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Why was Stalin able to achieve total power in the USSR by the end of the 1920s?

Aden Wilmshurst, Year 9

After Vladimir Lenin’s death in January 1924, there was a period when senior figures in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union contended for the leadership. As this political struggle went on, the Party’s unlikely General Secretary, Joseph Stalin, began to rise to power. Stalin, the son of a shoemaker and a cleaner, grew up in a small town in Georgia and Russian was not his first language. His main opponent, Leon Trotsky, was Lenin’s right-hand man during the Civil War, so many believed that he was the appropriate successor. Stalin was considered such an unlikely leader that historian Isaac Deutscher describes him as having been a ‘grey blur’ prior to his rise to power. However, Stalin still managed to achieve total power through his ruthlessness, Trotsky’s mistakes, Stalin’s manipulation of and power over others in the Party, as well as pure luck and external factors.

Joseph Stalin was undoubtedly a ruthless, tactical and persuasive leader, which aided his rise to power. According to Professor Paul R Gregory of the University of Houston, ‘power struggles [would] be won by the most ruthless contender’, so a candidate’s ruthlessness in this period of history was evidently a key factor. Stalin’s ruthlessness was displayed when he ‘gradually squeez[ed] out his Party rivals’ by ‘outmanoeuvring’ them. Stalin eradicated many of those who posed a political threat, including Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky, by ‘turn[ing] them against each other’ and allowing them to wipe out each other as potential candidates. These men greatly underestimated Stalin’s power of manipulation and ruthlessness. It is through the fact that he ‘cunningly manipulated the various groups of the Politburo’ that he could vitiate the effectiveness of his opponents’ campaigns, or even end them. An example of this was when he convinced Zinoviev and Kamenev to publicly criticise Trotsky at the 1924 13th Party Congress, precluding Stalin from having to make any public criticism himself. Stalin’s persuasiveness was further exhibited when he convinced the Party’s Central Committee to not publish Lenin’s last testament, despite his wife’s pleas for them to do so. This testament contained severely damaging criticisms of Stalin by Lenin, including a description of him as ‘too self-confident’ and suggesting that ‘another man’ be appointed. It is through Stalin persuading the Central Committee to not publish this detrimental testament that his opponents were prevented from achieving an advantage, as Lenin’s opinions were valued greatly. His ability to ruthlessly manipulate and manoeuvre the Party to negate the threats of opponents and to make sure that the politically catastrophic testament was not released illustrates how Stalin’s rise to power was effective and unwavering.

Trotsky’s campaign was crippled by a number of mistakes, including the fact that he did not go to Lenin’s funeral and that he naively believed he would not have to fight for the leadership of the Party. While a large number of leaders of the Party went to Lenin’s funeral and carried his coffin, Trotsky failed to appear. Trotsky was recovering from an illness and had been given the wrong date by Stalin; however, his absence sent a message that he was not close to Lenin nor keen to carry his legacy and, his ‘apparent snub of the late leader was never forgotten’. Another significant mistake of Trotsky was his complacence and underestimation of Stalin. Firstly, Trotsky failed to fight for the release of Lenin’s last testament, which would have benefitted him greatly. Trotsky was naïve and unprepared for attacks by Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev, as he was deemed the likely successor. They attacked him for his past criticisms of factions of the Party, which eventually led to him stepping down as Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs in January 1925. This event ‘marked the beginning

Alex Zheng - Year 9

of the end of his influence in political affairs’, and the most startling aspect of this event was that Trotsky barely fought to keep this position. This was because he believed that he could simply wait for the right situation, yet it never arrived. These mistakes and weaknesses of Trotsky led to his downfall and exile and contributed to Stalin’s eventual rise to power.

It was also due to Stalin’s control over and manipulation of members of the Party that his campaign prevailed. In his capacity as General Secretary, Stalin was responsible for the workings of the Party, including officials and personnel. As discussed by Victor Serge, in his 1937 book, From Lenin to Stalin, Stalin had ‘pack[ed] all the Party secretariats… with his creatures’. As Stalin had given a large number of Party officials their jobs, they were therefore loyal to him. This meant that Stalin was popular within the Party, giving him a significant advantage. Prior to becoming General Secretary, Stalin had been the Commissar of Nationalities, where he managed relations with minorities and regional areas. In this role, he was also able to gather support from members in regional areas, through his advocacy for ethnic minorities. Furthermore, Stalin had the backing of many in the secret police force of the Soviet government. He was particularly close to three senior members of the force, including Felix Dzerzhinsky, whom Stalin referred to as a ‘devout knight’. Stalin’s support from many powerful officials contributed to his rise to power.

A certain level of luck and external factors also helped Stalin achieve power in the USSR. One occasion where luck helped Stalin was when Trotsky was recovering from an illness, so could not go to Lenin’s funeral, hurting his image greatly. Although Stalin was cunning in giving Trotsky the wrong date, he was also lucky that Trotsky was not even in Moscow at the time, as he was in the Caucasus, and sick. Another external factor that aided Stalin’s ascent was his wife’s death. Stalin was in grief and angered by the death Bibliography

Han Wen Khaw - Year 8

of his first wife, so distraught that he was quoted saying that ‘with her died my last warm feelings for humanity’. Many credit this event to have contributed to Stalin’s ruthlessness and hunger for power and it is considered a significant turning point for him. This illustrates how there were external factors that assisted in Stalin’s rise to power.

Although Stalin was not the discernible successor to Lenin, he still managed to achieve total power in the USSR by the end of the 1920s. He did this through his own ruthlessness and power of manipulation, and was aided by Leon Trotsky’s mistakes. His control over a large number of members of the Politburo and the relationships he had cultivated with others, as well as external factors and luck

were also contributing factors.

Carrol, M (2010, July 6), Joseph Stalin’s rise to power: facts more intriguing than fiction Retrieved from https://www.uh.edu/news-events/stories/2010articles/July2010/070110PaulGregory.php Evans, Jenkins. (2001) Years of Russia and the USSR, 1851-1991 London: Hodder Education Laver, J. (1991) Russia, 1914-41 (history at source) Kent: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd Lynch, M. (2008) From autocracy to communism: Russia 1894-1941 for OCR London: Hodder Education Montefiore, SS. (2007), Young Stalin London: Phoenix National WWII Museum New Orleans. (2018, September 12). Trotsky’s struggle against Stalin. Retrieved from https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/ trotskys-struggle-against-stalin Roberts, G. (2014, November 8). Stalin’s staying power. Retrieved from https://www.irishexaminer.com/lifestyle/artsfilmtv/books/stalins-staying-power-296688.html Serge, V. (1937), From Lenin to Stalin UPI Archives. (1953, March 6). Josef Stalin was one of the most ruthless and cold-blooded leaders in recorded history. Retrieved from https://www.upi.com/Archives/1953/03/06/Josef-Stalin-was-one-of-the-most-ruthless-and-cold-blooded-leaders-in-recorded-history/7420410824161/ Year 9 Resource Book 2019 Webb, K. (2015) Russia and the Soviet Union Melbourne: Cengage Learning Australia

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