire previous year. The riddle in the sands is whether this surge was orchestrated by the Moroccans, to send a signal to the Spanish of the importance of Moroccan cooperation in controlling migration.

Recently, more control has been exercised over the Turkish-EU border, which is the third flashpoint in this crisis, despite occasional surges. For example, while in early August over 2000 people illegally crossed the Greek-Turkish border this number has dropped to little over 200 after the Greek authorities deployed an extra 1800 officers along the Evros river. According to Frontex, the European border agency, a significant number of people are awaiting passage in Turkey, and it is believed that those hindered by migration control will attempt to cross through other sections of EU external borders.

For other EU states, such as the UK and Sweden, this may very much seem like a distant concern given that Italy must deal with the majority of migrants.

However, the Italians have grown tired of spending nearly â‚Ź10m per month on the rescue mission, especially given that it is the relatively easy asylum regime of the UK and Sweden, coupled with freedom of movement within the EU, which is attracting the migrants. They have therefore decided to terminate the Mare Nostrum operation from November the 1st onwards.

The operation will be replaced by Operation Triton which will be overseen by Frontex. This is a smaller operation. Its budget of â‚Ź2.9 million is barely a third of that of Mare Nostrum. In addition, it only has a border surveillance mandate, so it is not authorised to rescue migrants outside of Italian territorial waters.

Undoubtedly, the operational scale-down will increase the

number of deaths through drowning. Member states are not ignorant of this. Some have argued that the cessation of the search and rescue mission will dissuade migrants from risking the crossing.

This argument rests on the shaky assumption that human traffickers based in Libya will easily give up their immensely profitable and exceptionally callous business. It is more likely that they will simply adjust. The price of the voyage will increase from the current price of around three thousand euro, and the traffickers will take their cargo further into European waters.

Even if the risk increases, migrants will remain just as desperate to cross. While the numbers will surely drop, vast numbers will still attempt to enter Europe, one way or another. It is also worth noting that prior to Mare Nostrum, the lack of a search and rescue mission did not stop migrants attempting the voyage. Thus, new search and rescue operations are unlikely to be a solution. One would rather expect an increase in untracked illegal migration as traffickers bring their cargo closer to the coast, rather than abandoning them in the sea after calling the Italian authorities.

The southern border of Europe accounts for over three quarters of border-related deaths worldwide. Migrants remain desperate. What can be done? Given that anti-immigrant parties are on the rise for now, it is unlikely that a more liberal policy towards refugees would be adopted. Regardless, the increase in the volume of immigration would likely incur disturbing second-order effects in the form of greater support for Eurosceptic parties.

Some claim migrants could be towed back, but doing this without procedural safeguards would breach European and international

human rights laws. More practically, it would be difficult to ascertain where exactly they departed from.

If it is the desire of Europe to prevent both border-related deaths and mass migration, then logically there is only one solution: to prevent the very source of misery in the first place - poor or non-existent governance in certain regions of the developing world, coupled with global wealth and income inequality.

It is useful to first note that trafficking networks have only become so numerous and far-reaching due to the power vacuum in Libya. A stronger European foreign policy could thus alleviate this humanitarian concern by providing vigorous support to those loyal to the elected government, against the Islamists.

If the idea of an effective European foreign policy is unpalatable, then an alternative could be to grant temporary asylum, along the lines of that proposed by the economist Dani Rodrik. Grant the refugees asylum for a period of seven years, during which they can work. However, the host government would retain a portion of savings until the migrant returns to their original country with skills and capital that could spur development.

In the immediate future, it is unlikely that either of these solutions would be adopted, or even if they would work. Europe might have luck; order may spring from chaos in Libya and Syria. But it should be kept in mind that luck manifests in two forms, and thus can never be a long-term substitute for policy.

Tony O’Connor MSc, Economics

International | 29

The Complexity of Counterinsurgency “Counterinsurgency theory falls largely into two camps.

The problem is, neither of these strategies work.”

Seven months ago some 270 girls were kidnapped from their school in Chibok, Northern Nigeria by Boko Haram. It took over a month of awareness-building, a social media hashtag, and a picture of the first lady of the USA before the world took notice. The fumbling response of the Nigerian Government has not only failed to return the girls home, but has also corresponded with an increase in terrorist violence within the state, and the spillover of the conflict into neighbouring countries.

The conflict, which has been ongoing since 2009, is just one of multiple modern day internal conflicts which the wider world takes limited notice of, and in which counterinsurgency strategies have failed, leaving states to frequently repeat the same mistakes over and over.

The dynamics of modern conflict have little to do with conventional warfare. Of the 31 officially designated wars or internal conflicts only two can be described as interstate - the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. All other conflicts are internal insurgencies, or secessionist

struggles, either between state and non-state actors, or amongst several non-state actors in the absence of an overarching authority. These conflicts rarely conform to the theoretical norms of war. Rather they are guerrillas wars, with groups utilising terrorist tactics in order to over the asymmetry between themselves and the oppposing forces.

This re-emergence of non-conventional warfare has seen modern militaries dusting off old manuals on counter-insurgency.

These strategies are largely based on cold war and colonial situations and modified to take into account the modern experiences of Western powers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency theorists falls largely into two camps – those who champion a coercive pacification agenda, and those who advocate a “winning hearts and minds” strategy. The former would see the total eradication, destruction or suppression of the insurgency and their support base. The later advocate a security based approach wherein the military provides protection and public goods to locals in an effort to win their

“A state must be considered legitimate by the civilians within the region. One military mishap can undermine entire missions.”

30 | Agora

loyalty and support and to undermine the insurgents’ supply lines.

The problem is neither of these strategies work.

The “hearts and minds” strategy, though appealingly humanitarian, has been misrepresented historically and is ineffectual in practice. The policy, which came to prominence as part of the British Army’s tactics in Malaya in the 1950s, was effective then largely as a result of the coercive tactics which preceded it- namely forced relocation and the monopolisation of supply lines. The policy of creating civil governance in conjunction with providing security was effective for Australian forces in East Timor, but this was largely due to their presence as a peacekeeping rather than as an occupying force.

Conversely the US and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan increased ethnic tensions between groups, most notably Sunni and Shia Muslims, by cultivating loyalty through favouritism towards one group, and failing to understand the cultural dimensions of the state.

Furthermore, the “hearts and minds” strategy is laden with substantial costs and issues of legitimacy. A state must have the financial means to build a civil society and to foster trust, and it must also have the commitment to see these endeavours through in the long run, including all the requisite linguistic and anthropological training required to ensure military entrenchment with the society. The US military refused to make such investments in its army during the

“Newer, better strategies are imperative if states are to address their internal conflicts and stop the escalation of violence we are currently witnessing.”

Occupation of Iraq, primarily because to do so would imply a long term mission within the state. Premature exit can result in the collapse of already fragile systems. A state must be considered legitimate by the civilians within the region.

The imposition of external systems of governance or removal of traditional norms can be viewed as imperialist, while armies who are in general trigger happy are charged with humanitarian agendas. One military mishap can undermine entire missions. Frequent attempts by the Nigerian government to garner the favour of northern regions were undermined by the assassination of key Boko Haram Leaders, while revelations of US mistreatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay resulted in increased insurgent activity in Iraq.

The alternative strategy, coercion and pacification, is unpalatable, legally questionable, and ultimately counterproductive. The tactic would see an army use whatever force necessary in order to subdue the insurgent population, eliminate the threat of the insurgent or terrorist organisation, and remove the threat of future uprisings. In practice it has resulted in mass human rights violations, extermination, and protracted or frozen conflicts.

The actions of the state may garner sympathy for the insurgent movement, resulting in increased financial support and recruitment.

Such was the case with surges in IRA funding and recruitment following the implementation of the Special Powers Act and internment

in 1971. Even if the operation results in a military victory and the ceasing of insurgent operations, the legacy of violence and resulting economic destruction fosters long term resentments which can manifest as future conflicts. The ongoing and protracted conflict in Chechnya, with atrocities committed on both sides has resulted in embedded hatred of the Putin regime among Chechens, while the Russian state must continually monitor and exert control over the region in order to maintain control, resulting in a frozen conflict.

Furthermore, the actions committed by the state and by the military in order to achieve this aim of pacification can undermine the state’s legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. While the Argentine state successful, and silently squashed the emerging left-wing insurgency in the 1970’s, the revelations of the “Dirty War” destroyed the legacy and legitimacy of the regime. Similarly, the crackdown of the Sri Lankan state on the Tamil Tigers was a military victory which ended the decades long conflict, but the emerging allegations of war crimes are destroying the state’s international reputation and fuelling a revival of Tamil sympathies. Similarly, the hijacking of the term “counterinsurgency” by the Sudanese state to justify its actions in Darfur is eroding the very legitimacy of the term itself.

The failure of contained and effectual counterinsurgency policy or tactic means that states have to alternate between the two

options, leading to protracted conflicts, with no discernible end point.

Often times such internal conflicts come to an end not through military means, but through societal pressures for a political solution, and the revoking of support for actors. That is not to say that all insurgencies are bad. Rebellion has contributed to the collapse of oppressive, predatory regimes, and the increased freedom of the subjugated people.

However, in such cases where the insurgents are at the zenith of extremism, where they maintain territorial control of populations through terrifying and coercive mechanisms all of their own, counterinsurgency strategies are needed in order to re-establish authority and control. In the case of ISIS and Boko Haram, conventional warfare may go so far as to cause organisation weakness and the regaining of territory, but it will not destroy the insurgency itself.

New strategies are needed if new forms of warfare are to be defeated. Newer, better strategies are imperative if states are to address their internal conflicts, stop the escalation of violence we are currently witnessing in the Middle East, and ensure that children are no longer caught in the crossfire.

Emma Tobin MSc, Conflict Studies London School of Economics

International | 31

TRINITY COLLEGE The University of Dublin Irish School of Ecumenics

Postgraduate Study at the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin.

Study the pressing issues of today’s world in a multicultural, intellectually rigorous and practically oriented context.

Masters in Intercultural Theology and Interreligious Studies (IT & IS) - Dublin:

This course promises a rigorous and challenging time of study in an increasingly significant field that has emerged from theological and religious studies scholarship. Drawing on the school’s traditional strengths in ecumenics, IT & IS offers course participants a critical grasp of theoretical and practical issues involved in understanding inter-religious and inter-cultural realities. Email: ecumsec@tcd.ie.

Masters in International Peace Studies (IPS) - Dublin: Ireland has gained a strong international

reputation for peace studies. ISE’s International Peace Studies (IPS) course, regarded as pioneer in worldwide terms, is the longest-running of its kind on the island.

Courses take account of perspectives from political theory, human rights, development and gender studies, and from conflict analysis and resolution processes. Our students are immersed in a forefront course of study that examines the causes and consequences of war and armed conflict, but so also in research on the resources and norms for, effective, ethical and sustainable peace building policies. An internship option offers the possibility of practical experience in the field. Email: peacesec@tcd.ie.

Masters in Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CRR) - Belfast: this course provides unique and

unparalleled opportunities to learn about conflict transformation in the class-room and through varied community encounter and civic engagement opportunities.

It combines taught modules, experiential modules, and independent research. The course is designed to suit the needs of specialists already working in the fields of conflict resolution and reconciliation, those new to the study of conflict resolution and reconciliation and those seeking to build towards a career in this field. Some modules are offered in week-long intensive blocks to accommodate the needs of busy professionals. Email: reconsec@tcd.ie.

Diploma in Conflict and Dispute Resolution Studies (CDRS) - Dublin: This evening course

examines the causes of conflict in corporate, statutory, voluntary, political, and community-based settings and provides training in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

particularly Restorative Justice and mediation. Through an alliance with Mediation Forum-Ireland those who complete the CDRS course will have an opportunity to have their names included in the relevant specialist panel of Accredited Mediators. The course is also accredited by the Mediators’ Institute of Ireland. Graduates include trade unionists, members of the Garda Siochana, lawyers, senior policy makers in human resources and industrial relations, civil and public servants, members of the Probation Services and NGO leaders.

M.Litt. and Ph.D. supervision is also available. Email: ressec@tcd.ie.

Opportunities for ISE students and graduates:

ISE graduates, at every level of society, help to shape public policy, and motivate others by their imaginative leadership.

They are employed in a wide range of fields, including: the diplomatic service, international organisations such as the UN, NGOs, as workers in health, education, the media, and in church and community based organisations. Others continue to Ph.D. and higher research. Furthermore, their studies at ISE often prove a catalyst for change both personally and professionally.

FURTHER INFORMATION: M.Phil. students can study full-time for 12 months or parttime for 24 months.

Full details about these courses or all relevant closing are available at the following websites: www.tcd.ie/ise; www.tcd.ie/religions-theology-ecumenics/.

To apply on line – please refer to: http://www.tcd.ie/ise/postgraduate/Apply.php.

Applications will be considered after the closing dates only if places remain available.

Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin, Tel. +353.1. 8974770, Fax: +353.1.6725024.

683 Antrim Road, Belfast BT15 4EG, Tel. +44.28.90770087, Fax: +44.28.90373986