Africanagenda 16 2

ISSUE Vol. 16 No. 2 2013

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Contents COVER Africa 50 years on, from unity to union………...........................

page 5

Financing Africa's integration…………....................................... page 11 Africa's gender agenda 50 years on………................................... page 14 Emerging trends in political violence in Africa…........................ page 17 Africa strives to move from neo-colonial mining mode…….... page 20 Turning West Africa into a free Migration and Trade Zone….............................................................................. page 23

DEVELOPMENT Subsidies and GM crops back on food policy menu……......... page 25 The ironic return of the Portuguese to Africa……..................... page 27

INTERNATIONAL Thatcherism and Africans: beyond the revisionist history….... page 29

page 8 photo: Heads of state at AU summit

The battle of Cuito Cuanavale………........................................... page 32

ENVIRONMENT Senegal's uphill battle to control fishery sector…........................ page 34

African Agenda Published by TWN Africa

SOCIETY FESPACO 2013 honours African women……........................... page 35

BOOK REVIEW My first coup d'etat, a book by John Dramani Mahama…........

page 37

Editor-in-Chief: Yao Graham Editor: Cornelius Adedze Assistant Editor: Kwesi W. Obeng Circulation: Joyce Ofori-Kwafo Design: David Roy Quashie

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EDITORIAL

Africa still yearns for renaissance AFRICA'S efforts at meeting its development challenges over the years through the vehicle of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now rebranded the African Union has continued to be elusive. The major battle won by the OAU is that of decolonization-a prime objective of the OAU-- as currently all its 53 members are no longer colonies of European powers. Beyond that, various attempts at unity, economic or political have not made enough inroads in the last 50 years.

At the birth of the Organisation of African Unity, OAU, 50 years ago, talk was awash of how it signaled the rebirth of African civilization and the drive towards African unity. These came on the heels of resurgent Pan-Africanism across Europe, the Americas, the Caribbean and mainland Africa that contributed to the independence struggle of African states. Most of the leaders of the independence struggle in Africa, Kwame Nkrumah, Sedar Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta, Modibo Keita among others could identify with one strand or the other of Pan-Africanism. Africa's independence was for them a stage to re-launch the famed historical civilisations of Africa as well as work towards a united Africa.

Right from the beginning the kind of united Africa and how to achieve it became a bone of contention among the emerging African leadership. An immediate United States of Africa was the answer to some, for others a gradual process culminating in the United States of Africa was a better option (See page 5, Africa 50 years on from unity to union). 50 years after, African unity is yet to be achieved. On the eve of the transformation of the OAU to AU, a new development programmed christened, New Partnership for Africa's Development, NEPAD, was touted as the instrument for the 'renaissance' of Africa. A decade and more after NEPAD and as we celebrate 50 years of the OAU/AU there is talk about 'renaissance' again. How many times would Africa be reborn before it is able to face its development challenges head on? Have the earlier births been stillborn, abortive or false starts?

Of course all has not been negative over the 50 years lifespan of the OAU/AU. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which are to be the building blocks 4

of the united Africa seem to be working, though at snail pace and with varying degrees of progress. (See page 23, Turning West Africa into a free migration and trade zone). Financing the African unity project is one major hurdle yet to be cleared as many countries fail to pay up their levies.

The result is the return to near control of Africa's development path by foreign 'donors' who invariably tend to have some leeway on the policy space of African countries. On taking over last year as AU Commission's chairperson, Dlamini-Zuma bemoaned the fact that nearly all of the AU's programmes are funded largely by foreign donors. Indeed, over 97% of programmes in the AU are funded by donors, including even staff salaries. How can the AU for that Africa progress under such circumstance? Proposals to offset this debilitating financial situation are not in short supply (See page 11, Financing Africa's integration).

Gender has also become topical in the AU, a departure from the OAU era when not much attention was paid to the issue. As if to buttress the point, the current chair of the AU Commission as well as six out of its ten commissioners are all women. (See page 14, Africa's gender agenda 50 years on). This does not however, guarantee that gender issues will become prominent in the workings of the African Union as most often appointment of women to prominent positions, has tended to become an easy alternative to dealing with gender issues. A simple affirmative action of ensuring women take up positions in AU Commission does not address deep-seated gender challenges that hinder social progress in Africa. The gender agenda of the AU should not therefore be limited to appointing more women to positions within the AU Commission and member countries, it should include ensuring that gender protocols are not only ratified but also implemented in the member countries to uplift the living standards of women on the continent.

Various declarations and commitments continued to be made by heads of state and government to gender equality but the situation in most AU member states has not changed much over the last 50 years. In their declaration at the 50th AFRICAN AGENDA

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Anniversary commemorative summit, African heads of state and government have once again reaffirmed their commitment to 'greater unity', 'determination' to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force, including those of equality between men and women' among others.

Nice words, ever repeated and have not meant much over the years.

Another promise is the promotion and harmonizing of the teaching of African history to advance the African identity. Good idea but the challenge here is how to ensure that the kind of history promoted must reflect the African reality. Ongoing efforts should be intensified and implemented as soon as possible to address age-old 'historical misinformation' that has passed as African history and has done harm to Africa's esteem in the world. The repair of the damage inflicted on the African psyche through centuries of a 'history' that reduced the self-esteem of the African thereby making him feel subordinate to other races is long overdue.

After reaffirming their 'common destiny', 'shared values' etc the declaration ended on a rather disappointing note by pushing to 2063 the unity agenda termed, 'Continental Agenda 2063' by which time they say 'through a people-driven process' they will realise the vision for 'an integrated, people-centred, prosperous Africa at peace with itself.'

At this rate African unity will not be achieved not even in the envisaged half-century proposed. The rest of the world is not waiting for Africa. An Africa, whose close to one billion population if united can change not only the development fortunes of its people but also that of the rest of the world.

The Continental Free Trade Area, the free movement of goods and people across the continent are immediate and initial building blocks that must be implemented as soon as possible if Africa is to make any headway in overcoming its development challenges. Mere lip service expressed in platitudes of 'fast tracking' integration will not help bring integration and the fruits thereof for the suffering, marginalized and poverty-stricken peoples of Africa.

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Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Emperor Haile Selassie - pioneers of African unity

Africa 50 years on from unity to union As the Organisation of African Unity, OAU, transformed itself to become the African Union, the challenges that dogged the Pan-African attempt at unity at its birth 50 years ago this year have lingered, writes * Cornelius Adedze.

THE desire for a united Africa, just after the independence of some African countries in the 50s resulted in the formation of various groupings. The two dominant groups were the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group. The Casablanca Group was in favour of a politically united federation of African states immediately whereas the Monrovia Group wanted a looser alliance based on gradual economic cooperation. In the end, on 25th May, 1963, in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, 32 independ-

ent African countries brought into being the Organisation of African Unity, OAU, a compromised institution.

50 years on the OAU now transformed into the AU has not got any closer to achieving either an economic union nor has it blossomed into a loose federation of African states. The fundamental challenges of whether total political unity or an economic union would best suit the interests of Africa still persist. At its Summit in 2007 in Accra, Ghana to commemorate Ghana's AFRICAN AGENDA

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50th Independence Anniversary the issue was touted as the Grand Debate that was to finally settle the issue between the 'gradualists' and the 'instantists'. Unfortunately, the debate was not to be. So Union government of Africa once more slipped by and as then Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisii put it, 'integration should be gradual, rather than precipitous. It must be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.'

True political and individual differences may have prevented OAU from 5

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reaching its goal of unity but the primary aim of decolonizing the continent is one of the major achievements that the organisation can boast of. By the close of the 70s most of Africa was independent save for Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

South Africa, the last colonial bastion was freed from the clutches of Apartheid Rule in 1994. Beyond decolonization however, various attempts at unification not just as a United States of Africa but through cooperation in various ways have not been fully achieved.

Specialised agencies like the Pan African News Agency, Pan-African Telecommunications Union, Pan-African Postal Union, Union of African National Television and Radio Organisations have become dormant if not moribund. The OAU limped on as African countries struggled from one challenge to the other for economic survival from the 70s onwards, battered by both the effects of the Cold War and later Structural Adjustment. The initial differences on the way forward for African Unity became more pronounced as each country and its leadership looked more toward their individual country's 'survival' rather than that of the collective African state.

Just like in the founding and early stages of the OAU, some African leaders stepped up to pursue the 'unity' agenda in diverse ways. Unfortunately unlike the founding years when one could count on the likes of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nasser of Egypt, and others to hold the fort for those calling for 'unity' as soon as possible, by the 70s these 'progressive voices' had been silenced, through coup d'etats or death. The 'gradualists' like HouphouetBoigny of Cote d'Ivoire, Senghor of Senegal, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia then held sway.

The 70s thus saw a slowdown in the attempts at political unity of Africa and was punctuated by the effects of the Cold War as African countries got caught up in the West and East war of ideology and domination. The fault lines of the Organisation of African Unity were made sharper in this period as members were divided along the ideological lines of Capitalism and Communism no longer along lines of immediate and gradual political unity of Africa.

Africa's efforts at integration have thus been largely influenced and dictated by individual leaders who called the shots due 6

“The initial differences on the way forward for African Unity became more pronounced as each country and its leadership looked more toward their individual country's 'survival' rather than that of the collective African state.” to their economic or political hold over others. With the worsening economic situation in most African countries the solution to it as suggested by some was the strengthening of regional economic blocs that should be the building blocks of a futuristic united Africa. They took a leaf from the blossoming European Union. Thus the era of regional economic communities, RECs, began. On the heels of these came such seminal efforts as the Lagos Plan of Action and eventually the Abuja Treaty that called for establishment of institutions like the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, the African Court of Justice and in particular, the Pan-African Parliament. The Abuja treaty reiterated the strengthening and consolidation of the RECs as the pillars for achieving the objectives of an African Economic Community and finally a Union of African states.

In pursuit of these objectives the OAU from 1999 initiated a series of extraordinary sessions aimed at achieving economic and political integration of the continent. Four OAU summits were critical in this. These were: •

The Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999) (Decision to establish an African Union taken)

•

The Lome Summit (2000) (Adoption of the Constitutive Act of the Union).

•

The Lusaka Summit (2001) (The road map for the implementation of the AU drawn)

•

The Durban Summit (2002) (Launch of the AU and convening of the 1st Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union).

The Sirte Summit was spearheaded by the late Libyan leader, Muammar Gadhafi AFRICAN AGENDA

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who thought that the time was due for the realisation of the United States of Africa, a dream of some of the founding fathers of the Organisation of African Unity. His radical ideas for an immediate implementation however, as usual met with resistance from the 'gradualists' and skeptics who doubted his intentions and saw in him an ambition to become leader of a united Africa, just like others before him saw Nkrumah as an overambitious leader seeking to become President of a united Africa.

Gadhafi's plan of actualising the initial dreams of a united Africa with a single army, a common currency and trade and travel freedom, was thus shot down. Indeed this proposal led rather to further divisions within the OAU as once again a watered down version resulted in the formation of the African Union. For some the objectives of the African Union are more comprehensive and attuned to the current needs of the continent than those of its predecessor, the OAU. The transformation of the OAU to the AU also coincided with the introduction of NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, sponsored by the likes of Thabo Mbeki (then President of South Africa) and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria. This new development paradigm, a neo-liberal, Western-sponsored effort was diametrically opposed to Gadhafi's proposals that relied more on Africa's own homegrown efforts at development.

The NEPAD agenda which 'killed' Gadhafi's ideas could not also survive and thus threw Africa back into finding out another approach to unity and development. The regional economic communities are themselves at varied levels of integration. Some have made some progress whereas others are still a long way off achieving their objectives. In the meantime, Africa continues to be riddled with social, economic, and political challenges that the African Union given its current status is unable to resolve. Top on the list are the civil strifes in Somalia, DRC, and Mali among others that the African Union is at pains to deal with. In Mali, the regional economic community, ECOWAS, could not deal with the situation until France bulldozed its way through. In Somalia, where civil war has raged on since the 90s, the AU has found it an intractable situation though it has some forces there. Will the muchtalked about African Standby Force have stood up to these situations?

A new deadline of 2015 has just been

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THE AIMS OF THE OAU: •

To promote the unity and solidarity of African States;

•

To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

•

To defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;

•

To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

•

To promote international cooperation.

THE AIMS OF THE AFRICAN UNION: •

Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;

•

Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;

•

Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;

•

Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;

•

Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

•

Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

•

Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;

•

Promote and protect human peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;

•

Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;

•

Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;

•

Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;

•

Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;

•

Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology; and

•

Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

issued the five regions - East, West, Central, North and Southern Africa - to develop their own standby brigades with military, the police and civilian components. For a force whose idea was mooted 50 years ago at the founding of the OAU the new deadline speaks volumes of Africa's preparedness to confront its challenges. This is the

third time that a new deadline has had to be issued.

The African Union backed African Standby Force's (ASF) operationalisation was planned for 2008, pushed to 2010, then 2013 and now to 2015. There are doubts by experts as to whether the force will be operational by then.

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“Just about 10 percent of Africa's imports are from Africa with close to 90 percent from outside Africa. Should Africa sign the Economic Partnership Agreement, EPA, with the European Union, it is likely trade among African countries will further dwindle as Africa would be swamped with European goods and services. “ Economic cooperation has not fared better either. Free movement of people and goods thereby facilitating trade among African countries is also a big challenge.

Apart from infrastructural challenges (which NEPAD was to address), policy harmonisation and implementation remain major obstacles although with varying degrees in the various regional economic communities. Trade among African countries though on the increase remains small as compared with trade with the rest of the world. Just about 10 percent of Africa's imports are from Africa with close to 90 percent from outside Africa. Should Africa sign the Economic Partnership Agreement, EPA, with the European Union, it is likely trade among African countries will further dwindle as Africa would be swamped with European goods and services.

Africa's quest to work together to confront the threat that globalisation poses it is also at risk as foreign 'partners' seem to have taken over the policy direction of the African Union. Some of these foreign partners have become more or less consultants to the AU thereby directing its policy whilst others underwrite its expenditure.

50 years of the OAU/AU may have chalked some successes from decolonisation to efforts at uniting the continent but unless the teething problems that were pushed aside in the organisation's founding years are dealt with, the ghosts of that period would continue to haunt and dog the continent's attempts at unity. * Cornelius Adedze is editor, African Agenda.

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AU @ 50 Summit in pictures

8

AU Commission Chair

Heads of state at AU summit

Children’s choir

Adult’s choir

AU Commission Executive Council

Former heads of state

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AU @ 50 Summit in pictures

Former Zambian leader Kenneth Kaunda

Ghana’s President John Mahama

Media at closing press conference

Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta

Artwork commemorating anniversary

Delegates at AU at 50 summit

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Factfile OAU/AU Admission dates of member states 25 May 1963:

13 December 1963: 13 July 1964: 16 December 1964: October 1965: 31 October 1966:

Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), D R Congo, Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan, Tanzania (Tanganyika), Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Zanzibar (Later joined Tanganyika to become Tanzania).

Kenya Malawi Zambia The Gambia Botswana, Lesotho

August 1968: 24 September 1968: 12 October 1968: 19 November 1973: 11 February 1975: 18 July 1975: 29 June 1976: 27 June 1977: June 1980: 22 February 1982: June 1990: 24 May 1993: 6 June 1994:

Mauritius Swaziland Equatorial Guinea Guinea-Bissau Angola Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe Seychelles Djibouti Zimbabwe Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) Namibia Eritrea South Africa

Organs of the African Union Assembly The Constitutive Act is very specific about the functions and powers of the Assembly as the supreme organ of the AU comprising of Heads of State and Government. South Africa has participated in the development of the Rules of Procedure for the Assembly, and the same process has taken place at SADC level.

Executive Council The Executive Council is a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other Ministers charged with the responsibility of dealing with the AU. The issues discussed by the Executive Council will have to feed into the Assembly.

Permanent Representatives Committee The Permanent Representative Committee is composed of Permanent Representatives and other Plenipotentiaries to the Union. This structure was not formally recognised under the OAU, even though the Ambassadors do meet on an ongoing basis. The PRC, amongst other things, will work closely with the Commission; be involved in the process of nomination and appointment of Commissioners; look into the selection and appointment of consultants and follow-up on the implementation of Summit decisions. The work of the PRC will feed into the Executive Council.

Commission The Commission will be based at the Headquarters of the AU and will be headed by the Chairperson of the AU. The Chairperson

10

will be assisted by a Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners, as well as other members of staff.

Specialised Technical Committees There will also be Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) established within the Secretariat and headed by Commissioners. The STCs will deal with issues such as Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters, Monetary and Financial Affairs, Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters, Science, Technology, Transport, Communications, Education, Culture, amongst other things.

Pan-African Parliament (PAP) The Protocol establishing the Pan African Parliament was adopted in 2000 during the OAU Summit in Lomè, Togo. The Protocol is now open for signature and ratification. So far 21 member states have signed and three have ratified. Article 22 of the PAP protocol provides for the Protocol to enter into force after deposit of the instruments of ratification by a simple majority of the member states.

Though the Constitutive Act of the African Union does not elaborate on the functions and powers of the Pan African Parliament, the Protocol provides that, for the first five years of the Parliament's existence, it will have advisory and consultative powers only.

Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) The Lusaka OAU Summit requested the Secretary General to submit to the 76th AFRICAN AGENDA

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Ordinary Session of Council, i.e. July 2002, a report on ECOSOCC with recommendations on structure, areas of competence, criteria for selecting members of ECOSOCC, relationship between ECOSOCC and African regional NGOs and professional groups, ECOSOCC's Rules of Procedure and its work programme.

This is one organ of the AU that will provide for civil society participation. The Lusaka Summit decision on ECOSOCC directs that member states will have to decide on the structure, functioning, areas of competence selection criteria, Rules of Procedure and work programme of the ECOSOCC.

Court of Justice The Constitutive Act of the AU provides for the establishment of the Court of Justice and for a Protocol on its statute, composition and functions. It is still unclear what the exact functions and powers of the Court will be, and whether it will have jurisdiction over states or nationals.

The functions and powers of the Court will be elaborated upon in a Protocol, which will clarify what the impact on domestic legislation will be.

Financial Institutions Article 19 of the Act provides for the establishment of financial institutions whose rules and regulations shall be defined in protocols relating thereto. The implications of hosting these organs will only become apparent once the relevant protocols have been concluded. The institutions are: • The African Bank • The African Monetary Fund • African Investment Bank

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Financing Africa's Integration Skeptics of continental integration too often claim that institutions like the African Union and the RECs will never get far because apart from the political will, they do not have resources.

While this kind of criticism is valid, one can also readily dismiss it against the face of efforts by institutions to resolve it, contends *Emmanuel Bensah. limitations to the existing financing mechanism. To this end, they authorized the Commission of the African Union to undertake studies, with the assistance of experts, to identify what one AU press release of December 2010 calls “alternative modalities of funding” the programmes of the then-OAU. Currently, the African Union funds are predicated on two sources of financing: member states contributions and partner's contributions. It is conceivable that the major constraint associated with these two sources constrain the AU from implementing its integration agenda. At no time has this become as important as now when the effects of the 2008 financial crisis are affecting Africa in different ways. As a consequence, AU policymakers believe it is hightime the AU got its act together by implementing the decisions of the Lusaka Summit.

Appeal

Imposing Chinese-built and donated AU Headquarters

THE idea of innovative financing for organizations like the African Union is not new as they have been ongoing since 2001. The actual idea emanated from a summit in Lusaka, Zambia in 2001. In conceiving of

the AU, the Heads of State and Government of the AU appreciated the fact that they needed to pursue the idea of a new source and mechanism to finance the AU. In doing so, they realized that there were AFRICAN AGENDA

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The Lusaka Appeal is contained in Decision AHG/Dec.160(XXXVII), which reads as follows:(1)The Conference authorizes the Secretary-General to: (i)Explore the possibility of mobilizing extra-budgetary contributions from member states, OAU partners and others; (ii)Undertake studies, with the assistance of experts, to identify alternative modalities of funding the activities and programmes of the OAU, bearing in mind that the Union cannot operate on the basis of assessed contributions from member states only, and to make appropriate recommendations thereon.” It goes on to list challenges, which include funding that fluctuates and is “paltry”; funding sources that are limited and “are not diversified and remain permanently uncertain”; the “largely inadequate” and “unstable” funds that are given to the AU, and which are not given “in real-time”.

It finally concludes that “the one and only solution allowing Africa to meet all 11

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these challenges lie in Africa making available to the AU and its organs, their own resources that are stable, substantial and more or less permanent; and hence the Lusaka Appeal of July 2001 As one might expect, the implementation of the Lusaka Appeal has been fraught with challenges, which include, for example, country delegations. Most often than not, the experts working on the Appeal are not the same ones from one meeting to another; and the government changes in countries also change with every government, inevitably taking with them vital information that would have been necessary as input for the implementation.

This trend has inevitably derailed the “virtually-permanent achievements” of previous meetings, with each new delegation wanting to make its mark on the proposed instruments.

The encouraging news is that a decision was adopted at the 15th ordinary sessions of the Assembly of the AU in Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010, and that decision reflects the firm political will of the Heads of State and Government to finalize the issue. Furthermore, the political will expressed by Heads of State and Government in the Kampala Decision invites experts as well as the ministers, to truly address the issue and make clear, consensual and concrete recommendations very much-needed for innovative financing to make the impact it so needs for African integration.

Contention On the back of this critical debate is a source of contention among policy-makers over how the AU sources its funds. In an October 2012 report entitled “A Stream cannot rise above its source: Financing of Africa's Regional Integration”, the five-page analysis (written by the Executive Director of the CCP-AU Janah Ncube and Policy Analyst with the Open Society Foundation's AU Advocacy Program Maureen Akena), offered a fairly succinct view of what is happening with the African Union's finances; what are the challenges to the financing, and what models exist that can inform a change.

The July 2012 summit approved the 2013 budget of the AU, which totals USD277 million, with contributions as follows: the AU member states pay 44% of the budget (122.8 million), with donors paying no less than 56% of the budget, or 155.3 12

million. That said, the total operational cost of USD117.4 million is covered by the Member states. With respect to the programs budget, member states pay 3%, with the donors footing a whopping 97% of the budget.

According to the authors, program costs for key institutions, such as the PanAfrican Parliament(PAP); the Human Rights Commission (ACHPR); the African Court (AfCHPR); NEPAD Planning Commission Agency (NPCA); the Commission on International Law(AUCIL); the Anti-Corruption Board and the Committee on the Rights and Welfare of Children (ACRWC) are all paid for by external donors! There is no allocation at all from member states towards the latter, which has the mandate to promote and protect the rights of children in Africa.

There is no gainsaying “he who pays the piper calls the tune”, which is the appropriate sub-heading for the section in the report explaining the dominance of donors in the operationalisation of the AU's work. The report states “while it is commendable that the operational costs are wholly covered by AU member states, it is quite disturbing that the integration and development agenda for this continent is being paid for by foreign resources.”

Inevitably, it can only prompt the question of who really is in control of the AU. Even if donors, because of the global economic downturn, were able to come up with 42% of what was expected from them in mid-2012, does that substantial sum not lead the AU member states beholden to them Bottom line is that the AU often has to wait on external funding before being able to respond to conflicts that require peacekeeping missions. Given all that is happening in Mali; Somalia; Eastern DRC and Guinea Bissau, it is very likely most of the funding will from donors. The report could not have put it better when it states “we cannot champion our African solutions when we can't pay for them.” While it may seem common-sense for some, it seems not-somuch for African policymakers who often go, cap-in-hand, to donors and the West to ask for technology transfer and “assistance.”

Before we answer that, it is important to first explain who is actually paying the funds at the AU. The truth is both shocking and funny: five countries-paying $16million each-pay 66% of the AU member states contribution. These are South Africa; AFRICAN AGENDA

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Nigeria; Libya; Egypt; and Algeria. This inevitably means that the 34% of AU member states contributions are paid by a shocking and whopping 48 African countries.

The report maintains that by mid2012, only 11(20%) of the 54 member states had fully-paid their contributions; with 19 countries owing for the current year and 24(44%) having arrears from previous years.

With these execrable statistics, how on Earth do African policymakers expect the African Union to operate? These are fundamental questions that need answering. The regional economic communities seem to offer an answer.

Sources The original study by the Commission of the African Union proposed no less than eight scenarios of innovative financing sources. These sources are to be structured around: (a) tax on imports; (b)tax on revenue from hydrocarbon exports; (c)tax on insurance premiums; (d)levy on airline tickets; (e) involvement of the private sector through sponsorship and other forms of support; (f) the sale of items and other products carrying the African Union symbol. However, as a consequence of a series of expert meetings and ministerial conferences, the Commission's choice was limited to the following main components or instruments: (i) levy on imports from the rest of the world; (ii)levy on airline tickets; and (iii)levy on insurance policies.

In order to obtain a greater insight into how these three instruments are used in levying taxes for some of the AU's regional economic communities, we need to turn to the cases of the Economic Community of Central African States(ECCAS); UEMOA/CEMAC; and ECOWAS. Truth be told, ECOWAS, UEMOA, ECCAS and CEMAC are the only RECs that have been implementing the levy on imports from non-member countries with some degree of success In ECCAS, the levy is called the *community contribution for integration (CCI)*. Consumer goods, originating from third countries, imported by member states are subject to the CCI. Products that are excluded from the field of taxation are products originating from the Community and imported goods under “suspensive customs regimes”.

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These amounts collected under the CCI are deposited into an account opened on behalf of ECCAS at the Central Bank of each of the 15 member countries of ECCAS. In addition, a central account for ECCAS is also opened at the Central Bank of the country, which hosts the headquarters - as in the case of the cash account in Libreville, Gabon.

On the plus side, if the CCI is wellimplemented and all countries have a surplus in the ECCAS account opened in their central bank, it is the entire region that is strengthened.

According to the AU's “Bulletin on Fridays”, these two organizations implement fully the Community levy system.

One of the major reasons for this is because they are both customs unions, which facilitates the implementation of this measure.

The levy rate in UEMOA is 1%. As a consequence, the levy rate in the member countries of UEMOA is 1.5%, broken down as follows: (i)1% for UEMOA; (ii)0.5% for ECOWAS countries.

In ECOWAS, as in ECCAS, the community levy is placed on taxable value of goods imported into the Community from third countries and marketed for consumption. The following are exempt from the community levy: (i)aid, grants and nonrepayable subsidies for a state, public corporations and state-approved charities; (ii)goods imported from third countries through financing provided by foreign partners, subject to a provision exempting such products from all tax levies; (iii) good imported by firms under the existing tax system at the date of entry into force of this Protocol; (iv) the goods having been charged the community levy under any previous tax regime.

ECOWAS Community levies are predicated on: (i) CIF (cost insurance freight) value at the port of landing for imports by sea; (ii) the CIF value of imports by land at the point of entry into the customs territory of the Community; (iii)the customs value at the port of landing (APOD) for imports by air; (iv)the market price list of the respective goods.

Based on the import value of imported goods, the customs requires the importer (who is also from the private sector) to issue two cheques: one in favour of UEMOA(1%) and the second in favour of ECOWAS(0.5%). The Customs Services in turn deposit the cheques received from importers to the accounts of UEMOA and

ECOWAS, which have been opened at the Central Bank of each state.

Finally, in ECOWAS, it is important to know how these funds are used. First, the funds go to the regular budget of the Community and its institutions', such as the West African Monetary Institute and the ECOWAS Regulatory Electricity Authority (ERERA). The funds exclude the budget of the Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund; (ii)the budget to compensate revenue losses suffered due to trade liberalization; (iii) the financing of development activities; and (iv)any other allocation decided by the Authority or the Council including the capital increase of the ECOWAS Fund.

Tax Even after all this good news on financing African integration, the story is not quite over - as exemplified by discussions on more levies. In this specific proposal, which is also known as “a citizen tax”, the idea is to get this levy to involve “all African citizens” through insurance subscriptions: automobile and real estate. Heath insurance is exempted.

The “solidarity tax” is so-named because most of the tax is supposed to come from G8 and G20, and can be applied to flights leaving Africa and with destinations in Africa; flights departing from Africa with destinations outside Africa, with the Commission of the African Union proposing US$2 for short distances, and US$5 for long distances.

Truth be told, ECOWAS member state Senegal has been doing this for a while. In the country, the tax applies only to flights departing from airports in the country.

Collection of the levy is done through IATA for all airlines associated with it. At its monthly payment operations, IATA pays the share due Senegal into a bank account (escrow account) held with the BNP Paribas The bottom line is that even as cheap and conditional loans may have dried up from the Breton Woods Institutions, through the Lome-based ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), West African countries, can easily obtain funding to finance both its private and public sector initiatives.

Formerly known as the ECOWAS Fund, EBID is the principal financial institution of ECOWAS. With its holding company operating through its two subsidiariesAFRICAN AGENDA

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the public-sector-focused ECOWAS Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the private-sector-led ECOWAS Regional Investment Bank (ERIB has), EBID remains the financing bank of NEPAD projects in the region. In so many ways, it is the European Investment Bank counterpart in the ECOWAS sub-region, and has been around since the inception of ECOWAS in 1975.

Observers of the sub-region believe EBID has, in many respects, been a trailblazer in the sub-region in the way it has maintained a consistent brief of fostering greater integration in the sub-region among its member states - especially in the light of the conflicts that mired the sub-region in the early nineties. So focused has it been in facilitating sub-regional integration that in 2004, in conjunction with the African Development Bank, it set up a Conflict Prevention Fund, which is indeed managed

by EBID.

Levy Meanwhile, ECOWAS has recently agreed on the creation of a 1.5 per cent Community Integration Levy which scope and operationalisation would be the subject of further regional reflection as part of the mechanisms to enable the region cope with the challenges of implementation of the new tariff regime.

According to Ecowas, the levy will seek to replace the two existing community levy regimes in the region comprising the ECOWAS Community levy and the counterpart Community Solidarity levy for the UEMOA. In conclusion, when one reflects on this, can one not really say we need to continue depending on donors, or is it perhaps not time to re-consider that fallacy of needing an “aid-exit” plan to woo investors and so-called FDI? If African policy-makers can get past this mindset - and it is possible for the sub-region to do this, as exemplified by the instrumental role the Ecowas Bank for Investment and Development is playing in the sub-region - then the sky will certainly offer itself as the proverbial limit on seed funding for continuing the narrative of African integration which continues to be written summit after summit. * Emmanuel Bensah is Communications Officer, TWN-Africa.

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AU Commission Chair, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuna

Africa's gender agenda 50 years on The July 2012 election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the position of Chair of the African Union represented not only a milestone in the continental body's history, but it also an affirmation that African women occupying leadership positions had come a long way since the Organization of African Unity was established 50 years ago, writes *Pauline Vande Pallen.

AT the time of independence, despite being part and parcel of the different liberation struggles and being members of parliament in a number of countries, and holding ministerial positions in countries like Ghana and Guinea, there was no similar effort to ensure women's voices were heard at the continental level with the establishment of the OAU. And whereas voices such as Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana were posing 14

questions such as “What part can the women of Africa and the women of African descent play in the struggle for African emancipation?�, the Charter of the OAU had no reference to women or the roles they could play, or how the institution could support their advancement or address issues of gender equality.

The situation is different today. There has been a greater recognition of and attenAFRICAN AGENDA

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tion to the role of women in Africa's integration and development processes. The African Union, successor to the Organization of African Unity has taken a different stance on gender issues focusing on both the institutional mechanisms that focus on gender as well as actively ensuring women have leadership roles in the organization. For the main institution promoting Africa's integration, 50 years of engaging

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with various actors particularly, civil society groups and organizations has resulted in a number of positive changes with regards to raising the profile of gender and gender issues in Africa's international institutions, and through the institutions to African countries.

When the Organization of African Unity was established in 1963, the main impetus for the Heads of State championing the formation of the body was to among others solidify political and economic links in order to “consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms”. To do this the organization aimed to “harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in all spheres of endeavor”.

The role of women in this grand scheme for Africa was little mentioned. In fact there was not one mention of women or gender equality in the Charter establishing the OAU, and despite the efforts by African women's groups and organizations for the organization to advance the gender equality issues, it took the OAU 29 years to set up the Gender and Development Directorate, GDD.

Impact It was one thing however to set up the Gender Directorate and another to make it effective. Even after the Gender and Development Directorate was set up its impact on the organization was minimal.

The GDD was essentially hampered in its ability to carry out its work by a number of weaknesses. Insufficient human and financial resources were major challenges. In addition the layers of bureaucracy that it had to work through limited the Directorate’s ability to both attract needed funding and to develop and undertake programmes that addressed gender gaps.

The OAU also had a dismal record when it came to women in leadership positions. Up until the time the OAU was succeeded by the AU there were few, if any, women in leadership positions. The weaknesses of the OAU on gender equality issues gave it little leverage in calling on its member states to address issues of gender.

When the OAU was succeeded by the African Union in 2002, it adopted a different approach to gender issues. Unlike the OAU, which, as a consequence of its time -

the post-colonial period, and the height of the East-West superpower divide - was all about establishing the continent as a power, a force in its own right, the African Union (AU) came into being when neoliberal globalization was at its height. Ostensibly part of its response to the current political and economic global outlook was to set out might be described as a more people-centric approach, seeking among others to promote democratic principles and institutions, encourage the participation of various constituencies and promote good governance principles.

Women have been a key constituency in Africa's development and right from its establishment the AU has recognized the need to engage with women. The promotion of gender equality is one of the principles set out in the Constitutive Act. Thus the AU seeks to build “partnerships “between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women ...”.

Effort Like the OAU, the AU has established a gender unit, the Women, Gender and Development Directorate (WGDD).

However, unlike the OAU, there has been an effort to support the work of the WGDD. Located in the office of the Chairperson of the AU Commission the WGDD has political support to carry out its mandate of mainstreaming gender, undertaking research and advocacy and building capaci-

“There have been steps taken to ensure the gender parity principle holds true at the level of heads of divisions and eventually throughout the Commission and the other arms of the AU albeit with different levels of success.” ty on issues of gender within the AU and its organs (including the regional economic communities - RECs) as well as within member states.

Since its establishment the WGDD had a role in a number of positive initiatives on gender equality championed by the AU. In 2003 African Heads of State and AFRICAN AGENDA

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Government adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women, the Maputo Protocol. The Protocol which went into effect in 2005 is a landmark in the push for gender equality in Africa although not without controversy. It seeks to combat discrimination and violence against women, as well as promote and ensure the rights of African women.

As of January 2013, 46 of the 53 members of the AU have signed the Protocol, 36 countries have ratified it and there are 4 countries that have neither signed nor ratified the instrument. The WGDD has, together with African women's right groups, been engaged in advocacy for various government to ratify a the Protocol The African Women's Decade is an initiative spearheaded by the WGDD. Launched in 2010, the decade is expected to review progress made towards attaining gender equality and women's empowerment. It is also expected that concrete actions to accelerate progress on the goals will be identified as well as measures to increase and secure funding for gender equality and women's empowerment programmes would be taken. Over the ten year period, themes to be focused on will include, fighting poverty and promoting economic empowerment and entrepreneurship; agriculture and food security; environment and climate change; finance and gender budgets and women in decision making positions.

Already the AU has made an effort to increase the number of women in decision making positions particularly in the AU commission based on the principle of gender parity. Currently six of the ten AU Commissioners are women, holding portfolios such as Trade and Industry, Human Resources, Science and Technology and Rural Economy and Agriculture. There have been steps taken to ensure the gender parity principle holds true at the level of heads of divisions and eventually throughout the Commission and the other arms of the AU albeit with different levels of success.

Yet despite the positives chalked by the AU in advancing the gender equality and women's empowerment agenda, there still remain a number of challenges that not only impact the effectiveness of the institution's own gender programme, but also impact its ability to influence member states on their on gender programmes.

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Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf

Two of the critiques of the erstwhile Gender and Development Directorate of the OAU was it was poorly staffed and it was far removed from the executive arm of the organization. The layers of bureaucracy that it had to muddle through made it difficult to attract the needed funding. It can be imagined that bridging these layers informed the decision to locate the Women, Gender and Development Directorate in the Office of the Chairman of the Commission. Yet the WGDD continues to be constrained by the lack of sufficient human and sufficient financial resources to carry out its programmes.

There are similarities with national level gender focused institutions. In Ghana for example, the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs recently given a new designation as the Ministry of Gender and Social Protection, was one of the least budgeted for ministries. Its budgetary allocation was but a fraction of what other ministries received and much of that was dependent on donor inflows.

Yet while there are similarities there are also dissimilarities.

With the exception of Rwanda which in actual fact is the only country in the world in which women have a majority in parliament, and Mozambique and South Africa which have a high percentage of women in 16

Women fetching water

parliament, African countries continue to do poorly in terms of women in governance.

Women continue to be on average less than 20% of the parliament, far less than the recommended 30% threshold. Leadership positions in African continues to be male dominated. Only two of Africa’s presidents are women - President Ellen JohnsonSirleaf of Liberia and President Joyce Banda of Malawi. A number of governments have made efforts to appoint women to high positions - in Ghana Justice Georgina Wood is Chief Justice and the 4th most important person in the land. In Nigeria Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is the Minister of Finance.

Women continue to confront multiple challenges in making it to the government table. Systemic prejudices often mean that the entry barrier to public life is raised higher for women than men.

The discussion on the progress of African institutions and gender equality cannot be without an acknowledgement of the role of African women's rights organizations and groups. Groups like FEMNET and Femme Africa Solidarite to name just two have championed the cause of African women's rights at the regional and continental level, offering support to the GDD and the WGDD as well as bringing pressure to bear on governments to bring about the AFRICAN AGENDA

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necessary changes promoting women's equality and empowerment.

A look to the future isn't as bright as one might wish. The global financial and economic crisis has negatively impacted gender equality and women's empowerment efforts at various levels. States continue to grapple with less money for many of the sectors that women participate in economically, and which have impacts on their well being such as health. How this will impact on continental inititatives like the African Women's Decade remain to be seen.

For African women's groups who have been the force behind many of the continent's gender agenda initiatives, the global financial and economic crisis has manifested in a fall in available funding. Many organizations are facing funding challenges, negatively impacting their ability to undertake advocacy at the different levels. Pushing the gender agenda forward in the coming years is likely to be a challenge.

In that there is little that has changed.

Advancing gender equality goals continues to be an uphill battle for Africa, African women's groups and African institutions. * Pauline Vande Pallen is Gender Programme Officer, TWN-Africa.

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Emerging trends in political violence in Africa Political violence tied to electoral competition is on the rise right across countries in Sub-Saharan along with a contest over livelihood resources. These pose major threats to the wellbeing of the continent's population and its young democracies, writes *Kwesi W. Obeng.

THIS year, 2013, marks the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), predecessor to the African Union, founded to promote the unity and solidarity of African states and to accelerate their efforts at achieving a better life for Africans.

Attempts at unifying Africa remain work in progress at best but African leaders have declared 2013, the “Year of PanAfricanism and the African Renaissance” to promote “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens

and representing a dynamic force in global arena”.

Year-long activities are planned to facilitate and celebrate African narratives of past, present and future to energize Africa's one billion population to use their “constructive energy to accelerate a forward looking agenda of Pan-Africanism and renaissance in the 21st century”.

A number of issues and events have helped define Africa (rightly or wrongly), how Africans see themselves and how the rest of the world perceives the continent AFRICAN AGENDA

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over the last five decades. Two of such issues are poverty and political violence perpetuated especially on Africans by fellow Africans and by extension external powers.

While the focus of this article is the emerging trend in political violence it is worth stating that with both China and India rapidly pulling ahead in the economic transformation of their societies, especially in the last two decades, poverty is now regarded largely as an African problem, never mind that there are many more poor people in India alone than the whole of Africa.

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The causes and motivation for political violence are immense. Central to any analysis of violence in politics is the question of power. The patrimonial and embedded rent-seeking politics practiced across Africa in which political leaders essentially retain their grip on political power by distributing public resources, contracts and jobs to cronies have been noted as a major source of tension in African politics. Again the general lack of distinction between the personal and public and between individual and the state compounds the opaqueness of African politics and its linkage to political violence. In too many cases, power holders have treated state resources as personal resources as many office- holders perceive public office not so much as a privilege to serve the people but an avenue to extract and accumulate personal wealth.

Political violence is perpetuated by both state (including the army and police) and non-state actors such as criminals, rebels, para-military and guerilla groups).

True, warfare and even mass massacres - as in Rwanda in 1994 and Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s -have been central to Africa's post-independence experience.

About two-thirds of countries in SubSaharan Africa have experienced armed conflict since independence but political violence is by no means exceptional to Africa.

Record Available records including leading political violence datasets such as the Armed Conflict Database from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo show that in comparison to other regions of the world, notably Asia, Africa is neither the leader in the frequency nor duration of such major forms of political violence. Asia leads in both frequency and duration of major forms of political violence.

Historically, there have been shifts in political violence on the continent. Over the last half century, there has been a shift from the anti-colonial wars, to proxy wars of the Cold War era, to what some academics describe as “reform” (representing the NRM regime of Uganda's Yuweri Museveni) and to 'warlordism' as exemplified by warlords in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars of the 1990s.

The struggle for independence and the Cold War served different kinds of violence.

The superpower rivalry of the Cold War, for 18

example, triggered and funded the bitter civil wars in Angola and Mozambique for example. In Angola, the United States along with its western allies and then apartheid South Africa armed Jonas Savimbi's UNITA against the Marxist MPLA regime.

In Mozambique too, the US and other western countries and the South African regime engineered and armed RENAMO to battle another Marxist administration, FRELIMO. Although they have ended, these wars remain some of Africa's longest and bitter conflicts.

Presently there are over a dozen lowlevel insurgencies on the continent. These include the separatist movement in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia, the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Casamance insurgency in Senegal, Cabinda separatists in Angola, Tuareg and Al Qaeda affiliates in northern Mali, Somalia, Ogaden insurrection in Ethiopia, several armed groups in Chad, Central African Republic and Congo DR, Darfur region in Sudan and insurgencies in Africa's newest state, South Sudan.

ed with the electoral process in Africa including not least the deeply entrenched informal patronage systems, politics of exclusion, mal-governance and socio-economic uncertainties of losing political power especially as most African constitutions concentrate power at the centre.

Weak electoral institutions, election fraud and the general opaqueness of the elections and rules governing the electoral process in

Patterns While there is an obvious consistent decline in warfare and large-scale mass killing of civilians including genocide in the last decade, other forms and patterns of political violence are emerging or are reemerging in Africa. Of the two most important of these re-emerging forms of political violence one is closely tied to electoral competition and the other linked to livelihood resources.

From Kenya to Nigeria, Malawi to Madagascar, Ghana to Uganda, Cameroon to Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire to Guinea and from Senegal to Zimbabwe election related violence have claimed thousands of lives, homes and businesses. These conflicts have the tendency of setting back the economic recovery process as they seem to reoccur with each election cycle in the various countries.

In many countries on the continent, electoral competition is generally pursued as a zero-sum game and political opponents are subjected to intimidation and harassment, violent displacement and even death.

That winner of an election gets to control nearly every aspect of the state system raises the spectre of violent contestation of electoral outcomes.

A number of factors may account for the high levels of political violence associatAFRICAN AGENDA

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some countries could also be attributed to the levels of violence associated with electoral contests in Africa's young democracies.

The massive “third wave of democratization” that swept across the continent in the 1980s and 1990s was expected to end the circle of senseless violence and introduce a more transparent and predictable election of leaders and development of governance institutions on the continent. The

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The brutal killing of about 1,500 people following the disputed presidential elections in 2007 in Kenya perhaps marked a watershed in this new trend of political violence in Africa connected to electoral contests.

Assassination of high ranking political figures and their supporters have characterized Nigerian elections in recent years. In Ghana, a razor thin victory by one of the

institutions have warned of the possibly of violence breaking out especially in the Great Accra Region, Ashanti Region and the volatile Northern Region whichever way the Supreme Court verdict goes.

Raila Odinga, former Prime Minister and the defeated candidate of the Orange coalition in the March 2013 Kenyan presidential election challenged the results at the courts. Kenya's Supreme Court treated with

“The payoffs from electoral violence in Africa are huge including access to juicy and high profile public jobs and contracts and so it remains to be seen if other countries will follow this precedent.�

promise of peace dividend has truly been short-lived. In some countries, it never materialised. Zimbabwe and Congo DR are examples. two major political parties nearly turned violent in 2008. Results of the 2012 presidential polls are currently been contested at the country's Supreme Court. The NPP is contesting the declaration of the NDC candidate and former vice president, John Mahama as president of the country.

Civil society groups and policy research

dispatch and upheld the verdict of the Electoral Commission which declared Uhuru Kenyatta as the winner of the polls.

Calm has since returned to the country and widespread outbreak of violence related to the March elections are not expected.

Kenya and Ghana, historical trend setters in Africa may yet be setting a precedent on the contestation of disputed election results through clearly laid down procedures, the courts, rather than the resort to AFRICAN AGENDA

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violence on the streets with guns, machetes and sticks. The payoffs from electoral violence in Africa are huge including access to juicy and high profile public jobs and contracts and so it remains to be seen if other countries will follow this precedent.

But of course other forms of political violence also matter, not least those linked to livelihood resources. Indeed, the widely reported electoral violence cases in Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya and Zimbabwe all had access to land (or the lack of it) at the core.

As climate change takes its toll on Africa's vulnerable landscape - leaves its watersheds and rivers dry and the extractive industry renders its most arable lands uncultivable, and the lack of reinvestment of even the minimal income from mining into industries that will outlive the mines, contestation over livelihood resources such as land and water are set to intensify.

Already the science shows that given Africa's geo-physical characteristics and depth of lack and poor quality of infrastructure, the continent will suffer the worst consequences of a global climate change unlike any other region of the world.

Africa cannot afford to slip up on tackling both political violence associated with elections and threats posed to livelihood resources from various sources . * Kwesi Obeng is Assistant Editor, African Agenda.

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Africa strives to move from neo-colonial mining mode The Africa Mining Vision as an example of the 'breakout'-from the mining enclave, a neo-colonial enterprise, to the transformative industry through the struggle to control its natural resources writes *Alhassan Atta-Quayson.

AS the African Union marks 50 years since its establishment, one question that lingers on the minds of its people is the extent to which the continent has “broken out” of the colonial approaches used to extract natural resources from the continent, with particular reference to mineral resources. A related question is the extent to which these vast resources have contributed to structural transformation or otherwise on the continent.

The vastness of the continent's mineral resources - though declining since they are 20

finite - is not in question, after luring European colonialists into Africa some centuries ago. Thanks, though, to new discoveries - as Africans have not been adequately informed of the types, quantities and qualities of the various minerals in their land the continent continues to retain its global position as a major producer and exporter of mineral resources in addition to hosting a relatively bigger chunk of proven reserves of various mineral resources (see Table 1 below).

The modus operandi for the exploitaAFRICAN AGENDA

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tion/extraction of mineral resource on the continent has largely not changed after European colonialist were “politically” returned over five decades ago. This is in spite of recent (from 2008 upwards) moves

by African governments to break out of the mining “enclaves” operative in various countries with the adoption of the African Mining Vision (AMV) by AU Heads of State and Governments in February 2009.

The search for and control of raw materials, including mineral resources, is probably the most important incentive for European

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quick to point to corruption, inefficiency and lack of foresight in the sector after African governMineral Resources African % African Rank African % of African Rank ment begun taking control of the of World in World World Reserve in World mines.

Platinum Group of Metals 54% 1 60+% 1 By the early 1980s, mining in Phosphate 27% 1 66% 1 most countries in Africa had Gold 20% 1 42% 1 nearly collapsed along with dire Chromium 40% 1 44% 1 challenges that many African economies were facing around Manganese 28% 2 82% 1 that time. These circumstances Vanadium 51% 1 95% 1 forced African leaders to produce Cobalt 18% 1 55+% 1 a policy whose implementation Diamonds 78% 1 88% 1 had a lot of promise for industriAluminium 4% 7 45% 1 alization and economic transforAlso Ti (20%), U (20%), Fe (17%), Cu (13%), etc mation. This policy was the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). The Source: The Africa Mining Vision (2009) LPA had some thought on how Africa's vast natural resources (including minerals) could conpenetration and eventual partitioning of the and breadth of the continent meant that tribute to structural transformation. Its once vibrant continent of Africa. With this even in the face of European imports, local implementation would have clearly motive, mining activities were undertaken iron ore production survived into early 20th improved Africa's economic circumstance with the overarching aim of extracting raw century. Finally copper production in and more importantly broken the more materials to power foreign economies in Africa, from ancient Egypt through parts of widespread colonial mining enclaves on the diverse ways. Consequently, as countries Niger, Mauritania and central and southern continent.

Unfortunately the policy did not fell under European political control, so Africa also highlights the continent's minsee the light of the day.

Instead, internationwere their rich and vast mineral resources. ing credentials prior to the current colonial al financial institutions (particularly World The approach for extracting minerals mining models that dominate African minBank and International Monetary Fund), resources, under these circumstances is not ing. in all these pre-colonial mining activihaving emerged as lenders to African difficult to describe: high capital intensity, ties, production processes that were strongeconomies around that time reconstituted dominance of imported inputs, payments of ly associated with other economic activities themselves into economic planning agenscanty rent to traditional authorities, little covered prospecting, mining, smelting and cies and in mid 1980s prescribed policies or no attention to environmental manageforging in indigenous ways. for African governments. These policies ment, disregard for human rights, no conwere contained in the Economic Reform Cosmetic sideration for local enterprise development Programmes (ERP) and Structural The colonial model of mining has and development of linkages, and exportaAdjustment Programmes (SAP) that challargely remained, although there have been tion minerals produced in their raw form. lenged the LPA and more importantly some minute cosmetic changes over time. deliberately opened up African markets to In the aftermath of the ouster of European Model the detriment of local production. With This model stands in contrast to the colonialist, African government decided to regards to mining, governments were asked approach of extracting mineral resources, take control of their mines as well, noting its to divest and rather concentrate on providand their use thereof, in Africa on the eve of relevance - jobs, income and foreign ing “enabling environment” to attract forthe colonial period. The cases of gold, iron exchange - but failed. While that failure is eign investors. Besides onerous incentives and copper illustrate this point. Prior to the not in much dispute, causes for the failure packages (largely fiscal) offered, mines arrival of European colonialists, west and continue to be subject of debate. owned and controlled by governments southern Africa were major exporters of Critical voices in Africa point fingers at were “handed over” on a silver platter to gold to the rest of the world. Modern day the nature, design and performance of globforeign miners.

Ghana, previously referred to as Gold al metals market and the US' pegging of her The ERP and SAP succeeded in Coast, was for several years the leading procurrency against gold value (price) thereby attracting investment to the mining sector ducer of gold in the world. fixing gold price for some time. These cirThe case if iron and its related products cumstances determined the amount of revbut failed in addressing the key issue of is even more telling. Yatenga in modern day enue earned by African government and transforming mineral resources into susBurkina Faso, where there existed about proportion that could be re-invested in tainable and all-inclusive development.

1500 smelting furnaces in production, epitmining activities. Those revenues were Consequently Africa's mineral resources omizes how vibrant pre-colonial mining in highly volatile and often at the low ends of have not contributed positively to structurAfrica was and its strong linkages with the the range. This had obvious implications on al transformation. Regrettably, some conrest of local economies. The quality of iron re-investment, recruiting and keeping flicts on the continent have been linked to ore and related products made in Yatenga expertise and skills, and research - key facextraction of mineral resources. and several other places across the length tors of success in mining. Yet others are Table 1: Some Leading African Mineral Resources (2005)

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South African miners on demonstration

“Whereas the AMV is viewed as a breakthrough as far as the thought of transforming mineral resources into sustainable and all-inclusive development is concerned, challenges and hurdles still remain in the way of realizing the vision.”

In many parts of Africa, destruction of livelihoods to pave way for large scale mines has been a major source of conflicts as companies hardly pay “adequate” and “prompt” compensation to affected farmers and landowners, as required by many statutes on the continent. Various forms of pollution, especially water pollution, and destruction of properties (due to blasting) have also emerged as major contributory factors to mining related conflicts on the continent.

In the past few years, the failure of the 22

mining regime to produce fair returns to various stakeholders (especially governments) has also become a major source of contention and now resulting in what has been variously described as “resource nationalism”. These weaknesses are illustrated by how recent mining boom lifted mining profits through the roof and left African governments with disappointing share. As communities go through various challenges in containing capital intensive large scale mines and general public fail to benefit from mining because of continued utilization of colonial mining model, African governments now feel the brunt from the receipt of inadequate financial benefits.

These circumstances have persuaded African government to rethink operative mining model. Seminal about this rethinking process was the adoption of the AMV and the processes initiated since then towards the realization of the vision. The vision rightly acknowledges that “Africa's efforts to transform the mining sector away from its colonially-created enclave features AFRICAN AGENDA

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have so far met with very limited success”.

The AMV thus set out its primary purpose as offering “a framework for integrating the sector more coherently and firmly into the continent's economy and society”.

Whereas the AMV is viewed as a breakthrough as far as the thought of transforming mineral resources into sustainable and all-inclusive development is concerned, challenges and hurdles still remain in the way of realizing the vision. Whiles emerging parallel initiatives such as the Natural Resources Charter and the European Union's Raw Materials Initiative could challenge the realization of the AMV, of more importance is how African governments can “walk the talk”. The regulatory framework must change to be AMV-compliant following required changes in national mining policies, mining contracts must be renegotiated, and Africans, particularly those with responsibilities must change their ways. * Alhassan Atta-Quayson is Programme Officer, Third World Network-Africa.

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Turning West Africa into a Free Migration and Trade Zone

By Tamba Jean-Matthew III WEST AFRICA is still the freest region in Africa in terms of citizens' movement even though The Gambia and Cape Verde have lately introduced relatively stiff arrangements for entry and residence of Ecowas citizens on their territories.

Over 100 million of the estimated 350 million of the region's citizens live freely in other countries thanks to efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) which is making impressive headways to guarantee the free move-

ment of persons and goods in the region.

Among the nationals that have widely migrated in the region are Guineans, Liberians, Sierra Leoneans and Nigerians who have been pushed into migration due mainly to civil wars or bad governance.

In spite of the Ecowas protocols that discourage restrictions on citizens movements in the region, foreign residents in the Gambia require a fee of about US$100 for a three-month permit while Cape Verde insists on clearly identifying the alien host AFRICAN AGENDA

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inviting a guest to the Island country due to pressure especially from Nigerians to create a new safe haven there.

Ecowas' moves to protect its citizens have not been lacking. The regional bloc for instance established a Brown Card scheme way back in 1982 to guarantee to the victims of road accidents a prompt and fair compensation of damages caused by nonresident motorists from Ecowas member states visiting their territory. The bureau established in member states carried out 23

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investigations and settlements of claims arousing from accidents incurred by Brown Card holders.

Besides Ecowas, a non- governmental initiative called 'Borderless' has been making strides for people and businesses to benefit by making regional economic integration a reality.

Among 'Borderless' aims is to foster competitive trade in West Africa by reducing barriers to trade, streamlining procedures, attacking corruption and facilitating the movement of goods and people will lower costs, create jobs and generate more revenue for government and more income for people.

These initiatives by state and non-state actors have in many ways encouraged and promoted trade among member countries in spite of some bottlenecks, like the proliferation of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) which are arguably one of the main stumbling blocks to cross border trade not only in West Africa.

NTBs have been defined as a variety of rules and regulations that slow cross-border trade by imposing quotas, embargoes and levies. These restrictions are non-tariff in nature, meaning that no tax or duty is paid.

And it is when neither tax nor duty is paid and no official receipt issued that makes the phenomenon illegal and corrupt.

Pledges In spite of pledges by many governments to curtail the phenomenon through the work of anti-corruption commissions, it is still commonplace to see mischievous customs officials or other men in uniform extorting money from traders for goods transported across borders through official checkpoints. Billions of dollars are lost each year as a result of this nefarious practice according to statistics.

Some critics have argued that is due to this weakness that the European Union is seeking to obtain over 70 percent of the region's markets while the United States is keen on its African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which provide tariff-free import into the US for thousands of products from some 37 African nations.

But lately, the some African Civil society activists in West Africa have been warning governments in the region over the high risk of opening over 70 percent of the sub region's market to the European Union.

The alarm was sounded in Dakar ahead of a three-day meeting of a regional ministerial 24

monitoring committee of Ecowas that obtained in Accra in February this year.

The ECOWAS monitoring committee is directly responsible for conducting negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement (Epa) with the European Union.

The activists acting under the Platform of Civil Society Organizations of West Africa on the Cotonou Agreement insisted that there should be no new concession to open up the region's market to the European Union beyond 70 percent.

They insisted that openning up the region's markets to the European Union beyond 70 was “economically unsustainable”.

Besides mineral resources like iron ore, bauxite, timber, diamonds and gold, the West Africa region also exports cash crops including cocoa and coffee as well as other agricultural produce like mangoes, green beans and banana.

The Dakar-based civil society organisation warned the ministerial monitoring committee which mainly comprises of negotiators “against any violation of the mandate given by the region's heads of state”.

Mandate The activists recalled that the Conference of Heads of State of Ecowas had mandated regional institutions to set the maximum threshold of opening the market to the EU by 70 percent.

They explained that even though the negotiators in the region had complied with the mandate, the European Union was always insisting on the opening up of the markets by at least 80%.

But the civil society activists counter argue that opening up the market beyond 70 percent could impact negatively on employment, growth and household incomes in the region.

Among other things, the ministerial monitoring committee discussed current trade negotiations and progress made on Ecowas' Common External Tariff, examined the offer of market access as well as other outstanding issues.

The EPA is presently negotiating for a reduction of trade barriers between the EU and the countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions.

By all indications, the intention that Ecowas and 'Borderless' have for West Africa is for instance to make it possible for AFRICAN AGENDA

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“Among 'Borderless' aims is to foster competitive trade in West Africa by reducing barriers to trade, streamlining procedures, attacking corruption and facilitating the movement of goods and people will lower costs, create jobs and generate more revenue for government and more income for people.” a truck carrying rice from a port in Ghana to arrive in Burkina Faso in three days instead of nine; for people crossing from Togo into Benin to do so in 10 minutes instead of one hour and for an exporter to pay a trucking company just to cover the costs of labor and fuel to send a load of shea nuts to port without adding US$250 to pay bribes at checkpoints along the way.

Arguably, it is their intention to see West Africa competing in international markets more successfully, increase exports and create jobs, make businesses become more productive and raise incomes while reducing consumer prices and for millions of people who spend up to 80% of their income on food to enjoy food security.

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Subsidies and GM crops back on food policy menu Once put on the backburner, the issue of subsidies and GM crops are back on the agenda of many countries as captured in the following report by *IRIN.

FOOD has become expensive and seems set to stay that way, so growing more of it has become both a necessity and an attractive investment.

But the trend has also put contentious issues like agricultural subsidies and genetically modified (GM) crops on the menu once again.

IRIN talked to some of the leading food security experts on the emerging issues highlighted in, among other new reports, the 2012 Global Food Policy Report by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

Countries like Malawi, caught in a trap of cyclical droughts, have provided subsidized fertilizer to boost food production but have come under attack for promoting unsustainable support to their farmers.

" The position of donors on fertilizer subsidies is quite scandalous, given what is happening in their own countries," says Peter Hazell, a leading agriculture expert who has worked with the World Bank and IFPRI. A drought in the US and fluctuating food prices have led policy-makers there and in the European Union (EU) to rethink protection and support for their farmers.

The US Farm Bill governs agriculture policy and is updated every four years, but the 2008 legislation was extended to September 2013.

The proposed bill recommends an expanded insurances programme with new crop insurance subsidies so farmers receive money when income from certain crops falls below a targeted level, and sets target AFRICAN AGENDA

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prices for crops that trigger payments when revenues fall for several consecutive years at much higher levels than before.

The EU has done away with export subsidies that supported the disposal of surplus production abroad, but its EU Common Agriculture Policy ensures high levels of direct support to farmers and protects its own markets.

Jim French, policy advisor to Oxfam America, says the organization "does not object to a nation's right to invest in and protect its agricultural interests", but subsidies can "sometimes distort both the market and production in ways that impact global hunger and poverty rates", and notes that some of the proposals in the new US Farm Bill "included moving back to subsidies".

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Agriculture expert Steve Wiggins, of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), says if rich countries are providing subsidies, it does not mean poor countries should emulate their bad example.

He argues that subsidies in rich countries "do not prevent any African government from providing decent rural access roads, from funding research and extension, maintaining competitive exchange rates, and so on". It is export subsidies that affect farmers in Africa, but poor countries can protect themselves from cheap imports by imposing tariffs.

Hazell points out that subsidies have helped countries like Malawi. "Perhaps the right lesson for Africa is not that subsidies are always bad, but that they need to be designed and implemented in more targeted ways that include a built-in exit strategy," and address financial viability.

These developments have prompted experts and activists to call for reviving the stalled Doha round of talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was to consider subsidies, tariffs and trade distortion in agriculture.

Outrage The US Congress adopted a clause in its 2013 agriculture budget bill that effectively bars the department of agriculture from any attempt to halt planting or harvesting a GM crop, even if the call comes from the judiciary, sparking outrage. India imposed a 10-year moratorium on field trials of GM crops in 2012.

Organizations like Greenpeace and activists worldwide welcomed India's decision, but the IFPRI report describes it as a significant setback to food policy, and mainstream scientists argue that GM crops offer a way out of deepening food insecurity as growing conditions like the weather and water become compromised by climate change.

IFPRI researchers P K Joshi and Devesh Roy note that the moratorium, "not based on scientific logic, will have negative effects on frontier research and demanddriven technology generation".

The adoption of the US clause, nicknamed the "Monsanto Protection Act", was described by Greenpeace as a "sad day for democracy and the future of our food".

Mark Bittman, a food writer for the New York Times, cites interviews with the Union of Concerned Scientists stating that GM crops purported to be weed- and insect26

“It is export subsidies that affect farmers in Africa, but poor countries can protect themselves from cheap imports by imposing tariffs.� resistant are actually failing.

There is no reliable proof that GM crops are harmful to human beings. "That's not the same thing as saying that the potential isn't there for novel proteins and other chemicals to generate unexpected problems," Bittman writes, "which [is] why we need strict, effective testing and regulatory systems."

The debate on GM crops is polarized between supporters and those who think it will have long-term impacts on biodiversity, possibly health, and lead to a takeover of food production by corporations like Monsanto. This has also been the case in Africa, where some countries have banned GM maize as food aid.

Per Pinstrup-Andersen, 2001 World Food Prize Laureate and the author of a book on the politics of GM food, described India's moratorium as "nonsensical", and said it "reduces India's efforts to assure sustainable food security for its population".

He is among the mainstream scientists who prefer to be open-minded on GM technology and believe that while it might not be the panacea to climate-proof plants, it is a tool with some potential to ensure food security in the coming decades.

Regulation "The regulation of the use of improved crop varieties in the United States is best done by the relevant agencies within the federal government, and not by the judiciary," he told IRIN. "Lack of understanding and insufficient knowledge among some judges are likely to result in erroneous decisions."

Hazell, who also backs the mainstream view on GM technology, likens the current situation to the state of computer science in the early 1960s.

"While the critics were still obsessed with problems of mainframe computers, the industry was busy developing laptop and portable computers that transformed not only the industry, but also the world.

Let's hope that something similar happens with the plant sciences, otherwise we are going to see a lot more famines and AFRICAN AGENDA

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deforestation in the years ahead. None of this is to say that we don't need sound biosafety regulation, but that should be based on science and national priorities, not driven by the misinformed anti-science views of a few international NGOs. Historically, farmers and countries alike have relied on yields to measure productivity, but in the past decade - total factor productivity (TFP) - which takes into account fixed factors like land, labour, capital, and the cost of direct inputs like fertilizers, has been gaining ground.

Alejandro Nin-Pratt of IFPRI says this method "is straightforward, as is the ratio of total output over total input, in other words, how much output is being produced by unit of total input."

Hazell agrees that TFP "is a better measure... than yield, which just captures the productivity of land. TFP growth improves with new technologies and investments like irrigation that raise the returns to fixed factors."

Women He points out that "one reason why farmers in Africa remain so poor is because agricultural growth there has been driven largely by increases in the cropped area and farm labour, with very little growth in TFP." FAO's 2011 annual report focused on the role of women in agriculture, signalling a new trend. Since then, the US Agency for International Development, IFPRI, and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative have even developed an index to measure women's empowerment in agriculture.

"The West makes gender equality an end in itself, and this can be counterproductive in many cultures," Hazell says. "There is evidence that empowering women farmers, especially in Africa, is important ... But this calls for practical and well-focused interventions that take account of local socioeconomic context, not for the construction of national gender empowerment indices that become goals in themselves."

ODI's Wiggins insists the goal should be, "All girls in school until they are 16, at least... taking care of children before 36 months, and making sure they are properly nourished."

Ruth Meinzen-Dick, IFPRI senior research fellow, says there is a lack of rigorous evaluation of approaches that have worked to empower women in agriculture.

They have launched a Gender, Agriculture and Assets Project (GAAP) to conduct assessments.

DEVELOPMENT

The ironic return of the Portuguese to Africa Nearly four decades ago, the Portuguese fled their former colonies in Africa deliberately whatever they could but they are now returning en masse as the economic crisis in Portugal hits a new low, writes *Wallace Chuma.

Heads of state of Portuguese-speaking countries

WHEN the Portuguese abruptly ended their colonial rule in the Southern African states of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, it was a spectacle of drama and savagery.

Bitter about losing power to blacks in the midst of fierce guerrilla war, they embarked on a sustained scorched earth policy in their wake, destroying any infrastructure they could, including pouring concrete into drainage systems to block them, just so the new black governments - whom they considered 'communists' - would inherit countries in a state of ruin and dysfunction. And they left en masse. Ironically, nearly four decades later, the Portuguese are escaping the biting economic environment in Lisbon

and headed for the former colonies. And they are doing so in thousands.

Both Angola and Mozambique have witnessed an increase of between 30-40 per cent in Portuguese arrivals over the past three years. Mozambique alone received 120 000 young Portuguese professionals, investors and other fortune-seekers in 2011.

In Angola, nearly 40 per cent of registered companies are owned by the Portuguese, way ahead of Chinese firms at 19 per cent.

Whereas Lisbon is reeling under heavy debt and an economy that shrunk by 3 per cent last year, both Angola and Mozambique are flush with cash from natural resources, especially oil and minerals. Angola's econoAFRICAN AGENDA

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“Both Angola and Mozambique have witnessed an increase of between 30-40 per cent in Portuguese arrivals over the past three years.� my grew by nearly 10 per cent in 2012, pushing it into third place in Africa, after Nigeria and South Africa. Mozambique grew by an average 7 per cent last year, a substantial figure if one considers that within the same period the Eurozone region contracted by 0.5 per cent.

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The picture gets even more interesting when one looks at the flow of investment between Portugal and its former colonies. Whereas in the past the natural pattern was a unidirectional flow from Lisbon to Africa, tables have been turned. Angola, for example, now controls close to 4 per cent of Portugal's stock exchange, while the African country's state-owned oil company Sonangol enjoys a 12 per cent stake of BCP, Portugal's biggest private bank. A tenth of Portugal's biggest media company, Zon, is owned by Isabel dos Santos, daughter to Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos.

But there is another twist of irony in all this.

While both Mozambique and Angola are registering significant economic growth and providing new opportunities to hordes of Portuguese and Chinese investors, professional workers and others, the local populations of the two countries aren't quite as lucky. The unemployment rate in Angola is 26 per cent, and in Mozambique it stands at 27 per cent.

“While both Mozambique and Angola are registering significant economic growth and providing new opportunities to hordes of Portuguese and Chinese investors, professional workers and others, the local populations of the two countries aren't quite as lucky. The unemployment rate in Angola is 26 per cent, and in Mozambique it stands at 27 per cent. “ 28

President Dos Santos of Angola

This is way too high even when compared to ailing Portugal's 16 per cent.

Despite being Africa's biggest oil exporter, Angola is still considered one of the poorest countries on earth, ranking 148th on the UN Human Development Index.

Mozambique fares even worse, ranking 172nd. In fairness, both countries suffered years of protracted and devastating civil wars after independence and only started growing within the past 10 or so years, thanks to the global (especially Chinese) appetite for natural resources. It would therefore be nigh impossible to reverse the damage that lasted for decades within only a few years. Basic infrastructure such as schools, clinics and roads that were destroyed during the wars are still to be fully restored in many parts of both countries.

But this does not take away the reality that the newfound wealth in Angola and

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Mozambique is not being fairly shared by the citizens and therefore has not been able to pull the most vulnerable groups out of poverty.

As young Portuguese professionals find an El Dorado in both Maputo and Luanda the capitals of Mozambique and Angola, respectively more than two thirds of people in both countries still live on less than US$ 2 a day and are therefore considered extremely poor.

The inequalities are more pronounced in Angola where the President and his inner circle boast of billions of investments in Portugal and other offshore destinations, while only marginally investing in their own people and in their own post-war country. The brutal irony is that, according to media reports here, most of the young Portuguese immigrants are not intending to stay in Africa for long.

They're in it to make money, and once done they will jump into the next flight back home.

For local nationals with no immediate connection to the ruling elites in both countries, the fruits of the new wealth from oil and minerals remain a pipe dream. And they have very few, if any options. This skewed distribution of wealth extends beyond just Angola and Mozambique. Despite the growing wave of resource nationalism across Africa, in the wake of the spiralling global price of natural commodities, there are still shocking levels of inequality within countries. Only a tiny fraction of the local populations - from South Africa to Ghana, from Nigeria to Zambia - can really claim to be benefitting in meaningful ways from the surge in mineral and metal prices in Africa. * Wallace Chuma, a senior lecturer in film and media studies at the University of Cape Town, South Africa.

INTERNATIONAL

Thatcherism and Africans: beyond the revisionist history Hagiographic obituaries and analysis of Margaret Thatcher in the US and UK seek to revise the reality that not only was Thatcher a divisive politician but her government laid the ideological foundation for the rampant neo-liberalism alongside, racism, militarism, imperialism that exist today writes *Horace Campbell.

MARGARET Thatcher became the Prime Minister of Britain in 1979. She had become the Prime Minister of Britain at a moment when she set out to restore the acceptable face of capitalism and to slow down the decolonization of Africa. During the period of her leadership she had exhibited such boldness in her strident defense of privatization and denationalization that she took on the intellectual and political forces that supported social democracy.

Thatcher was mortal like everyone else and she joined the afterlife on April 8, 2013.

When the news was first reported, there were street parties in England. This was a manifestation of the opposition to her poli-

cies. Glenda Jackson, the Labour Member of Parliament spoke for many when, in a debate about the legacies of Thatcher in the Parliament, she reminded fellow members that the period of Thatcher was one 'where greed and selfishness were seen as virtues.'

Since her passing, the internet and mainstream media have been awash with articles and information rehabilitating Thatcher, eulogizing her as one of the world's best leaders and reformist. This seems to be, however, a response to the baring of the true Thatcher image on the international stage since she was unceremoniously removed as leader of the party in 1990. The Thatcher rehabilitation project AFRICAN AGENDA

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stretches from the conservative media and scholarly circle in the UK to the right wing section of American politics as well as Hollywood. Many of the sectors of the British left that had been writing books on Thatcherism in the eighties disappeared after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Hence, many younger progressives did not know of the debates in 'Marxism Today' on the essence of Thatcherism.

However, for the African population in Britain and overseas, there was no loss of memory about the role of Thatcher in international politics. The collective memory of Africans was that she had been a strident racist. Yet, Margaret Thatcher has been 29

INTERNATIONAL

eulogized by none but Richard Dowden of the Royal African Society, who on the very day the former prime minister passed, claimed that 'Mrs. Thatcher played a pivotal role in the ending of Apartheid.'

These efforts to rehabilitate her, crowned with the pomp and ritual of a semi state funeral cannot cover up her true legacy. There were enough commentaries to remind the world of her ideas that equated being British with whiteness. No amount of sanitizing her image can delete her view that Nelson Mandela and the African Nationalist Congress were terrorists.

When the massive rebellions in Britain had shown her that the Africans residing in Britain would resist her policies, she dug deep into the ideas of Enoch Powell and then assaulted the independent working class organizations, especially the Mineworkers Union. The British Left has not yet awoken from her assault on ideas of decent health and housing for all. This assault at home was accompanied by the embrace of the neo-fascist regime of General Pinochet in Chile, the apartheid regime in South Africa and the most conservative factions the United States political class. It was this alliance that rehabilitated the very conservative ideas of Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman. These ideas have now been given the label of neo-liberalism.

Empire As an unabashed defender of empire, Margaret Thatcher had hoped that her alliance with Ronald Reagan and the neoconservatives would roll back the struggles for self-determination internationally. The freedom struggles in Africa discredited her allies such as brutal rebel leader Jonas Savimbi of Angola and Mangosuthu Buthelezi of South Africa and today the private military networks of her heirs are being exposed as the wars of imperial domination come to naught. The Thatcher era is dying and the left and progressive forces are learning that they have to be bold and audacious in promoting the alternatives to Thatcherism.

Margaret Hilda Roberts had been born into the ranks of the utilitarian liberals from the insecure shop keeping strata of Britain in Grantham, Lincolnshire on 13 October 1925. She matured within an environment when Britain had been degraded by the war, the competition from other imperial centers and anti-colonial rebellions. As a mem30

ber of the middle class that craved upward mobility, Margaret Hilda Roberts married Dennis Thatcher, an up and coming business person who was described as an 'adaptable businessman with the values of the colonial era.' Dennis Thatcher possessed the requisite income to give legitimacy to the aristocratic airs that Margaret Roberts later exuded. Her spirit embodied the venal attributes of selfishness and enrichment regardless of the social costs. These are the qualities that are now associated with the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. She had been enamored by the conservative ideas of Fredrick Von Hayek on individual liberty and keeping the government out of the economy. When she became the leader of Britain in 1979 she implemented a set of ideas that set in motion the policies of privatization, liberalization and support for private capitalists. She championed the kind of consolidation of ruling class power that set aside all limits on the private accumulation of wealth. It was the energy that she brought to the enterprise of denationalizing state property and her ruthlessness that led to her name being associated with an -ism. As one socialist paper summed up, 'Her political talents, such as they were, consisted of the nasty cunning and ruthlessness of the social climber.'

Policies As Prime Minister, she implemented policies of greed, ruthlessness, military invasions and crude enrichment for a few along with subservience to U.S. imperialism.

These are the attributes in politics that is today associated with Thatcherism. On the whole, the British progressive intellectuals capitulated to the ideas of imperialism and racism and this capitulation had a devastating effect on the British academy and on European Politics. It is this capitulation that ensured that Thatcherism continued even within the ranks of the British Labour party and Tony Blair was correctly called a Thatcherite. Thatcherism had reversed the social democratic gains of the British working people in such magnitude that the leaders of the Labour party, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, continued with the policies of deregulation and speculation that concentrated and centralized wealth in the City of London.

When Richard Dowden, Director of the Royal African Society, wrote that Margaret Thatcher had played a pivotal role in the ending of apartheid, he was carrying AFRICAN AGENDA

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out an exercise of manipulating the historical record of the role of Thatcher as an opponent of the decolonization process.

Dowden had distorted so much of that history that it is worth recalling for some of the younger readers the ways in which the Pan African diplomatic networks outmaneuvered Margaret Thatcher in the struggles for independence in Southern Africa.

When Margaret Thatcher had become the British Prime Minister in May 1979, the war of independence in Rhodesia had reached a critical stage. With the support of Mozambique and other frontline states the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe had placed the Rhodesian armed forces on the defensive. These freedom fighters received diplomatic and political support from the world wide anti-racist movement.

Michael Manley of Jamaica, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia provided the diplomatic support for the Zimbabweans within the Commonwealth. Nyerere had convinced President Jimmy Carter of the United States to support the diplomatic efforts to end the war. Thus, when Margaret Thatcher went to her first Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka (August 1-7, 1979), she was confronted with a Commonwealth that supported negotiations to end the rebellion of Ian Smith.

The British intelligence and the British settlers had convinced the British rulers that the freedom fighters were terrorists and Britain should take a hard line against them. This Thatcher did. Hence, when the Lancaster House Conference was called in London to hammer out the terms for an independence constitution, Britain sided with the Ian Smith regime. The numerous stalemates in these negotiations were only broken by the intervention of President Jimmy Carter.

Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives supported Bishop Abel Muzorewa who had joined forces with the settlers. The Conference agreed on the basic features of ceasefire, demilitarization, elections and the new government for Zimbabwe. Thatcher believed the British and South African intelligence agencies who had assured her that Muzorewa would win the elections. Millions of pounds were thrown at the Muzorewa group and at the end of the electoral process, the people voted for genuine independence. Bishop Muzorewa won three seats and the alliance between Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo acceded power.

INTERNATIONAL

Margaret Thatcher was angry and she was inspired by the fact that her husband Dennis Thatcher had invested heavily in South Africa.

After the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980, the frontline states turned their attention to the decolonization of Namibia and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. Margaret Thatcher received support for her hard line pro-apartheid ideas at the end of 1980 when Ronald Reagan became President of the United States. There was mutual agreement between Washington, London and Pretoria that there would be no meaningful independence for Namibia, and through the work of Bill Casey of the CIA there was increased support for the anti-communist forces internationally.

Margaret Thatcher was designated as the core errand person for this mission of coordinating the 'freedom fighters for capitalism.' The documents of the discussion of Alexander Haig who was the first Secretary of State of Reagan has left for the record the hard anti-communist line adopted by the Reagan administration and Thatcher. In her view, she had been tricked by Manley, Nyerere and Kaunda at the Commonwealth Conference in Zambia in 1979 and she along with Haig and Pik Botha (the Foreign Minister) of South Africa had agreed that there would be no 'red flag over Windhoek.'

Terrorist By this was meant that the freedom fighters of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) would never come to power in Namibia because they were communists.

Thatcher and the Conservatives supported the famous linkage clause that linked the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. It was during this period that the US and Britain supported the overt support for apartheid under the banner of 'constructive engagement.' Under this policy, freedom fighters such as Nelson Mandela were labeled as terrorists and anti-communist hardliners such as Jonas Savimbi and Osama Bin laden were hailed as Freedom Fighters.

During her period as Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher made two trips to Nigeria. The political class of Nigeria had

been compromised by all forms of financial activities that the CIA was able to pressure this leadership despite the fact that the people of Nigeria had made a firm stance against apartheid. Thatcher had traveled to Nigeria in January 1988 at the height of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale to promote British business and to seek the diplomatic engagement of Nigeria with Jonas Savimbi.

The first aspect of her mission was successful to the point that the compromised military and political leaders deepened their engagement with Thatcherism and sent their children to schools in Britain while maintaining their massive capital flight from Nigeria to Britain. This class also internalized the ideas of the conservatism of Thatcher.

On the second aspect of her trips to Nigeria, she was less successful. The Nigerian military, despite their conservatism could not openly support Jonas Savimbi. Though Savimbi made a trip to Nigeria to visit the dictatorship in the nineties, travelling from Cote d'Ivoire, it was after the moment when his intervention in Nigeria could change the course of history in Southern Africa. Murtala Mohamed had in 1975 declared that Africa was the center piece of Nigerian foreign policy and he had defied Henry Kissinger and stood with the freedom fighters in Angola and Southern Africa. In continuation of this Murtala Mohamed legacy, Nigeria, on many occasion challenged the neo-imperial foreign policies of the British, the French and the US across Africa.

Alliances But Murtala Mohammed's life was cut short by a coup that has raised questions about military sections and their alliance with Western imperialism. Margaret Thatcher, as the emissary for the neo-conservatives in the USA was sufficiently aware of that section of the Nigerian military and was working hard to win the support of that section of the military for Angola After the South Africans were decisively defeated in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, Crocker intervened to save the complete collapse of the front of racism and participated in the negotiations about Namibian Independence.

As stated above, Dennis Thatcher had invested in South Africa and opposed the liberation struggles of Africans. However, the anti-apartheid struggles had taken such AFRICAN AGENDA

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deep roots inside Europe and the United States that although the political leadership in the USA and Britain were Conservative there was a popular Free South Africa campaign in Europe and North America. In Britain, the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF) was an anti-apartheid organization that worked hard to educate the British working people.

During the diplomatic struggles over the future of white supremacy in Southern Africa, Margaret Thatcher took a hard line and equated support for freedom fighters with support for communism. It was in this period when Dick Cheney and the neo-conservatives in the USA labeled the ANC a terrorist organization. Thus, when confronted at the Commonwealth Conference in Vancouver in 1987 over the future of the political settlement in South Africa, Thatcher referred to Mandela and the ANC as 'a typical terrorist organization.' It was reported then that she and her Conservative allies held that 'Anyone who thinks that it is going to run the government in South Africa is living in cuckooland.'

Thatcher was wrong on this score and the victory of the freedom struggles was crowned by the release of Mandela and the process to put to an end, white minority rule in South Africa.

As Thatcher received her last rites, there is now a new awareness of the massive dislocation engendered by Thatcherism.

The opposition to neo-liberalism is growing all over the world as there is a clear awareness that there must be an alternative to capitalism. As the capitalist crisis deepens inside Europe and the rise of racist attacks seek to mobilize the white workers on the basis of white supremacy, the traditions of Brixton and the Black marching through London after the New Cross fire has sent a signal that the Black Working peoples will make an alliance with the progressive white youth in fighting neo-fascism. One of the great challenges is for the revived left to be bold and audacious in promoting new forms of politics and new forms of organization to give meaning to the ideas of peace and social justice for all. *Horace Campbell is Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University.

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INTERNATIONAL

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

By Dennis Laumann*

The skyline of Luanda, Angola’s capital

THIS year marks the 25th anniversary of a key event in the struggle for African liberation from European colonial rule: the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. In that remote town in southern Angola in March 1988, the army of apartheid South Africa was defeated by a Pan-Africanist alliance that included tens of thousands of Cuban volunteers. Their victory forced South Africa's racist rulers to enter into negotiations that led to the unbanning of anti-apartheid organizations, the release of Nelson Mandela, the independence of Namibia, and ultimately freedom for South Africa. Although prevailing 32

historical narratives about the end of apartheid ignore the significance of this epic battle, its central role has been emphasized

by Mandela himself.

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale marked the culmination of more than a decade of South Africa's war against Angola. In the months leading up to Angola's independence from Portugal on 11 November 1975, the South African Defense Forces (SADF), with covert assistance from the United States, invaded Angola to prevent the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from assuming power.

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The apartheid regime was threatened by the prospect of another free African nation, espousing socialism no less, on its borders since South Africa occupied neighboring South-West Africa (present-day Namibia).

At the time, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) waged an armed struggle for independence in Namibia while in South Africa the mass antiapartheid movement kept the regime on the defensive. Clearly, South Africa's white minority rulers felt under siege, though somewhat emboldened by support from the United States.

INTERNATIONAL

Closely observing events from across the Atlantic, the Cuban government unilaterally (in other words, without the knowledge of the Soviet Union) decided to defend Angola's sovereignty after the MPLA leadership requested help from Havana. As the SADF pushed through the Angolan interior towards the capital of Luanda, Cuba launched Operation Carlota, named in honor of an African woman who led a slave rebellion in 19th century Cuba.

Thousands of Cuban soldiers along with vital military equipment were transported on improvised merchant vessels and passenger planes from the Caribbean to Central Africa, a reversal of the voyages of the ships that carried Angolans to slavery in Cuba in prior centuries. By late March 1976, the allied MPLA and Cuban fighters successfully drove the SADF out of Angola into South-West Africa, a shocking defeat for the apartheid regime and an inspiration to South African youth who led the historic Soweto Uprising in June that same year.

Over the next decade, South Africa's racist rulers sought to destabilize Angola mainly through support of its proxy UNITA (the Portuguese acronym for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). Together with the United States through its Central Intelligence Agency, the SADF trained and armed UNITA and coordinated its campaign of terror against the Angolan people. Whenever the Angolan military, assisted by Soviet and Cuban advisors, struck against UNITA, the SADF carried out air strikes and ground invasions to protect its Angolan mercenaries. As a result, two southern Angolan provinces were effectively occupied by the SADF thus extending the apartheid system from South Africa through South-West Africa into Angola.

In July 1987, the Angolan army advanced on UNITA's camps in southeastern Angola. On the verge of being crushed, UNITA was rescued by the South Africans who attacked from their bases in SouthWest Africa that October. The situation quickly turned dire for the Angolan military which retreated into a defensive position at Cuito Cuanavale. Once again, Cuba quickly answered the call for aid and resumed direct combat operations in Angola, dispatching tens of thousands of volunteer troops and its most critical and advanced arms to southern Angola. The ensuing battle grouped together all the main protagonists

in the Angolan war: the armies of liberation - Angola, Cuba, and SWAPO (with members of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa serving in intelligence capacities) - against the forces of imperialism, South Africa and UNITA, backed by the United States.

The SADF repeatedly tried to capture Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988 but were successfully repelled. While the battle raged, the allied Cuban, Angolan, and Namibian forces, their MiG 23s assuring air superiority, launched a counter-offensive towards the west, advancing on Namibia, liberating the South African-occupied provinces of Angola, and forcing the SADF to retreat from their positions. After failing to take Cuito Cuanavale, losing the territory it occupied, suffering heavy losses, and facing growing resistance to the war amongst its base of white minority supporters at home, the SADF announced its withdrawal from Angola in April 1988. The following month, the apartheid regime agreed to negotiations which took place throughout the year with Angola and Cuba on one side of the table and South Africa and the United States on the other. The rest, as they say, is history: the ANC along with its main ally the South African Communist Party were unbanned on 2 February 1990; Mandela was released from prison on 9 February; and Namibia regained its independence on 21 March.

While the apartheid regime tried to spin its defeat in Angola as a tactical retreat - and even a win -newspapers in South Africa and the United States depicted the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale as a victory for the Angolan/Cuban/Namibian alliance.

More recently, former SADF commanders have acknowledged they were humiliatingly defeated and outwitted by their opponents, signaling out the brilliance of Fidel Castro who directed his troops in a command room across the ocean in Cuba. To those who fought against the apartheid regime, there never was any doubt who won the battle. As ANC/SACP leader Ronnie Kasrils recently argued in an 25th anniversary assessment, “. . . the acid test [of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale] is the outcome - which was the end of apartheid.”

It is imperative that scholars and activists reassert the importance of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale not only for the sake of historical accuracy but also to honor AFRICAN AGENDA

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the memory of those who fought and died for the liberation of southern Africa. Cuito Cuanavale was the largest military confrontation on African soil since the Second World War Allies-Axis battles in North Africa. It marked the beginning of the end of white minority domination in southern Africa, the dismantling of the apartheid system, and the total liberation of Africa from European occupation. It shattered the myth of white supremacy that was the ideological foundation of the apartheid regime and the entire European colonial project. It was a profound demonstration of PanAfricanism, what scholars lately call “reverse diaspora,” as over 50,000 Cubans returned to the land of their ancestry to rid the continent of racist rule. Finally, it was a testament to internationalist solidarity as revolutionary Cuba, always cognizant of the historic debt it owes Africa, sent its best forces and materials to fight against apartheid, leaving itself vulnerable to attack by the United States while expecting and receiving absolutely nothing in return for its sacrifices.

In a speech to tens of thousands in the Cuban city of Matanzas in July 1991, Mandela praised the contributions of Cuba to African liberation declaring: We have long wanted to visit your country and express the many feelings that we have about the Cuban revolution, about the role of Cuba in Africa, southern Africa, and the world.

The Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom, and justice, unparalleled for its principled and selfless character . . .

Your crushing defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale was a victory for the whole of Africa!

Today, visitors to Freedom Park in Pretoria will see included on the list of antiapartheid martyrs the names of the over 2,000 Cubans who lost their lives in Angola.

There is no greater authority than those who suffered under apartheid, including Mandela himself, on the question of the significance of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. * Dennis Laumann is Associate Professor of African History at The University of Memphis and author of Colonial Africa, 1884-1994 (Oxford University Press, 2013) dlaumann@memphis.edu 33

ENVIRONMENT

Senegal's uphill battle to control fishery sector

By Tamba Jean-Matthew III RIGHT groups and the new Senegalese authorities are determined to save an estimated 4 billion dollars of loss annually as a result of illegal fishing.

But a string of difficult factors are apparently blurring the government's resolve as Senegal faces alarming food insecurity due to dwindling fish stock.

Among the constraints is the issuance of dozens of “unconventional” licenses to foreign fishing companies by ex-President Abdoulaye Wade's regime. The licenses were condemned by Green Peace and eventually revoked by the incumbent government.

Barely a month after President Macky Sall came to power, he imposed a six-month ban on mechanized fishing by foreign companies to allow the fish population to replenish.

But analysts interpreted the move as a clever way to keep the 29 foreign fishing companies aloof while the legitimacy of their licenses was examined.

While the licenses are being suspended and new regulations drawn to govern reissuance of licenses, Russians and South Koreans have been making frantic efforts to woo the Senegalese government.

In December 2012, the Russian government expressed interest in undertaking “big-scale” fishing in the waters of several African countries including Senegal in exchange for 160 million dollars and free university scholarships.

The Senegalese News Agency quoted the Russian embassy in Dakar as saying that the Russians, apart from promising scholarships, would also provide vehicles, construction material and office equipment.

The targeted countries are Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Namibia.

The Association of Russian Fishermen currently operating in several West African 34

countries said they targeted 400,000 tons of fish mainly sardines and mackerel.

But before the advent of the new government, Greenpeace had signaled that 44 giant Russian trawlers were illegally exploiting” fish resources within Senegal's maritime borders.

The international watchdog explained that the vessels had the capacity of harvesting about 250 tons each per day and were “dangerously threatening to deplete the fishery resources” in the Senegalese waters.

Interestingly, Greenpeace accused the former government of protecting the Russian vessels “in outright disregard for international maritime laws and agreements” and threatened retribution.

The fishery ministry retorted that most of the Russian vessels were only plying the waters to conduct surveillance mission against illegal trawlers.

But Greenpeace counter argued that Russian trawlers were also caught fishing illegally in Gambian and Mauritanian waters.

Fish is one of Senegal's main food items and the sector is among the leading income earners and employment providers like tourism and groundnut production.

Another constraint that Senegal faces in attaining food self-sufficiency like many other countries in the sub region, is the difficult dialogue over its food exports including fish, mangoes and green beans.

In February 2013, civil society activists in West Africa warned governments in the region over the high risks that could obtain from opening over 70 percent of the sub region's market to the European Union.

The alarm was sounded ahead of a three-day meeting of a regional ministerial monitoring committee of Ecowas that was held in Accra.

The monitoring committee is directly responsible for conducting negotiations of AFRICAN AGENDA

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the Economic Partnership Agreement (Epa) with the European Union.

The Platform of Civil Society Organizations of West Africa on the Cotonou Agreement, insisted that there should be no new concession to open up the region's market to the European Union beyond 70 percent.

Opening up the region's markets to the European Union beyond 70 is “economically unsustainable”, the Dakar-based civil society organisation insisted.

In a statement, the activists warned the ministerial monitoring committee which mainly comprises of negotiators against any violation of the mandate given by the region's heads of state.

The activists recalled that the Conference of Heads of State of Ecowas had mandated countries in the region to peg the opening up to the EU market to 70 percent.

The activists explained that even though the negotiators had complied with the mandate, they could yield to the European Union's pressure to open up to its markets by at least 80%.

“Opening up to the EU market beyond 70 percent could impact negatively on food security, employment, GDP growth and household incomes in the region”, the activists maintained.

Agriculture, animal husbandry and fishery accounts for the livelihood of over 80 percent of the food needs of the estimated 350 million inhabitants in the West African sub region.

But in spite of the importance of agriculture, animal husbandry and fishery to the economies of the region, productivity remains low while the local produce face less competition both on the local and foreign markets, says Rougillatou Diagne Ndir of the Agricultural Productivity Programme in West Africa.

SOCIETY

FESPACO 2013 Honours Women

By Joyce Osei Owusu and Francis Gbormittah.

DJAMILA Sahraoui [Yema: Best Image, Special Mention for Actress and Silver Étalon], Apolline Traoré [Moi Zaphira: Mariama Ouédraogo-Best Actress]; Pocas Pascoal [Por aqui tudo bem: European Union Award]; … This is how the roll call

looks like when it comes to women's performance in the feature film category at the 23rd edition of the biennial Pan African Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO), in Burkina Faso. It comes as no surprise to many for AFRICAN AGENDA

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women to be highly acknowledged. This is because the role of women in cultural activities has long been recognised on the African continent, and indeed globally. The various awards, publicity, and funfair that followed this unprecedented recognition is equally not astonishing as women continue to make giant strides in the highly male dominated industry.

According to the Burkina Faso Minister of Culture and Tourism, Baba Hama, the Festival theme, “African Cinema & Public Policy in Africa,” for this year is timely for the promotion of cultural exchanges to ensure that decision-makers and stake-holders found cutting edge policies to support the development of the African and the diasporan film industries. It was equally opportune and significant that the prestigious festival decided to honour women and paid them the tribute they deserve in the movie industry. In doing this, as a result, came the big innovations.

The biggest tribute to women was in the fact that for the first time in its 44-year history, the festival had a woman, Mrs. Alimata Salambéré as the Guest of Honour.

Mrs. Salambéré, a cultural and communication expert was one of the founding members of FESPACO. She chaired the Festival's organizing committee in 1969 and since then has also extensively engaged in women related activities. The guest country, Gabon's delegation was led by her first lady, Sylvia Bongo Odimba. Moreover, as a novelty in FESPACO's history, all official juries were headed by distinguished working professional women from the African continent and the diaspora. The chairperson for the full length film jury was Euzhan Palcy (from Martinique) the first black woman director to be produced by a major Hollywood studio (MGM) and the first woman to win a French academy award.

The renowned Kenyan filmmaker Wanjiru Kinyanjui headed the short films jury, and the documentary film category was headed by Osvalde Lewat, the award winning Cameroonian filmmaker. The prominent scholar of African women in cinema studies, Beti Ellerson, headed the diasporan film jury and Jackie Motsepe, the General Manager International Content Acquisition and Co-productions of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) headed the Video and Television series jury.

Significantly, not only did women head 35

SOCIETY

the juries, but they also constituted the majority on some of the panels. These novelties, mentioned above indeed mark women's admittance and integration into the cinema world. Some have argued that the focus on women was taken overboard, however we must not forget that women are capable just like men and so “there is no reason why they should be underrepresented,” noted Michel Ouédrago, the General Secretary of FESPACO. Burkina Faso Minister of Culture and Tourism Baba Hama also stated that “when women are engaged the battle is won in advance.”

It is interesting to note that women's participation was not limited to the roles noted above. At the level of entries for the various competitive categories, women submitted films and videos, just as they did in 2011. From the festival's records, it is clear that since the 19th edition of the festival, women have made steady progress in participation and the number of awards won. For instance, women have been crowned as laureates for the Oumarou Ganda Award.

Furthermore, in 2005, Fanta Regina Nacro won best screenplay with La Nuit de la verite, and Apolline Troare won best original score with her film Sous la clarté de la lune. Despite the foregoing, women were still underrepresented compared to their male counterparts. The apparent backlash of the deliberate campaign to give women the place they deserve in the African movieindustry at FESPACO 2013 is highlighted in an interview with Victoria Kawesa, a Ugandan based in Sweden, and a board member and representative of CinemAfrica at the Festival. According to her, a male director from Senegal thought the move by FESPACO to focus on women was comic and tragic. For him it didn't make a difference if men or women were in charge. In the same way, gender didn't matter if the films were directed by men or women. Needless to say, showcasing women is only a small part of the process; women exhibiting their talent and being judged according to the quality of their work are even more significant. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider the awards won women's in this year's FESPACO. Women won 11 out of about 35 awards including jury special mentions, representing a decent 31.4% of total prizes. In the fea36

ture film category, Djamila Sahraoui (Algeria) with Yema won the Silver Stallion, the Best Image, and Special Mention for Actress (Djamila Sahraoui); Apolline Traoré's (Burkina Faso) Moi Zaphira won the Best Actress (Mariama Ouédraogo); and Pocas Pascoal (Angola) won the European Union Award with her film All is Well. In the documentary category, Nadia El Fani and Alina Isabel Pérez (Tunisia) won the first prize with their inspirational film No Harm Done, and Pascale Obolo (Cameroon) won the second prize with Calypso Rose, the Lioness of the Jungle, a promotional film of culture through music.

The Bronze Poulain was won by Nadine Otsobogo of Gabon with her short film Dialemi. The only prize in the Diasporan category, the Paul Robeson Award, went to Mariette Monpierre's (Guadeloupe) Elza's Happiness. The first prize in the television category was swept away by Samantha Biffot (Gabon) with her series, The Eye of the Town. In the schools documentary category, the first prize was won by Amina Mamani-Abdoulaye (IFTIC, Niger) with Hawan-Di. With the exception of the Fiction Feature Video Digital category, women received awards in all the other areas in the competition. African women have long been known to work in the domain of documentary filmmaking. Hence it was a great honour that their hard work was rewarded.

The quality of work presented by women at this year's festival was very impressive.

Pascale Obolo spoke of her creative ability as a woman reflected in her film, Calypso Rose, as “innovative visual writing for African cinema.” This goes to support the fact that women's quest to be given recognition isn't unbefitting. The relevance of the themes women worked on in their films, generally, can't be exaggerated: they were all about the age-old repression and suppression that culture and life in general imposes on them.

It's worth noting, however, that the Golden Stallion, the award for the Best Film at the Festival went to the Senegalese, Alain Gomis' Tey (Today), which follows the last 24 hours in the life of Satche, the protagonist before he dies. In FESPACO's history, Gomis is the first Senegalese filmmaker to win the Golden Stallion (Stallion of AFRICAN AGENDA

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Yennenga) though Senegal has produced some of the distinguished filmmakers on the continent, namely, Ousmane Sembène, Djibril Diop Mambéty and Safi Faye. The Silver Stallion as noted previously went to Djamila Sahraoui's Yema, from Algeria.

Yema, Sahraoui's second feature film is a post-Algerian civil war drama that focuses on “the theme of women and resilience in repressive times.” The Bronze Stallion went to Moussa Touré's La Pirogue which tells the story of a group of thirty Senegalese men who set sail for Spain on a fishing boat to seek greener pastures.

The general excitement of women participants in FESPACO 2013 was overwhelming and altogether infectious. This could be seen all over the Festival's locations and side attraction venues such as cinemas, cafés, street jamborees, shopping centres and lobbies of the Pacific Hotel and Azalai Hotel Independence. Besides the fandom, the networking and exchanging of ideas among women was lively and encouraging. It must be recognised that the official-three-feature-entry for women in 2005, was maintained in 2013. It therefore gives us the hope that this achievement can only be improved upon in the future, especially with the huge encouragement women received at this year's festival.

In his closing speech, Michel Ouédrago, the General Secretary of FESPACO outlined positive changes African cineastes should expect in the future. He noted that official competition will be opened for diasporan films and that there will also be an avenue for films on digital format to officially compete at the Festival.

Cash Prizes for feature film competition has not been left out: the 1st prize has been raised from CFA 10,000,000 to CFA 20,000,000; 2nd prize from CFA 5,000,000 to CFA 10,000,000; and 3rd prize from CFA 2,500,000 to CFA 5,000,000.

Looking over these cash prizes, one cannot help but say: it's a good time to be a filmmaker in Africa. It is therefore our hope that women filmmakers will continue to work hard in order to take advantage of these exciting initiatives in the most exciting of times. Nadine Otsobogo puts it forcefully thus: “women must do, not to try to do their best.” And that, indeed, is both a clarion call and an encouragement to African women in film.

BOOK REVIEW

MY FIRST COUP D'ETAT A book by John Dramani Mahama Review by Kwao Tordzro On February 24 1966, a coup d'etat took place in Ghana that overthrew the government of Kwame Nkrumah, first president of Ghana. There ensued the descent into what John Dramani Mahama calls in his book, 'The Lost Decades.' This is the period in which Africa witnessed economic stagnation, a period in which Africa's period of liberation which was marked by its ascendancy in the arts and literature went into decline. It was the period of Africa's brain drain.

Mahama's intentions, as stated in the introduction, include to explore the diversity that exists in Ghana in the face of the tendency to depict Africa in monolithically negative terms; to display the differencies that exist between Northern and Southern Ghana; and to highlight the 'vibrant life' of the urban areas; to show the contrast between it and traditional life of the villages.

John Mama's narration of his encounter with the coup and the military intrusion into civilian life with each successive coup d'etat is very succinct. Son of a cabinet minister, he was suddenly confronted with a situation when his father had been booted out of his official residence, himself in prison, his assets frozen. After this, there were to be three more coups d'etat.

In My First Coup D'etat, the various stories in the narrative are pieced together in a more 'fluidly circular than strictly linear' manner, weaving the personal story of Ghana's president with the experience of the country at large into a yarn that is at once entertaining and informative.

One of the results of globalization and the ICT revolution has been a rapid decline of interest in reading culture. Listening to the conversations of Ghanaian youth these days, one is likely to hear them arguing about the UEFA Champions league. If not, the conversation is likely to turn on the plethora of adverts of the myriad opportunities for school leavers and graduates in the many organisations springing up today, short courses on this and that, to put it simply, young people in the country find themselves labouring under the pressure to sur-

vive. In the academic world, syllabi regularly revised to de-emphasize the relevance of arts and social science subjects. One victim of these trends is an ever increasing ignorance about the basic facts of national life, of contemporary history.

To be sure, the newspapers are replete with features that bemoan the fact that young people of today have no knowledge or interest in their past. They are lacking in basic patriotism. The writers of such features are dismissed as 'old school.'

The coming of My First Coup d'etat by John Dramani Mahama is timely in that it fills a glaring vacuum of deterioration in the reading culture of the nation. To be sure, this down-turn in reading culture is global.

Coming from a just- elected president, however, it is bound to draw immense attention.

The book spans a five decade period, from Ghana's independence. It is an autobiographical account, written in the simplest language, interwoven with Ghana's contemporary history, regime by regime. By the time one finishes reading the book, it could have been about any one of subSaharan African countries, covering the same period.

John Mahama was born into a relatively privileged family. The colonial authorities of the then Gold Coast are on record as having as their official policy, the preservation of the then Northern Territories as a labour reserve for recruiting workers for the railways and the mines. When they decided to ease up on this policy a little, it was thanks to John's father being from a royal lineage that he got to go to school.

Apparently, the symbiosis between the colonials and traditional authority was still at work. Even then, it was not without resistance from the family of E.A. Mahama.

The colonial District Commissioner approached Mahama's great grandfather known by his chiefly title Soma Wura to volunteer one of his children to be educated. After much coaxing and arm twisting, E.A. Mahama was chosen after the consent of his father, another chief, the Gbemfu AFRICAN AGENDA

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“The book spans a five decade period, from Ghana's independence. It is an autobiographical account, written in the simplest language, interwoven with Ghana's contemporary history, regime by regime. By the time one finishes reading the book, it could have been about any one of sub-Saharan African countries, covering the same period.�

Wura. After formal education, E.A. Mahama was certified as a trained teacher.

On Ghana's attainment of independence, E.A. Mahama became a member of parliament and later a minister of state It was against this background that John Mahama enjoyed education at some of the select institutions in Ghana up to tertiary level.

The book details political happenings all over the world. It mentions the anti colonial struggle in Zimbabwe in 1967 and the execution of Che Guevara in the same year, the attainment of independence of Mauritius, Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea in 1968, and the assassination of Martin Luther King in the same year. Much of the book is devoted Ghana's place in 'Memories from the lost decades of Africa' as the book is sub-titled. Interspacing Mahama's recollections from his early childhood, adolescence, and early manhood through the university years is the political history of Ghana from Kwame Nkrumah to the NLC days, the regimes of Busia, Acheampong, Akuffo and Rawlings.

What the book deals with in greater detail is Mahama's growing up years. Here, the reader gains valuable insight into the social organisation of Gonja society, ethnically based inequalities within Ghanaian 37

BOOK REVIEW

society, not to mention the childhood pranks of John and his siblings. Even in recounting his first teenage love affair, Mahama deftly sheds light on the reluctance of officials, in this case, employees of the Ghana Commercial Bank to be posted to the Northern region, a deprived part of the country.

A whole chapter is devoted to the Simpa event, which was celebrated every month during full moon at a time when there was no electricity which provided young people an opportunity for courtship.

Here, unlike purely traditional occasions, highlife music and foreign music was played by a brass band. James Brown music was prominent. The importance of the conductor of the band, known as the conductay in the community is highlighted.

In Mahama's Northern Ghana, different religions existed peacefully side by side.

There were the Muslims. There were the syncretic Churches too, like the Church of Cherubim and Seraphim, who unlike the orthodox churches, used African musical instruments. There was, of course, animism which is at the heart of all African religion throughout the country. Among the Gonja, even non- Muslims were in the habit of giving their children Islamic first names. There was the practise of leaving food outside as sacrifice for the gods, who on pain of being whipped must not be seen by the human eye.

Among the cultural practices that My First Coup d'etat educates the reader is the naming ceremony. One learns about the period of sequestration of the newly- born child when it is known as a saando if it is a boy and a saanpaga if it is a girl. At naming ceremony, the wanzam or itinerary barber is seen shaving of the hair of the baby if it is a girl and circumcising it if it's a boy.

In Northern Ghana, as in other parts of the country, there are different factors that determine the name given to the child. The child may be named according to the day of the week on which it is born. It may be named according to whether it is a twin or if it is born after a sibling who did not survive.

It may be named after a forebear hoping it my inherit attributes of that forbear which were admired.

In his case, John Mahama was named Dramani, after his paternal grandfather. For that reason, his uncles and Aunts called him 38

'Nnana,' meaning 'My Grandfather.' Having started school John Mahama's brothers had Christian names imposed on them by their headmaster. When it came to his turn it was Mahama's elder brother John who suggested the name John, because he said it sounded 'nice.'

If Mahama's personal story is what casts light on the trials and tribulations of the country at large, it is in the telling of that story that Mahamas skill as a story teller lends credibility to the facts in the narrative.

Accounts of his and his brothers' childhood pranks as they surprised their rural relatives with ice water, the way the rural folk used to marvel at the electric light in their house are immensely effective as in an unobtrusive way, they tell their story of the NorthernSouthern, rural-urban divides in Ghana.

The story of Alice, John's first love, the innocence of a teenager in which that story is told belies the subtle skill of story teller who at the same time managed to tell us about the reluctance of officials of the Ghana Commercial Bank to be posted to the Northern Region, a tendency that persists up to today.

Frozen Fire and Oracle74, Cooley High, Chickinchi, Tony Marvis and Bob Miracles and Frisky Papa all belong to the period of young students who held up the banner of youthful music in the seventies.

Enough to remind people of Amartey aka Chickinchi, the renowned bass player who composed the tune title Sakora Koose.

Here and in other places, Mahama shows he knows how to inspire nostalgia.

There is something of the prosaic-poetic in Mahama. Frozen Fire, the resilience of Sumaila, who stuck to the school band until notwithstanding his lack of musical skill, he got to play the shekere in his own distinct style that earned him a permanent place in the band. There is a subtle hint is that the name of the band signifies the pent-up emotions of a society that has been put on hold for the meantime.

In a sense, the story of My First Coup d'etat is told as if the political history of Ghana during the 'lost decades is merely incidental to John Mahama's growing up.

But that could be deceptive. John's experience at the hands of the soldiers after the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah is symptomatic of many Africans during the period.

The proscription of individuals connected AFRICAN AGENDA

VOL.16 NO.2

with the overthrown Convention Peoples Party from participation in party politics is also something witnessed all over the continent. Thereafter, the impermanence of anything civilian is repeated in the form of military takeovers followed by civilian regimes which are but brief interludes. All the while, momentous events are taking place, on only on the African continent but also among the African diaspora. Sylvanus Olympio, Patrice Lumumba, Tafawa Balewa Martin Luther King, Malcolm X and Amilcar Cabral are all assassinated.

If these were years of gloom, what could the youth do but take refuge in music? So they did to the sounds of James Brown, Otis Redding, Jackson Five, Fela Anikulakpo, Hedzolei, Uhuru Dance Band and Geraldo Pino and the Heartbeats.

Meanwhile Mahama's education could not go on untouched by the influences of the times. In secondary school, under the tutelage of one of his tutors called Wentum, he began to lean towards the leftist political tendencies of the times. This continued in his university years when he joined a Marxist study group. Marxist political economy brought his thinking into conflict with the practice of his own father who had become the owner of a rice mill after his political career came to an end, an employer and thereby, an exploiter of the labour of the working man, according to John's newly-acquired ideas of classical Marxism.

It is understandable that as the story covers the childhood, adolescent and early manhood years, it should be told from the point of view of a narrator of such a period.

However, with the help of hindsight, the discerning reader expects some thoroughgoing analysis of the political and economic policies of Nkrumah's regime and those that followed his overthrow in order to shed light on changes that took place on the Ghanaian and African scene after Mahama's first coup d'etat, thereby explaining the reasons for Africa's descent into 'the lost decades.' The reason for some of the unanswered questions has been Mahama's stated 'need to protect people's privacy without damaging the integrity of the story.'

As the book states, Mahama is presently at work on his second book. Hopefully, that will provide the occasion for the answers to such questions.

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