THE EXTERNAL AND THE INTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE THREAT

HIGHLIGHTS

 Both ISIL and Al-Qaida are organisations which have proved to be extremely resilient over the years and capable of adapting to different geographical and political settings. Historically, they have used their success in ungoverned spaces to multiply their capability in non-conflict zones. They capitalise on regional achievements, reinforce local structures and then replicate winning strategies in external operations. For example, repeated military successes in conflict areas leading to the occupation of a stable portion of territory might put ISIL in the condition to direct resources into the re-establishment of its hyper-organised media apparatus. Once capable of an unprecedentedly aggressive propaganda strategy, which was then jeopardised by military losses, ISIL had been capable of radicalising thousands of Europeans. At first, the group incited its supporters to travel to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to join and fight for the ‘Caliphate’; then, when travel was increasingly challenging, it galvanised and coordinated affiliates and sympathizers to commit attacks on the EU soil.

 Many examples which currently raise security concerns can be mentioned. Al-

Shabaab has proved to be the most resilient and demonstrated interest in attacking civil aviation. The situation in Mozambique and Burkina Faso as well as the persistent success of ISIL West African Province (ISWAP) show that these organisations can rapidly resuscitate from military defeats in one region and reinforce their position elsewhere.

 Camps in the Syrian Arab Republic may well incubate terrorist threats, especially as the country continues to be considered by ISIL the final remnant of the ‘Caliphate’ – and one of its core areas. While the majority of people held in camps are victims, the current over-occupation of these sites and their potential for becoming a hotbed for indoctrination and radicalization shows how humanitarian needs are inextricably linked to security concerns. Cases of training of minors as future ISIL operatives have already been reported.

 Both ISIL and Al-Qaida prepare the ground for military action starting with undermining a target region’s state institutions by penetrating key society pillars with their radical ideologies. In this regard, attention should be paid, for instance, to the spread of violent extremism in countries such as Senegal or Côte d’Ivoire where there is the strategic intent to radicalise society and silence moderating influences in schools or in the judiciary.

 While the EU has a very advanced level of internal cooperation in security matters, not an equal degree of cooperation exists when EU Member States request evidence of crimes committed in third countries or when third countries demand information on European citizens.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

 There should be a closer consideration of how ISIL and Al-Qaida’s action in conflict zones impact on their activities in non-conflict zones. Failing to have an integrated approach would lead to a partial understanding of their global strategy and, as a result, in impaired capacity to anticipate their next moves.

 What is happening in Africa, with ISIL and Al-Qaida’s success on the ground, needs closer attention as it has an impact, eventually, on the European security threat. Attention should be paid not only to those contexts that have already escalated to armed conflicts. Preventive efforts should also be looking at situations where it has been observed a systematic attempt to undermine institutions, peace and stability as this can lead to governments vacuums, socioeconomic distress and ultimately conflicts. European States, in partnership with supporting EU agencies and in accordance with human rights and rights of defence, should consider fostering the cooperation with third countries in exchanging evidence, including on their citizens, to encourage bilateral assistance based on reciprocity.