Introductory remarks and scope of the report 1 2 3 4 5
Introduction In April 2021, following concerns raised by some European countries, UNICRI launched a research initiative to explore, assess, and understand the potential interplay between regular and irregular movements of people and the threat stemming from ISIL and Al-Qaida inspired terrorism in Europe. The research also looked at the risks posed by returning and relocating FTFs. The recent Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the potential massive exodus of Afghans1 have led to heightened security concerns in European countries2 and Turkey.3 Indeed, there is a high risk of possible infiltration of individuals linked to ISIL-K and Al-Qaida among those trying to leave the country. The analysis of the potential impact of movements of individuals on the evolution of the terrorist threat posed by ISIL and Al-Qaida in Europe is not new. The 2016 TESAT report observed that there was not a systematic abuse of migrant routes to Europe by individuals returning from the territory of the so-called caliphate. However, the report emphasised that there were still potential threats. The infiltration of the Turkey-Greece migrant route from some of the perpetrators of the 2015 Paris attacks highlighted the potential danger. Most European governments
decided to approach the challenge of criminals and radicalised individuals infiltrating migration routes with caution. This approach was mainly followed to not incentivise the anti-migrant sentiments that had spread across Europe following the 2015 migration crisis. This tension is reflected in how the EU and national administrations have dealt with the potential interplay between movements of people and the terrorist threat. Indeed, this research showed how some migration and reception agencies are still reluctant to be involved in security operations and information exchange with security authorities. Since 2015, the number of people trying to reach Europe through regular and irregular routes has evolved at different paces. In 2020, for instance, the COVID-19 outbreak and the consequent restrictions on movement worldwide significantly impacted migration figures. Eurostat data for 2020 suggests that asylum applications in the EU-27 dropped by nearly 50%, while 22 EU Member States issued one-fourth of the visas compared to the previous year. Consistently, in the EU and Norway, there was a drastic decrease of residence permits issued to third-country nationals – at least a 50% decrease per country.4
1
UNHCR estimates over half a million people fleeing Afghanistan by the end of the year. See: https://www.acnur.org/ portugues/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/RRP-Afghanistan-4-pager-Summary-of-Plan-27082021.pdf .
2
Few days before the Taliban reached Kabul and occupied the Presidential Palace declaring the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, thus definitely marking the fall of the Afghan government, Ministries of six EU countries i.e. Germany, Austria, Greece, Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium sent a joint letter to the European Commission asking for the return process of irregular Afghans to be kept in place – despite an opposite assessment by the EU Ambassador in Kabul and by other European embassies.
3
To prevent massive influxes of Afghans, Turkey built a wall at its border with Afghanistan. See: https://www.euronews. com/2021/08/20/turkey-builds-a-border-wall-to-stop-refugees-from-afghanistan. Greece also started the construction of fences, see: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58289893.
4
EMN, Annual Report on Migration 2020, p.14.
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