MALI
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability
responsiveness MANAGING FOR RESULTS relevance COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT
HUMAN COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP efficiency
relevance COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability HUMAN DEVELOPMENT relevance
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability
responsiveness MANAGING FOR RESULTS relevance COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP effectiveness
relevance COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability HUMAN DEVELOPMENT relevance
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability
responsiveness MANAGING FOR RESULTS relevance COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP effectiveness
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INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION: Mali
Copyright © UNDP December 2024
The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication by the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) would like to thank all those who contributed to this evaluation.
IEO TEAM
Directorate: Isabelle Mercier (Director) and Alan Fox (Deputy Director)
ICPE section chief: Richard Jones
Lead evaluator: Juan David Gonzales
Research Analysts: Solomon Mamo and Rim Benhima
Member of the Evaluation Advisory Committee: Michael Bamberger and Angela Bester
Evaluation consultants: Djibril Doucouré, Judicael Moutangou, Sue Nelson, Moussa Sacko, Raymond Onana, Saboury Ndiaye
Publication: Flora Jimenez and Iben Hjorth
Administrative support: Antana Locs and Mariam Touré
The IEO would not have been able to conduct this evaluation without the support of:
STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTNERS
UNDP staff in Mali: Maleye Diop (Resident Representative), Roland Seri (Deputy Resident Representative Programme), Yahya Ba (Deputy Resident Representative Operations), and Safia Guindo (Monitoring and Evaluation Focal Point) as well as other country office staff.
Other stakeholders and partners: Government of Mali, representatives of United Nations agencies, civil society, non-governmental organizations, and bilateral and multilateral development partners.
FOREWORD
In the heart of Mali, a nation known for its vibrant culture and rich history, a decade of turbulence has tested the resilience of its people. Political and security instability fueled by extremist violence casts a long shadow over the country. Yet amidst these challenges, Malians have demonstrated remarkable strength, generating steady economic growth driven primarily by agriculture, forestry, fishing, and services. But this growth has been uneven, leaving many behind, with a significant portion of the population still living in poverty. The harsh realities of climate change further compound these difficulties, threatening the very resources that sustain livelihoods and sparking conflicts over diminishing natural resources.
Against this backdrop, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been a steadfast partner in Mali’s journey towards recovery and development. From 2020 to 2024 – the period covered by this evaluation – UNDP played a crucial role in fostering inclusive governance, promoting peacebuilding, and supporting the conduct of more inclusive and transparent elections. UNDP also made significant strides in empowering the youth and women of Mali, investing in initiatives that enhance employment opportunities and nurture entrepreneurship. In terms of environmental sustainability, UNDP’s efforts have been instrumental in strengthening Mali’s resolve to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve its environmental policies and regulations. These actions are vital for the country’s long-term resilience against the growing threats of climate change.
However, the path of progress is seldom smooth. The multidimensional crises facing Mali have delayed the electoral process, underscoring the urgent need for continued capacity building. The evaluation reveals that while there have been gains, the impact of efforts to improve the business environment and job creation has been limited. Moreover, much remains to be done in the realm of environmental sustainability and climate change resilience, requiring more robust implementation and scaling to achieve full potential.
This second independent country programme evaluation of UNDP’s work in Mali not only reflects on the achievements and challenges of the past four years but also serves as a crucial guide for navigating the road ahead. This report presents findings, conclusions, and recommendations that, I trust, will contribute to the formulation of a new country programme that meets the challenges, ambitions, and aspirations of the Malian people for peace and sustainable development.
Isabelle Mercier Director, Independent Evaluation Office, UNDP
Figure 1. Budget and expenditure breakdown by outcome, 2020–2023 (in US$ million)
Figure 2. Evolution of budget and expenditure (Outcome 1), 2020–2023
Figure 3. Internally displaced persons in Mali and Mopti/Bandiagara region (2018-2022)
Figure 4. Violence against civilians in Mopti/Bandiagara region (2018-2022)
Figure 5. Evolution of budget and expenditure (Outcome 2), 2020–2023 (in US$ million)
Figure 6. Evolution of budget and expenditure (Outcome 3), 2020–2023
Figure 8. Leaving No One Behind framework
Figure 9. Programme expenditure, by funding source 2020-2023 (in US$ million)
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AER Renewable Energy Agency (Agence des Énergies Renouvelables)
AIGE Independent Electoral Management Authority (Autorité Indépendante de Gestion des Élections)
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ANTIM National Agency for Telehealth and Medical Informatics (Agence Nationale pour la Télémédecine et l’Informatique Médicale)
CB Crisis Bureau
CCR Community Reconciliation Committee (Comité Communal de Réconciliation)
CCS Security Advisory Committee (Comité Consultatif de Sécurité)
CNPV National Center for the Promotion of Volunteering (Centre National de Promotion du Volontariat)
CO Country Office
COFO Land Commission (Commission Foncière)
COVID Coronavirus Disease
CPD Country Programme Document
CREDD Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development (Cadre Stratégique pour la Relance Économique et le Développement Durable)
CSO Civil Society Organization
CTRCA Technical Unit for Business Climate Reforms (Cellule Technique des Réformes du Climat des Affaires)
ERAR Regional Reconciliation Support Team (Équipe Régionale d’Appui à la Réconciliation)
GEWE Gender Equality and women Empowerment
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GNI Gross National Income
GRES Gender Results Effectiveness Scale
ICPE Independent Country Programme Evaluation
IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IEO Independent Evaluation Office
IGA Income-Generating Activity
IMF International Monetary Fund
LGSF Liptako Gourma Stabilization Facility
LNOB Leaving No One Behind
M&E Monitoring & Evaluation
MATD Ministry of Territorial Affairs and Decentralization (Ministère des Affaires Territoriales et de la Décentralisation)
MEADD Ministry of the Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development (Ministère de l’Environnement, de la Sanitation et du Développement Durable)
MEF Ministry of the Economy and Finance (Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances)
MINUSMA United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Mission Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali)
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
NSS National Statistical System
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PACE Electoral Cycle Support Programme (Projet d’Appui au Cycle Électoral)
PAGEDD Programme to Support Economic Governance, Resilience, and Sustainable Development (Programme d’ Appui à la Gouvernance Économique, à la Résilience et au Développement Durable)
PAREM Support Programme for Reforms and Elections in Mali (Projet d’Appui aux Réformes et aux Élections au Mali)
PBF Peacebuilding Fund
PEJ Youth Entrepreneurship Programme (Programme Entrepreneuriat Jeunesse)
PIP Project Initiation Plan
PNPLEVT National Policy for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism and Terrorism (Politique Nationale de Prévention et Lutte contre l’Extrémisme Violent et le Terrorisme)
PPP Public-Private Partnership
PRODEVIM Meat Export Development Programme in Mali (Programme de Développement de la Viande à l’Exportation du Mali)
PROSMED Stabilization through Rule-of-Law Strengthening Support Programme in Mali (Programme d’Appui à la Stabilisation du Mali à travers le Renforcement de l’État de Droit)
PVE Prevention of Violent Extremism
RBA Regional Bureau for Africa
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TEF Tony Elumelu Foundation
TFP Technical & Financial Partner
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIET United Nations Integrated Electoral Team
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFP world Food Programme
WHO world Health Organization
Evaluation Brief: Mali
The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted the second independent country programme evaluation of UNDP Mali in 2023-2024. The purpose of the evaluation is to inform the development of the next UNDP country programme, strengthen accountability to national stakeholders and the UNDP Executive Board, and contribute to organizational learning and decision-making.
The independent country programme evaluation team in Mali assessed the current programmatic cycle (2020-2024), which covers three outcome areas: 1) inclusive governance and peacebuilding; 2) inclusive growth and private sector promotion; and 3) environmental sustainability and resilience to the adverse effects of climate change. Through this programme, UNDP contributed to achieving the results stipulated in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework in Mali as well as those of the Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development (CREDD) 2019-2023 developed by the Malian government.
For over a decade, Mali has experienced high levels of violence and political instability due to the activities of extremist groups. During this cycle, governance posed a major challenge, with protests against corruption and poor governance followed by a military overthrow of the elected government and the postponement of presidential elections. Despite these challenges, the Malian economy experienced steady growth from 2010 to 2021, driven mainly by agriculture, forestry, fishing, and services. Yet it remains undiversified and vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices. Moreover, Mali’s economic growth has not been inclusive, with a large portion of the population living below the poverty line. Like other Sahelian countries, Mali is heavily affected by climate change, which threatens agricultural production, increases food insecurity, and exacerbates conflicts over natural resources. Lastly, Mali relies heavily on public development aid, but this decreased following the transitional government’s new priorities to reaffirm Mali’s sovereignty. Managing this aid and maintaining relations with technical and financial partners (TFP) are critical challenges for the future.
Findings and Conclusions
UNDP played a crucial role in supporting inclusive governance and peacebuilding efforts, particularly through its technical support for electoral and constitutional reforms as well as its contributions to more inclusive and transparent legislative elections (2020) and a referendum (2023). The Country Office also strengthened security and rule-of-law institutions through training and strategic investment. In terms of social cohesion, UNDP supported the development of a national reconciliation strategy and helped reactivate conflict management mechanisms at local level.
Despite these efforts, recurrent political crises and insecurity hampered the electoral process, highlighting a continuing need for capacity building. The security environment and underfunding at local level threatened the sustainability of progress achieved in strengthening the rule of law and its institutions. while effective, conflict management mechanisms faced challenges in terms of inclusiveness, financial viability, and legal legitimacy. In addition, UNDP’s efforts to prevent violent extremism had only a modest impact on levels of violence. Finally, UNDP’s stabilization initiative through the Liptak-Gourma Stabilization Facility has been hampered by the persisting multidimensional crisis, the withdrawal of donors, and the prioritization of a highly unstable region, posing major challenges to the achievement of expected results.
The country programme aimed to foster inclusive growth and private sector development. To support monitoring and evaluation of public policies and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in Mali, UNDP supported data production efforts, identifying vulnerable populations in multidimensional crises. Additionally, it made significant financial investments in enhancing youth and women’s employment and entrepreneurship.
However, a number of challenges emerged. UNDP’s contributions to monitoring public policies supporting CREDD and the SDGs at national and regional levels were modest, and there was a lack of evidence suggesting sustainable improvements in statistical systems. UNDP’s efforts to improve aid coordination efficiency were affected by national political changes, leading the country to distance itself from donor coordination platforms and efforts. UNDP’s initiatives to improve the business environment in Mali had a marginal impact, due mainly to insufficient financial and technical investment and an unfavorable political, security, legal, and institutional framework. Finally, the UNDP’s flagship youth entrepreneurship programme in partnership with the Tony Elumelu Foundation (TEF) encountered challenges that hindered it from reaching its targets in terms of decent job creation, particularly in its initial phase. Numerous enhancements to the project in its second phase are anticipated to yield more substantial results.
In terms of environmental sustainability and resilience to climate change, UNDP played a central technical role in bolstering Mali’s ambitions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. UNDP strengthened Mali’s environmental policies and regulatory frameworks, assisted sustainable land management and biodiversity conservation efforts, and supported local communities in improving their resilience to climate change. UNDP collaborated with the Renewable Energy Agency to provide isolated rural populations with access to clean and affordable solar energy and played a significant role in implementing telehealth through a pilot project.
Several challenges remain in the implementation and scaling up of UNDP initiatives. These include insufficient national resource allocation to fulfill Mali’s climate ambitions, limited progress in implementing environmental policies, and technical and maintenance issues affecting infrastructures. Additionally, the effectiveness of strategies aimed at bolstering local communities’ resilience to climate change, which are dependent on supporting income-generating activities (IGA), was found to be limited.
Overall, the UNDP managed to adapt its strategies and maintain its key partnerships despite persistent socio-political instability. It succeeded in remaining relevant and addressing the country’s primary concerns with governance, elections, stabilization, the rule of law, the environment, and energy. However, the expansion of its work was hindered by a decrease in political dialogue and the gradual withdrawal of supporting donors.
UNDP’s commitment in central Mali allowed it to engage at the heart of the conflict and with populations exposed to multiple risk factors, thus reaffirming the relevance of its commitment to populations at risk of being left behind. However, strategies aimed at promoting the empowerment of women and youth, although targeted, did not address the root causes of their exclusion. The UNDP’s integrated approach to the rule of law demonstrated its significance despite facing challenges associated with the context, the sustainability of community initiatives, and difficulties with their institutionalization.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1. The Country Office should urgently reassess its strategic positioning given the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the impact of the political context on its traditional engagement in strategic aspects of development planning, and the potential decrease in its donor base due to the suspension of development aid by key UNDP donors. UNDP needs to identify specific opportunities and emerging threats in light of its comparative advantages and operational strengths and weaknesses.
Recommendation 2. The Country Office should reconsider whether its strategy to “leave no one behind” necessitates operating at the conflict’s epicenter in central Mali. The logistical and security obstacles it faces in conjunction with complex cooperation among humanitarian, development, and peace actors hamper the realization of significant outcomes and limit collaboration opportunities. It is therefore imperative that UNDP incorporate local realities more comprehensively and in all circumstances into the formulation of its community-level interventions.
Recommendation 3. The Country Office should enhance the promptness of its operations as well as the quality and reliability of its internal reporting and donor communication, beginning with its monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. This will allow it to identify and address areas for improvement in a transparent and effective manner.
Recommendation 4. The Country Office should persist in jointly bolstering the rule of law, conflict prevention, and social cohesion. This can be achieved by continuing to connect administrative and institutional efforts to strengthen community-level mechanisms and by exploring new avenues to secure funding. The decision to continue UNDP’s stabilization efforts in a resource-scarce context due to the geopolitical situation should be assessed, while the prevention of violent extremism, including deradicalization and reintegration, should be strengthened.
Recommendation 5. Given the limited opportunities offered by a politically challenging context, the Country Office needs to rethink its role and clarify its intervention strategy in the area of inclusive growth. However, it should continue to support key government institutions working on achieving the SDGs while reassessing the strategic relevance in the current context of its efforts to support trade promotion agencies and aid coordination mechanisms.
Recommendation 6. To maximize the potential impact of community resilience and sustainable natural resource management initiatives, UNDP should focus on an integrated programmatic approach similar to that deployed in the area of governance, capitalizing on past experiences and seeking to scale up. In the field of decentralized solar energy in particular, UNDP should strive to improve project management, foster inclusive dialogue, and promote public-private partnerships (PPP) in order to attract more local private investments.
Recommendation 7. The Country Office should continue experimenting with its integrated approach through its conflict prevention and rule of law portfolio centered around PROSMED. while implementing portfolios across the programme is not required, UNDP should formalize its portfolio approach to facilitate its scalability.
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
1.1 Evaluation Purpose, Objectives and Scope
The UNDP Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) conducts independent country programme evaluations (ICPE) to gather and present evidence of the organization’s contribution to national development priorities as well as the effectiveness of its strategy in leveraging national efforts to achieve these results. ICPEs are independent evaluations conducted within the framework of the general provisions of the UNDP Evaluation Policy.1
The objectives of this ICPE were to:
• Contribute to the development of a UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) in Mali for 2025-2029;
• Ensure UNDP’s accountability to its stakeholders, including the UNDP Executive Board, the Government of Mali, and civil society at large; and
• Promote organizational learning, particularly at country and regional level.
The ICPE covered the UNDP Country Programme 2020-2024 as formally approved by the Executive Board. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Terms of Reference (Annex 1, available online) and encompassed all UNDP activities in the country irrespective of the source of funding (see Annex 2 for the list of projects).
1.2 Evaluation Approach and Methodology
The ICPE was structured around four main questions. These were further expanded in an evaluation matrix (see Annex 3), which organized the available evidence in accordance with OECD Development Assistance Committee evaluation criteria. Outcome-level findings were structured using the capacity development framework, which is based on the premise that a country reaches its development goals by empowering individuals, strengthening organizations, and creating an enabling policy environment.
The evaluation team collected and analyzed qualitative and quantitative data from primary and secondary sources to inform its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. In addition to a document review (see Annex 4), the IEO conducted 137 semi-structured interviews with key informants, including 26 beneficiaries of UNDP interventions in Bamako, Mopti, and Ségou.
The evaluation scored the performance of the UNDP Country Office (CO) for each indicator included in the evaluation matrix using a four-point scale2 and drew conclusions and recommendations based on this evidence. 3 The performance score for the Mali Country Programme is presented in Annex 5. The IEO Gender-Results Effectiveness Scale (GRES) was used to assess the quality and level of achievements by programme outcome.4
The draft report went through an internal and external quality assurance process before being submitted to the Country Office and the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) for review and identification of any factual errors. The report was then shared with government officials and other national partners.
1 See https://popp.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke421/files/AC_Evaluation.pdf
2 4 = Fully Achieved/Exceeds Expectations; 3 = Mostly Achieved; 2 = Partially Achieved; 1 = Not Achieved.
3 See http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/rating_system/UNDP_IEO_RatingSystem_Manual.pdf
4 GRES classifies gender outcomes into five categories: negative, insensitive, targeted, sensitive, and transformative. See https://erc.undp.org/pdf/GRES_French.pdf
1.3 Limitations of the Evaluation
The evaluation was carried out in September 2023, three months after the UN Security Council’s decision to end the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on 30 June 2023.5 In response, the evaluation team had to minimize travel outside the capital due to a surge in violence in Timbuktu and Gao.
1.4 Country Context
For over a decade, Mali has experienced high levels of violence and political instability. Violent extremist groups continued to challenge state authority, first in the north then in central Mali, despite the presence of the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission and international military counter-terrorism campaigns. In 2020, protests against corruption and poor governance fueled by the perception that the results of the parliamentary elections had been manipulated culminated in a military overthrow of the elected president and the establishment of a transitional government. On 24 May 2021, a coup d’état led to the formation of a new government headed by a prime minister and a transitional president. However, the planned election calendar was not respected. The transitional government postponed the presidential election indefinitely due to technical issues, which delayed legislative and local elections. Government effectiveness and the rule of law continue to rank below the sub-Saharan African average.6
End of Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
Despite instability and conflict, Mali’s economy grew steadily from 2010 to 2021, with an average annual growth rate of 4.6 percent, surpassing the sub-Saharan average of 3.3 percent.7 This growth was led by the agriculture, forestry, fishing, and services sectors. However, Mali’s economy remains poorly diversified and vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices. Gold and cotton accounted for about 80 percent of the country’s exports but only about 12 percent of its GDP earnings.8 Mali remains among low-income countries, with a gross national per capita income of $820 in 2021.9 Mali ranked 186th out of 191 countries in the 2021/2022 Human Development Index.10 About 42 percent of Mali’s population lived below the national poverty line in 2020,11 with high concentrations of multidimensional poverty in northern and central Mali.12 In 2022, Mali ranked 180th out of 185 countries in
5 Security Council Resolution 2690 (2023).
6 world Bank, Government Effectiveness and Rule of law, world Governance Indicators.
7 world Bank, GDP growth (annual %), world Development Indicators.
8 IMF. 2023. IMF Country Report No. 23/209.
9 world Bank, per capita GNI, Atlas method (in current $), world Bank Country and Lending Groups, world Development Indicators
10 UNDP, Human Development Report 2021/2022.
11 world Bank, Poverty Headcount Ratio at National Poverty Lines (% of population), world Development Indicators.
12 Northern regions of Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, and Ménaka and the central region of Mopti (including the newly created regions of Bandiagara and Douentza). Observatoire du Développement Humain Durable. October 2022. Pauvreté Multidimensionnelle des 703 Communes du Mali. https://www.odhd-mali.org/uploads/a24eb9082a74ac82ea55dfa1963164130df77baf.pdf
Tuareg con ict reignites amid rising extremism
First coup d'état
Mass protests Second coup d'état
Constitutional referendum MINUSMA withdrawal Elections postponed
Mali Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
Elections and return to constitutional order Deployment of MINUSMA and Operation Serval
Presidential and legislative elections
Third coup d'état Electoral timetable released
the Notre Dame’s Global Adaptation Initiative and was at the epicenter of climate change, with low levels of adaptation.13 Deforestation, land degradation, and the gradual loss of wildlife biodiversity increasingly exposes populations to climatic hazards, food insecurity, and intercommunal conflicts related to access to and control of natural resources, including violent extremism.14 During the lean season of 2023, some 1.2 million people suffered acute food insecurity, and an additional 4 million (18 percent of the population) were in a situation of “stress,” risking severe food insecurity in the absence of assistance.15 In addition, the country’s rapid population growth (3.3 percent in 2021) combined with the effects of climate change threatened agricultural production, the economy’s largest sector.16
4.6 percent 42 percent 23 percent
Average annual economic growth rate (2010-2021), higher than the Sub-Saharan average
Share of population living below the national poverty line (2020)
Share of population who suffered or risked acute food insecurity in the absence of assistance
The Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development (CREDD) 2019-2023 sets out Mali’s national policies, with a focus on poverty and inequality reduction, resilience, and peacebuilding at both national and local levels. Meanwhile, the country continued to rely heavily on official development assistance (ODA), which rose by 45 percent from $1,041.69 million in 2012 to $1,510.28 million in 2021. However, the recent coup d’état resulted in a significant 20 percent reduction in ODA between 2019 and 2021, demonstrating the preliminary impact of cooling relations between Mali and its traditional development partners.17 Yet ODA still accounted for 9.4 percent of the country’s gross national income (GNI) and 62 percent of central government spending in 2020.18 Almost two-thirds of bilateral ODA disbursements came from four donors: the United States (26 percent), France (14 percent), Germany (10 percent), and Canada (10 percent).19 Additional data on the country context is available in Annex 6.
1.5 UNDP in Mali
UNDP’s 2020-2024 CPD aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for the same period as well as the national priorities enshrined in CREDD. The CPD also built on lessons learned and recommendations from the ICPE conducted in 2019, which recommended (among others) that UNDP define more clearly its thematic and geographical areas of intervention, strengthen the programme’s internal synergies, improve the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) function, clarify its positioning among its development partners, and improve coordination with other United Nations development partners.
13 Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. 2024. Rankings. https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings
14 United Nations Environment Programme (2011). Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Conflict, and Migration in the Sahel. https://wedocs.unep.org/20.500.11822/8032
15 wFP Mali, Country Brief. November 2022.
16 world Bank, Population Growth (annual percentage), world Development Indicators.
17 ODA data were extracted from OECD Query wizard for International Development Statistics, 16 May 2023. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-report-2010/query-wizard-for-international-developmentstatistics-qwids_dcr-2010-43-en
18 world Bank, Net ODA Received (percentage of GNI), Net ODA Received (percentage of central government expenses), world Development Indicators.
19 ODA data were extracted from the OECD Query wizard for International Development Statistics, 16 May 2023.
The CPD aspired to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) by 2024 through the following three objectives:
Outcome 1 – Inclusive governance and peacebuilding. i) By 2024, people live in a State governed by the rule of law and an environment in which peace and accountability are guaranteed by strong public institutions and in which the media and civil society play their role and ensure effective and inclusive governance; ii) People are resilient to conflict and live reconciled and in harmony in an environment of peace, secured and respectful of human rights and positive cultural traditions.
Outcome 2 – Inclusive growth and promotion of the private sector. By 2024, Malians, including women and youth, reap the benefits of inclusive and sustainable growth in a diversified, job-creating, and resilient economy.
Outcome 3 – Environmental sustainability and resilience to the adverse effects of climate change. By 2024, communities manage natural resources and the environment sustainably and equitably and are more resilient to the adverse effects of climate change.
The budget allocated for the 2020-2023 period was $152 million, of which $104 million was spent. A majority of programme expenditure, or 60 percent, was allocated to inclusive governance and peacebuilding (Outcome 1), while Outcomes 2 and 3 each consumed 20 percent of expenditure.
Source: Atlas/Quantum data through the IEO Datamart as of 10 November 2023
FIGURE 1. Budget and expenditure breakdown by outcome, 2020–2023 (in US$ million)
FINDINGS CHAPTER 2
2.1 Inclusive Governance and Peacebuilding
Outcome 1: i) By 2024, people live in a State governed by the rule of law and an environment in which peace and accountability are guaranteed by strong public institutions and in which the media and civil society play their role and ensure effective and inclusive governance. ii) People are resilient to conflict, live reconciled and in harmony in an environment of peace, secured and respectful of human rights and positive cultural traditions.
Related outputs:
Output 1.1: The poorest benefit from quality public services provided by effective and accountable institutions, public structures and decentralised local authorities.
Output 1.2: The capacity, functions and funding of national rule of law and human rights institutions and systems are strengthened to improve access to justice and address discrimination, in particular against women, victims of gender-based violence and other marginalized groups.
Output 1.3: National and local capacities for reintegration, reconciliation, peaceful conflict management and prevention of violent extremism are strengthened.
Output 1.4: Mechanisms and institutions for constitution-making, elections and parliamentary processes are strengthened to promote inclusiveness, transparency and accountability.
UNDP implemented 14 projects and executed $63.5 million out of a $98 million budget related to inclusive governance and peacebuilding structured around two portfolios created months after the launch of the programme: Inclusive political governance, and Conflict prevention and the rule of law.
The inclusive political governance portfolio is mainly composed of the flagship Support Programme for Reforms and Elections in Mali (PAREM), a $40 million basket fund, 20 and the Electoral Cycle Support Programme (PACE), a $5.5 million basket fund. 21 UNDP managed PACE from 2018 to 2021 while PAREM, initiated in 2021, was still active at the time of evaluation. 22 UNDP had been providing electoral support to Mali since 2012 and has been working with MINUSMA as a member of the United Nations Integrated Electoral Team (UNIET) since 2013, being responsible for managing, coordinating, and executing the electoral pooled funds. The onset of these two projects’ implementation accounts for the observed increase in budget and expenditure from 2022 onwards, as illustrated in Figure 2.
The Conflict Prevention and Rule-of-Law portfolio organized around the Stabilization through Rule-of-Law Strengthening Support Programme in Mali (PROSMED) consists of several related sub-projects with a $12.8 million budget. 23 Implemented in collaboration with UN women and MINUSMA and later the United
20 PAREM donors include Canada, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, the European Union, the Peacebuilding Fund, and IDEA.
21 PACE donors include USAID, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden.
22 Ibid.
23 The needs assessment mission identified the political, legal, and security-related challenges facing the organization of elections in the context of the transition, highlighting the need for legislative and institutional reforms, trust building, and inclusiveness, especially as regards the participation of women and youth.
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) following MINUSMA’s withdrawal, 24 PROSMED supports the Malian population in improving their resilience to conflict dynamics to enable them to live in a secure environment that respects the rule of law. 25 Its specific aims are to address four root causes of the Malian crisis: (1) the disintegration of social cohesion and the rise of violent extremism; (2) inadequacies of public services in the field of justice and security and the crisis of confidence of the population in security and justice actors; (3) weak governance and widespread corruption and; and (4) gender-based inequalities. PROSMED was being implemented in 10 regions and 22 cercles 26 The Malian window of the Liptako-Gourma Regional Stabilization Facility (LGSF), a regional project administered from the Dakar Hub with a $7 million budget, is the other key intervention under this portfolio. These four projects, which underwent a more in-depth evaluation, represent 64 percent of expenditure recorded under this outcome.
FIGURE 2. Evolution of budget and expenditure (Outcome 1), 2020–2023
Source: Atlas/Quantum data through the IEO Datamart as of 10 November 2023
24 Directorate of Civilian Affairs; United Nations Police; Department of Judicial and Penitentiary Affairs; Human Rights Division.
25 For the period 2022–2025, PROSMED’s interventions are being implemented through the following sub-projects: (i) Integrated Approach to Fight Impunity and Improve Access to Justice in Central Mali (PBF); (ii) Youth Committed to Sustainable Peace: Support for Youth Participation in Reconciliation Processes in Mali (PBF); (iii) women and Natural Resource Conflicts (PBF); (iv) Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development-Oriented Approach (Sweden, Netherlands, Czech Republic); (v) Construction of a collector in the city of Gao (MINUSMA Trust Fund, Denmark); (vi) Transition Support Project (European Union); (vii) Joint Regional Programme to Support the Implementation of Cross-Border Cooperation Activities in the Liptako-Gourma Region (Sweden); (viii) Stabilization through Rule-of-Law Strengthening Support Programme in Mali – PROSMED (Netherlands); (ix) Stabilization through Rule-of-Law Strengthening Support Programme in Mali – PROSMED Sud (PBF).
26 Mopti, Djenne (Mopti); Bandiagara, Koro, Bankass (Bandiagara); Douentza (Douentza); Ségou, Macina, Niono (Ségou); San, Bla, Tominian (San); Gao, Ansongo (Gao); Ménaka, Anderanboukane (Ménaka); Nara (Nara); Koutiala, Yorosso (Koutiala); Diéma, Yélimané, Nioro (Nioro).
Finding 1. Elections. UNDP’s efforts have proved their relevance in supporting certain electoral and constitutional reforms in line with the commitments stipulated in the former Peace Agreement. They contributed to the holding of more inclusive and transparent elections, including the 2020 legislative elections and the 2023 constitutional referendum, by creating spaces for citizen participation. However, recurrent political crises, insecurity, and the continual slippage of the initially established transition timetable hampered the electoral process, while the capacity-building needs of the new Independent Electoral Management Authority (AIGE) and other state institutions involved in the electoral process remained significant.
The political and electoral process in Mali was in transition and has remained incomplete since the last ICPE, highlighting the importance of UNDP’s role in channeling international assistance to support the restoration of the constitutional order through credible electoral processes. UNDP contributed to several key electoral processes and reforms.
First, UNDP’s technical, financial, and material support provided through PACE in collaboration with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD), the Directorate General of Electoral Affairs (now dissolved), and the Independent National Electoral Commission (now dissolved) facilitated the holding of legislative elections in 2020. with the joint support of UNDP, MINUSMA, and other partners, the elections recorded a turnout of only 36 percent in the first round and 35 percent in the second round, mainly due to security incidents. 27 Furthermore, the Constitutional Court’s annulment of more than 20 percent of the provisional results sparked protests and led to a military coup, followed by a second in 2021, leading in turn to the establishment of a transitional government. 28
Second, as the transition process commenced, UNDP in collaboration with MINUSMA and UN women supported the 2022 electoral and constitutional reforms, paving the way for a constitutional referendum to be held in 2023. workshops and consultative processes created spaces for inclusive discussion, fostered exchanges with civil society, especially women and youth, and strengthened citizen participation, thus contributing to improving the quality of the electoral framework and promoting the political transition. 29 The evaluation of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in collaboration with PACE highlighted the importance of opening channels of communication with a view to changing past practices and restore civil society’s trust in the Constitutional Court, thereby enhancing citizen participation, improving the quality of the electoral framework, and fostering political transition. 30
Third, PAREM facilitated the process leading to the adoption of Law No. 2022-019 of 24 June 2022, which assigned to AIGE the responsibility of independently organizing and managing all electoral and referendum operations. Established in January 2023, AIGE replaced the three former institutions mandated for this task. 31 Despite UNDP’s technical and material support to AIGE in conducting the referendum, which included training members in 816 of its branches, MATD retained its lead role in the 2023 referendum due to delays in making AIGE operational. To this end, MATD enlisted the required 3,000 members for its 994 local branches.
27 The 5,000 election observers deployed across the country reported incidents of voter suppression and intimidation, destruction of election materials, and abduction in the center and north of the country.
28 United Nations Security Council. Situation in Mali – Report of the Secretary-General. 29 September 2020. The Constitutional Court later changed the provisional results for 30 of the 147 seats.
29 These forums brought together international experts, lawyers, drafters, and key members of institutions for in-depth discussions on the draft law and the constitution. They also facilitated consultations with political parties and civil society, with a focus on women and youth, PAREM’s target groups.
30 IDEA, Lessons Learned from Supporting Mali’s Transition to Peace and Democracy Project, p. 8.
31 AIGE replaced the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD), the Directorate General for Electoral Affairs, and the Independent National Electoral Commission, the latter being finally dissolved in February 2021.
The overall results of these efforts were significant. Despite an official turnout of 39 percent, the Constitutional Court supported by PAREM managed to publish the results of the constitutional referendum for each polling station on time. The referendum generally went ahead as planned, although some security incidents disrupted voting in the north of the country, notably in Kidal, where some sources indicated that polling stations did not open. 32 UNDP’s technical and financial support facilitated the deployment of judicial delegates to polling stations and enabled the Court’s information technology system to be revamped as it had fallen into disuse. This facilitated the rapid collection, processing, and publication of results, thus reducing the risk of incidents occurring, as was the case in 2020. This more transparent process strengthened public confidence in the results and the decisions of the Constitutional Court, 33 in line with the previous recommendations of the European Union’s international observation missions in 2013 and 2018. 34
Although the political movements that signed the 2015 Algiers Agreement and armed groups from the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) disputed the results and rejected the draft constitution due to perceived shortcomings in the Peace Agreement, 35 97 percent of electors voted in favor of adopting a new constitution in June 2023. 36 The new constitution introduced a bicameral legislature and an independent electoral management body in accordance with certain commitments stipulated in the Algiers Accords. It also reaffirmed the multi-party system and strengthened the oversight role of civil society while enshrining a 30 percent quota for women’s political representation.37
At the time of evaluation, the achievement of UNDP’s electoral assistance objectives depended largely on the transitional government’s willingness to conduct timely, credible, and transparent presidential, legislative, and local elections. It also required continued financial and technical strengthening of the newly created AIGE. Lastly, the transitional government was mandated to ensure the requisite security and stability for credible elections, thus concluding the political transition and reinstating democratically elected governance in the country. 38
Finding 2. Security and the Rule of Law. UNDP enhanced institutional capabilities in security and law enforcement via training and strategic infrastructure investments, including modernizing prisons for better inmate treatment. This reportedly fostered trust between the population and the security forces at community level. However, persisting insecurity, issues with access to justice, local underfunding, and a worsening security environment threatened these improvements’ sustainability.
UNDP support to security and rule of law in Mali mostly focused at institutional level to enhance the capacity and presence of security (police) and judicial institutions. This support included capacity building, infrastructure rehabilitation, and digitization of data and systems, with the following results.
First, in line with the plan developed by the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, 40 policy directors and 75 agents operating in target localities have been trained since 2022 in technical matters as well as on ethics and human rights. Between 2021 and 2023, UNDP reports indicate that 1,448 security personnel, most of them men, were trained in a variety of subjects, including community policing and criminal investigation,
32 Coalition pour l’Observation Citoyenne des Élections au Mali, Observation of the Referendum of 18 June 2023, p. 33.
33 Interviews and IDEA, Lessons Learned from Supporting Mali’s Transition to Peace and Democracy Project, p. 10.
34 European Union, European Union Election Observation Mission, Mali 2018, Final Report, p. 11. BTI Mali’s 2020 country report (p. 35) also noted that none of the recommendations of the election observation missions in 2013 to improve the organization of elections and the voter registration system had been implemented for the 2018 or 2020 elections.
35 Coalition pour l’Observation Citoyenne des Élections au Mali, Observation of the Referendum of 18 June 2023, p. 27.
36 Coalition pour l’Observation Citoyenne des Élections au Mali, Observation of the Referendum of 18 June 2023, p. 37.
37 Coalition pour l’Observation Citoyenne des Élections au Mali: Press Release No. 003/2023 on the draft Constitution of the Republic of Mali. PAREM, Annual Report 2022, p. 6.
38 It will also require the good offices of the Special Secretary to resolve the political issues that impede the full implementation of the 2015 peace agreements. Carter Center, Independent Observer Report, November 2022.
with the majority benefiting from this training. The monitoring framework for the National Security Sector Strategy and 2022-2024 Action Plan allowed the Office of the Commissioner for Security Sector Reforms to better coordinate the efforts of different actors, including those international development partners that were members of the Internal Security dialogue group. In the justice sector, more than 120 staff of the newly created Communication Unit within the Ministry of Justice received support on judicial communication.
Second, 14 security infrastructures, including police stations and gendarmerie brigades, were built and rehabilitated in 8 cercles in Bandiagara, Kayes, Koutiala, Nara, Nioro du Sahel, and Ségou regions, while 12 justice infrastructures (magistrates’ courts and prisons) were built or rehabilitated in 7 cercles 39 The enhancement of living spaces in targeted detention centers significantly improved hygiene, health, and dignity for prisoners, in line with the United Nations Standards Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Visits to the Fana (Koulikoro) and Bollé women’s detention centers (Bamako) and meetings with detainees confirmed that benefits continued to be felt two years after the project’s conclusion.
Third, the digitization of the system used by the Planning and Statistics Unit of the Ministry of Justice allowed the 2016-2021 yearbooks to be finalized, evaluate performance, and inform the 2023 planned staff rotation. Through the Mandela Prisons project, 36 detention centers were equipped with AGIDERM software, which enhanced prison management and helped to limit overcrowding by ensuring close monitoring of pre-trial detention periods. The PROSMED programme continued to support the Directorate of Penitentiary Administration through training of clerks.
UNDP support was instrumental in setting up and running local Security Advisory Committees (CCS), benefiting mainly the rural populations most affected by the country’s security challenges. These committees facilitated dialogue between local communities and security actors in line with the provisions of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the security sector reform strategy. As of December 2023, 12 regional CCSs and 25 community CCSs were operational. Surveys and visits to Ségou and Mopti regions confirmed that the CCSs were helping to alleviate certain insecurity problems (for example, by installing street lights in high-crime areas) and boosting confidence in the police and gendarmerie, which is said to have increased by 13 percent in UNDP intervention sites.40 However, the limited resources available and the inadequate representation of justice actors in the CCSs have limited the ability of these mechanisms to address certain security challenges. These concerns were communicated to the Prime Minister’s Office but have yet to be addressed. In addition, strong CSS reliance on PROSMED resources poses a challenge to their sustainability.
Two surveys, one conducted by UNDP and the Human Sciences Institute, the other by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), indicate that the population’s trust in national security actors and its propensity to use their services in areas covered by UNDP generally increased between 2020 and 2022, with 40 percent more people resorting to security actors and being satisfied with the support they received. However, according to external data collected by SIPRI, the sense of security continuously deteriorated in Mopti region between 2019 and 2022. This data contrasts with the results obtained in the other regions surveyed in central Mali, where the population perceived the evolution of the security situation positively over the same period.41
39 District courts in Koro, Macina, Koutiala, Diema, Yélimané, and Nara and penitentiaries in Koro, Nara, Nioro, Diema, Yorosso, and Yélimané.
40 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. May 2023. Mali-Mètre 2023: Que pensent les Malien(ne)s? https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ mali/10100/2023.pdf
41 Institut des Sciences Humaines. May 2023. Rapport d’analyse: Enquête de perception réalisée dans le cadre du Programme d’Appui à la Stabilisation du Mali à travers le Renforcement de l’État de Droit (PROSMED); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Point Sud. 2023. Écoutez-Nous! Enquêtes sur les perceptions des populations au centre du Mali.
Despite a 5 percent increase in the population’s propensity to resort to judges and magistrates in project areas, access to justice at community level remains generally low in rural areas of Mali. This tends to confirm the validity of the approach put forward by UNDP, even if some key actions and reforms have been slow to materialize. At the time of writing this report, the implementation of new district courts before initiating legal and judicial assistance actions, as planned in the 2011 judicial map, was not yet effective.42 A draft law proposing the creation of a public legal aid body and the strengthening of witness and victim protection measures has not yet been approved.
Finding 3. Conflict Prevention and Social Cohesion. UNDP supported the development and approval of the strategy for national reconciliation and social cohesion, which played a key role in reactivating regional and community conflict management systems. Although these systems helped bolster social cohesion, the fluctuating patterns of inter- and intra-community conflict in intervention areas make it difficult to unambiguously determine the effectiveness of these interventions. Additionally, these systems confront issues related to inclusion, financial sustainability, and acknowledgment from formal justice stakeholders.
UNDP intervened at strategic and institutional levels to strengthen local conflict prevention mechanisms in areas where PROSMED intervened. This set the stage for the broader operationalization of a hybrid approach to peacebuilding, which combines traditional grassroots mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms with more top-down institutionally anchored mechanisms.
In collaboration with the Ministry of National Reconciliation, UNDP contributed to the development of a national strategy for reconciliation and social cohesion adopted in 2022. This strategy provided a clear framework for nationwide community mediation efforts. Additionally, UNDP aided the implementation of this strategy by revitalizing inactive conflict management and prevention mechanisms. These include Regional Reconciliation Support Teams (ERAR) and Community Reconciliation Committees (CCR) established by the Ministry of National Reconciliation in 2018 as well as the municipal and village Land Commissions (COFO) established under the 2017 Agricultural Orientation Law.
Key results at local level included the establishment or revitalization of 834 village and municipal COFOs as well as the management and resolution of a limited number of land-related conflicts by these commissions.43 UNDP efforts also strengthened capacities and raised awareness among local actors on formal and informal conflict management and resolution strategies via trainings, awareness-raising workshops, TV programmes, and radio broadcasts. Since the project’s inception, surveys conducted in project locations have reported a 13 percent rise in the number of individuals who are aware of what COFOs are.44 Given the population’s high degree of trust in customary and religious authorities,45 village COFOs included traditional authorities as well as representatives from women’s and youth organizations. Survey data from 2023 shows a 5 percent increase in the proportion of people who trust government actions to restore social cohesion, reconciliation, and peace. Lastly, UNDP and its MINUSMA partner enhanced the capabilities of 71 CCRs and 4 ERARs in Gao, Ménaka, Mopti, and Ségou regions. This was achieved by providing trainings, financial backing, and operational support and facilitating 27 inter-community dialogues.
42 Avocats sans Frontières Canada, Vers l’Accès à la Justice au Mali ? Avancées et Défis, Bamako, 2020 ; Law no. 2011-037 of 15 July 2011 on judicial organization; Law no. +2011-038 of 15 July 2011 on creating jurisdictions; Decree no. 2011-580/P-RM of 13 September 2011 modified by Decree no. 2018-0231 of 6 March 2018.
43 According to the 2022 PROSMED annual report, a first phase of support, finalized in March 2022 involved 186 land commissions in Ségou, Niono, Bla, Tominian, San, Macina, Bandiagara, Koro, Douentza, Mopti, Gao, Ansongo, Andérboukane, and Ménaka cercles The second phase of support, which started in July 2022, was scheduled to end in December 2023. This reached 323 additional land commissions and made it possible to extend PROSMED’s interventions to cercles in Nara, Diéma, Nioro, and Yélimané.
44 Institute of Human Sciences. May 2023. Rapport d’analyse: Enquête de perception réalisée dans le cadre du Programme d’Appui à la Stabilisation du Mali à travers le Renforcement de l’État de Droit (PROSMED).
45 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Point Sud. 2023. Écoutez-Nous! Enquêtes sur les perceptions des populations au centre du Mali.
However, COFOs faced various challenges, including a lack of operating budgets, members’ lack of tool ownership, and difficult collaboration with justice actors who were hesitant to endorse the decisions drafted by the COFOs. while the project sought to promote women’s and youth participation and to sensitize its members regarding their rights, these groups remained largely underrepresented as a result of prevailing socio-cultural norms. Some interviewees also emphasized that the formalization of traditional authorities’ roles in conflict prevention, especially in remote northern areas, occasionally reinforced the marginalization of women and youth from these mechanisms.
Despite the existence of a ministerial ordinance outlining the financing and functioning of COFOs, their dependence on UNDP threatens the sustainability of progress made through PROSMED. To overcome this challenge, UNDP advocated the integration of COFO support activities into Social, Economic, and Cultural Development Plans in 30 municipalities in Bandiagara, Mopti, and Ségou regions. However, these plans often suffer from underfunding, limiting the effectiveness of the sustainability strategy put forward by UNDP.
A perception survey conducted by SIPRI independently of PROSMED revealed varying trends in social cohesion within the cercles where UNDP has been active. However, this survey did not unambiguously show UNDP’s influence on these trends. The study, conducted between 2020 and 2022, observed a decline in the perceived quality of intra-community relationships in Djenné cercle and to some extent in Bandiagara and Tominian. In contrast, Niono’s perceptions remained generally negative but stable. Nevertheless, perceptions improved in the other intervention cercles 46 Regarding intercommunity relationships, perceptions worsened in Djenné, Douentza, and Koro cercles but improved in Bandiagara, Macina, Mopti, Niono, and San.47 UNDP was involved in all these cercles.
Finding 4. Prevention of Violent Extremism. UNDP put forward approaches vital in countering the shortcomings of strictly military security strategies by strengthening the capacities of the institution spearheading the prevention of violent extremism (PVE). Its support gave greater prominence to PVE, social cohesion, and peace-related discussions in schools and religious sermons. However, this support, which also promoted socio-economic opportunities for young people, was too modest to have a significant impact on levels of violence.
UNDP support to PVE in Mali was relatively modest and focused mainly on strengthening the Permanent Secretariat for the National Policy for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism and Terrorism (PNPLEVT), which operated under the Ministry of Religious Affairs and worship. Key results of these efforts included the development and adoption of a five-year action plan to operationalize the 2018 national Countering Violent Extremism policy previously adopted with the support of UNDP. It also strengthened the planning, monitoring, and evaluation capacities of the Monitoring and Coordination Committee of PNPLEVT.
Although UNDP specifically aimed to address violent extremism through religious and educational channels, its support was too limited to have a measurable impact on violent extremism. UNDP backed a consultation framework for religious actors, leading to the creation and dissemination of a Preaching and Sermon guide. This guide was used to train religious leaders across all denominations as well as school teachers, who subsequently adjusted their preaching and teaching methods to highlight PVE, social cohesion, and peace. Despite awareness campaigns resonating with communities and religious leaders, as evidenced by interviews and surveys conducted in project locations, the levels of violence have remained persistently high. For example, although the proportion of the population familiar with PNPLEVT in the intervention
46 Bankass, Bla, Koro, Macina, Mopti, and Ségou.
47 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Point Sud. 2023. Écoutez-Nous! Enquêtes sur les perceptions des populations au centre du Mali.
zones increased by 3.5 percent between 2020 and 2022, rates of violence did not fall significantly. However, UNDP surveys noted a 14 percent reduction in the number of people who consider violence the best response to community attacks following the project, which constitutes a significant protective factor against violent extremism.48
UNDP’s PVE strategy complemented to a certain extent MINUSMA’s PVE efforts, which focused on supporting youth socio-economic inclusion, rehabilitation, and reintegration through vocational training, awareness raising, and financing infrastructures. However, UNDP’s support and approach alone are insufficient in scope and depth to significantly curb violent extremism. The operating budget of the PNPLEVT Permanent Secretariat remains insufficient, even though the approaches it advocates proved to be necessary complements to military and security approaches.
Finding 5. Stabilization. Increasing political and security instability has greatly hindered the implementation of UNDP’s stabilization efforts in Liptako-Gourma as well as the re-establishment of the State’s presence in the newly created administrative region of Bandiagara. Terrorist attacks continued, with the number of violent incidents, casualties, and internally displaced people (IDP) reaching new highs. The withdrawal of donors due to geopolitical issues as well as prioritization of a highly unstable and insecure region were the main obstacles to achieving the expected results.
The Liptako-Gourma Stabilization Facility (LGSF), initiated in 2021 and implemented in Bandiagara region, faced significant challenges in its efforts to contribute to the return of IDPs, reduce levels of violence and casualties, and restore the authority and legitimacy of State authorities at the time of evaluation. As depicted in Figure 3, the number of IDPs in Mopti region (which encompassed Bandiagara region at the time of project implementation) decreased by a mere 5 percent between 2021 and 2023. Yet in April 2023, Bandiagara alone was still home to more than 82,000 IDPs, representing 22 percent of all IDPs in the country, the highest number nationwide, with women remaining the group most affected by internal displacement.
48 Institute of Human Sciences. May 2023. Analysis report: Perception survey carried out as part of the Stabilization through Rule-ofLaw Strengthening Support Programme in Mali (PROSMED).
49 Displacement Tracking Matrix of the National Directorate of Social Development of Mali (2018 to 2023). Calculations by the author.
FIGURE 3. Internally displaced persons in Mali and Mopti/Bandiagara region (2018-2022)49
As illustrated in Figure 4, the incidence of violent events targeting civilians persisted at a high level, averaging 226 events between 2020 and 2023. Most importantly, the number of civilian casualties was even higher, averaging 557 over those four years, peaking at 1,015 casualties over 10 years to 2022. These figures align with LGSF monitoring data indicating that the proportion of households feeling safe in intervention municipalities has drastically declined from 30 percent in 2022 to 18 percent in 2023, with marked declines in Dandoli, Bandiagara, and Dourou. 50
Regarding UNDP’s efforts to bolster the presence of the State in Bandiagara, a survey conducted in central Mali between 2019 and 2022 showed that the Bandiagara cercles had the highest vacancy rate at the prefecture level, with a job vacancy rate of 50 percent. 52 Interviews also highlighted that despite efforts supported by UNDP’s LGSF to rebuild public infrastructure, including health centers, social housing, IDP camps, roads, and street lighting, access to public services was not always effective in the region. 53 For example, the perception survey conducted by LGSF indicated that access to education was hindered mainly by insufficient staff, which also affected access to healthcare. Consequently, household satisfaction with the provision of and access to basic social services declined from 70 percent in 2022 to 56 percent in 2023.54 This was due to the volatile security situation but also to delays affecting the completion of infrastructure and the ineffective deployment of civil servants.
50 Facilité Régionale de Stabilisation du Liptako Gourma. Fenêtre Nationale du Mali. Annual Report 2023 (January-December 2023).
51 The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Consulted in January 2024.
52 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Point Sud. 2023. Écoutez-Nous! Enquêtes sur les perceptions des populations au centre du Mali, p. 33.
53 In 2022, UNDP counted the presence of 167 public officials in the 5 municipalities, including 114 teachers, 16 health staff, 20 water and forestry agents, 10 farmers’ supervisors, 3 mayors, 1 judge, 1 prefect, and 2 sub-prefects.
54 Facilité Régionale de Stabilisation du Liptako Gourma. Fenêtre Nationale du Mali. Annual Report 2023 (January-December 2023).
FIGURE 4. Violence against civilians in Mopti/Bandiagara region (2018-2022)51
UNDP also sought to contribute to stabilization by providing livelihoods to populations to limit their need to move, promote the return of IDPs, and offer them economic opportunities to reduce the risk of recruitment by groups promoting gender-based violence. This was achieved through capacity building (business management, marketing, and leadership training for youth and women), “work for cash” initiatives, and the provision of resources such as agro-food processing kits, agricultural equipment, soap making, and dyeing kits, among others, to encourage populations to initiate income-generating activities (IGAs). According to the perception study conducted by LGSF in 2023, an overwhelming majority of participants in “work for cash” activities (96 percent) improved their livelihoods through the project. The majority of participants (53 percent) used the money for immediate family expenses (food, healthcare, education), more than a third (37 percent) for the creation of a new IGA, and a minority for the continuation of an existing IGA. 55 This study also highlighted that the population greatly appreciated efforts to rehabilitate infrastructure.
The main challenge facing the LGSF in Mali was the reluctance of donors to maintain their funding in a changing geopolitical context characterized by Mali’s new partnerships and military strategies, particularly in Ségou, Mopti, Bandiagara, and Douentza. This led some donors to suspend their financial contributions. Consequently, the implementation of the project slowed down, which explains the financial execution rate of only 37 percent at the time of the evaluation.
The decision to intervene in Bandiagara, an administrative region newly created in 2023 with significant administrative infrastructure needs, was also questioned. 56 The limited presence of the State prior to the conflict posed a significant challenge given the extensive government services needs of the newly established region, which far outstrip what rapid, short-term interventions such as stabilization efforts can currently provide. This also cast uncertainty on whether it is necessary to adequately comprehend and address the root causes of the conflict, marked by historically low levels of legitimacy of State institutions and by intercommunal violence prior to any stabilization efforts. Moreover, the implementation of initiatives in the conflict’s epicenter without assurances of the State’s ability to maintain basic security compromised the effectiveness of stabilization efforts. 57
Lastly, while rapid action underpins UNDP’s stabilization approach, 58 administrative delays within UNDP itself have emerged as an impediment to the joint work plan’s implementation. According to some sources, these delays seem magnified compared to the faster-paced Rapid Impact Projects carried out by MINUSMA.
55 Centre d’Analyse et de Recherche de l’Espace Sahélo-Saharien. UNDP. 2023. Rapport Provisoire: Étude Qualitative Stabilisation, Phase II.
56 The number of administrative regions in the country increased from 1 to 19 in 2023, excluding the district of Bamako.
57 ACLED. 21 September 2023. Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel. https://acleddata.com/2023/09/21/fact-sheet-attacks-on-civilians-spike-in-mali-as-security-deteriorates-across-the-sahel
58 Speed, Scale and Social Contractare at the heart of UNDP’s 3-S stabilization approach.
2.2 Inclusive Growth and Private Sector Development
Outcome 2: By 2024, Malians, especially women and youth, reap the benefits of inclusive and sustainable growth in a diversified, job-creating and resilient economy.
Related outputs:
Output 2.1: The national statistics system has strengthened capacities to monitor progress towards the targets of the CREDD and Sustainable Development Goals, taking into account the gender and regional dimensions.
Output 2.2: National and local institutions have strengthened their capacity to plan, budget, implement, monitor and evaluate policies and strategies to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.
Output 2.3: An inclusive and enabling environment is created to deepen partnerships, dialogue and public-private financing for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in line with integrated national financing frameworks.
Output 2.4: Vulnerable populations, in particular women and youth, have access to financial and non-financial assets to strengthen their productive capacities and enjoy sustainable livelihoods and employment.
During the 2020-2024 cycle, the Country Office executed $19.5 million out of its $25 million budget related to inclusive growth. Most of this expenditure was shared between the Programme to Support Economic Governance, Resilience, and Sustainable Development (PAGEDD) and its $2.3 million budget as well as the Youth Entrepreneurship Programme (PEJ) and its $7.7 million budget. PAGEDD supports the improvement of the macroeconomic framework, the financing of human capital, the development of the private sector, the business climate, and the coordination of foreign aid, while PEJ is an entrepreneurship programme offering subsidies and mentoring to young people. while the former accounted for 12 percent of the resources spent under this outcome, PEJ alone accounted for 42 percent of expenditure, most of which was implemented in 2020 (see Figure 5).
FIGURE 5. Evolution of budget and expenditure (Outcome 2), 2020–2023 (US$ million)
Source: Atlas/Quantum data through the IEO’s Datamart as of 10 November 2023
Finding 6. Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Policies and the SDGs. Amidst ongoing multidimensional crises in Mali, UNDP was instrumental in generating data to identify populations most susceptible to being left behind. However, UNDP contributions to the monitoring of public policies supporting CREDD and the SDGs at both national and regional levels were modest as there is insufficient evidence to suggest that statistical systems have been sustainably enhanced.
UNDP was a steady supporter of efforts by the Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework’s Technical Coordination Unit (CT-CSLP) to monitor progress towards CREDD and the SDGs. Though relevant, it is unclear whether UNDP technical and financial support strengthened its institutional capacities or the broader capacities of the national statistical system. However, key results of these efforts included the setting up and implementation of a performance measurement framework to monitor CREDD implementation. 59 At the time of evaluation, the majority of CREDD indicators (89 percent) and three-quarters of SDG indicators (75 percent) could be informed by the National Statistical System (NSS). with UNDP’s support to the National Institute of Statistics for the implementation of the 2020-2024 Statistical Master Plan, NSS data increasingly met the statistical needs related to the monitoring of the SDGs and the 2063 Agenda. However, the entities contributing to the NSS under the coordination of the National Institute of Statistics continued to face insufficient resources.
Other contributions were more operational in nature. For example, UNDP supported regional and annual CREDD reviews, which were instrumental in the production of Mali’s Voluntary National Report on SDG implementation presented to the High-Level Panel on SDGs. These reports guided decision-making in times of multidimensional (security-related, political, and health) crises. For example, a study of COVID-19’s socio-economic impacts conducted with UNICEF helped stakeholders identify preventive measures against further poverty. In partnership with the Observatory for Sustainable Human Development and the Fight against Poverty, UNDP aided in conducting 10 studies, including the National Human Development Report in 2020, 2022, and 2023, the development of the poverty profile for the country’s 703 municipalities, and
59 At the end of the previous cycle, UNDP supported the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, a Theory of Change, and the integration of the SDGs using UNDP’s Rapid Integrated Assessment tool into the 2019-2023 CREDD.
the establishment of the SDG-related level of achievement in Mali through the Modular and Permanent Household Surveys. However, it is unclear whether this targeted support strengthened UNDP’s partners in a sustainable manner.
Support for localizing the SDGs, including their integration into regional and local plans and programmes, continued but faced challenges due to limited State presence nationwide. Training sessions for regional actors in SDG-oriented planning and the Mali 2040 National Prospective Study were not completed, the Government having decided to draw up a new Vision Mali 2063, to which the UNDP was lending its support. Further, the systematic disaggregation of study data by sex and region needed strengthening as 40 percent of 2021 studies lacked this data. Despite the positive momentum towards gender mainstreaming in national and local institutions’ policies and strategies, progress was slow, with nearly 40 percent of ministerial departments not generating a gender-related public spending report in 2022 despite having designated gender focal points.60
Finding 7. Aid Coordination and Mobilization. UNDP set the ambitious objective of improving the effectiveness of aid coordination. However, political changes at national level caused the country to move away from donor coordination platforms and efforts, thus challenging the continued relevance of UNDP efforts to deepen dialogue and partnerships with public and private partners (PPP).
Despite setting the ambitious goal of improving ODA coordination to enhance resource mobilization and contribute more effectively to the country’s socio-economic development and SDG achievement, UNDP’s contributions have been modest.61 The main achievement related to this output was the preparation of the 2020 and 2021 Development Cooperation Reports, a relevant first step in improving aid coordination. The planned support for the Aid Harmonization Secretariat to strengthen the capacities of the Integrated Public Aid Management System focal points took place in September and December 2023, even though the emerging foreign policies of Mali since 2021 posed new challenges to this partnership.
To link development planning with funding sources from the public and private sectors, UNDP and the Malian government initiated the development of a national integrated financing framework. A comprehensive assessment of sustainable financing for development was conducted to gather necessary data for financial dialogues with all development actors, and a draft of the national integrated financing strategy was made available. However, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these efforts.
At the time of evaluation, the political crisis had led to a drop in ODA and a sharp reduction in budget support from Mali’s bilateral partners, undermining pre-existing aid coordination mechanisms and efforts.
Finding 8. The Business Environment. UNDP initiatives have had a marginal impact on improving the business climate in Mali, primarily due to low financial and technical investment. Moreover, efforts to enhance the technical skills of private sector promotion organizations were deemed insufficient, due in particular to an unfavorable political, security, legal, and institutional framework for promoting private investment.
60 The number of departments with a gender report appended to the Finance Act was 15 in 2022 (Finance Act 2023, p. 888). with 25 ministries in 2022 (excluding delegated ministries), this represents around 60 percent of departments with such a report.
61 UNDP. Project Document: Support Programme for Economic Governance, Resilience, and Sustainable Development in Mali. 2021.
UNDP collaborated with key public and private trade promotion organizations, enhancing their capacity through trainings and financial support.62 However, these efforts had a marginal impact on Mali’s overall business climate, indicating that institutional-level interventions alone are ineffective without a conducive policy environment.
For example, UNDP supported the Technical Unit for Business Climate Reforms (CTRCA) and its PPPs in organizing trainings on change management and in the evaluation of its strategic plan. This support allowed CTRCA to digitize the issuance and management of building permits and make them accessible in Bamako as well as in regional capitals. while the digitization is expected to improve traceability, reliability, and efficiency in processing requests, the system’s transition to digital has been progressing slowly since its inception in 2014, suggesting that the initiative has enjoyed insufficient political support.
UNDP also supported the Agency for the Promotion of Investments in Mali in setting up a one-stop shop for the diaspora to facilitate investment from Malians living abroad. However, despite being launched in May 2023, the platform was not accessible as of December 2023. UNDP also supported the Agency for the Promotion of Exports in the deployment of a national barcode system as well as awareness-raising among entrepreneurs. Barcode systems are used to track and manage inventory, sales, orders, and other operational processes in an enterprise. Putting in place of a barcode system in compliance with international standards has been on Mali’s agenda for at least six years, not only to improve firms’ productivity and competitiveness but also to facilitate access for Malian products on foreign markets. However, due to delays and lack of resources, only a feasibility study had been finalized and the statutes and regulations of the Global Standards Mali Association validated at the time of evaluation. Both examples not only show that UNDP support was not merely insufficient but also highlight that intervening at the technical and institutional level without influencing policy-making can lead to partial results and slower progress in achieving desired outcomes.
UNDP withdrew from Mali’s Meat Export Development Programme (PRODEVIM). The implementation of PRODEVIM encountered various obstacles, including delays in the availability of government contributions, non-commitment from other donors, and instability within the line ministry, which significantly impacted the project’s implementation capacity. Overall support in this area remained modest as the programme evaluation highlighted the results as “weak” and “below expectations.”63
Finding 9. Youth Empowerment and Entrepreneurship. Despite a substantial financial investment aimed at improving employment and entrepreneurship among youth and women across the country, the flagship joint project of UNDP and the Tony Elumelu Foundation (TEF) was not successful in creating decent jobs, particularly during its first phase, due to inadequate design and gaps in project monitoring. However, significant improvements were made during the second phase of the project, which was still ongoing at the time of evaluation.
62 National Council of Employers of Mali, Network of west African Enterprises, Agency for the Promotion of Investments, Technical Unit for Business Climate Reforms, and Agency for the Promotion of Exports.
63 Agence pour la Promotion des Exportations du Mali. September 2023. Rapport d’Évaluation Finale de la Phase 1 du PRODEVIM.
The UNDP flagship Youth Entrepreneurship Programme (PEJ) implemented in partnership with the Nigeria-based Tony Elumelu Foundation (TEF) had the ambitious target to empower 10,000 young Malians through seed funding, training, and mentorship.64 The first phase (2020-2021) was mostly unsuccessful, while the second phase (2022-2023) continued to face major challenges despite some improvements. The following results were identified:
• During the first phase, 2,194 aspiring young entrepreneurs (30 percent of them women), were pre-selected and underwent a four-day business management training. 2,039 young people completed their training with a passing grade of 40 percent.
• Among this group, 1,860 young people (34 percent of them women), received a grant of $2,500 each. An additional 200 youth received funding of $5,000 each as part of a distinct TEF Entrepreneurship Flagship Programme.
• During the second phase, 811 aspiring young entrepreneurs (47 percent of them women) were trained, of whom 500 received $2,500 grants (34 percent of them women).
The PEJ programme faced multiple challenges, most notably during its first phase, mostly due to inadequate consideration of Malian contextual specificities in the programme’s design. First, PEJ was launched amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, participants had to submit their applications, go through an interview process, and follow the training process online regardless of their region of residence or connectivity constraints. Second, communication issues were flagged due to the fact the TEF team implementing the project was anglophone and the online trainings were conducted in English (simultaneously translated into French and Bambara), while some participants did not speak French. Third, the quality of the training, its duration, and its outcomes were questioned due to the very different capacities of participants. Fourth, TEF acting as the sole implementing partner during the first phase led to a complete absence of sustainability and ownership of the process or its outcomes within a pertinent national institution. Fifth, the requirement for young people to open a bank account with the Nigerian United Bank for Africa, which is affiliated with TEF, was poorly received by some partners and proved problematic for young people not based in Bamako as the bank’s only presence in Mali is in Bamako. Lastly and most importantly, the first phase of the project lacked an effective monitoring and follow-up mechanism.
This lack of adequate monitoring and follow-up mechanism significantly jeopardized the project’s performance during its first phase. Interviews and a document review revealed that an undetermined number of funded participants used the grants for personal rather than entrepreneurial purposes. As, according to one of the project’s technical reports, nearly a third of participants could not be traced, it can be inferred that the project lost track of over $1.3 million awarded to 532 young people by the end of the first phase (though several were traced in the following months).65 while interviews confirmed that some of the young people, especially those involved in the second phase, initiated economic activities, it remained uncertain whether these subsidies led to the creation of new, sustainable jobs or genuinely contributed to the empowerment of these young individuals. Thus, it cannot be conclusively affirmed that 2,194 jobs or very small businesses were genuinely established and continue to operate.
64 with expenditures exceeding $8 million, the PEJ programme was the main project implemented by the Policy and Strategy Unit, one of the flagship projects of the country programme, and was a result of a high-level partnership between the UNDP’s RBA and TEF.
65 CNPV, UNICEF, UNDP. Community Feedback from the U-Report/COVID-29 Youth Entrepreneurship and Outreach Programme –Technical Report.
The second phase of the PEJ project (2022-2023) drew lessons from the first phase by placing the project under the Ministry of National Entrepreneurship, Employment, and Vocational Training and by involving the National Center for the Promotion of Volunteering (CNPV) and the National Office for Employment and Training. An M&E analyst and 11 UN Volunteers were also recruited to monitor the programme in its 11 implementation regions. Moreover, grants were disbursed in two tranches to guarantee the proper utilization of funds. Additional improvements included the physical identification of youth businesses, conducting in-person training sessions, and organizing business plan competitions in local languages tailored to specific localities. Closer supervision of young people, oversight of fund use, and the organization of community feedback sessions by CNPV volunteers were other notable improvements observed.
Unlike the first phase, which over-represented young people residing in Bamako (or 68 percent of trainees and 72 percent of grant recipients), the second phase supported young people in all regions more equitably (while 13 percent of trainees were from Bamako, recipients from Mali’s three broad geographical zones were equally represented). Finally, UNDP further involved not only APEJ in the mobilization of national volunteers but also CNPV, two national incubators (DONILAB and Impact Hub), and the private sector through the Network of west African Enterprises in order to provide training and monitor entrepreneurs.
The second phase also had some shortcomings. The monitoring data did not make it possible to determine the extent to which participants had acquired sufficient business knowledge and management skills to create decent, sustainable jobs. At the time of evaluation, the inequalities faced by women business leaders were not explicitly addressed. Moreover, while TEF still does not employ French-speaking staff, the stronger involvement of UNDP and national volunteers facilitated communication.
In total, UNDP contributed to building the entrepreneurial capacity of nearly 3,005 young people and subsidized 2,560 of them. However, it cannot be affirmed that an equivalent number of businesses or jobs were created. In fact, many women dropped out of the process, accounting for less than 31 percent of subsidized entrepreneurs over the two phases.
Alongside PEJ, UNDP support facilitated Mali’s participation in the YouthConnekt initiative, establishing a youth nucleus and developing a roadmap and action plan. It is crucial to improve the rural business environment and finance pilot programmes to encourage young graduates to venture into rural entrepreneurship as merely creating programmes and funds does not automatically lead to youth engagement.
2.3 Environmental Sustainability and Resilience
to
Adverse Impacts of Climate Change
Outcome 2: By 2024, communities manage natural resources and the environment sustainably and equitably and are more resilient to the adverse effects of climate change.
Related outputs:
Output 3.1: National and local actors, including vulnerable communities, have strengthened their technical and operational capacities in risk prevention and adaptation to climate change.
Output 3.2: Communities manage natural resources in a sustainable manner, taking into account conflict prevention, risk management and pollution control.
Output 3.3: Solutions are being adapted to achieve universal access to clean, affordable and sustainable energy and generate income for women and youth through innovative technologies and financing.
During this cycle, the Country Office implemented 11 projects and executed $21 million out of a $30 million budget related to environmental sustainability. Most of the budget and expenditure are related to the digital health project and its $4.9 million budget, the Gourma Elephant Protection Project and its $4.1 million budget, and the Climate and Flood Risk Management Project and its $5.9 million budget.
FIGURE 6. Evolution of budget and expenditure (Outcome 3), 2020–2023
Finding 10. Climate Change. UNDP assumed a pivotal technical role in enhancing Mali’s ambitions in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and in strengthening capacities of Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF) staff in the area of climate change. During this phase, environment and climate change became the fourth pillar of the national development plan and benefited from higher budgetary allocations. However, meeting these climate ambitions was hampered by insufficient resource mobilization, allocation, and implementation.
UNDP’s technical and financial commitment to supporting its climate promise enhanced Mali’s climate ambitions and strengthened key sectoral institutions in charge of implementing its climate agenda. Most importantly, UNDP support contributed to elevating the profile of environmental issues at national level, which led to the environment becoming the fourth axis of CREED along with an increase in the budget dedicated to the environment.
More specifically, through this support, the Environment and Sustainable Development Agency revised Mali’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets to reduce GHG emissions by up to 40 percent compared to the first NDC in 2015. At sectoral level, the revised NDC aimed to reduce GHG emissions by 31 percent for energy, 21 percent for agriculture, 39 percent for land use and forestry, and 31 percent for the waste sector. Through a collaboration with UN women, gender issues were also better addressed in the revised NDC following the completion of a UNDP-backed study on gender inequalities related to the NDC. This led, for example, to the creation and validation in September 2023 of a Strategic Investment Plan in September 2023.
UNDP institutional support also enhanced the capacities of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF) as well as those of other members of the macroeconomic framework for mainstreaming climate change in macroeconomic policy, fiscal planning, budgeting, and public investments. Interviews indicated that this support helped elevate the profile of environmental issues at national level, which led to the environment becoming the fourth axis of CREED 2 accompanied by an increase in the budget dedicated to the environment, which rose from 0.76 to 2.3 percent. This increase was also notable in MEF reports on the execution of the central budget between 2018 and 2022.66
Despite this progress, the main challenge lay in the Malian government’s capacity to mobilize financial resources to implement the NDC. Indeed, the approval of the investment plan in September 2023 coincided with the withdrawal of MINUSMA and the closure of the Norwegian Embassy, which could lead to a loss of financial resources allocated to the environment sector, now diverted to the government’s security priorities. All in all, UNDP’s contribution to the implementation of the NDC has been largely strategic, especially since the new UNDP climate security project was still in its inception phase.
Finding 11. Sustainable Environmental Management. UNDP strategic level technical support strengthened Mali’s environmental policies and regulatory frameworks even though policy implementation witnessed only minor progress. UNDP’s local piloting of sustainable land management, biodiversity conservation, and natural resource conflict resolution initiatives reached relevant—albeit short-term—output-level results. However, the absence of monitoring and evaluation of ecological benefits hindered the facilitation of informed future decisions and their potential expansion.
UNDP support facilitated the development of new policies and strategies as well as the updating and dissemination of regulatory and strategic environmental policies. This support assisted the Ministry of the Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development (MEADD) in decision-making regarding
66 Ministry of the Economy and Finance of Mali. Reports on the provisional implementation situation of the central budget 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022. https://finances.ml/rapportdexecution
strengthening the preservation and protection of natural resources and the environment. It also contributed to the development of the Environmental Code, an integrated environmental assessment conducted in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme, the publication and dissemination of the updated National Environmental Protection Policy in 2019 at national and local levels, and the greening of the agricultural development policy and its action plan. However, the implementation of these various strategic documents stalled due to a lack of funding and political will.
In the area of biodiversity conservation, UNDP provided both strategic and operational support to the Directorate General of water and Forestry through a project aimed at protecting and improving the Gourma elephant ecosystem. This resulted in substantial improvement in the legislative framework, as evidenced by the adoption of a law establishing the Gourma Biosphere Reserve, which aims at protecting elephants, which increasingly compete with humans for the same resources, and combating wildlife crime.67 This law enhanced the protection, control, and conservation status of the biosphere reserve, which was upgraded from a mere reserve to a UNESCO world Heritage Biosphere Reserve. Similarly, the capacity of water and forestry officers responsible for combating poaching and wildlife and forest crime was strengthened in order to improve the law’s implementation. Lastly, UNDP supported the development of a national strategy to combat elephant poaching with an action plan in 2023; however, its implementation requires financial resources that have been slow to materialize. Interviews and UNDP reports indicated that the logistical, financial, infrastructure, and human resource support to the Directorate General of water and Forestry enabled the Joint Brigade to conduct successful joint surveillance and counter-offensive operations, ensuring the protection of elephants and their environment. However, the accuracy of this information could not be corroborated due to security constraints. The financial viability of this mixed army-civilian mechanism for wildlife protection was also questioned given that it largely depended on UNDP. The longer-term effectiveness of UNDP environmental protection projects remains uncertain. Meanwhile, UNDP implemented multiple small-scale, isolated projects with limited potential impact. However, the monitoring and evaluation of these projects remained insufficient, raising doubts regarding UNDP’s ability to fully assess their effectiveness.
Given the high levels of insecurity in the country, the UNDP environment team expanded its scope of action by integrating conflict prevention and natural resources management approaches through a joint project on women and Conflict Management (in collaboration with the UN in Niger). To date, the project has established 11 conflict resolution mechanisms in Gao and Menaka regions and built the capacities of 200 women mediators who joined COFOs and CCSs supported by PROSMED.68 However, the effectiveness of this intervention could not be corroborated.
Finding 12. Disaster Risk Prevention and Reduction . UNDP’s technical assistance to the National Meteorological Agency and the National Directorate of Hydraulics bolstered certain aspects of Mali’s infrastructure and information systems, subsequently decreasing the short-term flood risk for several isolated communities. However, immediate technical problems and maintenance shortfalls in some of the infrastructure posed a threat to their durability and, in certain instances, increased the long-term flood risk.
67 Law 2021-064 of 14 December 2021.
68 UNDP (2022). Results-Oriented Annual Report 2022.
UNDP projects whose implementation started during the previous phase 69 strengthened the capacities of both the National Meteorological Agency and the National Directorate of Hydraulics by expanding their hydro-meteorological network in certain municipalities Bamako district70 and Mopti, Kayes, Koulikoro, and Sikasso regions.71 These projects supported the installation of equipment such as automatic synoptic and aeronautical stations, weather stations, automatic hydrological stations, automatic rain gauges, limnometric stations, beacons, and hydro-meteorological stations. These stations instantly transmit data to the National Meteorological Agency and the National Directorate of Hydraulics. This data is then converted into climate information to generate general flood forecasts, which are disseminated through various media channels for the general public and localized bulletins upon the request of municipalities. Though the project did not correct some equipment failures, rendering them non-functional, the National Meteorological Agency committed to using its own resources for the maintenance of synoptic stations and to ensure business continuity. Through this pilot initiative, UNDP support for hydro-meteorological stations benefited 12 municipalities, though covering only one-fifth of national needs.
UNDP also supported the development of an early warning system that, according to evaluation reports, disseminated flood risk alerts and agro-climatic information to nearly 1.2 million people and 69,786 producers via monitoring committees and trained producers equipped with telephones. However, evaluation site visits showed that some monitoring committees were not operational and that certain hydro-meteorological stations malfunctioned, leading to a decreasing number of people receiving alerts. Additionally, the early warning system risked being discontinued due to uncertainties related to web hosting funding beyond the project. Finally, the evaluation did not demonstrate any tangible impact of this information on decision-making by municipal authorities or populations.
UNDP also reduced the risk of flooding in some municipalities in Bamako District by rehabilitating 29 kilometers of collectors and gutters and paving four streets. However, the sustainability of these structures is threatened by a lack of maintenance funds among municipal authorities, which could heighten the risk of flooding after project withdrawal due to the buildup of sludge and solid waste.72
Finding 13. Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change. UNDP efforts to strengthen adaptation and the climate resilience capacities of local communities achieved targeted output-level results, benefiting mostly project participants but reaching limited outcome-level results due to the limited and fragmented nature of the support provided.
Small-scale UNDP efforts to strengthen adaptation and the climate resilience capacities of local communities achieved minor output-level results, including small market gardening areas, hydraulic structures, aquaculture basins, soil defense and restoration structures, and cereal banks through targeted subsidies and trainings. Site visits confirmed that in specific cases, participants had improved their agro-sylvo-pastoral and fisheries production capacities while diversifying their income sources. However, the fact that UNDP financial support was spread over several years and across different municipalities resulted in fragmented investments and explains the absence of major outcome-level changes at community level.
69 The objective of the Climate and Flood Risk Management Project was to strengthen the capacities of national and local authorities for effective risk management and the reduction of negative impacts of floods on communities in the target areas at the level of seven municipalities, three of which are in Bamako District and the other four in Mopti and Kayes regions. The objective of the Support Project for the Implementation of the National Strategy of Mali was to improve the availability of reliable agro-climatic data and to support the integration and development of appropriate adaptation solutions in addition to improving the adaptive capacities of communities in its area of intervention, namely 10 municipalities in Sikasso, Koulikoro, Kayes, and Ségou regions.
70 Municipalities I, IV, and VI (District of Bamako).
71 Municipality of Kati (Koulikoro region), Madina Diassa, Tiéroula, M’Pessoba, and Koury (Sikasso region), Sébékoro and Tomora (Kayes region), and Fatoma and Pignari Bana (Mopti region).
72 UNDP. 2021. Final Evaluation Report of the National Policy for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism and Terrorism.
More specifically, UNDP implemented four projects, three of which started in the previous cycle and have continued in the current cycle (see Annex 7), aimed at strengthening the adaptation and climate resilience capacities of local communities in the most vulnerable areas. These projects intervened in 12 different municipalities from 2015 to 2022, illustrating the scattered nature of the interventions. The total budget committed for these projects is $5.2 million, including operating costs, which equates to an average of $377,500 per municipality.
Based on the lessons it learned over the years, UNDP moved towards a more integrated implementation approach, targeting specific and interrelated themes, focused on a limited number of municipalities, and benefiting from more substantial financial resources to maximize impact. UNDP’s new climate security project, which encompassed natural resource management and conflict prevention and management and adopted this thematic approach, attracted interest from the government as well as donors.
Finding 14. Energy. UNDP partnered with the Renewable Energy Agency to provide remote rural populations with access to clean, affordable solar energy for both household and business needs. However, the demonstration-oriented nature of the project, issues with the community management model of the mini solar power plants, and quality and maintenance concerns restricted their use and threatened their financial sustainability. Initiatives to engage the private sector to address these management and sustainability challenges were still in the early phases.
Though UNDP provided much-needed strategic and institutional support to the Renewable Energy Agency (AER), this support was insufficient to significantly improve access to energy by vulnerable populations living in remote locations. For example, UNDP’s key strategic contribution led to the development of a new energy policy and to the adoption of a renewable energy strategy for 2023-2028. It supported the AER experiment with a new 100 percent mini solar power plant electrification model for rural communities using batteries for storage as well as the introduction of hybrid and solar-powered multifunctional platforms to support IGAs. It also strengthened the AER research laboratory by providing material for testing photovoltaic equipment, financing research, and supporting specific events such as the Malian Renewable Energy week.
Testing mini solar power plants and solar multifunctional platforms brought clean and affordable energy to poor off-grid rural households. This led to the establishment of 11 hybrid mini grids with an installed capacity of 116 kwp in several regions of Mali.73 UNDP’s annual reports for 2021 and 2022 claim that the mini solar power plants brought lighting, improved access to water through solar water pumps, and supported women engaging in solar-powered IGAs. However, interviews and site visits identified malfunctions and maintenance issues in solar installations, pumps, and multifunctional platforms, raising doubts on the sustainability of the approach. Although UNDP efforts intended to create green jobs for the maintenance of mini power plants, the evaluation noted these jobs were precarious due to low demand for maintenance services and the insufficient number of mini power plants. Additionally, the demonstrative nature of the project and its modest financial resources did not sufficiently meet the energy needs of all beneficiary villages. Some villages were not fully covered by solar streetlights, while in other cases, energy needs for domestic and commercial use largely exceeded energy production.
UNDP’s decision to assign the management of mini solar power plants to village management committees rather than to the private sector due to concerns over tariff increases raised issues of cost-effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability. These committees were established without prior authorization from the Malian Agency for the Development of Domestic and Rural Energy, thus failing to comply with the regulations in place. Moreover, the non-transfer of the mini power plants to the Agency as per the
73
Ségou, Sikasso, Kita, Mopti, and Baguénida regions.
regulations hindered its ability to monitor and provide assistance in case of incidents. Even where local management committees were effectively put in place, they faced various challenges as the absence of financial profitability studies left them without proper guidance over how to set electricity tariffs. In addition, they faced difficulties in collecting fees from subscribers. The case of Banido, where a recently installed mini solar power plant has yet to establish its tariffs, exemplifies a situation that significantly constrains the financial capacity of the committees. This constraint jeopardizes their ability to ensure the upkeep, maintenance, and renewal of the grid, thereby putting the fulfillment of local energy needs at risk.
Finding 15. Telehealth. UNDP played a significant role in the implementation of telehealth through a pilot experiment structured around the solar electrification of health centers. while this initiative partially improved healthcare and led to more effective management of medical records, challenges such as equipment failures and inadequacies, lack of staff training, and a regulatory gap hindered the sustainability of the progress made.
UNDP in collaboration with wHO, the University of Sherbrooke, the National Agency for Telehealth and Medical Informatics (ANTIM), AER, and the Federation of Community Health Associations contributed to the implementation of a solar-powered telehealth pilot project implemented over 2021-2022.74 Key UNDP results included the development of a national digital health strategic plan 2024-2028, which was still awaiting political validation. Efforts were also underway to integrate robotics, drone use, and artificial intelligence into this plan in alignment with the creation of a new agency on robotics and artificial intelligence. UNDP involvement also gave increased attention to the digitization of the health system in the Health Dialogue Group, which brought TFPs together. Concurrently, the process of creating the National Digital Health Coordination Platform was being finalized.
UNDP technical support enabled ANTIM to redefine its strategic position and fulfill its missions. These include promoting research in information and communication technology, contributing to telehealth and medical informatics training, disseminating scientific information in these fields, establishing a digital health system, and fostering discussions on telehealth and medical informatics. with this assistance, ANTIM collaborated with the Federation of Community Health Associations to raise awareness and train these structures to integrate telehealth and medical informatics into their traditional practices. UNDP also contributed to the strengthening of the capacity of ANTIM through training provided by the University of Sherbrooke and the provision of a vehicle for field missions.
At community level, this pilot project equipped 29 health facilities with solar kits (solar panels and batteries) to supply new telehealth systems that included servers, computers, and smart glasses connected to the OpenClinic medical record system. The project created new skills among health workers as well as ANTIM in telehealth broad principles and equipment use. Field visits and interviews revealed that more than half the equipment was functional and in use, except for smart glasses due to the absence of a legal framework governing the use of external doctors via telehealth. In these cases, testimonies indicated that digital patient management was more transparent and efficient than manual patient management. while the project brought various benefits to health center staff in rural as well as urban areas, it also faced several challenges due to insufficient resources, the increasing electricity needs of these centers, and its ad hoc and demonstrative nature. Details are presented in the table below.
74 wFP and UNICEF, the initial implementing partners, withdrew their support during the project to implement their own initiative, resulting in a loss of key resources to implement social protection and resilience-related activities that fell under their responsibility.
Strengths
• Quicker access to digital patient files in OpenClinic and faster medical care.
• Increased revenues due to fraud reduction and improved transparency in financial management.
• Improved workflow and interconnectivity between medical units.
Areas for Improvement
• Low energy coverage due to equipment overload (initial allocation taking into account only the operation of computer equipment).
• Insufficient number of computers, leading to low use of OpenClinic software in certain units.
• Insufficient number of trained operators and duration of training.
• Resistance to change among healthcare providers.
• Low depreciation allowance for equipment maintenance.
2.4 Leaving No One Behind
Finding 16. Gender and Development . Gender equality and women empowerment mainstreaming was uneven throughout the UNDP programme. while efforts to increase women’s participation in politics were bearing fruit, substantial investments aimed at promoting women’s economic empowerment were mostly ineffective. UNDP dependency on traditional economic empowerment approaches did not address the root causes of discrimination and inequalities specific to the intervention’s location.
Gender equality and women empowerment (GEwE) was unevenly mainstreamed throughout the UNDP programme, which explains the programme’s modest achievements in that regard. The most significant results were recorded in the inclusive political governance portfolio, where the longstanding efforts of UNDP, UN women, and civil society organizations (CSO) to promote women’s participation in electoral processes positively impacted the legal framework, strengthening their voice and increasing their political participation and influence over policymaking.75
Through their awareness-raising and capacity building efforts, UNDP and its partners contributed to the implementation of the gender quota law in the 2016 municipal and 2020 legislative elections. The PACE project strengthened the capacities of women candidates and established women’s situation rooms in four regional capitals, an approach replicated in the 2023 referendum. These initiatives encouraged women’s engagement as candidates and voters and raised awareness of potential risks, including hate speech and threats of violence against women. They contributed to a significant increase in the number of women candidates for legislative office (from 13.5 to 30.4 percent) and municipal office (from 16 to 33.4 percent) between 2013 and 2020.76 This increase was also reflected in a rise in the proportion of women elected at
75 Law 052 should guarantee a 30 percent quota for women in appointments to national institutions and legislative bodies.
76 PAREM, Global Data Access Framework, pp. 8-9.
municipal level (from 8 to 26 percent) and national legislative level (from 9.5 to 28.5 percent) during the same period.77 The results of these initiatives can therefore be deemed gender-sensitive in terms of the Gender Results Effectiveness Scale (GRES). 78
Another significant result due to its gender-sensitive nature but which also merits further evaluation stems from PROSMED. UNDP working through the COFOs facilitated training for women in rural areas, focusing on advocacy and lobbying. Coupled with community training on women’s rights and 90 screenings of a film highlighting the issue of women’s access to land, this created a favorable environment for women’s groups to conduct effective advocacy actions. These efforts enabled them to acquire nearly 143 hectares of land allocated by 121 villages. In the long run, these advances could contribute to empowering women and youth in the intervention areas, even though other underlying socio-cultural factors could counteract progress.
Multiple factors also explain the limited contribution of the programme to GEwE. Though UNDP’s role in the Spotlight Initiative in Mali had transformative potential, it was significantly scaled back in the aftermath of the 2020 coup and following donors’ decision to disengage from efforts directly benefiting government institutions.79 This decision was supported by the fact that results achieved at that time faced an uncertain future due to the fragility of the transitional government. 80 The adverse political context thus resulted in the decision to move forward with the Initiative without the three pillars UNDP would have led during the second phase, namely legislation, institutional strengthening, and data management.
UNDP’s approaches were also often unsuitable to the achievement of gender transformative or gender responsive results in terms of the GRES scale. Several projects across the programme sought to promote GE wE by equipping women, youth, or IDPs with material, financial, and technical resources. By encouraging people to initiate IGAs, UNDP hoped to foster their economic empowerment and ultimately their resilience to conflict, climate change, or discrimination. However, such change can only occur if the income generated is sufficient to cover the needs of the targeted households and if it is sustainable. while interviews and site visits tended to indicate that the approach implemented alleviated the workload of participants and even translated into economic gains, there was no evidence that the gains would persist overtime or of any broader positive economic spillover effects among communities. Most importantly, these approaches alone did not alter the underlying causes of inequality or discrimination, including unequal access and control of land and productive resources. Specific attempts were made to involve women in local conflict prevention and social cohesion mechanisms such as COFOs and CCRs. 81 However, despite the existence of legal texts governing the inclusion of young people and women in COFOs, actual inclusion and influence of women or young people remain limited and highly dependent on project support. These mechanisms are also exposed to the risks of replicating and perpetuating pre-existing power dynamics, including the exclusion and discrimination of women, most notably in remote regions of the country less exposed to diversity.
77 PACE, 2020 Report, pp. 3-30.
78 See https://erc.undp.org/pdf/GRES_French.pdf
79 European Court of Auditors. 2023. Special Report. The Spotlight Initiative to end violence against women and girls. Ambitious but so far with limited impact.
80 Humanitarian Emergency Response Africa. Rapport d’évaluation à mi-parcours utilisant la méthodologie ROM. Programme national de prévention et de réponse aux violences faites aux femmes et aux filles au Mali.
81 Though PROSMED and the women and Management of Natural Resource-Related Conflicts Project.
Overall, the results achieved are inconsistent with UNDP’s claim that it dedicated 82 percent of its resources to interventions where gender equality was an important objective (see Figure 7). UNDP reported $70 million in expenditures on project outputs having GEwE as a primary objective (GEN2) and $15.3 million in expenditures on project outputs significantly contributing to GEwE (GEN3).
At the operational level, UNDP embarked on a Gender Certification process in 2021 for which the Country Office obtained the Silver Seal. Subsequently, UNDP contributed to the institutionalization of gender through the development of a new 2022-2025 strategy accompanied by an action plan, both aligned with the three outcomes of the country programme as well as with the UNDP’s overall strategic plan in its priority areas and its six solutions. This document constitutes the reference framework for gender promotion interventions in Mali.
In terms of human resources, UNDP also mobilized two Gender Specialists in order to have the necessary capacities to support its commitment, including the Gender Seal. However, a marked gender imbalance persists at Country Office level, with 73 percent of office staff being male, particularly in both professional (P) and general (G) positions.
Finding 17. Leaving No One Behind. UNDP operationalized the Leaving No One Behind (LNOB) principle by intervening in central Mali, the epicenter of the conflict, where a critical mass of civilians is exposed to multiple risk factors. However, this stance hampered UNDP’s ability to achieve sustainable development results in an area where humanitarian work and insecurity prevail.
Based on the UNDP’s LNOB implementation framework, this evaluation observed that by intervening in central Mali, UNDP was purposefully targeting the populations most at risk of being left behind. During this cycle, most projects as well as most programme expenditures were concentrated in Mopti, Ségou, and Bandiagara regions (see Annex 6). Project implementation was also supported by the presence of a major UNDP project office in Sevaré (Mopti region).
Figure 7. Distribution of Expenditures by Gender Marker by Outcome (in US$ million)
8. Leaving No One Behind framework
Over the last decade, central Mali was the epicenter of the conflict, hosting the highest number of casualties and violent events, including violence against civilians, driven in part by trust and governance deficits as well as emergent ethnic rivalries. Mopti, Bandiagara, and certain municipalities in Ségou were also exposed to the highest level of multidimensional poverty across the country. while northern regions of the country such as Timbuktu, Gao, Menaka, and Kidal also faced very high levels of multidimensional poverty, population density and cases of violence against civilians tended to be lower. Most importantly, the remote nature of these regions as well as the limited presence of the State and prevalent insecurity have kept UNDP away from these regions, where MINUSMA was better equipped to operate. Southern municipalities were generally much less affected by multidimensional poverty and conflict-related violence than the rest of the country even if their populations faced distinct but significant development challenges.
At the time of evaluation, questions were being raised by certain actors with regards to the relevance of UNDP’s focus on a region where humanitarian work often prevailed and where sustainable development results are harder to achieve. These doubts were reinforced by the previous findings, highlighting that UNDP performance has been significantly hampered by security challenges in these three regions, most notably in Bandiagara, where UNDP operations have been highly dependent on MINUSMA’s and the national government’s security apparatus. In such a context, should UNDP continue to target these hard-to-reach regions, where long-term development results will be difficult to achieve, or focus on other regions of the country?
2.5 Strategic Positioning and Programme Coherence
Finding 18. Strategic Positioning and Comparative Advantage. The political context in Mali limited the political influence held by UNDP during the last cycle, while security challenges hindered its ability to operate effectively at the communal level in central Mali. This situation has placed its technical support at institutional level at the heart of its programme, particularly in the areas of governance and climate change, where its comparative advantage resided.
Most of the government institutions interviewed perceived UNDP as a reliable ally, capable of providing relevant technical inputs on various SDG-related issues. However, the window of opportunity for UNDP to engage in effective political dialogue and exercise strategic influence has narrowed following the transitional government’s decision to reaffirm its sovereignty by distancing itself from some of its traditional partners. At the time of evaluation, this reaffirmation led to more limited participation than in the past by TFPs in the development of Vision 2063 and the post-CREDD document. This included UNDP, which has traditionally held a pivotal role in these initiatives. Nonetheless, UNDP’s financial assistance was
FIGURE
used by the Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework’s Technical Coordination Unit to conduct a strategic diagnosis and evaluation of CREDD, which was instrumental in the development of Vision 2063 and the post-CREDD document.
Despite the challenges, UNDP has maintained good relationships with its government partners as well as other partners (CSOs, TFPs, UN) on a technical level in its three areas of intervention, namely inclusive governance, inclusive growth, and climate change. Those working on governance issues viewed UNDP as a potential collaborator capable of taking on some of the civil work of MINUSMA. However, this expectation did not take into account the fact that UNDP’s current financial and logistical capacities would not allow it to extend its operations to other geographical areas and expand its thematic scope while its actions depended on and were coordinated with those of MINUSMA. UNDP was an equally reliable partner of MEADD, supporting its participation in national and international climate meetings. In these two areas, UNDP has catalyzed development resources from vertical funds. It has been at the forefront of UN efforts related to SDG 16 on peace and justice as it has been the main beneficiary of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in Mali: in fact, since 2020, Mali has ranked third worldwide among PBF beneficiaries, with a portfolio amounting to $40 million. Similarly, UNDP has been a significant beneficiary of the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Fund for Mali.
UNDP work in the field of inclusive growth benefited from much less visibility and recognition than in other areas. Its flagship projects faced difficulties due to poor project design (e.g., the PEJ project) and the dispersion of rather limited resources among too many government institutions (e.g., PAGEDD). Prolonged vacancies for national and international economist positions within the Country Office during this cycle, the latter being the head of the inclusive growth unit, hampered the Office’s ability to develop a clear vision and strategy in this area, thereby hindering the achievement of the expected results.
UNDP’s positioning at local and community level had to contend with an unfavorable security context, restricting its ability to directly access intervention areas and in some cases limiting the quality of project monitoring. However, PROSMED stands out as an exception, having collected baseline data, conducted a mid-term perception survey, and planned to carry out a final survey, thus allowing it to have comprehensive and credible monitoring data. In the most difficult to access areas, UNDP outsourced implementation to local CSOs already in place and known to local communities, thereby outsourcing security risks but also crucial accountability mechanisms.
Finding 19. Resource Mobilization and Donor Relations. Amidst the current multidimensional crisis, UNDP attracted bilateral donors that moved away from direct budget support they previously provided to Mali by investing where UNDP perceived comparative advantages lie. while this created evident short-term opportunities, the monitoring and reporting of UNDP projects were sources of concern for some donors.
At the time of writing, the financial data analyzed indicated that the bulk of the resources spent during this cycle came from bilateral donors (41 percent), followed by UNDP (37 percent) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) (10 percent). This highlights the importance these bilateral donors attach to UNDP in Mali, especially given the political upheavals of the last few years, the ensuing sanctions, and the cooling of relations with some key donors. while OECD data shows a decline in ODA in Mali since the 2020 coup, the UNDP budget has in fact increased, in particular due to funding dedicated to the Common Electoral Fund (PAREM) and LGSF stabilization work.
FIGURE 9. Programme expenditure, by funding source 2020-2023 (in US$ million)
This coincides with the fact that UNDP was considered by donors, government, and civil society partners alike to be a credible, impartial partner capable of dissociating itself from regional and global geopolitical challenges. while several embassies have been forced to reduce their footprint and direct budget support in the country, they have found in UNDP a reliable partner through which they could channel their support, particularly in the area of governance and the rule of law. In this regard, expenditure related to bilateral financing increased by 73 percent between 2020 and 2023, from $8 million in 2020 to nearly $14 million in 2023.
On the other hand, interviews with UNDP donors in 2023 present a more nuanced picture of how donors perceived UNDP. For example, UNDP’s stance on human rights issues was raised in some interviews, 82 with the following statement illustrating how UNDP was perceived:
“UNDP is known to collaborate with state institutions in a positive way.”
“UNDP’s voice is respected at State level. They have a good capacity to support institutions and to develop relevant actions in this context. But the question arises as to where to draw the red line in a context of growing authoritarianism and a crisis of state legitimacy. Can UNDP denounce actions despite its commitment to work with central institutions?”
Nevertheless, UNDP’s pragmatic stance fills a need for the Malian government and the population as well as those in the international community who wish to continue supporting Mali. In this regard, with its mandate centered on capacity building, UNDP has placed the emphasis on backing national institutions and local actors, including the National Human Rights Commission. This is to ensure that the country is equipped with its own resources for tackling human rights matters via its indigenous mechanisms.
while many donors initially recognized UNDP as a capable partner in areas where it had a clear comparative advantage, they also pointed out specific areas for enhancement. The principal grievances were about uneven communication with donors as well as inadequate reporting practices that could be viewed as a lack of transparency when projects underperform. The most obvious example of this dissatisfaction culminated in the refusal of two key donors to participate in PAREM following their unsatisfactory involvement in PACE, the electoral project previously implemented with their support. Despite this rebuttal, PAREM, which was being implemented at the time of evaluation, faced similar challenges. Its Technical Committee had not met during the first two years of the project, and some factual information requested by donors
82 The rule of law implies the promotion of “the equality of all citizens before the law and legislation that is fair, non-discriminatory, and respectful of human rights.”
remained unanswered, making it impossible for donors to know how their financial contributions were being used. Similar dissatisfaction was noted for other projects that were completed or ongoing at the time of evaluation.
At the time of writing this report, major bilateral donors such as Norway and Sweden were pulling out of Mali, while others were still considering their position, influenced by Mali’s determination to assert its sovereignty against its traditional TFPs. This situation threatened the prevailing UNDP resource mobilization strategy for this cycle. This also raises the importance for UNDP to reassert its reliability as a neutral, trusted partner.
Finding 20. Interagency Coordination and Nexus. Cooperation and coordination between UNDP and other UN entities largely focused on resource mobilization from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Spotlight Initiative. However, cooperation between humanitarian and development actors remained insufficient in a context that often renders the distinct principles governing humanitarian, development, peace, and stabilization efforts incompatible.
UNDP collaborated closely with MINUSMA, whose operational capacities enabled it to implement substantial portions of its work plan. For instance, under the PAREM project, MINUSMA provided technical and security support in northern regions, which were inaccessible to UNDP. Alongside PROSMED, MINUSMA also served as a significant technical partner at the security level. Despite these coordination efforts, collaboration between UN agencies in Mali remained largely tied to each other’s resource mobilization efforts. Consequently, aside from the efforts funded by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Spotlight Initiative, which make inter-agency cooperation a prerequisite for accessing their funding, collaboration at both strategic and operational levels remained challenging. However, the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Electoral Team with UNDP-administered electoral projects at its core is an exception. Regular meetings between the UN team and MINUSMA have facilitated the adoption of coordinated and complementary positions in response to government requests.
while strengthening collaboration between humanitarian, development, and peace actors is increasingly becoming an imperative in countries facing multidimensional crises and conflicts, there was little mention of this nexus in the interviews conducted for this evaluation. Despite the increased role of UNDP in the stabilization efforts in the center of the country as well as the need to create sufficient conditions for the return of IDPs, collaboration between humanitarian and development actors remained insufficient. Some interviews underscored that UNDP attended meetings along with UNHCR groups on sustainable solutions in Mopti and Gao regions. However, there was scant evidence to confirm that these groups were active, while the group was inactive in Bamako.
It is evident that while UNDP operates at the intersection of development and peace, this is not the case at the level of the humanitarian development nexus. According to some analyses, the current context has not facilitated the reconciliation of humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence with those of actors working in peacebuilding and peacekeeping, who align with the incumbent government. Although the Peace pillar encompasses both peacebuilding and peacekeeping, the latter, driven by MINUSMA’s stabilization efforts, was occasionally misconstrued as belonging with previous counterterrorism efforts by European armed forces. 83 This distinction is crucial for humanitarian actors who cannot restrict themselves to intervening in areas prioritized or secured by the State. 84
83 Steinke. 2021. The Triple Nexus in Mali Coordination, Securisation, and Blurred Lines.
84 ALNAP (2022). The State of the Humanitarian System. London: ALNAP.
In terms of partnerships, it is important to highlight the limited collaboration between UNDP and international financial institutions despite the overlap in their mandates (e.g., world Bank).
Finding 21. The Portfolio Approach. In the absence of clear operational guidance, the Country Office experimented with different interpretations of what portfolio approaches could be, ranging from a mere semantic shift to a more comprehensive catalytic project design.
In the previous cycle, UNDP’s initiatives were split into multiple, distinct, non-complementary projects scattered geographically. However, paired with a heavy emphasis on infrastructure construction and the deployment of judicial and security personnel, this approach proved insufficient to strengthening the rule of law or enhancing social cohesion.85 UNDP sought to address these issues by adopting a portfolio approach to its governance support. In that regard, the conflict prevention and rule of law portfolio and more specifically PROSMED were the most successful. First, by intervening at strategic levels to create an enabling environment and at institutional, community, and individual levels to address these four catalysts of the crisis, PROSMED offered a comprehensive, multi-tiered response that better suits the complexity of the issues at hand compared to the approaches previously employed by the Country Office. Second, both flagship projects from that portfolio coincided in Bandiagara region even though PROSMED also intervened in other regions. Third, both approaches promoted mutually reinforcing strategies to promote stabilization and the rule of law. Even though LGSF faced significant implementation challenges, PROSMED supported conflict prevention and social cohesion mechanisms in Bandiagara while LGSF moved forward with its infrastructure and cash-for-work initiatives. Lastly and most importantly, PROSMED’s flexible design had a catalytic effect that attracted other donors (PBF, The Netherlands, United Kingdom), allowing it to expand its reach.
UNDP’s environmental sustainability projects comprised two portfolios: resilience, and climate change adaptation. Despite being thematically aligned, the linkages between the projects within portfolios lacked clarity. Key projects tended to address development more holistically by aiming to simultaneously address natural resources and environmental preservation, climate resilience, environmental governance, and climate change adaptation. For instance, the (then) nascent climate security project had to concurrently address climate, security, and peace issues. Yet it was unclear how these environmental portfolios differed from the normal project-centric approach.
Beyond this, the Country Office made targeted attempts to implement new projects where it already had a critical mass of interventions, as demonstrated by the fact that Mopti, Bandiagara, and Ségou regions benefit from the level of investments and from projects.
2.6 Knowledge Management
Finding 22. Monitoring and Evaluation. Despite Country Office efforts to bolster its monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms, there remained room for improvement in the quality of M&E reports and processes.
Following the findings of the previous ICPE, the Country Office strengthened its M&E team by integrating M&E specialties or leads (some of whom were UN volunteers) into the main flagship projects of the programme. For example, the PEJ, PAREM, PROSMED, and Stabilization and Climate Change projects each had an M&E specialist. The Head of the Programme Management Support Unit is responsible for M&E at programme level and for supporting the Office’s experts. An expert in social and environmental standards was also expected to join the team. Despite these fairly recent efforts, challenges related to the monitoring of these different projects and portfolios seem to have persisted, particularly in the cases of the PEJ and Stabilization projects, where the problems of remoteness and insecurity seem to have hindered the deployment of an effective data collection system to the extent that comprehensive reports on the progress of the projects were not available at the time of evaluation. This absence of dependable data regarding project execution significantly jeopardized UNDP’s capability to track progress, discern commendable or troublesome performance, or implement necessary corrective actions. This also coincided with the perception among some donors that they are not well informed about the progress of certain projects. However, it is important to note that PROSMED stood out for the quality of its annual reports, which are based on perception surveys, which allow it to have reference data at the beginning of the project (2020) as well as at mid-term (2022).
UNDP’s decentralized evaluation function successfully completed 16 of its 22 planned evaluations for the 2020-2024 cycle. In fact, Mali’s UNDP office ranks among those that have conducted the most evaluations within the African region. However, the quality of these evaluations falls short of the regional average, suggesting a need for improvement. Specifically, the office ranked 40th out of 45 African offices for average evaluation quality, with a score of 3.93 (3 indicating a mostly unsatisfactory rating), below the regional average of 4.26 (4 indicating a mostly satisfactory rating). 86 In fact, Mali’s decentralized evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations were the weakest components throughout the process.
CHAPTER 3
3.1 Conclusions
Conclusion 1. Despite the unstable socio-political environment, UNDP was able to adapt its strategies, sustain its key partnerships with government, and leverage its comparative advantages in governance, elections, stabilization, rule of law, environment, and energy to remain relevant and address key concerns in the country. This positive alignment and responsiveness also resulted in opportunities for UNDP to further broaden the scope of its technical work. However, expansion was impeded by the reduced influence of political dialogue between Mali and its traditional partners, including UNDP, the gradual pullout of its supporting donors, and the challenges associated with tracking, evaluating, and communicating vital results and challenges.
UNDP’s programme in Mali was implemented amidst an unprecedented context marked by a sudden shift to a multidimensional security, political, and health crisis. while this crisis was partially fueled by years of governance deterioration, compromised rule of law, and declining public trust in State institutions, its consequences significantly impacted UNDP’s work. Despite the volatile environment, UNDP successfully adapted its programme in a timely and tactful manner, maintaining or reinforcing its comparative advantage in areas such as governance, elections, stabilization, and climate issues whilst preserving the trust of its various partners. This represents a significant improvement compared to the previous ICPE, which faced difficulties in pinpointing UNDP’s comparative advantage in Mali.
At the conclusion of this challenging programme cycle, UNDP had earned the trust of key Malian institutions as well as the international community, positioning itself as a significant conduit for development aid from major donors that had ceased their direct budget support to Malian institutions. This allowed them to maintain their technical efforts towards achieving the SDGs. However, UNDP higher level strategic and policy influence was significantly hampered by Mali’s renewed willingness to redefine its sovereignty by distancing itself from its traditional TFPs.
The withdrawal of MINUSMA at the end of 2023 introduced further changes in UNDP’s operating environment. Although this departure negatively impacted UNDP operations in high-risk areas and limited its scope of action, potential intervention areas left vacant by MINUSMA could be filled by UNDP provided sufficient funding is available. Major challenges lay ahead as major donors were pulling out of the country and as UNDP weak monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and inadequate communication and coordination with donors increasingly risked compromising the effectiveness of its interventions.
Conclusion 2. UNDP’s territorial focus on central Mali allowed it to engage at the heart of the conflict and with populations exposed to several risk factors, affirming the relevance of its commitment to populations at risk of being left behind. However, its strategies to promote women’s and youth empowerment, though targeted, fell short of addressing the root causes of these populations’ exclusion and adapting to local circumstances, culminating in limited and transitory changes.
At programme level, UNDP’s territorial presence in central regions, particularly through its Mopti office, is warranted by escalating risk factors related to the intensification of conflict and increases in violent incidents, IDPs, and casualties in central Mali. Apart from being the conflict’s epicenter, the central region also has some of the highest poverty rates. Thus, factors such as discrimination, vulnerability to conflict, multidimensional poverty, and governance deficit intersect in that region, justifying a robust UNDP presence aimed at leaving no one behind. while other regions, including the north of the country, also exhibit high vulnerabilities, comparatively weaker UNDP presence there is justified by accessibility challenges and the complementary presence of MINUSMA.
Over the past decade, the combined efforts of UNDP and the United Nations Integrated Electoral Team (UNIET) to support and educate women and promote the implementation of the gender quota law have significantly increased the proportion of women elected at municipal and legislative levels. This shows that efforts designed to address the specific needs of a particular group can contribute to a more equitable distribution of power even if underlying norms, cultural values, and power structures remain unaltered.
Beyond this particular case, the Country Office primarily promoted gender equality and women’s empowerment by replicating strategies from the previous cycle. However, these approaches, which focus on the number of women benefiting from activities such as IGAs, overlook their specific needs. This undermines the sustainability of benefits over time as the root causes of women’s challenges remain unaddressed.
Youth have been extensively targeted by this programme, particularly through the Youth Entrepreneurship Programme (PEJ). However, this ambitious project was mostly ineffective, falling short of creating the desired employability or economic empowerment outcomes due to serious project design and monitoring flaws that failed to take into account known constraints such as remoteness, insecurity, and low levels of literacy, among other factors. In this case, the numerous grants and training provided resulted in minor output-level results.
Conclusion 3. UNDP’s integrated approach to the rule of law proved its relevance but encountered challenges due to an unfavorable context, limited replicability of its institutional support, and sustainability issues with community initiatives . These bottlenecks, exacerbated by Mali’s political reconfiguration, have allowed UNDP to achieve mostly output-level results. Limited progress in stabilizing the Bandiagara region, also explainable by the geopolitical context and unexpected contextual changes, raised questions about the suitability of this approach in such a fragile environment.
UNDP devised and put into action an integrated rule-of-law programme with the corollary objective of contributing to the stabilization of Central Mali. This initiative targeted four root causes of the conflict: i) the decay of social cohesion and the emergence of violent extremism; ii) the shortcomings of public justice and the security services coupled with the public’s dwindling trust in these entities; iii) pervasive corruption and weak governance; and iv) gender-based inequalities. By mobilizing a plethora of governmental partners and strategic donors working in these fields, UNDP embodied its integrator role. However, results were limited to output-level contributions at policy, institutional, and community levels, which were hampered by the above-mentioned political volatility and limited political buy-in to fully implement policy reforms and scale up and fund institutional and community-level mechanisms that mostly relied on UNDP funding.
In parallel to these efforts, the Liptako-Gourma Regional Stabilization Facility (LGSF) extended infrastructure support in Bandiagara region to reassert the State’s presence and authority in the region and provided direct economic support to vulnerable groups to encourage the return of IDPs. Despite these efforts, the region witnessed an unprecedented surge in violent incidents, casualties, and IDPs, illustrating that minimum security prerequisites for successful stabilization were absent in the region.
In a constantly changing political landscape, territorial and community-based efforts have proved capable of empowering and educating at-risk populations about local security and conflict prevention mechanisms. while these community mechanisms were exogenous to the local populations, their endorsement by traditional authorities led to their legitimization and acceptance by the broader population. However, their sustainability was questioned given that they rely heavily on UNDP financing.
Finally, despite the relevance of awareness-raising efforts to counter extremist narratives, these approaches remain largely underfunded. MINUSMA’s prevention of violent extremism efforts focused on supporting youth socio-economic inclusion, rehabilitation and reintegration through vocational training, awareness raising, and financing infrastructures came to an end or were at risk of being underfunded.
Conclusion 4. UNDP working through UNIET strengthened electoral institutions during the 2020 parliamentary elections and subsequent electoral reforms. Despite the challenges faced by the political transition, UNDP’s continued presence and adaptable assistance have proved crucial for these processes. However, MINUSMA’s departure will limit UNIET’s ability to intervene in northern Mali and in insecure locations and to engage in higher-level policy dialogue efforts.
UNIET’s assistance with UNDP at its helm strengthened electoral institutions and their dependent processes during the 2020 parliamentary elections, electoral and constitutional reforms, and the 2023 constitutional referendum. The basket fund played a key role in mobilizing essential resources for election management bodies grappling with budget limitations while enhancing the transparency and credibility of polls conducted by the new independent electoral management authority (AIGE). It also facilitated a more informed participation of civil society and other actors involved in electoral processes.
The evaluation underscored the significance of integrated strategic projects such as PACE and PAREM, which maintained technical and material assistance through a pooled funding mechanism. Amid successive crises and a transition period, PAREM’s continuous operations and sustained relations with relevant institutions during periods of external financing freeze emerged as a crucial success factor. UNDP’s ongoing presence in Mali also played a vital role in maintaining this stance. Its adaptable management of the basket fund in response to contextual changes was critical, even though communication with some donors may have been insufficient.
Sustained support from UNDP remains crucial, especially as MINUSMA’s withdrawal will significantly hamper UNIET‘s capacity to provide logistical and technical assistance to the northern regions of the country as well as those facing high levels of insecurity. MINUSMA’s higher-level political engagement will also be absent from any future electoral interventions.
Conclusion 5. UNDP’s contributions to inclusive growth and private sector development have been limited, even in its endeavors to strengthen relevant national institutions. Its assistance was thinly spread across various partners. Moreover, the key objectives related to aid coordination and national planning became difficult to achieve in the context of Mali’s reaffirmation of sovereignty, which limited UNDP’s traditional involvement in these strategic planning processes.
UNDP support under this outcome was mostly operational, though with no evidence that it created sustainable capacities. For example, UNDP supported the country in producing reports providing evidence on the implementation of the SDGs, poverty levels, and the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19. However, it was kept at a distance from more strategic endeavors such as the development of the new national development plan (CREDD). Despite the UNDP’s ambitious aim to boost the effectiveness of aid coordination, alterations in the political landscape at national level have led the country to disengage from donor coordination platforms. This subsequently cast doubt on the relevance of UNDP’s attempts to strengthen dialogue and partnerships with Mali’s traditional TFPs. In addition, attempts to bolster trade promotion organizations proved ineffective due to an unfavorable political and policy environment. This showed that intervening at the technical and institutional level without influencing policy can result in limited success and decelerated progress towards desired outcomes.
Despite an unpropitious context, the lack of an integrated and coherent strategy outlining the most effective approaches to maximize UNDP’s contributions to inclusive growth in a fragile setting was a significant shortcoming. Additionally, prolonged vacancies in the UNDP Policy and Strategy Unit adversely impacted outcome performance.
Conclusion 6. UNDP solidified its position as a strategic partner to the Ministry of the Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development (MEADD) by supporting the country in updating its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and establishing an investment plan, mobilizing resources for environmental projects, and assisting in the development of policy and regulatory frameworks on climate change and sustainable environmental management. Though UNDP’s efforts to bolster community resilience and access to solar energy were commendable, they required an integrated programmatic approach and improved management to maximize their utilization and attract private investments.
UNDP consolidated its position as a strategic partner of MAEDD, providing both strategic and operational support for the development of public policies, strategic documents, capacity-building activities, and infrastructure projects. Its partnerships with various national directorates and agencies enabled it to mobilize vertical Global Environment Fund resources for various environmental projects. However, increased competition for security and rule-of-law resources underscores the need for UNDP to strengthen its integrative role and to work with other agencies and partners to mobilize resources for structuring projects.
UNDP’s continued support to communities, sustainable natural resource management, and resilience has materialized through various projects. However, while useful, these initiatives remain scattered and demonstrative, limiting their impact. UNDP is now striving to adopt an integrated programmatic approach, as exemplified by the climate security project, to capitalize on past experiences and scale up.
In the area of solar energy, UNDP has been a pioneer, facilitating access to clean energy for rural last-mile households left behind. while these achievements address the needs of disadvantaged communities, they remain experimental, requiring improved management and inclusive dialogue, including with major players such as the world Bank, to attract more local private investment and overcome persistent challenges. The deployment of telehealth through solar energy is promising, although it is a complex project requiring regulatory, technological, and practical actions in health centers to be scaled up.
3.2 Recommendations
Recommendation 1. The Country Office should urgently reassess its strategic positioning given MINUSMA’s withdrawal, the impact of the political context on its traditional engagement in strategic aspects of development planning, and the potential decrease in its donor base due to the suspension of development assistance by key UNDP donors. In response, UNDP needs to identify specific opportunities and emerging threats in light of its comparative advantages and operational strengths and weaknesses.
The termination of MINUSMA’s mandate, which involved civilian-led development work on restoring and extending State authority, strengthening administrations at local and national levels, and preventing conflict and violent extremism, has created a void. Given UNDP’s comparative advantage in governance, including elections, rule of law, conflict prevention, and social cohesion as well as the willingness of certain national and international partners for UNDP to address some of these gaps, UNDP must assess the opportunities and risks tied to expanding its interventions. These opportunities may include a programmatic, operational, or political role as well as acquisition of liquidated assets.
This analysis should take into account the organization’s strengths and weaknesses along with the swiftly changing operational environment. Factors to consider include reduced opportunities for policy dialogue, a contracting donor landscape, UNDP’s limited security infrastructure, and restricted capabilities to operate in remote and insecure locations. Additionally, the need to prevent spreading its interventions too thinly across partners, themes, or locations and to overcommit should be considered. Amid potential inter-agency competition at national level, it is critical that decisions be supported by substantial backing from UNDP headquarters.
Recommendation 2. The Country Office should reconsider whether its strategy to leave no one behind (LNOB) necessitates operating at the conflict epicenter in central Mali. The logistical and security obstacles present in conjunction with complex cooperation among humanitarian, development, and peace actors hamper the realization of significant outcomes and limit collaboration opportunities. In all circumstances, it is imperative that UNDP incorporate local realities more comprehensively into the formulation of its community-level interventions.
UNDP’s community-level work targeted central Mali, the epicenter of the conflict, which hosts disproportionate numbers of victims of conflict and is affected by widespread levels of poverty. Its local presence through its Mopti office as well as MINUSMA’s security apparatus proved critical in facilitating programme implementation in the center of the country, even though this will no longer be available. Yet, despite the high costs of operating in central Mali, results were modest, being hampered by multiple factors, including remoteness, insecurity, prevalent humanitarian actions, and the complexity of local issues. The southern region of the country is less affected by the security crisis but also hosts significant pockets of poverty and faces equally complex governance and climate change issues, providing a more fertile ground for UNDP to better fulfill its development mandate. UNDP should thus consider the pros and cons of diverting or diversifying its support to more secure regions where achieving more sustainable results could be more attainable.
UNDP must also significantly bolster its economic empowerment strategies for vulnerable populations. This can be achieved by transitioning from approaches that rely on providing grants and training to populations without proper supervision, an approach that has limited potential for generating substantial changes. Given UNDP’s limited resources and capacity to reach a large number of beneficiaries, it should prioritize exploring approaches tackling the root causes of inequality and exclusion with potential for replication by its partners and reliance on locally-rooted institutions and knowledge.
Recommendation 3. The Country Office should enhance the promptness of its operations as well as the quality and reliability of its internal reporting and donor communication, beginning with its M&E system. This will allow it to identify and address areas for improvement in a transparent and effective manner.
The Office faced operational challenges, evident from project delays, questionable coordination, and communication with donors. The M&E mechanisms did not systematically provide adequate evidence of the effectiveness and limitations of interventions. Additionally, there was a lack of transparency regarding actions taken to address programmatic or operational shortcomings. These weaknesses may become more noticeable and pose a greater reputational risk if UNDP succeeds in expanding the scope of its programme after the departure of MINUSMA. This risk, already significant, could in the long term erode the trust of donors in UNDP.
Recommendation 4. The Country Office should persist in jointly bolstering the rule of law, conflict prevention, and social cohesion. This can be achieved by continuing to connect administrative and institutional strengthening efforts to community-level mechanisms and exploring new avenues to secure funding. The decision to continue UNDP’s stabilization efforts in a resource-scarce context due to the geopolitical situation should be assessed, while the prevention of violent extremism, including deradicalization and reintegration, should be strengthened.
The programmatic approach implemented through PROSMED held considerable potential. However, even midway through the project, challenges surfaced regarding the financial sustainability of local peace and security mechanisms as well as other initiatives whose effectiveness would hinge on the State’s full commitment. Despite restricted opportunities to engage in policy dialogue at government level, it is essential for UNDP to identify new avenues to secure increased funding from the State. Additionally, continuing to collaborate with traditional authorities at local level could serve as a catalyst for change.
Despite UNDP being entrusted by major national and international partners to aid the stabilization effort in Bandiagara, escalating levels of violence and insecurity in the region serve as both the cause and the manifestation of their unsuccessful attempts. Recent geopolitical changes along with the government’s gradual distancing from its traditional TFPs, which support these efforts, could justify the end of donors’ financial support to the Malian window of the Liptako Gourma Stabilization Facility. However, if it were to be renewed despite this context, an evaluation should be conducted to collect evidence on the project’s actual performance that could be used to improve subsequent phases of such a project.
Given that support for deradicalization was relatively modest, it is recommended that this component of the programme be reinforced to better incorporate aspects related to deradicalization and reintegration, thereby offering a viable solution for some conflict stakeholders. This is an area of intervention initially covered by MINUSMA that risks underfunding following its withdrawal.
Recommendation 5. Given the limited opportunities offered by a politically challenging context, the Country Office should rethink its role and clarify its intervention strategy in the area of inclusive growth. However, it should continue to support key government institutions working on achieving the SDGs while reassessing the strategic relevance of its efforts to support trade promotion agencies and aid coordination mechanisms in the current context.
while UNDP’s efforts towards inclusive growth were somewhat fragmented at the strategic and institutional levels, they remain the most appropriate entry point for supporting the key government institutions involved in achieving the SDGs.
Other approaches should be scaled back, including the less successful support to trade promotion agencies and initiatives and support to aid coordination platforms as well as standalone unidimensional community-level economic empowerment efforts.
Recommendation 6. To maximize the potential impact of community resilience and sustainable natural resource management initiatives, UNDP should focus on an integrated programmatic approach similar to that deployed in the area of governance, capitalizing on past experiences and seeking to scale up. In the field of decentralized solar energy, UNDP should strive to improve project management, foster inclusive dialogue, and promote public-private partnerships (PPP) to attract more local private investments.
UNDP should take into account and value good practices from projects focused on resilience, adaptation, and sustainable management of natural resources that have produced satisfactory results. Supporting their expansion through integrated, better structured, and transformative projects will strengthen the resilience of households and women, preserve natural resources and the environment, and manage conflicts effectively.
UNDP should work to consolidate its position in the field of off-grid mini power plants, carefully assess the effects and impacts of tested solutions, and strive to collaborate in synergy with TFPs such as the world Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the west African Development Bank. The aim would be to mobilize resources to increase access to renewable energy in rural areas. It will also involve rigorous advocacy and constructive dialogue with the Government of Mali, the private sector, and financial institutions to foster investment in off-grid solar mini grids.
In addition, UNDP should support the development of regulations designed to promote telehealth, an initiative that has considerable potential to improve access to healthcare in remote areas.
Recommendation 7. The Country Office Should continue experimenting with its integrated approach to the conflict prevention and rule of law portfolio centered around PROSMED. while implementing portfolios across the programme is not required, UNDP should formalize its portfolio approach to facilitate its scalability.
The portfolio approach, particularly through PROSMED under Outcome 1, facilitated the design and implementation of an integrated programme that operates at multiple levels and catalyzes funding from several donors. Despite PROSMED still being in progress, its integrated approach, targeting a predetermined number of cercles, marked a significant improvement over past efforts characterized by the implementation of small, dispersed projects. Consequently, the Country Office should continue to reinforce this portfolio.
As an increasing number of country offices aim to adopt a portfolio approach to enhance programme coherence, a clearer definition of the concept and its implementation is required. Consequently, it is recommended that the Country Office clarify and formalize and adjust its portfolio approach as much as possible by developing theories of change for each portfolio in its programme integrated into a programme-level theory of change.
3.3 Key Recommendations and Management Response
RECOMMENDATION 1.
The Country Office should urgently reassess its strategic positioning following MINUSMA’s withdrawal, the impact of the political context on its traditional engagement in strategic aspects of development planning, and the potential decrease in its donor base due to the suspension of development cooperation by key UNDP donors. UNDP needs to identify specific opportunities and emerging threats in light of its comparative advantages and operational strengths and weaknesses.
Management response: Partially Accepted
The reassessment of UNDP’s positioning following MINUSMA’s withdrawal has always been a major priority for the Country Office, which has already developed its programmatic offer that takes into account the impact of the political context as well as the suspension of development assistance from some traditional donors. This repositioning, formulated with the support of all headquarters offices (RBA, BPPS, BERA, CB, BMS, among others), maximizes UNDP’s comparative advantage by capitalizing on the achievements of previous years, identifying new opportunities anchored in national priorities and complexities in which the country office evolves, and promoting engagement with emerging donors.
Key Action(s)
1.1 Develop a post-MINUSMA UNDP programmatic offer with the support of the Regional Bureau for Africa and the Central Offices (Bureau for Policy and Programme Support and CB)
1.2 Provide UNDP leadership in priority sectors of the government for which the United Nations Country Team has been asked to work with the government after the departure of MINUSMA
Frame
May 2024 Management The programmatic offer was presented to and adopted by the Risk Prevention and Anticipation Board
Completed
April 2024 Management Teams Leaders
UNDP has been appointed by the United Nations Country Team as Lead or Co-Lead in the working Groups on Environment and Climate Change and Sustainable Solutions and to co-create with the Government a flagship programme in the energy sector
Completed
Recommendation 1 (cont’d)
1.3 Deploy a SURGE capacity to operationalize the implementation of UNDP’s post-MINUSMA programmatic offer
December 2024 Management
Additional SURGE capacities have been deployed to assist in the repositioning of UNDP and to implement the post-MINUSMA programmatic offer
RECOMMENDATION 2.
The Country Office should reconsider whether its LNOB strategy necessitates operating at the conflict’s epicenter in central Mali. The logistical and security obstacles present in conjunction with complex cooperation among humanitarian, development, and peace actors hamper the realization of significant outcomes and limit collaboration opportunities. In all circumstances, it is imperative that UNDP incorporates local realities more comprehensively into the formulation of its communitylevel interventions.
Management response: Partially Accepted
This point was discussed at the highest level to reconsider the need to operate in central Mali. For the next Country Programme, UNDP will geo-target the areas of intervention guided by an integrated development approach aimed at leaving no one behind.
Key Action(s)
2.1 Identify areas of intervention (geographical targeting) for the next Country Programme 2026-2030
2.2 Rethinking UNDP’s strategic positioning and involving grassroots communities as stakeholders
June 2025 Programme
June 2025 Programme
The mapping of interventions is available. In addition to the process of drawing up the new programming cycle, areas of intervention will be co-identified with the national partner on the basis of objectively identified criteria.
Deployment of a support mission for the formulation of position papers for the next Country Programme Document. This will involve grassroots consultations for co-creation with the government’s decentralized sectoral structures and the communities concerned.
In progress
In progress
RECOMMENDATION 3.
The Country Office should enhance the promptness of its operations as well as the quality and reliability of its internal reporting and donor communication, beginning with its M&E system. This will allow it to identify and address areas for improvement in a transparent and effective manner.
Management response: Accepted
The Country Office has developed its Strategic Action Plan for the priority activities of the Programme section for the year 2024, in which an action aims to “improve the quality and efficiency of the implementation of the Country Programme by systematizing and optimizing work processes related to the harmonized approach to cash transfers and the implementation of a monitoring and evaluation system to produce reliable and quality reports that facilitate effective communication with partners.”
Key Action(s) Time Frame Responsible Unit(s)
3.1 Develop the Office’s Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan with all monitoring and evaluation activities in the Country Programme and projects, including periodic review of the implementation of activities and the effectiveness of programmatic visits with the country and donors
3.2 Organize training for staff on impact reporting and the quality of the information contained in the report
Tracking*
Comments Status
December 2024 Oversight Unit A new integrated tool on monitoring and evaluation is being configured
In progress
December 2024 Oversight Unit Training on the module will be scheduled Not started
3.3 Carry out at least five (5) strategic partnership or communication activities to highlight the results achieved by the Country Programme
December 2024 Communication Unit
The Office documents at least 4 films (in progress), success stories, podcasts, etc. In terms of resource mobilization, the implementation of the resource mobilization plan is effectively monitored, the various tools put in place record exchanges with partners, concept notes are aligned with donor priorities, and the strategy for diversifying partnerships has been put in place by the Office (PCAP, Unity, etc.)
RECOMMENDATION 4.
The Country Office should persist in jointly bolstering the rule of law, conflict prevention, and social cohesion. This can be achieved by continuing to connect administrative and institutional strengthening efforts to community-level mechanisms and exploring new avenues to secure funding. The decision to continue UNDP’s stabilization efforts in a resource-scarce context due to the geopolitical situation should be assessed, while the prevention of violent extremism, including deradicalization and reintegration, could be strengthened.
Management response: Partially Accepted
The Country Office strengthened its interventions in the areas of the rule of law, conflict prevention, and cohesion as part of its post-MINUSMA programmatic offer. The stabilization efforts carried out by the Country Office are the result of the request by the national authorities. Taking into account the local context and national priorities, the Country Office has recalibrated its programmatic offer in the area of stabilization to address the resilience of communities by promoting durable solutions through access to basic social services. The Country Office is also exploring opportunities to finance stabilization efforts through domestic resources to be mobilized from the government, given that the stabilization of secure localities is a priority for the government. Recommendation 3 (cont’d)
4.1 Develop at least two (2) initiatives to strengthen interventions in the areas of the rule of law, conflict prevention, and social cohesion
December 2024 Governance Unit
Three (3) initiatives are available, including 2 on support for the prevention and fight against violent extremism and terrorism in Mali with Fw and the Peacebuilding Fund and one (1) on support for the improvement of security governance through the promotion of leadership and the empowerment of women and youth in the Central Mali region with Fw
4.2 Develop programmatic interventions on durable solutions within the framework of the humanitariandevelopment-peace nexus, which promotes community resilience by facilitating access to basic social services
Completed Recommendation 4 (cont’d)
December 2024 Governance Unit An initiative for stabilization as a multisectoral response to displaced women and youth in central Mali (Bandiagara) has been formulated and submitted to the Japanese International Cooperation Agency. The overall objective of the project is to support the relief and recovery processes of women and youth recently affected by internal displacement and gender-based violence through socio-economic and integrated livelihood opportunities within IDP camps and host communities in Bandiagara. The second USAID-funded initiative focuses on climate-smart adaptation and disaster preparedness in Mopti and Bandiagara. This activity aims to reduce vulnerability to climate shocks and disasters and the loss of human lives and associated livelihoods as well as the damage caused by climatic hazards and floods in Mopti and Bandiagara, under extreme pressure due to the conflict, forced displacement, droughts, and limited access to basic social services.
Completed
RECOMMENDATION 5.
The Country Office needs to rethink its role and clarify its intervention strategy in the area of inclusive growth given the limited opportunities offered by a politically challenging context. However, it should continue to support key government institutions working on achieving the SDGs while reassessing the strategic relevance of its efforts to support trade promotion agencies and aid coordination mechanisms in the current context.
Management response: Partially Accepted
In the post-MINUSMA context, the Country Office will support the government in the formulation and effective implementation of a Integrated National Financing Framework to facilitate the financing of structuring projects aimed at the structural transformation of an inclusive and sustainable economy. In addition, the Country Office will continue its support to national institutions supporting sustainable inclusive economic transformation and promoting the private sector to achieve the SDGs and strengthen human development.
Key Action(s) Time Frame Responsible
5.1 Continue advocating with the Government for the finalization of the Integrated National Financing Framework and its implementation plan
December 2024 UPS
5.2 Develop a strategic programmatic offer for the targeted strategic repositioning of UNDP on opportunities in development management and financing
December 2024 UPS
UNDP supported the Ministry of the Economy and Finance in finalizing the diagnostic assessment of financing and formulating a national integrated financing strategy. UNDP will continue its support for the appropriation of these documents and the integration of the integrated financing mechanism into national planning documents for its operationalization.
As part of the formulation of the new Country Programme Document, a guidance note was developed with the support of the UNDP Regional Center FOR AFRICA in Addis Ababa
In progress
Completed
Recommendation 5 (cont’d)
5.3 Develop an offer of support to key government institutions working to achieve the SDGs
March 2025 UPS
Reflections have been initiated for the continuation of the programme to support economic governance, resilience, and sustainable development, which constitutes the strategic framework for supporting the main government institutions working to achieve the SDGs
In progress
5.4 Identify opportunities for selective and targeted strategic positioning of UNDP in the context of support for the development of Vision 2063 and the new post-CREDD document
March 2025 UPS
UNDP supports the process of developing Vision Mali 2063, which was launched in December 2023. A CREDD diagnostic and evaluation report has been produced. work involving national stakeholders is underway. The available documents offer clues to situate the strategic positioning of UNDP. Continued technical discussions with stakeholders as well as the availability of the final version of the report will help refine opportunities for collaboration between UNDP and the government. In progress
RECOMMENDATION 6.
To maximize the potential impact of community resilience and sustainable natural resource management initiatives, UNDP should focus on an integrated programmatic approach similar to that deployed in the area of governance, capitalizing on past experiences and seeking to scale up. In the field of decentralized solar energy, UNDP should strive to improve project management, foster inclusive dialogue, and promote public-private partnerships to attract more local private investments.
Management response: Accepted
Based on the lessons learned from previous interventions, the Country Office has refocused its positioning strategy on the implementation of an integrated approach that covers the issues of climate security, adaptation to climate change, and sustainable management of natural resources while addressing areas related to conflict prevention, strengthening resilience, local governance, and managing migration and displacement of people. This strategy also applies to the area of access to renewable energy, with a diversification of partnerships, including international financial institutions and the private sector.
Key Action(s)
6.1 Strengthen the programmatic framework on Climate Security through its expansion to other regions of Mali
Time Frame Responsible Unit(s) Tracking*
December 2024 UNDP Environment Unit
6.2 Develop an integrated programmatic approach in the field of the environment, energy, and climate change in the formulation of the new Country Programme
June 2025 UNDP Environment Unit
A new project on climate security has just been launched in Koulikoro region
The integrated programmatic offer is being formulated with the support of experts at headquarters
In progress
In progress
Recommendation 6 (cont’d)
6.3 Support the implementation of the National Action Plan for Derisking Renewable Energy Investment to promote private sector investment in renewable energy
6.4 Co-create with the government the formulation of a structuring programme in the field of energy
December 2025 UNDP Environment Unit
Training actions have started In progress
RECOMMENDATION 7.
December 2025 UNDP Environment Unit
As Co-Lead of the UN Country Team with UNOPS, the Country Office is supporting the government in formulating a national energy programme In progress
The Country Office should continue experimenting with its integrated approach to the conflict prevention and rule of law portfolio centered around PROSMED. w hile implementing portfolios across the programme is not required, UNDP should formalize its portfolio approach to facilitate its scalability.
Management response: Accepted
As part of its positioning strategy and in the context of formulating its new programmatic cycle, the Country Office will continue to implement its Country Programme through an integrated approach that maximizes the application of the organizational policy on portfolio management.
Key
7.1 Conduct a strategic reflection on the implementation of the portfolio approach by the Country Office
December 2024 Management Team Leaders
Preliminary discussions have been initiated to refine the strategy for implementing the portfolio approach In progress
Recommendation 7 (cont’d)
7.2 Build Office capacity on the portfolio approach and build an organizational culture within the office
December 2024 Management
7.3 Define the strategy, scope, and modalities for the implementation of the portfolio approach by the Country Office by integrating lessons learned from the previous Country Programme
June 2025 Management
Team Leaders
Five (5) key staff members have been trained on the portfolio approach and all staff in the Programme and Operations sections have been trained and discussed the portfolio approach during their annual retreats with experts and focal points at headquarters Completed
Arrangements have been made to finalize the strategy for the implementation of the portfolio approach by the Country Office
* The implementation status is tracked electronically in the Evaluation Resource Center database.
In progress
ANNEXES
Annexes to the report (listed below) are available on the website of the Independent Evaluation Office at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/24014
Annex 1. Evaluation terms of reference
Annex 2. List of projects for review
Annex 3. Evaluation matrix
Annex 4. Documents consulted
Annex 5. Country programme performance rating
Annex 6. Country at a glance
Annex 7. Analysis of climate change resilience and adaptation projects
Annex 8. Status of country programme document (CPD) outcome and output indicators matrix
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