Tvergastein - Issue #1 by Tvergastein Journal

1st

Editorial board: Marit Aakvaag, Sondre Aasan, Theodor Howard, Misha Jemsek, Luis Carlos Rosado van der Gracht, Ingerid Salvesen, Eirik Sjåvik, Torstein Tvedt Solberg, Christian Strømme and Eivind Trædal. Design: Eivind Freng Dale Front page photo: Rune Guneriussen “It´s common knowledge” (2009) Printer: Grøset Trykkeri Circulation: 1000 Editorial review finished: 11th of May 2012 Date of publication: 24th of May 2012 Tvergastein has two annual issues and is distributed for free at UiO, UMB and several other locations. A digital version can be found at our webpage: www.tvergastein.com We would like to extend our sincere gratitude and thanks to Rune Guneriussen and Johan Brun for lending us their photographs as well as to our sponsors: The Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), Kulturstyret at SiO, The Arne Næss Chair in Global Justice and the Environment at SUM, The Interfaculty Research Area LEVE at UiO, and Frifond. The photo on this page is taken by Johan Brun. Address: Tvergastein, co/SUM, Postboks 1116, Blindern 0317, OSLO E-mail: tvergastein@sum.uio.no Web: www.tvergastein.com Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/tvergastein Twitter: @tvergastein The article submission deadline for the second issue is set to the 25th of September 2012. Tvergastein accepts submissions in two categories: Shorter op-ed pieces (2,000 - 5,000 characters) and longer articles (10,000 - 20,000 characters), in either English or Norwegian.

issue

Tvergastein 1st Issue 4

Rebuilding Bridges Editorial Statement

5 Interdisciplinary Research Desmond McNeill

Environment

6 Peak- and Thought-Fishing Nina Witoszek

Tvergastein

and

Development

8 Tvergastein - a place Editorial Piece on Tvergastein 14 Sustainability Thirty Years Later David Rothenberg 16 Heading for Rio, Again… Robyn Eckersley 18 Tid for ei revitalisering Eirik Frøhaug Swensen 24

Rio +20: Hva Editorial Piece

mener

av miljøengasjementet

Norge?

26 Styringseffektivitet - En graf som oppsummerer det som er feil med norsk klimapolitikk Magnus Delsett 28 Hva skjedde Eivind Trædal

med

«miljøvalget»?

38 The Revolution of the Details An Interview with Bruno Latour Bård Hobæk and Eirik Høyer Leivestad 46 A Brief Examination of Everyday Consumption How the Study of ‘the Mundane’ Can Inform Sustainability Discourse and Policy Melanie Leeson

Rune Guneriussen Editorial Piece

60 Sustainable Development Arve Hansen

and

Consumption

from

Rio

and

Beyond

68 Twin River Tension: Legal Aspects of Water Management in the Tigris-Euphrates Watercourse Julie Gjørtz Howden 76 Ethical Oil Greenwashing Canada’s Oil Sands? Luis Carlos Rosado van der Gracht 82 Making Peace with the Earth From a Destructive Anthropocene to a Creative Anthropocene Guided by the Living Earth Dr. Vandana Shiva 88 Gråbo – et lappeteppe - Et forslag til et bærekraftig lokalsamfunn i Sverige Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson og Sofi Nilsson 94 Planlegging for en bærekraftig fremtid - En kommentar om byøkologi generelt og prosjektet «Gråbo - et lappeteppe» spesielt Bård Sødal Grasbekk 98 Space for Debate Climate Change, Climate Denial and the Logic of the Media Angi Buettner 108 About

the

Contributors

Rebuilding Bridges There has long been a bond in Norway between academia and environmental activism, a link captured by the image of Arne Næss chained together with young students and activists during the demonstrations against the damming of Mardøla and Alta. However, there are signs that these bonds have weakened. The vital democratic and activist part of the Norwegian environmental movement has lost touch with like-minded academics and scientists, with some honorable exceptions. The environmental organizations do not have a strong foothold among students, and being an environmental activist is often incompatible with full-time studies. At the same time, environmental issues are becoming increasingly important for nearly all disciplines. For the sake of our common future, students are engaging with every aspect of what is seen as a looming environmental crisis. We present our attempt to establish anew connections between activists and academics: an interdisciplinary journal of environmental issues, the first of its kind in Norway. We recognize that the scale of environmental problems is such that they affect nearly every field of study. What is needed is to join forces, to understand our greatest challenges through every available lens and from every perspective. Our current editorial board consists of ten students from four countries currently studying at the University of Oslo or the Norwegian University of the Life Sciences at Ås. The idea for this journal was hatched among master’s students at the Centre for Development and Environment, where Arne Næss spent his last active decades as a professor. We inherit the same principle of an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the 4

challenges of environmental problems and sustainability that the institution was founded on. We have chosen to name this journal after Arne Næss’ cabin under Hallingskarvet at Hardangervidda. Like the cabin, Tvergastein will be a place for sharing and developing ideas, and we hope to emulate its expansive vantage point. The year 2012 marks the 20th anniversary of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Earth Summit), where the United Nations Forum on Climate Change was conceived. Expectations may be lower for the upcoming Rio+20 summit than they were in 1992, but the circumstances are far more dire. Many of the topics on the Rio agenda are covered in the following texts. We have also presented our comments to the Norwegian negotiating positions. In this and coming issues, we hope to contribute to a fruitful cross-pollination between the restive environmental activism that is urgently needed, and rigorous and critical studies of environmental affairs. Our deepest thanks to all the contributors as well as to our sponsors: The Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), Kulturstyret at SiO, The Arne Næss Chair in Global Justice and the Environment at SUM, The Interfaculty Research Area LEVE at UiO, and Frifond. Marit Flood Aakvaag, Sondre Aasan, Theodore Howard, Misha Jemsek, Luis Carlos Rosado van der Gracht, Ingerid Salvesen, Eirik Sjåvik, Torstein Tvedt Solberg, Christian Bianchi Strømme, Eivind Trædal - The Tvergastein Board of Editors

Interdisciplinary Research on Environment and Development Desmond McNeill My ambition as a researcher is to make sense of events and phenomena in the real world, and by better understanding them, to contribute to bringing about positive change. The perspectives and methods that are suited to this purpose should not, I suggest, be determined a priori, but by the ‘reality’ that the researcher encounters in practice, in the field – whether the field is a village in Nepal, the boardroom of the World Bank or the archives of the national library. Based on my experience at SUM over two decades, I believe that an interdisciplinary approach can be very well suited to this purpose. Ideally, this will involve several researchers with varied approaches working in collaboration. But if one conducts research alone, it is important to be open to a variety of perspectives and methods, and to have a critical attitude to one’s original discipline. This does not mean, however, that interdisciplinary research replaces disciplines; quite the contrary, it builds on them. I advocate an interdisciplinary approach not so much because the subject matter is complex (this is surely true of all fields of knowledge), but rather that in studying environment and development it is particularly important to take account of context, and to balance a desire for generalisation with an appreciation of the particular. Research concerned with environment

and development should, I believe, have a strong empirical base. The perspectives and methods adopted should be determined by the nature of the question to be answered; and researchers should be willing – in the light of experience - to challenge the conventions and practices of their own discipline. In studying the issue of sustainable development, there is a need to complement – or even counteract – the tendency that is very evident today to favour a mechanistic understanding of complex social phenomena, and to adopt policies based on such understandings. A critical researcher should be willing to question the questions, or more accurately the way in which the questions are posed. This applies not only within academia but also when relating to policy, although it may sometimes be frustrating for a policy-maker seeking simple answers and clear recommendations for action. Rather than making weakly based claims of generalisation across disparate and perhaps ill-understood local realities, the most useful contribution a researcher can make to policy-making may be to offer instructive insights based on rigorous study of the particular - informed by theory, which may be derived from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.• Based on a chapter in Development and Environment: Practices, Theories, Policies (Unipub, forthcoming). 5

Peak- and ThoughtFishing at Tvergastein

Tvergastein at the foot of Hallingskarvet.

Photo: Johan Brun

Nina Witoszek The whimsical American film director, Woody Allen once said: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.” The young editors who have the audacity to launch a new environmental journal called Tvergastein, defy this highly ironic prognosis in an intriguing way. On the one hand, unlike the increasingly gloomy proponents of the ‘climate Ragnarök’, they believe that something can be 6

done to challenge environmental obscurantism and to discover new ways of voicing and solving the most urgent crisis of our time. But then, they have chosen Tvergastein as their locus communis: a solitary philosopher’s hut surrounded by billowing clouds, mists, nebulae, and vapours. The mountains above it look like the army of grim dementors from the Harry Potter series. Apart from the cottage, there is no sign of human habitation; the landscape is sublime, yet humble and hungry. Tvergastein is five hundred meters above the tree-line; it has an Arctic soul,

and it entices us into helpless wonder. Are the young editors telling us it is time to wrap up, retreat to the icy northern wilderness, and muse on Spinoza? Finally, what are we to think of yet another paper-print environmental magazine in the age of despotic, triumphant digitocracy? Isn’t the idea of Tvergastein a living anachronism, like trying to re-launch a steam locomotive? And yet, Tvergastein, invented by a group of young, post-utopian international researchers, is a project which thrills and tempts us towards an idea of renewed possibilities. It does not stand for a forlorn world which has turned its back on the gross sins of our time and retreated to nature. It is an active Norwegian ashram: a place of philosophical pilgrimage, tinderangling og tankerangling (peak- and thought-fishing); a place where the project of environmental paradigm shift, initiated by Norway’s greatest nature philosopher Arne Næss, is continued and ever revised; a place where planning and scheming of engagement and action takes place. Arne Næss, ‘the inhabiting intelligence’ of the journal, received numerous international prizes for his achievements both as an intellectual and as an activist: the Fridtjof Nansen Prize, the Gandhi Prize, and medals and distinctions from two successive Norwegian Kings. But he always mentioned that the greatest event in his life was “building in 1938 my cabin up on the slope of a mountain of metaphysical dimensions. But on the average I am there only about 90 days a year, the exceptionally rough climate being one of the limiting factors.” Næss obeyed the call of Hallingskarvet – the mountain range above – because he needed the absolute silence to train his ear for new ideas. The view which stretched below, he used to say, was the view where thoughts could not afford to be pedestrian. The patron of the new journal is a Norwegian national icon and an international sage. The question is, has Næss’s ‘ecophilosophy T’ – named in honor of Tvergastein – gotten us anywhere worth getting? The Irish poet W.B.

Yeats captured the fate of ideas in his poem Easter 1916: “Hearts with one purpose alone/ Through summer seem/ Enchanted to a stone/ To trouble the living stream.” Can we talk about Næssianism as a living stream, or has it become “enchanted to a stone” over the years? There are critics who claim that deep ecology, for all its bravado, hardened over time and became a spent force – too radical or utopian to be taken seriously. But there is also evidence that within the last thirty years deep ecology has become a “broad ecology,” assembling a colorful community of practitioners, believers, maniacs, skeptics and inquisitors who swim both with and against the living stream that is Næss’s vision. Næss’s intellectual generosity, his fondness for being challenged, and his ability to adapt to every intellectual context – whether academic debate, a Greenpeace meeting, or Buddhist meditation session – have imparted a spaciousness upon his philosophical utopia. What has given a special urgency to Næss’s legacy is the aggregate crisis of our time. Global warming – which threatens not just an environmental collapse but the existential crisis of humanity at large – has reanimated interest in Næss’s idea of the necessity of a perestroika in human habits of the mind and habits of the heart. On one occasion Næss said: “We should, must see to it, in all [the] next century, that there would be Tvergastein, and there would be people there, living according to the rules of Tvergastein. There are many non-sensical rules today, and we want to disobey this nonsense…Most of the rules [of Tvergastein] would be kept alive here, at this place, all next century. That’s the opinion of the good people here, in Norway.” The journal which bears such a mythical and pregnant name is a fulfillment of Næss’s greatest wish. It remains to be seen, of course, if it obeys the no-nonsense rules of Tvergastein.•

Photos left and above: Johan Brun

Tvergastein - a Place About 200 kilometers east of Bergen there are two great landmarks, the Hardangerjøkul, and a 40 kilometers long, broad mountain, Hallingskarvet, running from East to West … On these slopes we find a place called Tvergastein, 1500 meters above sea level, with a lake named Tvergasteintjernet. The stupendous, majestic Hallingskarvet captured my imagination from the time I was about 5 years old, staying during Easter and summers in a cottage at Ustaoset, a tiny village about 8 kilometers from the mythogenic mountain where I developed my place. This is how Arne Næss, in his own words, describes his Place - Tvergastein. In Arctic conditions and above the tree line, it is no ordinary Norwegian cabin. In the following pages we hope to describe the vision Arne Næss had for Tvergastein, using photographs and Næss’ own words to explain the ideas we, the editorial board, were inspired by while creating this first issue of the journal. We are grateful to the photographer Johan Brun for lending us his pictures from the book Det gode lange livs far: Hallingskarvet sett fra Tvergastein. The book is a project Brun and Arne Næss made together in 1995, and the captions are the words that Næss wanted to accompany the photographs. We are thankful for permission from Kit-Fai Næss to print the excerpts by Arne Næss, and to be able to include her memories of Tvergastein as well.

What is remarkable about Tvergastein, and similar places, is their capacity of furnishing the basis of a life of simplicity of means and richness of ends. The latter is dependent upon their development from being a place to being a Place. With increasing intensity of commitment, the Place will satisfy an increasing variety of needs and will allow for an increasing variety of cherished goals to be reached. The little time and effort spent on the simple means frees time for dwelling in situations characterized by intrinsic values. But, for most of us, the Personal Place cannot permanently satisfy every need. Perhaps the time spent there decreases over the years, or is never more than a minor part of the year. This holds true for Tvergastein. However, it is remarkable how a Place, even when it is uninhabited most of the year, largely determines one’s attitudes, one’s likes and dislikes, and one’s general outlook. One is caught up in the Place, hopefully with good consequences, but inevitably causing some maladjustment in locality very different from the Place. A Personal Place occasionally tyrannizes, imposes itself, gives orders. To disobey these ‘orders’ creates a feeling of guilt or weakness of character. This is unavoidable. Phenomenological speaking, the orders given by the Place and the orders given by oneself are inseparable. Only philosophies which impose a sharp subject/object dualism try to trace a border between the self and ‘its’ geographical surroundings.

What can we learn from each other? The classic case of belonging to a place is that of being born and raised somewhere, just somewhere in geographical sense, and then the ‘place’ develops into ‘the Place’. But when the place is physically destroyed or unfit for living because of other factors, can a different place develop into ‘the Place’? Certainly it can, and that happened with the Tvergastein area. The same will happen to many people in the future: they experience a longing and a satisfaction that elicits such utterances as ‘Here I belong!’ It may even happen that there are two places where we are drawn to, and a conscious choice is possible. In such cases certainly one thing can be inferred on the basis of experience at Tvergastein: choose what has a reasonable chance of being also satisfactory to a life companion and to close friends. Don’t choose the place which is so particular that such chance is small. Furthermore don’t choose the place such that there is little chance that you yourself are capable of mastering it when you are at an advanced age. Then it is not a place where you can live and die. Tvergastein is extreme in many ways and unfit for many purposes. The development could only be more or less tragic. But even so it is difficult for us who have a place where we feel we belong, not to be glad and grateful to have one. Why so? That is difficult to say. - Excerpt from ‘An Example of a Place: Tvergastein’ written by Arne Næss in 1992.

Om våren trenger vannet hjelp for å finne det gamle bekkeleiet under sneen. Finner vannet nye leier vil den sårbare vegetasjonen ødelegges. Naturen trenger støtte. Foto: Johan Brun

Overvintringsrommet er som et mikrokosmos. Her er alt som trengs. Uansett vær og vind, uansett om det overhodet lar seg gjøre å komme ned til sivilisasjonen – alt er der. Et innendørs mikrokosmos. Foto: Johan Brun 11

Foto: Johan Brun

Hallingsskarvet er mektig og stort, men livet langs stupene gir rom for å dvele ved de enkelte vesener som lever der. På bildet tatt på nordsiden av Skarvet, ser vi tusener av siv, hvert enkelt med sin egen form. Formen beskriver hver sin kurve – med hver sin ligning, tenker den som er litt opptatt av geometri. De gir uttrykk for mange forskjellige holdninger, noen gir inntrykk av å skynde seg fremover mer enn andre. Noen med bue som går helt ned mot høyre, ser nedover mot høyre og flytter ikke på seg. De er noenlunde, men ikke helt parallelle, og peker i retning bort fra hvor den vanligste vinden kommer. Hvert enkelt – jeg ser knapt en eneste klar unntakelse, bærer noen få eller ganske mange

små dotter av sne. Tyngden har vel bidratt til at de alle har krummet seg så dypt. Dotten er resten av store snefnugg som har dalt ned nylig, men krystallformene er nå på vei til å slettes ut. Avstanden mellom dottene varierer og bidrar til den enkeltes «personlige» identitet. Bildet sier litt om de enkelte sivenes livssituasjon et bestemt øyeblikk i deres sene alder før sne og vind bøyer dem helt ned mot vannet, hvor mange av dem blir sittende fast i isen. Hver enkelt har et liv som på mange måter ligner vårt eget. Lengst til høyre ser vi noen raringer som snur seg mot vinden. Noen har en knekk i knærne, eller er det hoftene – som hilsende japanere?

Jeg tenkte: «Crazy man» Det var en av de aller første skiturene vi tok sammen, Arne og jeg, og jeg reagerte på at han hilste på alle trærne. Jeg spurte ham om hva han holdt på med, sa at han måtte jo skjønne at det virket litt rart. Da sa han bare: «Ser du ikke at de snakker til deg?» Sånn var Arne. For ham var grenene på trærne levende vesener som det gikk an å kommunisere med. Dere skulle sett meg den første skituren opp til Tvergastein. Etter en times ett-skritt-frem-ogto-tilbake, så la jeg meg ned på bakken. Sa: «Jeg vil dø». Jeg kom jo fra sementjungelen i Hong Kong og hadde aldri gått på ski, jeg hadde ikke engang sett seks trær stå sammen før jeg kom til Norge. Men etter hvert som jeg levde med Arne, så forandret jeg meg. Altså, han sa aldri «gjør sånn, tenk sånn». Du kan si det var som når man slipper en dråpe blekk på et papir, og dråpen sprer seg sakte utover papiret, ikke sant? Etter hvert ble et nært forhold til naturen også en del av meg og en del av min verden.

Tvergastein er et sted hvor alle små ting får en større betydning. Vi satte større pris på enhver bit i hermetikkboksene med fruktcoktail, siden vi måtte tross alt bære dem opp hele veien. Det samme med vann, da vi måtte hente det fra et tjern en kilometer unna. Etter to dager på hytta, falt Arne til ro. Jeg liker ikke ordet ‘lykke’, kan jeg beskrive det som en slags tilfredshet? Sånn «her har jeg alt». Vi gikk mye tur, og klatret en del, det var ikke alltid vi snakket så mye. Vi slo vitser om hvor mange fruktcoktailbiter den andre hadde tatt. Mest av alt leste vi, og Arne skrev nesten alle bøkene sine på hytta. Over mange år har vi dratt med oss bøker dit, jeg tror det er over 2000 bøker der nå. Likevel, Tvergastein handler egentlig om rikdom på en annen måte. Arne kunne se fem-seks bøtter fylt med vann utenfor Tvergastein, og føle seg rik. Fra samtale med Kit-Fai Næss, Arne Næss’ livsledsager i 36 år. Nedskrevet av Ingerid Salvesen, medredaktør i Tvergastein.

Arne Næss og Kit-Fai Næss på Hardangervidda. Foto: Wong Wai Kwok

Sustainability Thirty Years Later

David Rothenberg

Back in the 1980s in Oslo we liked to think that we invented the idea of sustainability. Of course that’s far from being literally true, but since Gro Harlem Brundtland led the United Nations Committee that wrote the famous Brundtland Report that defined sustainability as “letting the present meet its needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs,” it seemed there was a Norwegian root to the whole idea, something we at the Centre for Development and the Environment took some pride in being a part of. Over the next decade we watched this originally very slippery definition turn into something that begat scores of conferences on sustainable design, sustainable business, sustainable growth, and sustainable sustainability, an idea that just won’t go away. Its expansion into the general culture of futurology dovetailed with society’s absorption of the core ideas of deep ecology into mainstream environmental14

ism through Al Gore’s popular book Earth in the Balance also in the 1980s, where he announced that “we must change the relationship to nature at the very heart of our civilization,” an idea straight from the words of Arne Næss. He didn’t straight-out call this notion deep ecology, but he made it possible to enter the mainstream, with that single sentence read by so many people. Today sustainability and deep ecology have seeped into culture at large and been subsumed into our general worry about a singular number that hangs over all ecological thinking and all visions of a changing human future on Earth: the exact number of degrees of temperature that we can allow the atmosphere to rise before we will have caused too much climatic calamity to survive. Global warming has emerged as a single environmental fear to concern nearly all of us all over the planet. Back in the eighties most people were far more worried about impending nuclear war brought on by the crazy Americans and mad

Russians to make environmentalism more than a sectarian concern or special interest of only the few, but today it is at last a global concern. Everyone’s talking about it, and we now know that the sustainability of the entire human position on Earth is at stake. We still want

sustainability possible. So what if governments keep arguing, he writes in the latest issue of the Garrison Institute Newsletter. What’s important is that people keep meeting, discussing, networking, sharing ideas on this problem that will, in time, lead to the necessary solutions.

Of course, in times of great danger are the possibilities for greatest opportunity... the future to be able to make its own choices; meanwhile, we can’t use all the world’s natural resources up as we continue to grow, expand, develop, and transform the planet into a place solely modeled upon human needs. It’s hard to be anything but pessimistic when one considers the barrage of statistics that arrive every year, showing that things are much worse than we thought they were the year before. Of course in times of great danger are the possibilities for greatest opportunity—now is the time for leaders in alternative energy and alternative values to change what we mean by progress and development to truly emerge. I would always smile when Arne Næss would say, “I remain an optimist… but for the twenty-second century, not the twenty-first.” Someday, he reckoned, we would learn. Probably at the last minute possible to save everything! Still, I think we should try to remain optimists even for the present. I’m impressed that visionary writer and enterpreneur Paul Hawken is even optimistic about these interminable climate meetings at Copenhagen and Durban, where the world’s governments can’t seem to agree on how to limit emissions to make real

And I am heartened by the efforts of one of my undergraduate students at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, Anthony Sorgi, who feels today’s young people are not reading enough serious books on the subject of sustainability and creating a better world. So even in this age of apps and online fantasies of higher technology meaning better technology, Sorgi convinced the university to buy six copies of the twenty-five best old-fashioned books on making the world a better and more sustainable place, chosen by a group of world leaders on these topics. The books will be strategically scattered around the campus on old-fashioned bookshelves, where students can take them, read them, and learn what they can do to help solve these pressing problems the whole planet faces. His project can be viewed at www.neweartharchive.org, and he hopes this movement will spread to other American college campuses and after that, universities in other countries. So people are working hard to meet our present needs and hopefully helping the future to know what its needs will be. Sustainability as an idea is still evolving, and let us hope it improves fast enough to allow us all to go on.•

Heading for Rio, Again…

Photo: Misha Jemsek

Robyn Eckersley In June 2012, governments, stakeholders and global civil society will gather together at the Rio+20 Conference in Brazil to renew and enhance the international community’s commitment to sustainable development. The agenda is both exciting and ambitious. The so-called Zero draft outcome document remains a work in progress, bulging with competing ideas, both big and small. The two grand themes under consideration are building a green economy to promote sustainable development and poverty eradication, 16

and rethinking the global institutional framework for sustainable development. The first theme presents the conference with the opportunity to steer away from the ecological myopia of neoliberalism towards a new economic philosophy that respects local and planetary ecological thresholds and the Earth’s biodiversity while reducing the glaring gap between rich and poor. This theme is highly contested but it has generated an outpouring of new ideas alongside the refinement of older ones. My favourites include the ‘plenty line’ (to com-

plement the ‘poverty line’), Sustainable Energy Trade Agreements and Clean Trade Agreements to replace Free Trade Agreements, and a new ‘genuine progress indicator’ to replace GDP. There are also ‘no brainers’ on the table, like phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, increasing en-

thresholds and goals must also be thoroughly infused into the core institutions of economic governance, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since the first Earth Summit in 1992, these institutions have given only tokenist consideration to sustainable development and

We need much more than another shopping list of goals.

ergy and resource efficiency, promoting renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies, and factoring the full social and ecological costs of production and consumption into prices. As ever, the bitter fights will revolve around apportioning the costs of adjustment and ensuring that the ladder is not kicked down for developing countries. The second theme presents the conference with a unique constitutional moment to review the out-dated international governance institutions created in the aftermath of World War Two, which were premised on cornucopian assumptions and unbridled economic growth. This includes reforming the international institutions of environmental governance by upgrading the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to a specialised UN Agency and creating a new Sustainable Development Council in the United Nations system. However, these reforms, while welcome, will not be enough. Planetary environmental

have largely undermined many of the painstaking achievements of environmental multilateralism. Rio+20 provides a unique opportunity to correct what the UNEP’s Report on the Green Economy has called “the gross misallocation of capital” that is perpetuating unsustainable development around the world. Even if the conference falls short of these lofty goals, organisers are hopeful that the negotiators will at least agree on a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to complement the Millennium Development Goals. Yet, after twenty years of faltering steps towards sustainable development, we need much more than another shopping list of goals. We need an outcome that is visionary, tangible and transformatory, one that turns economic thinking on its head. As the former US Senator Gaylord Nelson once put it, the economy must take its proper place as “a wholly owned subsidiary of the environment”, and not the other way around.•

Tid for ei revitalisering av miljøengasjementet Eirik Frøhaug Swensen

Klima engasjerer mindre enn før. Klimatoppmøtet i Durban sist desember gjekk over i historia som nok eit nederlag utan at nokon er så veldig overraska.

Kontrasten til stemninga før København i 2009 er slåande. Klima har ikkje hatt den mobiliserande effekten mange håpa og trudde på berre få år tilbake. Som erstatning har vi fått resignasjon, politikarforakt og svekka tru på vitskapen. Det er på tide å ta miljøsaka tilbake

Vår

tids største utfordring

I standard læreverk om miljøspørsmål blir klimakampen ofte skildra som siste fase i utviklinga. I ei nyleg utgjeven bok om miljøsosiologi står det: «Klimat börjar alltmer ersätta miljö, ekologi och hållbar utveckling som övergripande benämning».1 Dette er ei presis skildring av situasjonen i 2012, men ikkje desto mindre problematisk. Å setje likskapsteikn mellom klima og miljø har nemleg potensielt store konsekvensar, av di det avgjer om vi må gjere noko no eller om vi kan vente. Om vi skal handle nasjonalt eller kan kjøpe oss fri internasjonalt. Om eit tiltak er verdt noko i seg sjølv, eller berre som summen av mange. Kort sagt, det får verknadar for den praktiske politikken om vi tenIllustrasjon: Kathrine Hegstad

kjer i kategoriane ‘klima’ eller ‘miljø’. Kanskje tida difor er inne for å fokusere meir på dei handfaste miljøutfordringane? Å syne verdien av det enkelte miljøtiltak er grunnleggjande for eigarskap og engasjement til saka, og til sjuande og sist er det jo summen av alle små miljøavgjerder som skaper ein betre klode. 2007 blir ofte kalla året då klima kom for alvor på dagsorden, symbolisert ved at Al Gore og FNs klimapanel vann fredsprisen, og sjølv tabloidavisane byrja å snakke om ‘klimakrisa’ på framsida. Forfattar og klimapessimist Mark Lynas skreiv boka Six Degrees, og uttalte at «hadde folk visst kor alvorleg trusselen vi sto ovanfor var, ville det vore opprør i gatene». For miljørørsla og andre som arbeider for ei endring av den miljømessige status quo, blei dette sett på som ‘a wind of change’. Mange var sikre på at klima kunne utløyse eit større engasjement i miljøsaka, at dei enorme dimensjonane gav klimasaka ei mobiliserande kraft. Slik gjekk det ikkje. TNS Gallups klimabarometer for 2010 synte at nordmenns uro for klimaendringar 19

Tid for ei revitalisering av miljøengasjementet

hadde minka markant frå 2009 til 2010.2 Klima, trass alle spådommane, har vist seg å vere ein hype, og ikkje den grunnleggjande erkjenningsmessige omveltinga mange spådde. Spørsmålet er dermed kva som gjekk gale, kvifor spring vi ikkje ut på gata og protesterer, som Mark Lynas meiner vi burde? Klimaendringar er etter alt å dømme ein trussel mot livsvilkåra på heile kloden, og noko som påverkar og vil påverke alt og alle. Men er det der vi skal byrja? Mange har vore ute og beskrive ‘klima’ som ein abstrakt storleik som folk flest ikkje kan halde seg til. Psykolog Per Espen Stoknes har til dømes uttalt at den nåverande klimapolitikken ikkje talar til hjartet vårt.3 Det er truleg mykje sanning i dette, og det er viktig å gå nærmare inn på sjølve omgrepa knytt til miljø og klima. Den etter kvart så diskrediterte postmodernismen snakkar om at «språk konstituerer røyndom». Eg vil uansett hevde at dette er meir treffande i miljøfeltet enn mange andre stader. For er eigentlig ‘klima’, med tilhøyrande suffiks som -problem, -krise, -utfordring etc. omgrep vi kan halda oss til? I boka Klimaparadokset frå 2010 hevdar statsminister Jens Stoltenberg at «Mange andre lokale miljøproblemer vil altså løses hvis vi løser klimaproblemet».4 Kjerna i denne tilnærminga til klima er synet på eitt overhengande problem som må løysast. Undertittelen på den same boka lyder då også «Jens Stoltenberg om vår tids største utfordring». Men kva er eigentlig konsekvensane av ei slik tilnærming der miljø får status som positive biverknader og handsamas som nettopp det; biverknader? Korleis påverkar ei slik språkleggjering klimaet – eller kanskje vel så viktig; miljøet? Ein rask gjennomgang av norsk miljøhistorie kan illustrere nokre poeng.

Litt

miljøhistorie

–

kva som har enga-

sjert før

Å engasjere seg for miljøsaka har lengre røter i den norske historia enn mange kanskje er klar over. Allereie mot slutten av 1800-tallet sette Den Norske Turistforening i gang ein prosess for å få verna vassdrag truga av kraftutbygging. Rett etter krigen, i 1946, demonstrerte 30 000 menneske 20

mot å byggje kraftmaster gjennom Nordmarka, ein av dei største protestaksjonane i Noreg nokon gong. Parallellen til aksjonen mot kraftmastene i Hardanger over 60 år seinare er slåande. I begge tilfelle sto miljø – og friluftsinteresser mot ‘naudsynt utvikling’. Mot slutten av 60-talet blei engasjementet i miljøspørsmål meir organisert. Kampen for bevaring av Mardøla og Alta-aksjonen er ikkje berre viktige i norsk miljøhistorie, men i norsk historie generelt. Det mest synlege symbolet på miljørørslas oppkomst i Noreg, kanskje saman med aksjonane i Mardøla og Alta, er danninga av Framtiden i våre hender. 2000 menneske møtte opp i Nadderudhallen for å høyre om visjonane for ei ny verd. To år tidlegare kom Erik Dammann ut med ei bok med same tittel. Det er mange som smilar litt av denne forma for miljøengasjement, så grunnleggjande 70-talet i både form og innhald. Poenget er at miljøsaka har hatt og framleis har eit veldig mobiliseringspotensial når den direkte verkar inn på kvardagslivet til folk. I dag er dette kanskje enda tydeligare utanfor Noregs grenser, anten det er småbønder i Latin-Amerika som kjemper for kontroll over lokale vatnresursar og eigarskap til jord, eller kanadiske urfolksgrupper som protesterer mot dødeleg oljesandutvinning. Medan miljøkampen frå byrjinga av handla om det nære og handterlege, skjedde det ei gradvis endring utover på 1980-talet. Miljøproblem blei ikkje lenger forstått som ein uunngåelig del av samfunnsutviklinga, men snarare som eit potensiale; vekst og miljø i skjønn foreining. Den nederlandske statsvitaren Maarten Hajer omtalar denne utviklinga som ‘økologisk modernisering’.5 FN-rapporten Vår felles framtid frå 1987, lagt fram av vår eiga Gro, kan sjåast på som den symbolske byrjinga på denne tradisjonen. Miljøproblem endra definisjon til vekstnæring. Korleis omgrepet ‘berekraftig utvikling’ sidan har blitt nytta av alle som ynskjer å assosiere seg med noko grønt, er illustrerande. Når alt frå oljeselskap til bilfabrikantar og gruveindustri kallar seg ‘grøne’ og ‘berekraftige’, er det openbart at desse omgrepa samstundes blir tømde for meining. Det er i en slik samanheng ‘klima’ også må vurderast. ‘Klimakampen’ har blitt fråkopla den praktiske miljøpolitikken. Vi snakkar og skriv mykje om klima, medan miljøkrisa i verda

Eirik Frøhaug Swensen

blir stadig meir akutt. Min tese er at eit framleis fokus på klima ikkje styrker, men hindrar miljøsaka. Eg vil difor setje fram fem påstandar om kvifor vi må tilbake til å snakke om miljø, og kvifor Stoltenberg burde snudd sitatet sitt på hovudet: det abstrakte klimaproblemet er eit resultat av mange

hatt ein motsett effekt. Enkelt sagt er klima lite handfast, medan miljø er det vi har rundt oss, som er synleg og merkbart. Det gis ofte inntrykk av at folk ikkje er engasjert i miljøspørsmål; ein peikar på dårlege valresultat for ‘miljøpartia’, at folk lever stadig mindre miljøvennlege liv gjennom høgare

Når alt frå oljeselskap til bilfabrikantar og gruveindustri kallar seg ’grøne’ og ’berekraftige’, er det openbart at desse omgrepa samstundes blir tømde for meining. konkrete miljøutfordringar. Politikk handlar om å løyse problem, ikkje abstraksjonar.

Frå

klima til miljø

1. Vi vil få tilbake ei haldning om at ‘alle monner drar’. Heilt sidan klima kom på dagsorden, har det vore eit problem til stades. Det har sneke seg inn ei haldning om at alle må gjere noko for at det skal monne. Dette verkar dårleg inn på motivasjon og er lite mobiliserande. Både verdien av enkelttiltak og innsatsen til dei einskilde landa blir nedprioritert innanfor ein slik diskurs. Anten det gjeld ei einskild bedrift eller Noreg som heilskap, blir det hevda at ein tapar konkurransekraft om ein føreslår einsidige utsleppsreduksjonar. Med klima kan utsleppa i staden alltid bli redusert hjå ‘dei andre’. Kristin Asdal har vist korleis dette har vært ein ønska politikk frå norsk side.6 Då Noreg gjekk i spissen for å opprette eit system for omsetjelege klimakvoter tidleg på 90-talet, var det nettopp for å hindre at norsk oljeindustri skulle bli utsatt for ‘urimelege’ utsleppskrav. Det er difor ikkje spekulativt å hevde at kvoteordningane har bidrege til auka av dei totale norske utsleppa dei siste 20 åra.7 No ligg ansvaret i eit system med pulverisert ansvar og ikkje på oss sjølv. Slik det er i dag kan norske utslepp bortforklarast med at ‘det speler inga rolle, sjå kor mykje Kina slepp ut’. Blir derimot norske utslipp kopla til miljø, innafor ein terminologi der kvar enkelt medverkar til forureining, gir det straks meining å ta omsyn til det nasjonale. 2 Miljøspørsmål er enklare å forholda seg til for folk flest. Klimaspørsmålet, som i utgangspunktet skulle verke mobiliserande, har i staden

forbruk og fleire flyreiser. Men kanskje det like mykje handlar om korleis miljø blir kommunisert ut og ramma inn. Min påstand er nemlig at folk engasjerer seg viss dei har ei kjensle av at det nyttar. Den amerikanske statsvitaren Sheila Jasanoff er inne på dette når ho problematiserar klimabegrepet: «How can human communities restore local, particular and actionable meaning to a phenomenon that repeatedly slips out of the conventional boundaries of sense-making?» Det handlar altså om noko så enkelt som kjensla av at dette angår meg. Her kan transportdebatten tene som døme. I staden for å fokusere på det abstrakte ‘CO2-utslepp frå transportsektoren’, vil konkrete miljøtiltak som reduserer CO2-utslepp og den lokale luftforureininga ha ein mykje større salsverdi. Eit godt døme på at lokale miljøsaker har mobiliserande kraft, er den lokale ‘Byluftlisten’ som kom inn i Bergen bystyre ved lokalvalet i 2011. Det er masse grasrotengasjement i Noreg, og det meste av dette handlar om lokalt engasjement for lokale saker. Til dømes: å ta vare på eit lokalsjukehus, stoppe utsendinga av godt integrerte asylsøkjarar i eit lokalsamfunn, eller verne urørt natur i nærleiken av der ein bur. Dette er stikk i strid med logikken til Stoltenberg, sitert tidlegare. ‘Handle lokalt, tenkje globalt’, er eit forsliten uttrykk i miljørørsla. Eg har meir tru på ‘handle lokalt, tenkje globalt og lokalt’. Det som i alle fall ikkje fungerer er Stoltenberg sitt ‘handle globalt, tenkje globalt’. 3. Det er enklare å byrja nedanfrå og opp, enn ovanfrå og ned. Min påstand er at såkalla klimapolitikk per definisjon er et ovanfrå og nedprosjekt. Det gjer ikkje berre at folk missar eigarskap til prosjektet. Det former også kva vi ser på 21

Tid for ei revitalisering av miljøengasjementet

som relevante tiltak. Antropologen Mike Hulme har sagt at når vi rammar inn ‘klima’ som eitt stort ‘megaproblem’, fylgjer også løysingane i same mønster. Det er nettopp ein slik tankegang som fører til at det i ‘klimakampen’ er dyre teknologiske tiltak som dominerer. Den såkalla ‘månelandinga’ på Mongstad byggjer fullt og heilt på ein logikk om at det er dei store enkelttiltaka som skal sørgje for å redusera klimautslepp. Resultatet til no er eit pengesluk utan sidestykke. Samstundes er det ei mengd små fornybare teknologiar og energisparetiltak som strever. Eit anna viktig aspekt ved å byrja nedanfrå er auka gjennomsiktigheit og meir provbare tiltak. Det einskilde miljøtiltak er alltid lokalt og kontrollen må skje der. Mykje av problemet med norsk klimapolitikk i dag er ein illusjon om at ein kan kontrollere effekten av utsleppa, sjølv om tiltaka blir gjennomført langt vekke. Den norske regnskoginnsatsen er eit interessant døme i så tilfelle. Både korrupsjon og tvilsam klimaeffekt har utsatt desse prosjekta for kritikk. Ei heilt anna sak er den positive miljøeffekten ved å verne regnskog. Dette illustrerer nettopp kvifor miljøargumenta må få ei større rolle. 4. Vi kan ikkje lenger skyve alle tiltak fram i tid. Klimapolitikk har ein tendens til å handle om framtida. Det blir utforma ambisiøse mål for kutt i klimagassutsleppa, i 2020 eller 2050. Dette er likevel ikkje noko nytt. I 1989 gjorde Stortinget sitt første vedtak om å stabilisere norske klimagassutslepp, og måltallet blei sett høveleg langt fram i tid. Og så blei det gløymd. Ein ambisiøs miljøpolitikk, eller fråværet av ein slik, er derimot synleg frå dag til dag. I sluten av april kom det, etter mange utsetjingar, ei ny klimamelding. Her sto dei innanlandske tala om utsleppskutt ved lag, sjølv om ingen trur dei blir overhaldt. Målet om innanlandske kutt blei kritisert av LO-leder Roar Flåthen sumaren 2011, og med framlegg om at vi kunne kjøpe oss fri i utlandet. Det går ein intens kamp mellom departementa om kva som skal prioriteras; miljø eller arbeidsplassar, miljø eller økonomisk vekst. Det er stort sett miljø som tapar. Å snakke om det ulne klima passar perfekt inn i ei slik ramme. Blir måltalet sett langt nok fram kan ein alltid få terrenget til å passe til kartet. Eit døme her er teorien om såkalla fråkopling (decoupling); 22

at det er mogleg å kombinere redusera klimagasutslepp med økonomisk vekst. Men er det naudsynt at dette er den interessante problemstillinga? Går vi derimot bort frå klima kan slike ‘røynder’ bli kritisert og undersøkt meir ope, nettopp ved å vise til at miljøeffektane ved uavgrensa vekst uansett vil vere enorme. 5. Klimaskeptikarane mister sin retoriske kraft i debatten. Som punkta over viser, har vektlegginga av klima ikkje evna å engasjere folk. Teknologiske pengesluk og tiltak utan relevans for kvardagslivet til folk har ikkje ‘skapt opprør i gatene’. I staden har klimaskeptikarane blitt ein faktor i debatten, også i Noreg. Mange i denne gruppa argumenterer med at klimatiltak er store og kostbare, og at det eigentleg ikkje er mogleg å kontrollere kva pengane blir brukt på. Noko dei har mykje rett i. Dei klimaskeptiske opererer på mange måtar som ‘djevelens advokat’ i debatten. Med klima flytande rundt som ein abstraksjon, får dei også lett spelerom. Skilnaden mellom klimaproblem og miljøproblem er at den fyrste kategorien alltid kan bortforklaras. Miljøproblem derimot, er synlege og høgst reelle. I Noreg har klimaskeptikarane framleis relativt lite å seie, og fylgjeleg er ikkje konsekvensane så store for miljødebatten. I USA derimot, er det ein brennaktuell problemstilling. Som Naomi Oreskes og Erik Conway viser, har klimaskeptiske grupper i årevis freista å rokke ved kunnskapen på feltet. Resultatet har blitt ein diskusjon om vi treng å handle, snarare enn ein innsats for handling der det trengs. Om ‘klima’ og ‘miljø’ blir synonym også i Noreg, er faren stor for at miljøkampen vil lide. Klimaskepsis kan i utgangspunktet dra openbart naudsynt miljøhandling med i dragsuget.

Ein

fornya og solidarisk miljøpolitikk

Dei fem påstandane eg har sett fram skildrar korleis og kvifor det er på høg tid med ein ny kurs - vi må snakke mindre om klima og meir om miljø. Det kan sjølvsagt innvendast at miljø og klima i visse tilfelle kan vere i konflikt med kvarandre. Debatten om Hardangermastene er eit godt døme på det; skal vi prioritere urørt natur eller meir klimavennlig energi? Svaret på denne utfordringa

Eirik Frøhaug Swensen

er todelt. For det første vil det alltid vere veging i politiske spørsmål; også når miljø blir diskutert. Akkurat som ein veg miljøomsyn mot andre samfunnsomsyn, er det også konfliktar mellom de ulike miljøomsyna. Men, i staden for å nytte merkelappen ‘klima’ til ein kvar tid, la oss heller sjå på det som ein kontrovers mellom ulike val i miljøpolitikken. Kva er til dømes ‘miljø’ i det vi kallar eit fornybart energisystem? Dette leier oss over til det andre punktet; for om vi opnar opp for ein reell diskusjon om miljø, kan vi bryte den tilslørande effekten ‘klima’ har i debatten. For å ta Hardanger som døme att, i staden for å ta ‘klimaeffekt’ som noko gitt, kan vi spørje kva er dei positive miljøeffektane ved å byggje master? Vil betre tilgang på fornybar strøm eigentleg erstatte kullkraftverk i Europa? Kva er den reelle effekten av å elektrifisere sokkelen? Det er desse spørsmåla som må setjast opp mot miljøskader i Hardangernaturen, ikkje ‘klima’ som en kategori utan fastlagt innhald. Ikkje slik å forstå at ein ikkje skal ‘tru’ på klimautfordringa. Poenget er berre at ‘klima’ som kategori skjuler det eigentlege innhaldet; ei lang rekkje enkeltståande miljøutfordringar som i seg sjølv er meir enn nok til å vekkje oss. Geografen Erik Swyngedouw set klimadiskusjonen inn i ein større samanheng når han uttaler: «the enemy is always externalized and objectified». Klimadiskusjonen handlar alltid om CO2-utslepp, men utan å spørje kva konsekvensane og årsakene av slike utslepp eigentleg er og vil vere. ‘CO2’ og ‘klimautslepp’ blir ein fiende vi må kjempe mot med dei

same verkemidla som skapa dei i fyrste omgang. Vitskapssosiologen Brian Wynne påpeiker det absurde i at ein abstrakt klimadiskusjon ikkje får fram at det allereie er ein slik utoleleg situasjon, og at opphavet til apokalypsen ligg integrert i vår samfunnsorganisering: «for many people, apocalypse has indeed already arrived».8 Tilbakekomsten til ‘miljø’ som kategori vil tvinge fram ein større innsats i retning praktisk handling, ikkje minst for dei som lever på eksistensminimum i mange deler av verda. Klimakampen har gjort verdas fattige ei bjørneteneste, og friteke oss frå høve til naudsynt systemkritikk. Men systemkritikk i vår tid er truleg berre mogleg ved å sjå det store i det små. Vi treng det konkrete som kan mobilisere til handling. Knut Kjeldstadli er inne på det same når han skriv: «kanskje trekker 1980- og 1990-tallets postmodernisme og ‘språklige vending’ tankane vekk frå ‘de store forteljingene’ – og då vekk frå merksemda om global ulikskap, om kapitalakkumulasjon eller klimaet?»9 Om det er postmodernismen eller ‘den menneskelege natur’ kan diskuterast. Likevel, poenget er at vi er i ein situasjon der dei store forteljingane har langt mindre overtydingskraft enn dei små. Medan klima dekker for ein reell diskusjon om økologisk kapasitet, finst det utallege døme på at miljø gjer oss i stand til å sjå oss sjølv som ein del av ein større heilskap. Dette i seg sjølv talar for ein ny retorikk, og vonleg nye praksisar. Rio 20+ er eit utmerkt høve til å ta slike prinsipielle diskusjonar med store praktiske konsekvensar.•

Noter 1 Lidskog, R. & Sundqvist, G. (2011): Miljösociologi. Studentlitteratur. 2 TNS Gallup (2011): Klimabarometeret 2010. 3 Stoknes, P. E. (2010) i Vårt Land 23.02.10 4 Alstadheim, K., (2010): Klimaparadokset. Jens Stoltenberg om vår tids største utfordring. Oslo: Aschehoug. 5 Hajer, M. (1995): The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Clarendon Press. 6 Asdal, K. (2011): Politikkens natur. Naturens politikk. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 7 http://www.ssb.no/emner/01/04/10/klimagassn/ 8 Wynne, B. (2010): Strange Weather, Again: Climate Science as Political Art i Theory Culture & Society 27, no. 2-3(2010): 213-232. 9 Kjeldstadli, K. (2010): Akademisk kapitalisme. Oslo: Res Publica. 23

Styringseffektivitet En graf som oppsummerer det som er feil med norsk klimapolitikk

Magnus Delsett

Etter to års venting kom omsider klimameldingen i slutten av april. Etter interne dragkamper vant SV fram med kravet om å ta ⅔ av utslippskuttene på hjemmebane. Og med det kan tidenes største sløseri starte. Eller? Som en oppvarming til klimameldingen fikk vi denne våren en debatt om hvor de norske utslippskuttene skal tas. LOs leder Roar Flåthen var bekymret for særnorske avgifter og konkurransekraften. I en lang debatt i Dagens Næringsliv formante flere økonomer oss om hvor unødvendig det er å kaste bort penger på å gjøre utslippskuttene dyrere enn de trenger å være. Gjennom handel med kvoter er det nemlig mulig å kuttte utslipp til en billigst mulig penge. Systemet baserer seg ganske enkelt på at en lovregulerer retten til å slippe ut klimaforurensing til å kun gjelde innehavere av klimakvoter. Vil du slippe ut mer enn du i utgangspunktet får lov til, må du kjøpe noens kvote. Og vips, så har vi etablert er marked, med alt som hører med av konkurranse og kostnadseffektivitet. Det gikk imidlertid ikke slik mange økonomer gjerne skulle ønske. Enden på visa ble at klimameldingen bekreftet målene fra klimaforliket fra 2007. ⅔ av utslippskuttene fremdeles skal tas i Norge. SV 26

vant fram, og fikk gjennomslag for å bruke penger på «dyre» klimatiltak i Norge fram mot 2020. Men

er dette sløsing?

De fleste vil være enige i at det viktigste med klimameldingen ikke er hvor mye utslipp som skal kuttes i Norge. Den viktigste målsetningen for klimameldingen er å hindre omfanget av de farlige menneskeskapte klimaendringene Dette må være bakgrunnen for en diskusjon om hvilke virkemidler vi skal prioritere. Ettertiden vil ikke måle oss på hvor kostnadseffektivt vi klarte å løse problemene. Den store testen står på om vi klarer å løse problemene i det hele tatt, og hindre de verste konsekvensene av et klima i endring. Skal vi lykkes trenger vi et langsiktig perspektiv. I 2050 må vi ikke slippe ut CO2. Det betyr at vi har under 40 år på oss til å slutte å bruke olje. Vi må snu hver sten - gå gjennom samfunnet sektor for sektor - for å endre adferd og endre på energivanene våre. Det sier seg selv at det stiller store krav til vår evne til å planlegge og tenke langsiktig. Fram mot 2020 må vi etablere systemer som lar oss reise, produsere, bo og leve uten å bruke bensin. Fram mot 2020 skal vi innom flere målepunkter. Om utslippene magisk reduseres med 85% natt

Virkemidlene kan ikke bare være kostnadseffektive. De må være styringseffektive også.

til 1. Januar 2050 vil det ikke være nok. De akkumulerte utslippene vil være for høye til at det gir effekt. Utslippskurven må peke slakt nedover. Kostnadseffektiv

er utilstrekkelig

Kostnadseffektivitet som mål på klimatiltak blir utilstrekkelig. Vi trenger å styre utslippskuttene effektivt også. Vi vet mye om hva som skal til for at nordmenn skal flytte over fra bil til buss, og vi vet det tar tid å planlegge og bygge ut ny ny samferdselsinfrastruktur. Vi vet vi trenger mer utslippsfri energi, og at naturen blir den store taperen hvis vi prøver å gape over for store utbygginger for raskt. Heldigvis vet vi også hvordan vi kan sørge for å bygge ut tilstrekkelig med fornybar energi, og samtidig ta vare på naturen. Vi vet også hva som er barrierene for å realisere potensialet ved energisparing. Vi vet hvor nødvendig dette er. Men vi vet også at disse tiltakene vil koste mer enn å kjøpe kvoter i utlandet. Styringseffektiv

1. Januar i år. Ordingen er ikke vedtatt fordi det er det mest kostnadseffektive klimatiltaket. Begrunnelsen var at fornybarandelen i energiforsninga vår er under 50%. Det må endre seg før 2050. Det forholder seg på samme vis med kollektivtransport og jernaneutbygging. Det sier seg selv at det vil koste betydlig mer å bygge jernbane og ansette bussjåfører i Norge enn i Tanzania. Men hvordan skal vi transportere oss rundt i 2050 når bensinpumpene skal være pensjonert, dersom vi ikke er villige til å plassere noe av nasjonalformuen vår i en effektiv og utslippsfri infrastuktur? Kollektivtransport og vindmøller i Norge er ikke kostnadseffektive klimatiltak. Men det er styringseffektive klimatiltak. Vi trenger de klimatiltakene som ikke er billigst. De tiltakene vi gjør her hjemme som omstiller oss fra å være fossilavhengig, til å bli fornybare. Det som tror at klimakrisen løses med noen enkle håndgrep tar feil. Det er en omstilling. En omstilling som gir oss fantastiske muligheter, og som kan hjelpe oss å løse andre problemer i samme slengen.•

Ordingen med grønne sertifikater, som lovpålegger en etterspørsel etter fornybar energi, trådte i kraft 27

Hva skjedde med «miljøvalget»?

Eivind Trædal Nesten en fjerdedel av velgerne sa at miljøet var den viktigste saken for dem før stortingsvalget i 2009. Men valget gav liten eller ingen uttelling for partiene som hadde markert seg på miljø. Hvorfor?

Valget i 2009 var av mange forventa å bli et miljøvalg. Miljø var blant de viktigste sakene for en stor andel av velgerne, og aktuelle miljøspørsmål var høyt profilert i valgkampen. Mai 2009 ble det vedtatt åpning av Goliat-feltet for oljeutvinning, Statoil stod ved sine investeringer i oljesand i Canada på sin årskonferanse, og rensing av gasskraftverket på Kårstø ble utsatt. En stor, kontroversiell beslutning gjensto: spørsmålet om å åpne Lofoten og Vesterålen (LOVE) for leteboring. Selv om bransjen har en sentral plass i norsk økonomi, har petroleumsutvinning så langt ikke skapt store bølger i norsk offentlighet. Men etter at utvinningstakta på norsk sokkel har begynt å synke, blir mer sårbare områder attraktive for oljeselskapene. Spørsmålet om utvinning i arktiske strøk har vært på agendaen både i valgene i USA og Canada, og var nå også aktuelt i Norge. Foran valget var det mange som forventa at LOVE-saken Illustrasjon: carlosrosado.com

ville påvirke valgresultatet. Dagbladet opererte med anslag på at opptil 166 000 miljøbevisste velgere kunne «vende Jens ryggen».1 Miljøet har påvirka norske stortingsvalg før. Stortingsvalget 1989 blir gjerne trukket fram. I dette valget oppga 38 prosent av velgerne miljø som sin viktigste sak.2 SV dobla nesten sin oppslutning, til 10,1 prosent. Til sammen fikk SV, Venstre, Miljøpartiet De Grønne og Fylkeslistene for miljø og soldaritet (der Norges Kommunistiske Parti inngikk) 14,5 prosent av stemmene. Også i 2009 var det stort miljøengasjement. Spørsmålet om oljeutvinning utenfor LOVE fikk stor medieoppmerksomhet under valgkampen. En dramatisk enkelthendelse skapte et ekstra stort fokus på saken: Det Panama-registrerte lasteskipet Full City gikk fredag 31. juli på grunn utenfor Langesund i Telemark, og store oljeutslipp gjorde stor skade på området. Ikke overraskende var det stor oppmerk29

Hva skjedde med «miljøvalget»?

somhet rundt oljeutvining generelt og LOVE og Full City-ulykka spesielt i de seks månedene før valget sammenlignet med seksmånedersperioden før stortingsvalget i 2005.16 Også i de store valgsendingene på TV var saken høyt oppe på agendaen. En uke før val-

Hvor finner vi forklaringa på dette tilsynelatende misforholdet mellom mange av velgernes holdninger og deres valgatferd? Svaret finnes trolig blant tre hovedfaktorer: Velgernes vurdering av stridsspørsmålet, partienes kommunikasjon av saken, og de institusjonelle rammene for

Det er en nær sammenheng mellom standpunkt til spørsmål om miljøvern og hvilket parti man stemmer på. gdagen, den 7. september 2009, blei en debatt om miljø holdt i Langesund, der statsminister Jens Stoltenberg, Venstre-leder Lars Sponheim og miljøvernminister Erik Solheim satt i panelet. Debatten blei sendt på NRK1. Sendingen blei trolig sett av mange. NRKs valgdebatter hadde et gjennomgående høyt seertall, med en topp på 668,000 seere under folkemøtet i Kristiansand.17 Nesten en fjerdedel av velgerne oppga miljø som sin viktigste sak. Men valget gav dårlig uttelling for partiene som hadde markert seg på LOVE-saken. Av plasshensyn har jeg valgt å fokusere på forskjellene mellom SV og AP. Forskjeller i disse partienes holdninger til oljeutvinning, og måten saksfeltet blei kommunisert på i valgkampen, kan gi en pekepinn på hvordan miljøbevisste velgere oppfatta partiene under valget. Som utbryterparti med fokus på nye skillelinjer, er det nærliggende å anta at SV konkurrerer med Arbeiderpartiet om velgere, og at miljøstandpunkter er et område som gir SV et potensiale til å «stjele» velgere fra Arbeiderpartiet. Imidlertid tyder tallene fra velgerundersøkelsen 2009 på en motsatt effekt Arbeiderpartiet har «stjålet» 0,9 prosent av velgerne fra SV. I følge SSBs velgerundersøkelse hadde KrF ikke overtatt stemmer fra SV, og Venstre (som også markerer seg på miljø) har kun fått 0,2 prosentpoeng. Dette kan tyde på at miljøstandpunkt har hatt liten effekt på velgerbevegelsene. I tillegg har Senterpartiet overtatt 0,6 prosentpoeng av velgerne fra SV, og Høyre 0,5 prosentpoeng.15 30

debatten. Det er flere hypoteser som kan utformes om årsaken til det tilsynelatende svake innslaget av miljøstandpunkter i valgresultatet. For det første kan det ha hatt en effekt at miljøbevisste velgere blei presentert for en uklar valgsituasjon, fordi blant annet Arbeiderpartiet underbygde en pragmatisk vekst og vern-innramming av spørsmålet. For det andre kan det ha hatt stor betydning at ingen partier klarte å vinne ‘sakseierskap’ på motstand mot utvinning utenfor LOVE. For det tredje kan de institusjonelle rammene ha påvirka måten folk har oppfatta LOVE som politisk sak. De institusjonelle rammene ble eksplisitt en del av den politiske diskusjonen i 2009-valget. Arbeiderpartiet gikk inn for et «vente og se»standpunkt, fordi forvaltningsplanen for Barenshavet, Lofoten og Vesterålen ikke var ferdig ennå. Dette gjør det interessant å se om politiske beslutninger har blitt skjøvet over til forvaltninga gjennom utarbeidelse av denne planen, og dermed dempa konflikten foran valget. Forvaltningsplanen er neppe et dokument som i sin utforming påvirker velgernes atferd. Men indirekte kan den ha hatt en funksjon. I siste del av drøftinga vil jeg undersøke om forvaltningsplanen kan betegnes som et politisk dokument, ved å se på to politiske nøkkelbegreper. Hvis så er tilfelle, kan dette både ha påvirka velgernes oppfatning av saken, og bidratt til å skyve beslutninger ut av valgkampen.

Eivind Trædal

Miljøets

plass i norsk politikk

Norge har siden starten av 1900-tallet basert mye av velferdsveksten på produksjon av elektrisk energi og industri med høyt energiforbruk.3 Utbygginga av energien og industrien blei gjerne organisert gjennom en institusjonalisert og stabil politisk prosess med svakt innslag av politisering og massemobilisering, og der mye autoritet blei delegert til administrative undersystemer og eksperter.4 Miljøbevegelsen, som vokste fram fra 60-tallet og utover, kritiserte særlig avhengigheten av «upolitiske» eksperter og forvaltningsorganer i slike beslutningsprosesser. Avgjørelser blei tatt i Stortinget, men reflekterte ofte planer og initiativer fra byråkratiet.5 Den voksende miljøbevegelsen fikk også påvirkning på folks stemmegivning. Tidligere undersøkelser har vist at en grønn ideologisk dimensjon som går på tvers av tradisjonelle sosiostrukturelle holdningsvariabler har vært klart til stede i norsk politikk.6 Holdninger til miljøvern har gjerne blitt plassert på en vekst-vern-akse, der skillet går mellom veksttilhengere og vernetilhengere. På ytterste del av verneaksen finner vi kompromissløse natur- og miljøvernere som ikke aksepterer større inngrep i naturen. På den andre siden av aksen rene veksttilhengere, som ikke har noe ønske om å moderere veksttiltak med verneinteresser.7 Blant mellomposisjonene kan vi på vernesiden skissere en ‘økologisk balanse’-tankegang, som «ser på miljø som en overordnet målsetning i forhold til økonomisk vekst». På vekstsiden av aksen kan vi finne den såkalte ‘vekst med vern’- ideologien. Her ser man på vekst som «en forutsetning for miljøvern, og ikke noe som står i absolutt motsetning til vern».8 ‘Vekst med vern’-tanken er den som «først og fremst (...) har vunnet støtte i den norske befolkning.»9 Tilslutninga til disse typologiserte ideologiene har tidligere vist seg å svinge svært mye.10 Miljø har gradvis fått større plass i norsk politikk etter framveksten av miljøbevegelsen, men vi har ikke fått noe miljøparti på Stortinget som i Sverige. Imidlertid har etablerte partier i

sentrum og til venstre for Arbeiderpartiet tatt opp i seg nye miljøstandpunkter.11 12 Tidligere multivariate undersøkelser har vist at det er en nær sammenheng mellom standpunkt til spørsmål om energiutbygging/ og miljøvern og hvilket parti man stemmer på eller er medlem av.13 Samtidig må det understrekes at dette også henger sammen med bakenforliggende variabler, og at påvirkninga holdninger-partivalg er gjensidig.13 Det er særlig to partier som har identifisert seg som miljøpartier: Venstre og SV.14 I tillegg kommer mindre partier som Rødt og Miljøpartiet De Grønne. Mye av miljøkampen foregår gjennom utenomparlamentarisk virksomhet, mellom forvaltning, interesseorganisasjoner og Storting i høringsrunder forbundet med utredninger. Politisk

stridsspørsmål-perspektivet

Å drøfte innslaget av et saksområde forutsetter at politiske holdninger og verdier har en egen kausal forklaringskraft.18 Holdningsbaserte skillelinjer kan deles i to varianter: politiske verdier, og politiske stridsspørsmål.18 En verdi er i politisk sammenheng definert som «en overbevisning om at spesifikke samfunnstilstander er å foretrekke framfor andre».18 Basert på dette kan en ideologisk skillelinje være basert på «et sett av empirisk korrelerte verdier». 18 Teorier om verdibaserte konfliktlinjer søker å forklare langsiktige tilknytninger hos velgerne til et politisk parti. Her kan bøndenes stabile støtte til Senterpartiet på bakgrunn av områder som rovdyrpolitikk, landbrukspolitikk og distriktspolitikk stå som et eksempel. Slike tilknytninger minner om de tradisjonelle strukturelle konfliktlinjene.19 Politiske stridsspørsmål kan forklare mer kortsiktige endringer i velgeratferd. Her knyttes velgerbevegelser til holdninger til spesifikke politiske saker som er på dagsorden. Saken eller sakene deler befolkninga inn i forskjellige holdningsgrupperinger. Ved å se på stridsspørsmåls betydning, kan man forklare utfallet av spesielle valg gjennom å forstå velgeratferden til flytende stemmegrupper.20 31

Hva skjedde med «miljøvalget»?

Hva skal til for at folk stemmer på grunnlag av verdier og holdninger? For det første må verdiene det er snakk om reflektere viktige politikkområder, som de har klare standpunkter i forhold til. For det andre må befolkninga være utdanna og informert om aktuelle stridsspørsmål på feltet. For det tredje må det eksistere klare forskjeller mellom partiene.21 Hvilke av disse var ikke oppfylt i 2009? For det første kan vi se på sammenhengene mellom verdier og policyområder. Velgerne var generelt opptatt av miljø i perioden. Tre fjerdedeler ønsket seg «beskyttelse av miljø framfor økonomisk vekst» og omtrent like mange var positive til «økte skatter til beskyttelse av miljø» i 2007, sammenligna med henholdsvis 67 prosent og 75 prosent i 1996.22 Andelen som så på miljø som sin viktigset sak var hele 24 prosent, det høyeste siden toppåret 1989, da tallet var 37 prosent. I 2005 var det bare 8 prosent som sa det samme.23 24 25

Den høye andelen velgere som så på miljø som viktigste sak tyder på at stridsspørsmålet og verdiene var viktig for mange av velgerne. Kontrasten til valgene i 1985 og 2005 underbygger inntrykket av at engasjementet svinger i takt med ‘oppmerksomhetssykluser’.26 LOVE har trolig bidratt til det store oppsvinget i miljøengasjement i 2009. For å få et klarere bilde av hvordan disse holdningene fordelte seg mellom partienes velgere, kan vi se på en undersøkelsen, gjennomført av Synovate på oppdrag fra Dagbladet 24.27. august, basert på telefonintervju av 1099 stemmeberettigede. Spørsmålet var «Mener du det er riktig eller galt å åpne for leteboring i havområdene utenfor LOVE, eller har du ingen mening om saken?» Se figur 1. Dette antyder at velgerne til de rødgrønne partiene var overveiende skeptiske til oljeutvinning utenfor LOVE. Vi kan dermed slå fast at miljø generelt var et viktig policyområde for mange velgere, og at en stor andel av SV og Arbeiderpartiets velgere hadde klare holdninger til LOVE som stridsspørsmål. Grupperingene 32

går på tvers av regjeringsalternativene, men på rødgrønn side er det få tilhengere, og mange motstandere av oljeutvinning utenfor LOVE, selv i Arbeiderpartiet. Dette, kombinert med den breie mediedekninga av saken, skulle også tyde på at spørsmålet var oppfatta og kommunisert til en stor andel av befolkninga. Likevel kan stridsspørsmålet ha kommet i skyggen av andre konflikter. 2009-valget skjedde et år etter den globale finanskrisa, og økonomiske spørsmål var høyt oppe på agendaen. Valgresultatet ser ut til å reflektere den økonomiske høyre-venstre-aksen, med FrP og Ap som vinnere. Den kryssende vekst-vern-aksen, har historisk sett vært mindre viktig for stemmegiving enn høyre-venstre-dimensjonen.27 Det er samtidig verdt å nevnte at også 1989-valget fant sted under økonomiske nedgangstider, og også førte til en stor vekst for FrP, men tilsynelatende med mindre polarisering langs denne aksen. Hvorfor så ulike resultater? De aktuelle regjeringsalternativene er trolig en avgjørende faktor. Mens landskapet var relativt åpent i 1989, blei valgkampen i 2009 gjennom de fleste kanaler kommunisert som en polarisert kamp mellom høyre og venstre. De største mediene lagde grafer som målte delegatbalansen mellom borgerlig og sosialistisk side.28 Også SV brukte dette som et retorisk bakteppe for LOVE-saken: Erik Solheim kontrasterte i sin sluttappell i NRKs valgdebatt de rødgrønne partiene med FrP og Høyre, og i mindre grad med Arbeiderpartiet, i sitt forsvar for SVs miljøpolitikk. «Den eneste garantien for å hindre oljeboring i Lofoten og Vesterålen, er de rødgrønne (...).»29 Dette kan ha svekka den tredje forutsetningen for en verdi- eller holdningsbasert stemmegiving: Klare forskjeller mellom politiske partier på dimensjonene (Synnovate 2009). Arbeiderpartiets uklare kommunikasjon kan ha forsterka dette. Det er tydelig både gjennom valgprogrammet og kommunikasjonen på Stortinget at Arbeiderpartiet prioriterer sysselsetting og næringsutvikling, og overlater til forvaltningsplanen å kombinere disse målene med

Eivind Trædal

Parti

Riktig

Ingen mening

Galt

Fremskrittspartiet

58 %

26 %

16 %

Høyre

51 %

27 %

22 %

Arbeiderpartiet

28 %

32 %

40 %

Senterpartiet

22 %

36 %

42 %

Venstre

16 %

29 %

55 %

Kristelig folkeparti

11 %

37 %

52 %

Sosialistisk venstreparti

8 %

14 %

78 %

Rødt

4 %

29 %

67 %

Figur 1: «Mener du det er riktig eller galt å åpne for leteboring i havområdene utenfor LOVE, eller har du ingen mening om saken?» miljøhensyn. Dette reflekterer en ‘vekst med vern’-tankegang, som tilsier at både miljøhensyn og arbeidsplasser kan sikres. Naturlig nok et populært budskap. Arbeiderpartiet gav aldri noe klart signal om at LOVE skulle bygges ut, og velgere som eventuelt ville stemme på bakgrunn av denne saken, hadde dermed mindre grunnlag for å «straffe» Arbeiderpartiet. Sakseierskap

i petroleumspolitikken

En supplerende forklaring er også mulig: Mange velgere har latt miljø påvirke stemmegiving i 2009, men de tradisjonelle miljøpartiene har mista sakseierskap på saken til andre partier. En analyse av enkeltsaker som LOVEs betydning i valg kan vi finne hos John Petrocik, som analyserer sakseierskap i det amerikanske presidentvalget i 1980. Partiene mobiliserer velgerne ved en selektiv vektlegging av saker der de har en opparbeida tillit i befolkningen «Partiene bruker valgkampen til å rette søkelyset på saker der de nyter en relativ fordel i velgerskaren».30 John Petrocik anslår at særlig tre forhold betinger et partis sakseierskap: «Deres rykte/ rulleblad som problemløser på visse felt, deres evner til å sette ‘egne’ saker på dagsorden, og sammenhengen mellom velgernes prioritering av sak og deres valg av parti.»31 Særlig viktig i valgkampsammenheng er sakens aktualitet.

Stridsspørsmål som dukker opp på den politiske dagsorden vil kunne grupperes langs ideologiske dimensjoner. Disse dimensjonenes betydning vil variere med partienes politiske ståsted.32 Et aktuelt spørsmål vil også kunne ha flere kvaliteter, det kan være et ‘valensspørsmål’, der det råder enighet om målsettingene, men uenighet om middelet og evnen, og «posisjonsspørsmål», der partiene plasserer seg for eller mot den aktuelle saken.32 I posisjonsspørsmål vil velgerne i hovedsak oppfatte hvorvidt partiet er for eller mot en sak, og dette vil påvirke deres partivalg. I valenssaker må partiene overby hverandre for å oppnå høyest troverdighet på saken.34 I følge Petrosci vil sakseierskapet avhenge av partiets rykte/rulleblad som problemløser på visse felt, deres evner til å sette egne saker på dagsorden, og sammenhengen mellom velgernes prioritering av sak og deres valg av parti. SVs rykte på miljøsaken har lenge vært godt. På tidligere posisjonssaker innen miljø, som gasskraftutbyggingsplanene på seint 90-tall, nøt SV og Venstre størst tillit hos velgerne.35 Miljø kan sees på som en av SVs kjernesaker. SVs ambisjon om å få saken om LOVE på dagsorden lyktes, med god drahjelp fra Full City-ulykka. Men SVs rulleblad på miljøspørsmål blei trolig svekka av regjeringssamarbeidet. De mange store kompromissene på saksfeltet relativt kort 33

Hva skjedde med «miljøvalget»?

tid før valget kan ha ført til mindre tillit hos velgerne både til partiets evne og vilje til å løse spesifikke miljøproblemer. Det samme kan sies om Venstre, som vant få seire i sin tid i regjering. Normalt vil det være lettere for opposisjonen å «stjele» saker dersom regjering er svak.36 Den rødgrønne regjeringa var ikke svak, og vi ser ingen markert oppgang hos opposisjonspartiene som var kritiske til utbygging av LOVE. Arbeiderpartiet overtok imidlertid velgere fra SV. Har Ap overtatt miljøstandpunkter fra SV? De to partienes programmer gir ikke et inntrykk av dette. Sammenligner vi igjen med 1989, har SV anno 2009 en mer radikal linje i sin olje- og energipolitikk enn 20 år tidligere. Tanken om petroleumsfrie havområder var den gang ikke en del av debatten. Arbeiderpartiet på sin side, er stabile i sin ‘vekst og vern’-strategi.37 Lite tyder på at Arbeiderpartiet har «stjålet klærne» til SV i petroleumspolitikken. Overgang fra SV til Ap har neppe skjedd direkte på bakgrunn av miljøspørsmål, men Aps pragmatiske kommunikasjon kan ha lyktes i å dempe motstanden hos tidligere SV-velgere. I SVs program stilles hensynet til konkurrerende og utsatte næringer som fiske foran eventuelle petroleumsinteresser i nord. SVs kommunikasjon kan tolkes som et forsøk på å ramme inn spørsmålet som et posisjonsspørsmål, der man i et sakseierskap-perspektiv kan vente seg at saken vil engasjere velgere langs vekst-vern-aksen.38 Engasjementet i befolkninga rundt saken var som vist ganske stort. Dersom SV og de andre partiene som var mot oljeutvinning i LOVE hadde lykkes i å etablere saken som et posisjonsspørsmål, ville det kunne ført til polarisering og potensiell velgergevinst for nei-partiene.39 Forskjellen mellom SVs og Arbeiderpartiets kommunikasjon rundt oljeutvinning i TV-debatten en uke før valget, var stor. Solheim understreka at ulykken eksemplifiserte at LOVE ikke kan åpnes for oljeutvinning. Stoltenberg sto på Arbeiderpartiets pragmatiske budskap: «Vi vil gjøre som Stortinget har bestemt, og som Regjeringen har bestemt, nemlig å skaffe oss masse kunns34

kap, og så vurdere om vi skal gå videre».40 Arbeiderpartiet framstiller her dette som en form for valensspørsmål: Helhetlig forvaltning er målet, og forvaltningsplanen er det tverrpolitiske middelet, med støtte både i Regjering og Storting. Regjeringserklæringa fra 2005 reflekterer Aps ‘vente og se’-standpunkt. I et valensspørsmål-perspektiv ville SVs og Venstres ønske om å opprette petroleumsfrie soner kunne regnes som en overbydelse av Arbeiderpartiets politikk, men SVs retoriske hovedfokus var et generelt nei til utbygging av området, i kontrast til Høyre og FrPs klare ja. Petroscis punkter er utarbeida i studiene av et topartisystem, og tar derfor ikke høyde for regjeringskonstellasjoner. Som tidligere nevnt har disse trolig hatt stor effekt på velgeratferden i 2009. Dette ville også kunne avklares med mer data om velgernes vurdering av valgsituasjonen. Regjeringssamarbeidet har uansett trolig hatt en effekt på kommunikasjonen: Frykt for ikke å kunne presentere et enhetlig regjeringsalternativ for velgerne motiverte trolig SV og Ap til å dempe konfliktnivået. Kravet til «ansvarlighet» som påligger et regjeringsparti, gav mindre spillerom for SV til å markere seg.41 Partiet ville ikke stille noe ultimatum overfor Ap på LOVE-spørsmålet i valgkampen.42 SV fikk på denne måten sitt sakseierskap svekka, uten at det er lett å peke på noe annet parti som fullt ut lyktes i å overta sakseierskapet. Dermed er det trolig sammenhengen mellom velgernes prioritering av saken og valg av parti som har blitt svekka. Forvaltningsplanens

rolle

Påvirkninga mellom partienes og velgernes holdninger går begge veier. Partiene er brobyggere mellom velgere, sosial struktur og offentlige myndigheter.43 Når det gjelder offentlige myndigheter, er graden av institusjonalisering på det aktuelle saksfeltet, og disse institusjonenes mandat viktig. Miljøhensyn settes på dagsorden og institusjonaliseres, slik de har blitt gjort gjennom forvaltningsplanen der større ansvar har blitt gitt til Miljøverndepartementet. Denne

Eivind Trædal

institusjonaliseringsprosessen blir i seg selv en sentral rammebetingelse for holdningsdannelse. Institusjonalisering har blitt trukket fram som en prosess der miljøinteresser gis et sikrere fundament. Dette kan trygge miljøinteresser på tross av svingende holdninger til miljøvern i befolkninga.44 Ulempen kan være at stridsspørsmål

punkt i LOVE-spørsmålet. Men stemmer denne framstilinga? I formål-avsnittet i forvaltningsplanen for Barentshavet og Lofoten kan vi se hva slags mandat som har blitt gitt forvaltninga i utarbeidelsen av disse planene. Tilsynelatende er sameksistens et sentralt mål. «Formålet med denne forvaltningsplanen er å legge til rette

Det er trolig sammenhengen mellom velgernes prioritering av miljøsaken og valg av parti som har blitt svekka. holdes utenfor de demokratiske kanaler. Prosessen er som regel prega av en «vekst med vern»tankegang, og dette kan igjen påvirke velgernes holdninger.45 Ferdigstillelsen av forvaltningsplanen førte i 2006 umiddelbart til utlysning fra OED, over to og en halv måned før det offisielle vedtaket i Stortinget, og før komitébehandlinga.46 Prosessen fram mot beslutning har et demokratisk innslag gjennom høringsrunder med innspill fra interesseorganisasjoner, men sammenfattinga foregår innen forvaltninga, i tråd med planens politisk fastsatte mandat. Dette svekker trolig påvirkninga gjennom valgkanalen. Som vi har sett har beslutninger tidligere blitt tatt på grunnlag av planen før Stortinget har behandla den. Forvaltninga har så langt basert seg på en oppfatning av at forvaltningsplanen er en beslutning, og ikke et beslutningsgrunnlag.47 I Soria Moria slås det imidlertid fast at beslutninga om LOVE skulle tas av Stortinget på bakgrunn av forvaltningsplanen.48 Timing kan dermed bli en viktig faktor. Dersom den reviderte forvaltningsplanen hadde kommet før valget og ikke i 2010, ville den kanskje ha hatt en annen effekt på velgeratferd, særlig hvis partiene hadde forskjellige tolkninger av forvaltningsplanens konklusjoner og rolle. Det ville i alle tilfelle ha tvunget Arbeiderpartiet til å ta et klarere standpunkt. Forvaltningsplanens status som et nøytralt kunnskapsgrunnlag var et sentralt premiss hos Arbeiderpartiet for ikke å ta noe klart stand-

for verdiskaping (...) og samtidig opprettholde økosystemenes struktur, virkemåte og produktivitet.» Kartlegginga skal «(...) legge til rette for sameksistens mellom ulike næringer, særlig fiskeri, petroleumsaktivitet og sjøtransport».49 I Unni Berges analyse av Barentshav-prosessene fra 2005, tolker hun forvaltningsplanene som et strategisk virkemiddel for regjeringspartiene Krf og Venstre for å heve miljøprofilen sin.50 Berge peker på «ønsket til regjeringa om å oppnå legitimitet for petroleumspolitikken» som en politisk årsak til reformen.50 Hun antyder også den underliggende miljøideologien: «Sameksistens vart eit regelliknande mantra og svaret på dei fleste spørsmål». Opprettelse av petroleumsfrie områder blei på sin side ikke inkludert i forvaltningsplanens formålsavsnitt. Begrunnelsen var at tiltaket var i strid med målet om sameksistens.51 Tidligere analyser av utredningsarbeidet i petroleumsforvaltning har også vist en betydelig makt- og definisjonskamp innad i forvaltninga underveis i utredningsprosessen.52 Vekstinteressene styrkes ved å sette sameksistens som mål, mens permanente vernetiltak ikke vurderes. Dette kan sammenlignes med konsekvensutredningene, som de facto er en del av åpningsprosessen, men i politisk retorikk har blitt framstilt som en faglig vurdering som skulle fungere som politisk beslutningsgrunnlag, og der utfallet var usikkert. I stortingsdebatten rundt vedtaket av forvaltningsplanen juni 2006, blei den politiske bredden i vedtaket understreka av Aps repre35

Hva skjedde med «miljøvalget»?

sentant. FrPs representant var uenig i denne framstillinga, og uttalte ønske om «en robust forvaltningsplan, som hadde overlevd nærmest enhver regjeringskonstellasjon.» Venstres representant uttalte skuffelse over manglende støtte i komiteen fra regjeringspartiene SV og SP rundt strengere miljøkrav, og lovte fortsatt kamp om LOVE-spørsmålet.53 Dette minner om måten energipolitikken blei ført på før framveksten av miljøbevegelsen.54 Stortinget kobles inn seint i prosessen, partiene er mindre kobla inn i spørsmålene (bortsett fra i Regjering), og viktige spørsmål har blitt avklart mellom Regjering og forvaltning. Denne tendensen forsterkes under en flertallsregjering, særlig når forvaltningsplanens utforming tilgodeser en vekst og vern-ideologi som er populær både blant de største partiene og befolkninga. Oppsummering Hvor finner vi nøkkelen til det svake valgresultatet for «miljøpartiene» i 2009, tross det store fokuset på LOVE? Mye tyder på at at de 24 prosent av velgerne som oppga at de prioriterte miljø, og de mange velgerne som var mot oljeu-

tvinning i LOVE, stod overfor en situasjon der det var uklart hvilket parti som fortjente deres stemme. Dette skyldes trolig blant annet hvordan regjeringsalternativene skar på tvers av vekst-vern-aksen. Dette var på sin side muliggjort delvis ved å skyve beslutninga ut av regjeringskontorene, og fram i tid. Forvaltningsplanen kan ha bidratt til å dempe konfliktnivået. Stilt overfor den uklare kommunikasjonen til sentrale partier som Arbeiderpartiet rundt petroleumsspørsmål, blir det vanskeligere for velgerne å la sine miljøholdninger gi seg utslag over stemmeseddelen selv når de er stilt overfor en svært aktuell miljøsak i valgkampen. Den manglende sammenhengen mellom offentlig debatt og opinion og politikk, kan ha hatt negative effekter, både på folkets tillit til politikere, og deres engasjement for miljøet. Det gir samtidig et uklart mandat til de folkevalgte, som må gjøre vurderinger basert på meningsmålinger, og ikke valgresultater. 1989-valget viser oss at miljøfeltet er et område som særlig kan gi innsikt i effekten av stemningsbølger og dramatiske enkelthendelser i politikken. Videre forskning kan gi verdifull innsikt i denne typen velgeratferd, i et land med en stor og stabil gruppe «flytende» velgere.•

Eivind Trædal

Noter 1 Dagbladet.no, (1. september 2009) Jens taper flest velgere på olje-

boring i Lofoten. Hentet Februar 20, 2010 fra dagbladet.no : http://www. dagbladet.no/2009/09/01/nyheter/ valg_2009/valg09/politikk/innenriks/7897275/

2 Aardal, B. og Valen, H. (1995): Konflikt og opinion. NKS-Forlaget, Oslo, s. 183. 3 Garnåsjordet & Haagesen 1980: 3, sitert i Aardal, B. (1993): Energi

og miljø - nye stridsspørsmål i møte med gamle strukturer. Oslo: Institutt for samfunnsforskning. 4 Knutsen, O. (1997): «Challenges to politcal parties, the case of Norway». i L. S. Kaare Strøm (Red.), From old politics to new politics, environmentalism as a party cleavage. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, s. 256.

5 Knutsen, (1997), s. 256. 6 Ibid., s. 251. 7 Aardal og Valen (1995), s. 191. 8 Aardal, B. (1993): Energi og miljø. Nye stridsspørsmål i møte med gamle strukturer. Oslo: Institutt for samfunnsforskning, s. 79. 9 Aardal og Valen (1995), s. 191. 10 Ibid., s. 193. 11 Knutsen, (1997), s. 256. 12 Aardal, (1993), s. 350. 13 Ibid., s. 349. 14Aardal, B., Krogstad, A. & Narud, H.M. (2004): «Valgkamp på norsk» i I valgkampens hete. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, s. 65. 15 SSB (2011): Velgerundersøkelsen

2009 SSB.no. Hentet mai 8., 2012 fra http://www.ssb.no/emner/00/01/ rapp_valg/notat_201129/notat_201129.pdf , s. 21.

16 Atekst-søk foretatt 8.04. 2010.

17 Staude, T. (2009, september 14):

NRK ble folkets valgvinner. Hentet mars 15, 2010 fra http://nrk.no/nyheter/innenriks/valg/valg_2009/1.6773607 18 Knutsen, O. (1988): «Partipolitiske skillelinjer i avanserte industrisamfunn» i Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning nr. 29, s. 165.

19 Knutsen (1988), s. 166. 20 Ibid., s. 165. 21 Ibid., s. 166. 22 SSB (2007): Verdiundersøkelsen. 23 Aardal, B. (2007): Norske velgere.

En studie av stortingsvalget 2005 - tabellvedlegg. Hentet mai 14, 2010 fra http://home.online.no/~b-aardal/vedlegg.pdf

24 Aardal, (1993). 25 NRK (2009, 28. august): Nrk.no.

Hentet 24 februar, 2010 fra http:// www.nrk.no/nyheter/innenriks/valg/ valg_2009/1.6751557

26 Aardal og Valen, (1995), s. 182. 27 Knutsen, (1997), s. 255. 28 NRK (2009, 14. september).

nrk.no. Hentet 13. februar, 2010 fra http://www.nrk.no/valg09/ 29 NRK. (2009, 3. september): Velg! 09. Hentet 14. mars, 2010 fra http:// www1.nrk.no/nett-tv/klipp/546439 30 Narud, H. V. (2001): «Partikonkurranse og sakseierskap». Norsk Statsvitensapelig tidsskrift , 17, ss. 395424, s. 398

43 Aardal (1993), s. 85. 44 Aardal og Valen (1995), s. 195. 45 Aardal, (1993), s. 79. 46 OED. (2006, 3 13): Tildelinger i

19. konsesjonsrunde. Hentet 12. mars, 2010 fra http://www.regjeringen.no/ nb/dep/oed/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2006/tildelinger-i-19-konsesjonsrunde.html?id=104476 47 Espen A. Hauge, s. i.-o. (2010, juni 25): Spørsmål ang. 19. konsesjonsrunde. (E. Trædal, Intervjuer). 48 Ap, Sv, Sp. (2005): Soria moriaerklæringen- Plattform for regjeringssamarbeidet mellom Arbeiderpartiet, Sosialistisk Venstreparti og Senterpartiet 2005-2009. Oslo. s. 60. 49 Miljøverndepartementet. (2002): Stortingsmelding 12 - Rent og rikt hav. Miljøverndepartementet, Oslo. s. 14. 50 Berge, U. (2005). Petroleumsaktivitet i Barentshavet: Konflikt eller sameksistens? Oslo, s. 72.

51 Berge, (2005), s. 49. 52 Statkonsult. (1998): Interdeparte-

mentalt samarbeid - rådgivning eller konsensus? Oslo: Statkonsult, s. 17. 53 Stortinget. (2006). Forhandlinger i Stortinget nr. 187 - dagsorden., (ss. 2813-2814). Oslo. s. 2813.

54 Knutsen, (1997), s. 236.

31 Ibid., s. 401. 32 Ibid., s. 402. 33 Ibid., s. 404. 34 Ibid., s. 404. 35 Ibid., s. 406. 36 Ibid., s. 401. 37 Aardal, (1993), s. 121. 38 Narud og Valen (2001), s. 401. 39 Ibid., s. 419. 40 NRK, (2009). 41 Narud og Valen, (2001), s. 401. 42 NRK, (2009).

The Revolution of the Details An Interview with Bruno Latour

Bård Hobæk and Eirik Høyer Leivestad

Bruno Latour (born 1947) is a French anthropologist and philosopher, associated with the diverse field of Science and Technology Studies. His early works include Laboratory Life (with Steve Woolgar, 1979) and Science in Action (1987), in which the institution and practice of science were made subject to ethnographic studies that infamously blurred the common distinction between fact and artefact. These perspectives were later generalized in Latour’s attack on the modernist narrative in We Have Never Been Modern (1991), which claimed that the occasion of large-scale ecological challenges marks the definite breakdown of a modern constitution based on sharp divisions between nature and culture, science and politics, humans and non-humans. His later works have largely revolved around questions of political ecology, coining the central terms ‘The Parliament of Photo: Bård Hobæk and Eirik Høyer Leivestad

Things’ and ‘compositionism’ as signposts for political reorientation. Latour is currently a professor and vice-president for research at Sciences Po (Paris), where the interview was conducted. We want to start by focusing on what you in recent articles have referred to as the disconnect, or the distance between our awareness of the environmental crisis, and our inability to handle it politically. On this background we want to raise the question of how the distance can be bridged, whether this would entail a re-articulation of the political and the relation between democracy and science. So first off, how can we account for this disconnect? There are many reasons for this. One is simply the novelty of the question. Until recently we have never had to deal with the environment in 39

The Revolution of the Details

political terms; it was not politicized in the sense that it was not disputed, it was not in public arenas, it was never made controversial. The environmental problems have an extension and a networky connectedness that looks like nothing we have seen before, and which has nothing to do with political sovereignty or the boundaries we are used to. Furthermore, the matter itself is entirely scientifically based; we have to go through the sciences even to see which issues to consider. This is true not only of climate, it is true of fish, forests, agriculture or the economy; they are all rendered visible as political problems through sciences. Even the scientists themselves are in disagreement. This is about sciences, technologies and non-humans, and we still haven’t learned how to handle them as political issues. In other political disputes, there is an immediately known regime or gamut of passions to be relied on, whether you are from the left or right. But what do you do about Gaia? How do you react? These questions are new, and impose themselves with an increasing urgency. We don’t have much time to adjust. Are we closer now than we were 40 years ago, when this was first brought onto the public agenda? It is a disputed question among historians of environment in what sense this really is new. The main novelty is the scale of the issue, which has made it a political matter, not simply something to be managed. Another striking feature is that it is completely revolutionary, but in a new sense. It’s a revolution that has none of the characteristics of the revolutionary agendas of the 19th and 20th century, because it’s a revolution of very small, tiny things. It’s about your coffee, your food, clothes and travels, your attitudes vis-à-vis the landscape. It’s revolutionary in the sense that we know we have to change the very fabric of existence, but not as subversion or liberation. We know that it’s about small details added to one another, and that to our complete 40

surprise these details have an amazing global effect. Many still doubt this, and in this sense I don’t think we’re closer. The urgency is closer, of course, but are we better armed politically? We know that we have never been modern, that changes the situation a bit. But is it clear that the crisis can’t be handled through the institutions of modernity? Is it at all possible to face these issues differently? I don’t know if it’s possible, but we have to. I once wrote a paper called “To ecologize or to modernize, that is the question.” The question is still there. Ecology is not about nature, it’s about a certain way of dealing with non-humans. Modern notions struggle with this. Politics remains human-centered, which is quite normal, but when you add the sciences, it already makes a huge difference. When the scientists are introduced as spokespersons for non-humans, they challenge modern notions of sovereignty. And they intervene in questions that are themselves scientifically mediated, because they are invisible without them. This modifies quite deeply the very notion of a political arena. And in that sense, if you look at all of these controversies, they are already assembling rather odd types of what I’ve called parliaments. They are divided, and they come in all shapes. They differ by the types of issues – the water question is not the same as the energy question, and within energy, the nuclear question is distinct from other energy sources. There is a patchwork quality to this, and this is another reason that makes it difficult for the political sciences to recognize their traditional animal, so to speak. They dreamed of a one size fits all institutional setup, but this is something different. Tuna fish, farmed salmon or oil, these issues have very different constituencies and assemblies. Add this patchwork to what I said about the revolution of the details, and it’s completely incomprehensible from the traditional left or

Bård Hobæk and Eirik Høyer Leivestad

right. You don’t recognize this as a revolution, or you don’t see why we have to deal with all these little novelties. In a way, it’s politics as usual, but with a lot of new entities. People are reluctant to acknowledge this; it’s easier to say that it’s about nature and the arguments of science. They prefer to reserve politics for the entities we are used to, which is basically screaming humans. But screaming salmon? Screaming GMO? We see that the public actually knows very well how to handle it. One of my favorite examples is the group of activists defending the interests of nettle. That’s quite magnificent, as an extension of politics. Do you see something like the parliament of things you described materializing here? And is this an adequate re-description of the political sphere? Oh, it’s everywhere. It’s intentionally a bit naïve, the words I used, reusing the classical speech form of constitutions. But it’s there; everything we are discussing is a small parliament. The difficulty is their composed nature, a composite body unrecognisable for those who want one big assembly or congress. Look at all the issues now surrounded by representative institutions, which includes scientific, political and activist representation. Just open a newspaper, they are everywhere. And that’s one way of answering your question of what has changed. From my perspective, which I recognize is a limited way of looking at things, the transformation is amazing. Every issue now has its own mini-parliament attached to it. But this is not recognized by those who are still waiting for capitalism to disappear. For them, none of this exists. But what are the limits or obstacles these new institutional frameworks push up against? The international climate process is a perfect example, and a dramatic failure. Many people think these efforts are doomed already, because

they are facing obstacles they will be unable to overcome within a relevant time-frame. The questions are enormous and seem to call for a big answer, like realpolitik or capitalism. Yes, but global warming is also a good example of how small decisions by no one in particular have huge consequences. There is not one single element of this that is not an artifact, in the good sense of the word. What is artefactual can be redone, there is no destiny here. If you add capitalism, it doesn’t solve the question, it just gives it a destiny and there’s nothing you can do. I don’t believe in capitalism more than the rest of these huge macro-actors. The difficulty is not that we run into an even bigger entity than Gaia. Gaia is big enough; we don’t need to add capitalism. It’s not a fight between Gaia and capitalism. It’s a fight among humans about the way to deal with non-humans. It’s odd, but it’s not outside the normal history of politics. It’s just odd. After everything I said about the disconnect, the counterweight to that is to say that this is politics. Politics is made to make possible that sort of situation. Urgency, globality, sacrifice, representation, dispute, settlement, that’s what politics is about. It’s what cosmopolitics is about. But at the same time we seem paralyzed, unable to take the appropriate measures. We do and we don’t. It would be very surprising if our ways of doing things were modified overnight. But partly, I agree on the timing question, which is a source of great angst. We realize simultaneously that a revolution of the details is an amazingly slow process, requiring an amazingly courageous type of politics, and that the time is not there. Even this, in a way, is the normal political situation. But here we are not only opposed to other humans. We have to win against ourselves, partly against other humans, against non-humans, for other non-humans. This is the novelty, not the problem of urgency 41

The Revolution of the Details

itself. People still think it’s all about saving nature. But it is rather a question of recognizing your enemies, which is difficult. We are back to Carl Schmitt, the constitution of the political through the identification of friends and enemies. And who are our enemies? That’s a big part of the politics of nature, to recognize your enemies. Ecology is often framed as apolitical; you’re an ecologist so you don’t do politics. There is no definition of friends and enemies. Of course there are enemies, detecting them is classically what politics is about. But if you throw in capitalism, it becomes a fight between capitalism and… what? There’s no counterpart, and the discussion stops. Is it capitalism against nature? This means nothing. The question of enemies is specific to each issue; it will vary for every single topic. GMO will be different from rivers or climate change. And we are so lazy after the long domination of the left/right divide, that people have forgotten their Leninist slogan: ‘The specific analysis of the specific situation’. People have been hiding in the left/rightdistinction, which means that when you’re on the left, there is this big, vague bundle of things to agree and disagree with. When the ecologists appeared, at least in France, they stuck to the idea that it’s not about politics, it’s about nature and facts that dictate something to be done. This is the negation of politics. Or they alternate between a completely leftist definition of what ecology is, and saying that they are beyond the right and left divide. Does that mean you have no enemies? Yes, we only speak about facts of nature. In Politics of Nature, 12 years ago, you said that the environmental movement was basically already doing the right things, but that they were ideologically misguided. Is this still the case? And is getting rid of this concept of 42

nature still the big challenge for political ecology? This was slightly unfair, and it’s unfair to maintain it. But I’ll rephrase slightly and say that the idea of science they rely on remains so outdated that it slows down their political impact. That I will maintain. Of course their practice is courageous, but every time they enter a controversy, they fall into the trap. Climategate is a moving example. So, insofar as ideas play a role, which is not big but not negligible, the ideology of science rampant in these ecological questions doesn’t help. My task, as I see it, is to modify the definition of science: there are spokespersons representing issues, things that are highly disputable, which is good. You don’t have to limit scientists to facts; they do all kinds of interesting things. They define the problem in many ways, and they have to be part of the solution, but not only them. And I still think that this is a good way out of the impasse. Of course there are lots of others, this is only the one that I as a writer, intellectual or professor can help with. Maybe you could elaborate on the Climategate example, the role played by scientific certainty is quite telling here. In fact, I think the dispute was useful. The reaction of the scientists was not to argue for the certainty of science, but for the trust in the institution of science. This is a novelty. I was greatly amused, and asked them since when they taught that science was dependent on an institution? This is what my colleagues and I have been saying, and they criticized us for being relativists. They now say that the institution of science is worthy of trust and respect. Yes of course, this is what we have always said. But the institutional aspect is completely hidden if you focus on certainty. So, I think the case was useful, it moved us away from a completely implausible philosophy

Bård Hobæk and Eirik Høyer Leivestad

of science, that of certainty. This is so easy to attack, to poke a hole in. Climate modeling is a big puzzle. It’s sturdy, but it’s made out of so many different pieces. If you are a silly positivist, you can say, ‘oh look, I found a mistake here.’ Yes, of course you did. They are now uninteresting, more than ridiculous. The only scientists worth listening to are slowly changing their positions from an outdated, positivist definition of certainty to something much more interesting: trust in the institution. They discuss peer review, instruments, they even talk about numbers, which is very strange, ‘5000 scientists say that...’ This is more in keeping with trust in political institutions. It is not a critical position, it can be discussed. Trust in the institution of science. I never heard this before, in 35 years of doing science studies. Never heard the scientists defend trust in the institution, they were always jumping straight to truth and certainty. I might be overly optimistic, but I think we’ll get rid of the climate-sceptics completely. Would you say that the study of science and technology is inherently political? Of course. But there are lots of other ways. The arts must be moved quite a bit, their resources are needed to frame, to reimagine this disconnect, or why we don’t believe what the sciences tell us. There’s an interesting comparison to be made to the nuclear threat that my generation lived under during the cold war. According to James Lovelock, seven out of eight humans will be wiped out. Many of the same questions are raised, but with some significant differences. The nuclear winter was human-dependent in a different way, somewhat rational in its irrationality. With Gaia, no one pushes a button anywhere. It’s not a human enemy, nor a divinity, but a set of retroactions. The generational difference is also interesting in a different way. We are from the generation

that has been told in school from early childhood that mother earth has to be saved. For us, the big question was never really about believing the threat, but a persisting feeling of not knowing what to do. The problems we are faced with do not have one single solution, and can no longer be approached through critique or as a revolution. It has to be experimented. It has to be pragmatically studied by specific inquiries in every single issue. Coffee is not the same thing as climate change. And every time we do something we create lots of unintended consequences, ecology is full of that. This means we also have to be very careful in monitoring the results. All of this requires hard work. Your experience from school is probably particular to Norway, no one has heard of Gaia in France. And the work is easier for you; you don’t have to make too radical choices. But our economy is entirely based on petroleum. It’s quite telling that even when disregarding the massive contradiction of being based on oil export and picturing ourselves at the forefront of the ecological turnaround, even then, we are still unable to make these changes. Well, unable is putting it too strongly, lots of people are already doing things differently. If you tell people they need to change radically their way of life, they will not do a thing. We are expecting too much, too radical changes? No. But this is not radical in the classical way, and that’s a difficulty. It’s not like going from capitalism to socialism or back. It requires attention to details, you have to do fresh inquiries every time, and you have to assemble the stakeholders, which itself requires inquiries. It is different from politics as we knew it in the 20th 43

The Revolution of the Details

century, with its set of questions, ideologically prepackaged and with known stakeholders. That was not about the politicization of every issue in detail, you never thought twice before eating salmon. You could be a Marxist, have your hamburger, demonstrate in the afternoon and know exactly what it meant to be against capitalism. But now, where is the enemy? We have to explore and compose the positions, and again, we need new inquiries. And we need the social sciences, but they are far off. Completely incapable every time they approach science and technology. Every single windmill needs new inquiries. This is extremely complex, both technically and politically, but not unsolvable.

which is the essential political question. And for this, you need tools, instruments. This is our job, in the field of science and technology studies, finding instruments that enable you to map controversies, to detect the enemy, in an ad-hoc way, issue per issue, before you compose. That’s the political work, not to say that I’m from the left, therefore I’m anti-nuclear. Can you show me the connections and consequences for other issues, and how you will politicize energy consumption? Politics is marked by an amazing laziness. Ecology is still new and people haven’t realized they need to rework what it means to be for and against something.

People are being mobilized today as ethically responsible consumers. In what other ways do you think that they can be mobilized? And to do what?

We brought up consumption because we have a clear impression that this is taking an increasingly central role in public discussion, as one of the only things concerned people see as what they can do. As the only political act imaginable, it’s apolitical.

I don’t know how much of a difference the revolt of the consumers can make. In some questions, it does, of course. But again, what’s new and unsettling for the normal political sense, so to speak, is that this whole matter is issue-specific. Politically correct coffee and nuclear energy; these issues imply completely different ways of being a consumer. Consumer, like citizen or activist, is not a category you can use across the board, it depends on the issue. This is why I use the word composition to talk about these things. It means that we have to do the work of connecting all these issues. With the bundles of opinions from the left or right, you never had to get into the details of the issues to make the connections. It was predictable; you knew what to do in a whole range of questions. With ecology it gets difficult. People say this is because ecology is neither from the left nor the right, which is stupid. On the contrary, the recognition of enemies is absolutely crucial to ecology. It’s not an abstention from being right or left. It’s about raising anew the question of a composition, of who is the enemy,

I don’t agree; it’s like saying you see no other way but to vote for an election. Yes, but that’s what democracy is about. Being in a supermarket, questions of energy, of travel, having rendered them political makes a big difference. Don’t forget that the whole issue itself is a consequence of very small producing and consuming actions. Again, the cause and the solution are on the same scale, of the same nature; the situation was made and can be redone. Minus the huge question of irreversibility, of course. But a lot can still be redone. Not the dodo, the dodo is dead. So far. The difficulty is that we have to accept that we live in a completely artificial world, for which we take responsibility. We want to save nature and be less technical, but we have to be more technical and take more responsibility. More details, mediated by the sciences, over and over again. That’s a lot of novelty for political science. But academics are always the latest in everything.

Bård Hobæk and Eirik Høyer Leivestad

In sum, what you’re saying is quite reassuring, then. That the enormous complexity of the task ahead is slowly dawning on us, and we are slowly developing the means to handle it. Yes, without the problem of time, I would feel pretty good. In the 20th century, the catastrophes were human, and took place in a landscape that could be polluted, but not basically modified. With the Gaia-argument, things are bleaker, but in a way morally better, because we now have

absolutely no way of escaping our responsibility. Before this, you could still be modern, you could go further and then wait for the consequences. Now that the consequences are coming back at us, as Peter Sloterdijk beautifully said, we finally know that the earth is round. Not just in geography, but in responsibility. It’s ethically round. We are in a situation of greater urgency, but also in a position to be more responsible, responding to more voices. We grow up.•

A Brief Examination of Everyday Consumption How the Study of “the Mundane” Can Inform Sustainability Discourse and Policy Melanie Leeson

The study of consumption, in particular studying the ways in which people consume daily, can be a means of more directly connecting academic sustainability literature with policy. The following are brief explications on three consumption concepts: social signalling, social practice theory and the ways in which people and objects engage with one another during consumptive practice. These concepts were presented during a course about consumption at the Centre for Development and the Environment at the University of Oslo. The aim of the course is to “address the increasing importance of consumption in everyday life, the ways consumption affects the environment, and both the theories and public policies which address sustainable consumption... [The course examines] the practices of every day life across cultures with a view to understanding consumption and its relationship to values, attitudes and social structures.” More specifically within the context of this esPhoto: flickr.com/photos/cunaldo

say, “the point will be made that social structures and physical infrastructures surrounding consumption are firmly anchored. Seen in this way, achieving a sustainable society will constitute a significant social change.”1 Put in another way, in order to move toward a sustainable society, significant social change is required. But in order for change of this magnitude to take root, actors, including policymakers and everyday citizens need to understand the underlying cultural attitudes and social structures that make up current consumptive practice, as well as what has dictated the design of physical infrastructure that has allowed for and/or has encouraged unsustainable consumption. Case One: Social Signalling There are several ways to define social signalling in relation to consumption (i.e. various distinctions one could draw for how, why and what a person is signalling). One description of social signalling is instrumental: consumption for the 47

A Brief Examination of Everyday Consumption

purpose of ‘saying something’ about oneself. As Zygmunt Baumann describes it, “Conspicuous consumption [is] instrumental: a visiting card, or way of notifying the ‘significant others’ se-

Indian consumption patterns are moving in the direction of Northern-style consumption, in part, due to wanting to be associated as a “successful and modern” society. As the North enjoys

Performance and signalling go hand-in-hand – the consumptive act is carried out/through as a performance. lectively admitted to ‘private views’ just how high the nouveau riche has managed to climb, and that he has the means of settling there for good.”2 Performance and signalling go hand-in-hand – the consumptive act is carried out/through as a performance. Signalling comes from the intention to signify something about oneself, whereas performance is the act that communicates the signal. Hal Wilhite provides many examples of social signalling in Keralan households:3 the way dress can signal something about one’s character; the practice of migrant worker families purchasing modern household appliances for houses larger than their neighbours to signal newly acquired wealth; soap use within a culture that traditionally use other means to keep clean to signal modern integration into Northern conceptions of development; increased prevalence of air conditioner ownership as a signal of modernity in household structuring and composition. To elaborate on the first example, the notion of beauty in India is a good example of the ways in which the consumption of beauty products and procedures are used as a means to signal or identify oneself with the European and hence Northern/developed world ideal of beauty: “[there is] widespread belief in rural Kerala that dark skin tone is a characteristic of lower castes. From the early 19th century women have used powders, creams and treatments to lighten their skin… Today, fairness is one of India’s biggest businesses, and Kerala women are its biggest consumers.”4 48

the highest living standards and as individuals in the North have been signalling social status and wealth through ever-increasing consumption, so it appears that “rising economies” in the South are following suit. However, Baumann observes modern consumption differently. Social signalling, or “conspicuous consumption”, is the way of the past5 and we live in the “time of desire”: ‘Seduction’ and ‘temptation’, the midwives of desire, are eminently human skills, and so consumer demand [has] been wrenched out of the deadly grip of ‘needs’, those innocent and incorruptible children of nature, and entrusted to human cunning, shrewdness, ingenuity, acumen, inventiveness, creativity – and zeal …human desires to explore the pleasures they never experienced and resolve problems they did not suspect having.6

Put simply, Baumann is arguing that consumption has become a thing-unto-itself – there is no instrumental value to it, there is no meaning behind it and consumers are perpetuating the act of consuming for the sake of perpetuation. Consumption, according to Baumann’s conception, has nothing to do with signalling or performance. His reasoning is that we are consuming without purpose or thought because we are insecure: Seeking security through consumer choices is itself a prolific and inexhaustible source of insecurity. Finding one’s way amidst the deafening cacophony of peddlers’ voices and the

Melanie Leeson blinding medley of wares that confuse and defy sober reflection is a mind-boggling and nerve-wracking task.7

If most consumers in the North took the time to reflect on their consumption patterns and were honest, they could identify with this concept. But I think Baumann’s claims are valid only as a generalization of consumption in the North, because it does not cover the full spectrum of consumption in these societies. There are small but steadily growing pockets of thoughtful consumers who have recognized the destructiveness of autotelic consumption and have taken steps to change their consumption patterns to ones that are more traditional, hence instrumental: consumption for needs, function and/or for pleasure. Examples include niche food markets like specialty coffee, artisan wines, clothing designers who create “new” clothing from discards, the Slow Food movement, etc. In addition, there are activist communities that advocate “buying locally”, the Fair Trade movement, frugal living and dumpster diving (the practice of getting food from the garbage bins of supermarkets). A couple of these examples will be more fully examined in the following. Case Two: Social Practice Theory Social practice theory places its emphasis on doing. An act is deconstructed based on how it is embodied in physical behaviour. The locus of study is the practice itself rather than in the various structures that inform a given behaviour – mind, body, object, subject, etc. – as in most of cultural theory. As Andreas Reckwitz describes practice, “bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects are treated, things are described and the world is understood”.8 Practice theory offers a perspective that relates directly to the ways people actually consume, A ‘practice’ (Praktik) is a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of

bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, knowhow, states of emotion and motivational knowledge9

– in sum, all that goes into the consumption of things. If the goal of a piece of research is policyoriented, one can assume the researcher considers the “real-life” context or the everyday behaviour of the individual or group under study. There is a tendency within the social sciences to “place the social in mental qualities, [or] in discourse, [or] in interaction,”10 to provide “grand themes” for the reasons and ways in which humans interact with and view the world. After all, the social is a complex and often complicated web of interactions amongst and between the individual, non-human objects, structure, language, behaviour, etc. As Reckwitz notes, There is a certain danger of trivializing practice theory. At first sight, its approach might seem relatively close to everyday talking about ‘agents’ and their behaviour. In fact, this is not the case. Although praxeological ‘new speak’ is highly modest in its terminology…it implies a considerable shift in our perspective on body, mind, things, knowledge discourse, structure/processes and the agent.11

At the base of practice theory is the body, “Practices are routinized bodily activities; as interconnected complexes of behavioural acts they are movements of the body”12 (emphasis added). In other words, body is everything in practice theory – without the physical movement of the body, there is no practice. Closely connected with practice as physical is the mind, mental patterns…not the ‘possession’ of an individual ‘deep inside’, but part of the social practice... [N]ot only are bodily routines the place of the social; the mental routines and their knowledge are integral parts and elements of practices. A ‘practice’ thus crosses 49

A Brief Examination of Everyday Consumption the distinction between the allegedly inside and outside of mind and body.13

The social is a complex and fluid set of interactions rather than discrete and/or dualistic entities that linearly interrelate with one another. Each entity coshapes the others, thus the body and mind are mutually constitutive and reinforcing; “there are no separate realms”.14 Finally, there is the agent/individual. Agents are, “…carriers of routinized, oversubjective complexes of bodily movements, of forms of interpreting, knowing how and wanting and of the usage of things” (emphasis added).15 Thus practice theory within the context of consumption research “encourages us to regard [an] ethical problem as the question of creating and taking care of social routines, not as a question of the just, but of the ‘good’ life as it is expressed in certain body/understanding/things complexes.”16 It is this “ethical problem” in social routines that I would like to focus on, as it relates to food consumption. The consumption of mass produced food as opposed to locally produced food is my ethical dilemma: I believe that social practice theory can provide insights into why food consumers in North-America are so distanced from the original producers of food. In my experience and personal opinion, the North American conception of the good life is based on the ability to consume what one wants in the ways one deems necessary or satisfactory. One of the many consequences of this is that the North-American consumer is provided with the most “choices” of any society in the world. The domain of food consumption is no exception. One need only walk through the average supermarket or search the internet for “restaurants in ‘x’ city” to observe the endless number of choices a food consumer has. As food is both a necessity and pleasure item, the food industry has become adept at adding layers to the production of food and many people profit from this. If we break down 50

a dinner of chicken, potatoes, some vegetables and brownies for dessert, the components of this seemingly simple meal becomes bewilderingly complex when one considers each ingredient and asks where it originates. If the ingredients were bought at an average supermarket, the sites where the ingredients were produced are endless and because of the way our food industry has developed, where convenience and availability are the ends, many people produce many different options of the same thing. Eating has become a routinized behaviour. The acts of looking in the refrigerator (in many cases not), writing a shopping list (which is often not followed), driving to the supermarket, walking down the aisles and either consciously or unconsciously putting things into the shopping cart, then going through the checkout, paying the bill, driving home and putting together a meal (often many of the purchased items are not consumed during this meal), has become an automated process in many households. Perhaps in themselves, these routines are not ethical problems. However, food consumption as a whole has become a set of ethical problems because mass food production has become environmentally detrimental, original producers of food are being exploited with low wages or unfair prices for their products, people are obese because they are eating unhealthy, nutritionally barren foods and the consumer is constantly bombarded by marketing telling her to buy an endless changing constellation of products. In contrast the “local food movement” (e.g. Slow Food) both challenges the food consumer to consume more thoughtfully (i.e. actually think about what she consumes as well as know where the food she eats comes from) and simply take pleasure in the consumption of food. Eating behaviours are different in this type of food consumption; there are routines but each act has likely been thought-through because of the movement’s principles. To use the chicken, potatoes, vegetables and brownies dinner example from above, a Slow Food routine of prepar-

Melanie Leeson

ing this meal would be quite different than the supermarket version. To follow the principles of Slow Food, the ingredients need to come from as many local producers as possible, which means either knowing the producer or buying from a venue that sells local ingredients. Since Slow Food is not a big movement, this can be quite a challenge because following a Slow Food diet requires a lot more thought (at least initially) and preparation. One cannot just simply get into her car and drive to the nearest supermarket. Menus have to be planned in advance in order to get the right ingredients together for a given meal. The positive consequences to this are numerous, but for me, they include a much better tasting meal and much more personal satisfaction in the preparation of it. Just as importantly, it feels good knowing where one’s food comes from, knowing the environment has been as minimally impacted as possible and that the producers of one’s food have not been exploited in their production and sale of it. It is neither difficult nor overly complicated to shop and eat in this way once the routine is begun. Using my hometown, Edmonton, as a case study: weekly farmer’s markets spread across multiple locations throughout the city provide initial access and contact with local food producers. If one were to stop here, she would at least have weekly access to fresh locally produced food. But there are more numerous and sometimes even more convenient options than this. For example, there is a program wherein a weekly catalogue of food is distributed to members via email and members place orders once a week for items they want to purchase. In one version, coolers are then distributed right to members’ doorsteps or in another version, shoppers pickup their cooler from a central distribution point. These movements have developed slowly and started with small groups of people and the biggest driver has been word-of-mouth. Once someone sees first-hand how easy it is for a friend or neighbour to buy and eat fresh food (an example of practice theory in action), the

once complex and seemingly difficult change in food consumption from mass-produced to fresh and local, becomes much less intimidating. If food policy bureaucrats are interested in changing the food industry to be more sustainable and less exploitative, social practice theory provides a basis for how to investigate the ways in which people consume. The routines and programs I outlined above could be explicated in much more detail through analyses of each of the practice model’s agents. Such deconstruction of live behaviour is analysis-friendly; there are numerous policy implications embedded within every consumptive routine. Case Three: Objects Convey Knowledge to Users Peter-Paul Verbeek’s 2006 essay “Materializing Morality. Design Ethics and Technological Mediation” introduces the reader to a moral perspective on technology and the ways in which the design of technological products can have social impacts. Verbeek begins by defining the notion of a script: …the manifold roles technological artifacts play in their use contexts…technologies possess a ‘script’ in the sense that they can prescribe the actions of the actors involved. Technologies are able to evoke certain kinds of behavior… the products of ‘inscriptions’ by designers. Designers anticipate how users will interact with the product they are designing and, implicitly or explicitly, build prescriptions for use into the materiality of the product.17

Following from this definition is a moral dimension: if design and hence product designers can shape the ways people interact with products without the explicit acceptance from the individual, what, if any, responsibilities do designers have to the end-user? Simultaneously, if a user has awareness of scripts, are there live implications to the ways she consumes? 51

A Brief Examination of Everyday Consumption

Heidegger’s mission in Sein und Zeit is to deconstruct ‘knowledge’ and ‘things’ and the ways in which they both constitute and reconstruct reality. Heidegger was skeptical about ‘objective reality’; the belief that knowledge can be a priori and the notion that a person or thing’s ‘being’ exists separately from the ‘interpretive context’. As Verbeek outlines, “According to Heidegger, [things] should be understood as connections or linkages between humans and reality.”18 To oversimplify Heidegger, human reality is only comprehensible within an ‘interpretative context’ – there is no ‘objective reality’ per se; reality exists within the relations/interpretive context between and amongst ‘beings’ (including ‘things’). Of particular importance to the present discussion is Heidegger’s description of how things are used – the ‘readiness-to-hand’ hypothesis: [Things] that are used for doing something typically withdraw from people’s attention; the attention of, for example, a person who drives a nail into a wall is not directed at the hammer but at the nail… Only when [the thing] breaks down does it ask attention for itself again. The artifact is then, in Heidegger’s words, ‘present-at-hand’ and is not able to facilitate a relationship between a user and his or her world any more. Although ready-to-hand artifacts withdraw from people’s attention, they do play a constitutive role in the human-world relation that arises around them… When a [thing] is used, it facilitates people’s involvement with reality, and in doing so, it coshapes how humans can be present in their world and their world for them. In this sense, things-in-use can be understood as mediators of human-world relationships.19

When Heidegger states, “things have knowledge,” he is acknowledging the importance of the interpretive context. He is also arguing that the relationship between object and person constantly evolves; he is making the case for a ‘web of relations’, rather than perpetuating traditional subject-object dualism. In other words, humans 52

do, in some respects, choose how they interact with a thing but the object is not passive: its composition and the way it was designed actively contribute to the relation between subjectobject so that the distinction between the two is less clear than the long-standing dichotomy previously argued by metaphysicians (e.g. Descartes mind-body dualism where the body and mind are mutually exclusive). Continuing with Heidegger’s readiness-tohand conception is Don Ihde’s ‘embodiment relation’, In the embodiment relation, technologies are incorporated by their users, establishing a relationship between humans and their world through the technological artifact. T h i s embodiment relation, for instance, occurs when looking through a pair of glasses; the artifact is not perceived itself, but it helps to perceive the environment. Technological artifacts become extensions of the human body.20

Objects have intentionality; “[things] are not neutral instruments but play an active role in the relationships between humans and their world.”21 Ihde goes further than Heidegger in his contention that things are not neutral – objects are not merely active in the relation between human and thing; they are purposefully contributing to the relation. But he stops from suggesting that things have fixed goals. Rather, “[Things] get shape within the relationship… within different relation[s], [things] can have a different identity.”22 The example of the telephone is brought into Verbeek’s text to illustrate this concept: the telephone was not developed as a piece of equipment to be used for reciprocal communication, it was intended to be a hearing aid for the hard of hearing. Because of the various contexts telephones have subsequently been embedded in, however, a telephone’s identity and use have changed throughout its various iterations – both user and object have participated in coshaping the way a telephone is used. Much of the Verbeek text focuses on tech-

Melanie Leeson

nology, as Heidegger himself was very much interested in the widespread influence and use of man-made things in everyday life, for example, computers and appliances (things often taken for granted because of their widespread use and distribution). These discussions are important because we continue to live in the age where technology and the advancement of ob-

ket, most people do not visit all 20 aisles each time they go shopping – consumers have been trained by the things within the supermarket to be able to navigate a huge space and thousands of items efficiently. The organization of aisles, signs indicating what kinds of items are contained in a given aisle, labels and packaging, are all categorized within seconds by a shopper. But if a

One of the consequences of this type of food buying is that people have stopped knowing, and in many cases, wondering where their food comes from. jects making everyday life “efficient” are prized. However, the focus of this current discussion will be on the consumption of food (as has been the case above), as it is a huge driver of everyday consumption for everyone in society. When one visits a supermarket, there is an overwhelming amount of information that requires immediate processing: the complicated layout of the space, the sheer number of items on display and the many people operating within their various roles as shopper, cashier, store manager, stocking staff, etc. Most people do not think of a visit to the supermarket as complicated and this is because the objects in the supermarket have knowledge and intention. The average consumer has had so many experiences with the objects within supermarkets that over time, walking through one becomes an automated and habitual act, despite the myriad sources of stimuli present in typical supermarket exhibits. For example, when did it become habit to unconsciously navigate up to 20 aisles of different categories of things? In the history of exchanging money for goods, small stores that specialized in selling one or two items with perhaps several varieties of each thing were common from the middle-ages until the early late 19th century. In early versions of the general store, there were only a few aisles and one could easily walk through the entire store during one short visit. With the modern-day supermar-

person living as late as 100 years ago were to visit a modern supermarket, would she be able to navigate one with as much ease as the average person living in the North does now? One of the consequences of this type of food buying is that people have stopped knowing, and in many cases, wondering where their food comes from. The mere thought of knowing who the producer is is not an item of interest to many supermarket consumers. When one purchases vegetables from a farmer who is a friend, the motivation to buy is to eat the purchased produce. When a person buys potato chips from the supermarket, there are many other things at play: how enticing the packaging is in relation to other options, where the chips have been displayed in relation to how a shopper travels within the supermarket, whether the type of product is suitable for the shopper (e.g. if the person is salt conscious, she will choose a brand with lower salt content). Many exchanges between the object and shopper occur before the food is ever consumed. The act of buying a bag of chips often has more to do with how enticing the packaging is, rather than any inherent qualities of the product inside. The carrot is a raw product that is grown to be eaten. It does not have anything to offer the consumer other than its taste and nutritional value (it perhaps it has some aesthetic value to the consumer). The same cannot be applied to a bag of chips – it is 53

A Brief Examination of Everyday Consumption

a thing that has knowledge. Such food items are designed by people wanting to convey information other than the fact that it contains some raw product. Viewing things in this way – that they are not passive objects being consumed by individuals who dictate the interaction – is a way of conceiving of consumption that demands one pause and reflect on her consumption. When an interaction becomes a relationship between beings, as with the consumption of things with knowledge, the realm of the ethical becomes important and requires thought and attention. Such a conception of subject-object interaction has implications in the ways a person consumes things.

that manages its resources wisely. The time and effort spent on these debates are important: we need widespread and wholesale change in the ways our cities are built, the ways students are educated about the world and how their participation in it affects other beings, and in the discourses of local, national and global politics. But in order to change these grand structures, we need to conceive of and examine everyday behaviour in a new way. Quite simply, a move toward more sustainable consumption requires many individuals to physically do things differently. And in order to provide ways of consuming more efficiently, academic and political discourse must carefully and thoughtfully examine the seemingly mundane acts of everyday living.•

Conclusion Often sustainability discourse focuses on grand theories and discussions about what the global community must do to change the current trajectory from a world that overconsumes to one

Notes 1 Centre for Development and the Environment, Consumption, Development and Social Change, http://www.uio.no/studier/ emner/annet/sum/SUM4019/ (Apr. 24, 2012). 2 Rojek, C. (2004): “The Consumerist Syndrome in Contemporary Society. An interview with Zygmunt Bauman” in Journal of Consumer Culture 4, p. 291–312. 3 Wilhite, H. (2008): Consumption and the Transfomation of Everday Life: A View from South India: Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 4 Wilhite, (2008), p. 38. 5 Rojek, (2004), p. 294. 6 Ibid., p. 298. 7 Ibid., p. 303. 8 Reckwitz, A. “Toward a theory of social practices: A development of culturist theorizing”. European Journal of Social Theory 5, p. 243-263. 9 Ibid., p. 249. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., p. 250. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p. 252. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., p. 259. 16 Ibid. 17 Science, Technology & Human Values, 31(March 2006), p. 363. 18 Reckwitz, 252. 19 Ibid. 20 Verbeek, 365. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 54

Above: Twentyfourseven # 21, 2006, edition of 5+1, 125cmx218cm, c-print/aluminium Left: Downfall, 2008, edition of 5+1, 131cmx91cm, c-print/aluminium.

Rune Guneriussen Born 1977 in Kongsberg, Norway Education from Surrey Institute of Art & Design in England http://www.runeguneriussen.no Tvergastein is thrilled to present some of the works of the internationally acclaimed artist Rune Guneriussen in our first issue, and we are proud to feature his picture “It’s common knowledge” (2009) as our cover image. Rune Guneriussen is a conceptual artist working in the space between installation and photography. His site-specific work, with objects such as tables, lamps and chairs in scenes of Norwegian nature, started in 2005. By isolating manmade objects in a natural landscape, Guneriussen creates complex and beautiful installations, which are in his words “subject to a certain character carefully laying out a story”. The photographs approach the balance between nature and culture, inviting the spectator to reflect on the multiple readings and narratives. A globe in snow might reference the melting Arctic; a chair, society’s craving for manmade objects; glowing lamps in a tree, our dependence on electricity. None of the photographs are manipulated and are solely made on site, which makes the work increasingly complex and time-consuming. His work also includes live installations open for an audience, most recently for the Nuit Blanche 2009 in Paris with the installation “Don’t leave the lights on”, and previously “An electric field”, his most extensive project done in Norway. Review by Torstein Tvedt Solberg 57

Cold Comfort, 2010, edition of 5+1, 125cmx200cm, c-print/aluminium

As an artist, I believe strongly that art itself should be questioning and bewildering as opposed to patronising and restricting. As opposed to the current fashion I do not want to dictate a way to the understanding of my art, but rather indicate a path to understanding a story. â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Rune Guneriussen

Unprepared winter scenario, 2009, edition of 5+1, 110cmx172cm, c-print/aluminium

Sustainable Development and Consumption from Rio to Rio and Beyond Arve Hansen

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Truly, the path to sustainable development is paved with good intentions, but the rhetorical vagueness of that master phrase has made it too easy for hard questions to be ignored, stifled in a quilt of smoothly crafted and wellmeaning platitudes.â&#x20AC;?1

Unsustainable consumption patterns are an under-analysed side of the mainstream concept of sustainable development. At the same time, however, sustainable consumption has been a part of the concept of sustainable development since the beginning, and at the Rio +20 conference another attempt to bring this agenda to the front will be made. Although welcome and important, this attempt is unlikely to produce any radical changes to the sustainability of economic development, partly due to the shallowness of the approach. Confronting consumption means asking uncomfortable systemic questions about the capitalist global economy, and the mainstream sustainable consumption approach thus tends to rather focus attention to individual consumer choices and production efficiency. In this article I will claim that understanding consumption is vital to environmental sustainability, and that it furthermore requires a holistic Illustration: Heida Mobeck

approach that goes beyond economic assumptions of consumer sovereignty. Sustainable Development Consumption

and

Sustainable

It is important to acknowledge that the introduction and mainstreaming of sustainable development was in many ways extremely important, at least at a rhetorical level. It meant an official recognition of the environmental problems created by economic growth, and at least a stated intent to confront this challenge. Achieving this was a radical break with the prevailing modernization logic, and recognition in the mainstream development discourse of the work and opinions of many scholars and activists championing the case of the Earth. The goal of the Brundtland Commission was to change the focus from seeing the environment as something peripheral to development, to integrating the environment 61

Sustainable Development and Consumption from Rio to Rio and Beyond

into development work.2 It succeeded in focusing on the interplay between development and the environment,3 but at the same time this remains one of the most fundamental challenges of international development. The question as to whether economic development and environmental sustainability are at all compatible is still largely unanswered. Sustainable development was famously defined by the Brundtland Commission as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”4 As many scholars have pointed out, this is a woolly definition that serves more like a slogan than an actual definition.5 What sustainable development really means, and the concept of development, for that matter, is largely dependent on the ideological foundations of the definer. The Brundtland Commission did of course produce more than a single definition in its presentation and exploration of sustainable development. Agenda 21, the document representing the blueprint for sustainable development, and released at the Rio Conference in 1992, is 338 pages long, consisting of 40 chapters, and does not lack bold statements. The following is stated in the preamble: Humanity stands at a defining moment in history. We are confronted with a perpetuation of disparities between and within nations, a worsening of poverty, hunger, ill health and illiteracy, and the continuing deterioration of the ecosystems on which we depend for our well-being. However, integration of environment and development concerns and greater attention to them will lead to the fulfillment of basic needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future. No nation can achieve this on its own; but together we can – in a global partnership for sustainable development.6

Although undoubtedly a nice vision, it is not unproblematic. What will this global partner62

ship look like, and how should responsibility be distributed? Indeed one of the main criticisms of the sustainable development agenda has been the amount of responsibility assigned to the economically poorer parts of the world, even though they are least to blame for the state in which the world finds itself. This is also one of the main reasons why the agenda has met resistance among national governments in the developing world; the vagueness of the vision gives an opportunity to the richest countries to greenwash their development speak at the same time as hindering the efforts of the least privileged to develop economically. In the words of Adams:7 The version of sustainable development expounded at Rio and Johannesburg demanded no radical changes in the relations between rich and poor countries, no systematic reorganization of the control of resources, no reining back of consumption of non-renewable or renewable resources that might harm the delicate constitution of the juggernaut of the world economy.

The work of the Brundtland Commission has been criticized for its lack of attention to unsustainable consumption,8,9 even though Agenda 21 points out the major cause of continued deterioration of the global environment as the “unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, particularly in industrialized countries, which is a matter of grave concern, aggravating poverty and imbalances.”10 Paragraph 4.5 states: Special attention should be paid to the demand for natural resources generated by unsustainable consumption and to the efficient use of those resources consistent with the goal of minimizing depletion and reducing pollution. Although consumption patterns are very high in certain parts of the world, the basic consumer needs of a large section of humanity are not being met. This results in excessive demands and unsustainable lifestyles among the richer segments, which place im-

Arve Hansen mense stress on the environment. The poorer segments, meanwhile, are unable to meet food, health care, shelter and educational needs. Changing consumption patterns will require a multipronged strategy focusing on demand, meeting the basic needs of the poor, and reducing wastage and the use of finite resources in the production process.11

ment policy discourse, where the focus turned towards overpopulation in the South and the pollution caused by poverty, while, in the words of Escobar15 “by a curious optical twist, the consumption of the people of the North is rendered invisible.” If consumption does enter the debate, it tends to do so in a way that is not threatening, for example through recycling

A fundamental problem is that it does not address the root causes of high consumption. In addition, Our Common Future the original report of the Brundtland Commission, states that “sustainable global development requires that those who are more affluent adopt life-styles within the planet’s ecological means – in their use of energy, for example.”12 The following two paragraphs of this report are also treating consumption issues: If needs are to be met on a sustainable basis the Earth’s natural resource base must be conserved and enhanced. Major changes in policies will be needed to cope with the industrial world’s current high levels of consumption, the increases in consumption needed to meet minimum standards in developing countries, and expected population growth.13 Living standards that go beyond the basic minimum are sustainable only if consumption standards everywhere have regard for long-term sustainability. Yet many of us live beyond the world’s ecological means, for instance in our patterns of energy use. Perceived needs are socially and culturally determined, and sustainable development requires the promotion of values that encourage consumption standards that are within the bounds of the ecological possible and to which all can reasonably aspire.14

The problem is, however, that consumption never fully pervaded the dominant develop-

or green consumption;16 important, yes, but issues that do not threaten our right to consume as if there were no environmental limitations. A central point here is that the documents behind sustainable development are much more radical, and much more political, than any of the official discourses that have grown out of it. This is perhaps not surprising. Theory is often easier than political practice, and in the attempt to reach something all countries can agree on, international environmental discourses have tended to be reduced to platitudes. As mentioned in the introduction, sustainable consumption will again be part of the agenda in Rio +20. The plan is to launch a 10year framework on programmes for sustainable consumption and production. The zero draft of the outcome document “The Future We Want” states in paragraph 97: “We agree to establish a 10-Year Framework of Programmes on sustainable consumption and production (SCP) as part of a global pact on sustainable consumption and production.”17 What does this mean? One of the main objectives of this programme is “doing more and better with less, meaning ‘more’ delivered in terms of goods and services, with ‘less’ impact in terms of resource use, environmental degradation, waste and pollution.”18 This means making production more efficient, and does not necessarily confront consumption. The focus seems to be on greening production, as well 63

Sustainable Development and Consumption from Rio to Rio and Beyond

as on improving information for consumers through eco-marking and fair trade. A fundamental problem is that it does not address the root causes of high consumption. The focus is on efficiency rather than reduction per se. One then encounters the problem of rebound effects. Improved resource efficiency tends to be coupled

in order to equalize global living standards, and thus meet the official goal of international development. Space does not allow for a thorough discussion of specific consumption patterns, but some should be mentioned. Energy is perhaps the most pressing issue. The OECD countries

Energy is perhaps the most pressing issue.

and nullified by increased consumption.19 Serious discussions of the problem of continuously increasing levels of consumption are missing, as well as of the relationship between consumption and economic structures. Another problem is obviously to achieve anything at all with this. The framework will not require governments to do anything apart from being encouraged to implement sustainable consumption and production policies. Sustainable Development tion: Going Deeper

and

Consump-

The United Nations Population Fund operates with estimates of a rapidly growing global consumer class of around 1.7 billion people. This global consumer class â&#x20AC;&#x153;accounts for the vast majority of meat eating, paper use, car driving, and energy use of the planet, as well as the resulting impacts of these activities on its natural resources.â&#x20AC;?20 Here, inhabitants of the industrialised countries are naturally over-represented (although consumption levels also vary considerably among these), but elites of less developed countries also constitute an important share. This number also reflects the inequality of global development, and if equality for all was to be reached at the level of the global consumer class it would be environmentally catastrophic and physically impossible given that we only have one world of resources available. It is thus vital to address overconsumption as a real problem, 64

account for almost 50% of global energy demand.21 Energy demand is growing rapidly, and following current trends lower-income countries (and first and foremost China) will account for the majority of the increase in the decades to come. However, demand will also increase in OECD countries from present high levels.22 Most of the energy demand is being met by the use of fossil fuels (80 per cent), and renewable energy sources are not likely to be able to compensate for this in any near future.23 This leads to a range of environmentally devastating effects, such as emissions of carbon dioxide. Carbon emissions have been a central aspect of mainstream sustainable development discourses, and one of the few areas where there has been some agreement and action. The focus has however again been on emissions in production processes, something that has allowed many of the richest countries to show that they are taking steps to tackle environmental problems and reduce emissions. This is, however, mainly caused by deindustrialisation in the economically rich countries and industrialisation of the less developed. A shift to a focus on consumption, on how much carbon is embedded in what we consume, alters the picture radically.24 Helm et al.25 uses the example of Britain, one of the success stories of the Kyoto protocol, and calculates that a 15 per cent decrease of carbon production has been met by a 19 per cent increase in carbon consumption since the 1990s. The main reason

Arve Hansen

for the decrease was the closure of coal industry and outsourcing of carbon production,26 yet another example of the overall tendency of the most polluting industries and stages of manufacturing being outsourced from the economically rich countries. There are important reasons why consumption is seldom discussed in a serious manner in mainstream sustainable development discourses. In Rostow’s27 classical stages of growth model, one of the most central models of modernisation theory, the age of high consumption is seen as the final stage of the development ladder. This is arguably still so in mainstream development theory, which in turn is grounded in capitalist development. No other economic system has been able to deliver the increases in material well-being that capitalism has, and the capitalist mode of production radically enlarges people’s consumer choices.28 At the same time, the growth imperative of capitalism makes it structurally dependent on high consumption. Capitalism as an economic system collapses if it does not grow. This is the fundamental issue in the global economy, and also the fundamental issue in sustainable development. Capitalism needs growth, and growth is dependent on increased levels of consumption of energy and of the goods that are produced. Thus questioning consumption levels means questioning our economic system. Growth is the mantra of development, and for good reasons. It is the only way that a country can develop in the current economic system. The relationship between development and consumption in the global capitalist economy can be crudely summarized like this: In order to improve living standards around the world, economic development and increased consumption is needed. In order to achieve real economic development, industrialization is needed. In order to guarantee successful industrialization, increased domestic and/or global consumption is needed - someone needs to buy the commodities produced. This introduces another crucial dimension to this debate;

if, hypothetically speaking, consumption levels in the rich parts of the world were to be drastically reduced, what would then happen to the economic growth of less developed countries basing their economic development on exports? Radically new thinking on development would certainly be needed. Even if the economic structures depend on us consuming more, why do we comply? We do of course consume to satisfy our basic needs, such as for water, food and shelter. But the question becomes much more complex if we go beyond basic needs, and if we ask why we consume so much. There are no simple answers to this. Reductionist mainstream economic analyses tend to reduce consumption to simply rational individual behaviour and the natural end of the production chain. But consumption cannot be understood simply as an outcome or function of economic growth, it is also socially and culturally driven.29 Grounding consumption in the social and cultural domain, reduces the sovereignty of the consumer, but does not remove the agency of the consumer. Individuals consume, but they do so deeply influenced by external structures as well as internalised socio-cultural factors. The mechanisms at play in consumer behaviour will, as Shove30explains, vary depending on what is consumed, and whether we are talking about conspicuous or inconspicuous consumption (that is, the taken-for-granted consumption that is part of daily routines and habits). The latter is perhaps most vital to sustainability, although frequently neglected. More precisely, it is of great importance to understand how and why the average consumer consumes more and more, how what is normal gradually changes to involve increasing levels of consumption.31 This can be key to understanding how unsustainable consumption patterns become naturalised,32 or what Shove33 sees as “the standardization and globalization of ultimately unsustainable expectations.” This again links to the previous paragraph on global economic structures. High and increasing consumption and capitalism are like65

Sustainable Development and Consumption from Rio to Rio and Beyond

ly to be inseparable, and economic and cultural globalisation mainly means the globalisation, or expansion, of capitalism and capitalist consumer culture. Crudely put, this means the further globalisation and normalisation of unsustainable consumption patterns. If consumption patterns are a part of the capitalist culture and continuously increasing consumption is vital to the global capitalist economy, the mainstream sustainable consumption approach that we see today can act as little more than tinkering with unsustainable structures. Much more research is needed, where economic, social, and cultural factors of consumption are combined. The social practice approach to consumption (see e.g. Wilhite 2012 on energy consumption), rooted in Bourdieu’s34 theories (particularly the concept of habitus), quite possibly represents the most promising approach to holistic explanation of consumer behaviour. At the same time, however, the sustainable consumption approach could play an important role if it manages to bring questions of consumption to the policy level. This could be a crucial step towards locating responsibility for environmental degradation among those who consume the most, rather than those who produce the consumer products, and at the same time gradually lead to more awareness of the consequences of high consumption. Yet, there is still a high possibility of Pepper33 being

right when claiming that “sustainable, ecologically sound capitalist development is a contradiction in terms.”35 Conclusions As shown in this article, the original concept of sustainable development did pay attention to unsustainable consumption practices and patterns, without this reaching the policy level or mainstream development discourses. When sustainable consumption is on the agenda for the Rio +20 conference, the focus appears to be more on production efficiency than reduction in levels of consumption. I have argued that consumption levels should be placed at the centre of the sustainability discourse, and that focus should be on consumption reduction in economically rich countries. This does however first of all demand improved understanding of the drivers of high consumption, an area where I have suggested economic structural, social and cultural factors to be more important than individual economic rationality. The problem with this approach is that it raises fundamental and awkward questions about the global economy that cannot be answered by simple policy shifts. Deeper thinking on the relationship between consumption, development, and environmental sustainability is still urgently needed.•

Arve Hansen

Notes 1 Adams, W. M. (2009): Green development: environment and sustainability in a developing world, London, Routledge. p. xvii 2 UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme (2012): Global Outlook on Sustainable Consumption and Production Policies: Taking action together - Executive Summary. United Nations Environment Programme. 3 Langhelle, O. (2002): “Bærekraftig utvikling” in: Benjaminsen, T. A. & Svarstad, H. (eds.) Samfunnsperspektiver på miljø og utvikling. Oslo: Universitetsforl. 4 WCED - World Commission On Environment and Development (1987): Our common future, Oxford, Oxford University Press. p. 16 5 Banerjee, S. B. (2003): Who Sustains Whose Development? Sustainable Development and the Reinvention of Nature. Organization Studies, 24, p.143-180. 6 UNCED – United Nations Conference On Environment and Development (1992): Agenda 21, UNCED. Paragraph 1.1 7 Adams, p. 171-172 8 Sachs, W. (1999): Planet dialectics: explorations in environment and development, Halifax, N.S., Fernwood Publ. 9 Escobar, A. (1995): Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the third world, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. 10 UNCED, Paragraph 4.3 11 UNCED, Paragraph 4.5 12 WCED, p. 16 13 WCED, p. 52 14 WCED, p. 42 15 Escobar, p. 211 16 Princen, T., Maniates, M. & Conca, K. (2002): Confronting consumption. In: Princen, T., Maniates, M. & Conca, K (eds.) Confronting consumption. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 17 UNCSD - United Nations Conference On Sustainable Development (2012): The Future We Want, Zero Draft of the Outcome Document - Rio + 20 [Online]. United Nations. Available: http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/ documents/370The%20Future%20We%20Want%2010Jan%20clean.pdf [Accessed 15.04.12 2012]. p. 15 18 UNEP 2012. p. 3 19 Hill, C. (2011): An introduction to sustainable resource use, London, Earthscan. 20 UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund (2004): State of the World Population 2004. United Nations Population Fund. p. 18 21 UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme (2007): Global environment outlook 4 (GEO-4): Environment for Development, Valletta, Malta, Progress Press Ltd. 22 Ibid. 23 Wilhite, H. Forthcoming (2012): “The Energy Dilemma” in: Nielsen, Kenneth Bo & Kristian Bjørkedahl (eds.) Development and the Environment: Practices, Theories, Policies, Oslo, Unipub. 24 Helm, D. (2009): Environmental challenges in a warming world: consumption, costs and responsibilities. Tanner Lecture. New College Oxford. 25 Helm, D., Smale, R. & Phillips, J. (2007): Too Good To Be True? The UK’s Climate Change Record. Available:http://www. dieterhelm.co.uk/sites/default/files/Carbon_record_2007.pdf [Accessed 15.04.12]. 26 Helm, D. 2009 27 Rostow, W. W. (1960): The stages of economic growth. A non-communist manifesto, Cambridge univ. 28 Falasca-Zamponi, S. (2011): Waste and consumption : capitalism, the environment, and the life of things, New York, NY, Routledge. 29 Wilhite, H. (2008): Consumption and the transformation of everyday life: a view from South India, Houndmills, Palgrave/ Macmillan. 30 Shove, E. (2003): Comfort, cleanliness and convenience: the social organization of normality, Oxford, Berg. 31 Ibid. 32 Redclift, M. (1996): Wasted: counting the costs of global consumption, London, Earthscan. 33 Shove 2003. p. 18 34 Bourdieu, P. (1977): Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 35 Quoted in Adams. p. 171

Twin River Tension: Legal Aspects of Water Management in the Tigris-Euphrates Watercourse Julie Gjørtz Howden

Management and sustainable provision of freshwater resources is a central theme of the upcoming UN Rio+20 conference. Freshwater management was also given special attention at the 1992 Rio-conference and in its plan of action, Agenda 21. As the demand for freshwater increases, and thereby also the pressure on water resources, equitable and sustainable utilization of natural resources has been on the international agenda during the last decades; including the utilization of international watercourses, where the water is shared between two or more states. Equitable and sustainable utilization is amongst the core principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC), adopted by the General Assembly in 1997.1 Though already in process prior to the 1992 Rio-conference, the Convention contributes to the international legal framework that Photo: flickr.com/photos/yeomans

enforces the ideas and goals of the Rio Declaration. Constructed around the core principle of “equitable and reasonable” utilization, the UNWC’s purpose is to promote “the optimal and sustainable utilization [of international watercourses] for present and future generations.”2 This article aims to discuss the nature of the principle of state sovereignty in the law of international watercourses, and the correlation between state sovereignty as a general principle of international law and equitable utilization as a ruling principle, codified in the UNWC. The main question is whether the claim for sovereignty can hinder equitable and sustainable development of freshwater resources. The question will be explored through the legal arguments of the parties to the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse: Turkey, Syria and Iraq. As the following inquiry will show, the principle of equitable utilization is a principle of international law that naturally 69

Twin River Tension

restricts the exertion of state sovereignty, and that the claim for full territorial sovereignty is inconsistent with applicable international law. The International Watercourse A watercourse is generally defined as a “system of surface waters and groundwater constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole.”3 An international watercourse is a watercourse that forms or crosses the border between two or more states. Such states are commonly referred to as watercourse states or riparians.

since 1965, the parties have yet failed to reach a trilateral agreement concerning the utilization of the watercourse. Consequently, the three states have developed individual water projects to supply their respective populations with hydropower, drinking water and agricultural irrigation. These unilateral projects increase pressure on the water resources and tension between the riparian states. As the upper riparian of both the rivers, Turkey is in the most favourable position to exploit the resources freely, and for a long time Tur-

The three states have developed individual water projects to supply their respective populations. Watercourses flow where they are naturally disposed to flow, without regards to boundaries or population density. When water is consumed for domestic, agricultural or industrial purposes, some of the water will return to the river through return flows or disposed water, but eventually the available amount of water decreases both in quantity and quality. Water is indispensable to human existence, and if the water supply is reduced to an amount that is not sufficient for the world’s population the consequences will be fatal. As international watercourses supply water to more than one state, the co-riparians are dependent on each other’s utilization of the watercourse. The Tigris-Euphrates Situation The Tigris-Euphrates watercourse (or the twin rivers) consist of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, both originating in the mountains of Southeastern Turkey, and crossing or forming the border of Turkey, Syria and Iraq before they unite in Southern Iraq and flow jointly towards the Persian Gulf. Since they supply the same three riparians and empty in a common terminus, the rivers are usually considered as one single watercourse.4 Although negotiating discontinuously 70

key pleaded absolute territorial sovereignty to the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse. As expressed by former Turkish Prime Minister, Suleyman Demirel; “Neither Syria, nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey’s rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil. This is a matter of sovereignty. We can do whatever we want.”5 Although the polemic has eased in the later years, Turkey has nevertheless come a long way in the fulfilment of an ambitious and expensive dam project in Southeastern Anatolia, the GAP-project.6 The GAP envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydraulic power plants on the TigrisEuphrates watercourse, and will irrigate 1,7 million hectares of land.7 According to the more pessimistic estimates, the project will reduce the Euphrates’ flow into Syria by 40 % and into Iraq by 90 %.8 While the process of reaching a trilateral agreement lingers, Turkey continues the construction of the GAP-project, and thereby reduces the amount of water to be shared. As downstream states, Syria and Iraq are in a weaker position than Turkey. Iraq is facing severe water difficulties, and experiences at the same time a steady reduction in available freshwater and deterioration of water quality.9 Return flow from the planned irrigation systems in Turkey

Julie Gjørtz Howden

and Syria also represents a serious threat to Iraq’s water quality, since nearly half of the water flowing into Iraq from the Euphrates will have been in contact with pesticides and fertilizers.10 As an upstream riparian in relation to Iraq, and a downstream riparian in relation to Turkey, Syria may be in the most complex position. While Iraq receives large amounts of water from the Tigris and also has important tributary rivers on her territory, the Euphrates is by far the biggest source of freshwater in Syria, and almost all of its water comes from Turkey. Syria contributes very little to the river’s flow, and is thereby largely dependent on Turkish will to release the required amount of water from her large dams.11 Consequently, Iraq and Syria are in great need of a trilateral agreement over the utilization of the twin rivers. The Principle

Sovereignty

As one of the fundamental principles of international law, the principle of sovereignty is the basis for all international agreements. Every independent state has full sovereignty within its own territory, an inherent right to exert power therein, and to exclude other states from doing the same. The principle is expressed in the Charter of the United Nations in article 2 paragraph 7: “Nothing in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state […].” The principle of sovereignty has two aspects; it is a legal status accorded to independent states, but also the right to exercise power within its territory. In the following analysis, the latter aspect of the principle is in focus. To its fullest degree, the principle of sovereignty gives the independent states the right to exploit the natural resources in their territory freely and to their own profit. An upper riparian could accordingly divert, pollute or dam up the water in a watercourse on its territory, without any concern for the damage this might bring to downstream riparians. The use of a watercourse

situated within its territory is generally a matter of a state’s national jurisdiction and submitted to municipal law. But when this utilization creates legal or factual harm to another watercourse state the utilization becomes an international concern and is submitted to international law. Harm-causing utilization in an upstream state will violate the sovereignty of downstream states where the consequences of such usage are felt. In the utilization of international watercourses, the principle of state sovereignty thus has a reciprocal nature, since both the upstream and the downstream state are affected by the regulation;12 restricting the utilization in the upstream state violates its sovereignty, whereas unrestricted usage in an upstream state violates the sovereignty of the downstream state, because the potential for water projects on its own territory will be limited in favour of the upstream state. Having established the nature of state sovereignty, the question is accordingly whether the principle of state sovereignty is generally absolute in international law. As expressed in the UN Charter, the limits of the principle of sovereignty are subject to interpretation. For instance, military invention on the territory of a sovereign state may be accepted in order to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”13 Whether an operation is necessary in such a case, and to what degree, is a question of specific interpretation and may change with time. A common conception of the principle of state sovereignty, confirmed by international courts, is that it “plays the part of a presumption [and must] bend before all international obligations.”14 In this sense territorial sovereignty is only dominant when a matter is unregulated. As the power to exert sovereignty is a quality granted to sovereign states through international agreement the same quality is restricted through other agreed obligations. The principle of state sovereignty is thus not generally absolute in international law, but is submitted to interpretation. 71

Twin River Tension

The Principle

Equitable Utilization

The ruling principle of international water law is the principle of equitable utilization, addressed in article 5 of the UNWC.15 The principle obliges the states “in their respective territories [to] utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner […] with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom.”16 The Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as “development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”17 As the UNWC article 5 implies, sustainable development of a watercourse is both the aim of the principle of equitable utilization, and a factor in its determination. This reflects the process that is implemented in the principle of equitable utilization, and the width of its scope. Equitable utilization embodies both an obligation and a right.18 It confirms the principle of sovereignty by according every state the right to an equitable share of a watercourse within its own territory. And correlatively, it poses an obligation on the states to use the watercourse in such a way that it does not affect other watercourse state’s equitable use of the same watercourse. In settling the equitable utilization for a watercourse, “all relevant factors and circumstances” must be taken into consideration, and the determination is unique to every watercourse.19 In light of the principles’ content, the analysis will now focus on their interrelationship in the management of international watercourses. Sovereign or Equitable Management? In the “Turkey Water Report” the Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works declares that “Turkey is of the view that each riparian country in a transboundary system has the sovereign right to make use of the waters in its territory.”20 This statement is followed 72

by acknowledgement of the principles of nonharmful use and equitable utilization, but seems nevertheless to be the point of departure for Turkey’s water politics. The Turkish delegate to the UN General Assembly also expressed this view during the UNWC voting in 1997, by claiming that the convention did not “make any reference to the indisputable principle of the sovereignty of the watercourse States over the parts of international watercourses situated in their territory.”21 Turkey was finally one of three states voting against the Convention, whereas Iraq and Syria have ratified the UNWC and are bound by its content. They both claim equitable utilization as the foundation for the allocation of the water in the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse. An interesting question is whether the Turkish emphasis on sovereignty represents a legal obstruction for the equitable and sustainable utilization of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse. Could a claim for sovereignty legally outweigh an assertion for equitable utilization? In order to answer this question, it is essential to explore the principles of sovereignty and equitable utilization through three important aspects; the basic rights to the watercourse, the need for cooperation and the different nature of the two principles. The recognition and protection of every watercourse state’s basic right to utilize the watercourse is fundamental in the principle of equitable utilization. The principle presumes cosovereignty amongst all the watercourse states, and thereby an equal basic right to utilize the resources. Not equal in quantity, but equal in quality. By insisting on the predominance of the principle of sovereignty, Turkey does not acknowledge basic rights or co-sovereignty granted to its downstream neighbours through the principle of equitable utilization.22 Without recognition of basic rights, the distribution and management of water may be unequal, and constitute a violation of the sovereignty and integrity of the other watercourse states. But since the principle of equitable utilization provides the

Julie Gjørtz Howden

states with a legal protection of their basic right to utilize the watercourse, a Turkish claim for sovereignty will not present a legal obstruction for the equality amongst the watercourse states. With regard to the second aspect, a minimum level of cooperation is required for achieving an equitable and sustainable utilization of a watercourse.23 In order to manage a watercourse optimally and avoid deterioration of water quality and quantity, the watercourse states must exchange information and cooperate on a technical level. By concluding such an agreement states voluntarily abandon some of their sovereignty in the specific field. In this sense cooperation is a

the exercise of its sovereignty, but they do not diminish or deprive it of its sovereignty as a legal status.”25 The principle of equitable utilization, on the other hand, is the concrete result of a holistic determination. Achieving equitability is a process, and all relevant factors are taken into consideration. As these factors are distinguishable elements, equitable utilization is a right that is positively delimited for each watercourse state, according to the actual circumstances. Consequently, the principle of equitable utilization secures concrete rights and obligations, while the principle of sovereignty is a presumed quality.

The individual management of a shared resource, without the other riparian’s consent is a breach of international law. waiver of sovereignty. However, as a ruling principle of international law, equitable utilization obliges the watercourse states to cooperate in the management of their common watercourses. This obligation clearly contravenes the principle of sovereignty and its claim for discretionary management of territorial resources. Although the principles embody inherent contradictions in this regard, the claim for sovereignty will not present a legal obstruction for cooperation since the latter is implicit in the principle of equitable utilization. Finally, the principle of state sovereignty also differs in nature from the principle of equitable utilization. According to Lauterpacht, “[t]he sovereignty of the State in international law is a quality conferred by international law. It cannot, therefore, be either the basis or the source of the law of nations.”24 In Lauterpacht’s opinion, sovereignty is thus a quality that is presumed where nothing else is agreed. Similarly, the encyclopaedic definition of sovereignty declares that both treaty obligations and principles of international law “may, and frequently do, restrict a State’s freedom of action and thereby

Although the two principles are different in nature, they are also closely interrelated; the extent of the equitable right and obligation will determine the magnitude of state sovereignty. Being a right and an obligation accorded by international law, it is this principle of equitable utilization that determines the correlation between the principles, not the principle of sovereignty. This view was also acknowledged by the International Court of Justice in the judgement of the “Gabčicovo-Nagymaros”-case between Hungary and Slovakia. Here the Court was asked to judge the legality of a Slovakian project on the Danube River which threatened the Hungarian water supply.26 The Court stated that Slovakia “by unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource [was] depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube.”27 The Court thus determines that the individual management of a shared resource, without the other riparian’s consent is a breach of international law. The Court further declares that Hungary has a right to an equitable share of the river, and that this right can not be overruled in 73

Twin River Tension

favour of Slovakia’s exercise of sovereignty. The common understanding is thus that states are not free to determine the correlation of the two principles unilaterally. The Turkish emphasis accords the principle of sovereignty authority over the principle of equitable utilization, so that the latter must adjust to the first. Turkey thereby says that the principle of equitable utilization applies as long as it does not confine the principle of state sovereignty in any considerable manner. This understanding differs from the common conception of the principles’ natures, since Turkey seems to define the principle of sovereignty positively, as a right that can not be significantly repressed by other principles of international law. Consequently, in light of the states’ basic right to the watercourse, the obligation to cooperate, and the different nature of the two main principles, the Turkish emphasis on sovereignty is not a legal obstruction for the equitable and sustainable utilization of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse.

Conclusion In conclusion, every watercourse state has a basic right to utilize an international watercourse, inherent in the principle of equitable utilization. Although protecting the interests of each watercourse state, the principle of sovereignty is inconsistent with the interests of the watercourse itself. In order to protect and preserve the world’s freshwater resources, they must be managed in a sustainable manner. This necessitates comprehensive management and cooperation between the watercourse states. The principle of equitable utilization, as a ruling principle of international law, will restrict the principle of sovereignty. A claim for full territorial sovereignty will thereby be inconsistent with applicable international law. Although it can make the management of a watercourse difficult, the claim for sovereignty is theoretically not an obstruction to the equitable and sustainable development of the world’s freshwater resources.•

Julie Gjørtz Howden

Notes 1 The convention has still not entered into force due to an insufficient number of ratifications, but many of its provisions are binding as customary international law. 2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Preamble, fifth paragraph - http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf 3 UNWC. Article 2, litra a. 4 McCaffrey, S. (2010): The Law of International Watercourses. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 324. 5 Wegerich, K. and Jeroen, W. (2010): The Politics of Water: A survey. London: Taylor & Francis, p. 57 6 In Turkish the project is called Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, and thus abbreviated GAP 7 Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, GAP homepage; http://www.gap.gov.tr/gapaction-plan/southeastern-anatolia-project-action-plan/general-framework 8 Kukk, C. and Deese, D. (1996): “At the Water’s Edge: Regional conflict and cooperation over fresh water.” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 21: 47, p. 21-64. 9 Ahmmad, Y.K. (2010): Establishing a Legal Framework for the Use and Protection of Iraq’s Equitable Right to the Tigris and the Euphrates River Basin, Doctoral thesis. University of Dundee, p. 45-46, see also UNESCO Office for Iraq: http://www. unesco.org/new/en/iraq-office 10 Kliot, N. (1994): Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, New York: Routledge, p. 164. 11 Ibid, p. 112-113. 12 McCaffrey, p. 387. 13 Charter of the United Nations, article 42 - http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ 14 Arbitral Tribunal of the “Lake Lanoux”-arbitration, Judgement November 16. 1957, p. 16 - http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/w9549e/w9549e07.htm#bm07.2.7 15 The principle is binding upon all states as a customary principle of international law, see McCaffrey p. 404. 16 UNWC. Article 5, paragraph 1. 17 UN Document: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, Chapter 2, paragraph 1. - http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm 18 International Law Commission Yearbook. (1994): Vol. 2 part II, p. 97. 19 UNWC art. 6, paragraph 1 20 Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works. (2009): Turkey Water Report, p. 48 - http://www2.dsi.gov.tr/ english/pdf_files/TurkeyWaterReport.pdf 21 UN Document: A/51/PV.99, p. 5 22 Kibaroğlu, A. and Kramer, A. (2011): “Turkey’s Position towards International Water Law” in Ayşegül, K, Scheumann, W and Kramer, A (eds.): Turkey’s Water Policy. Berlin: Springer, p. 216. 23 UNWC. Article 8. 24 Lauterpacht, H. (1966): The Function of Law in the Interntional Community. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, p. 97-98. 25 Steinberger, H. (2000): “Sovereignty.” Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Bernhardt, R. (ed): North-Holland, p. 512. 26 The project was planned in cooperation between the two states, but when Hungary withdrew from the project, Slovakia continued the project on her own territory. 27 Interntional Court of Justice. (1997): ”Gabčicovo-Nagymaros-project”, Judgement September 25, paragraph 85 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf

Ethical Oil Greenwashing Canada’s Oil Sands?

Luis Carlos Rosado van der Gracht

Canada has long enjoyed the image of a democratic, prosperous and internationally responsible nation. International perceptions of Canada as a “northern gentle giant” are likely due (at least in part) to its relative military and economic inconsequence when compared to its larger and more aggressive southern neighbour. Although Canada has traditionally had a mixed record regarding environmental management, over the past several decades there has existed a sense that Canada is one of “the good guys” and that despite its shortcomings it remains environmentally progressive and committed to addressing global environmental issues such as ocean acidification and climate change. However, Canada’s environmental progressiveness has been called in to question by many domestic and international observers in light of the increasingly aggressive exploitation and of Illustration: carlosrosado.com

Alberta’s and Saskatchewan’s oil sand reserves. The exploitation of said oil sands is nothing new, but raising oil prices coupled with technological advancements in bitumen extraction and refinement have in recent years lead to a dramatic increase in production and expansion of the oil sands themselves. As of 2010, Investment in the oil sands, including pipelines and upgrades totaled $200 billion, making the oil sands project the largest energy project in the world.1 It is often noted that Canada’s leadership role in moving forward with international environmental agreements has in recent years suffered much erosion. This much is clear when we consider that at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit Canada was a key player in the development of the Climate Change Convention, and a leading member on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. However, in December 2012 77

Ethical Oil

Canada became the first country in the developed world to pull out from the Kyoto accord while citing the 14 billion dollars in penalties which such a move would save the country.2 Canada’s increasing exploitation of its oil sands and the decision taken by the government of current Prime Minister Stephen Harper to withdraw from the Kyoto climate accord, are symptoms of an evolving political discourse in which Canada is increasingly abdicating its international responsibilities in favour of the short term benefits which unsustainable resource extractions afford the state. Furthermore, the Canadian government and special interest groups such as those represented by the ethical oil movement are actively attempting to steer the conversation around oil sand production away from the environmental impact and towards issues pertaining to human rights and (to a lesser degree) the superiority of Canadian environmental policy and practices. The term ethical oil was coined by Ezra Levant in his book Ethical Oil: The Case for Canada’s Oil Sands. The book was seen by many as an effort to counteract environmentalists in Canada, the United States and Europe who advocated for the closure of the Alberta oil sands due to allegations that the resulting emissions from said reserves were up to 20% higher than the global average; although the precise accuracy of this statement remains highly contested. EthicalOil.org encourages people, businesses and governments to choose Ethical Oil from Canada, its oil sands and other liberal democracies. Unlike Conflict Oil from some of the world’s most politically oppressive and environmentally reckless regimes, Ethical Oil is the ‘Fair Trade’ choice in oil.3

According to Kathryn Marshall (spokes person for ethicaloil.org) the term ethical oil refers to four specific values inherent in Canadian oil production which are articulated as arguments for the ethical superiority of Canadian oil when 78

compared to oil produced in nations under totalitarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Iran or Venezuela:4 1- The existence and enforcement of strict environmental controls which govern the activities of oil companies in Canada 2- Respect for workers rights; particularly safety and level of compensation 3- Respect for human rights (with a particular focus on women’s rights) 4- Peace and democracy (at a national level) The first point refers to the existence of transparent government organizations such as Environment Canada, “which works to preserve and enhance the quality of the natural environment.”5 While environmental controls in Canada are likely to be more effective than those in most other oil producing nations, there has been increasing criticism towards the federal government for what is perceived by many as a process of American style de-regularization of energy producing industries which favours selfenforcement on the part of corporations. Recent efforts at de-regulation and the reformation of government in the U.S., and moves towards multi-stakeholder policy-making in Canada, have altered the standard against which trends towards Canadian-American convergence must be assessed. Since Canadian environmental implementation has also been altered over the same period, however, it is argued that a form of ‘strong’ convergence is emerging, in which both countries are moving not towards each other but towards a third, common, style, that associated with the development of self-regulation and voluntary initiatives under the influence of New Public Management ideas and principles.6

There is also growing criticism toward the move

Luis Carlos Rosado van der Gracht

taken in 2007 by Environment Canada which requires government scientists to clear all media requests to media relations headquarters, thus effectively muzzling government scientists on issues pertaining to the environment: Across Canada, journalists are being denied access to publicly funded scientists and the research community is frustrated with the way government scientists are being muzzled. Some observe that it is part of a trend that has seen the Canadian government tighten

overwhelmingly positive record regarding individual rights, it is important to keep in mind that unlike countries such as Mexico or Norway, the Canadian state does not directly own or administer the various corporations engaged in resource extraction within its territory. While Canada is capable of guaranteeing the rights of its own citizens and guest workers trough the application of the Canadian charter of rights and freedoms, it does not have the ability to control or influence the activities of companies such as Exxon or Shell in their operations abroad. Let us

Is a barrel of crude oil produced in Canada by company X more ethical than an identical barrel of oil produced by the same company in Nigeria? control over how and when federal scientists interact with the media. As a result, media inquiries are delayed, and scientists are less present in coverage of research in Canada.7

While the previous examples are indeed troubling and seem to represent a move towards a degradation or watering down of environmental policy, it would be unfair to characterize the entire environmental bureaucratic apparatus of Canada as entirely deficient. That being said, the clear weakening of Canadian environmental standards coupled with the pro-development over environment discourse of the present Harper administration seems to leave little room for holding up Canada’s current environmental practices as a shining example of ethics by which something referred to as “ethical” could be marketed. However representatives from the Canadian Oil industry often argue that while Canadian oil may not be “perfectly ethical” it is still “more ethical” than say oil imported from the Middle East. The second, third and fourth points outlined by Kathryn Marshall regarding the standards by which oil is deemed “ethical” are concerned with the protection of individual rights and freedoms. While Canada certainly has an

then consider the following question: Is a barrel of crude oil produced in Canada by company X more ethical than an identical barrel of oil produced by the same company in Nigeria? It would seem that by their own logic proponents of Canadian ethical oil ought to call for a boycott of energy companies who operate in countries whose regimes they describe as authoritarian, regardless of whether they also happen to operate in Canada. This however has not been the case. While it is troublesome and impractical to expect countries to police the foreign operations of all corporations which operate on its soil, it seems dubious to make claims which espouse the ethical quality of a product when the company which produces said product is actively engaged in un-ethical practices abroad. For example, when the media began to report that the uniforms to be worn by Canadian athletes at the Olympics games would be made in China, Canadian members of Parliament immediately began to question the appropriateness of the decision, citing concerns about the message such a move would send to the world, given working conditions in many Chinese textile manufacturers and China’s human rights record.8 Although objections to Chinese-made 79

Ethical Oil

Olympic garments and claims about the ethical nature of Canadian oil are extremely different, they none the less illustrate an apparent double standard which many law makers and proponents of the ethical oil movement apply to oil companies. With regard to the point that Canadian oil is more ethical, than so called “conflict” oil from nations such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, because of Canada’s exemplary record of upholding women’s rights, the organization notes: Every barrel of conflict oil from places like Saudi Arabia and Iran goes to fund medieval, bloody regimes that oppress women and treat them like property. Care about women’s rights and social justice? Then support ethical oil from places like Canada, where the highest standards of human rights and equality are upheld.9

Although it is clearly true that women in Canada enjoy more rights than women in Saudi Arabia or Iran, the claim that choosing “conflict oil” over “Canadian ethical oil” amounts to contributing to the oppression of women seems disingenuous at best. It is also important to note that given current trends in oil consumption, increases in Canadian oil production are unlikely to result in a reduced demand from oil producing nations such as Saudi Arabia. In many ways this argument seems reminiscent of claims made by the Bush administration in the United States before the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which argued that the planed invasion had as one of its principal goals to free the women of the country from the oppressive rule of the Taliban. It is important to note that the discourse surrounding ethical oil, although specific to its Canadian context, is not unique amongst oil producing democracies. In Norway for example the oil company Hydro claims that “We have to find more oil and gas and produce more energy to solve the energy crises and to help the poor countries to develop.” Additionally, The former 80

Petroleum and Energy Minister, Torhild Widvey, claims “Norway has a global responsibility to provide the world with more energy, which will contribute to increased wealth in developing countries.”10 Although there are interesting philosophical conversations to be had by considering an ethical/utilitarian calculus regarding the pros and cons of different sources of oil, it is important to not lose sight of the fact that regardless of their country of origin, the emissions resulting from the burning of fossil fuels continue to contribute to the dire planetary crisis in which we currently find ourselves. By attempting to greenwash the Canadian oil industry (admittedly, no easy task!) proponents of the ethical oil movement are in effect distracting the public from the real issues and the threat that the ever-increasing expansion of the oil industry represents. It is precisely because of this reality that politicians such as Canadian Environment Minister Peter Kent has chosen to bi-pass scientific debates and attempted to influence public opinion by conjuring up images of suffering men and women in far away lands.11 As we approach the 20th anniversary of the Rio Earth Summit, it is essential that the voices of special interests groups such as those represented by the Canadian ethical oil movement are not allowed to drown out evidence-based environmental discourses and politicize what the scientific community already knows; if we are to avoid catastrophic damage to our planet and the life forms which call it home, we must drastically reduce our carbon emissions and transition towards new technologies and consumption practices. It is clear that there are no easy solutions or quick fixes to the dilemmas we are currently confronting. However, to sugar coat reality in an effort to further a political agenda which attempts to disingenuously trade off the health of our planet against the rights of individuals while simultaneously passing the buck to the next generation is simply not very ethical.•

Luis Carlos Rosado van der Gracht

Notes 1 Nikiforuk, A. (2012): Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent. Vancouver: DM Publishers Inc. 2 AP (2011, December 13): Canada abandons Kyoto Protocol, in The Independent. [online]. –URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/canada-abandons-kyoto-protocol-6276239.html 3 Ellerton, J. (2012): “About Ethical Oil.” [online].-URL: http://www.ethicaloil.org (retrieved 04May 2012). 4 Tremonti, A. (2011, Dec 11). Ethical Oil @ CBC The Current Podcast. Podcast retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/episode/2011/12/06/ethical-oil/ 5 Environment Canada (2012): “About Environment Canada” [online]. –URL: http://www.ec.gc.ca/default. asp?lang=En&n=BD3CE17D-1 (retrieved 04 May 2012). 6 Howlett, M. (2000): Beyond Legalism? Policy Ideas, Implementation Styles and Emulation-Based Convergence in Canadian and U.S. Environmental Policy. British Columbia, Cambridge University Press. 7 AAAS (2012): AAAS Annual meeting symposium (American Association for the Advancement of Science). Vancouver, Friday, February 17, 2012. Available at: http://acs.qc.ca/documents/PresskitAAAS.pdf 8 Price, B. (2008, December 13): Canada’s Olympic Athletes to Wear ‘Made in China’ Uniforms, in The Epoch Times [online]. –URL: http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/8-5-3/70123.html 9 Ellerton, J. (2012): “Care about women’s rights? Support Ethical Oil” [online].-URL: http://www.ethicaloil.org/news/ care-about-women’s-rights-support-ethical-oil/ (retrieved 04May 2012). 10 Wells, P. (2012): Arctic Oil and Gas: Sustainability at Risk? New York: Routledge, p. 230. 11 Price, B. (2012, January 20): Canada’s crude awakening, in Macleans [online]. –URL: http://www2.macleans. ca/2012/01/20/crude-awakening/

Making Peace with the Earth From a destructive Anthropocene, to a Creative Anthropocene guided by the Living Earth Dr. Vandana Shiva

The Economist’s special issue on the “The World in 2012” ends with an obituary for The Earth. The earth is not about to die. What is dying is an outmoded paradigm and world view that has created multiple crises, beginning with the ecological crisis. The Mayan Prophecy, to which it refers, is not about the end of the Earth, but our age of ecological destruction. By working on models of human progress based on the false assumption that we are separate from the earth and the earth is dead inert matter, humanity has pushed species to extinction, destabilized the climate, destroyed water, and polluted the rivers and oceans. The illusion that we are separate from the Earth is ecoapartheid. Beginning with separation from the Earth, we create separation within the human community. Finally, we separate ourselves from our own humanity, our being, our purpose on Illustration: Heida Mobeck

Earth. We start believing the Earth is to be owned and conquered. We accept the brutalisation of our brother and sisters. And we shrink ourselves into appropriateness or consumers. Eco-apartheid has ethical consequences. It also has material consequences for our well being. This ecological destruction is threatening to undermine the conditions which have allowed humans to prosper and survive. It is our future that we are closing, not that of the Earth. We have become a destructive force on the planet. We have moved out of the Holocene Age that began 10,000 years ago at the end of the Pleistocene. It comes from the Greek words holos (whole) and kainos (new). This age provided the stable climate which gave us the conditions for our culture and material evolution as a human species. 83

Making Peace with the Earth

The Anthropocene Age Scientists are now saying we have entered a new age, the Anthropocene age, the age in which one species, the human, is becoming the most significant force on the planet. Current climate change and species extinction are driven by human activities and the very large ecological footprint of our species. Climate catastrophes and extreme climate events are already taking lives – the floods in Thailand in 2011, in Pakistan and Ladakh in 2010, the forest fires in Russia, more frequent and intense cyclones and hurricanes, severe droughts and intense flooding are examples of how humans have destabilized the climate system of our self-regulated planet which has given us a stable climate for the past 10,000 years. Humans have pushed 75% agricultural biodiversity to extinction because of industrial farming. Between 3 to 300 species are being pushed to extinction every day. How the planet and human beings evolve into the future will depend on how we understand the human impact on the planet. If we continue to understand our role in the old paradigm of capitalist patriarchy based on a mechanistic world view, an industrial, capital centered competitive economy, and a culture of dominance, violence, and war and ecological and human irresponsibility, we will witness the rapid unfolding of increasing climate catastrophe, species extinction, economic collapse, and human injustice and inequality. This is the destructive Anthropocene of human arrogance and hubris. It is displayed in the attempt of scientists to do geo-engineering, genetic engineering and synthetic biology as technological fixes to the climate crisis, the food crisis and the energy crisis. However, they will aggravate old problems and create new ones. We have already seen this with genetic engineering which was supposed to increase food production but has failed to increase crop yields. It was supposed to reduce chemical use but has increased use of pesticides and herbicides. It was 84

supposed to control weeds and pests, and it has instead created super weeds and super pests. Waging

war on the planet

We are in the midst of an epic contest – the contest between the rights of Mother Earth, and rights of corporations and militarized states using obsolete world views and paradigms to accelerate the war against the planet and people. This contest is between the laws of Gaia, and the laws of the market and warfare. It is a contest between wars against Planet Earth and peace with Earth. There are planetary wars taking place with geo-engineering – creating artificial volcanoes, fertilizing the oceans with iron filings, putting reflectors in the sky to stop the sun from shining on the Earth, as if the sun was the problem, not man’s violence against the earth, and the arrogant ignorance in dealing with it. In 1997, Edward Teller co-authored a white paper “Prospects for Physics – based modulation of global change” where he advocated the large scale introduction of metal particulates into the upper atmosphere to apply an effective “sunscreen.” The Pentagon is looking to breed immortal synthetic organisms with the goal of eliminating “the randomness of natural evolutionary advancement.” What is being done with the climate is being done with the evolutionary code of the universe, with total indifference for the consequences. Synthetic biology is an industry that creates “designer organisms to act as living factories.” “With synthetic biology, hopes are that by building biological systems from the ground up, they can create biological systems that will function like computers or factories.” The goal is to make biology easier to engineer using “bio bricks.” “Use of standardized parts, following a formalized design process, the engineers approach to biology, makes biology an engineering discipline, requiring the reduction of biological complexity. An engineering

Dr. Vandana Shiva

approach to biology based on the principles of standardization, decompiling and abstraction and a heavy reliance on information technologies.” However, “engineering” plants and ecosystems has undesired and unpredictable ecological impacts. For example, the green revolution de-

nature, not her masters and owners. Intellectual Property Rights on life forms, living resources and living processes is an ethical, ecological and economic perversion. We need to recognize the rights of Mother Earth and therefore the intrinsic value of all her species and living processes.

Corporations view the 75% biomass used by nature and local communities as ‘wasted’. stroyed biodiversity, water resources, soil fertility, and even the atmosphere with 40% GHG’s coming from industrialized, globalised agriculture The

third

Green Revolution

The second green revolution has led to emergence of super pests and super weeds, and increased use of herbicides and pesticides. Synthetic biology as the third Green Revolution will appropriate the biomass of the poor, even while selling “artificial life”. There is an intense scramble for the earth’s resources and ownership of nature. Big oil, big pharma, big food, big seed companies are joining hands to appropriate biodiversity and biomass – the living carbon – to extend the age of fossil fuel and dead carbon. Corporations view the 75% biomass used by nature and local communities as “wasted”. They would like to appropriate the living wealth of the planet for making biofuels, chemicals, plastics. This will dispossess the poor of the very sources of their lives and livelihoods. The instruments for the new dispossession are technological tools of genetic engineering and synthetic biology and intellectual property rights. Turning the living wealth of the planet into the property of corporations through patents is a recipe for deepening the poverty and ecological crisis. Biodiversity is our living commons – the basis of life and commons. We are part of

The

ecological shift

The destructive Anthropocene is not the only future. We can have a shift in paradigm. A change in consciousness is already taking place across the world. We can look at the destructive impact our species has had on the planets biodiversity, ecosystems and climate systems and make a shift. The ecological shift involves not seeing ourselves as outside the ecological web of life, as masters, conquerors and owners of the Earth’s resources. It means seeing ourselves as members of the earth family, with responsibility to care for other species and life on earth in all its diversity, from the tiniest microbe to the largest mammal. It creates the imperative to live, produce and consume within ecological limits and within our share of ecological space, without encroaching on the rights of other species and other people. It is a shift that recognizes that science has already made a paradigm shift from separation to non-separability and interconnectedness, from the mechanistic and reductionist to the relational and holistic. At the economic level it involves going beyond the artificial and even false categories of perpetual economic growth, so called free trade, consumerism and competitiveness. It means shifting to a focus on planetary and human well being, to living economies, to living well, not having more, to valuing cooperation rather than 85

Making Peace with the Earth

competitiveness. These are the shifts being made by indigenous communities, peasants, women and young people in the new movements like the Indignants in Europe and the Occupy Wall Street in the U.S. This involves working as co-creators and coproducers with the earth. This demands using our intelligence to conserve and heal, not conquer and wound. This is the creative and constructive Anthropocene of Earth Democracy, based on ecological humility in place of arrogance, and ecological responsibility in place of careless and blind exercise of power, control and violence. For humans to protect life on earth and their own future we need to become deeply conscious of the Rights of Mother Earth, our duties towards her, our compassion for all her beings. Our world has been structured by capitalist patriarchy around fictions and abstractions like ‘capital’, ‘corporations’, ‘growth which have allowed the unleashing of the negative forces of the destructive Anthropocene. We need to get grounded again – in the earth, her diversity, her living processes and now unleash the positive forces of a creative Anthropocene. Towards Earth Democracy We will either make peace with the earth or face extinction as humans even while we push millions of other species to extinction. Continuing

the war against the earth is not an intelligent option. Recognizing the Rights of the Earth is not just an imperative for the future of our species. It is also an imperative of social justice. Ancient cultures tested the impacts of their actions on the basis of the Seventh Generation. Future generations have rights and those rights flow from a bountiful earth. We have been chasing the mirage of limitless economic growth on a planet with ecological limits, which is a contradiction in itself. But this growth is based on the concentration of the Earth’s resources in a few hands, depriving and excluding billions from their rightful share, leaving them in hunger and poverty. Recognizing the rights of the Earth is the basis of also respecting human rights. The war against the Earth also becomes a war against people. When we respect the Earth, we share her abundance. As Gandhi said “The Earth has enough for everyone’s needs, but not for a few people’s greed.” We need to move from eco-apartheid to Earth Democracy. We need to celebrate the Living Earth and our own creative potential as members of the Earth Community.• This text is the foreword to Dr. Shivas upcoming book The Living Earth.

Foto: Johan Brun

Hallingskarvet sett fra øst mot vest, fra Prestholtskarvet helt til det vakre, fjerne Hellevasskarvet vestenfor Folarskaret. Ett eneste sammenhengende fjell fra horisont til horisont. Fjellmassivet hører til de aller største i Europa. – Fra Næss (1995): Det gode lange livs far.

Gråbo – et lappeteppe - Et forslag til et bærekraftig lokalsamfunn i Sverige Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson og Sofi Nilsson

Prosjektet «Gråbo – et lappeteppe» er resultatet av tre studenters arbeid i kurset Local Context, som er en del av mastergraden Design for Sustainable Development på Chalmers Tekniska Högskola i Göteborg. Prosjektet ble høsten 2011 gjennomført i samarbeid med Lerums kommun øst for Göteborg, med fokus på tettstedet Gråbo. Gråbo er et av kommunens mindre tettsteder med omtrent 5000 innbyggere, og det tar omtrent en halvtime med buss til de sentrale delene av Göteborg. Fordi Gråbo ikke ligger langs toglinjen og elven, som de andre tettstedene i Lerum, oppleves det ofte som om det ligger litt på «baksiden» av kommunen. Lerums kommun har som mål å være Sveriges mest miljøvennlige kommune i 2025, og Gråbo skal være deres pilotprosjekt i denne satsingen. Som et ledd i dette, ble Chalmers involvert for å komme med ulike forslag til en bærekraftig Illustrasjon: Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson og Sofi Nilsson

fremtid for Gråbo. Dette ble senere presentert for innbyggerne i Gråbo og for kommunestyret, og brukes nå som en diskusjonsgrunnlag for den videre utviklingen av et bærekraftig samfunn. Studentene stod fritt til å velge problemstilling, men temaer som gikk igjen var fortetting, hvordan minske avhengighet til bil, og lokal produksjon av mat. Prosjektet var delt i to bolker. Den første var en grundig analyse av tettstedet og omgivelsene rundt. I analysen ble det tydelig at Gråbo er delt i flere relativt adskilte områder, der innbyggerne kun kjenner sine nærmeste naboer, til tross for at det er et lite sted. Dette, samt dårlige gangveier, fører også til at folk ofte velger bilen, selv på korte turer. Vi tok også for oss tettstedets strukturer, historie og kultur, samt eksterne faktorer både på regionalt, nasjonalt og globalt nivå for å kunne foreslå gode løsninger både for miljøet og innbyggerne. 89

Gråbo – et lappeteppe

Lappeteppet Med resultatene fra analysen gikk vår gruppe i gang med et konsept som gikk ut på å «lappe sammen» byen med to hovedgrep: Det første; å fortette innenfor de eksisterende grensene. Det andre; å skape et mer selvforsynt tettsted som er mindre avhengig av nabobyer når det kommer til arbeidsplasser, shopping og så videre. Gråbo har i dag en lav befolkningstetthet, og innbyggerne føler at de har dårlig kontakt med naboer utenfor eget nabolag. Ved å se på Gråbo som et helt lappeteppe istedenfor bare én og én lapp, ønsker vi å skape et tettere samhold i tettstedet. Kommunens mål for Gråbo er 1% befolkningsvekst pr år frem mot 2025, hvor det meste av veksten er planlagt å skje i områder som i dag er jordbruksmark. Vi mener det er fullt mulig å få til en 2% årlig vekst innenfor de eksisterende grensene. Hvorfor er det mer bærekraftig å ha en vekst innad i Gråbo istedenfor å fortsette ekspanderingen? Bystrukturen er preget av flere «hull», som skaper barrierer mellom ulike nabolag og gir en følelse av store avstander. Ved å tette hullene ønsker vi å tilrettelegge bedre for fotgjengere og syklister. Dette vil føre til lavere utslipp fra biler og dermed bedre luftkvaliteten og folkehelsa, fordi folk vil bevege seg mer. I tillegg er det viktig å bevare jordbrukslandet rundt Gråbo. Om man bygger på jordbruksland, tar det opptil 1000 år før man kan bruke jorden til dyrking igjen.1 Selv om verken Norge eller Sverige står foran matmangel i nær fremtid, er det fortsatt bra i et globalt perspektiv å spare så mye jordbruksland som mulig. Gråbos utvikling har i hovedsak skjedd rundt to akser: En nord-sør-akse Lundbyvägen som går fra det historiske torget til dagens sentrum, og en øst-vest akse Hjällsnäsvägen som krysser denne ved dagens sentrum. Ved å styrke aksene og gi dem hver sin tydelige karakter vil de bli tydeligere definert og hjelpe til å knytte de ulike delene av Gråbo sammen. Lundbyvägen vil få en urban karakter. Lundbyvägen defineres også med to sterke endepunkter, dagens 90

torg Mjörnbotorget i syd og det historiske torget Snikentorget i nord. For å gi Snikentorget en klar karakter, foreslår vi bærekraftige aktiviteter som bondens marked, lokal mat og aktiviteter med forbindelse til lokal historie og kultur. For å kunne bruke de eksisterende store parkeringsplassene i Gråbo til videre utvikling, har Lundbyvägen gateparkering mellom trær. Dette gir også fotgjengere og syklister større avstand til trafikken. Hjällsnäsvägen vil ha natur som et «tema», siden veien knytter Gråbo sammen med den omkringliggende naturen: innsjøen, skogen og jordbrukslandskapet. Her vil det være både sykkeltrasé og hestesti, som vil få prioritet over bilene. Veiens karakter vil vises tydelig ved vegetasjon og trær. Fortetting og nye boliger Langs disse to aksene har vi definert tre fokusområder for videre fortetting av Gråbo. Det første området ligger langs Hjällsnäsvägen i et boligområde bygget på 70-tallet med små leiligheter til utleie. Det andre er en smal, tom, tomt sydøst i Gråbo som i dag primært brukes som gangvei men ellers ligger øde. Det tredje området er to parkeringsplasser og en tom flate i tilknytning til Snikentorget. Ved å utvikle disse områdene som eksempler på hva som kan gjøres med hele Gråbo, håper vi å kunne inspirere alle innbyggerne i Gråbo til å leve mer bærekraftig og ta bevisste og miljøvennlige valg. Derfor har alle områdene fått hvert sitt klare tema: matproduksjon, vannkretsløp og dyr. Dette tror vi kan skape en økt interesse for innbyggerne til å oppdage nye sider ved Gråbo, samt at det skaper en større tilhørighet for de som bor området når det skjer noe spesielt der som de kan delta i og få glede av. Vann I vannområdet har vi fokusert på vannets kretsløp og hvordan man kan spare vann. Gråbo ligger ikke langs noen elv eller innsjø, men det ligger en bekk i kulvert under dette området. Ved

Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson og Sofi Nilsson

Illustrasjon: Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson og Sofi Nilsson

å ta opp bekken igjen, kan den brukes til lokal vannrensing og for å forskjønne området. Her er det tegnet rekkehus, som alle har et «vanntårn» sentralt plassert i huset hvor alt vann samles og brukes. Det vil bli brukt to vannsystem: Et kommunalt og et lokalt. Fra kommunen vil man få drikkevann, og kloakk vil også håndteres kommunalt. Lokalt kan man ta hånd om gråvann, fra for eksempel dusj og oppvaskmaskin, som kan renses både mekanisk og biologisk i bekken. Dermed kan det brukes igjen til ting som ikke krever drikkevannskvalitet, for eksempel klesvask eller til å vanne plantene. Dyr I dyreområdet har vi ønsket å rette fokus på hvilket forhold mennesket har til dyr og hvordan vi kan leve sammen. Dette kom etter å ha snakket med flere av skolebarna i Gråbo som uttalte at «dyr er ekle og de må iallfall bo i bur hvis

vi skal ha dem i nærheten av oss!» Dette ser vi for oss at i stor grad skjer i samarbeid med den nærliggende skolen. Vi har foreslått å legge til flere atriumshus for å øke tettheten også her. I tillegg har vi laget en innhegning for sauer og et kretsløphus. I innhegningen vil det bo sauer i sommerhalvåret, som barna kan få ull fra som de kan bruke i undervisningen. Kretsløphuset er en kombinasjon av et drivhus og et hønsehus. Her kan barna levere inn matrester fra skolelunsjen til hønene, og få egg og tomater tilbake. Ved å ha dyr i nærheten, tror vi barna lærer mer om hvor maten kommer fra og at det blir morsommere å gå til og fra skolen når man kan se på og mate dyrene. Mat I området for matproduksjon ønsker vi å se mer på hvilke muligheter som finnes til lokal matproduksjon også innenfor byens grenser. I Syd91

Gråbo – et lappeteppe

Sverige har man en vekstperiode på omtrent 8 måneder, og i mellom de lave blokkene fra 70-tallet er det god plass til å dyrke mat. Tanken er at alle leilighetene skal ha tilgang til en uteplass hvor de kan dyrke egen mat. Vi har fortettet ved nye rekkehus og en ekstra etasje på flere av husene, og disse vil få private drivhus. Alle leilighetene vil også ha sin egen parsell til å dyrke det man vil på. I tillegg vil det være fellesområder, der overskuddet kan selges på Bondens Marked og slik skaffe penger til vedlikehold og videre forskjønning av området. Dette er bærekraftig fordi maten blir økologisk og ekstremt kortreist og vi tror også det kan føre til et bedre naboskap i området.

I januar 2012 ble forslagene presentert for innbyggerne i Gråbo, gjennom foredrag og en utstilling. De blir også lagt frem for kommunestyret for å vise konkrete tiltak som kan gjøre Gråbo mer miljøvennlig, bærekraftig og bedre å bo i. Prosjektet «Gråbo – et lappeteppe» vil nok ikke bli gjennomført i sin helhet, men vi håper at kommunen tar med noen av ideene, som å ta opp bekken og å bygge et kretsløphus. For oss som arkitekturstudenter har det vært spennende å delta i en debatt om både fortetting i en mindre by, og hvordan man kan bruke sentrale områder, som i dag står ubrukte, for å skape mer aktivitet gjennom bærekraftige midler.•

NOTER 1

Forskare oroas av att svensk åkermark exploateras – Jordbruksaktuellt, 2011-07-21

Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson og Sofi Nilsson

Illustrasjon: Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson og Sofi Nilsson

Planlegging for en bærekraftig fremtid - En kommentar om byøkologi generelt og prosjektet «Gråbo - et lappeteppe» spesielt Bård Sødal Grasbekk

Er det mulig å planlegge bærekraftige byer og tettsteder? Denne artikkelen er et forsøk på å peke på noen av utfordringene ved planleggingen av urbane miljøer, menneskets moderne habitat. Planleggere kan inneha ulike teoretiske posisjoner og er ofte uenige seg imellom om hvordan best utvikle byene. Hvor kaotisk dette kan virke så vi i forbindelse med arkitekturkonkurransen i New York for tomtene der tvillingtårnene hadde stått. Striden om Vestbanetomta i Oslo og om Munchmuseet var også preget av en forvirrende prosess. Dragkamper foregår mellom sentralisert administrasjon, markedsaktører, velforeninger og andre. Det kan være vanskelig å innta en objektiv holdning i planprosessene da disse i stor grad er preget av ulike verdiprioriteringer. Hvilke instanser og interessenter som regulerer og styrer byutviklingen har vidt forskjellige konsekvenser for hvordan byen blir. Denne utfordringen fordrer forståelse for de ulike interessegruppenes behov. I diskursen om bærekraftige byer eller økologisk urbanisme synes en dreining mot en ny funksjonalisme. Naturvitenskapen har lenge lagt premisser for byplanleggingen. Analogt med et økosystem Illustrasjon: Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson og Sofi Nilsson

sees byen som et system av levende vesener og bygde strukturer i interaksjon med hverandre. Men det finnes en fare for at imperativene om en økonomisk og teknisk rasjonell planlegging kan skygge for hensynet til liv og sosiale behov. Et

historisk tilbakeblikk

I vesten kan tiden for de store visjonære byplaner virke fjern fra dagens markedsstyrte byutvikling. I det 20. århundre ble store prosjekter planlagt og bygget inspirert av Le Corbusier og CIAMs funksjonalistiske program.1 Funksjonalistene var lei av fortidens jålete arkitektur og overklassens stil-karneval. De bygde heller billig og industrivennlig arkitektur i stor skala for å gi den forsømte arbeiderklassen sanitære boforhold. De sosiale boligprosjekter fikk nå betydelig prestisje. Høye blokker i et åpent parklandskap ble det paradigmatiske formuttrykket. Lys og luft skulle skape trivsel og vakre opplevelser av de moderne byggverk. Men på tross av 95

Planlegging for en bærekraftig fremtid

denne tilsynelatende naturpoesien var det mekanistiske verdensbildet kjernen i funksjonalismen. Alt skulle mekaniseres og bygges nytt. Eksteriører og interiører, boliger og byer. Boliger ble kalt «bomaskiner», og disse ble etterhvert fylt av mindre maskiner for å lette husarbeidet. Men med mekaniseringen og den blinde tro på fremskrittet ble noe viktig glemt. Det prestisjefylte masseboligprosjektet Pruitt-Igoe i St. Louis, Missouri, er et kroneksempel på hvordan den modernistiske tilnærmingen kunne få uhyrlige konsekvenser. Prosjektet var tegnet av arkitekten bak World Trade Centre og sto ferdig i 1954. 33 blokker på 11 etasjer. Det var ikke grenser for hvor bra dette prosjektet skulle være for de fattige amerikanere som fikk flytte inn. Boligmangelen var løst, og beboerne fikk attpåtil en høyere levestandard enn de kunne drømt om. Men de vanskeligstilte beboerne oppførte seg ikke slik planleggerne hadde beregnet. Prosjektområdet ble raskt preget av mistrivsel og kriminalitet, og det lignet etter hvert en krigssone. Det ble uforsvarlig å la blokkene stå. De ble revet i løpet av 1970-årene. Rivningen markerte et veiskille i byplanleggingen. Gradvis ble medvirkning og inkludering av lokale innbyggere og aktører i prosessene regelen, til fordel for en mer pragmatisk tilnærming i byplanleggingen. Pruitt-Igoe eksempelet illustrerer hvor viktig det er å forstå befolkningen man bygger for, og at man bør involvere dem i utformingen av sine leveområder. Den sosiale dimensjonen står sentralt når det skal planlegges for bærekraftig utvikling. Idag ser vi mindre grep og intervensjoner i byen stå frem som de kanskje mest effektive virkemidlene i byplanleggingen. Dette kan være alt fra små midlertidige prosjekter i byrommene til omfattende transformasjoner av tidligere industriområder. Transformasjonene gjenvinner arealer som ikke er i bruk til nye formål. Andre viktige virkemidler i byplanleggingen er fortetting rundt knutepunkter og allsidig bruk. Flere formål kan lokaliseres i et område for å redusere avstander og tidsbruk, og i stor grad gjøre mo96

torisert ferdsel overflødig. Gatene blir tryggere for barn og store arealer kan gjenvinnes til bruk for gateliv, etablering av vegetasjon og håndtering av overflatevann. Lappe

sammen

Gråbo

Tre arkitektstudenter ved Chalmers tekniska högskola har i dette nummer av Tvergastein bidratt med en illustrert oppgave i stedsutvikling. De har med utgangspunkt i noen prinsipper for bærekraftig utvikling utarbeidet en utviklingsstrategi for tettstedet Gråbo. I denne er spesielt to utfordringer angrepet. Den ene er befolkningsveksten som er estimert å ligge på 1 % årlig frem til 2025. Den andre er hvordan tettstedet og lokalsamfunnet kan knyttes bedre sammen. Oppgaven har ikke gått i dybden på trafikkplanlegging, men berører hvordan tungt trafikkerte veier forringer bymiljøet, og de har klare tanker om hvordan hovedveiene skal utvikles på fotgjengernes premisser.2 Et av virkemidlene de har benyttet for utviklingen av tettstedet er fortetting av bygningsmassen. Denne kan i prinsippet utføres enten vertikalt eller horisontalt. Vertikalt ved å legge flere etasjer på bygningene, og slik bevare størrelsen på utearealene mellom dem. Horisontalt ved å utvide bebyggelsens grunnflate. I begge tilfeller vil det bli økt bruk og slitasje på gjenværende grøntområder. Ofte vil derfor permeable, vannabsorberende flater, som plen og grusvei, erstattes med harde flater, som steinheller, betong og asfalt. Harde flater tåler mer bruk, og er ikke like vedlikeholdskrevende. Men de øker mengden overflatevann som etter tur belaster avløpssystemene. Gruppen har hovedsakelig valgt horisontal fortetting ved å utnytte litt mer av grøntområdene til boligformål, men har til gjengjeld søkt å oppgradere standarden på grøntområdene. Studentene har tegnet en oversikt over grøntstrukturen i Gråbo, samt skjemaer for vind- og solforhold. Ved siden av disse plansjene ville det være fint å se en nedbørsstatistikk. Siden fortetting og vannhåndtering står så sentralt i opp-

Bård Sødal Grasbekk

gaven er det nyttig å vite hvor store vannmasser som må behandles. En terrengmodell ville vært nyttig for å forstå hvordan vannet renner. Også en kartlegging av det biologiske mangfoldet både i og utenfor tettstedet ville vært interessant. Kanskje man ved enkle grep kunne gjøre det lettere for lokale dyr og fuglearter å leve i området. Disse utredningene er på siden av arkitekturfaget, men nevnes her for å belyse det faktum at bærekraftig planlegging krever tverrfaglighet og et vidt spekter av hensyn.

1918 om hvordan urbant landbruk kunne bote på byenes sløseri og trengsel. Han mente i likhet med nasjonalromantikerne før ham at aktiviteten også etablerte en fysisk og symbolsk kontakt mellom folket og jorda.3 Matdyrking er en lærerik aktivitet. Folk kan hjelpe hverandre med arbeid og råd, og sosiale bånd uavhengig yrke og alder kan utvikles og styrkes. I tillegg til dette har hagearbeid og opphold i grøntområder gode virkninger på fysisk og psykisk helse.4

Dyr,

Våre byer og tettsteder bringer med seg muligheter for menneskelig utvikling og trivsel. En tettere bebyggelse kan skape nærhet mellom folk og spare arealer. Fortetting som virkemiddel krever likevel at planleggerne tar hensynsfulle beslutninger. Det kan tilsynelatende rettferdiggjøre nedbygging av verdifulle grøntområder. Derfor er det fint å klargjøre for interessekonflikten mellom å bygge ned uteområder på den ene siden og å aktivisere dem på den andre. En annen interessant tilnærming til fortetting kan være å undersøke hvordan blandete formål i bygningsmassen kan skape nye sosiale og økonomiske synergieffekter. Gråbo forsøkes lappes sammen ved å gi innbyggerne felles arenaer i de offentlige rom. Det er uvisst hvor godt de nye programmene vil lykkes i å aktivisere befolkningen på tvers av tettstedet. Hvis innbyggerne ønsker seg slike programmer i uteområdene er de foreslåtte grepene potensielt fruktbare. Gruppen stiller indirekte krav til innbyggernes livsførsel, noe vi har sett kan være vanskelig å planlegge for. For å etterstrebe sosial bærekraft må planleggere også involvere lokalbefolkningen i utviklingsprosessen. Fremtidens byer bør bygges i fellesskap.•

vann og mat

Gruppen har utarbeidet detaljerte forslag til etablering av attraksjoner og aktivitetstilbud i tre områder med stort utviklingspotensiale. Disse er karakterisert av temaer som spiller på matproduksjon og naturkontakt. Her skal det være dyrehold, hagebruk, lokal vannhåndtering og gjenvinningsystemer. I det store og det hele skal Gråbo utvikles til å bli et trivelig tettsted der en grønn livsstil lar seg realisere uten store om og men. Det er interessant hvordan gruppen har forsøkt å undersøke mulighetene for urbant dyrehold. Det kunne være interessant å se på hva som faktisk kreves for å kunne realisere dette, og i hvilken grad dyrene ville trives. Der vann er tenkt som attraksjon kommer det tydelig frem at man ved løsning av økologiske problemstillinger også kan tilby gode opplevelser. Lokal vannhåndtering krever ikke store investeringer, og er svært realistisk å implementere i både liten og stor skala. Derfor har byøkologiske prosjekter ofte begrenset seg til bare å omfatte dette. Slike systemer for vannhåndtering inkluderer som regel gråvannsanlegg, fordrøyningsdammer og regnbed. Her renses vannet blant annet med planter, før det enten føres ut i naturlige vannløp eller gjenbrukes lokalt. Urbant jordbruk og kortreist mat har nylig fått opphøyd status gjennom blant annet Slow Food bevegelsen og imperativer om kortreist mat. Tradisjonelt har det vært forbundet med nød og matauk, men også sterke lokalsamfunn. Landskapsarkitekten Lebrecht Migge skrev i

fragmentert tettsted

Noter 1 Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne: Organisasjon av arkitekter ledet av Le Corbusier. 2 Gehl, J., (2010): «Byer for mennesker», Bogværket. 3 Mostafavi, M. (red.) (2010): Ecological Urbanism, Lars Müller Publishers. 4 Ward Thompson, C. & Travlou, P., (2007): «Open Space – People Space», Taylor & Francis. 97

Space for Debate Climate Change, Climate Denial and the Logic of the Media Angi Buettner

The more the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change consolidates (indicating that urgent and drastic action is needed), the louder climate change denial becomes, and a growing number of politicians support environmental policies that do not address climate change; there are complex political, financial, and psychological explanations for this (see for example Dickinson;1 Hamilton;2 Marshall3). In this context, it is useful to consider how these developments are reflected in the media coverage of climate change. 2009 was a crucial year for international environmental governance, with the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen taking place in December, with the goal to agree on a new global climate treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol from 1997. In the same year, Ian Plimer, an Australian geologist, made a strong impact on public debate over climate change with the publication of his book Heaven and Earth: Global Warming, the Missing Science.4 In this book Plimer deIllustration: Eirik Severeide

clares that â&#x20AC;&#x153;global warming is all a myth,â&#x20AC;? and that the whole of international climate science, politics, and media has united to perform a great climate change con trick. The book sold out almost immediately, stayed on the bestseller lists for months, was taken up by politicians, and received extensive and prolonged media attention. At the same time, the book received numerous reviews by scientists showing the scientific errors and lack of quality of the argument (see for example Ashley;5 Enting6); the authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strong links to the mining industry in Australia also were revealed.7 Nonetheless, the book continues to be picked up enthusiastically by climate change deniers, by politicians in support of non-action on climate change, and, most tellingly, by the media. In this article I will consider the Plimer case as an example of ways in which the media report and deal with the climate change debate. Plimer has considerable cultural capital: as an award-winning scientist, his voice warrants 99

Space for Debate

hearing, and he and others in the climate change denial camp use this cultural capital strategically to put their message out into the public sphere through skilful use of the media. However, I will argue that the very logic of the media produces rhetoric-driven public debate about climate

make a simple story out of climate change: “There is no problem with global warming.”16 He banalizes the complex issues by joking about how climate scientists “fear warmth,”17 whereas for him it is clear that “We humans normally seek a warmer climate for our holidays. Maybe

The very logic of the media produces rhetoricdriven public debate about climate change.

change. This allows vested interests to control the amplification of voices and to hijack the debate, and hinders the media coverage of the complexities of climate change politics and science. Despite his arguments being thoroughly and convincingly dismantled in the public sphere (see for example, Karoly;8 Manne;9 Monbiot10), Plimer has won the attention of the public mostly by turning himself into a media celebrity, and by strategic lobbying, argument framing, and media use. He fosters an image of the maverick who upholds free debate and fights the silencing of dissent and the censoring of climate change sceptics. He does this loudly and aggressively.11 At the same time, Plimer works hard at establishing his credibility and expertise. With this claim to credibility and authority, Plimer declares that climate change is a green religion, a communist conspiracy, not based on science, and that there is no scientific consensus. Plimer throws doubts on the science of climate change, mostly by misrepresenting the operation of the IPCC (“It is unrelated to science”12). He discredits environmentalism as a whole, as well as attacking individual advocates. His pet hate is Al Gore, and he uses Gore as a stand-in for the whole of environmentalism and climate science.13 Later in the book, Plimer discredits Nicholas Stern’s 200714 report on the economics of climate change,15 although he does not provide evidence for his arguments. His main rhetorical move, however, is to 100

warming is good for us?”18 More importantly, Plimer turns climate change into part of planet Earth’s geological history. He in effect naturalises, or, rather, re-naturalises what is anthropogenic climate change into a natural phenomenon, so that we don’t have to worry about the environmental impacts of our industries and actions. According to Plimer, the climate change of the past century was not driven by human action, but by planetary and galactic factors, as has always been the case during the history of our planet. There has been no warming since 1998, and CO2 emissions don’t matter.19 Plimer’s evaluation of decades of international climate science is: “If we humans, in a fit of ego, think we can change these normal planetary processes, then we need stronger medication.”20 One of the scientists who reviewed Plimer’s book, summarises the quality of its content and argumentation: The arguments that Plimer advances in the 503 pages and 2311 footnotes in Heaven and Earth [sic] are nonsense. The book is largely a collection of contrarian ideas and conspiracy theories that are rife in the blogosphere. The writing is rambling and repetitive; the arguments flawed and illogical. […] It is not ‘merely’ atmospheric scientists that would have to be wrong for Plimer to be right. It would require a rewriting of biology, geology, physics, oceanography, astronomy and statistics.21

Angi Buettner

None of Plimer’s claims are new; they are familiar messages by climate change deniers. In a book on the role of science in public life, the authors point out not just the organised lobbying campaign against climate change by industries and people connected to them, but also the media savviness of climate change deniers: they know that they need to lobby and that it is about who wins the attention of the public, the media and the politicians.22 Plimer loudly proclaims his credibility, but is quiet when it comes to his credentials: his professional expertise (a geologist, not a climate scientist), and his industry and political affiliations. Plimer is closely linked to political groups working actively to stop or at least delay action on climate change. He is listed as an associate of the Institute of Public Affairs, a Melbournebased conservative think tank;23 an allied expert for the Natural Resources Stewardship Project in 2007, a Canadian advocacy group that opposes the Kyoto Protocol24 and he is a member of the academic advisory council for Nigel Lawson’s global warming skeptic group.25 Plimer has strong connections with the mining industry. He is Professor of Mining Geology at the University of Adelaide, as well as currently director of three mining companies, and making a considerable income out of these directorships.26 This extensive link to fossil fuel networks is not generally disclosed by the media outlets that cover Plimer’s opinions. Plimer has turned into a celebrity climate change sceptic; a supposed rebel and a maverick, who speaks for “the average punter out there.”27 The oft-repeated statement about Plimer in the media is that he is “one of the few scientists” who disagree with anthropogenic climate change.28 This characterisation of Plimer and his role in the debate has been widely taken up by, accepted, and disseminated in the media. The Logic

Media and ConStory of Climate Change

of the

structing the

The media are part of the wider field of cultural

production, and the production practices within the media industries are ruled by certain logics. Among these logics are storytelling, networking, noise, and the spectacle. The media uptake of Plimer is a product of the conditions of media production within environmental news reporting. There is a lot of work on the many constraints of news production—factors of journalistic production such as news media norms, formats, and professional practices (in turn determined by commercial pressures)—and how they influence the coverage of environmental issues (for example Anderson29 Boyce and Lewis;30 Wilson31). The daily deadlines of journalism, for example, make the coverage of scientific data difficult over time; this influences the practice of sourcemedia relationships. Time, space, and scientific literacy pressures often lead to one-source stories, and the over-reliance on one source, usually an “expert.” When it comes to who the groups and individuals are who are seen as credible and legitimate environmental news sources, the media are likely to pick agents who have developed a strategy on how to gain access to the media as potential sources. The selection of sources is ideological and hierarchical, and groups with vested interests develop media strategies accordingly. The media principle of balance, which still defines good practice within news production, leads to the presentation of two opposing points against each other in dramatic fashion. This inhibits coverage of scientific complexity; moreover, what is in reality a tiny minority begins to look like a valid counter balance.32 In the case of reporting climate change, many scientists criticize the media for perpetuating indecision by including both scientific and non-scientific claims, as if they were of equal validity (see for example Veron33). Bjorn Lomborg (another celebrity denier, of The Skeptical Environmentalist fame34) and Ian Plimer are just two examples of the media making use of mavericks and outsider voices, and staging a struggle between scientists 101

Space for Debate

where there is consensus. Ian Plimer and his particular version of climate change denial has all the makings of a good story; he is David fighting the Goliath that is the IPCC; there is a conspiracy by elite scientists against the average person; and, ultimately, there is nothing to worry about. This simplistic set of narratives is more palatable than climate change considered as a dangerous risk, requiring massive changes in our energy systems and lifestyles. Simplifying the story in this way is a powerful strategy: climate sceptic arguments are attractive, because they offer an escape route from the fact that things will have to change. Recurring story structures (such as conflict) are germane to the media, and Plimer provides fodder by drawing extensively on popular culture in Heaven and Earth. Conspiracy theories and echoes of Dan Brown and Michael Crichton (whose State of Fear similarly turns global warming into a hoax by environmental groups to protect their business, and similarly gives this story a veneer of research by bolstering it with thousands of footnotes35) feature extensively in the book. With this kind of storytelling, Plimer provides his version of what Ulrich Beck has described as the staging of environmental risk.36 Simplified stories touch “cultural nerve fibres,” provide and utilise “cultural symbols”37 and, therefore, are influential within public debate. Another reason Plimer appeals to the media is because of the logic of the spectacle. With his authoritative, polemic, and polarizing style, he has turned himself into a spectacle within the climate change debate. Among the main logic of the spectacle is the accumulation of spectacles.38 In a sense, the quality of what Plimer does and says in his media appearances and book doesn’t matter, as long as he and his messages continue to be represented. Having access to media space in itself already provides a certain degree of credibility, particularly for people with no specific knowledge of the issue. When individuals are cited as having an affiliation to a well-known institution and a title, as in the case of ‘Ian Plimer, 102

Professor of Mining Geology at Adelaide University’, there is automatic credibility. One example of how the Plimer incident works within the logic of the spectacle is the Monbiot vs Plimer debate. After Plimer’s claim that climate change is a hoax was recycled enthusiastically in the British magazine Spectator in July 2009, George Monbiot, well-known for his environmental commentary for the Guardian newspaper, criticized both author and book for many mistakes that had already been pointed out in numerous book reviews by scientists (see for example Ashley; Lambeck39). Plimer then challenged Monbiot to a public debate, hosted by the Spectator; Monbiot agreed on the condition that Plimer first answers a few questions about the sources for his claims, which Plimer replied to by accusing Monbiot of scientific illiteracy. The whole incident resulted in a considerable amount of media attention (interviews, blog entries, etc.) for both Monbiot and Plimer. Eventually, Plimer pulled out and the Spectator cancelled the debate. Finally, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s program Lateline hosted a debate between Plimer and Monbiot on 15 December 2009.40 This all is an example of how the media construct debate: as a staged debate, a fight between two opposing people and opinions, a duel in which its surrounding spectacle and the fact that it is happening counts for more than the content or the quality of the debate. The Plimer vs Monbiot interaction perpetuates the logic of the spectacle. The debate took place live on ABC’s Lateline, presented by Tony Jones. It began with a discussion of Copenhagen and the hacked emails of the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia. Over the course of the program, almost 25 minutes, the debate turned into a squabble. Plimer accused Monbiot of bad manners, and Monbiot insisted that “Plimer just will not answer the questions.” Since Plimer and Monbiot met for this debate after a long and public communication over the points of contention, this debate potentially offered op-

Angi Buettner

portunity for serious discussion, especially since there was almost half an hour of air-time available. But the time was mostly wasted. There was nothing new in the debate to qualify the situation or supplement the media exchange that had already happened. Both Plimer and Monbiot repeated their messages: Plimer insisted people were trying to silence him and that climate change is about that “governments just cannot resist the opportunity to tax us more”; Monbiot insisting that Plimer answer his questions about the sources for his claims in Heaven and Earth. Monbiot’s repeated “Answer the question, Professor Plimer” made him look tedious. Monbiot used the debate to reiterate the point that Plimer was evading questions. But anybody who followed the exchange between Plimer and Monbiot already knew that, and didn’t need to have that point repeated for 30 minutes. Plimer meanwhile used the debate as a PR opportunity and kept waving a copy of his book at the camera. He also successfully diverted the debate to a discussion of the East Anglia emails and the errors found in the 4th IPCC report in November 2009, rather than a discussion of himself and the quality of his claims. This pushed both Monbiot and Jones into having to defend the science community and spend time on explaining how these incidents do not mean what Plimer claims they mean. Both Plimer and Monbiot repeated the stances they had already taken, and for the viewer there was in the end no new piece of information that would help to make a decision on who to trust and what to believe. There would have been, for example, the opportunity to clear the question of the credibility of experts used by the media. Plimer repeatedly made the strong accusation that both Tony Jones and George Monbiot are journalists with no scientific credentials and expertise. Plimer focused on the crucial point of legitimacy, raising the question of who legitimates certain participants and discourses in the debate. This is crucial for the processes that create the credibility of par-

ticipants in climate change debates. The media play a considerable role in this, and one would have thought that Jones and Monbiot, both experienced and respected journalists, would have jumped at this opportunity. But neither journalist managed to turn this into an opportunity to press Plimer on his credentials. Neither pointed out that Plimer did not have any expertise or scientific credentials in the fields he is speaking on, and purporting to be an expert in. Monbiot insisted that the role of the journalist is to keep pressing people to answer the questions they do not want to answer. But neither he nor Jones manage to ask pressing questions of Plimer that would clarify for the audience who Plimer is, and how to evaluate his role in the debate. Instead, the debate remained stuck in the formula of conflict; there is accusation and counter-accusation, petty nitpicking rather than quality arguments being made, and two men becoming increasingly agitated and angry. There were two people on two opposing sides, on stage together for their duel. At the end, it is not clear who is left standing, and who was right or wrong. It just stopped because the program ran out of time. The message of this staged debate (the episode was titled “Monbiot, Plimer cross swords”) was that there are people with opposing views. This kind of polarizing helps to reinforce confusion and uncertainty. The following day the Guardian published Monbiot’s write-up of the debate: “So at last we’ve had our fight”, Monbiot announced, and that he won the “battle” and “showdown.”41 The fact that a high-quality journalist such as Monbiot was dragged into this logic demonstrates just how limited the media are by their own logics and conditions of production. The debate between Monbiot and Plimer indicates that the reason why there is such a disproportionate level of confusing and confused climate change coverage, erring on the side of climate change denial in the face of a scientific consensus, cannot merely be attributed to the neglect of the media’s responsibility as fourth estate; it also has to 103

Space for Debate

be explained by the logic of the media itself. The logics and conditions of production currently ruling the media misrepresents facts, and underinforms on the political, historical and scientific contexts. This currently determines the quality of the public debate on climate change. The Political Dynamic Change Debate

of the

Climate

The Plimer incident poses questions about the responsibility of the media, and of the social function of journalism and news as one of the prevalent forms of mass media that communicate regarding the environment. If providing the sites and tools for a high quality debate on climate change is part of the media’s role, giving a prominent voice to climate change denial as part of its construction of debate—or, rather,

Contemporary manifestations of eco-bashing continue this tradition from at least the 1990s onwards, in which environmentalism has been constructed as a political threat, and environmentalists as the new socialists. The Rio Earth Summit in 1992 can be seen as a “watershed for international environmentalism, but also as the beginning of the conservative backlash against climate science.”45 46 The historical background of today’s climate change debate is characterised by battles between warnings from climate scientists, and attempts by fossil-fuel companies to protect their commercial interests.47 Conservative forces are fighting the social and cultural transformation required to deal with climate change, defending the political and economic status quo, and holding on to such ideologies as the power of

The media spectacles over climate deniers remind us that there is a strong anti-green current. staging of debate—is problematic. It is particularly problematic if this kind of media coverage feeds off, rather than reports on, climate change denial, and fails to provide the historical and ideological contexts of that debate. Since 2009, the media have been full of reports on the rise of climate change scepticism, supposedly as a backlash following the 2009 UN Summit in Copenhagen, as well as the East Anglia emails in November 2009 and the criticism of the IPCC over the use of information that had not been rigorously checked. This version of the climate change story fails to convey that this rise in climate change denial has a history. In 1996 Paul Ehrlich (author of the seminal The Population Bomb42) described efforts made to “minimise the seriousness of environmental problems” and to “fuel a backlash against ‘green’ policies,”43 and he points to the role of the media in this backlash.44 The media spectacles over climate deniers remind us that there is a strong anti-green current. 104

technology and science, progress, or mastery over nature. Climate change denial is part of this green backlash: an orchestrated campaign financed largely by coal and oil industries.48 49 50 What is the role of the media in all of this? The media campaigns of climate change deniers have been highly successful.51 In the first half of this essay I have argued that this is largely because the logic of the media offers many opportunities for the strategies of climate change deniers. The two media logics whose workings are part and parcel of the history and success of climate change denial are the logic of noise and the logic of networks. What has been fascinating to observe in the case of Ian Plimer is how quickly commentators picked up Heaven and Earth, and wholeheartedly repeated its assertions. Commentators amplify voices, and as such amplifiers play an important and potentially powerful role in public debate. In Australia, the media figures who have reinforced Ian Plimer’s climate denial mes-

Angi Buettner

sage were mostly the conservative Murdoch and Fairfax columnists. Their initial coverage of the book’s publication provided free publicity, and constituted a form of promotion rather than news coverage. Andrew Bolt (radio commentator and newspaper columnist), Christopher Pearson (The Australian columnist), and Miranda Devine52 (Sydney Morning Herald columnist), all celebrated Plimer’s book. Christopher Pearson, for example, judged the importance of the book in the following terms: I expect that when the history of global warming as a mass delusion comes to be written, Australia’s leading geologist will be recognised as a member of the international sceptical pantheon. As far as the progress of what passes for national debate is concerned, in all likelihood 2009 will be seen as the turning point and divided into the pre and postPlimer eras.53

Bolt, Pearson, and Devine are well-known rightwing commentators in Australia. In his book on climate change politics in Australia, Guy Pearse discusses the role and close connections of the media conservatives within the political scene of greenhouse policy.54 Chris Mitchell, editor of the Australian (where most of the media support for Plimer came from), won the 2008 APPEA JN Pierce Award (from the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association) for Media Excellence for coverage of climate change policy.55 The Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association Ltd. is the peak national body representing the oil and gas industry. In Australia, this group of media figures is one of the voices telling the public that climate change is a green religion that lacks a scientific basis, and its amplification of the climate scepticism message has been a cycle of reinforcement. Many of these media sceptics are regular speakers at conferences and fundraising events for organisations funded by the big polluters. Andrew Bolt, Christopher Pearson, Alan Jones,

Miranda Devine, and Michael Duffy, for example, have all given speeches at think tanks vociferous on climate change policy.56 There is a deliberate membership overlap and these connections are not mentioned. The same is the case for the small group of “experts” this group of conservative commentators relies on as sources, both locally and internationally. Among them are Ian Plimer, Fred Singer, and Bjorn Lomborg; and, “virtually every source cited involves only a few degrees of separation from polluter cash.”57 There is criticism of news media generally that they are failing their social role and responsibility. But in the case of climate change, there is a particular case being made of the failure of the media. In the context of the political dynamic currently at work in the climate change debate—political inaction in the face of urgency; denial in the face of evidence—the question of whether news reporting of climate change might be part of the reason for the green backlash needs to be considered. The logic of noise needs much more attention in our analysis of the media, particularly given the increasing trend in the media to give voice to commentary and political opinion. Do the mediations of the debate in the mainstream media provoke confusion about climate change, about what is fact and fiction, and hence delay the search for (technological) solutions, policy development, and social and political action? Social researchers repeatedly make the point that confusion causes disengagement from politics and the political process. Climate change is going to be one of the defining problems of humanity. As such it is a textbook example of the need for knowledge and information in order to know how to act politically. The media—and particularly the news media—have been traditionally seen as central to the right to know in order to participate. The media provide one of the most prevalent interfaces between scientists, policy makers, and members of the general public. Therefore, we need media that can help us ask the obvi105

Space for Debate

ous questions: are the climate change deniers qualified; are they doing research in the climate change field; are they accepting money from the fossil fuel industry?58 The media need to take the processes of authorising they perform for the public more seriously. Taking a closer look at the “credibility” of the “experts” relied on by the climate change denial campaign and amplified by the media reveals that most, like Plimer, have tangential qualifications and links to polluters and polluter-funded front groups. A closer look, minus the noise of the media, also reveals that they actually are a small number of people. We also need to think through the logics of the media in the context of making sense of science and its role in society. The public understanding of science is limited, in a time of the increasing “politicisation of scientific research.”59 This is why popular science books by scientists, such as by Plimer, matter. Rather than fostering confusion about science, or perpetuating the myth that the everyday person cannot understand science, the media could help to increase science literacy. A recognition of the limitations in media expertise (the news media, for example, have to give an account of other fields of expertise, such as climate science, but can only really give an account of itself as a field), and the different logics at work (science seeks consensus; media seeks conflict), would also help to think through and re-think the role of the media in public debate over climate change. Finally, we need media that participate in discussions about the relationship between debate and social change. What kind of information, communication, and images can we use to shape perception and opinion and inspire action? In the context of environmental issues, such as climate change, Ulrich Beck has described the core of the relationship between media and politics: we have to rely on the symbolic politics of the media. The symbols that translate for us the many environmental risks are being produced in the battle over the meaning of these risks. The key question therefore is “Who discovers 106

(or invents), and how, symbols that disclose the structural character of the problems while at the same time fostering the ability to act?”60 Caught up in the political dynamics of the debate, the media miss the purpose and the politics of the climate change debate: that the function of the debate is to prevent climate change.61 Part of the responsibility of the news media is to introduce new knowledge to the public. A book on the social construction of climate change asks the crucial question: How is new knowledge introduced to the public? What roles do scientists, the media, leaders at all levels, interest groups and NGOs play in constructing knowledge for the public?62

This is part of the social role and responsibility of the media, alongside its logic of spectacle for entertainment and business purposes. Why worry about the quality of the climate change debate? Because undermining and misinterpreting environmental data prolongs an already difficult search for solutions.63 To change our attitudes and to act in the face of climate change needs nothing short of a revolution.64 Plimer and his recycling of climate change denial messages and the re-recycling through the media represents conservative resistance to the transformations necessary in the face of global climate change; it is merely clinging onto the ideologies of mastery over nature and (economic) progress. Faced with the task of dealing with change, defending conservative values with no new vision will not create a public debate that can be of public benefit. A media consultant recently suggested that in the era of ecological challenges, we might need a “publicbenefit journalism,”65 a journalism that benefits the public in the long run, not only particular groups with vested and short term interests.•

Angi Buettner

Notes A longer version of this article has previously been published as “Climate Change in the Media: Climate Denial, Ian Plimer, and the Staging of Public Debate.” New Zealand Journal of Media Studies 12.1 (2010): 79–97. Available <http://www.nzmediastudies.org.nz/issues.php?issue=7&tit le=Volume+12+No.1>. 1 Dickinson, J. L. (2009). The People Paradox: Self-esteem Striving, Immortality Ideologies, and Human Response to Climate Change, in Ecology and Society [online][accessed 9 Nov. 2009]. 2 Hamilton, C. (2002): “The Social Psychology of Climate Change.” National Academies Forum: Climate and Culture in Australia. Conference paper presented 27 Sep. 3 Marshall, G. (2001): “Denial and the Psychology of Climate Apathy.” The Ecologist, Nov. 2001. 4 Plimer, I. (2009): Heaven and Earth: Global Warming, the Missing Science. Ballan, VIC: Connor Court. 5 Ashley, M. (2009, May 9): No Science in Plimer’s Primer, in The Australian. [accessed 2010, April 15] 6 Enting, I. G. (2010, January 25): “Ian Plimer’s ‘Heaven and Earth’—Checking the Claims.” ARC Centre for Excellence for Mathematics and Statistics of Complex Systems. The University of Melbourne. Version 2.1. [accessed 15 April 2010]. 7 Burton, B. (2009, November 12): Ian Plimer’s Mining Connections, in PRWatch.org. Centre for Media and Democracy. [accessed18 April 2010]. 8 Karoly, D. (2009): “Heaven + Earth – Review.” Science Show. ABC Radio National 13 June 2009. Transcript. Web. 4 September 2009. 9 Manne, R. (2009, April 25): Cheerleading for Zealotry Not in the Public Interest, in The Australian [accessed 17 April 2010]. 10 Monbit, G. (2009, July 9): Spectator Recycles Climate Rubbish, inThe Guardian [online] [accessed 20 Aug. 2009]. 11 See particularly Plimer (2009), pp. 9–29 and 435–493. 12 Ibid., p. 20. 13 See for example ibid., p. 442. 14 Stern, N. (2007): The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 15 Plimer (2009), p. 478. 16 Ibid. p. 25. 17 Ibid. p. 461. 18 Ibid. p. 468. 19 See for example ibid., p.109. 20 Ibid. p. 11. 21 Ashley, M. (2009). 22 Mooney, C. and Kirshenbaum, S. (2009): Unscientific America: How Scientific Illiteracy Threatens Our Future. New York: Basic Books, p. 110. 23 Institute of Public Affairs (2010) People and Associates—Ian Plimer, [accessed 17 April 2010]. 24 DeSmog Blog. (2010) Ian Plimer—Plimer and the NRSP, [accessed 17 April 2010]. 25 Global Warming Policy Foundation. (2010): Academic Advisory Council, [accessed 17 April 2010]. 26 Burton, B. (2009) 27 Plimer (2009) p. 456. 28 See for example Lateline (2008, November 11) “Ian Plimer Joins Lateline Business.” Business. ABC News, [accessed10 April 2010]. 29 Anderson, A. (1997): Media, Culture, and the Environment. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP. 30 Boyce, T. and Lewis, J. (2009) eds. Climate Change and the Media. New York: Peter Lang. 31 Wilson, K. M. (2000): “Communicating Climate Change

Through the Media: Predictions, Politics and Perceptions of Risk. Environmental Risks and the Media. Eds. Stuart Allan et al. New York: Routledge, p. 201–217. 32 Boykoff, M. T., and Boykoff, J.M. (2004): “Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US Prestige Press.” Global Environmental Change 14, p 125–136. 33 Veron, J.E.N. (2008): A Reef in Time: The Great Barrier Reef from Beginning to End. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP. 34 Lomborg, B. (2001): The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 35 Chrichton, M. (2004): State of Fear. New York: Avon Books. 36 Beck, U. (2009): World at Risk. Cambridge: Polity. 37 Ibid. p. 98. 38 Debord, G. (1994): The Society of the Spectacle. New York: Zone Books. 39 Lambeck, K. (2009, June 7) “Comments on Heaven and Earth: Global Warming: The Missing Science.” Ockham’s Razor. ABC Radio National, [accessed 4 Sept. 2009]. 40 Lateline (2009, December 15): Plimer, Monbiot Cross Swords Over Climate Change.” Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 41 Monbiot, G. (2010): Showdown With Plimer, in Monbiot.com. [accessed 15 April 2010]. 42 Ehrlich, P. (1971): The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine Books. 43 Ehrlich, P. and Ehrlich A. (1996): Betrayal of Science and Reason: How Anti-Environmental Rhetoric Threatens Our Future. Washington, DC: Island Press, p. 1. 44 Ibid. p. 1. 45 Hamilton, C. (2009, May 11): Nature Will Deal With Sceptics, in Crikey, [accessed 25 Aug. 2009]. 46 Lindahl, E. (2006): Mediating Nature. London: Routledge, p. 226. 47 Hamilton, C. (2007): Scorcher: The Dirty Politics of Climate Change. Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, p. 16. 48 Baxter, C. (2010): Dealing in Doubt: The Climate Denial Industry and Climate Science: A Brief History of Attacks on Climate Science, Climate Scientists and the IPCC. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International. 49 Hoggan, J., and Littlemore, R. (2009): Climate Cover-Up: The Crusade to Deny Global Warming. Vancouver: Greystone Books. 50 Oreskes, N., and Conway, E. (2010): Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. Bloomsbury. 51 Hoggan and Littlemore (2009). 52 Devine, M. (2009, April 18): Planet Doomsayers Need a Cold Shower, in Sydney Morning Herald [accessed17 April 2010]. 53 Pearson, C. (2009, April 18): Sceptic Spells Doom for Alarmists, in The Australian, [accessed 17 April 2010]. 54 Pearse, G. (2007): High and Dry: John Howard, Climate Change and the Selling of Australia’s Future. Camberwell, Victoria: Viking, particularly p. 159–162; 247–250. 55 “About APPEA.” APPEA, n.d. Web. 18 April 2010. 56 Pearse, G. (2007). p. 211. 57 Ibid. p. 250. 58 Hoggan and Littlemore, (2009), p. 4. 59 Hamilton, C, (2007), p. 13. 60 Beck, U. (2009), p. 98. 61 Ibid. 62 Pettenger, M., ed. (2007): The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses. Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 244. 63 Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1996). 64 Lindahl, E. (2006), p. 233. 65 Cass, D. (2009, Sep 2): On the Slow Death of PoliticalTV: Time for Ecocene TV, in Crikey [accessed 2 Sep. 2009].

107

About the Contributors Angi Buettner is a lecturer in Media Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, Aotearoa New Zealand, where she researches in the areas of media and politics, news culture, and environmental communication. Her most recent publication is Holocaust Images and Picturing Catastrophe: The Cultural Politics of Seeing (Ashgate 2011). She was aided in the writing of her piece by her research assistant Misha Jemsek and by the discussions with Tony Schirato. Magnus Delsett is currently a student in the Social Economics program at the University of Oslo. Robyn Eckersley is Professor in Political Science in the School of Social and Political Sciences, and Director of the Master of International Relations Program at the University of Melbourne. Her most recent book is Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power (2012, co-author). She is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia and she served as Arne Næss Chair in Global Justice and the Environment at the University of Oslo for the northern winter of 20102011. She can be contacted at r.eckersley@unimelb.edu.au. Bård Sørdal Grasbekk is a Master’s student of Landscape Architecture at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. He is currently completing his Master’s thesis about different approaches to aesthetic valuation of natural and built environments. Arve Hansen is a research fellow and PhD candidate at the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) at the University of Oslo. He holds two masters degrees in Development Studies, from Universitat Jaume I (UJI) and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), and is currently working on a project on consumption and development amid the capitalist transition in Vietnam. He can be contacted at arve.hansen@sum.uio.no. Kathrine Hegstad is currently studying drawing at Einar Granum School of Art, and has previously studied media and communication. Bård Hobæk and Eirik Høyer Leivestad are Master’s students in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bergen. Julie Gjørtz Howden is currently completing her Master’s degree in law at the University of Bergen. The subject of her thesis is the law of international watercourses and its application in the TigrisEuphrates basin. She can be contacted at julie.howden@jur.uib.no. Astrid Humerfelt, Adam Peterson, and Sofi Nilsson are Master’s students in the program Design for Sustainable Development at Chalmers Tekniska Högskola in Goteborg, Sweden. Heida Karine Johannesdottir Mobeck lives in Oslo and plays the Tuba. Melanie Leeson is a Master’s student at the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) at the University of Oslo. She has worked in the coffee industry for the last four years and is in108

vestigating how direct trading impacts the wellbeing and livelihoods of coffee producers. She will complete fieldwork on this topic in Burundi this fall. She can be contacted at melaniel@student. hf.uio.no. Desmond McNeil graduated in economics from the University of Cambridge in 1969, and received a Ph.D in economics at University College London in 1988. From 1969 – 71 he was a volunteer in Tanzania, and from 1971 – 75 a consultant undertaking studies in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Since that time he has worked primarily as an academic, but with an interest in linking research with policy. From 1992 - 2001 he was Director of SUM. Since then he has been Professor, and Director of SUM’s Research School. Luis Carlos Rosado van der Gracht is a Mexican / Canadian Master’s student at the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) at the University of Oslo. His main research interests are in the fields of Philosophy, Environmental Ethics and Mesoamerican Archeology. He can be contacted at luiscr@student.hf.uio.no. David Rothenberg is Professor of Philosophy and Music at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. He is a musician, composer, editor of the MIT Press journal Terra Nova: Nature and Culture, and author of many books, including Hand´s End: Technology and the Limits of Nature (1993) Always the Mountains (2003), Why Birds Sing (2005), which inspired a documentary of the same name broadcast on BBC4, and Thousand Mile Song (2008). Eirik Severeide is currently studying art at Einar Granum School of Art. Vandana Shiva received her Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Western Ontario. She later shifted to inter-disciplinary research in science, technology and environmental policy, which she carried out at the Indian Institute of Science and the Indian Institute of Management in Bangalore. She has founded the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, and Bija Vidyapeeth, an international college for sustainable living in collaboration with Schumacher College, U.K. Eirik Frøhaug Swensen is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of Interdisciplinary studies of Culture at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim. He contributed to Norwegian Business School’s climate report 2011, and has previous experience with Changemaker Norway and Young Friends of the Earth Norway. Eivind Trædal is a Master’s student in the Culture, Environment and Sustainability program at SUM. He has previous experience with Young Friends of the Earth Norway. Nina Witoszek is a Polish-Irish-Norwegian writer, columnist and Research Professor at the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) at the University of Oslo, Norway. Her previous scholarly engagements include fellowships at the Swedish Collegium for the Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Uppsala, (1993); Robinson College, Cambridge (1995), Mansfield College, Oxford (2001) and visiting professorship at Woods Institute in Stanford (2010). Her publications include Postmodern Challenge (1998), Culture and Crisis in Germany and Scandinavia (2001), and The Origins of the Regime of Goodness (2012). 109