SAAPS 2013 Regional Colloquium “The African Union: Quo Vadis - the next 50 years” 4 October 2013
Challenges and prospects of AU to implement Ezulwini Consensus: the case of collective security and the use of force
Lecturer at ULPGL, Goma/ DR Congo tusphil@yahoo.fr
Contents Introduction Genesis of 2005 World Summit Outcome to Ezulwini Consensus Challenges to implement the Ezulwini Consensus
Prospects to implement the Ezulwini Consensus
I. Introduction The OAU was founded in 1963 and worked to bring African nations together to gain and strengthen their independence. It has experienced various internal and intra-States conflicts. Conscious of that fact, in 2000, African Heads of State and Government resolved to replace the OAU by adopting unanimously the Constitutive Act of the AU. To make difference with the OAU, Article 4(h) of the Act provides “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.
Intro’ Desirous of establishing an operational structure, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Act, the Protocol creating the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was adopted in July 2002. The Protocol has integrated Article 4(h) with the objective to anticipate and prevent conflicts (art 3(b)). Considering atrocities against citizens in Darfur as well as in Burundi, the AU resolved to create the AMIS and the AMIB in 2003. Due to financial constraints of the AU during both operations, the UNSC decided to establish hybrid operations.
Intro’ For a better decisive response in such situations, the UNGA adopted Res 60/1; the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Its paragraphs 138-139 provide that each State has the R2P its populations. The R2P was endorsed by the AU in a report known as Ezulwini Consensus. Since, many African States remain in fragile peace due to “revolutions”, internal and internationalized armed conflicts, coup d’état, etc. The guiding question is how can the AU or subregional organisations respond in a timely manner in order to ensure the full protection of civil population under imminent threat?
II. Genesis of 2005 World Summit Outcome to Ezulwini Consensus The 2005 World Summit Outcome was preceded by two important Reports: - Millennium Report of the UNSG: The International Commission on the Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) asserts “the idea that sovereign states have a R2P their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe - from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” - In the same point of view, the Report of the High-level Panel on threats of the UN underlines that the international community has the responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring missions and diplomatic pressure – and with force if necessary, though only as a last resort.
Genesis of 2005 World Summit to Ezulwini ‘
As the SC is far from the scenes where conflicts happen, even the AU has the right to intervene, however, there is a fact that they cannot protect people everywhere. Therefore, Ezulwini Consensus, recognising the power of the SC to authorize the use of force, in circumstance requiring urgent action, the report insists that regional organizations in areas of proximity to conflicts should be empowered to take action. Then the SC should approve after and assume responsibility for financing such operations.
Genesis of 2005 World Summit to Ezulwini ‘ In this way, the UNSC encourages the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or regional agencies [Art 52 (3) of the UN Charter] Besides, among objectives of the AU is to coordinate and harmonize the policies of existing and future Regional Communities (Article 3, l). Thus, regarding the situation in Eastern DRC, as a regional organisation in the area of conflict, the ICGLR has taken actions, but the implementation of the Ezulwini Consensus is facing many challenges.
III. Challenges to implement the Ezulwini Consensus Gravely concerned by the escalation of the armed conflict in the Eastern DRC, the ICGLR has organised more than one extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government in order to find home-grown solutions. It is the case of: ICGLR Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee and Ministers of Defence of 11 July 2012 (at the Headquarters of the AU) Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the ICGLR on 15th July 2012 (Addis Ababa) Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the ICGLR on 7-8th August 2012 (Kampala)
Challenges to implement the Ezulwini’ Fifth Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the ICGLR on 24 November 2012 (Kampala) Sixth Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the ICGLR on 31st July 2013 (Nairobi) Seventh Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the ICGLR on 5 September 2013 (Kampala) From the above, we can deduce the first responsibility of the ICGLR to find lasting solutions to peace and security in the region and particularly in Eastern DRC.
Challenges to implement the Ezulwini’ From different declarations, the ICGLR condemned the actions of the M23 and succeeded to withdraw rebels from Goma up to 20 km; ICGLR decided to intervene through a neutral International Force to eradicate M23 and all negative forces in Eastern DRC, and to open a Dialogue process in Kampala between the Government of the DRC and M23 under the mediation of the Chairperson of the ICGLR, President of Uganda. Thus, working with the AU and the UN, the UNSC decided to establish the Intervention Brigade through Resolution 2098 (2013).
Challenges to implement the Ezulwini’ Nevertheless, many evidences from the UN Group of Experts and NGOs have proved that Rwanda and Uganda (Member States of ICGLR) have cooperated to support the creation and expansion of the M23 and have consistently advocated on behalf of the rebels. Besides, both Governments have violated the arms embargo by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels in the destabilization of Eastern DRC. Rwandan and Ugandan support to M23 is also a violation of the Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in the GLR (Article 5 of the Pact).
Challenges to implement the Ezulwini’ It is also the violation of paragraph 5 of the Peace, security and cooperation framework for the DRC and the Region that provides to neither harbour nor provide protection of any kind to persons accused of international crimes. Consequently, the ICGLR failed to request Rwanda and Uganda to provide response to the allegations against them for supporting M23 rebel group. Failed to recall Rwanda and Uganda to respect the national sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the DRC.
A mediator is supposed to be neutral, but the ICGLR failed to request President Museveni to resign from the position of Chairperson and Mediator even though he was denying the accusations. [ judge and party ]
IV. Prospects to implement the Ezulwini Consensus For Member States of the ICGLR Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith (Art 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969) Therefore, Member States of the ICGLR have to demonstrate their political will to respect the fundamental principles protected in the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act. It is the case notably of the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, non-interference and nonaggression.
For Member States of the ICGLR’ By doing so, they will ensure the GLR a specific zone of reconstruction and development as declared in the Preamble of the Pact. To not transform the ICGLR into a club of friends instead of undertaken required actions to protect populations under imminent threat. To abstain from sending or supporting armed opposition forces or armed groups onto the territory of other Member States (Article 5b of the Pact);
If any Member State fails to comply, an extraordinary Summit shall be convened to consider appropriate action (Art 5a of the Pact).
For the African Union The conflict in Eastern DRC is not yet resolved due to the fact that some Member States have failed to comply with the Pact that created the ICGLR. Besides, President Museveni is the mediator, but Uganda is accused to provide military support to the rebel group M23. Due to that, it is important that the AU take its own responsibility by sending African Experts in order to help the ICGLR to resolve the crisis as the mediator is no longer neutral. This will help the AU to take appropriate measure to implement the Ezulwini Consensus.
For the African Union As the situation on the ground remains fragile, the AU must open a permanent office in the Eastern DRC that will keep informing the AU of the situation. Collaborating with the UN Mission, with the ICGLR, and the civil society the representative of the AU in Eastern DRC, being on the ground, will suggests the AU strategies that will definitely help to resolve the cycles of armed conflicts and persistent violence by armed groups. Finally, regarding the agreement that could be signed between the Government of the DRC and the M23, the representative of the AU will have the task for monitoring its enforcement.
Thank You