ILLA - EPM Module 6

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

MODULE 6

EMERGENCY PLANNING MANAGEMENT

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

Copyright The course material is and remains the property of the University (and must be immediately returned to the University upon request at any time) and is either the copyright of the University or of third parties who have licensed the University to make use of it. The course material is for the private study of the student to whom it is sent and any unauthorised use, copying or resale is not permitted.

Unauthorised use may result in the student’s registration being terminated.

This course material was created in the academic year 2005/2006.

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

MODULE 6

CONTENTS

Unit 1

Introduction

1-1

Unit 2

Land Use Planning: Risk Assessment and Decision-Making

2-1

Unit 3

Command and Control of Major Public Gatherings

3-1

Unit 4

Managing Low-Intensity Crises

4-1

Unit 5

Urban Area Evacuation

5-1

Unit 6

Integrated Emergency Management in London

6-1

Unit 7

Disaster Inquiries in the United Kingdom

7-1

Unit 8

Managing Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome/ Disorder (PTSS/D)

8-1

Conclusion

9-1

Unit 9

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UNIT 1 Introduction

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

Contents 1.1

Introduction

1-5

1.2

Module Contents

1-5

1.3

Bibliography

1-10

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1.1

Introduction

Module 6 concentrates on the practical management of risks, crises and disasters. It is deliberately eclectic, covering such varied topics as post-traumatic stress disorder, mass evacuation of civilian populations, and the use of probabilistic risk assessments in land-use planning decisions.

It is not intended, however, that these units should be taken as prescribing ‘idealtype’ solutions to specific problems. Rather, they reflect the ‘best advice’ of a number of leading UK practitioners in the field of risk, crisis and disaster management. There is always the possibility that other practitioners would offer different advice. The Units should therefore be treated with the appropriate degree of methodical scepticism.

1.2 Module Contents Unit 2 Land Use Planning: Risk Assessment and Decision-Making In the United Kingdom, there are three basic stages in the management of industrial risks and hazards. First, those risks are identified. Secondly, they are reduced, and thirdly, the possible adverse effects of a disaster are mitigated. Planning controls play an important part in mitigating the effect(s) of a disaster by controlling the scale and nature of development(s) in the vicinity of hazardous sites.

The British experience of risk identification, reduction and mitigation is described in detail, with the risk assessment procedures of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the risk management procedures of Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) being reviewed. The role of quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) in the formulation of advice to local planning authorities is described.

A number of important issues are raised. First, the issue of democratic freedom is discussed. While the HSE initially advises LPAs on the desirability of developments, should the LPA ignore that advice, the Executive has the power to ask for a formal review and reconsideration of the decision by central government. Secondly, the issue of consistency is discussed. One of the ‘dangers’ of local decision making is that different communities might be exposed to different levels of risk, even where the HSE’s advice is nationally consistent and holistic. Thirdly, in giving its advice, the HSE accepts the industrial ‘status quo’. No representations are made to local industries to reduce their risks so as to allow more vulnerable forms of development. It is left to local authorities to create new development opportunities by requesting that risks from industrial

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processes be reduced. Fourthly, in giving advice, the HSE takes no account of the risk tolerance of local residents. In one of the cases reviewed, a local authority backed a development against the advice of the HSE on grounds that the residents of the locale had a long acquaintance with the industry and its attendant risks.

Unit 3 Command and Control of Major Public Gatherings This unit examines the experience of a major British police force - London’s Metropolitan Police (the ‘Met’) - in developing and implementing strategies for managing a large street carnival. The Notting Hill Carnival is one of the largest events of its kind in the world, attracting over 500,000 people on each of its two days.

The event generates income and - potentially - good will for the Capital. During the 1970s and early 1980s, however, street crime and occasional riot tarnished the event’s image, and potential positive impact on London’s economy.

The Metropolitan Police chose not to bury their heads in the sand. Rather, through wide-ranging consultation with special interest community groups and local authorities, they began to develop a holistic and inclusive management strategy for the event - one that drew on the widest possible range of experience and expertise.

The Met’s corporatist strategy paid dividends. The event became more orderly, and gained in stature, prestige and tourist appeal. All sides benefited.

The Met’s innovative approach should be considered in the context of such discourses as that advanced by Browning and Shetler (1992) in their seminal work on postExxon Valdez problem-solving. Through the exploitation of’‘difference’, the Met were able to address the problem of simultaneously ensuring both public order, public safety and public enjoyment. Divergent constructions of the event were canvassed, sifted and synthesised to generate a comprehensive, sensitive - yet highly’effective risk management strategy.

Unit 4 Managing Low-Intensity Crises This Unit looks at the phenomenon of the ‘low-intensity crisis’. In doing so, it contrasts sharply with most of the other units, which tend to focus on spectacular failure. It could be argued that deaths from smoking constitute a ‘low-intensity crisis’, such deaths being to some degree ‘normalised’ by the temporal and spatial diffusion of the adverse public health effects of smoking. Road deaths could also be said to constitute a lowintensity crisis, again because the problem is diffused through both time and space.

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Some prefer to use the term ‘long-wave crisis’ to describe the phenomenon of the spatial and temporal diffusion of morbidity and mortality. It could be said that a long-wave crisis is a temporally and spatially disaggregated disaster, to the extent that the temporal and spatial concentration of its effects might be overwhelming.

For example, if a significant proportion of the approximately 3,500 people killed on the roads of Britain each year were to be killed in a single road traffic accident (RTA) (say, a major motorway accident involving many automobiles and heavy goods vehicles, some carrying flammable loads) it is possible that the emergency services would not be able to cope, and other resources might have to be mobilised (using the Government’s definition of a ‘disaster’ as an event ‘...which because of the scale of its effects cannot be dealt with by the emergency services and local authorities as part of their day-to-day activities’ (HMSO, 2003).

However such a phenomenon is described, whether it be a ‘low-intensity’ or ‘longwave’ crisis, it is clear that the net effect may be as costly, both in human and financial terms, as any ‘conventional’ disaster. Indeed, the low-intensity crisis may present Emergency Planners and others with even greater problems than more easily identifiable disasters, because the effects, being less dramatic, are less easy to identify, and public sympathy and support may be more difficult to secure.

Unit 5 Evacuations This Unit looks at the mechanics of organising an evacuation in the United Kingdom.

The roles of the emergency services, including the Police, Fire and Ambulance services are described in detail. The role of the local authority is also described. Often taken for granted, local authorities provide a whole range of essential services during evacuations, including shelter, food, advice and emotional support. Local authorities may even be best placed to supply transport services, where large numbers of people need to be moved. The potential inputs from voluntary agencies are also described.

Voluntary organisations can provide useful supplementary services. The Womens’ Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS), has over 70,000 volunteers who train to provide staff for rest centres, welfare support to relatives of victims and emergency feeding, including for emergency responders.

Two readings are provided with the Unit. The first describes an evacuation in a US community familiar with the required disciplines and routines of evacuation plans. The second describes an evacuation in the town of Barry, South Wales, where a rail tanker derailment generated a risk of toxic gas release. The reading, which consists of newspaper reportage, gives the residents’ account of the evacuation. It also illustrates the role played

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by the local authority in the provision of physical comforts to the evacuees. The Barry case is interesting because, despite the town’s long acquaintance with the chemicals and petrochemicals sectors, numerous citizens expressed surprise at the volume of chemicals transported by rail through a congested urban area, and some were unhappy at being kept away from their homes for several days. It may be concluded that even where a population is very familiar with a risk in general terms, when that risk is realised, in this case through a derailment, any subsequent precautionary action may cause deep dissatisfaction if not handled with tact and diplomacy. In the case of the Barry derailment, for example, even the close attentions of the local Member of Parliament and Secretary of State for Wales failed to silence all discontent (which may have been due partly to the activities of a local action group, in existence long before the incident, dedicated to challenging the safety record of the local chemicals and petrochemicals plants).

Unit 6 Integrated Emergency Management In London This Unit describes the British approach to organising for crisis and disaster management by focusing on the response to the 7 July 2005 London bombings. The British strategy is to delegate crisis and disaster management to that form of government and service delivery closest to the public - the local authority. This approach has certain strengths. Local authorities know the areas in which they operate, and are accountable to the people they serve. It also has certain weaknesses, however. Local authorities can be overwhelmed by large events, leading to intervention from higher authorities. The dramatic events of 7 July are still being studied extensively but already some important lessons can be brought out from the different accounts.

Unit 7 Disaster Inquiries in the United Kingdom This Unit discusses the role of the disaster inquiry in providing an understanding of why a disaster occurred, and who was responsible. In the United Kingdom the inquiry has been a frequently used mechanism for getting at the truth of why a particular event occurred. In the 1960s, for example, an inquiry was held into the Aberfan coal tip disaster, which killed 144 people, 116 of them children. The inquiry called 136 witnesses over a five month period. It found against the National Coal Board, the owner-operator of the mine whose slurry tip destroyed Pant Glas School (McLean and Johnes, 2000).

Besides reviewing the mechanism of the public inquiry, the Unit explores such potential innovations as a charge of ‘corporate killing’. The proposed new charge is critiqued in detail. While apparently providing victims and their families with leverage over guilty parties, ‘corporate killing’ as a legal remedy does have certain disadvantages. For example,

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in seeking to allocate blame for an event, the possibility of being found culpable may inhibit the provision of data that might be of value in preventing or ameliorating future disasters: no one faced with such a charge would willingly furnish more information than s/he needed to mount an effective defence. Browning and Shetler (1992:484) call this process the “protective close down of knowledge”.

Unit 8 Managing Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome/Disorder (PTSS/D) This Unit provides an introduction to the phenomenon of post-traumatic stress syndrome, and to the debate surrounding its identification (diagnosis), treatment and prevalence. While some experts believe it to be a common after-effect of either direct participation in, or knowledge of disaster, others believe the phenomenon to be the product of ‘over-diagnosis’. There are other disagreements, too. For example, the extent to which individuals who were not present at a disaster might, through witnessing the event on television, be traumatised by the knowledge of its occurrence.

Such remote trauma may certainly affect the relatives of those affected by a disaster.

It may even affect those who have no relational investment in the disaster at all.

The Unit provides a useful stepping off point for the re-examination of the many case studies used in the course. The Hillsborough disaster, for example, provides a rich vein of study material, with both victims, victims’ relatives and police officers claiming to have suffered the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder. Other disasters worth examining in this context are the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize and the Marchioness Thames pleasure boat disaster. Many of the survivors appear to have suffered from post-traumatic stress. One of the readings for the Unit is taken from the popular women’s magazine Options. The article allows the victims of a number of disasters to ‘tell their own story’. In giving these people a voice it provides us with a valuable insight into what it is like to be traumatised by disaster.

Unit 9 Conclusion This Unit looks at some of the issues in contemporary risk assessment and management, using the nuclear industry as an exploratory heuristic. The Unit combines formal academic discourse - specifically that advanced by Wynne in the essay ‘May the sheep safely graze?’ (Wynne in Lash, Szerszynski & Wynne, 1996: 4483) - with an investigative odyssey. Wynne’s discourse is explored first. This provides the reader with an analytical tool-set for the deconstruction of the odyssey - a journey through the socio-technological landscape of Sellafield - that follows.

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1.3

Bibliography

Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society, London: Sage.

Browning, L. D. and Shetler, J. C. (1992) ‘Communication in Crisis, Communication in Recovery’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, November 1992, Volume 10, Number 3.

HMSO (2003) Dealing with Disaster (revised 3rd edition), Civil Contingencies Secretariat: London.

Husband, S. (1993) ‘Disaster Survivors Talking’, Options, August: 44-47.

Lash, S., Szerszynski, B. & Wynne, B. (1996) Risk, Environment and Modernity, Towards a New Ecology, London: Sage.

McLean, I. and Johnes, M. (2000) Aberfan; Government and Disasters, Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press.

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UNIT 2 Land Use Planning: Risk Assessment and Decision-Making

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Contents 2.1

Aims and Objectives of this Unit

2-5

2.2

Introduction

2-6

2.2.1 Quantification

2-8

2.2.2 Participation

2-10

2.2.3 Institutional Relationships and Roles

2-11

2.2.4 Summary

2-13

Major Accident Hazards and Land Use Planning

2-13

2.3.1 Setting the Scene: Policy

2-13

2.3.2 Setting the Scene: Legislation

2-15

2.3.3 The Institutional Relationship

2-17

The HSE and Expert Risk Assessment

2-18

2.4.1 Major Hazards Assessment

2-18

2.4.2 Development in the Use of QRA

2-20

2.4.3 Risk Criteria and Advice to Local Planning Authorities (LPAs)

2-21

2.5

The ‘Political’ Risk Decisions

2-23

2.6

New Advice Delivery Arrangements

2-26

2.7

Analysis and Conclusions

2-27

2.8

Guide to Reading

2-30

2.9

Suggested Further Reading

2-31

2.3

2.4

2.10 Study Questions

2-31

2.11 Bibliography

2-31

Readings

2-35

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2.1 Aims and Objectives of this Unit This unit will introduce you to a number of key debates over the policy and practice of risk assessment and its role in informing decisions made as part of risk management in relation to land use planning and major accident hazards.

The techniques and procedures of risk assessment are widely seen as a useful aid to decision-making across a wide variety of risks. In the first part of this Unit (Section 2.2) we will consider a traditional view of the relationship between risk assessment and risk management presenting these as separate tasks, the first primarily expert and scientific in character, the second essentially political, but informed by the results of expert risk assessment. We will complicate this simple picture by examining various issues in the relationship between risk assessment and management. In Section 2.2.1 we will consider the attractions and limitations of moves towards increasingly quantified risk assessments through the production of statistical measures of risk and the various claims made for the utility of such statistics. In Section 2.2.2 we will examine who is involved in risk assessment and risk management, the shift from narrow to broader forms of participation and debates over the extent and nature of the broadening that should take place. In Section 2.2.3, we will consider questions of institutional relationships and roles relating in particular to the allocation of roles across territory and between different levels of government.

Having raised these conceptual issues, we then analyse in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 a case study example of the routine use of risk assessment to inform decision-making. The Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE’s) role in assessing the risks presented by major accident hazards is examined. Accidents at Flixborough (see Module 4, Unit 7, and Module 5, Unit 3), Seveso and Bhopal displayed the impact that toxic releases, explosions and fires at chemical and petrochemical plants can have both on-site and off-site. The accident at Bhopal in 1984 killed more than 4,000 people living near to the plant and caused over 200,000 injuries (Perrow,1999:355). Part of the regulatory response to this risk in the UK is to control where such plants are located and to use the land use planning system to limit the accumulation of population in their vicinity.

Local government officials who are responsible for land use planning at a local level take decisions as to the significance of risks for planning decisions, but do so using the expert advice provided by the HSE. The HSE base their advice on technical risk assessments by experts and use of quantitative modelling to estimate the potential risks of accident events. The interplay between the HSE and the local planning authorities will be described and evaluated, together with developments in the legislation that shapes these activities.

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2.2 Introduction While we all make risk decisions on an everyday and, to an extent, individual basis many decisions about risk have to be made collectively on our behalf by a variety of public bodies. Across government and at various different levels, we can identify decisions being made about the significance of risks, their acceptability and the deployment of resources to control or reduce them. These collective decision-making tasks are all part of ‘risk management’, a term defined by the Royal Society (1992: 3) as ‘the making of decisions concerning risks and their subsequent implementation’ and’‘regulatory measures intended to shape who can take what risks and how’ (p.

136). Society nowadays presumes a lot of risk management, expecting decisions to be made on a sound basis, with blame and castigation waiting for those who are seen to manage public safety in an inappropriate or unwise manner.

Exactly how effective and ‘socially acceptable’ risk management should proceed, is the crucial question; it is also an intensely problematic one. While some models of risk management seek to simplify and derive general rules of ‘best practice’, it is evidently the case that different risks embody different characteristics, contexts, sciences and politics. This enormously complicates the risk management task, with approaches to decision-making deemed appropriate for one type of risk and in one context, insufficient or inappropriate for others. Furthermore, the very different world-views which are now recognised as underpinning different perceptions of risk, mean that the various parties to a debate about risk management may be basing their presumptions and principles on quite different conceptual foundations (Krimsky and Golding, 1992; Wynne, 1996).

Not surprisingly therefore, there are a number of dimensions of risk management which have become the subject of sometimes intense debate among practitioners and academics; including issues of participation, anticipationism, quantification, institutional roles and relationships, use of regulatory instruments, access to information, authority, blame and liability. A detailed discussion of these can be found in the Royal Society (1992) report which identifies key ‘doctrinal contests’ in risk management and stresses the dynamic nature of recent risk management practice.

We are not, in this Unit, going to examine the debates about principles of and approaches to risk management in full, but rather to focus, through the use of a case study, on some of the key questions raised by the practice and use of ‘risk assessment’ to inform the broader decision-making remit of ‘risk management’.

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Traditionally risk assessment has been conceived as a separate task to risk management.

Risk assessment has been defined in many different ways, but is usually considered an essentially scientific activity, distinguishable from the ‘politics, law and administration’ of risk management (National Research Council, 1983). The importance and significance of risk assessment for risk management is enormous. To characterise the traditional view, this is where the rational, hard-headed, objective, consistent and value-free input of knowledgeable and experienced experts is seen to take place. Drawing on the credibility of a structured scientific practice, risk assessment provides the bed-rock on which risk management decisions are typically made, defended and legitimised.

M

Figure 1: The Traditional View of the Relationship between Risk Assessment and Risk Management

RISK ASSESSMENT Expert assessment Objective Science

RISK MANAGEMENT Decision-making Judgemental Politics

As shown in Figure 1, we therefore have a simplified model of risk assessment carried out by ‘experts’, who then supply the results of their scientifically structured analysis of risks to those responsible for making or implementing risk management decisions.

However, if we consider the actual operation of this simplified model, we rapidly move to needing the answers to a series of more detailed questions. For example: •

How is the risk assessment task to be carried out?

•

Who is to be involved in and have access to the risk assessment task?

•

What is the product of the risk assessment task to consist of?

•

How is the risk assessment product to be considered and acted upon by the decision-makers?

•

To what extent is there and should there be an institutional divide between the risk assessment and risk management tasks?

Asking such questions not only embellishes the black boxes and arrows. It also takes us into the territory of a number of the contested debates of risk management referred to earlier.

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2.2.1

Quantification

Risk assessment typically involves the quantification of risk; the production of statistical measures of the level of risk (or probability of harm) involved in a particular activity or scenario over a specified period of time (for example a probability of death of 1 in a million per year). Quantified risk assessment or QRA takes on a number of different guises but has now become the foundation of most risk assessment work. QRA is traditionally seen as providing a systematic, structured and ‘rational’ approach to judging the significance of different risks in a consistent manner, and an objective basis on which to then make decisions about the allocation of resources. The attraction of having a statistical measure of risk is quite clear as it, in principle, provides regulators with a clear and easily defensible basis on which to make decisions. As Toft notes: ... the probabilistic numeric derived from such methodologies can be utilised to legitimise claims that the risks associated with a particular hazard are acceptable, since it is possible to demonstrate explicitly that they are numerically smaller than some preset criteria of acceptability and thus can be used to calm any fears that may have arisen within the general public or other interested parties.

(Toft, 1996:100) Whipple, commenting on the engineering profession, notes that: A major motivation, if not the major motivation, for using quantitative risk assessments for risk management is that such an approach permits a conceptual separation between the technical factors that determine risk and the political factors that bear on risk management.

(Whipple, 1992) While QRA has, for these and other reasons, become a very important part of the process through which risk decisions are taken, its basis and use are contested. There is a spectrum of views on how much risk assessment and management should rely on quantification and the apparent power of risk statistics to legitimise a decision.

Criticisms of QRA centre on the validity of its status as a rational, objective and valuefree process. As has been frequently pointed out and carefully demonstrated, risk assessment in practice is often full of uncertainties and riddled with qualitative judgement (Freudenberg, 1992; Jasanoff, 1991; Otway, 1992; Wynne, 1992). There can, for example, be problems with the quality of data on which assessments of risk are based (how, for example, can one accurately assess the risk of failure of a mechanical component if that component fails so rarely, or, indeed so often, that to save money

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performance records are not kept?). Assumptions have to be made about which risk scenarios are to be considered and included in risk calculations, and there are major problems in dealing with the inherent unpredictability of human behaviour (Freudenberg, 1992; Royal Society, 1992; Toft, 1996; Mayo, 1991). As a consequence, it is argued, the statistical measure of risk produced at the end of a QRA process does not embody the qualities of accuracy, objectivity and stability often assigned to it.

To be fair to the HSE, however, such weaknesses have been explicitly recognised in such policy documents as The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations (HSE, 1988). Consider the following, for example: [Some risk estimates] represent no more than a complex set of expert judgements based on a variety of factors such as the known rate of failure of engineering components ... . All of them are subject to large margins of error, and those that depend on engineering judgement may be overstated, because of the caution and pessimism which it is customary to build into such estimates.

(HSE, 1989b: iii) The HSE’s Quantified Risk Assessment: Its Input into Decision Making goes on: Such estimates can also under-estimate the actual risk, since the chains of events that lead to plant failure or the mismanagement of faulty situations can include certain kinds of human error which QRA cannot readily predict, and which depend for their elimination on scrupulous management and inspection.

(HSE, 1989b: iii) While for some observers such (‘in-house’) deprecations and criticisms have the potential to fatally damn the use of QRA in guiding decision-making, for most practitioners they are seen as indicating the need to use QRA with care, and in ways which acknowledge its limitations and uncertainties. These may include the incorporation of explicitly qualitative elements alongside the predominantly quantified risk assessment process (referred to as ‘adding extra vitamins’ in Royal Society, 1992), the explicit indication of levels of uncertainty and reliability alongside risk statistics (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Jasanoff, 1991) and a stress on the use of QRA products as only one input to decision-making processes which also rely on explicitly qualitative and judgemental considerations. Cohen, a former member of the Health and Safety Executive, is quite explicit in accepting the many limitations of QRA, but still strongly defends its continued use:

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QRA is an essential input into a strategic decision process about risk, but its imperfections and omissions need to be borne in mind by the decision maker. It cannot determine decisions about risk which are essentially political…..It seems fair to ask what kind of decision on a technically based risk (and on the underlying technology) might be made without any expert quantitative estimate of risk? It is this that I believe makes it absolutely essential to use QRA, but with all the caution that has been noted.

(Cohen, 1996: 98) While it is indeed generally the case that QRA is only one input to risk management decisions, this does raise questions about the ways in which risk statistics are to be used and communicated to those in decision-making bodies. Are they to be presented in a ‘naked’ form simply as statistics or as statistics with expert evaluations of their significance attached to them? Are decision-makers in practice able to diverge significantly from the decision implied by statistical logic; or are they in fact constrained, explicitly or implicitly, in the extent to which they can make an essentially qualitative judgement?

Is the acknowledgement of uncertainty and unreliability something that in practice can permeate the presentation of QRA products without this becoming self-destructive?

2.2.2

Participation

Closely related to the questions raised in the above paragraph are debates over the extent of participation and openness appropriate to ‘technical’ risk assessment practice and ‘political’ risk management decisions. Here two alternative models of ‘broad’ and’‘narrow’ participation are often presented (Fiorino, 1990). Narrow participation is taken as the traditional norm in most Western democracies. This is where the assessment of risk and the taking of key risk decisions is entrusted primarily to an elite and closed community of experts (i.e. a ‘technocracy’). Often associated with this model is restricted access to information. Calls for broader forms of participation have emerged for a range of reasons, seeking an extension of those involved in risk management beyond the elite expert groups.

Expert elites it is argued cannot adequately reflect the interests of all, or adequately deal with complexities of the science and politics now embodied in many risk issues.

Pidgeon (1996) presents three bases on which to evaluate these alternative models of participation; normative, instrumental and substantive. Normative questions of who ought to be involved in decision-making relate to matters of democratic rights and the extent to which science can be seen as an’‘ethically agnostic activity’ (Pidgeon, 1996: 166) free of political ‘bias’ and simply deploying truth and facts to society’s benefit.

Instrumental arguments relate to the need for the legitimation of decisions and the maintenance of public trust in institutions to act wisely on their behalf. Substantive questions address whether or not risk assessment and management is more effective University of Leicester

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and of better quality with broad or narrow participation; for example, it is argued by some that broadening constituencies can help avoid ‘blindspots’ in analysis and reveal hidden and maybe unwarranted assumptions in how risks are being assessed.

It is now generally accepted by most participants in risk management, that excessively narrow forms of participation are inadequate and that some broadening is necessary.

The extent and form of broadening is not agreed, though. The importance and value of focused expert evaluations is still strongly defended by some observers as a counter to broadening trends (Royal Society, 1992). There are differences in views about whether broadening should take place only in the making of risk management decisions, involving, for example, greater public access to regulatory decision-making fora, or whether we should also be opening up the scientific practice of quantified risk assessment to a wider constituency and scrutiny (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; O’Riordan, 1996; Pidgeon, 1996). In this respect it has been argued that quantification allows greater scope for external scrutiny of risk assessments as it provides an explicit statistically based methodology and outcome which can be rigorously examined and criticised (Cohen, 1996). Jasanoff (1991: 19) in contrast contends that: ... if risk analysis merely converts political arguments into technical ones, the cause of accountability is not likely to be well served. Because of their esoteric nature such methodologies threaten to elude the traditional processes of democratic control.

Again, here there are problems in generalisation. Exactly what form of participation is most appropriate for a given situation will vary with the nature of the risk decisions, the characteristics of the science involved and the profile of the stakeholders with an interest in decision outcomes. Narrowness and breadth are in this light relative notions with different manifestations in different contexts.

2.2.3

Institutional Relationships and Roles

Discussion so far has already touched on relationships between different institutions involved in risk assessment and management. As shown in Table 1, there are a range of different types of institutions that potentially have roles in risk management, operating at different levels of scale – supranational, national and subnational. For any risk issue it is necessary to resolve which types of institutions at which levels are to have particular roles in assessing risk or taking risk management decisions, and where, as is typical, multiple institutions are involved, how these are to interrelate. There may be a case, in some circumstances, for QRA assessments and risk management decisions to be taken within the same institution and at the same territorial level. In others it might be appropriate for there to be a division of roles between institutions and between levels so that for example a national level expert body may provide the results of QRA methods University of Leicester

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for locally based decision-makers to act upon. Here again there are debates about the extent to which it is best to have institutional separation of risk assessment and risk management functions. As Mayo (1991) identifies, there are a range of arguments presented for both separation and non-separation. ‘Non-separatists’, she argues, have contrasting ‘sociological’ and’‘metascientific’ viewpoints, which link closely to the different perspectives on quantification and uncertainty discussed earlier.

A further issue for levels of scale and territorial competence, is the tension between consistency and flexibility in risk decisions. At a European level this is embodied within debates about subsidiarity. On the one hand it can be argued that there should be panEuropean safety standards and risk assessment methods; on the other there is a case for taking decision-making down to a more local level and allowing safety decisions to be more directly accountable and to reflect political and cultural variations. Similarly, within a nation there can be tensions between ensuring nationally consistent risk management decisions and allowing local factors and local politics to have a bearing.

Given the scope for variation in the assumptions and data fed into QRA calculations, similar questions can be raised about the consistency of QRA methods in different situations and across different institutions; should there be a common UK or even European approach to QRA, so that calculated risk statistics can be more meaningfully compared and decisions can be informed by these on a more consistent basis?

Table 1: Nine Types of Institutional Player in Public Risk Management at Different Territorial Levels Institutional Type Territorial Level

Core Executive Bodies

Independent Public Bodies

Private Independent Bodies

Supranational

EC Commission

EC Court of Justice

International environmental pressure groups

National parliaments

National independent

National courts, associations regulatory bodies

National

Subnational

State or local governments

Independent regional/local statutory bodies

Local firms and activists

Source: Adapted from Royal Society, 1992

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2.2.4

Summary

In this introductory section we have focused on the relationship between risk assessment and risk management, presenting a simple model of this relationship and then raising some questions about how the expert practice of risk assessment should be carried out and how it should inform the taking of risk management decisions. We have also examined three interrelated areas of debate in more detail; the role and status of quantification in risk assessment; participation and the potential broadening of who is involved in assessment; and the setting of appropriate institutional roles and relationships in an increasingly multi-level policy environment.

Having considered these issues we will now move on to a case study through which to examine them in a more practical setting. The chosen case study, that of land use planning and major accident hazards, provides an example of where quantified risk assessment is a routinised and well developed activity, but also where relationships between risk assessment and decision-making bodies are complex and sometimes problematic. Furthermore we shall see that practices have developed over time as a result of experience and are still evolving, with important changes underway in 2006.

2.3

2.3.1

Major Accident Hazards and Land Use Planning Setting the Scene: Policy

Major accident hazards can be broadly defined as the storage or use of hazardous substances, where in the event of a major accident and release of toxic, explosive or flammable materials local people and the nearby environment could be seriously affected.

Such accidents rarely happen, but the potential hazard or threat has been demonstrated both in a number of major disasters, for example at Flixborough in 1974, Seveso, Italy in 1976 and Bhopal, India in 1984 and in smaller scale incidents at a range of sites in the UK. One of the largest UK incidents for many years was the explosion and fire at the Buncefield fuel depot near Hemel Hempstead on 11th December 2005; there were no serious casualties but substantial property damage and major environmental pollution concerns resulted. Sites designated as presenting a potential major accident hazard are broadly spread across the UK, although there is clustering in areas that have a concentration of the chemical and/or petrochemical industry. In 1989 there were about 1,700 sites classed as notifiable installations in the UK (HSE,1989a:5).

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The UK approach to the control of major accident hazards was formulated in the 1970s under the guidance of the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH) (one of a number of advisory committees informing the development of health and safety policy) and is based on the following principles: •

identification – establishing where major accident hazards exist;

•

risk reduction – reducing the possibility of an accident event occurring by controls on-site;

•

mitigation – reducing the impact of an accident event if one should occur through emergency planning and land use planning control.

‘Risk reduction’ involving assessment and appropriate control on-site by industry and enforced by the Health and Safety Executive was expected to reduce the risk of an accident to a low level, but not to completely eliminate the hazard. It was recognised that there would remain some’‘residual risk’ of an accident occurring. For this reason it was seen as ‘prudent’ to exercise some control over the relative locations of the sources of hazard and any population in the vicinity.

Land use planning, in this context, plays a mitigating role in the event of an accident taking place. If there are fewer people in the vicinity of an installation when a major accident happens, there will be fewer potential casualties or fatalities, and emergency plans will be easier to enact effectively. The well-documented record of chemical industry accidents clearly showed that adequate separation would have saved lives and prevented injury. In Bhopal the high number of off-site fatalities was in part due to the very close proximity of a dense population to the site boundary. In contrast, at Flixborough, there were no fatalities among members of the public, as the site was some distance from the nearest villages.

Policy recognition of the role for planning in the control of major accident hazards appeared relatively early in 1972. Procedures were established whereby local planning authorities (LPAs) could consult with the then Factory Inspectorate (now the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)) to obtain expert advice on the safety implications of new hazardous installations, or development in the vicinity of existing ones (Petts, 1988).

A key principle established at this stage was that planning authorities should be making decisions about the acceptability of different risks, and that the advice from the HSE should remain as advice (discussed further below).

For proposed new hazardous installations, LPAs could decide to either allow the introduction of the hazard, refuse permission for this to take place, or allow the hazard only subject to particular conditions. Development in the vicinity of a hazardous site, involving, for example, a new school, hospital or housing, could similarly be allowed, University of Leicester

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refused or allowed with conditions, with consideration of the risks potentially playing a role in this determination. By the 1990s the HSE was receiving about 800 - 900 consultations from LPAs per year and the vast majority related to proposed developments in the vicinity of existing hazards; applications for new hazardous sites were no more than 100 per year (DETR, 2000a: 30).

2.3.2

Setting the Scene: Legislation

Following the Flixborough disaster in 1974, the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH) was set up as mentioned above. The ACMH’s work led to the introduction of controls on the development of land near the sites of hazardous operations. After some experience of these arrangements had been gained the responsibilities of the LPAs were defined in new primary legislation that was introduced in 1990 as the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act. It applied specifically to England, although similar provisions were made for Scotland and Wales; the detailed differences will not be discussed in this unit. Regulations made under the 1990 Act have further defined the procedures, including the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 1992, known as the PHS Regulations. Under the PHS Regulations the presence of hazardous chemicals above specified threshold quantities required consent from the Hazardous Substances Authority (HSA), which is usually also the Local Planning Authority (LPA).

The LPA has a statutory duty to consult the HSE on all hazardous substances applications and the risks that would be presented to people in the vicinity.

From the outset the HSE’s approach to its land-use planning advice has been based on the presumption that the site operators will be complying fully with the requirements of the Health& Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. This legislation places duties on employers to ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of employees, and that others, including the public, are not exposed to risks to their health and safety. However, it was recognised that for hazardous installations some risks would remain and need to be subject to further consideration and control through the planning system.

Even after all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to ensure compliance with the requirements of the 1974 Act, there will remain the residual risk of an accident which cannot entirely be eliminated. The [planning] controls will ensure that this residual risk - to people in the vicinity or to the environment - is taken into account before a hazardous substance is allowed to be present in a controlled quantity. The extent of this risk will depend upon where and how a hazardous substance is to be present; and the nature of existing and prospective uses of the application site and its surroundings.

(DETR, 2000b: 7) University of Leicester

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Some of the processes and activities to which the land-use controls apply are defined in specific legislation; these include nuclear installations, pipelines and licensed explosives factories and stores (magazines).

More general regulations, administered by the HSE, have implemented in UK legislation the requirements of European Council Directives on industrial safety, which are known as the Seveso Directives. The first of these led to the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard (CIMAH) Regulations in 1984. Under this legislation some 295 ‘top-tier’ sites were identified for more extensive controls than the larger number of ‘lower-tier’ sites, but the provisions of CIMAH did not include land-use planning control measures.

The second Seveso Directive was published in 1997. It required that by February 1999 member states were to “ ensure that the objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting their consequences are taken into account in their land-use planning policies”.

Thus an explicit link between land-use planning and the control of hazardous installations was to be made (see Voke, 1997, for details; a supplied reading with Unit 3 in Module 5). The Seveso II Directive was implemented by the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999, which replaced CIMAH, and by further planning legislation as the Planning (Control of Major-Accident Hazards) Regulations 1999. These amended the 1992 regulations and made important changes to the lists of substances for which consent is required and to the controlled quantities.

More recently changes to COMAH were made by the Control of Major Accident Hazards (Amendment) Regulations 2005; these changes implemented the requirements of EC Directive 2003/105/EC. These were made to: 1. take account of recommendations of two EC working groups on the scientific and practical basis for the inclusion of named carcinogens and the qualifying quantities for substances dangerous for the environment; and 2. implement the lessons learned from major accidents In Europe since Seveso II was introduced, notably a spill of cyanide into a river in Baie Mare which killed thousands of tones of fish, a major explosion at a fireworks factory in Enschede in the Netherlands that killed 20 people, and an explosion involving ammonium nitrate at a fertiliser plant in Toulouse France, in which 30 people died.

(HSE, 2005)

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One effect of these new regulations has been to bring more sites within the scope of the COMAH legislation and therefore subject to the land-use planning regime. When these new regulations were introduced, the Government estimated that some 158 new sites would be caught, increasing the overall number of COMAH sites by about 14% to a total of about 1,100 sites in the UK. Sites now covered include some mines, quarries, boreholes and land-fill sites where specified dangerous substances are present. Also the new regulations have extended the lists of specified dangerous substances, including named carcinogens, and changed the qualifying quantities of some substances (HSE, 2005). Furthermore about 90 sites previously subject to COMAH’s lower level controls have become subject to the more stringent top-tier requirements, including land-use planning policy.

2.3.3

The Institutional Relationship

If we apply the simple model of risk assessment and management introduced earlier, we can assign to the HSE the role of expert body performing the assessment of risk, while the LPAs are the risk management decision-makers; see Figure 1.

This institutional relationship was reviewed by the of the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards in 1984 and endorsed, in spite of some pressure for assessment and decision-making roles to be combined within the HSE. In their third report ACMH commented that: It has been suggested that when safety is involved the planning decision should in effect be taken by the HSE on the grounds that planning authorities are not experts in the assessment of risk. We have rejected this in the past and continue to do so ... . Our view is that HSE ought to provide a clear assessment of the risks associated with the development and to ensure that plant standards are appropriate for those risks. The decision on whether or not to grant planning permission should however rest with the LPA who, on behalf of the local community, attempts to come to a balanced decision, having taken all the factors into consideration.

(Health and Safety Commission, 1984) We therefore have what appears to be a neat divide between assessment and decisionmaking; and between expert ‘science’ and non-expert ‘politics’. We also have an example of a territorial divide, with the HSE, a national body, giving its advice on a nationally consistent basis, and some 500 individual LPAs working at a local level, making decisions related to fairly small land areas ‘on behalf of the local community’. There would therefore seem to be scope for risk management decisions to be taken in different ways in different parts of the country reflecting local circumstances. Perhaps a locally perceived economic need for work in an area of high unemployment could influence local politics and opinions.

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In territorial terms we also have the supranational EC influence, although the Seveso II Directive (and therefore COMAH) focused on common procedures for ‘taking account’ of risk rather than common assessments or decision-making standards.

We will now consider more closely how the relationship between the HSE and LPAs has worked in practice, by examining first the assessment work undertaken by the HSE, and second how LPAs utilise and respond to HSE advice.

2.4 The HSE and Expert Risk Assessment 2.4.1

Major Hazards Assessment

The HSE has over 30 years of experience of undertaking risk assessments in order to provide advice to LPAs on planning applications. The Major Hazards Assessment Unit (MHAU) in Bootle, Liverpool, was a centre of expertise fitting into an organisational structure which also had inspectors working at regional offices with specific responsibility for dealing with major accident hazards. Recently the MHAU became the Risk Assessment and Process Industries Unit (RAPI) with staff drawn from a variety of technical, engineering and industrial backgrounds. In order to provide advice for LPAs on development proposals the HSE has developed methods of making quantified risk assessments (QRAs), which have two components: (i) Consequence assessment – this involves predicting and modelling the types of accident event that could take place at an installation, how large these accidents might be and how far away from the installation their impacts may be experienced. This modelling is undertaken through the use of computer models for different types of hazardous materials and taking account of a wide range of factors. For example, for a release of chlorine resulting from a pipeline fracture, consequence modelling has to consider: •

the speed of release of the chlorine;

•

its vaporisation and mixing with air;

•

the speed and extent of travel of the gas cloud downwind;

•

the dilution of the chlorine with time and downwind movement;

•

degree of inhalation by people;

•

the resulting level of harm through inhalation (which can include death at sufficient concentration levels).

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Modelling accident events involves the making of a range of assumptions and has many sources of uncertainty. The number of actual accident events on which to base or verify models is very limited (each one inevitably being unique) and field trials of large-scale releases are problematical. Assumptions have to be made as to which of the many different possible types of accident event are to be modelled and under what atmospheric conditions and how members of the public will behave during an accident event (e.g. whether or not they will shelter inside buildings). The influence of factors such as topography and surface roughness on cloud dispersion has also proved difficult to incorporate. Finally, questions of dose-response, or the level of exposure needed to produce particular impacts on people can be particularly contentious and a source of disagreement between different expert groups. Griffiths and Megson (1984) showed how the use of different assumptions as regards the toxicity of different gases lead to a substantial variation in the resulting estimates of accident extent. They concluded that ‘there is no scientifically defensible case for choosing one rather than another from this wide range of toxic response statements’ and that as a result ‘risk estimates for major hazards need to be examined with great care to establish the validity of their implied levels of accuracy’ (Griffiths and Megson, 1984). (ii)’Likelihood or probability assessment – this involves estimating how likely it is that accident events will happen and therefore how likely it is that certain levels of damage are experienced away from the installation. In its quantified form this involves the use of ‘fault trees’ to assign and combine probabilities. Fault trees are widely used in systemfailure analysis and are one of the key components of QRA for many types of hazard (Royal Society, 1992). They are essentially logic diagrams which show a given hazard event – say a major fire – and which then trace the different possible series of sub-events which could eventually lead to this outcome, attaching probabilities to each of the steps along the way. These probabilities can then be combined to work out the risk of the hazard event occurring. Many assumptions are needed to produce such event trees. For example, decisions have to be made about which events to take account of; data on component failure rates can be very sparse and unreliable and the role of human error in the initiation and response to incidents is particularly hard to predict. How, for example, would one estimate the chance of a tanker driver accidentally uncoupling a supply hose?

In practice the two elements of HSE’s risk assessment work – consequence and likelihood – are combined together within computer models, which produce risk contours as an end result. Risk contours show how levels of estimated individual risk around a hazardous installation are distributed and decline with distance. Individual risk is expressed as the chances per million/per year of a person at a specified location receiving a–‘dangerous dose’ of a given hazard. Once these risk contours are in place HSE staff use them to estimate the level of individual risk involved at particular proposed developments near to a hazardous site – or to estimate the level of risk that a new hazardous site will present to existing populations.

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2.4.2

Development in the Use of QRA

Prior to 1985 HSE advice to LPAs was not based on both of the components of assessment outlined above, It was focused only on the first. Consequence assessment was undertaken using computer models, but likelihood was only assessed in a qualitative manner – through the best judgement of experienced inspectors within the MHAU as to what were ‘reasonably foreseeable’ or ‘credible’ accident events. The results of these assessments were then used to derive’‘protection’ or separation distances between hazards and populations. This approach was criticised on a number of grounds – that too much protection was being provided for very unlikely accidents with resulting excessive restrictions on land use; that the definition of what was a credible event was too arbitrary and inconsistent; and that it was difficult to compare the degree of protection being provided with that provided for other types of hazard (HSE, 1989a; Lewis and Hayns, 1989). QRA was seen as providing a response to a number of these criticisms.

Drawing on the ground-breaking study undertaken for the Canvey Island complex in the late 1970s (Health and Safety Executive, 1978) and the quantification of risk in other areas, including that for nuclear installations (HSE, 1988; HSE, 1989b), the use of QRA within HSE’s land use planning advice was therefore gradually extended.

In 1989 a discussion document laid out the new approach to be used for assessing risk and giving advice to LPAs (HSE, 1989a; see the supplied reading). This document was a radical step change but it was not an unblinkered conversion to and reliance upon statistical methods; it includes acknowledgement of some of the criticisms of QRA discussed earlier. Also this discussion document only deals with the use of QRA for proposed development in the vicinity of major hazards, with new hazardous sites and pipelines excluded because, it is stated, these ‘do not easily lend themselves to the use of simple criteria’. Only individual risk calculations are quantified with a ‘judgemental approach’ maintained for taking account of societal risk (the risk of events happening which affect a large number of people at the same time). Important sources of uncertainty in risk estimates are also identified including the sparseness and unreliability of data on component failure-rates, problems in validating consequence models from ‘real’ accident or releases and major uncertainties in dose-response estimates. As a consequence it is acknowledged that ‘QRA cannot produce a precise value for the risks’ and the HSE approach to QRA is described as one of ‘cautious best estimate’ in which: ... every attempt is made to use realistic, best estimate assumptions but where there is difficulty in justifying an assumption some overestimate is preferred.

(HSE, 1989a: 4)

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2.4.3

Risk Criteria and Advice to LPAs

Once HSE staff have assessed the level of risk associated with or presented by a new development proposal, they do not just inform the relevant LPA of the calculated risk statistic and leave them to judge its significance. Rather HSE judges the significance of the calculated risk statistic and provides an interpretation of the level of tolerability of risk for the LPA. This takes the end form of advice as to whether or not on risk grounds the development proposal should be allowed or refused planning permission.

The interpretation of the significance of risk draws on two factors; the calculated level of risk judged against specified threshold tolerability criteria, and for development near to hazardous sites the type of development that is involved (industry, housing, community facilities, etc.). In the 1989 discussion document on the assessment of risks for development near to hazardous sites, key threshold levels are identified for the risk of an individual receiving a ‘dangerous dose or worse’. Dangerous dose is defined as the dose of toxic gas or heat or explosion overpressure which gives all the following effects: severe distress to almost everyone, a substantial fraction require medical attention, some people are seriously injured, any highly susceptible people might be killed. The three key threshold levels are: 10 chances in a million per year 1 chance in a million per year 0.33 chances in a million per year These are in practice translated into risk contours identified around each site defining inner, middle and outer zones. Table 2 then shows how different types of development might have been considered in relation to these zones.

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Table 2: A Decision-Making Matrix Used by the HSE Development Category

Inner Zone

Middle Zone

Outer Zone

Industry, warehousing, farm buildings and housing developments involving < 10 dwellings

ACCEPT

ACCEPT

ACCEPT

Retail, community and

MAYBE

MAYBE

ACCEPT

Housing developments > 10 dwellings and large hotels

REFUSE

MAYBE

ACCEPT

Developments involving especially vulnerable populations such as schools, hospitals, sheltered housing; developments involving more than 1,000 people out of doors (theme parks, sports stadia)

REFUSE

MAYBE

MAYBE

leisure facilities, large industrial parks

In the inner zone where the level of individual risk is highest and above the level of 10 chances per million (cpm) per year only small-scale industry and very limited housing development is recommended for construction, and other types of development are recommended for refusal. In the outer zone where the risk is between 1 and 0.33 cpm per year all developments except those containing especially vulnerable populations are deemed acceptable. In the middle zone ‘maybe’ responses predominate. Here a more detailed assessment would be undertaken, sometimes drawing on estimates of societal risk but also on expert judgements of the inspectors. Thus a collective decision on the appropriate response to the planning authority may be made. This is a classic form of ‘elite consensus’ referred to by the Royal Society (1992) as a traditional model of ‘preference-merging’ within risk management; in this respect it is significant that this procedure was maintained alongside the shift to the more formalised use of QRA. The HSE risk and ‘development type’ criteria that have been derived from expert sources, have been exposed to wider scrutiny and comment through the publication of consultation documents. In the 1989 document reference is made to the upper and lower risk thresholds being derived from the first Royal Society Study Group (1983) report on risk assessment and the HSE report on the’‘Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations’ (HSE, 1988). These are presented as credible sources on which to base and legitimate University of Leicester

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risk thresholds for major hazards. Comparisons are also drawn to the risks of other hazards such as road accidents and lightning strikes to justify the criteria used. This is a widely used approach to setting risk criteria sometimes referred to as ‘bootstrapping’.

We can see from this discussion that despite the move to QRA there are still important qualitative and judgmental aspects to the HSE assessments and the interpretations provided to the LPAs. Thus there is blurring of the divide shown in Figure 2 between the risk assessment (HSE) and risk management (LPA) roles.

2.5 The ‘Political’ Risk Decisions The LPAs rarely contain risk ‘experts’. Professional planners and elected planning committee members have to deal with a whole mass of ‘land use’ issues, which include meeting social and economic needs alongside protecting environmental quality and community safety. In any given local authority area they will be making decisions on a large number of applications for planning permission and formulating development plans within tight time scales. Planning legislation also provides a range of opportunities for public participation in planning permission decisions including the submission of letters of objection, attendance at planning committee meetings and where relevant the right to present evidence to public inquiries.

Some LPAs with concentrations of chemical and petrochemical sites will come up against major accident hazard issues on a regular basis and consequently develop some level of familiarity and understanding of risk and the approaches developed by the HSE for giving advice. The majority will have to contend with major hazard issues far less frequently and consequently can find it very difficult to deal with the safety implications of the decisions they have to take. Research has found that many LPAs have a poor awareness and understanding of planning regulations concerned with hazardous industry and that many development plans fail to contain policies relating to the hazardous sites within their spatial remit ( Walker and Bayliss, 1998).

As we saw earlier for many years LPAs have been obliged to consult with the HSE on relevant planning applications for hazardous sites and development in their vicinity.

They would typically receive a response back from the HSE within about 4 weeks, although some cases took longer. The standard response provided by the HSE does not include any discussion of statistical levels of risk, but provides an interpretation of the significance of risk levels and a recommendation as to whether or not there are sufficient grounds for objecting to the planning application because of hazard concerns.

The way in which such advice is dealt with by the LPA to an extent depends on the advice the HSE has provided:

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1. HSE response of ‘no objection on hazard grounds’’– where the HSE raise no objection it is almost universally the case that LPAs then consider safety issues no further. It is very rare for LPAs to attempt to exercise a greater level of protection than recommended by the statutory expert body. This is in part at least because an applicant refused permission on hazard grounds would have a very good chance of winning an appeal against this decision where the HSE did not back up the LPA’s concerns about safety.

Where an appeal was made the LPA would need to employ consultants to give alternative expert advice, often involving considerable expense. In addition guidance from the Department of the Environment stated that LPAs ‘should not substitute their own interpretations of risk assessments for those of the expert authorities’ (DOE, 1994).

Pressures on the LPA therefore have to be very great for them to act more cautiously than the HSE recommends – involving either high levels of local public concern or major implications for other development plans in the area. An example of the latter situation arose in Middlesborough where the LPA refused permission for a new storage site for ammonium nitrate (which presents a toxic and explosive risk) even though the HSE considered the risks this presented to be acceptably small. The applicant then appealed but failed to get the decision overturned. In this case the assessment of risk made by consultants employed by the council was accepted by the inquiry inspector as superior to that of the HSE. This was, however, an exceptional rather than typical outcome. Other examples of where public concern has led to involved debates over safety with public rights to participation actively taken up can be found; these include, for example, the major inquiries into gas and petrochemical developments in Scotland in the early 1980s (Snowball and Macgill, 1984).

2. HSE response ‘advising refusal on hazard grounds’’– the HSE advise refusal of planning applications comparatively rarely but where they do it can present major dilemmas for planning authorities. There is pressure on LPAs to follow the HSE’s advice. Department of the Environment Circular 11/92 advised LPAs that if the HSE recommend refusal of planning permission on hazard grounds, this should not be overridden ‘without the most careful consideration’. That DOE circular was superceded

by DETR Circular 04/2000 but the guidance on this point remained the same (see paragraph A5 in the supplied reading extract from DETR, 2000). Furthermore LPAs have to inform the HSE if they are minded to go against their advice to refuse applications, with sufficient time to allow the HSE to consider whether or not to request the Secretary of State to call in the application for his determination and thus effectively take the decision out of the LPAs hands.

For these reasons LPAs have rarely granted planning permission where the HSE have recommended refusal. Research has found that most cases where this has happened relate to the control of development in the vicinity of existing major hazard sites. Typically the LPA wanted to see development taking place for social or economic reasons – the University of Leicester

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provision of housing, of retail or entertainment facilities or the wholesale rejuvenation of previously derelict or run down areas. Due to the potential problems arising from going against HSE advice, risk issues are usually explored in greater depth in these circumstances, sometimes involving the use of external consultants to provide an alternative risk assessment. Examples of four situations in which planning permission was granted against the advice of the HSE are provided below. These show the range of factors involved in the decisions and the difficult balances that had to be made.

Example 1: In the early 1990s, the Black Country Urban Development Corporation repeatedly granted planning permission against the advice of the HSE for projects in the vicinity of the Albright and Wilson plant in Oldbury that were part of a major regeneration package for the area. Here the very reason for the existence of the Urban Development Corporation was to redevelop the area and this was considered a higher priority than protection against a risk that the community had been living with for a very long time (the Albright and Wilson plant dated from the mid-19th Century).

However, the Urban Development Corporation eventually managed to negotiate with the company to lower levels of hazardous material storage, which reduced the extent of conflict with nearby development proposals.

Example 2: In the early 1980s a large number of derelict sites near to Hays Chemicals in the St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council area, previously cleared of housing through compulsory purchase orders, were owned by the Council. They wanted to redevelop these sites to begin a process of urban renewal for the area. The HSE objected to applications put in for new housing. The local authority looked into the HSE advice in some detail employing consultants to provide an alternative source of risk assessment. Having looked at the risk figures and compared these with other risks in society, it was decided that the housing redevelopment would be allowed but only where there had previously been housing, before it had been pulled down. This was a difficult decision rationalised by the argument that the total population at risk would be no worse than it had been before, and that if the HSE advice was followed the area around the plant â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;would become a wastelandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

Example 3: An application was made to add a restaurant to an existing pub near to a large site run by Zeneca in Huddersfield. The HSE recommended refusal but the planning committee granted planning permission. There had been considerable lobbying by the applicant and the argument was made that this was an existing building in an already developed area and that the population increase intended was not that great. In fact the numbers of people using the pub had gone up more substantially anyway just because of the refurbishment and renovation the owner had already undertaken. Without further expansion, it was argued, the pub would find it difficult to survive in a competitive environment. This argument plus the small incremental addition to an existing population swayed the planning committeeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s decision.

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Example 4: In Accrington the LPA granted planning permission for the conversion of an old canal side warehouse into a hotel very close to the boundary of a chemical site, against the advice of the HSE. The council members felt that the need for redevelopment of the warehouse as part of a general policy of rejuvenation along the canal was so strong that it outweighed safety concerns. The HSE in this case decided that the risk to the proposed occupants of the hotel was so high that they used their powers to request the application be called in and a public inquiry held. At this inquiry the applicants argued that the HSE assessment was overly theoretical and that a more pragmatic view taking account of the good safety record of the firm and comparability of the level of risks with others such as death from road accidents should be emphasised. Here, however, the planning inspector agreed with the HSE view arguing that: ... given the careful analysis of risk factors ... and the level of risk compared with the norm, there is no justifiable reason to disagree with the HSE assessment. On the contrary I believe that the level of risk at up to 300 cpm, must in the context of considering a development proposal in the vicinity of a hazardous installation be taken very seriously. To assume a lower level arrived at more pragmatically would, in my view, be irresponsible at this site.

The pattern of responses to HSE advice discussed above, indicates that it is very rare for safety issues to be discussed in any depth in local planning decisions. Typically it is not safety or levels of risk that are debated by planners and planning committees; at least implicitly, it is the expertise and credibility of the HSE and the threat of appeals or call-ins which are the key underlying factors. The exceptions are where, for various reasons, the HSE’s advice to LPAs is challenged (as in the four cases above) and due to the closer scrutiny of evidence taking place in public inquiries, questions of the reliability of risk assessments and the interpretation of statistical estimates of risk are discussed.

2.6 New Advice Delivery Arrangements During 2002 the HSE developed a software tool known as PADHI (Planning Advice for Developments near Hazardous Installations). It embodied the HSE definitions of three risk contours and zones around installations and the classification of the proposed development into one of four sensitivity levels. The main factors determining these levels are the number of persons at the development, their vulnerability (eg.children or old people) and the intensity of the development. Factual assessments of these two factors can be combined in a simple decision matrix to give an ‘Advise Against’ (AA) or ‘Don’t Advise Against’ (DAA) response to the Planning Authority.( see the details on page 2 of the third supplied reading). An ‘advise against’ response becomes more likely as the number of people or their sensitivity level increases and the closer the development is to the site or pipeline (IFRLUP, 2005b).

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The PADHI system has allowed the majority of Planning Authority requests for HSE advice to be dealt with by local HSE offices, and answered more quickly than under the previous arrangements whereby all cases had to be sent to the specialist HSE office in Liverpool.

During 2006 HSE began devolving a revised version of PADHI, together with access to contour maps, out to the about 500 local planning authorities in England, Scotland and Wales. A programme of over 40 seminars will give training to LPA staff and guidance packs on how to use the PADHI+ system will be issued. The LPAs will have Internet access to the HSE’s map library that shows the consultation zones for hazardous installations and pipelines. Thus the LPA will have a three zone map specific to the site near which the development is proposed. For pipelines the distance each zone extends from the pipeline will be provided for LPAs to plot onto their pipeline maps (IFRLUP, 2005b).

If the local use of PADHI+ gives an ‘Against’ decision then the Planning Authority must still refer the case to the HSE for authority to proceed; the HSE could decide to ‘call-in’ the application for Government consideration. In each case the advice that PADHI+ generates will still belong to the HSE and so the HSE will be obliged to support the LPA at an appeal against a decision where the PADHI+ output was the significant factor. Thus providing the local authorities with this assessment tool will not be transferring the ultimate decision-making on difficult cases. Furthermore the PADHI+ system does not deal with development near some particularly hazardous sites (nuclear installations, explosives stores and quarries etc.). Thus these new arrangements are designed to deliver ‘standing advice’ routinely and quickly.

2.7 Analysis and Conclusions We have reviewed the development of the ongoing and routine use of risk assessment for informing risk management decisions in land-use planning. It is useful now to ask how well the simple model of the relationship between risk assessment and risk management (as shown in Figure 1) fits the practice outlined in this description. As we have seen there is not a clear divide evident between risk assessment and risk management; the supposed ‘clear water’ is muddied particularly by the level of interpretation that the HSE adds to the statistical product of risk assessment and the way in which LPAs are in practice constrained in their ability to deviate from HSE advice. It is in this light also hard to maintain the supposed divide between objective science (HSE) and subjective politics (LPAs). While the work of the HSE is scientifically based there are undoubtedly value judgements being made in the interpretation of risk estimates and qualitative elements feeding into the decision-making software.

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1. Quantification. The HSE has progressively, but cautiously, used QRA to a greater degree within the assessments they undertake of the risks from major accident hazards. There are a number of reasons for this. It has provided what appears to be a more solid and consistent defence for the advice they give when challenged in public inquiries; it has enabled advice on planning applications to be produced in a more mechanistic and efficient manner; it enables comparisons to be made with other sources of risks and to the criteria and standards applied in other areas of risk management. However, as with most QRA there are many uncertainties in the accident modelling and risk estimates that the HSE produce, which to an extent challenge the seeming solidity and consistency of the statistically based assessments. These uncertainties are recognised by the HSE but only at a general policy level. The advice given to LPAs has been presented without mention of the uncertainties or limitations of the QRA on which the advice is based. Only in the rare circumstances of public inquiries is the basis of HSE assessments scrutinised and some of the uncertainties exposed by challenges from alternative risk assessments.

2. Participation. The shift to greater use of QRA in the HSE has been accompanied by greater openness in explaining the basis on which their assessments of risk are made.

Prior to 1989 there was little information publicly available on assessment methodologies or the criteria on which advice to LPAs was produced, in part because of the ‘closed’ culture characteristic of the general operation of the HSE but also because a greater part of the assessment was on the basis of expert judgement – which is hard to explain and expand on ‘on paper’. With clearer statistical criteria in place it was possible to present a coherent and more convincing account of the approaches being used. The HSE has also increasingly discussed its assessment methodologies at conferences and other open meetings, so that more can be gleaned and debated by the wider expert community of consultants and other risk experts in government and business. Steps have also been taken towards broadening participation of non-expert groups through more active discussion with planners and the commissioning of a major research project into the public perceptions of risk around major hazard sites (Brazier et al., 1997) (Walker et al.,1998).

As discussed earlier, within the planning system, decision-making is open to public participation through a number of established mechanisms, so that in principle there has always been broad participation possible at the final decision-making stage. While it is possible to point to examples where that participatory opportunity has been utilised and local publics and pressure groups have made major inputs into decision-making processes, there have also been constraints acting against such participation. In particular the level of secrecy surrounding major accident hazards and the reluctance of some LPAs to highlight the existence of safety issues in their locality (particularly where hazards are hidden rather than obvious) is significant. Not until 1986 were registers of even the locations of major accident hazards made publicly available (Walker, 1989). Additional obstacles to public participation in risk management processes include the unequal distribution of educational

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and economic opportunities and the possibility that industrial hazards are a less urgent concern than such social hazards as poor housing, unemployment, crime, inadequate health care, poor transport infrastructure, etc. (Bennett, 1997).

3. Institutional relationships and roles. The nature of the relationship between HSE and LPAs has been demonstrated in some practical examples. However, there has been a long-standing debate about whether or not LPAs should have the decisionmaking role where hazard issues are involved, or whether this should be left to the HSE as experts (the ‘technocratic’ approach). Arguments for the HSE taking on the role have been made by those in industry concerned that LPAs do not have the necessary expertise to understand complicated technologies and risk concepts, but also by planners feeling that they do not have sufficient grasp of issues which can often seem very involved and abstract and where most feel obliged to follow HSE advice in any case. In contrast other planners, particularly in cases where they have challenged HSE advice, feel that it is imperative that safety can be balanced against other planning matters at a local level. Further debate has revolved around the extent to which consistency of treatment is needed. A former Director of the HSE, referred to the importance of the national stock of industrial hazard experience in arguing that: ... standards are needed because there are both economic (level playing field) and social (equitable) reasons for the regulators to behave consistently.

(Remington, 1995) Put another way, a nationally consistent approach to risk management should ensure that the regions and their sub-units compete for such social ‘goods’ as investment in industry and leisure on an equal basis, with no one stealing a march on anyone else by opting for lower standards of safety. Such an approach should also ensure that no local population is exposed to greater risk than the general population.

4. Recent System Changes. The PADHI+ system that is being provided to LPAs for their local use is an embodiment of latest HSE thinking on best practice. However, it will be subject to continuous review and changes will no doubt be made as and when deemed necessary. There may be renewed concerns that allowing local level decisionmaking could lead to the creation of ‘hazard havens’, where ‘dirty’ technologies concentrate as areas with high levels of unemployment trade off safety against economic prosperity (a phenomenon also recognized at an international level). In practice though, as we have seen, local level autonomy for LPAs is highly constrained. Central Government’s planning policy guidance stresses the need to usually follow official expert guidance and mechanisms are available through which decisions can be taken out of local hands. In this light the balance between national consistency and local flexibility would appear to be strongly towards the former rather than the latter.

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As a final comment, this discussion has hopefully shown the need for careful analysis of the particular contexts and circumstances within which risk assessment and risk management take place. In an area of public policy as complex and varied as that of risk management, simplistic models often prove inadequate and broad-brush dichotomies (science–politics, objective–subjective) can fail to capture the subtleties of real-world practice.

The need for caution in the interpretation of risk assessments based on QRA methodologies has been recognized by the HSE: QRA is an element that cannot be ignored in decision-making about risk, since it is the only discipline capable, however imperfectly, of enabling a number to be applied and comparisons of a sort to be made, other than of a purely qualitative kind. This said, the numerical element must be viewed with great caution and treated as only one parameter in an essentially judgemental exercise ... .

QRA illuminates some important components of safety assessment: but there are others. One important factor is that human behaviour at all levels in an organisation can significantly influence the standard of safety achieved in practice. Whilst work is proceeding on increasing the extent to which it is possible to take specific account of human factors in quantified risk assessments, it is crucial that management adopt a structured approach to influencing human behaviour.

(HSE, 1989b: iv)

2.8 Guide to Reading You should now read the extract supplied from the HSE guidance on Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning in the Vicinity of Major Industrial Hazards. Although it was published in 1989 this document has not yet been revised and it continues to be the basis of the HSE’s approach to these assessments.

The second supplied reading is a short annex to DETR Circular 4/2000, Planning Controls for Hazardous Substances, in which central Government guidance to Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) was set out again.

The third supplied reading is an HSE newsletter informing LPAs of the progress of the PADHI implementation project (IFRLUP, Issue No. 3, February 2005).

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2.9 Suggested Further Reading Freudenberg, W.R. (2003) ‘Institutional failure and the organizational amplification of risks: the need for a closer look’, chapter 4 in Pidgeon, N., Kasperson, R.E. and Slovic, P. (eds) The Social Amplification of Risk, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2.10 Study Questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University.

1.

What are the sources of uncertainty within QRA?

2.

What are the pros and cons of HSE giving the risk assessment software to the local authorities who have the decision-making role for planning applications involving hazardous installations?

3.

What would be the advantages and disadvantages of the HSE being more explicit about the uncertainties of the QRA they undertake?

2.11 Bibliography Bennett, S.A. (1997) ‘What Risks in Whose Risk Society?’ PhD Thesis [unpublished], London: Brunel University.

Brazier A., A. Irwin, C. Kelly, L. Prince, P. Simmons, G.P. Walker and B. Wynne (1997) ‘Public Perceptions of Risks Associated with Major Industrial Hazard Sites’, in Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference 1997, Lisbon, Portugal.

Cohen, A.V. (1996) ‘Quantitative Risk Assessment and Decisions about Risk: An Essential Input into the Decision Making Process’, in C. Hood and D.K. Jones (eds) Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management, London: UCL Press.

DETR (2000a) Planning Controls for Hazardous Substances, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions; Circular No 04/2000 (8th May).

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DETR (2000b) Hazardous Substances Consent; a Guide for Industry, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions: London.

Fiorino, D.J. (1990) ‘Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms’, Science, Technology and Human Values 15: 226–43.

Freudenberg, W.R. (1992) ‘Heuristics, Biases and the Not-so-General Publics: Expertise and Error in the Assessment of Risks’, in S. Krimsky and D. Golding (eds) Social Theories of Risk, Westport: Praeger.

Funtowicz, J.R. and S.O. Ravetz (1990) Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Funtowicz, J.R. and S.O. Ravetz (1993) ‘Science for the Post-normal Age’, Futures 25: 739–52.

Griffiths, R.F. and L.C. Megson (1984) ‘The Effect of Uncertainties in Human Toxic Response on Hazard Estimation for Ammonia and Chlorine’, Atmospheric Environment 18(6): 1195–206.

Health and Safety Commission (1984) Advisory Committee on Major Hazards: Third Report, London: HMSO. HSE (1978) Canvey: An Investigation of Potential Hazards from Operations in the Canvey Island/Thurrock Area, London: HMSO. HSE (1988) The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations, London: HMSO. HSE (1989a) Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning in the Vicinity of Major Industrial Hazards, London: HMSO. HSE (1989b) Quantified Risk Assessment: Its Input into Decision Making, London: HMSO. HSE (2005) Explanatory Memorandum to the Control of Major Accident Hazards (Amendment) Regulations 2005. (viewed on www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/SI 2005) Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (1996) Use of Risk Assessment within Government Departments, London: HSE. IFRLUP, (2005b) HSE’s Implementation of the Fundamental Review of Land Use Planning. IFRLUP Newsletter, Issue No 4, Autumn 2005. (see www.hse.gov.uk/ landuseplanning/ifrlup/index.htm)

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Jasanoff, S. (1991) ‘Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society’, in D.G. Mayo and R.D. Hollander (eds) Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Krimsky, S. and D. Golding (eds) (1992) Social Theories of Risk, Westport: Praeger.

Lewis, L.E.J. and M.R. Hayns (1989) ‘Limitations on the Usefulness of Risk Assessment’, Risk Analysis 9(4): 483–94.

Mayo, D.G. (1991) ‘Sociological versus Metascientific Views of Risk Assessment’, in D.G. Mayo and R.D. Hollander (eds) Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

National Research Council (1983) Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process, Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

O’Riordan, T. (1996) ‘Exploring the Role of Civic Science in Risk Management’, in C. Hood and D.K. Jones (eds) Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management, London: UCL Press.

Otway, H. (1992) ‘Public Wisdom, Expert Fallibility: Towards a Contextual Theory of Risk’, in S. Krimsky and D. Golding (eds) Social Theories of Risk, Westport: Praeger.

Petts, J. (1988) ‘Planning and Hazardous Installation Control’, Progress in Planning 29: 1–75.

Perrow, C. (1999) Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Pidgeon, N. (1996) ‘Participation and Risk Assessment’, in C. Hood and D.K. Jones (eds) Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management, London: UCL Press.

Remington, J.D. (1995) ‘A Social Regulator’s Use of Science’, Transactions of the Institute of Chemical Engineers 73(B4), Supplement: S5–S7.

Royal Society (1992) Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, London: Royal Society.

Royal Society Study Group (1983) Risk Assessment, London: Royal Society.

Snowball, D.J. and S.M. Macgill (1984) ‘Coping with Risk: The Case of Gas Facilities in Scotland’, Environment and Planning C 2: 343–60.

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Toft, B. (1996) ‘Limits to the Mathematical Modelling of Disasters’, in C. Hood and D.K. Jones (eds) Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management, London: UCL Press.

Walker, G.P. (1989) ‘Risks, Rights and Secrets: Public Access to Information on Industrial Major Hazards’, Policy and Politics 17(3): 255–71.

Walker, G.P. (1995) ‘Land Use Planning, Industrial Hazards and the “COMAH” Directive’, Land Use Policy 12(3): 187–91.

Walker, G.P. and Bayliss, D. (1998) ‘Development Plans and Hazardous Installations’, Planning Practice and Research 13(1): 23–34.

Walker, G., Simmons, P., Wynne, B. and Irwin, A. (1998) Public Perception of Risks Associated with Major Accident Hazards, Sudbury: Health and Safety Executive Books.

Whipple, C. (1992) ‘Inconsistent Values in Risk Management’, in S. Krimsky and D. Golding (eds) Social Theories of Risk, Westport: Praeger.

Wynne, B. (1992) ‘Risk and Social Learning: Reification to Engagement’, in S. Krimsky and D. Golding (eds) Social Theories of Risk, Westport: Praeger.

Wynne, B. (1996) ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert–Lay Knowledge Divide’, in S. Lash, B. Szerszynski and B. Wynne (eds) Risk, Environment and Modernity, London: Sage.

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READING Risk criteria for land-use planning in the vicinity of major industrial hazards Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Inter-Relationship of Hazardous Substances Consent with Planning Permission and Other Controlsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (1992) From DETR Circular 4/2000, Planning Controls for Hazardous Substances, 31-36.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING ‘HSE’s Implementation of the Fundamental Review of Land Use Planning’ (2005) HSE Newsletter, IFRLUP, Issue No. 3, February 2005.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

UNIT 3 Command and Control of Major Public Gatherings

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Contents 3.1

Aims and Objectives of this Unit

3-5

3.2

Introduction

3-5

3.3

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

3-6

3.4

Public Event Policing

3-8

3.5

Standard Preparation and Leadership

3-9

3.6

Control Facilities

3-10

3.7

Training Facilities

3-11

3.8

The Role of Publicity and the Media

3-13

3.9

Notting Hill Carnival

3-15

3.10 Preparation

3-17

3.11 The Strategic Goal

3-17

3.12 The Partnership Approach to Planning and Tactics

3-18

3.13 Sectors and their Command

3-21

3.14 Training

3-21

3.15 The Carnival

3-22

3.16 Event Success or Failure

3-24

3.17 Conclusions

3-25

3.18 Guide to Reading

3-25

3.19 Further Reading

3-26

3.20 Study Questions

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3.21 Bibliography

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Readings

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3.1 Aims and Objectives of this Unit After reading this Unit, the student should have a detailed understanding of how a major police force prepares and executes a public safety and public order plan for a very large event — specifically the annual street carnival in Notting Hill, London, England. The Unit (from Section 3.2 to Section 3.17) has been written by a senior Metropolitan Police Officer (holding the rank of Commander) who has been intimately involved in preparing these plans. This person has been asked to speak on the subject of organising the policing of the Notting Hill Carnival on numerous occasions.

The readings are intended to illustrate the history of the Carnival, and the social context in which it takes place. It will be seen that the Notting Hill area of London has, in the past, experienced serious race relations problems. To one of the local groups involved in organising the Carnival, it came to be seen as a vehicle for black protest — a means of articulating social and economic frustrations and resentments (Pryce, in Goulbourne, 1990: 136—7). This put the police, representing the authority of the state, in an invidious position. Whatever it did, the MPS ran the risk of becoming the focus of either covert or overt abuse.

Given early antipathy between the MPS and Afro-Caribbean residents, it is important to understand how the MPS went about bridging the gap between police and community. A corporatist, consultative approach to policing, and the use of such tactics as ‘relative policing’ (explained in detail below) have all contributed to making the Notting Hill Carnival a more peaceful — although not entirely peaceful — feature of London’s summer event calendar. Of course, there are still political and economic frustrations within the black community, but today these are less likely to be (violently) expressed through the medium of Carnival.

3.2 Introduction The first part of this Unit will introduce the reader to the Metropolitan Police and the internal mechanisms which are in place to prepare the Service for policing large-scale public events. (Since this Unit was prepared in 1996 the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has increased in size and undergone organisational changes but the principles and issues discussed are still current) The second part will, through a detailed examination of the Notting Hill Carnival, show how these internal processes reach out into the community to the Local Authorities, London Underground Ltd, the other emergency services (who are heavily involved in supporting the event), local residents, Carnivalists, businesspeople and the public who attend.

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3.3 The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) The London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS or ‘Met’) was established in 1829 by Sir Robert Peel to deal with crime and disorder which proliferated in the central London area in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. In the interim 160 years it has developed into a police force with responsibility for the whole of Greater London, which includes the whole of the county of Middlesex, and parts of Essex, Hertfordshire, Surrey and Kent, together with a long stretch of the River Thames. The MPS is not responsible for the policing of the City of London, essentially the ‘business district’, which is also known as the Square Mile.

Therefore in addition to the provision of a police service to Central London, the MPS polices extensive urban areas in the suburbs and includes within its overall boundary two international airports, London (Heathrow) and the City Airport, situated in the East of Greater London.

The MPS is unlike any other police service in the UK in that the Commissioner (in command) reports through the Metropolitan Police Committee to the Home Secretary.

The Police Committee consists, at the present time, of Government appointees. In every other police force, the Chief Constable (in command of a geographic area) will report to a police committee consisting of a mixture of locally elected councillors representing both the ruling party and the opposition, together with local magistrates (Justices of the Peace, or JPs). The latter provide a degree of non-political involvement.

The MPS, led by the Commissioner, has 27,166 police officers of all ranks including detectives. To further assist the sworn police officers in the provision of service a further 16,000 full and part-time ‘civil staff’ personnel are employed. The annual budget for the MPS in 1996/7 was £1.954 million.

The MPS is a two-tier organisation, led by the strategic group, the Policy Board headed by the Commissioner, which directs the work of the Service through to Operational Command Units (OCU). To assist in the management of such a large organisation the MPS is divided into five geographic areas, with an additional Assistant Commissioner being deployed at New Scotland Yard to take overall responsibility for ‘Specialist Operations’, including organised crime and terrorist matters. Each area is commanded by an Assistant Commissioner, who is a member of the Policy Board.

Each area (including Specialist Operations) is further divided into OCUs, each commanded by a Superintendent; thus a member of the Policy Board has a direct responsibility for service delivery within his/her area.

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Greater London consists of 32 boroughs and each borough will comprise a variable number of OCUs, depending on geographic size, population, crime and other special features. While there are numerous ‘partnership’ opportunities which are being developed and refined between the police and the local authorities, the boroughs do not at present exercise any direct control over the police in the borough.

Each Assistant Commissioner is also responsible for specific areas of policy development, which is considered in committee, and adopted for service-wide introduction by the Policy Board. Thus Assistant Commissioners are responsible for the development of policy in the fields of Public Order, Vice and Licensing, Community Safety and Partnership, Criminal Justice, Criminal Investigation, 24-Hour Response, Service Delivery and Traffic, and Security and Protection.

The Policy Board is supported by a Strategic Co-ordination Dept, an Inspectorate and Quality Support Unit, Personnel, Finance, Technology, Property Services and Publicity Depts.

The MPS currently deals with approximately 841,000 crimes per year and about 20 percent are ‘solved’. The MPS responds to the government’s Key Objectives as does every other force in the UK. The MPS transposes the Key Objectives into a number of MPS Objectives, and during 1996/7 these included the need to devote significant resources to the prevention and detection of offences relating to terrorism, burglary (especially from people’s homes), street robberies (known as ‘mugging’) and robberies in business premises and a reduction in the supply of illegal drugs.

To these efforts must be coupled the MPS Objectives to provide ‘High Visibility Policing’ and to deliver Standards as defined in the MPS Charter (relating, inter alia, to the ability of the MPS to respond and attend to emergency calls made by the public within specific times).

The nature of both policing and public expectation within the MPS ensures that police officers deal not only with crime and traffic but also with a large number of the social and domestic problems which inevitably occur within a population of some 6.8 million, a number which is considerably inflated on a daily basis by commuters, business people and visitors.

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3.4 Public Event Policing London is the capital of the United Kingdom, the home of the monarch and the government. It is an international city judged from any viewpoint: commerce, business, finance, tourism, culture and shopping. It is the home of the Commonwealth Secretariat. The headquarters of numerous international businesses and organisations can be found there. It stages and supports many international events including conferences — governmental (Group of Seven, Presidency of the EU, Bosnia Peace Conferences), industrial, business, educational, church, sporting, social and cultural.

As the police in the capital city the Metropolitan Police have a special responsibility for the Embassies (the ending of the Iranian Embassy Siege has already been studied), High Commissions and Missions which represent foreign governments in London, together with their representatives.

Each and all of the above make special calls upon the MPS, which forms part of our corporate response to ‘Capital City Policing’.

On top of this must be included such ceremonial events as the Queen’s Birthday Parade (Trooping the Colour), the State Opening of Parliament, Remembrance Sunday, state visits by the heads of state from foreign governments. Other recurring events include international soccer, rugby and cricket matches. In addition there are a large number of marches, pickets, vigils and demonstrations which can be initiated by any individual who gives the necessary notice.

Thus the Metropolitan Police can find itself policing a small group of six persons who wish to protest about a matter of limited local significance to huge demonstrations and marches with many thousands of persons protesting about a matter of major national concern (the ‘Poll Tax’ (Community Charge), for example) or international events like the Vietnam War or, more recently, the war in Kuwait and Iraq (the ‘Gulf War’).

During the course of any single year there are many hundreds of public events, each of which will require a bespoke policing plan. About 400 of these will employ over one hundred police officers, while there are likely to be about 12 events where in excess of one thousand police officers will be deployed. Many of the events identified above are likely to be included in that dozen, to which must be added the New Year’s Eve celebrations in Trafalgar Square and the Notting Hill Carnival. Both of these annual events absorb considerable planning energy and personnel.

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3.5 Standard Preparation and Leadership Clearly a system has been designed and reviewed over the years which allows for the police preparation for these events to be broken down into component parts. Appendix A is just such a model. It presents the police with an organisational template which fits every event, while allowing freedom of actions within the general agenda. Preliminary work in connection with this agenda, initial information, meetings with organisers, early site visits and the collection of information and intelligence are usually undertaken by a junior officer, who will report to his/her OCU commander. The latter will then be in a position to assess the rank of the officer to command the event and police resources to be deployed.

In 1985 serious disorder broke out on a housing estate in Tottenham, North London.

This became known as the Broadwater Farm Riot. The MPS held a large-scale enquiry into its management of that event and one of the most important results was the establishment of a simple leadership chain to support public event policing, whether the event be large or small. The chain of command works within a system known as Gold, Silver, Bronze, where: a.

Gold is the officer in command and responsible for setting the strategy for the event;

b.

Silver is the forward or ground commander, responsibility for planning and implementing the tactics which will support the strategy; and

c.

Bronze, of whom there may be many more than one, who will have geographical or functional responsibility for the implementation of the tactics on the ground/ at the venue where the event is taking place.

There will be only one Gold for each event, which could be one single event taking place at one location in a short time (e.g. a soccer match), or it could be a series of meetings at several venues supporting an international conference. The venues may include the conference centre, various theatres used for entertainment, hotels used as residences, and meeting halls used by the media etc. for press conferences, together with journeys to be made. Gold will set the strategic policy for the entire event for which s/he is responsible.

Almost without exception s/he will be supported by one Silver, who will design a tactical plan to support the event, ensuring that it takes place in safe, secure conditions, and the business for which the event is to be held is conducted without disorder. Silver is able to call upon all the resources available to the MPS to support Goldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strategy, both in terms of personnel and equipment and will usually split the event into component parts which geographically will be known as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Sectorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

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To assist both Gold and Silver, each Sector will be commanded by a geographic Bronze appointed to implement the policing plan over their area of responsibility. This may be one part of a soccer stadium (e.g. outside the ground to control spectator arrival) or the route of a protest march. In terms of conferences Bronzes will probably be appointed to each principal venue, while another could have responsibility for security at the hotels and residences being used by the delegates on a 24-hour basis.

It will therefore be clear that there may be numerous Bronzes appointed, but each will report to and will make requests for resources through Silver. Silver will report the progress of the event to Gold and only in the event that the strategic plan is or is likely to be compromised should Gold interfere with the moment by moment management of the event.

While the strict organisational chain of command is well established, there is a clear need for other officers to have important roles to play. Prime among these would be the ‘Stewards Liaison Officer’ in respect of a march or demonstration, the ‘Contingency Planning Officer’ in respect of the Notting Hill Carnival, and the ‘Reserves Coordinator’. Although not geographic Bronzes, each has a direct responsibility to Silver for the provision of information, intelligence, specialist knowledge and resources which can be used, either to update progress, alert all parties, including those outside the police service (e.g. fire, ambulance, organisers, etc.), or be available for immediate deployment in the event that additional personnel or equipment is required.

3.6 Control Facilities A wide range of control facilities exists within the MPS and includes telephones, both land line and mobile, facsimile machines, group paging systems and radio, both in vehicles and personal issue. In addition the MPS makes use of extensive Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) opportunities, using both fixed sites within Central London or surrounding stadia and temporary sites made available for a single event. The product of the CCTV coverage is transmitted back to a control facility by micro-wave. Integral to this overview opportunity is the use of airborne CCTV, carried in a police helicopter. The signals are sent back both to Control and to Silver, the ground commander at the scene, who is able to receive the CCTV signal ‘in the street’ through a portable system the size of a large briefcase.

Small events are routinely controlled from either police stations, bespoke control rooms at the larger stadia or from specially equipped vehicles either on the route or at a venue. Larger events are controlled from the Special Operations Room at New Scotland Yard, where dedicated facilities exist to command and control up to three major events

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at any one time. (In 1996 the facility was used by three Golds to command three separate events which were taking place simultaneously in different parts of London, i.e. Trooping the Colour, the Derby horse race at Epsom and an England v Scotland soccer match at Wembley.)

The establishment of this facility is aimed at preventing Bronze(s) from setting up small controls to overview events on their Sectors, thus ensuring that both Silver and Gold are fully aware of the ‘whole picture’ at all times. It also ensures that all resourcing is undertaken from a central point and that priorities are determined by or on behalf of Silver. Control forms a vital part of any operation and the larger and more unpredictable the event, the greater the need for tight control over all the resources deployed, together with a tried and trusted mechanism for obtaining further personnel and material as necessary.

3.7 Training Facilities Officers occupying command positions in respect of public events will all be members of the Public Order Cadre. Each will have attended the requisite courses both at the Metropolitan Police Public Order Training Centre (POTC) at Hounslow in west London (near Heathrow Airport) or at ‘workshop’ weekends held to consider both strategy and tactics relating to various case studies.

At POTC officers will work their way through both standard and advanced courses.

Each course has a legal and practical base. Opportunities are given for officers to plan events. After the planning process has taken place those officers can test their plans on a computer system which allows a high level of realism to be introduced, as the instructional staff test both the strategy and the tactics deployed. This allows the student to consider whether the tactics were suitable, whether or not sufficient resources were deployed and whether contingencies (‘what ifs’) had been properly considered.

Subsequent to this training, an opportunity is then given to produce, within this training environment, a policing plan for an ‘event’, where the problems, demonstrators, and disorder are real. The officer will be expected to produce a plan, brief his or her colleagues, execute the plan and de-brief colleagues after the event has taken place. POTC allows for a high degree of realism and is constructed rather like a film set with streets, buildings, street lights, bridges and open spaces. It provides a true test of training and ability, not to mention courage as ‘demonstrators’ (usually colleagues) will throw wooden blocks and petrol bombs at officers engaged in the exercise.

University of Leicester

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

For truly major events which are notified well in advance (the Notting Hill Carnival being the best example) an opportunity is taken to both train and ‘team build’ using the Minerva computer training suite, situated at the Met’s Hendon Police Training College in north London.

Minerva provides an interactive computer-based training opportunity, where Gold, Silver and the Bronzes can ‘see’ on TV incidents taking place which require a response, either urgent or over a longer time-period. The training takes place against the background of real Carnival sounds, which makes communication both by radio and in conversation difficult and in some cases impossible. The computer film allows officers to ‘walk through the crowd at Carnival’, witness incidents and call for assistance in real time. They are required to consider the various options available, make decisions and see the results of those decisions screened in front of them. As in many arenas of policing, communication soon becomes the key issue. This training opportunity makes officers aware of the noise of Carnival, the real time decisions which may have to be made against the background of the needs of Carnivalists, the public, other emergency services and various agencies, including the local councils.

While leadership and management training is afforded to ‘senior officers’, Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors, who will form the backbone of the officers deployed to physically implement and support the tactical intention also receive additional training at POTC. While much of their work relates to training in the use of tactical options which can be used to deal with serious public disorder, considerable efforts are made to train officers to ‘talk down’ situations as part of the ongoing officer safety programme.

Officers trained at POTC will be competent to work as part of a team (called a Police Service Unit (PSU) or Serial consisting of one Inspector, three Sergeants and 21 Constables) in a variety of differing circumstances, e.g. crowd entry tactics, arrest tactics when confronted by large crowds, dealing with a person who is mentally ill in a house or similarly restricted conditions. They will each be issued with a variety of protective equipment. They will train with and be supported at the scene of public disorder by the Mounted Branch, photographers and information and evidence gatherers.

Thus the objective of providing an integrated training opportunity for the most senior officers likely to command public order events right down to the Constables who will physically confront the challenges presented is achieved.

University of Leicester

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

3.8 The Role of Publicity and the Media The role of the media cannot be overstated in all phases of any public event. It can naturally be divided into two major sections: a. publicity; and b. news.

Each of these aspects can be divided into three phases: a. pre-event; b. during the event; and c. post event.

Each phase is, in a different way, as important as the other. The MPS recognises the value of a well-briefed and co-ordinated â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Department of Public Affairsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (DPA) department, staffed exclusively by members of the civil staff. These people respond daily to the hundreds of requests in respect of news stories, feature articles and general questions, as well as structuring our publicity and information drives (for example, information about Operation Bumblebee, a crackdown on burglary). They also have and share a vitally important role in respect of pre-planned events.

It would be usual, as soon as an event is notified, to enlist the services of the DPA to arrange and ensure that mundane but important matters such as general public information is made known through the media, radio, television, local and national press. In the case of large events it is quite usual to deploy a middle to senior officer (Chief Inspector/Superintendent) to work with the DPA representative and be available for broadcasts, in person and in uniform. In this manner the MPS would hope to ensure that the general messages we wish to put across to the public receive wide publicity. These are best exemplified by two events: a. Notting Hill Carnival, where the general message is one of public safety, emphasising how busy the area becomes, linked to a strong crime prevention message relating to the wearing of jewellery, bringing valuables with you, carrying handbags etc.; and b. New Years Eve, where there is no formal organiser, therefore the MPS ensures that the public are aware that the weather will be cold, there is no formal entertainment, and there is basically nothing to do apart from joining many thousands of others â&#x20AC;&#x201D; doing nothing. Clearly messages are adapted to suit the event, the expected interest group and to try to ensure that as little inconvenience as possible is caused to others, e.g. residents and visitors to London for business or pleasure.

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It is in the pre-event phase in which a number of contingencies are discussed, together with possible publicity threats and opportunities.

While an event is in progress, it is usually wise to have a DPA Press Officer available together with the nominated police officer. In the absence of a dedicated officer another would usually be nominated to ‘front the media’ if requested, although on occasions this is done by a civilian ‘police spokesperson’ from DPA, who will have consulted Gold before formally commenting.

For truly major events the Gold usually arranges regular updates both in the form of interview and written updates. Clearly for any event that is likely to take place over a number of days it will be vital to provide regular updates at significant times. It is no use calling a Press Conference at 5.45 p.m., during one major news broadcast and 15 minutes before the next. The MPS tries to be aware of the needs of the media, particularly during the course of any dynamic operation.

Post-event reports could range from a short summary placed in DPA for transmission to the various agencies on an ‘if asked’ basis, through to a number of interviews with the Designated Press Officer. It is an important part of the work of the police service to thank the public who attended if behaviour was good, identify minority behaviour and explain police action, as necessary.

The media will be particularly interested in any police activity which they perceive to be ‘outside the norms’ of traditional police deployments, i.e. the use of officers wearing protective overall, the mounted branch, special equipment on the helicopter — Skyshout (public address systems) or Nightsun (a high powered search-light). The deployment of female officers in command positions or the carriage of firearms is still the subject of particular comment and question, although neither is any longer a rarity.

It is considered most important to be able to make a firm and realistic comment on events. The MPS endeavours not to hide behind the ‘no comment’ or ‘sub-judice’ rule.

Only in remarkably rare cases will the MPS not be able to comment upon the activity, and while it may be difficult to speak directly and specifically about an individual detail, there is no reason why a good broad overview of activities cannot be provided.

It is sometimes difficult to imagine the pressure placed upon the Service by the media, but it would not be unusual for the designated officer to give up to 20 separate interviews to radio and television stations post-event, especially if any matters provoking comment or controversy were identified.

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It has often been stated that the media would not exist in the United Kingdom if it were not for the fact that they report so many â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;police casesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. It should be clearly understood that, in respect of event policing, in all its phases, the MPS would be seen as unprepared, unconvincing and open to widespread criticism in all facets of the operation if we did not actively seek the assistance of the media and consistently demonstrate a willingness to appreciate their needs and deadlines.

3.9 Notting Hill Carnival The August Bank Holiday weekend of 1996 saw the 31st Notting Hill Carnival take place around the streets of Notting Hill and North Kensington, essentially a small residential area within the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the City of Westminster.

The Carnival began in 1965 as the Notting Hill Festival and Pageant, a street festival of people dancing to the music of steel bands. In fairness, at that time there was very little need for formal organisation. The Festival was initially a celebration of West Indian culture by the first generation immigrants who had settled in the Notting Hill area â&#x20AC;&#x201D; although early events were organised by white community workers (see Pryce, in Goulbourne, 1990: 131). The event remained essentially local for several years and in 1969 was attended by only about 3,500 people.

The 1970s saw the Carnival grow and the area which it occupied grew with it (Pryce in Goulbourne: 131). But it remained a street Carnival, without true form or shape.

By 1974, however, the event had moved to the August Bank Holiday weekend and some 150,000 were estimated to have attended on the Monday. Fears were expressed by the police that the event was now too large for the thoroughfares, that crimes might be committed and a large-scale breakdown in public order might occur. (Because of such fears, the authorities had tried to relocate the Carnival to the White City Stadium in Shepherds Bush, west London.)

In 1976 just such a circumstance occurred, resulting in large-scale disorder and in injury to 400 police officers and 200 members of the public. Interestingly the disorder seemed to be aimed directly at police officers in an apparent attempt to prevent them from arresting people committing serious offences: robbery, theft and assault.

The early 1980s saw the crowds attending continue to grow. Crime and the threat of disorder were real and for several years there existed an uneasy balance between revel and disorder. By 1985 the Carnival was the biggest annual event planned and policed by the MPS. Crowds attending in 1985 were in the region of 650,000.

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

In 1987 there were once again disturbances with police tackling five seats of disorder.

The following morning the officer in command (now the Commissioner of the MPS, Sir Paul Condon) expressed the view that ‘society as a whole must decide if the criminal side of Carnival was too high a price to pay for the fun side’.

Controversy raged on many sides, but as a consequence of public interest a document was produced entitled ‘The Way Forward’ which suggested four options for the future.

From this document came the Six Guiding Principles which broadly hold good to this day. The strategic aim was to improve public safety, and the Principles suggested that this should be achieved by controlling a number of facets; the route, street trading, alcohol, sound systems, road closures and close-down times. The proposals found support among the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Police Consultative Group, and formed the basis for all future negotiations with the organisers.

The Principles were introduced in 1988, with considerable reservation from many people, but the Carnival was heralded as a success, with crime down by 92 percent compared to 1987 and large numbers continuing to attend.

Subsequent to this watershed year, progress has continued to be made. The present organisers, Notting Hill Carnival Ltd., in liaison with other ‘partner’ groups, have seen the Carnival continue to attract more and more people. The result of this was that the police placed ‘public safety’ at the top of their agenda, together with other statutory agencies and the London Underground Ltd. (LUL).

In 1993 the MPS commissioned an independent company to review the arrangements relating to safety issues at the Carnival. The results were incorporated as part of a comprehensive review, with the result that new structures were introduced in 1994.

The 1996 Carnival saw about 250,000 attend on the Sunday, traditionally known as the Children’s Day, while about 800,000 attended on the Bank Holiday Monday. This is now the largest street event in the United Kingdom, and probably within Europe. Those attending to view the parade and listen to the sound systems represent the ‘world community’. The participants are mainly, but certainly not exclusively, Afro-Caribbean.

The difference between 1996 and the mid-1970s to mid-1980s is that the route and direction of travel is agreed, stewards and route managers are deployed by NCL, although this still remains an area requiring augmentation, the sound systems occupy agreed positions, the street traders occupy licensed pitches, and the food traders attend ‘food handling’ courses run by the local authority. There are agreed close-down times for both sound systems and those on the routes, and while crime does take place, and is investigated and detected, the police place far greater emphasis on public safety.

Improvements continue to be made as the result of negotiation on an annual basis and through a rolling programme of meetings and partnership liaison.

University of Leicester

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

The cost to the MPS varies year by year as additional resources, both personnel and technical, are added or withdrawn. The 1996 Carnival saw the deployment of about 7,000 police officers and members of the civil staff over the whole period at a total cost of almost £3 million.

3.10 Preparation For the MPS, preparation for Carnival is an all-year planning opportunity, beginning in the autumn when the de-brief reports and costings are obtained from the Carnival recently concluded. In addition a well-publicised public meeting is also held at which all members of the local communities, residential, business, as well as Carnivalists, can express a view on recent events. All of the above will guide strategy, tactics and thoughts for the forthcoming Carnival, some ten months away.

The MPS will appoint Gold and Silver at this early stage. It is very likely that both will have had some considerable experience at previous Carnivals, most probably in a Bronze or specialist leadership role.

Bronze sector commanders, with geographic responsibility for one of the five areas within the Carnival will then be appointed, together with specialist Bronzes, i.e. Bronze Traffic, Bronze Mounted Branch, the Police Reserves Co-ordinator, the Contingency Planning Officer , the Control Room Controller and the Police Media Representative.

This group will meet early in the new year and will determine the strategic goal, the strategy to achieve this and high-level tactics.

3.11 The Strategic Goal In 1996, after due consideration, the strategic goal was specified as: ‘A Safe and Troublefree Carnival’.

The strategy chosen to achieve this goal was: •

taking into account the concerns of the local residents;

•

working in partnership with all key agencies;

•

focusing police action to achieve goals of safety, the maintenance of the Queen’s Peace and the prevention and detection of crime;

•

providing an appropriate and effective policing response to any given circumstance.

University of Leicester

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

While not bound by the contents, there is value in Gold being aware of the advice given in the ‘Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Pop Concerts and Similar Events’.

This comprehensive document deals with events such as the Reading and Glastonbury Pop Festivals and contains much useful information relating to the establishment of a safety philosophy and a safe environment.

3.12 The Partnership Approach to Planning and Tactics The overall intention is to ensure that each Bronze commander fully understands his/ her role and responsibilities, that these are then devolved and briefed to the lowest possible level.

High-level tactics agreed at this first meeting identify certain pan-Carnival tactics which every Bronze must agree, e.g. policing style, the establishment of the Traffic Exclusion Zone (TEZ), establishment of Safety Zones, the preservation of certain routes on the perimeter and into the heart of Carnival which will allow access to emergency vehicles.

Decisions will also be taken in respect of the need for a bespoke briefing video, eventually to be seen by all officers working within the Carnival operation. Usually a theme is set, which highlights team-work, fully explains the strategy and high-level tactics, the extent of each sector and broad policy matters, including and highlighting the fact that Carnival is very popular, and that the Met is there to support the needs of the public. The intention is to ensure that every officer on duty fully understands his/ her role within Carnival and where each fits into the overall plan.

The Sector Commanders (Bronzes) are charged with designing their own tactics to support the strategy. When designing their plan they make recommendations in respect of the personnel needed to accomplish their task.

At a subsequent meeting each Bronze explains their plan to colleagues in order that they feel comfortable with each other and to ensure that there are no areas of overlap or special difficulty identified. Clearly it could not be the case, for instance, where two Sectors intend to evacuate towards each other. Such difficulties are overcome months before the event.

Each Bronze undertakes to support ‘relative policing’, i.e. no more police than are necessary are to be deployed at any one time. Their plans identify access, egress and ‘pinch points’ and carefully consider, as part of their planning process, whether any building or environmental change to the area, or change in the overall policing plan, the route, siting of principal sound systems or other features need to be taken into account, either in the production of their plan, the personnel required or the technical equipment to be deployed in support.

University of Leicester

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

As time goes forward the plans become more focused. That focus increasingly points towards the ‘Carnival Office’, a small team of two police officers who have the responsibility for servicing not only the needs of Gold and the Strategy Group, but also the physical preparation of the operation in liaison with other groups mentioned below.

Prime among the Met’s partners are those whom we meet at the Liaison Group, representatives from the Local Authority, the residents, Carnivalists, the emergency services, including St John Ambulance (a voluntary first-aid organisation), the London Underground Ltd. (which runs the capital’s ‘tube’ network), the British Transport Police and, most importantly, Notting Hill Carnival Ltd. Within this group the broad protocols for Carnival are agreed, including closing time for both costume bands and mobile sound systems, as well as static sound systems.

The provision of stewards is agreed, together with the important details which are the responsibility of other agencies, e.g. the provision of toilets, street signs, opening hours for the underground stations. Over many years this group has provided a wide focus for all who have a role within the Carnival area.

Within the MPS, the internal Working Party will begin its work. This group, led by Silver, will determine what equipment is required to support both the Strategy and the Tactics to be employed at Carnival.

The MPS will take over a number of schools, to house, brief and feed the officers on duty. Coach parks need to be established to accommodate police transport, including fleets of hired coaches. Arrangements have to be made to provide and service up to 30 CCTV cameras deployed to monitor crowd safety and criminal opportunity. The Metropolitan Police Catering Service will produce menus for breakfasts, lunches and dinners to feed the officers as they come on duty, as well as providing a full snack during the course of their tour of duty. Portacabins (mobile, temporary accommodation) will be required to house ‘crime reporting and advice’ centres, others will provide a CCTV control facility on the hard shoulder of the (A40) elevated road, which runs directly over the top of Carnival. ‘Dot Matrix’ boards will need to be deployed to provide public information in respect of the progress of Carnival, safety messages, times of trains, etc.

The list of requirements is almost endless. For example, once a school is hired, hardboard is laid to accommodate the tramp of police officers boots, the kitchens must be ‘deepcleaned’, infant sized tables and chairs removed and adult furniture introduced. Large amounts of communications equipment are set up, personal radios, facsimile machines and telephones. Briefing rooms need to be established with video, overhead projectors and ‘power point’ (computer-based presentation techniques) opportunities.

The task of the Working Party which is vital to success, is again based on the experience of needs and works on the maxim: ‘If you don’t ask for it — it won’t be there.’

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

The other various interested parties, will make their own arrangements, large or small.

None will be larger nor more complicated than those made by London Underground Ltd. and the British Transport Police (BTP).

The Carnival is served basically by two underground (‘tube’) stations, while a third, Ladbroke Grove, in the heart of Carnival remains closed for safety reasons. It is essential that the Geographic Bronze commander in each of the sectors ‘owning’ a station is fully familiar with the plans of LUL and BTP, and is aware of the contingency plans to deal with anything untoward at the stations, both of which have significant structural and design differences.

One, Notting Hill Gate, is a deep underground station. Access to the surface from the platforms is by escalator, and great care needs to be taken to ensure that the platforms and the supporting infrastructure (e.g. the booking hall) do not become overfilled. As a result the underground police and the surface police need a very comprehensive series of options and plans to cater for various contingencies which differ significantly at various times of the day, best exemplified by mass arrivals, followed some hours later by mass departures.

The second, Westbourne Park, is a surface station which until 1995 had a particularly narrow and (adjudged) dangerous access/egress. As a result LUL built a new exit for alighting passengers and achieved a complete separation of arrivals and departures. This significantly reduced danger to the public and the threat of conflict born of frustration as people struggled to enter or leave, despite the best efforts of LUL employees and the police.

It is quite possible that on the Monday of Carnival the LUL will transport half a million people into and out of the area.

The responsibility for co-ordinating the work of other emergency services belongs to the Contingency Planning Officer. S/he, under the auspices of the ‘Safety Advisory Sub-Group’, is responsible for bringing together the London Ambulance Service, the London Fire Brigade, the Local Authorities, the Ambulance Service and the BTP. Their remit is to specifically address the topic of public safety, and to make recommendations and formulate proposals to the Liaison Group (above).

This officer will also produce a ‘Public Safety Strategy Document’ and a ‘Major Incident Plan’.

The former identifies the threats to be found within the Carnival area and the steps taken to reduce the risk. Bronze Sector Commanders will pay particular attention to the contents when determining the deployment of their staff. The latter is a comprehensive document which brings together all aspects of dealing with major incidents, of any kind, but focused on the Carnival. It provides a comprehensive checklist of the needs of everybody liable to be involved from the Coroner to the media, from survivor-reception to hospital liaison.

University of Leicester

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

3.13 Sectors and their Command The geographic area of the Notting Hill Carnival is divided into five sectors. The number of sectors is reviewed on an annual basis but over a number of years it is the number which the police service feels most comfortable with. It is quite usual for small detailed changes to be made each year. The intention, when the present sector system was designed, was to ensure that each sector had a part of the Carnival route for which it was responsible — thus avoiding an island-site situation which had previously obtained. It is thought that if each sector has a part of the route and external perimeter of the Carnival area, there may be a better chance of organising an evacuation from an individual sector, as well as on an integrated basis, especially from sensitive areas within the heart of Carnival, typically All Saints Road and the entertainment areas beneath the Westway (A40 roadway).

Consideration has been given in the past to the need to sectorise, and to the strengths and weaknesses of this geographic division. The fact is that the total area and the event is too large and complex for one individual to control. The intention and strength of sectoring is to ensure that appropriate levels of both command and control can be exercised throughout the whole of the Carnival area, with each of the five Sector Command Teams (led by a Bronze, of Superintendent rank) able to determine their policing requirement on a minute-by-minute basis. The provision of ‘rest centres’ for the police officers on or near to each sector means that the philosophy of ‘relative policing’ can be anticipated, monitored and adjusted locally. Anticipation is the great key to success, as it takes police officers considerable time to move through the dense crowds. Clearly there is no wish to routinely deploy officers through heavy crowds at anything other than walking pace and therefore the intention is to anticipate problems, based on a series of criteria, including history, the weather, the names of any particular music group which may be appearing, and many more.

3.14 Training The importance of training was highlighted in the first part of this Unit and both Minerva and the facilities of the POTC are used to great effect in the weeks preceding the event. Minerva is able to expose Bronze commanders and their team to a large number of occurrences in a relatively short time. Thus officers deal with and report on a large number of scenarios, which can include a missing child, a personal injury accident involving a carnival float, a man falling from a roof-top, a drug arrest, a firearm incident and a major stage collapse.

University of Leicester

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

On each occasion various decisions have to be made — additional resources need to be requested and brought forward using specific routes, information circulated to colleagues in order that the Carnival route can be broken, the Carnival halted and stewards and organisers informed.

Reassurance is required that designated routes are open, ambulances and fire engines have been deployed, areas evacuated and the media informed. The list is almost endless.

However, after some three hours of such activity each sector commander will have exercised a number of general plans and maybe one or two which are specific to their sector.

Meanwhile additional training is taking place at POTC involving other officers in specific ‘crowd entry tactics’ in the event that a swift entry is required into any particular part of Carnival for rescue purposes or to deal with minor instances of disorder.

Similarly other officers are refreshed in respect of other public order skills relating to isolation and containment of troublemakers or indeed dispersal, should that tactic be needed. However, it has long been noted by the Metropolitan Police that due to the density of the crowd, dispersal of troublemakers would not be a viable option until late into the evening, long after most people have left the area. Therefore some exercises do take place at night.

Thus all the pieces of an amazingly complicated jigsaw are put into place.

3.15 The Carnival The Carnival really takes place on the streets over three days, beginning on the Saturday night with ‘Panorama’ — the steel band competition. This event takes place in the north of the Carnival area, is a very pleasant occasion and generally very lightly policed, the geographic Bronze taking command of the event. In essence the Traffic Police isolate an area for the event to take place, using only one main street and a part of a park known as Horniman’s Pleasance. It always starts and finishes late.

Gold and/or Silver will usually attend as it gives an early indication of the ‘mood’ of Carnival and reintroduces the officers to the sights and sounds.

However, on the Sunday morning policing starts early, usually with the traffic division imposing a ‘Traffic Exclusion Zone’ around the area. Local residents will have been made aware of this area by way of a leaflet drop some time previously and the zone is widely advertised in the local press, on Carnival ‘flyers’, radio, TV, sponsors’ publications, etc.

Every effort is made to ensure that the residents are not unduly inconvenienced, but some inconvenience is inevitable. Vehicle removal units (which consist of trucks with cranes University of Leicester

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that can lift cars off the street and transport them away, usually to a car pound) are deployed to ensure that dedicated routes remain open and available for use by the emergency services if called forward. The only vehicles permitted to enter the Carnival area should be those actually associated with the Carnival: floats, sound systems, vendors, etc.

The second primary task for the Traffic Police is to try to ensure that the rest of the traffic in West London continues to flow throughout the whole of the Bank Holiday weekend.

Three primary routes into and out of London adjoin or run close to the Carnival area.

The police personnel build-up for Carnival is like Carnival itself, slow and progressive.

The intention is to have the most officers on the streets or available from mid-afternoon until mid to late evening. More officers will be deployed on the Monday, which is traditionally much busier, than on Sunday.

The physical location of Silver differs from his/her classic role of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Forward Commanderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

This would normally find him/her positioned at the seat of a demonstration or with a march and available to personally respond to events as they unfold. Such scenarios can easily be envisaged where Silver can see the whole of an event, e.g. at a stadium or Trafalgar Square or a reasonably sized march. The Carnival cannot be similarly assessed, and with the potential for events requiring an organised and measured police response liable to occur anywhere, Silver will co-locate with Gold in the Special Operations Room at New Scotland Yard.

From here Silver will run the high-level tactics, providing support to the geographic Bronzes, who are responsible for the provision of any initial response, calling for additional resources as required. Silver receives information from a variety of sources, including CCTV, RT, as well as situation reports from individual officers and Sector Commanders. LUL provide details on the numbers of travellers. Organisers, community interveners, the St John Ambulance and the Local Authorities will also be providing information which helps to make up the big picture of what is taking place across the whole area. From all of this Silver will gauge whether or not the police response, overall as well as specifically, is appropriate.

Points of difficulty and tension will rise and fall during the course of both days. Prime among these will be the numbers of persons attending overall, the numbers passing through the underground stations, the potential for crushing at the various stages and sound systems, any need to halt the Carnival procession, the reported presence of gangs of criminals (street robbers, muggers), alleged firearm incidents and a variety of contingencies both predicted and otherwise â&#x20AC;&#x201D; gas/water leaks, for example. One of the most dangerous circumstances in recent years proved to be a torrential shower of rain which arrived without notice, caused panic among people rushing for shelter and crushing in shop doorways as others sought shelter.

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MSc in Emergency Planning Management

The generality of both the high level and sector tactics supports most of the above, but regular command team meetings check for strengths and weaknesses as the event unfolds.

Silver is able from his/her central position to have a constant overview of priorities.

Gold is able to retain a higher view of the event, ensuring that the tactics being deployed continue to support the strategic goal which has been set. Only in the event that, for whatever reason, there was a need to change the strategy would Gold need to impose himself/herself on the policing plan. S/he does remain in a position to offer advice and guidance to Silver.

S/he is also able to constantly check to ensure that all lines of communication, both internal and external, remain open and that all parties remain aware of the facts surrounding the event. All Sector Commanders, as well as Silver and Gold remain aware of the need to ensure that all officers and those taking part in the Carnival are up to date with proceedings and that rumour and inaccuracies are not allowed to develop and spread. It is of the utmost strategic importance that any false information be dealt with swiftly, as rumour quickly becomes exaggerated and can alter the mood of any event, but especially Carnival very quickly.

So the event proceeds to a conclusion sometime around midnight on the Bank Holiday Monday, to be followed by a mammoth effort by the local authorities to clean the streets ready for â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;business as usualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; on the Tuesday.

3.16 Event Success or Failure The philosophy of event policing cannot be based on simple success or failure. Clearly at Carnival each year a number of crimes do occur, a number of people do seek assistance from First Aid or are conveyed to hospital having suffered some form of injury. Success has a much wider connotation to the police service, which revolves around whether or not the general public, residents, persons attending and those taking part consider the event to have been a success. The criteria for evaluating the success of the event, therefore, includes public satisfaction.

Crime figures alone do not tell the story of Carnival, nor does the presence or absence of disorder. It would seem to be a fact that over time larger and larger crowds continue to attend. The Carnival is on the international map, with visitors coming from all over Europe just for that weekend and specifically to visit it. If the clock were to be turned back to the 1970s and 1980s, with the threat of disorder high on the agenda the undoubted popularity of the event would have long ago waned.

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The Metropolitan Police do not organise the Carnival or other public events, marches, demonstrations, etc., but they do assume a very high-profile support role as each takes place on the streets of London, for which the Met does have a heavy responsibility.

However, ‘partnership’ with other agencies grows and continues to improve.

The strategic goal, usually relating to the Maintenance of the Queen’s Peace, and other matters which we set for ourselves, is, without complacency, generally achieved.

3.17 Conclusions Command and Control at Major Public Gatherings is a complicated topic. Events unfold in London at great speed and occasionally with limited or no notice. The Metropolitan Police Service needs to ensure that it has in place a series of strategic and tactical options, well known to sufficient senior and middle ranking officers. These officers are then able to respond immediately using well-tried planning, briefing, implementation and execution processes, backed by the ability to assess and refine those processes both while the event is taking place and afterwards as part of a ‘slowtime’ de-brief opportunity.

The training provided and the systems in place ensure that events in slow or quick time, dignified or disorderly, can be accommodated with equal facility, while the Metropolitan Police Service, as a whole, continues to achieve the Objectives which have been set for it by central government.

Finally it must be remembered that Public Event Policing is not the whole job. It is undertaken as part of the total role of the office of Constable.

3.18 Guide to Reading In Reading 1, two chapters are reproduced. The first, from Black British, White British (Hiro, 1973), details some of the early race-related disturbances in the Notting Hill area of London. The second, from Black Politics in Britain, (Goulbourne, ed., 1990) describes, from a sociological standpoint, the background to, nature and significance of the major street disturbances of 1976 for the black population of London.

Reading 2 is two pages reproduced from the MPS staff newspaper ‘The Job’. This article gives a police officer’s view of the 2004 Carnival.

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3.19 Further Reading Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (1999) The Event Safety Guide: A Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Music and Similar events, Sudbury: HSE Books Knobil, M. (1996) Images of the Carnival, London: Exel Logistics Media Services.

ISBN 0-9528153-0-3 Waddington, P.A.J. (1994) Liberty and Order, London: UCL Press. 1-85728-226-4 HB

3.20 Study Questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University.

1.

With regard to the policing of large street celebrations, how important is ‘live’ pre-event training (of the kind offered at the Met’s POTC)?

2.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of computer-based training programs like the Met’s Minerva system?

3.

Can it ever be right to evaluate the success of a Carnival policing operation on the basis of how much the public enjoyed the event?

3.21 Bibliography Goulbourne, H. (ed.) (1990) Black Politics in Britain, Aldershot: Avebury.

Health and Safety Commission (HSC) (1993) Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Pop Concerts and Similar Events, London: HMSO. Hiro, D. (1973) Black British, White British, Harmondsworth: Pelican.

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READING ‘Race Riots’ (1973) In Black British, White British, p36-42.

‘Culture from below’ (1990) In Black Politics in Britain, p130-148.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Notting Hill is a smooth operationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; From the MPS staff newspaper, The Job.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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UNIT 4 Managing LowIntensity Crises

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Contents 4.1

Aims and Objectives of this Unit

4-5

4.2

Introduction

4-5

4.3

Types of Crisis and Disaster

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4.4

‘Low-Intensity’ vs Event-Based (‘Conventional’) Emergencies

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4.4.1 Conventional’ Emergencies

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4.4.2 ‘Low-Intensity’ Crises

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4.4.3 Types of Low-Intensity Crisis

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4.5

Examples of Low-Intensity Crises

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4.6

Case Study 1: Rabies

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4.6.1 Features of Rabies

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4.6.2 Organisational Involvement

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4.7

Case Study 2: The 1996 E. coli 0157 Outbreak in Central Scotland

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4.7.1 Introduction

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4.7.2 Background and Nature of the Problem

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4.7.3 The 1996 Central Scotland Outbreak

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4.7.4 Chronology of the Outbreak (Based on Pennington, 1997 Chapter 2)

4.8

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4.7.5 Casualties and Demands on Medical Services

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4.7.6 Difficulties Encountered in Controlling the Outbreak

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4.7.7 Perception of the Problem

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4.7.8 Role Reversal

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4.7.9 Postscript

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Features of Low-Intensity Crises

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4.8.1 Recognition

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4.8.2 Scale

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4.8.3 Timescale

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4.8.4 Isomorphism

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4.8.5 Cost

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4.9

Conclusion

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4.9.1 Involvement

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4.9.2 Recognition of a Low-Level Crisis

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4.9.3 News Media Pressures

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4.9.4 Role Reversal

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4.10 Guide to Reading

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4.11 Study Questions

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4.12 Bibliography

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Readings

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4.1 Aims and Objectives of this Unit Module 1 started with a discussion on Theories of Risk and Crisis. This Unit is intended to develop theories of crisis, and consider the practical implications. In particular, it is intended to consider a crisis situation which differs fundamentally from the conventional ‘emergency’ in that there is not a recognisable incident location, and the problems which must be coped with can be widely diffused, both geographically and over time. The term coined for this type of problem is a ‘Low Intensity Crisis’.

Two main case studies are used. The first is the management of an outbreak of rabies – a theoretical crisis for which many organisations have already made contingency plans. The second is a case study of an actual crisis – the 1996 E. coli 0157 outbreak in Central Scotland.

By the end of this Unit and associated reading you should: •

recognise the possibilities of different scales and intensities of crises and disasters;

•

be able to identify the particular features of a ‘low intensity’ crisis or disaster;

•

recognise the need to match team membership (in terms of participating organisations) to the problem in hand.

4.2 Introduction Before considering the ‘low-intensity’ aspect, it is first necessary to re-examine what is understood by ‘crisis’ and ‘disaster’. This involves a review of the theoretical perspectives of Module 1, and their application to actual situations.

A straight dictionary definition of ‘crisis’ sees it as a ‘turning point, especially of disease, time of danger, or suspense in politics, commerce, etc.’ (COD, 1982) The historical medical connotation is interesting in that it refers back to the days before antibiotics, where treatment of a life-threatening fever was a case of making the patient as comfortable as possible, and waiting. As the fever progressed, the patient’s body temperature would rise, and a point would come (the crisis) when either the fever would break, and the patient would recover, or the body would be unable to cope, and the patient would die.

At a crisis point, there is a very real danger that things could go wrong, and the outcome could be failure. There is one optimistic aspect to this, in that if there is a possibility of failure, there is also a corresponding possibility of success. The worst has not yet happened.

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An organisation finds itself in crisis management mode whenever it has to deal with important issues, and finds the arena for debate is outside its control. The crisis could be an actual accident, or a ‘scare’ which has shaken public confidence. The common element is the need to convince the public (or at least a substantial body of people outside the organisation) that current or proposed activities are adequate, safe and acceptable. This may need to be done very quickly, possibly to a deadline, and commonly in a hostile news media environment.

In Module 1 a crisis was presented as having four key characteristics: 1.

The crisis constitutes a series of events rather than the management of a single entity.

2.

The crisis may be caused by a disaster, but this may not be a physical one.

3.

The crisis has a diffuse origin, making it difficult to gain a complete overview of the situation.

4.

It may well be unclear what action needs to be taken (Heinzen, 1966: 16–17, quoted in Module 1: 40)

Combining these concepts, crisis management becomes a time when: •

managerial action or intervention is called for;

•

a series of events may combine to make the problem bigger;

•

there may not be a physical focus;

•

it may be difficult to get an overview of the whole situation;

•

the correct course of action may be unclear;

•

the arena for debate may not be controllable;

•

there is a very real possibility of failure.

The special features which make up a low-intensity crisis may, however, compound the managerial problems. The diffuse, low-intensity nature of the situation may mean that at the outset, the nature of the problem remains unrecognised, and resources are allocated or managerial measures taken may be insufficient to prevent escalation.

This can greatly increase the probability of failure, and subsequent criticism that, with hindsight, control measures proved to be ‘Too little – Too late!’

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It is even possible that the failure (in terms of the unwanted outcome, such as casualties, or a combination of circumstances which cannot be managed with the resources allocated) could already have occurred. The situation could well be out of hand before the existence of a crisis is recognised.

In the remainder of this Unit, the terms crisis and disaster are used, if not synonymously, at least to refer to different stages in the management of a low-intensity situation; a ‘crisis’ being the stage where successful management may still lead to a successful outcome, a ‘disaster’ being where harm has been caused, and there is an element of damage limitation.

4.3 Types of Crisis and Disaster There are several different types of crisis /disaster. Broad divisions include: •

event-based

•

slow-onset

•

long-wave

•

low-intensity

Event-based crises and disasters are the most common (in the United Kingdom) and are the typical ‘emergencies’, with an initiating event, and an identifiable boundary.

The classic slow-onset disaster would be famine caused by drought and crop failure.

The problem may be seen coming, and there may be months between the crop failing and the food running out, but the scale may be overwhelming. Although predominantly a Third World issue, industrialised countries are not immune. A United Kingdom example could be the repeated water shortages caused by lack of rainfall during hot summers, resulting in depletion of reservoirs and emergency restrictions. It does not take much to turn a ‘routine’ emergency measure, such as a ban on the use of hosepipes, into the crisis and near disaster in the long hot summer of 1996, which almost resulted in a failure of supplies to major urban areas in Yorkshire. The water supplier – Yorkshire Water Services Limited – resorted to hiring a fleet of tanker lorries to fill reservoirs and keep supplies maintained.

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Barnett and Blaikie (1994) use the term long-wave disaster to describe the AIDS pandemic, particularly as it affects Africa. The particular features of this type of disaster are that: It does not seem to the affected society to be a discrete event, with recognisable trigger mechanisms, which can be used as markers to mobilise a familiar sequence of actions, such as an earthquake or devastating floods.

By contrast, even a drought and the subsequent famine that may be triggered thereby both have recognisable onsets, which in turn will be used to mobilise familiar responses.

(Barnett and Blaikie, 1994: 143) One example of a long-wave disaster from the United Kingdom (and other industrialised countries) could arguably be deaths and injuries from motor vehicle accidents. Another could be the problems of drug abuse, and the associated criminality.

The boundaries between the different categories are not rigid, or even mutually exclusive. It could even be argued that they should not be regarded as divisions at all, as in any given situation, all or any of the aspects may be present. Different organisations have vastly different roles, and a particular set of circumstances can even be a different type of crisis for each organisation. For example, the 1988 Lockerbie aircraft crash caused by a terrorist bomb was an event-based disaster for the organisations carrying out the initial search and rescue. For the air travel industry, it became a low-intensity crisis, with repercussions in terms of changes in operational procedures, and increased security, for every airline and every airport in the world.

For the airline involved, Pan Am, it is even possible to speculate that the security failure which allowed the terrorist bomb to be placed on the aircraft was a symptom of the managerial problems the company were experiencing in the period following deregulation of US air travel in 1978 (Bremner and Tendler 1988; Parry 1988, cited in Sipica and Smith, 1992: 19). These problems could be regarded as the long-wave crisis, and the Lockerbie disaster one of the consequences, another consequence being that the company ultimately ceasing trading.

As Sipica and Smith (1992: 4) note: Crisis management is a complex, highly interactive process which necessitates a considerable degree of strategic thinking on the part of management before the onset of a crisis.

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The presence or lack of viable, proven emergency management and business continuity plans are a feature of the management of an organisation. Any subsequent failure of an organisation to cope with an unexpected crisis is, therefore, not only attributable to the crisis itself, but is also symptomatic of a long-wave crisis in the management of that organisation.

Not all organisations may see the need to consider these different types of crisis, but there may be an unrecognised need particularly when assessing the organisation’s vulnerability as part of a risk assessment. The long-wave crisis of drug abuse may well be a relevant issue, for example to a transportation organisation, where the possibility of a driver, pilot or captain making the wrong decision while under the influence of a drug must be considered.

Slow-onset and long-wave events tend to be very large, and require a response at the national or even international level. The co-ordination of the international response to very large-scale events such as famines and AIDS pandemics is too large a topic for a single unit, so what will be focused on are low-intensity crises and disasters.

4.4 ‘Low-Intensity’ vs Event-Based (‘Conventional’) Emergencies 4.4.1

‘Conventional’ Emergencies

Although all emergencies are different, the majority have several features in common, which may be used as a basis for an attempted definition. In its introduction, the Home Office guidance document Dealing With Disaster gives a definition of a disaster which may well be familiar. It states that: In the context of civil protection, a useful working definition of a disaster is any event (happening with or without warning) causing or threatening injury, damage to property or to the environment or disruption to the community, which because of the scale of its effects cannot be dealt with by the emergency services and local authorities as part of their day-to-day activities.

(Home Office, 1997: 1)

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Annex A to the same document sets out the definition of a ‘major incident’, as given in the Association of Chief Police Officers Emergency Procedures Manual, and in the Fire Service Major Incident Emergency Procedures Manual. This is: ... any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services, the NHS or the local authority for: (a) the initial treatment, rescue and transport of a large number of casualties; (b) the involvement either directly or indirectly of large numbers of people; (c) the handling of large numbers of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media, usually to the police; (d) the need for large scale combined resources of two or more of the emergency services; (e) the mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and supporting organisations, e.g. local authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people.

(Home Office, 1997: 43) Both the Home Office and Emergency Service definitions start with the all-embracing concept of ‘any event’ or ‘any emergency’ but the caveats include certain assumptions which indicate that only one type of disaster is being considered. There may be several causes, but the disaster would have the following features in common: 1.

It would be an event, which implies that it would have a recognisable time and location.

2.

The response would involve the emergency services with news media and public enquiries being (usually) directed to the police.

3.

Non-emergency services such as the local authority would play a supporting role.

4.

Management would involve the mobilisation and deployment of resources, movement of people and dealing with victims as an identifiable group.

5.

Once the scale of resources committed is reduced to manageable levels, the emergency response is over, and a different type of response (a ‘recovery phase’) begins.

6.

The recovery phase is not seen as part of ‘the emergency’.

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The most fundamental aspect linking all these features is that the emergency situation is perceived as an event – more fundamentally, an individual event – which is external to the responding organisation. The event scene then becomes a focus for an obvious readily identifiable problem, which can be responded to. There is usually a fairly clear time period when the situation would be regarded as an emergency, and when the emergency can be declared to be over. This in many cases would be comparatively short, being measured in hours or, at the most, days.

In effect, the responders are carrying out the task of management of the event. There are routine events warranting a standard response, and larger scale events warranting the implementation of more complex plans. Given that the organisations adopting this definition are primarily response organisations, this is, perhaps, not unexpected.

This is such a common pattern of response, that situations which do not fit these parameters may well not be recognised as an emergency, warranting a special response at all.

As an example, picture a theoretical scenario of a medium sized community. Basic needs are food, warmth and shelter. If the community is affected by a ‘conventional’ disaster, such as an aircraft crashing, a flood or an industrial accident, and any one of these three basic needs could not be met, the need for an integrated response is recognised. Support services responding to the incident would usually ensure that welfare arrangements were made. They would usually be provided proactively, with active steps being taken to identify and seek out people with special difficulties.

If the same community were affected by an extended power cut in the middle of winter, the community, or a significant part of it, may find itself without cooking and heating.

(Even gas and oil fuelled heating systems may rely on electrical controls and circulating pumps.) These are two out of the three basic necessities. Particularly vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or people with young children, may have real difficulties in coping. The power utilities would, of course, mount an emergency response to restore electricity supplies, but initiating proactive welfare is not their normal role. They see the problem in engineering terms. There had not been a triggering event involving an emergency services response, fitting their working definitions of a ‘disaster’, or ‘major incident’, and because the people lacking the facilities to prepare food or heat their homes are scattered throughout the community, welfare support may be totally lacking, or at best provided reactively, if individuals contact welfare support services themselves.

Although the needs of the individuals are the same, and in terms of numbers there could be as many people with those needs going unmet, the diffuse, low-intensity nature of the problem means that it is treated entirely differently. It is an interesting aside on the nature of perception, that the people affected may also regard the problem differently, and may accept with little complaint discomforts which would be the subject of complaint if caused by a more obvious emergency.

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There are other aspects which may be different between the two scenarios, such as risk of fire or explosion, or risk of damage to the dwellings themselves. Even so, what this demonstrates is that the nature of the event may have as big an influence on the response (or an even bigger influence) as the actual effects of the event.

4.4.2

‘Low-Intensity’ Crises

Going back to the ‘official’ definitions of disasters used earlier, there is a third definition – that used by the National Health Service (NHS), which is: Any occurrence which presents a serious threat to the health of the community, disruption to the service, or causes [or is likely to cause] such numbers or types of casualties as require special arrangements to be implemented by hospitals, ambulance services or health authorities.

(Home Office, 1997: 43)

There is a fundamental difference between this, and the other two definitions. It is the nature and scale of demand on services – the effect of the emergency, rather than the cause – which triggers the emergency response. Reference to ‘casualties’, as opposed to ‘patients’, and the jargon term ‘Majax Plan’ (major accident plan) sometimes used in the NHS does, however, also suggest a similar conceptual event-based bias as in other emergency services.

Applying the NHS definition, an aircraft crash such as the 1989 Kegworth disaster (which as well as the 47 fatalities, also resulted in 74 seriously injured survivors) would warrant a ‘Major Accident’ response from the three major hospitals involved.

An accident and emergency unit could, however, find itself facing a similar overload, if something like an unpredicted severe frost left roads and footpaths covered in ice. The resultant spate of road traffic accidents and pedestrians slipping and suffering fractures could produce a similar number of casualties. The resources of the hospital could become equally stretched, and require ‘special arrangements to be implemented’, even though each individual event may itself be a very minor incident. The crisis or emergency has been caused by a combination of small events, none of which is a major incident or disaster, but when taken in combination, warrant a non-routine emergency response.

There is no single location or event which can be pointed to as the crisis event, and no individual event was of a fundamentally different scale or nature to any other, but the crisis for the service is real. The source is diffuse – it is a low-intensity crisis.

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In this situation two things could happen: 1.

The system gets gradually overloaded, and breaks down. Patients find that they have a long wait for attention, and there is a real possibility that some patients with urgent needs could get overlooked. This could possibly result in fatalities in patients who would have been saved with prompt treatment.

2.

Provided the nature and scale of the problem is recognised in time, special arrangements can be made. The sorts of measures which would be taken for a ‘Majax’ incident could be implemented, and with a system of triage, all life threatening situations given priority.

4.4.3 Types of Low-Intensity Crisis It is possible to identify two variants on the theme of a low-intensity crisis. The first is where the actual locations of the incidents which combine to make a low-intensity crisis are diffused. In effect, the crisis or disaster itself is low intensity. An example is the E coli 0157 case study.

A second variation is where there is an initiating event, but the effects are diffused either geographically or in time. In effect, in this case, the consequences have not been contained within the site boundary. A classic example is the off-site consequences of the fire at the Sandos Ltd Schweizerhalle works in Switzerland, in November 1986.

The building on fire was a chemical store, and the main problem was perceived to be fire, so water was pumped from the River Rhine, 400 metres away. Contaminated run-off flowed back into the river, affecting the drinking water of an estimated 20 million people, and taking 10 days to reach the sea. Failure to recognise the true nature of the problem turned a local event-based crisis into a low-intensity disaster for a major part of the Rhine Valley.

4.5 Examples of Low-Intensity Crises In the Introduction, it was said that two case studies would be used – the measures to be taken in an outbreak of rabies, and the 1996 E. coli 0157 outbreak in Central Scotland. These are not the only examples.

In terms of fatalities, perhaps the biggest United Kingdom ‘event’ type disaster this century was the London Smog of 5–8 December 1952 (National Society for Clean Air, 1983). (‘Smog’ is a term coined in 1905 to denote the combination of smoke and fog in urban areas. Certain atmospheric conditions combine to stop it dispersing.) There

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were an estimated 4,000 extra deaths in the Greater London area. In what was then the Administrative County alone, bronchitis deaths increased from 121 to 872, and deaths from heart and circulatory diseases rose from 318 to 801, when compared to a similar period without the smog formation. As well as the fatalities, there was extensive illness, with a greatly increased demand on medical services. There was also major social and economic disruption, with road traffic down to walking pace or below.

Certain diseases can give rise to low-intensity crises. Fortunately, diseases such as smallpox, cholera and typhus are a thing of the past (at least in developed countries), but other diseases are still common. Since the 16th Century, at least 31 influenza pandemics (very widespread epidemics) have been described. The most destructive epidemic of modern times, that of 1918–19, is estimated to have caused 20 million deaths. Lesser outbreaks occur every few years. Because the effects are so diffuse, most victims only see the situation as it affects them, but if the diffuse effects over the whole country are collated, in terms of casualties, cost and service disruption, the effects may well be regarded as a disaster.

In October 1997, a newspaper article heralded the possibility of an influenza epidemic with the headline ‘Six million urged to get flu jabs’ (Mihill, 1997). Douglas Fleming, director of the Birmingham research unit of the Royal College of General Practitioners is quoted as saying: ... in the last severe winter for flu, 1989/90, there were 20,000 extra deaths that could be attributed to the illness and about 850,000 visits to GPs from people with flu or flu-like illness.

The report went on to say that around 6.5 million doses of vaccine had been prepared, at a cost of £35 million.

About 18 weeks later, the Yorkshire Evening Press (1998a) ran an article with the headline ‘50 nurses downed by “flu” at hospital’. It pointed out that a series of events •

50 nurses off sick at the same time

•

the seasonal extra demands on beds in winter

•

the school half-term holidays with staff needing time off to look after children

had all combined to cause the hospital concerned to consider emergency measures, such as getting staff to work extra sessions, restricting non-emergency admissions and the postponement of routine operations.

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Although none of these circumstances could be regarded in isolation as a major accident, the combined result on the organisation was a crisis which had to be managed. This also demonstrates another feature of low-intensity crises. Their effects may be so diffuse that they affect the response organisations themselves, as well as the public.

The problem in this case was maintaining ‘business as usual’ with a depleted workforce.

This would be a business continuity planning issue for any organisation. For the NHS, however, this problem would be compounded by the public expectation that it would also care for the influx of extra patients with conditions also related to influenza.

Fortunately, a later report (Yorkshire Evening Press, 1998b) noted that although the situation was reviewed on a daily basis, the availability of ‘bank’ nurses meant that they were able to cope. By itself, it was a crisis which was successfully resolved. If, however, there had been a major accident during this period, the combination of circumstances would have drastically altered the scale of an accident which would have swamped available resources, and so warranted a ‘Majax’ response. If contingency plans such as arrangements for triage of casualties and diversion to different hospitals were based on the accident alone, they could be activated on some fixed criterion such as number of casualties. If they do not also take into account the circumstances of the responding organisation, the possibility of failure may be very real.

This is also a reminder of the change which takes place when a responding organisation becomes affected by the events themselves. What may normally be the management of crisis, becomes management in crisis. An event-based incident which would be well within an organisation’s normal capability may warrant a different response if there is a simultaneous low-intensity crisis, such as the influenza outbreak of 1989–90 (let alone the one of 1918–19). The assumption that neighbouring organisations would be able to supply personnel to make up any resource shortfalls may be optimistic. They may themselves be experiencing similar difficulties.

It should be noted that epidemics are not the only types of crisis which have this effect. Severe weather is another example of a diffused low-intensity crisis which may also have as big an effect on responding organisations as on victims.

4.6 Case Study 1: Rabies In certain parts of the world rabies is an everyday risk. Henry Wilde (Wilde in New Scientist, 1993a), a rabies expert from the southern hemisphere, claims that 4 percent of dogs in Bangkok are rabid, and in Thailand 100,000 people a year have to be treated after being bitten. The annual fatalities in India have been variously put at between 15,000 (New Scientist, 1993b) and 25,000 (Dawood, 1994).

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The disease is fortunately very rare in the United Kingdom. Eradicated by 1903, there was an outbreak in 1918 which lasted until 1922, and this was ascribed to dogs smuggled into the country by returning servicemen (Ministry of Agriculture, 1971: 10). There were no human cases, but 312 dogs, eight cattle, two sheep, three swine and three horses were infected. The last case of human rabies contracted in the United Kingdom was in 1902, although from time to time people who were infected abroad fall victim.

The 1977 Memorandum on Rabies (DHSS, 1977: 6) noted that there were 12 such cases between 1946 and 1977.

The last major problem was in Camberley in 1969, when a dog released from quarantine developed rabies, and escaped for a while, opening up the possibility of the infection of wildlife. This incident had many repercussions, including an official inquiry, and a review of legislation and official guidance.

Concern has been expressed that the disease could be re-imported from Europe. Animal rabies in Europe peaked at 24,737 cases in 1989, but has steadily declined since then, falling to 11,075 (Eurotunnel, 1994).

Set against this background, the British perception of the level of the rabies risk may be regarded as much higher than the evaluated risk. It is an emotive issue which has produced polarised opinions, particularly as regards the need for quarantine of imported animals. Because of the high perceived risk, an outbreak affecting wildlife has been the subject of contingency planning arrangements at both local and national level.

The validity of quarantine as a control measure and the alternatives to it, is not, however, intended to be the subject of this case study. Neither is it intended to be a definitive statement of how an outbreak would be handled. Sources quoted were valid at the time they were produced, but may have been superseded as policies and organisational roles have evolved.

It is intended to be a study of how an identified potential high profile low-intensity crisis has been planned for. This case study draws on the experiences of a local authority â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Warwickshire County Council â&#x20AC;&#x201C; who carried out an exercise to test how their planning arrangements would cope with such an event. The results were written up in a report Rabies â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Exercise K9 Report (Warwickshire, 1993). It must be stressed that there is no suggestion here that rabies was perceived by the Warwickshire County Council as the only (or even the main) hazard they must prepare for. Their report (Warwickshire, 1993: 4) indicates that the Emergency Planning Unit were considering scenarios for a major exercise to test their overall level of preparedness. In order for the exercise to be realistic, a topic had to be selected, and the scenario chosen happened to be a rabies outbreak.

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As a case study, it serves two purposes. At one level, it reflects the experience of an organisation who attempted to realistically exercise handling such an event. At another level, it is an indicator of the level of preparedness which certain sections of the public (or, at least the news media) may expect to see if a crisis of this nature occurs.

4.6.1

Features of Rabies

According to the Committee of Inquiry on Rabies set up after the 1969 Camberley incident, rabies is: ... a disease of the central nervous system which is known to have plagued mankind for as long as recorded history. It is caused by a virus, which is usually present in the saliva of a rabid animal, and the most frequent mode of infection is by biting. ... With two possible exceptions, there has never been an authenticated case of recovery from the disease.

(Ministry of Agriculture, 1971: 1) Rabies has been induced in every species of mammal which has been tested for susceptibility, and it is considered ‘highly probable’ that all mammals may be similarly susceptible. Animals most often implicated are canines, particularly domestic or feral dogs, and wild foxes.

There may be a very long incubation period. Some animals possibly taking up to a year to develop the final form of the disease, with the possibility that they may be able to pass the infection on for much of this time. The quarantine period was set at 6 months as a compromise between absolute certainty and practicability (Ministry of Agriculture, 1971: 4). Given that the 1918 outbreak took four years to control, and the length of the proposed quarantine period after the last known case, the crisis could potentially last a long time. The minimum would be 6 months, even if no secondary cases were discovered.

The area affected could be quite large. Hole (1969: 244) notes that during the 1918–22 outbreak, rabid dogs were picked up 30–40 miles (48–64 km) from their home. The Committee of Inquiry on Rabies proposed that if rabies spread to wildlife, an initial area of 12 miles (19km) radius from the edge of the infected area would be designated as a control zone, and the following measures taken: 1.

All animals coming into contact with the infected animal to be destroyed.

2.

All animals in the zone to be subject to restricted movement, and veterinary surveillance for six months.

3.

All domestic dogs and cats to be vaccinated, and issued with a special identity collar.

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4.

Dogs and cats to be exercised only on a leash, cats to be confined.

5.

If an owner does not comply, the animal to be taken to a quarantine accommodation at the owner’s expense, or destroyed.

6.

All stray cats and dogs to be rounded up, or shot if they can not be caught.

7.

Foxes and other susceptible wildlife to be gassed, trapped or poisoned.

8.

Public access to zoos, circuses and safari parks to be curtailed.

9.

Animal exhibitions, cat and dog shows to be discontinued.

10.

Special controls placed on cattle markets, abattoirs, and on transportation of farm livestock.

A secondary zone of a further 12 miles (19km) would be established round the primary control zone, and in this area the fox population would also be controlled for a period of 18 months after the last known case (Ministry of Agriculture, 1971: 79–82).

Given that the primary control zone from a point source would cover some 450 square miles or 288,000 acres (1,170 sq km, or 117,000 hectares in metric units) the scale of the problem would be significant. It would almost certainly include at least one large town, and would most probably become a ‘cross-border’ incident with more than one authority involved. This would necessitate co-ordination of measures such as trapping stray dogs and feral cats, so that animals could not roam from uncleared to cleared areas.

It is stressed that these control measures were the ones proposed in 1971, and although current control measures follow substantially the same pattern, there may be significant points of difference, particularly as knowledge of wildlife behaviour and distribution has increased.

4.6.2

Organisational Involvement

From the outset, a large number of organisations would be involved. The 1969 Camberley incident was primarily police led, but since then there have been substantial changes both in the police role and in that of the local authorities.

In the 1993 Warwickshire exercise, the management team noted: As a rabies outbreak was logically followed through, the number of organisations needing to be consulted grew, incorporating internal and external agencies who are not generally involved in the emergency procedures of the local authority.

(Warwickshire, 1993: 3) University of Leicester

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The final list of participating organisations was (Warwickshire, 1993: 34 Appendix 5): County Council Departments Trading Standards Planning and Transport Emergency Planning Unit Clerks Caretakers Libraries and Heritage Property Services Assistant Chief Executive Borough Councils Departments Chief Executives Environmental Health Technical Services Press Officers Other Organisations Police Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Public Health and Hospitals The Media The Automobile Association British Rail British Telecom British Red Cross Saint John Ambulance British Waterways The Military National Rivers Authority Severn Trent Water Ltd National Agricultural Centres National Canine Defence League Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Royal Voluntary Service Private kennels across the county

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The reason for the involvement of some organisations is not immediately obvious. The Automobile Association, for example, can augment the local authority’s ability to make and erect road signs, and they also have an effective communications network. British Rail (as it was then) owned the rail network, and railway lines are an important corridor for the movement of wildlife as are rivers and canals. British Waterways control the mooring and passage of pleasure boats, and many boat owners take dogs with them.

Different areas may have a different list of participants, for example, port operators in coastal and estuarine areas. If it had been a real outbreak, rather than an exercise, the list could have been extended. Farmers and landowners would have to be consulted (possibly via such organisations as the National Farmers Union and Country Landowners Association). The exercising of pets at motorway service stations would need to be monitored. There could be financial implications for caravan site owners, with restrictions on campers with pets. The leisure industry as a whole could be affected, with tour operators reluctant to use accommodation in or near the control zone (and possibly, considering human nature, with visitors ignoring control measures). There may also be a desire for involvement (or possibly antagonism to control measures) on the part of other animal welfare charities and pressure groups.

Again, it is stressed that this is not intended as a definitive list, but it does demonstrate the revised working relationships and new co-ordination links which need to be established. It also demonstrates the social and economic issues which must be addressed alongside the operational and logistical issues.

Dealing with an outbreak of rabies could cause a prolonged and heavy demand on resources. Logistically there would be resource problems in carrying out surveys and control measures such as rounding up stray dogs and feral cats. The UK, for example, has an estimated 7.3 million ‘owned’ dog population, with a further 250,000 strays (Commission of the European Communities, 1992). The estimated feral cat population is 2 colonies per 10 sq km of urban area, with one person having the ability to survey 25–30 sq km per week (Baker and Thomas, undated: 13). As was previously noted, the primary control zone from a point source outbreak would be 1,170 sq km (hopefully not all urban) and once surveyed, the animals in the colonies would then need to be trapped.

A significant outbreak of rabies (particularly if it spread to the wildlife population) would therefore be a major low-intensity crisis, being diffuse both in area and time, and some of the control measures would be extremely unpopular. The United Kingdom has traditionally been regarded as an animal loving country, and it is open to debate whether or not control measures could actually be maintained for 6 months after the last known case (without the reinforcement of publicity that a new case would bring).

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4.7 Case Study 2: The 1996 E. coli 0157 Outbreak in Central Scotland 4.7.1

Introduction

If the previous case study looked at a potential high profile low-intensity crisis, which had been identified and planned for, the 1996 E. coli outbreak is an actual disaster where the low-intensity diverse distribution, the nature of the problems, and the length of time they took to resolve, fell outside the scope of the plans as they existed at the time.

4.7.2

Background and Nature of the Problem

Escherichia coli is a bacterium which normally lives harmlessly in the gastro-intestinal tract of most, if not all, humans and animals. At one time, all the bacteria in the group would have been regarded as the same, but modern medical science now has the capability to differentiate between different strains (or types) of E. coli. It has now been found that although most strains are harmless, certain strains can give rise to disease. The strain E. coli 0157 has been found to cause quite severe symptoms.

E. coli 0157 was first identified as a cause of human illness in 1982, when two outbreaks linked to eating undercooked hamburgers were reported in the USA (Pennington, 1997: 7).

In recent years, outbreaks linked to E. coli have been increasing, although there is some debate as to what extent the increase is due to an actual increase in the number of people infected, and how much is due to better diagnosis and identification. At one time, for example, the presence of E. coli in a pathological specimen could have been disregarded, as it would be assumed to be one of the harmless strains.

Pennington records 15 other outbreaks between 1992 and 1996 in Scotland â&#x20AC;&#x201C; five in 1996 alone (Pennington, 1997: 9). The known extent of the problem in the previous few years is indicated in Table 1.

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Table 1: E. coli cases 1990–95 Human infection with E. coli 0157 1990–95 Scotland

England & Wales

Year

Number

Rate/100,000

Number

Rate/100,000

1990

173

3.39

250

0.49

1991

202

3.96

361

0.71

1992

115

2.25

470

0.92

1993

119

2.32

385

0.75

1994

242

4.71

411

0.80

1995

248

4.80

792

1.52

Source: Based on Pennington, 1997: 10, para 3.6 The World Health Organisation (WHO, 1997: 1) list various sources of infection, including milk, apple juice, yoghurt, cheese, fermented sausage, cooked maize, mayonnaise, lettuce and seed sprouts, as well as meat. Other important routes of infection include person-to-person contact, animal–human contact, drinking water and infection during recreational use of water.

4.7.3

The 1996 Central Scotland Outbreak

The 1996 outbreak of food poisoning was claimed to have its origin in food supplied by one manufacturing butcher, J. Barr & Son, Whishaw. The firm carried on a substantial wholesale and retail trade in the production and distribution of raw and cooked meats and bakery products. It employed some 40 people, many on a part-time basis. The distribution chain was described as ‘diverse and complex’ with 85 outlets eventually being identified as being supplied by the company (Pennington, 1997: 5).

4.7.4

Chronology of the Outbreak (Based on Pennington, 1997: Chapter 2)

Sunday 17 November 1996 Cooked steak and gravy supplied by Barrs to Whishaw Parish Church lunch, attended by about 100 people.

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Friday 22 November 1996 The Lanarkshire Health Board became aware of several cases in Whishaw, central Scotland. The Lanarkshire Health Board (the Health Board) notified the Environmental Services Department of North Lanarkshire Council (the Council), and by the evening case histories obtained from 9 of the 15 confirmed or suspected cases indicated that 8 had consumed food obtained either directly, or at a church lunch, supplied by Barrs.

Mr Barr visited by Health Board and Council officials.

Saturday 23 November 1996 An ‘Outbreak Control Team’ was formed (in accordance with the 1996 guidelines issued by the Scottish Office Department of Health Advisory Group on Infection).

The team was chaired by Dr Syed Ahmed, Lanarkshire Health Board Consultant in Public Health Medicine, and consisted of representatives from: •

The Lanarkshire Health Board

•

North Lanarkshire Council

•

Local Hospital and Health Care NHS Trusts

•

The Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health

•

The Whishaw Health Centre

Products supplied by Barrs consumed at a birthday party held at the Cascade public house, led to further cases.

Sunday 24 November 1996 Reports indicated that distribution of products from Barrs had extended beyond the local authority, into the central belt of Scotland.

Tuesday 26 November 1996 The Scottish Office Department of Health and the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries met with the Health Board and the Council.

Wednesday 27 November 1996 A Food Hazard Warning was issued by the Scottish Office.

The voluntary closure of the entire business (including bakery) was announced

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Thursday 28 November 1996 A further Food Hazard Warning was issued by the Scottish Office.

The Scottish Office joined the Outbreak Control Team as observers.

Sunday 15 December 1996 Last confirmed case linked to the outbreak showed onset of symptoms.

Sunday 29 December 1996 Last case possibly linked to the outbreak was reported.

Monday 20 January 1997 Outbreak declared over.

The actual outbreak itself therefore lasted some 65 days, and had been ongoing for six days before being recognised. (This is, in fact, very common in this type of incident. There is a period after the infected food is eaten before symptoms show. By this time many of the victims have returned home, and it takes some time before they either seek medical help or inform others of their symptoms. The common link then needs to be recognised â&#x20AC;&#x201C; bearing in mind that different patients may attend different GPs, and the outbreak then has to be confirmed by laboratory tests which can take some time to complete.)

4.7.5 Casualties and Demands on Medical Services There were 496 cases linked to the outbreak, resulting in 18 deaths. A total of 127 people were admitted to hospital, with 13 requiring dialysis (Pennington, 1997: 7).

Table 2: Number and location of cases in the 1996 E. coli outbreak Number of cases linked to the 1996 E. coli 0157 outbreak Location (Health Board) All Scotland

Lanarkshire Forth Valley

Lothian

Greater Glasgow

Case Status* Confirmed

272

195

73

4

0

Probable

60

50

10

0

0

Possible

164

128

35

0

1

Total

496

373

118

4

1

Source: Based on Pennington, 1997: 7, para 2.18 University of Leicester

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*based on a clinical definition ‘confirmed’ =

someone with E. coli 0157 identified in their stool

‘probable’

=

someone with bloody diarrhoea and positive serology

‘possible’

=

someone with non-bloody diarrhoea and positive serology or someone with no symptoms but positive serology or someone with bloody diarrhoea without positive serology

As well as the actual cases, there were many more suspected cases, where medical resources were called on to investigate. The Whishaw clinic alone carried out tests on 969 people with diarrhoea, in addition to the substantial number who would have attended their GP. Of the fatalities, eight had attended the luncheon at Whishaw Parish Church, and six were residents of Bankview Nursing Home in Bonnybridge. For these particular organisations the impact would have been particularly severe, and would be on a par with a major transport accident.

4.7.6

Difficulties Encountered in Controlling the Outbreak

Pennington (1997: 12) notes that European Union (EU) food law places the responsibility for ensuring the safety and protection of the consumer very firmly with individual food businesses. The system is supported by legislation, but this is extremely complex, and appears to have been developed piecemeal, with at least four different EC directives applying different controls in different situations. This has led to a great deal of confusion. The recommended protocol (which is mandatory in certain situations) is the application of the HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) system. In effect, this is the application of a self-regulation system which should, in theory, ensure food safety.

The system can be summarised as a 7-step process: 1.

Conduct a hazard analysis on the complete food production process, up to the point of consumption.

2.

Determine the critical control points (CCPs) – where hazards can be eliminated or minimised.

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3.

Establish critical limits to ensure the CCP is under control.

4.

Establish a system to monitor CCPs.

5.

Establish the measures to be taken if a CCP is outside limits.

6.

Establish procedures to verify the effectiveness of the HACCP process.

7.

Establish documentation and recording procedures.

A Meat and Livestock Commission survey in January 1997 (Pennington, 1997: 49) revealed the extent to which butchers had applied the system. Principal findings were: 1.

A significant number of butchers (including 40 percent of those manufacturing and wholesaling cooked meat products) had not carried out a risk assessment, and the legal requirement for a risk assessment was not being adequately met.

2.

The majority of butchers do not have a documented risk assessment, and do not maintain control records.

3.

Less than 50 percent of butchers manufacturing and wholesaling cooked meats had a product recall system and only 11 percent of product recall systems had been tested.

4.7.7

Perception of the Problem

There were two main aspects to the way the outbreak was treated. The first was that E. coli was presented as a ‘new’ problem, despite being known about for at least 14 years prior to the outbreak.

A standard textbook Hygiene for Management (Sprenger, 1983: 25–30) lists it as just one of seven different groups of food poisoning bacteria featured in outbreaks in the United Kingdom.

The second aspect was related to the brief for the Pennington inquiry and subsequent publicity. E. coli is a very diverse organism. Of the 15 previous outbreaks listed by Pennington, the mode of spread was determined in 11 of them. These were as follows:

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Table 3: E. coli infections in Scotland, 1992–96 – identified methods of spread E. coli 0157 infections in Scotland, 1992–96* Mode of spread

Numbers affected

Milk (2 outbreaks)

108

Burgher meat (2 outbreaks)

40

Cheese

22

Person-to-person (2 outbreaks)

8

Acquired in hospital

5

Recreational water (paddling pool)

5

Animal-to-human

4

Source: Based on Pennington, 1997: 9 (*excludes the case study outbreak) This indicates that control of E. coli 0157 is a more general public health issue, and not specifically a meat-trade problem.

The inquiry investigated an actual outbreak which happened to be based on a butcher’s shop. The investigation and the vast majority of the news media attention centred on meat and meat products. Subsequent attention centred on the meat trade, and so did the pressure for legislative controls. In February 1998, for example, the Draft Food Safety (General Food Hygiene) (Butchers’ Shops) Amendment Regulations 1998 were issued. These propose the requirement for an annual licence for butchers’ shops – but not for other food premises (Environmental Health News, 1998: 5).

4.7.8

Role Reversal

One feature of the outbreak was that in the later stages, news media attention turned away from the primary source of the problem, and increasingly concentrated on the way the outbreak had been handled. Chapter 12 of the Pennington inquiry report also looked at arrangements for the handling and control of outbreaks, and although commenting that revised guidelines which had just been published that year worked ‘reasonably well’, suggested that a further review was needed.

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More forthrightly, reporting on the subsequent legal proceedings, a professional publication observed that: Criminal charges against Whishaw butcher John Barr were dropped this week as a case against him collapsed in a welter of claims of lack of corroboration and of procedural bungles by the outbreak control team.

The article concluded: ... the unsatisfactory end to the Crown case has shaken public confidence in the efficiency of public health officials. Some Scottish MPs are already pressing for an inquiry into the handling of the case.

(Mason, 1997) The crux of the case appears to be that the people involved treated the problem as an event-based crisis – an infectious disease outbreak linked to consumption of food at a particular time and location. Activities centred on identifying people associated with the event, who may have been infected. If the problem had been an event-based crisis, with one batch of food at one event being the source, this would have been correct. In fact, the vast majority of outbreaks would fall into this category.

Although the possibility had been addressed, the same degree of attention had not been given to the possibility of food from the same source being distributed over a wide geographical area, and consumed over an extended period of time. In treating the problem as an event (a routine ‘outbreak’), consideration of the problem as one of contamination of the food chain, and the recording of evidence for criminal proceedings, had been given a lesser priority.

4.7.9

Postscript

While the Central Scotland incident was under investigation by the Pennington group, a further outbreak of E. coli 0157 occurred in a Tayside nursing home. Six residents fell ill on 31 January 1997, and a further case occurred on 9 February 1997. There were three deaths associated with this outbreak (Pennington, 1997: 8).

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4.8 Features of Low-Intensity Crises 4.8.1

Recognition

The nature of a low-intensity crisis means that one of the first aspects is the difficulty in recognising that a series of what may appear to be routine occurrences have combined to warrant a special response. This late recognition may only arise when an overloaded system fails.

This failure can also occur if a very narrow, inward-looking view, concentrating on the localised effect of an event rather than the wider consequences, is taken. A typical scenario would be a service utility, which when faced with a crisis, concentrates solely on reinstating the service, overlooking the possible need for associated response measures from other organisations. In extreme circumstances this inward-looking, single-minded attitude can be the root cause of an incident becoming a disaster. A classic example of this would be the 1986 Swiss Sandos Ltd, Schweizerhalle incident.

4.8.2

Scale

Because of the possible slow build-up and diffuse nature, low-intensity disasters can be very large indeed. The London smog, with 4,000+ deaths, the Sandoz incident with threats to the water supplies for several countries, and a direct fish kill estimated at half a million, and the off-site consequences of the Chernobyl reactor accident in 1986 are obvious spectacular examples. Smaller scale examples, such as the 1996 E. coli 0157 outbreak, indicate however that consequences can be out of proportion to the apparent risk perceived prior to the event.

4.8.3

Timescale

The timescale of low-intensity crises can be considerably extended. The Sandoz incident, although the fire itself was over in hours, warranted an emergency response dealing with protection of water supplies and disposal of dead fish lasting over ten days. The subsequent monitoring lasted a further seven years, and cost the equivalent of ÂŁ4 million.

The fatalities in the London smog occurred over a period of five days (and the incident may have contributed to many more over a much longer period).

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In the 1996 E. coli 0157 outbreak the first official food warning came ten days after the start of the outbreak, and the incident was not declared over until 65 days had elapsed. The inquiries and threat of legal proceedings went on very much longer. The Pennington report was published in April 1997, but the Fatal Accident Inquiry had still not been concluded nearly a year later. In March 1998, an article in a Scottish newspaper observed that out of 172 injury claims received by the insurers, only 41 had been settled (Sunday Post, 1998).

4.8.4

Isomorphism

Module 1 Unit 6 introduced the concept of ‘Isomorphism’, in particular, ‘crossorganisational isomorphism’, where different organisations providing similar services can be affected by the same sorts of errors, giving rise to the same hazards. Isomorphism simply means ‘of the same shape’, and is closely allied to the conceptual heuristic of ‘representativeness’. This is where in the eyes of the public (and often the news media) something which has gone wrong in one location, or in one organisation or company, is regarded as representative of the hazards in all broadly similar circumstances. Problems for one particular butcher (as in the 1996 E. coli outbreak) are then portrayed as problems for the meat trade as a whole. A perceived inadequacy in the response by one organisation in one location is portrayed as a failing of similar organisations nationwide.

Organisations and companies with no direct involvement in the handling of a widely publicised incident may suddenly find themselves subject to scrutiny, and their operations questioned. They may need to revise working practices and priorities to meet public and governmental demands. In this way, a disaster in one location may become a low-intensity crisis for all other similar companies or organisations.

4.8.5

Cost

The scale and extent of low-intensity crises and disasters can result in massive, extended financial implications. Pennington (1997: 3) notes that the cost of producing the report alone was £45,000. To this must be added the cost of complying with the recommendations. The report estimates that there are 1,217 butchers shops in Scotland, and gives the following as the potential cost:

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Table 4: Costs of compliance with the Pennington recommendations Average capital cost per business (£) Business Category*

A

B

C

D

E

Additional equipment

20,000

15,000

9,500

9,000

6,000

Other costs (including structural alterations)

16,500

9,000

10,000

6,000

3,500

Total

36, 500

24,000

19,500

15,000

9,500

Source: Based on Pennington, 1997: 49 *Business category A: the manufacture of wholesale, and retail cooked meat and meat products B: the manufacture of cooked meat products for sale on own premises C: the manufacture of a limited range of cooked meats products for sale on own premises D: buying in an extensive range of cooked meat products for resale E: buying in a limited range of cooked meat products for resale The overall gross estimate to Scottish butchers alone was a capital cost of approximately £21 million, with an additional ongoing staffing cost of £20 million per annum (at 1997 prices) (Pennington, 1997: 49).

It was subsequently announced (Environmental Health News, 1997) that the government was to spend £19 million on increasing food safety. As noted in the previous section, the effects of isomorphism mean that the effects of the E. coli outbreak were being felt by every enforcement authority in the country. One organisation estimated that their share of the government funding would be £8,500 a year, but the increase in salary bill alone would be £25,000 a year. The local authority were having to find twothirds of the ‘knock-on’ costs of a food poisoning outbreak in which they had no involvement, by cutting other services.

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4.9 Conclusion 4.9.1

Involvement

It is possible to become caught up in a low-intensity crisis in several ways: •

as an organisation whose activities may have been instrumental in causing the crisis;

•

as an organisation responding to the crisis;

•

as an organisation which is a victim of the crisis;

•

as an organisation affected by the isomorphic aspects (the public application of ‘representativeness’).

Some of these forms of involvement may not be identified by a conventional hazard assessment process. Operational and special contingency plans must therefore be sufficiently flexible to be able to cope with the unexpected.

4.9.2

Recognition of a Low-Level Crisis

The starting point in managing any situation is the development of a mental picture (sometimes referred to as a ‘Mind Map’ or ‘Schema’, but referred to in an earlier unit as a ‘Hazard Construction’) of what can go / has gone wrong. This shapes the nature of the response, and if it is based on a narrow conceptual model of what could go wrong, and fails to recognise the possibility for certain types of emergency, it may leave the organisation very vulnerable. This means that actions may have been initiated and decisions taken without involving the whole range of organisations with an interest in the crisis.

Possible consequences could be: •

organisation members attempting to apply inappropriate rules and procedures;

•

the abandonment of pre-set procedures, with organisation members working without guidance, and making procedures up as they go along;

•

a failure to recognise the valid involvement of other organisations;

•

a failure of other organisations to recognise your own involvement.

As well as being highly stressful for those involved, these are a potential source of both conflict and a communication breakdown. They could go so far as to cause the contingency arrangements to fail, with the possibility of public criticism and litigation.

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Other organisations must be brought into the management rather belatedly, and management may involve a large element of damage limitation.

It also means that because a lead organisation may have failed to recognise the nature of a low-intensity crisis, other organisations who may have a role (or legal duty) cannot count on being contacted. It may be necessary to be proactive rather than reactive, if that role or obligation is to be recognised. This aspect could particularly be encountered if fairly rigid planning measures require a lead organisation to â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;declareâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; a major emergency, or trigger integrated response measures.

4.9.3

News Media Pressures

Often the threshold between a situation being regarded as routine, and being seen as a crisis may be fairly arbitrary, and may be media driven, rather than being an operational or practical decision. This indicates the value of proactive relationships with the news media, to avoid speculation which may escalate perception. It also suggests a need for media monitoring to determine how events are being portrayed.

4.9.4

Role Reversal

The extended nature of a low-intensity crisis usually leads to extended news media coverage. In the later stages the news media will be attempting to find different angles to cover, and this frequently leads to a critical evaluation of the roles of responding organisations. Similarly, the scale, cost and social implications mean that some form of inquiry is likely. Staff training and briefings may assist in overcoming the pressures of role reversal. These may also emphasise the need for complete and effective record keeping in case they are subsequently called to give evidence.

4.10 Guide to Reading Three articles have been provided. The first short (re-typed) article questions whether, with hindsight, the 1996 E. coli outbreak was predictable (Christopher, 1997).

The second reading is a journal article (Joffe, 2002), which offers a social psychology approach to understanding how social groups form their perceptions of health risks, which are potential low-intensity or long-wave crises.

The third reading is pages 1-24 of the UK Governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s current Rabies Contingency Plan. This was published in 2004 in draft for public consultation; the consultation period closed on 4 March 2005 and the comments can be viewed on the defra website.

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4.11 Study Questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University.

1.

The point has been made that a feature of crisis management is that there is a pivotal period where managerial decisions can lead to a successful outcome in that the disaster is avoided, or to failure, when all that remains is damage limitation and disaster recovery. A feature of low-intensity crises and disasters is that it may be difficult to recognise when the situation has entered this â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;crisis managementâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; phase. Prepare a checklist of indicators (for example, news media enquiries, calls from other organisations) which may alert a manager or controller to the possibility that a crisis may be developing.

2.

The article on the E. coli outbreak (Christopher, 1997) claims that with hindsight the outbreak was predictable. If this was the case, then this implies a failure in the risk assessment and control procedures which should have predicted and prevented it. The general duty of care placed on both companies and regulatory bodies is not unique to the food industry, and any individual or organisation could find themselves being scrutinised in the same way as those involved in this case. Consider any real or simulated incident which could involve your organisation, and assume you are to answer questions at a press conference.

What questions might an investigating journalist ask you, and how might you reply?

(Guide: to do this, try to identify stages in the management of the crisis where a decision may have to be made, for example, whether or not to commit resources, or to notify another organisation. For a manufacturing organisation it could be the decision to continue trading, or to institute a product recall. For a regulatory body, it could be the decision to invoke a statutory power. What options would be available, and how could you justify the one chosen?)

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4.12 Bibliography Baker, S. J. and Thomas, P. (undated) ‘A Summary of the Procedures for the Control of Wildlife Rabies in England and Wales’, Home Office Emergency Planning College Seminar Notes, unpublished.

Barnett, and Blaikie (1994) ‘Aids as a Long Wave Disaster’, in Varley, A. (ed.) Disasters, Development and Environment, London: John Wiley, pp. 139–61.

Bremner, C. and Tendler, S. (1988) ‘Israeli agency warned Pan Am of lax security’, The Times, Saturday 24 December: 2.

Christopher, P. (1997) ‘Was the E. Coli Outbreak Predictable?’, Journal of the Royal Society of Health 117(1): 40.

Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dawood, R. (1994) ‘Rabies Alert’, Traveller Magazine, June.

Department of Health and Social Security / Welsh Office (1977) Memorandum on Rabies, HMSO. Commission of the European Communities (1992) A Report on Various Aspects of Rabies, report submitted to the Scientific Veterinary Committee, 28 February 1992, EC Directorate General for Agriculture VI/1533/92-EN-REV.1.

Environmental Health News (1997) ‘Local Authorities Set to Bear the Costs of E. coli Vigilance, say CEHOs’, 12(38) (3 October): 1.

Environmental Health News (1998) ‘The Draft Food Safety (General Food Hygiene) (Butchers’ Shops) Amendment Regulations 1988’, 13(8) (27 February).

Eurotunnel (1994) ‘Eurotunnel Information Paper: Rabies and the Channel Tunnel’, Eurotunnel Publication – Miscellaneous M3/9, January.

Heinzen, B. (1996) Crisis Management and Scenarios: The Search for an Approach Methodology, Ministry of Home Affairs, The Netherlands.

Hole, N. H. (1969) ‘Rabies and Quarantine’, Nature 224 (October 18, 1969): 244–6.

Home Office (1997) Dealing with Disaster, 3rd edition, Liverpool: Brodie Publishing.

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Mason, D. (1997) ‘Barr Criminal Case Collapses as Evidence is Challenged’, Environmental Health News 12(42) (31 October): 1.

Mihill, C (1997) ‘Six million urged to get flu jabs’, The Guardian, Tuesday 1 October: 5.

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) (1971) Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Rabies – Final Report, Cmnd 4696, London: HMSO. New Scientist (1993a) ‘Rabies Risk’, 3 July: 11.

New Scientist (1993b) ‘Man’s Best Friend?’, 27 November: 3.

National Society for Clean Air (1983) The History of Air Pollution and its Control in Great Britain, Brighton: The National Society for Clean Air. Parry, G. (1988) ‘Hi-tech terrorists raise pressures on airport security problem that can never be beaten’, The Guardian , Friday 23 December: 5.

Pennington, T.H. (1997) Report on the Circumstances Leading to the 1996 Outbreak of Infection with E. coli 0157 in Central Scotland, the Implications for Food Safety and the Lessons to be Learned (The Pennington Group Report), HMSO. Sipica, C. and Smith, D. (1992) The Failed Turnaround of Pan American Airlines, Crisis Management Working Papers No.1, Liverpool John Moores University / Home Office Emergency Planning College.

Sprenger, R. (1983) Hygiene for Management, Highfield Publications.

Sunday Post (1998) ‘Compensation fears for E. Coli death families’, 15 March: 3.

Warwickshire County Council Emergency Planning Unit (1993) Rabies – Exercise K9 Report.

World Health Organisation (1997) Prevention and Control of Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC) Infections, Report of WHO Consultation, Geneva Switzerland, 28 April–1 May 1997 (WHO Food Safety Unit, document WHO/FSF/FOS/97.6).

Yorkshire Evening Press (YEP) (1998a) ‘50 nurses downed by “flu” at hospital’, 12 February: 1.

Yorkshire Evening Press (1998b) ‘Hospital flu crisis eases’, February: 1.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Was the E. coli Outbreak Predictable?â&#x20AC;&#x2122; Christopher, P. (1997) Journal of the Royal Society of Health.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Representations of health risks: What social psychology can offer health promotionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Joffe, H. (2002) Health Education Journal, 61(2), 153-165.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING ‘Defra Rabies Contingency Plan’ (2004) DEFRA’s Rabies Contingency Plan Draft, 7 December 2004.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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UNIT 5 Urban Area Evacuation

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

Contents 5.1

Aims and Objectives of this Unit

5-5

5.2

Introduction

5-5

5.3

Organisations Involved in Evacuation

5-7

5.4

Framework of Operation

5-8

5.5

Factors Influencing Evacuation

5-13

5.6

Warning

5-16

5.7

Hospitals and Residential Homes

5-17

5.8

Area Clearance

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5.9

Transport

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5.10 Care of Evacuees

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5.11 Return and Rehabilitation

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5.12 Conclusions

5-24

5.13 Guide to Reading

5-26

5.14 Suggested Further Reading

5-26

5.15 Study Questions

5-26

5.16 Bibliography

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Readings

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Appendix

5-47

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5.1 Aims and Objectives of this Unit The aim of this Unit is to examine the principles and factors involved in the evacuation of an urban population, with particular reference to the societal organisations within the United Kingdom. The Unit looks at the expectations and problems both of those being evacuated and the organisations involved in the decision-making process. The topics covered are the organisations involved, the framework of operation, factors influencing the decision to evacuate, warning, special cases, area clearance, transportation, care of evacuees, and the return and rehabilitation aspects. At the end of the Unit you should have an understanding of the key elements, their relationships with the decision-making process and the factors which should be taken into account when considering an urban evacuation.

It should be emphasised that this Unit describes UK practice. Other countries apply different criteria and deploy different agencies, for example a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;national guardâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in emergencies. As you will soon realise from your study of Module 5, this unit was written before the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 came into force and created a new statutory framework for the UKâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s national emergency response arrangements.

In May 2006, when this Module was being prepared for printing, the Government was working on a new guidance document on evacuation and so revision of this unit (from section 5.3 onwards) was deferred until it could incorporate that new material.

Meanwhile this text still gives a useful description of the issues and principles involved in this important part of disaster response management

5.2 Introduction Too often emergency planning has been perceived as little more than a function of the emergency services assisted in some way by the local authorities and other organisations when the need arises. In turn, the local authority departments, public utilities and voluntary organisations have frequently visualised their possible involvement in a major emergency only from their own position or speciality. An effective integrated emergency response requires that all organisations at all levels each play their part with their own roles and responsibilities and in support of each other. Unfortunately there is no national framework of warning and response in the event of a major emergency which may involve the complete evacuation of part or all of an urban area.

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There is a wealth of experience throughout the world, particularly of large scale population movements following natural disasters (Wisner et al.,2004). The available literature concerning evacuation includes special measures within the hazard areas around technological hazards, general factors such as control and co-ordination of the agencies involved, and concerns for the care of evacuees and rehabilitation. One important research question has been the likely reactions of people caught up in disaster situations.

Authorities have also expressed concern about whether they should expect community residents to respond in an orderly and rational fashion when disaster strikes, or whether panic and other maladaptive behaviors will be common.

(Tierney et al.,2001:106) When considering the wide variety of emergencies that have taken place throughout the world in recent years, it takes little imagination to visualise how similar disasters could have affected the UK. However, there have been few emergencies in the UK that have generated numbers of homeless people which, for the local authorities, could be considered a large-scale evacuation.

Within the context of the organisation of the emergency services and local government in the United Kingdom, a major emergency may be defined as: Any event (happening with or without warning) causing or threatening death or injury, damage to property or to the environment or disruption to the community, which because of the scale of its effects cannot be dealt with by the emergency services and local authorities as part of their dayto-day activities.

(Home Office, 1997: 1) Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) was progressively adopted by local authorities, and emergency plans have been prepared and exercised with this definition in mind.

Certain emergency situations occur with some frequency and specific responses can be prepared to cope with particular problems, for example those associated with flooding and certain hazardous installations. A key step in this process is ensuring a good understanding of the roles of all organisations that may be involved in the major emergency.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the supporting Regulations and statutory guidance has consolidated previous organisations and practices that had developed at local levels to deliver IEM for a wide range of possible scenarios. It has also extended central Governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s â&#x20AC;&#x153;powers to intervene and take control during situations defined as an emergencyâ&#x20AC;? (Borodzicz,2005:102).

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5.3 Organisations Involved in Evacuation While it may be necessary for any individual, industrial concern (particularly in relation to their own premises) or organisation to initiate an evacuation in urgent circumstances the police, if available, will take the overall lead role in any evacuation. In the event of a major evacuation of a large urban area, it is essential that this role of control and coordination at the scene is understood by all the organisations that would be involved.

The police do not have the power to force people to evacuate from their homes but once the population is on public land they can exercise control to discipline traffic flow and to direct people to Evacuation Assembly Points. Equally important, they can prevent movement into unsafe areas or premature return into the evacuation zone.

In many circumstances the fire service will be likely to take control at the site of the incident or at the source of the problem if one can be identified. In many incidents, they will have valuable and rapid access to experts and expert information. The fire service will frequently assist the police in the general evacuation process and they will take a lead role in certain circumstances, for example when special rescue arrangements are required or when special equipment is necessary to prevent injury or loss of life.

The National Health Service (NHS) will provide the total service of treating the casualties arising from any incident while maintaining care for the sick. In the event of an evacuation this will include any evacuation of hospitals and as far as possible, in co-operation with the local authorityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Social Services Department, the evacuation of nursing homes and similar private establishments in the area. It is well established that the ambulance service will be the initial point of contact to trigger the NHS response to any incident involving immediate casualties. Ambulance Service procedures involve the alerting of appropriate hospitals to treat casualties. If required, expert medical attention can be directed to the scene in the form of Medical Incident Officers and Mobile Medical Teams. Individual ambulance services have standing arrangements to call for immediate support from the ambulance services of neighbouring health authorities and, if appropriate, they will liaise with the voluntary aid societies to gain the use of their vehicles. In the event of any requirement for additional transport, such as coaches for sitting case patients, they may seek support by contacting the local authority Emergency Planning Team. Any transfer of patients between hospitals will be organised by direct contact between the Ambulance Liaison Officers at hospitals and the Ambulance Control.

As well as having an overall co-ordinating role within their own boundaries, district councils will have the responsibility of caring for the evacuees. This will start with arranging transport from the Evacuation Assembly Points and will end with the return home, or in extreme circumstances with finding suitable alternative accommodation.

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(borough or district council) and other organisations involved will be a major task. A local authority will provide emergency centres where representatives of all the organisations involved can share information, decide tactics and commit resources. If the incident involves more than one local authority, an agreed â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;lead authorityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; will establish overall co-ordination as necessary, while individual authorities will continue to act within their own boundaries essentially independently of each other.

If circumstances are beyond the capability of the emergency services or the borough/ district councilsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ability to cope, or if special assistance or resources are required, then access can be made to additional management, manpower, specialists and hardware either by invoking mutual aid agreements or by alerting the local authority Emergency Planning Unit who will arrange for the appropriate parts of strategic emergency plans to be implemented. If the incident involves more than one county, the county council will establish liaison with the adjacent counties involved and, if required, with the appropriate government departments.

In the event of a large-scale evacuation, a number of voluntary organisations specialising in the care of people and animals could be involved.

While the county council can obtain useful help and advice via a range of special arrangements such as the Armed Forces Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) scheme, and consultation with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), there is no simple lead into government resources.

5.4 Framework of Operation Alerting is a process whereby the emergency services and other organisations are informed that there is, or there is likely to be, an incident which will affect people, property or the environment and may need their involvement. In desperate circumstances the alerting process may follow many paths but the essential step is informing the police. This initial contact will ensure that all relevant organisations will be alerted.

On receiving and authenticating the alerting message, the police will ensure that the relevant emergency services, the local authority Emergency Planning Unit and public utilities, as required, are alerted. The Emergency Planning Unit will alert the appropriate borough/district councils, county departments and voluntary organisations as necessary.

If required, mechanisms exist whereby the military can be alerted so that they can assist the police and provide manpower and resources to assist the local authorities (MACC).

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On deciding to warn the public and prepare for an evacuation, certain information needs to be communicated quickly and efficiently. It is essential that the public take the warning seriously, note its content and respond. It is normally the police who recommend whether or not to evacuate and define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will take account of advice from the fire service on risks associated with fire, contamination and other hazards, from the ambulance and social services on problems associated with moving people who are frail or disabled or at risk for any other reason and from local authorities on possible places to shelter within the area.

The police can only recommend evacuation and have no power to require people to leave their homes. Past experience has shown that people with pets may be unwilling to leave their homes unless arrangements include their pets.

Under present warning arrangements the police will inform the public via mobile public address systems or door-to-door contact. The public will be warned to evacuate immediately or could be instructed to tune to local radio for further information. It is possible that the public may require additional confirmatory information from a credible source and plans must address the means to achieve authoritative announcements. Most local authorities are installing two-way communications systems in sheltered housing schemes which may prove useful in emergency situations such as evacuation. Local radio and possibly television could be employed to relay warning messages prepared by the police, but unless and until this system is firmly established, there can be no certainty that an acceptable proportion of the population affected will be listening to a radio or watching television.

Emergency centres are established with various management links for control, coordination, communication and information exchange in an emergency situation. These centres are either a purpose-built structure, or a designated room, with established communications systems and support services which can be activated at short notice.

Smaller organisations and departments of larger organisations should consider standing arrangements to set up emergency control and co-ordination arrangements.

After the assessment of an incident resulting in a decision to warn the public to evacuate any area, the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations will all be involved in the resulting activities. Normally, local authority control and co-ordination will take place at the borough/district councilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s designated Emergency Centre with representatives from the involved departments, the county council and other involved organisations as necessary. For any incident involving a major evacuation beyond the resource of an individual borough/district or affecting more than one local authority, the agreed lead authority may assume responsibility for overall co-ordination of activities and the provision of support and services where and when needed.

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The first police officer at the scene, subsequently reinforced by more senior ranks as they arrive, will set up the Police Forward Control. The main point of contact for the Forward Control will be the Police Incident Control Room usually set up at the nearest police station or at a suitable location near the scene of the incident. As well as providing the location for control and co-ordination of resources operating in the local authority area, the local authority Emergency Centre (EC) may be established to provide a communication and information centre and to provide for the representation of all organisations involved. Other organisations may establish their own Emergency Centres to co-ordinate their dedicated functions. These centres will be designated by the organisation and staffed accordingly. To ensure overall co-ordination, it will be essential that all involved organisations are represented at the local authority Emergency Centre.

Information has to be communicated and all available systems should be made accessible to establish and maintain links between the organisations involved.

Information exchange is an essential process in order to effect a successful evacuation.

Even with modern systems recent incidents have illustrated that difficulties with communications can create uncertainty and confusion. All organisations should plan to achieve a mechanism for the immediate and spontaneous exchange of information by the best available means (telephone, radio, speech, written, etc.). It cannot be overemphasised that messages must be clear, concise and correct.

Organisational activity during the evacuation process will rely largely upon the public telephone service, often using mobile phones. Additionally, local operational activity for some organisations will be carried out with dedicated radio communications. In the event of failure of the telephone network, there could be serious disruptions to the operations but most organisations have alternative systems that can be employed.

Telephone exchanges are frequently located in the town centre and serve the urban and surrounding areas. The exchange may be affected during an incident if staff have to evacuate. Evacuation plans should recognise this eventuality. In any incident telephone traffic increases dramatically because of public concern and media interest.

When there is a major evacuation, overloading is inevitable. In these circumstances British Telecom and other service providers may need to take action on their own initiative by, for example, implementing the Government Telephone Preference Scheme (GTPS) which limits the number of subscribers who can initiate calls. The GTPS does not affect the ability to receive calls on any telephone on the system. It is likely that future developments with the installation of new telephone exchanges will provide more options for British Telecom and other service providers in such difficult circumstances. Local authorities, the emergency services and other statutory and private bodies operate private wire systems for intra- and certain inter-organisational communications. Such speech and data links may be more reliable and efficient than a switched system during a major emergency.

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Most of the organisations involved in the evacuation process will establish alternative communication systems to minimise disruption in the event of any failure of their principal system. Alternative systems may operate in parallel to the established system as required. Voluntary emergency communications groups (e.g. RAYNET) exist which operate fixed and mobile radio equipment in support of the local authorities and the emergency services, and arrangements normally exist for their call out by the police or local authority.

Receiving and disseminating information is dependent upon effective communications links being established during an emergency. Organisations involved in the evacuation process need information on a range of subjects, in many forms and by different means.

Decisions cannot be made effectively or objectively without adequate information. Coordination of information gathering and dissemination between involved organisations, or at least sharing of mutually beneficial information, is necessary to meet the needs of large-scale evacuation. Gathering information can be an aggressive or passive activity.

Organisations will establish their own emergency centres and the establishment of these centres will in itself generate information and each will act as a focus for information flow. Information officers should be appointed to manage this flow of information so that the needs of that particular management structure are satisfied and relevant information is disseminated to other centres and organisations. Information should be analysed and recorded throughout in order to create a useful database.

The initial gathering of information on which decisions will be based is of particular importance in any emergency which may lead to evacuation. The police have the responsibility for the initial analysis of the incident and to assess its potential ramifications. Active information gathering will be required for factors such as location, materials involved, wind speed and direction, topography and possible effects. The police have access to specialist advice from various sources but any delay in obtaining key information may be crucial and may be overtaken by events at the scene.

Consultation with specialists will take place either at the scene or via a police station or the fire brigade using telephone or radio communications.

The objective decision to evacuate is a balance of what is desirable based on the available information on the risk versus what action is possible in the time given. The extent of information available to the decision-makers at this point â&#x20AC;&#x201C; police, fire brigade, company site controller, local experts or local inhabitants â&#x20AC;&#x201C; may critically affect the outcome. Without adequate information about the incident, an objective decision cannot be made and there is a danger that an evacuation decision may be based upon speculation or over-emphasis on a worst-case scenario. In the absence of information or instinct for self-preservation there may be no evacuation in circumstances in which it should be essential.

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Once a decision to evacuate has been made, the major information flow for the alerting and warning organisations will change from one of active information gathering to widespread dissemination to the people and organisations involved. When the evacuation has started, all organisations involved must adopt an active information seeking system in order to satisfy the requirements within their own organisation and to clarify the situation from their operational viewpoint. For clarity of purpose and to avoid duplication and omissions the information must be shared between organisations at all levels. Information sorting, analysis and storage will take place at the emergency centres set up by the organisations involved. Such centres will have their own organisational requirements for information which will be extracted from the total flow. Requirements of other organisations will be filtered and given in response to either specific requests or in anticipation of needs.

Emergency Centres will disseminate information as well as collect it. The need for dissemination will depend on the internal requirements of the particular organisation and the perceived and actual requirements outside that organisation. It is often difficult for organisations to consider the needs of other organisations at the start of an emergency or during periods of high internal communications activity. Direct requests for information will flow throughout the event between all involved organisations. During the actual process of evacuation (moving out, administration, arrival at rest centres, rehabilitation, etc.) it can be anticipated that there will be a continuous need to collect and provide information in response to the heavy demand from those involved, the media and the public. Staff operating at the time will be expected to deal with a wide variety of questions ranging from the general evacuation to personal details concerning the evacuees. Information to respond to these questions will be generated by appropriate liaison and discussion between the officers at the various emergency centres.

For an incident requiring a large-scale evacuation, there is likely to be a deluge of information, and the training of officers in operational procedures employed in emergency centres is essential to make effective use of the available information.

Experience suggests that without such training unnecessary delays of hours or even days in the exchange of essential information will occur. It is inevitable that rumours will develop in a situation where information is not fully available and the public do not fully appreciate or understand the reasons for evacuation. Rumours will often be a result of resentment and misunderstanding when the public or individuals are, or believe that they are, not in full possession of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;the factsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; of the situation. This is likely to occur during periods of relative inactivity as would be experienced in rest centres.

It is essential that evacuees and the public are kept informed of the situation and that the information should be provided by an authoritative source.

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A Casualty Information Bureau (CIB) may be activated on the authority of a senior police officer in anticipation of an overwhelming number of calls from the public that will be generated by a decision to evacuate a substantial urban area. The criteria for deciding whether or not to activate a CIB in a particular situation is the number of enquiries likely or possible from members of the public and not the actual number of persons killed, injured or displaced. Police experience has shown that in the event of a major incident, nation-wide enquiries may commence in less than an hour. Efficient enquiry services separately for casualties and general information have to be quickly established by the police. The CIB will be established in a designated room at the police HQ, which has been specially equipped with multiple line communications and other facilities, staffed by police personnel. It will be responsible, inter alia, for collating and maintaining records of casualties, the homeless, evacuees, police officers involved in the incident, etc. and linking these with enquiries from the public and relatives. Information handled and stored by the CIB will concern only those directly affected and it must not be seen or used as a general source of information concerning the incident. To help prevent overloading the CIB, as much information as possible will be given to the media.

Even so there will be many specific queries that are not directly concerned with casualties which must be directed by the CIB personnel to the offices of the relevant authority such as the emergency services, public utilities, local authorities, etc.

5.5 Factors Influencing Evacuation In certain circumstances the need to evacuate may be so obvious that the decisionmaking process is irrelevant and on their arrival the emergency services may find that, for a localised area, the evacuation step itself is under way or complete. However, if a substantial area is involved, the police will be faced with a most complex task.

Before deciding that evacuation is necessary, many or all of the factors given below will need to be considered.

The â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;999â&#x20AC;&#x2122; system for alerting the emergency services works well provided telephones are available. In a situation where the telephone system is out of order, an alternative means of notifying the police will be essential. While in a rural area this could be a difficult task, in an urban area contact with any member of the emergency services will enable a radio message call to be routed to the police. The value of an alerting message will depend on the source. At best the call will come from an expert employed at the source of the hazard or from a trained representative of the emergency services.

At the other end of the spectrum, there may be a vague, yet significant call from a member of the public which will require authentication by the police.

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For a number of locations, such as those installations which fall under the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations (COMAH) 1999, specific emergency plans to meet well defined threats have been prepared within the framework of the ‘All Hazards’ major emergency plans. Training and exercises are part of the emergency planning process and the major incident training carried out by the police and other authorities will contribute in the event of a major evacuation. At this time the scenario of the evacuation of a major town does not feature in major incident training and training for specific hazards is not common. However, even though major emergency incidents are rarely repeated, each one provides potentially useful training for the future since the same basic management principles tend to apply.

The evacuation process itself is not without risk and this must be considered when deciding whether or not to evacuate. For example, mass evacuation by car must increase the possibility of road accidents and in some cases, excitement and stress may have adverse effects on the elderly and the sick. The evacuation of hospital patients and the sick, handicapped and infirm within the community poses particular problems and difficulties. It must be acknowledged that there may be reluctance and clinical pressures acting against any decision to evacuate as a matter of prudence because of the possible catastrophic effect on the seriously ill.

Before embarking on a major evacuation, the police will need to validate the emergency situation, seek expert advice from the fire service or other sources, assess the potential impact of the threat and identify possible alternatives before making a decision. In certain circumstances the threat may be reasonably well defined and within the experience or training of the police and/or their advisers. This may enable a decision to be made with some confidence. However, it is much more likely that there will be a lack of information and complicating factors which have to be considered before making a decision. Within the assessment process the police will need to judge whether ‘evacuation’ really is the best policy. In recent years increasing weight has been given to ‘shelter’, i.e. remain inside a building with doors and windows closed, as preferred advice in a number of circumstances. The ‘shelter’ strategy could be a better solution: (a)

for short-term (puff) releases of toxic gas or vapour;

(b)

during hours when most of the population is asleep;

(c)

if the threat timetable is unpredictable in the short term;

(d)

if the information is weak or in doubt;

(e)

if the outdoor threat is high e.g. thermal radiation or blast;

(f)

if there is airborne or deposited toxic or radioactive material;

(g)

when resources to carry out evacuation are inadequate or not available;

(h)

when the population is relatively immobile;

(i)

if the threat is imminent; and

(j)

the greater the distance is from the source.

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A useful strategy, particularly when the short-term risk is low but the long-term risk is high, may be to shelter while evacuation is being organised.

When people are sleeping, the breathing rate is reduced and there is a good chance that they will be on an upper floor in a secure dwelling with reduced ventilation rate.

These factors tend to reduce the risk from airborne hazards, particularly toxic gases that are heavier than air. Being indoors can also reduce the effect of certain physical threats such as gamma and thermal radiation and blast. On the other hand, this situation makes the warning process more difficult, less certain and tends to increase the delay before people take action. Thus, if other factors allow, it may be better to delay evacuation until the population is awake and to use the time to plan and gather resources. At weekends and bank holidays, the holiday season and on special occasions such as a show or rally, there can be substantial shifts or concentrations of populations.

Often people in these circumstances may have very limited protection, even from the weather, and special consideration or priority for evacuation may be desirable.

In general terms, there is no authority that can be used to ensure that the public will evacuate from private premises. The police are able to control movement in public places and could restrict entry or return into the evacuation area. There are, however, exceptions in the enforcement of evacuation. For example, Social Services has specific responsibilities in relation to children and others in need of care and protection. However, in reality such action is likely to be impractical within the required time scale. In desperate circumstances the only realistic course of action may be to give priority to those who are prepared to accept advice and evacuate. The real authority in this situation is not based on law but on factors such as the perceived threat, education, experience, domestic circumstances (in terms of children, pets, property) and attitude to authority (compliance).

If the public see or hear about neighbours being evacuated they may follow and selfevacuate depending on the threat. This may be helpful in speeding up the total evacuation but it can also create problems of control or limitation of the extent of the evacuation.

For larger incidents, the public may identify that there is a threat by various means, particularly radio or television, and decide on this basis to take action. In this way, substantial numbers may self-evacuate and compound the problems for those who have been advised by the emergency services to evacuate or shelter. This so-called â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;evacuation shadow effectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (Zeigler et al.,1981), in which large numbers spontaneously evacuate from a wider area outside the designated risk zone, has been observed at incidents like Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, and during US East Coast hurricanes, and is presumably due to the publicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s perception of danger (Tierney et al.,2001:85). Clearly the media can be highly influential during any evacuation. Accurate reporting and information are likely to be highly beneficial. On the other hand careless, sensational reporting could turn a major emergency in one area into a disaster nearby.

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5.6

Warning

When there is an easily defined threat and well-established response pattern, simple systems such as sirens may be used to warn the public to take the required action including seeking further information. Even so, a substantial proportion of the population may not hear or accept the warning for many reasons including confusion with other sounds, hearing defects and lack of understanding. In the absence of an ideal means of informing the community of the need to evacuate, a variety of methods will need to be considered. Loud hailers, radio, television, press announcements, personal call, etc. all have their merits in differing circumstances but no single method is likely to reach even a high proportion of a large population that needs to be warned to evacuate. It is important to avoid broadcasts which are ambiguous or likely to promote panic. In practice this will be difficult since the police can only try to influence the media. The media in Britain are largely outside the control of the authorities. If loud hailers or radio broadcasts are used then the content of the message should be carefully worded and consistently used. The message should state the genuine reasons for evacuation and the location and directions to the Evacuation Assembly Points to be used. Firm but considerate handling of all evacuees is necessary. If circumstances permit, information relevant to the rest centres can be included in the evacuation message. A calm and considered approach towards evacuation will heighten public confidence and speed the process of evacuation. In circumstances requiring the most immediate response by the public the message should be as simple and positive as possible.

Initially, the police will deal with enquiries from the media and over the years this has developed into an expectation that the police will: (a)

make an announcement to the media;

(b)

provide information and advice for the media to give to the public; and

(c)

provide the telephone number of a CIB for the media to convey to the public.

Response to this by the media can be mixed although local radio can usually be relied upon to be helpful and to transmit messages to the public quickly and accurately. There is no formal media protocol for alerting and informing the public. This means that media announcements may not have the required impact on the population under threat. To avoid conflicting information and confusion of the public, all organisations should be urged to direct initial queries from the media to the police. It can be expected that with time, media interests change from reporting the actual occurrence to reporting the effects on various organisations and ultimately to human interest stories. Thus all organisations and the companies concerned must be prepared to answer media queries concerning their own activities and their own employees as the emergency situation develops.

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Provision of clear, accurate, up-to-date information to the public during an emergency will provide helpful reassurance and will help motivate those who have to heed the warning. Even so, there will be some who will not be satisfied that evacuation is the best course of action or that the hazard has passed. Individuals may need to be offered more tangible evidence that they are not at risk. For example, specialists may need to monitor individuals for radioactive contamination to provide reassurance after a nuclear accident. Consideration must also be given to those not in danger who need not take action, particularly those at the fringes of the incident, or upwind, or who may detect the incident as a result of smell or smoke. Reassuring the public helps to avoid complications arising from self-evacuation, the unnecessary use of the telephone system and the effects of rumours. In this last respect, positive action may be necessary in association with the media to overcome misunderstandings or even deliberately misleading information.

5.7 Hospitals and Residential Homes The evacuation of a major hospital may absorb the full resources of the District Health Authority (DHA) involved and the ambulance service. In general terms, approximately 50 percent of in-patients could be categorised as convalescent, 40 percent stretcher cases (the acutely ill and severely disabled) and 10 percent dangerously ill for whom movement would pose severe problems. Such an evacuation will also demand considerable external support, particularly in terms of attendants (1:2 patient overall) and suitable means of transport for sitting-case convalescent patients. Depending on the time of day, evacuation may be complicated by day hospital and out-patient attendance. There would be knockon effects, extending throughout the Regional Health Authority area and probably beyond, in the relocation of in-patients. For any prolonged closure of out-patient clinics, alternative arrangements would have to be made with neighbouring DHAs. From any large town there would be a substantial number of patients to be evacuated from nursing homes, sheltered accommodation, hostels and their own homes. Identification of immediate needs for an ever changing population of the elderly, handicapped and infirm would demand the co-operation of hospitals, general practitioners, Social Services Department(s) and voluntary organisations such as the Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS), Help the Aged and Age Concern. The DHA would co-operate with the police in establishing a CIB to record details of casualties and the relocation of patients. It is likely that the pressure of media attention could centre on the care being provided for those unable to fend for themselves.

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The implementation of any evacuation plan for substantial numbers would be prolonged as a result of the need to: (a)

concentrate ambulance service vehicles from dispersed locations in the area and beyond;

(b)

acquire additional transport, e.g. coaches;

(c)

recruit and assemble additional attendants;

(d)

identify suitable accommodation for patients; and

(e)

collate information on the numbers, category and location of those in residential care or in their own homes.

While a high proportion of patients may be moved in an evacuation there are likely to be clinical pressures against moving patients for whom relocation might be traumatic.

The decision to evacuate or not evacuate such patients will rest with the Regional Health Authority. There will be a requirement to seek volunteers to stay with patients who could not be moved. There will also be pressures on general practitioners for advice on prophylactic measures, for example for incidents involving chemicals and radiation, and the DHA could be involved in conjunction with local authorities in various environmental health problems as a consequence of evacuation.

It will be readily apparent that evacuation of hospital in-patients and the elderly, sick, handicapped and infirm within the community, poses distinct problems which have a direct bearing on the fundamental decision to implement evacuation.

5.8 Area Clearance The evacuation process may be considered to comprise four stages: decision, notification, preparation and the actual evacuation to a safe location. In the case of a large-scale evacuation the preparation stage will probably involve the largest number of organisations and may thus generate the greatest frustration, if only because of communications difficulties. The need for evacuation will be confirmed by the Police Incident Commander with due regard to advice given by experts and will establish the physical size of the area to be cleared. The responsibility for transportation, accommodation and feeding of evacuees rests with the local authority and they should be advised at an early stage. Once a decision to evacuate has been taken, the police will define the area to be evacuated, establish control, regulate the movement of people and vehicles and arrange for the process of evacuation. In this process the police will

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need to identify the component parts of the area that is affected since their response will need to be adjusted to cope with a variety of static and dynamic situations including normal housing areas, shopping centres, hospitals, events such as football matches, factories, office blocks, road, rail and air traffic, etc. As well as documenting all evacuees the police will aim to list all persons who decline to leave the area after being warned.

The boundary of the evacuation area will need to be clearly defined and, if possible, easy to identify. If available, local knowledge should be employed to make maximum use of natural or easily identifiable barriers such as walls, buildings, rivers and roads.

A map of the largest practical scale should form the basis for planning and plotting the implementation of the evacuation. The size of the area or the population density will indicate whether or not the area requires sub-division into sectors in order to facilitate control of the operation. Although technically feasible there is at present no easy and direct means of identifying the locations of the population below ward or parish level (i.e. below the smallest level of political administration).

The area to be evacuated will be sectored by the Police Evacuation Officer. Once evacuated, each sector will be secured until the whole evacuation area has been cleared.

Once each team has completed its task of evacuating a sector, an organised withdrawal to the perimeter will be required in order to maintain security and safeguard the police personnel involved. The perimeter of the evacuated area will need to be policed in order to prevent both criminal and innocent breaches. Evidence from previous emergencies suggests that looting would not be a major problem.

Business and entertainment activities tend to concentrate people into single or groups of buildings or areas with relatively few exit points. The occupation of multi-storey buildings further exacerbates this problem. The evacuation warning will have to be transmitted to all occupants who will then leave the building(s). There is a danger that the time to evacuate large buildings and crowded areas will be seriously underestimated. Industrial and business sites can be extensive with personnel spread over a considerable geographical area. This poses problems of warning, assembly and evacuation. However, the process is likely to be similar to that for incidents involving fire which are generally well practised. The evacuation of a large assembly of the public, for example a theatre or football ground, will not have the benefit of practice and great care will be necessary to avoid panic.

During an evacuation, and if circumstances permit, most owners will wish to take their pets with them. For those who elect for accommodation at Rest Centres arrangements will be made by the local authority with appropriate organisations such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) to care for the animals until the owners return home or move to more permanent accommodation.

In assessing the area that is being evacuated, the police will aim to identify any domestic University of Leicester

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animals remaining in the evacuation area. As appropriate and practicable the police, DEFRA, RSPCA and the local Trading Standards Department will arrange for the care, treatment and if possible evacuation of domestic animals. In the case of an incident affecting a livestock market an attempt will be made to load the animals back on to any available transport at the site. Some markets may have the capacity for the majority of the animals to be removed.

5.9 Transport If evacuation is to take place over a wide area, then all available transport must be used to move the evacuees out of the hazard zone. The buses, ambulances and special vehicles operated by organisations such as the Regional Health Authority, Social Services Department and certain voluntary organisations will be employed to capacity during a major evacuation for moving patients and those with mobility problems.

Depending on the time available such transport may need to be supplemented by adapting any vehicles that are available. There are a variety of transport systems that could be employed in the event of a major emergency depending upon circumstances and availability of resources.

Rail offers advantages in capacity, ease of control and little conflict with other transport systems. However, railway lines are inflexible, loading and unloading are time consuming and usually have to be carried out at fixed points. In the event of the failure of electrical power, networks which operate on an electrified third rail or pantograph system may have to consider alternative diesel traction should there be an urgent and immediate call for use in an evacuation.

Since the deregulation of road passenger transport, the provision of buses and coaches is undertaken by a large number of companies of varying size, many of which provide local bus services or operate school transport contracts. This makes the problem of assembling large numbers of buses and crews more difficult than in the past and subsequent control of movement would need to be with the local authority rather than with the bus companies.

Buses and coaches offer the advantages of wide dispersion, flexibility and an independent power supply. When they are used in a large-scale evacuation, careful consideration must be given to control, co-ordination and the supply of fuel.

Many schools, taxi firms, hire companies, sports clubs, voluntary organisations and so on operate minibuses which could provide useful flexibility for small groups of people or where access is restricted. Some of these groups operate vehicles with side or tail-lift facilities for use by the handicapped. However, the major operators of such

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vehicles are the Social Services Department and in an emergency situation it would be expected that these vehicles would be fully committed to the transport of the elderly, handicapped, sick and infirm. Minibuses offer the advantages of flexibility and access with a door to door capability but are labour intensive and as with buses, pose problems of control, co-ordination and fuel supply.

Local organisations and local authorities may have a number of cars, vans and minibuses. Organisations such as the Automobile Association (AA) and Royal Automobile Club (RAC) could provide valuable assistance in the area of traffic control, communications, signposting, etc.

Many local authority owned vehicles have the advantage of installed radios which offer a means of co-ordination from a designated emergency centre. The actual vehicle movements will be controlled by an emergency centre set up by the appropriate department of the district concerned. As necessary they will establish contacts with the liaison officers of the supporting transport companies and organisations involved.

In the event of a major evacuation, transport and resources may be required from well beyond the boundaries of the district involved. A County Transport Co-ordinator (CTC) may be appointed to co-ordinate the provision of transport as necessary on a county-wide basis.

5.10 Care of Evacuees The police will maintain a written record to ensure as thorough evacuation as possible and will satisfy themselves that each building under their control is declared clear or not, and marked as such. A record will be required of any persons who refuse to be evacuated. If there is no reply from an address and if time permits, enquiries will be made to check if the premises are occupied. In cases of doubt, it may be necessary, at the discretion of the police, to physically enter and check the premises.

Evacuees will be directed or taken from the evacuation area to the Evacuation Assembly Point which will be the control point through which they will pass. To avoid logistic problems at the Evacuation Assembly Points, evacuees within the control of the police will be split into two categories: (a)

those who wish to provide their own transport and make their own arrangements; and

(b)

those who will go to the organised rest centres using their own transport, which will be encouraged, or by transport organised by the local authority.

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Those evacuees making their own arrangements for transport and accommodation will, if it is possible, be documented by the police with the aid of a well established card system with details including their destination for future contact. These cards will then be forwarded to the CIB at Police HQ. Comprehensive documentation of evacuees cannot be guaranteed since some may avoid the routes controlled by the police. In extreme circumstances it may be necessary to allocate all resources to ensuring rapid evacuation.

In this event or in a prolonged evacuation the police will request such evacuees to register their safe exit at some more convenient time and location. Those reporting to rest centres will be documented there. Where possible, a police officer will be sent to each rest centre to assist in the documentation. Documentation of evacuees in these circumstances is likely to be reasonably efficient, and computerised systems to aid this process are being developed following the Zeebrugge disaster experience.

The police will normally assemble the evacuees that are reasonably mobile and requiring transport at Evacuation Assembly Points from where the local authority will take responsibility for their transport to the rest centres. If circumstances permit the local Social Services Department will arrange to collect people with mobility problems and transfer them to the rest centres or other more suitable accommodation.

Rest centres will be established under the overall co-ordination of the district council to provide short-term accommodation and feeding facilities for those who have not had access to alternative accommodation or have specifically chosen the rest centres.

The district council will be assisted by Social Services staff and volunteers. Buildings have already been identified as suitable for use as rest centres in most local authority areas and are registered as having adequate space for sleeping or sitting, and toilet and washing facilities for a specified number of people. The provision of meals and drinks will be required if the evacuees need to be accommodated for more than a few hours. Meals may have to be provided by various outside organisations, or prepared on the premises if kitchen facilities are available. Staff operating rest centres will be expected to provide information to the evacuees and deal with their queries. There will be a number of administrative functions to be carried out in addition to the documentation required by the police.

Some or all of the evacuees may require longer term accommodation, for example if houses have been damaged or destroyed during the incident (as at Flixborough) or there is dangerous, long-term contamination of the area. It may be possible to provide local authority houses, private accommodation, caravans or to lodge such people with other families particularly those of relations or friends. Alternatively, they could be accommodated in hotels, hostels, holiday camps, etc. The district council has a duty to house the homeless until they can return to their own homes which, subject to safety, should be a priority objective.

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Experience of evacuation and rest centre operations has shown that the issue of pets will create problems. Despite the attachment of owners it is planned that pets will not generally be allowed into rest centres as they can generate conflict and health problems.

Whereas separation of people and their pets limits problems such as mess, space, noise, feeding, health risks, etc. it will be necessary to show that they are being cared for by organisations such as the RSPCA. Care and comfort to the victims of a disaster is expected from any society and the longer term effects are well known if not well understood. Less well established is the effect on staff, volunteers and workers involved in such incidents who can become the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;hidden victimsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; of the disaster, stressed by traumatic exposure to death, destruction and loss.

This effect has been demonstrated in recent disasters such as the Bradford City fire, Herald of Free Enterprise incident and the Kingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Cross Underground fire. Social Service Departments have recognised the need to cater for counselling staff and workers, including police officers, fire brigade staff, medical staff, etc. as well as the victims. A post-disaster support programme for all those affected will be needed to ensure that those involved are cared for both physically and emotionally, to provide support to the community and to plan for a smooth transition during the post-disaster period.

5.11 Return and Rehabilitation After a major evacuation the return to normal must be well controlled to avoid conflict, traffic chaos and criminal activity. Many of the problems associated with the evacuation will apply in the process of rehabilitation and it may be expected that there will be a range of new problems involving factors such as: (a)

accounting for people, particularly the sick and the disabled;

(b)

helping individuals with special problems and those experiencing shock or similar effects;

(c)

dealing with damaged or contaminated property;

(d)

dealing with those who have suffered directly or indirectly such as those who have been injured, lost property or made homeless;

(e)

matching resources to need and generally providing advice;

(f)

claims for compensation.

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If the factor leading to evacuation has also caused a significant number of deaths, then a number of agencies will be involved in providing financial and other assistance.

In these circumstances some kind of fund is likely to be established to help survivors and dependants.

After the emergency has ceased to be a direct concern of the emergency services, one or more agencies may be involved for a long period. Before closure of the emergency centres and before the representatives of the key organisations disband, it is essential that the ongoing activity is identified and these organisations are committed to the further tasks. While in these circumstances there may no longer be a condition of major emergency, since the organisations involved are working in their normal mode, public and other contacts may still be necessary. Most probably this will be met by providing a lead telephone number.

5.12 Conclusions The framework of all-hazards planning has been beneficially adopted by the emergency services and local authorities that would be involved in a major evacuation and by a number of service and voluntary organisations. The roles of the emergency services and local authorities in the event of a major emergency are well understood and they are mutually supportive. Further, the roles of an increasing number of service and voluntary organisations are being established and can be relied upon to contribute to the overall emergency plan.

The cascade arrangements for alerting the emergency services, local authorities and the service and voluntary organisations are normally well established and work well.

Arrangements for warning and informing the public in the event of a major emergency, particularly when shelter or evacuation is necessary, rely heavily on police manpower, informal arrangements with the media and relatively basic equipment.

The Emergency Centre concept or the provision of Emergency Centres is a key feature in the arrangements for coping with major emergencies.

Although the evacuation of a major urban area is considered in emergency plans, comprehensive training for this complex task is not usually given to any of the officers in any of the organisations that may be involved.

A major evacuation cannot be carried out without some risk to the population involved.

It cannot be assumed that all fit people will wish to be evacuated in an emergency.

Circumstances may dictate that, at least initially, the emergency services concentrate on the evacuation of those who will comply with their directions. While it may be University of Leicester

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considered that evacuation is the best policy for most of the population, alternatives may need to be considered for groups or individuals such as hospital in-patients and the elderly and infirm in the community. It is unlikely that patients in certain critical circumstances will be moved from hospitals in the event of a major evacuation and volunteer staff will be required to remain with such patients.

Shelter overnight followed by evacuation may in certain situations be a better alternative to immediate evacuation.

Providing carefully structured information to the public not only aids the process of evacuation but helps to avoid over-reaction, incorrect action and rumours. The Casualty Information Bureau provides an essential service to the public, local authorities and emergency services during an emergency and deliberate and unintentional abuses of the system must not be allowed to dilute its effectiveness.

It will be necessary to supplement manpower and transport resources available to the District Health Authority to evacuate state and private hospitals, residential homes and individuals with mobility problems in their own homes. The evacuation of a large urban area will have a substantial impact on the hospitals, residential homes, etc. throughout and beyond the boundaries of the evacuation area. The transport used to move the sick, elderly and handicapped and belonging to the organisations involved in a major evacuation are likely to be fully committed and the local authority may need to provide additional vehicles.

There is no general method of relating population and property that is available to assist the police in the event of the need for evacuation. Concentrations of population, for example at work, at places of entertainment and shopping precincts, can always be anticipated but the numbers involved will be difficult to assess.

Processes for the control and care of the people passing through Evacuation Assembly Points are well established but so far have not been put to the test for handling substantial numbers. In a major evacuation those with their own transport and seeking their own place of safety would possibly slip through the police documentation system and would need to be urged to register later to avoid unnecessary distress from relatives and concern on the part of the emergency services.

The care of pets and animals during a major evacuation will pose special problems and whatever action is implemented may give rise to concern and even conflict. In a major emergency special arrangements will need to be made for the care of all domestic animals including pets (which are unlikely to be allowed in to rest centres).

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The importance of counselling those involved in a major emergency has been recognised and this should be implemented for all incidents that have a substantial impact on the population.

When the emergency services have completed their responsibilities, the major emergency may not be over and substantial work by the local authorities and other agencies may be required for restoration of property, rehabilitation of the population, etc.

5.13 Guide to Reading You should now read the supplied paper ‘Planning for the Expected: Evacuation in a Chemical Emergency’ by Phillips (1992), and Western Mail reportage on the Barry, South Wales, vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) chemical tanker emergency. The first reading describes an evacuation in the United States of America. The second an evacuation in the United kingdom. While the second consists only of newspaper reportage, there is sufficient data for a number of comparisons to be drawn. For example, between each community’s familiarity with evacuation procedures.

5.14 Suggested Further Reading For the latest Government guidance on evacuation and related procedures go to the website www.ukresilience.info/ccact.

5.15 Study Questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of the material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University.

1.

List and describe briefly the factors influencing the evacuation decision-making process.

2.

Discuss the importance of information in the context of a large-scale evacuation.

3.

Outline the problems which may be encountered in the actual evacuation of a large urban area.

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5.16 Bibliography Borodzicz, E. (2005) Risk, Crisis and Security Management, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Home Office ((October) 1997) Dealing with Disaster, 3rd edition, Liverpool: Brodie Publishing, ISBN 185 893 9208.

Tierney, K.J., Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W. (2001) Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States, Washington: Joseph Henry Press.

Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. (2004) At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters (Second Edition), London: Routledge.

Zeigler, D.J., Brunn,S.D. and Johnson, J.H. (1981) ‘Evacuation from a nuclear technological disaster’ Geographical Review, 71: 1-16.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Planning for the Expected: Evacuation in a Chemical Emergencyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Phillips, B. (1992) Disaster Management, Vol. 4, No. 2.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

READING Various Newspaper Articles

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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APPENDIX

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Appendix Extract from Home Office Publication Dealing with Disaster, 2nd edition (HMSO, 1994: 17-18) Evacuation In some circumstances it may be necessary to advise the public on whether they should evacuate a given area or stay put and shelter indoors. Such circumstances include risks to life or health from: (a)

the release or threatened release of radioactive materials, or other hazardous substances;

(b)

the spread of fire;

(c)

explosion;

(d)

severe storms;

(e)

flooding;

(f)

earthquake; and

(g)

environmental contamination.

The possible need for evacuation in the event of the release or threatened release of radioactive material is addressed in ‘Arrangements for Responding to Nuclear Emergencies’ published by HMSO on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive (ISBN 0 11 885525 5) and is not considered further.

In the event of the release or threatened release of non-radioactive hazardous materials, additional information on the nature of the risk may be obtained from the fire service, from chemical data systems and other accredited sources. One crucial factor in determining the area to be evacuated will be the forecast speed and direction of the wind which, together with other ‘CHEMET’ advice, can be obtained from the appropriate Regional Weather Centre.

Warnings of severe storms or other adverse weather are issued by the Meteorological Office and/or Regional Weather Centres in the form of severe weather warnings. In addition, warnings of abnormally high tides that could possibly lead to flooding are issued by the Meteorological Office to the police and the Environment Agency.

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It is normally the police who recommend whether or not to evacuate and define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will take account of advice from the fire service on risks associated with fire, contamination and other hazards, from the ambulance and social services on problems associated with moving people who are frail or disabled or at risk for any other reason, from local authorities on possible places of shelter within the area. The police can only recommend evacuation and have no power to require people to leave their homes. Past experience has shown that people with domestic pets may be unwilling to leave their homes unless arrangements include their pets.

In considering or executing evacuation, care must always be taken not to put people at risk by bringing them outdoors when they might be more effectively protected by sheltering indoors. This is particularly important in the case of the release of hazardous substances, or where a second terrorist device may be present.

The physical difficulties of large-scale evacuation should not be underestimated. If it is decided to evacuate a given area evacuation assembly points should be set up near the area and, if time permits, signposted. Those in the affected area should be advised to go to their nearest evacuation assembly point. This can be done by house-to-house call or by using loudhailers, mobile public address systems, radio or TV announcements or any combination of these methods. People taking prescribed and other medications should be reminded to carry these with them.

The emergency services and the local authority should, as far as is practicable, take steps to ensure the security of property left empty after evacuation. When arrangements are being made for evacuation and for securing property attention will need to be paid to the safety of emergency service and local authority workers who might be exposed to risk while working outdoors.

At the evacuation assembly point local authority staff should co-ordinate the dispersal of evacuees going to reception and rest centres and should maintain a comprehensive index of evacuees and their whereabouts. This information will be needed by the police for casualty bureau purposes and later if it is necessary to interview witnesses.

In order to account for all people evacuated from an affected area it is important that those leaving reception or rest centres and intending to stay with friends or relatives are encouraged to register their eventual destination at the centre. Rest centres should be staffed by local authority personnel and trained volunteers who can provide service and support.

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UNIT 6 Integrated Emergency Management in London

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

Contents 6.1

Introduction

6-5

6.2

Aims and Objectives of this Unit

6-6

6.3

Integrated Emergency Management

6-6

6.3.1 Background

6-6

6.3.2 Implementation of IEM

6-8

6.3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses

6-9

6.4

Emergency Management in London

6-11

6.4.1 After 9/11

6-12

The 7 July 2005 Bombings

6-13

6.5.1 Lessons Learned

6-13

6.6

Conclusions

6-17

6.7

Guide to Reading

6-17

6.8

Suggested Further Reading

6-18

6.9

Study Questions

6-18

6.5

6.10 Bibliography

6-18

Readings

6-21

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6.1 Introduction On the morning of Thursday 7 July 2005 four suicide bombers caused explosions in central London. The attacks hit three underground trains and a bus as many people were travelling to work. At least 56 people were killed and some 700 were injured in the blasts. The emergency services responded quickly; all hospitals in the area were soon full. As with other major emergencies and disasters many other agencies, particularly local authorities and voluntary services, contributed to the emergency response and later took on a wide range of victim support work and efforts to return the affected community to normality.

The emergency services are well prepared and trained to tackle a wide range of crises, in most cases without resort to outside help. However, in circumstances where there is widespread disruption of community life, support is available from a great number of public and private organisations, voluntary groups and the community. The emergency planner has to make arrangements to minimise the effects of major emergencies, arrangements that must take account of the changing environment and be appropriate to the contemporary needs and expectations of the community for which they are made. The public expectation is that public authorities will pick up the pieces of shattered or affected lives following a major emergency.

In 1991, the then Home Secretary announced that: With the now reduced risk of nuclear conflict the [United Kingdom] Government believes that the time is right to develop more flexible civil defence arrangements. This approach will require a closer correlation between contingency plans for civil defence and peacetime emergencies.

(Civil Protection, 1991) The statement went on to say that this could best be done by developing an “integrated approach to emergency management”, based around the principle of combined wartime and peacetime planning procedures so that there are in place structures and systems that would cope with any disaster whatever its cause whether wartime or peacetime.

“To put it in practical terms a local authority ...... must have plans in place which could be used to re-house large numbers of people who have been made homeless. The same plans would be needed whether the citizens had been made homeless by flooding or by war.” (Home Office, 1991)

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This public statement effectively regularised the practice that had developed around the country whereby emergency plans had been widened from the narrow remit of response to, and mitigation of, the effects of nuclear war on the general population.

Those engaged in emergency planning had recognized that all types of major emergencies and disasters required the co-ordination of those responding if effective emergency management were to be delivered.

6.2 Aims and Objectives of this Unit The aims of this Unit are to examine the concept of integrated emergency management and its application within the largest conurbation in the United Kingdom, namely the capital city, London. The 7 July bombings were a severe test of London’s plans and capabilities and lessons were still being learned from that experience when this unit was prepared. However, early conclusions were that many aspects of the capital’s emergency planning and response capabilities had worked well.

6.3

Integrated Emergency Management

The underlying aim of integrating the arrangements for emergency management is that flexible plans will be developed which would enable any organisation to deal effectively with a major or minor emergency, whether foreseen or unforeseen (Home Office, 1997).

6.3.1

Background

Following the Home Secretary’s announcement in 1991, that called for a closer correlation between contingency plans for civil defence and peacetime emergencies and explained that this could best be done by developing an integrated approach to emergency management, the Government provided official guidance on the basic philosophy and broad principles (Home Office, 1993).

However, at the time of the Government’s introduction of the concept of integrated emergency management a number of local authority emergency planning units were already moving towards, or had introduced, generic emergency plans rather than specific event-oriented plans. The Chief Emergency Planning Officers’ Society, in 1992, published for their members a short paper on the way it wished to develop emergency planning policy in the future. The paper set out clearly for the first time the detail of the concept of integrated emergency management and its role in the dynamic process of ensuring optimum preparation for the response by the many agencies and services that would be drawn into a major disaster.

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The traditional approach to emergency planning had produced prescriptive plans for a number of possible emergencies (often related to a wartime scenario) and a generic plan to cover the response to any other event. Those with specific responsibilities in emergencies were faced with a number of different plans in which the management arrangements for response could differ. Many plans were based on the position (rank/ seniority) of a manager in an organisation rather than that personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role in normal life or emergencies.

The causes of emergencies or disasters differ but the requirements of an affected community remain unchanged. For example, the circumstances that require people to be evacuated from their homes are varied but their essential needs when evacuated remain the same. In recognising this, and the need to plan for the management of response, the concept of integrated emergency management arose.

A basic principle of integrated emergency management was that it should be a process leading to the most effective co-ordinated management of preparation for, and response to, all major emergencies. The emphasis was firmly placed on preparation and recognising the roles and responsibilities of all potential participants. Importantly it respected their right to organise the delivery of the service for which they are responsible in the manner that best suits them, subject only to a set of co-ordinating management arrangements with which their plans would be integrated. Lastly, it sought to integrate the emergency arrangements for specific contingencies with those made for any other eventuality.

Integration of emergency management arrangements embraces a number of concepts, some of which overlap. Firstly, the principal emphasis in the development of any plan must be on the response to the incident and not the cause of the incident. Planning arrangements for a range of emergencies, whether caused by natural events or resulting from technical failure, or by a deliberate act of terrorism, should be an â&#x20AC;&#x153;all hazardsâ&#x20AC;? approach (Parker and Handmer, 1992:267). The plan must be flexible; it has to work in adverse weather conditions, at any location, and at any time of day or night.

Secondly, emergency management arrangements should be integrated into the everyday working structure of the organisation. Emergency plans must build on routine arrangements and it is therefore essential for those who will be required to respond to any emergency to be involved in the planning and exercising of the plan.

Thirdly, the activities of different departments within an organisation should be integrated. The overall response to a major emergency or disaster will invariably need input from a number of different departments. Effective planning must integrate these contributions and establish protocols in order to achieve an efficient and timely response.

Without an awareness of the contribution of others a confused response will result.

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Fourthly, there is a vital need to co-ordinate arrangements with other authorities and organisations. Major disasters will almost always span boundaries, and may indeed spread. If the response is to be truly effective in meeting the needs of all those caught up in the disaster then leaders of the emergency services, local authorities, commerce, industry and the community must be aware of the roles their organisation may be called upon to play and how they fit into the response as a whole (Home Office, 1997).

Finally, planning and responding to emergencies is not the totality of the arrangements.

Integrated emergency management should also look at the prevention of and recovery from disasters. In the United States, the concept of integrated emergency management was defined as covering mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Tierney et al., 2001). In the United Kingdom, the Local Government Act 1972 made reference to “avert, alleviate or eradicate” the effects of disaster. Addressing each of these requires varied management skills but an integrated approach to the management of emergencies should ensure that each of the areas is addressed.

6.3.2

Implementation of IEM

Development and adoption of a nationally agreed framework of command and control structures (Home Office, 1997) facilitated the implementation of IEM; it directed that consistent principles should be followed, irrespective of the cause or nature of the emergency, but would allow a flexible response to individual circumstances. The response was divided into three levels - operational, tactical and strategic. The requirement to implement one or more management levels was dependent on the nature of the emergency, but would normally start at the operational level and only moving on to the tactical and finally strategic level if necessary.

It is a characteristic of civil emergencies and the command and control chain that it usually works from the bottom up. Any member of the public can raise an alarm by dialling 999 and alerting the appropriate emergency service. At the start of any incident for which there has been no warning the operational level will be activated first, with other levels coming into being with the escalation of the incident, or a greater awareness of the situation.

Where the scale of an emergency is large, the first emergency service to reach the incident site will alert the other emergency services if they are not already in attendance and they will co-ordinate with each other and take tactical decisions concerning their own service in the light of the developing situation. As the emergency escalates and a “major incident” is declared, assistance from the local authority and other agencies will be sought.

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During major incidents a co-ordinating group will be formed from representatives of the emergency services, local authorities and essential services to resolve matters affecting all agencies. If it becomes apparent that resources, or expertise beyond the level of the operational or tactical commander are required, or should there be a need to co-ordinate more than one incident or scene, it will be necessary to refer to the strategic level of management. Where local services find that the scale of a disaster puts it beyond the capacity of their own resources, it is usual to call upon mutual aid arrangements with services in adjacent areas.

The national response to wide area disasters will normally be co-ordinated through contingency arrangements under which ministers may call together representatives from Government departments, emergency services, essential services and local authorities. Such emergency committees have no executive authority other than that delegated to departmental representatives by their parent departments. More often than not, however, Central Government will have a role to play and this may be either an active role in providing specialist advice or assistance, or be limited to dealing with parliamentary, media and public enquiries. In either case, a specific government department will be nominated to take the lead.

The above arrangements for handling major civil emergencies or disasters in the United Kingdom do not include the formation of a national disaster response squad or corps.

However, military aid to the civil community is available on request either through the police or directly to the local Army Headquarters (Home Office, 1997).

The role of local authorities in a major emergency or disaster is threefold: firstly to assist people in distress, secondly to co-ordinate the activities of the voluntary agencies and organisations providing assistance, and thirdly to maintain their own day to day services to the public. The planning for civil emergencies by local authorities followed the Home Office guidance that advocated the concept of a generic plan to cover all eventualities, complemented by departmental plans. The departmental plans were to reflect the roles and responsibilities of staff and include call-out procedures, listing and allocation of responsibilities for key departmental procedures, provision of instructions, check lists and details of available resources and contacts.

6.3.3

Strengths and Weaknesses

The major strength of integrated emergency management, within the context of the wide variety of organisations that could become involved in the response to a major emergency or disaster, lay in the fact that it was not a prescriptive system but a flexible process. It allowed development of individual arrangements suited to the day-to-day management structures and circumstances of each organization.

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Planning for a response to a major emergency, irrespective of its cause, and planning the tasks based on the effects and not the cause, enables an expansion of the response in an escalating situation. Further, the adoption of integrated emergency management techniques ensures that planning is not done in isolation but is carried out with a wide range of personnel and departments who may have a role to play and, through the use of a common planning framework, enhances the process of working together through collaboration and co-operation.

In addition â&#x20AC;&#x153;It is based on what people do normally, designed to enhance their capacity and capabilities in exceptional circumstances and allowing them to fulfil their individual, traditional or statutory role, utilising all skills and resources available to best effect.â&#x20AC;? (CEPO Society, 1992). In a disaster people should continue to do what they have been trained to do (Milne-Henderson, 1992). Integrated emergency management should ensure that this is so.

However, whilst integrated emergency management aimed at the integration of the form and content of the plans of one organisation with those of other organisations, there were no statutory arrangements for integration protocols to be adopted by the emergency services, local authorities, voluntary bodies and others who could have a role to play in a major emergency or disaster.

Additionally, the concept aimed for the delivery of services through the extension of normal day-to-day work and management structures, opting for function-based planning rather than local departmental plans and arrangements. A basic crisis management plan, complemented by functional support plans, could mean that an individual department would have to refer to several plans in a crisis to determine its role in that emergency.

An omission in the Home Office integration of emergency management arrangements was the lack of reference to, or a recommendation to carry out risk assessment. This could have led to inadequate estimation of the resources required in a major emergency or disaster and inadequate planning to ensure an effective response.

Many authors (for instance Parker and Handmer, 1992) were stridently critical of the fact that for many years UK local authorities did not have a statutory duty to plan for civil emergencies. As we discussed in Unit 2 of Module 5, before the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, peacetime civil emergency management was based on civil defence provisions under the Civil Defence Act 1948. Here in this unit it is important to note that for many years the lack of such a duty did not prevent effective integrated emergency management arrangements being established in most areas, including London, as the next section will demonstrate.

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6.4 Emergency Management in London The system of peacetime emergency management for the capital was created by combined efforts from the emergency services and local authorities, in much the same way as it was achieved in other parts of the country. However, a much larger, more complex organization and some special arrangements were needed to cope with the scale and complexities of the challenge.

In any one of Englandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s 34 shire counties, such as Leicestershire, one county constabulary provides the police service and takes the lead in coordinating the response to a major incident; the county council has the main responsibility for emergency planning and training, which includes working with the many other bodies with a part to play in emergency preparedness. Different forms of local government and emergency planning arrangements apply in the larger metropolitan areas, in Wales, and in other parts of the UK (Norman and Coles, 2003). Without going into those details, which are in the supplied reading (Coles, 2006), we can note that the situation in London is much more complicated than in the English shire counties.

Within the greater London area there are 33 separate local government administrations, 32 London Boroughs and the Corporation of the City of London, which administers a small central area formed largely of the old financial business heart of the capital conurbation. Policing in the 32 boroughs is provided by the Metropolitan Police Service, but the City has its own separate, small force; also British Transport Police, which is a national body, has a major presence in London. One fire service and one ambulance service cover the whole area.

For many years, from 1889 to 1986, there was a further tier of local government overarching the boroughs and providing certain functions for the whole of the Greater London area. In 1986 the then Conservative Government abolished the Greater London Council and joint boards were set up to manage strategic functions, including the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority (LFCDA). Elected representatives from the boroughs served on these boards, and as Chair of the LFCDA had an important role in emergency planning.

The Labour Government that was elected in 1997 followed through on its policy of reestablishing a single strategic authority for London. In 1999 the Greater London Authority was created consisting of a 25 member London Assembly and a Mayor who was elected in 2000. Fourteen of the 25 assembly members are elected representatives of constituencies created by grouping the 33 boroughs. The Assembly is tasked to review â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;issues of importance to Londonersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, and to scrutinize the work of the Mayor, who has responsibilities for transport, policing, fire and emergency planning, economic development and environmental planning.

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The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) was set up in 1973 to bring together the emergency services and representatives of the local authorities, in order to develop agreed procedures for effective coordination of the response to major incidents in the capital (Coles, 2006, see the supplied reading). LESLP produced manuals which became key reference documents for emergency response planners; the LESLP Major Incident Procedural Manual (6th edition) was current in July 2005. For many years LESLP, chaired by a senior Metropolitan Police officer, has been the central reference point for cooperation between all London’s emergency planners, including those based in each of the local authorities. As Borodzicz (2005:126) notes, LESLP has also stressed the importance of joint services training and has organized some major exercises, including in 2003 a simulated terrorist attack on the Bank underground station.

6.4.1

After 9/11

The UK Government’s response to the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States included creating a new organization to examine the implications of those attacks for London. The London Resilience Team, led by a senior central Government official (a civil servant) was comprised of secondees from the emergency services, local government, the Health Service, transport bodies and the utilities. Having assessed the needs, London Resilience began work on measures to strengthen the strategic planning and response capabilities of the metropolis. It was considered that existing planning had been appropriate but that the scale and nature of the new threats required, “ a new strategic emergency planning regime to cope with the step change” (see London Resilience’s website).

The requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 significantly increased the work of the London Resilience team to cover all types of emergency as defined by the Act; it also brought into being the London Regional Resilience Forum as an oversight body.

In April 2005 the Resilience team produced a Strategic Emergency Plan, which included pan-London arrangements; the main sections were: 2. London Command and Control Protocol 3. Media/Public Information Protocol 4. London Mass Fatality Plan 5. Large-scale Evacuation (Operation Sassoon) 6. Site Clearance 7. Disaster Fund That such a comprehensive plan was in place before 7 July is one indicator of the level of preparedness that existed, but it was built on a solid foundation of many years of co-operative planning and training.

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6.5 The 7 July 2005 Bombings Three bombs exploded almost simultaneously at 08.50 in crowded carriages of three separate underground railway trains running on different routes under central London.

The first device exploded in the third carriage of a Circle line train between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations; seven people died in the blast and more than 100 were injured. The second explosion was on a Piccadilly line train travelling in a 21 metres deep tunnel between King’s Cross and Russell Square; the device had been placed in the first carriage near the double doors where passengers often stand. Initial reports confirmed 21 people dead but police expected that figure to rise. The third explosion was in the second carriage, also near the doors, of a Circle line train that was leaving Edgeware Road for Paddington; many passengers were seriously injured (Fire, 2005).

The emergency services were dealing with those three incidents when at 0947 an explosion on a number 30 bus in Tavistock Square killed 13 people and seriously injured others, who were helped by doctors from the nearby British Medical Association building. Police later established that suicide bombers had placed the four devices, and had been working to a prepared plan.

Around 200 firefighters were involved in the response, together with many police, ambulance and other personnel, including specialist rescue teams. The death toll soon rose to 52 and hospitals were full by mid-morning as about 350 people required treatment; the capital’s entire transport system was shut down. Rescue and later recovery teams at the deep Piccadilly line scene encountered intense heat, dust, fumes, vermin and asbestos exposure. The police had to deal with 160 crime scenes simultaneously and gathered about 38,000 pieces of evidence (Hayman, 2005).’The Police have said they had some communications problems because of slow implementation of restrictions on the use of mobile phones. However, further comment on the public use of phones will come later.

6.5.1

Lessons Learned

On 14th of July a joint statement was made by the Local Government Minister, Phil Woolas and the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, on behalf of the London Resilience Forum.

London responded well to last week’s horrendous attacks thanks to the quick response of the emergency services, transport operators and health service staff. London’s councils also rose to the challenge providing a family assistance centre and a temporary mortuary in a very short space of time.

The response showed the benefits of the well-prepared and well practiced (sic) plans that were in place to help the Capital respond to such an incident.

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Today the London Resilience Forum met to take stock of the response and to identify any immediate lessons that we can incorporate into our contingency arrangements. Whilst our response went well and our plans worked, we can never afford to be complacent. There are always lessons to be learnt and that was the purpose of this meeting.

Various interesting details about the response have emerged. For example a newspaper later reported that: Within a few minutes of the July 7 bombings, the FSA [Financial Services Authority] implemented part of the existing contingency plans, setting up a secret internet chatroom to help to coordinate the situation (The Times, 2005).

The Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England and the Treasury department of central Government share responsibility for ensuring that London’s financial systems do not collapse during a crisis.

The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Ian Blair gave evidence to a House of Commons committee on 13th September 2005. He stated that there was “no glaring hole in our operations [they] went as planned and rehearsed”. There were some transport and communications problems, particularly with Metropolitan Police radios not working underground. After King’s Cross the British Transport Police got better radios but not the Met. The incidents had revealed some need for adjustments to command structures but these were “not significant”. He acknowledged that managing 24hr rolling news was difficult. An improved Casualty Bureau was needed as 44,000 calls were received in the first hour (Blair, 2005).

An interesting personal commentary on the 7/7 response has been published by a well-known writer on disaster management (Scanlon, 2005). It gives a vivid account of the impact on the people involved, particularly victims who were able to help those more seriously injured. His main points were: 1.

Terrorist attacks on London Underground are not new; the first was in 1881.

2.

London Underground managers have experienced many IRA incidents and have established procedures, for instance for dealing with coded calls. These attacks were different; no warnings were given and suicide bombers triggered the devices.

3.

The shutdown of the entire transport system was exacerbated by the need for a thorough investigation.

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4.

Good work on victim identification was aided by the fact that some of the police involved had dealt with the dead in Thailand and Sri Lanka: “skills were recently honed”.

5.

The Casualty Bureau worked well, giving information to anxious callers. Again staff involved had had tsunami experience.

6.

Initial responses by fellow passengers and other private citizens were importantly helpful, as has often been reported in other mass casualty incidents.

7.

There were high-speed communications straight away; text messages and phone photos from passengers.

8.

Lessons learnt from the Kings Cross fire were evident. There was better communication between London Underground’s four Emergency Response Units and the ‘blue-light’ services.

9.

The Underground’s CCTV system (1,400 cameras) was crucial to the investigation; the bombers were soon identified entering stations and their earlier movements were traced quickly.

10.

The decline in the use of London’s public transport was temporary; normal business was soon resumed.

The London Assembly set up a committee to review the events of 7 July and transcripts of the five meetings are available on the website; a full report was expected to be published in June 2006. This was a formal process but was not a legally constituted Public Inquiry; it was tasked to consider only the events of 7/7 and so did not look into the causes, the police investigation, or the subsequent attempted attacks on 21 July.

The fifth meeting was a public hearing for survivors to give their personal accounts and observations on the experience. Survivors had been given three choices: submitting written evidence, private recorded interviews or this public hearing which may have been a world’s first for such an event. Certainly it was a significant event as those who chose to speak came prepared to make detailed and considered contributions; the transcript runs to 62 pages.

The physical injuries, shock and anguish experienced by the many passengers involved is reported in powerful detail and the many facets of personal and collective suffering are exposed. Some elements of the accounts overlap; others are contradictory, maybe reflecting the inevitable confusion in such circumstances, and some of the speakers made singular, telling observations. Cleary several had made great efforts to followup on those they were with at the time and some were in process of becoming expert

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on the whole story. No doubt other written testimony will become available and spokesmen for the victims will come forward as has happened after many disasters, particularly Lockerbie and Hillsborough.

Researchers could take a great deal from the transcript by systematic thematic analysis.

However simply reading through raises many points for everyone involved in disaster management to reflect upon; these might include: 1.

Whilst grateful for the help they received many felt it should have got to them quicker. Being in the dark, hurt and close to others who were dead or more seriously injured was hard to bear for any length of time.

2.

Underground carriages should have emergency lighting like aircraft; there should be emergency tunnel lights and better communications to get information to those trapped. Some had not found any first-aid equipment, others had.

3.

A big worry was that the smoke might be the result of a biological/chemical attack.

4.

There were many accounts of giving help and comfort to others; also feelings of helplessness and time running out with no prospect of rescue. The inability to communicate with people on the surface was hard to bear.

5.

Getting out of the carriages, along the track and up out of the station was difficult.

Guards on trains should be brought back to help in such emergencies.

6.

One walking survivor emerged from the station and met a policeman who said â&#x20AC;&#x153;Go homeâ&#x20AC;? without taking any contact details. Others were surprised that there was no recording of names as they left Edgware Road station.

7.

A member of the public, who had previously been in the fire service, saw the need and took it upon himself to set up a rendezvous point in a shop near a station.

About 150 people used this to receive first-aid and to make contact with the police.

8.

Media demands for images of the devastation should be curbed to respect the injured.

9.

Delays in getting medical aid to victims were critical; there was resentment at teams being held back until the area was declared safe to enter.

10.

It was felt that London Ambulance Service were slow to respond in numbers appropriate to the scale of the incident.

11.

Some people were seen to be refusing help and wanting just to get to work.

Some survivors felt they should have been offered access to shock treatment at the time and not have to wait to go to their own doctor.

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12.

We need more first-aid training on the national curriculum.

13.

There was gratitude expressed for voluntary help given by legal professionals.

14.

That day had deep and lasting effects on many people.

6.6 Conclusions Against the background of the national approach to integrated emergency management, the arrangements in London are more complex. This is not surprising given that London hosts the national government and is a prime target for terrorist action. Also the density of population and complexity of the daily activities mean that any disruption can soon become a crisis.

Despite various reorganizations the London local government authorities and the emergency services have cooperated well to develop and exercise emergency preparedness measures that embody the principles of Integrated Emergency Management.

On 7 July those preparations were put to a severe test. From many official, professional and public perspectives the response of the emergency services, other agencies and many individuals was quick and effective. Many lives were undoubtedly saved by sterling efforts from those who responded. However for the trapped and suffering victims help could not come quickly enough. How can these views be reconciled?

Perhaps as further evidence emerges and elapsed time allows for more impact of the recovery process, new perspectives will develop to inform policy on what more needs to be done to strengthen London’s emergency management systems.

6.7

Guide to Reading

You should now read the supplied copy of Coles, E. (2006) Emergency Risk Management in the United Kingdom and the Case of Management Arrangements for London Post 9/ 11. This is to be a chapter in Public Risk Management of Cities in Western Countries, a book in preparation for publication in China as part of the lead up to the Beijing Olympics.

The second reading is a senior Fire Officer’s view of the response to the 7 July bombs: Dobson, R. (2005) “A response we can be proud of”, in Fire Magazine, p26-27, September 2005.

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6.8 Suggested Further Reading For more recent information you should visit the following websites: London Assembly, www.london.gov.uk/assembly/resilience/index.jsp London Resilience, www.londonprepared.gov.uk National Civil Resilience Directorate, www.odpm.gov.uk

6.9

Study Questions

You should write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below.

We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of the material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University.

1.

Discuss the main features of integrated emergency management as it is applied in the United Kingdom.

2.

Compare and contrast the arrangements for London with those of an English shire county or a unitary authority.

3.

What are the main lessons so far from the July 7 bombings.

6.10 Bibliography Blair, Sir Ian (2005) Oral evidence to a House of Commons Committee on Counter – terrorism, 13 September, Questions 43-59 in HC462-I. Borodzicz, P. (2005) Risk, Crisis & Security Management, London: John Wiley & Sons.

Civil Protection (Summer, supplement, 1991) ‘Home Secretary Announces Outcome of Emergency Planning Review’, Home Office Communications Directorate: London County Emergency Planning Officers’ Society (1992) In Case of Emergency - A Blueprint for Modern Emergency Management, Private publication Fire (2005) ‘London attacks in detail’, Fire Magazine, September, 12-13.

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Hayman, A. (2005) Oral evidence to a House of Commons Committee on Counter – terrorism, 13 September, HC462-I. Home Office (1991) Autumn Statement - Question and Answer Briefing, Home Office: London.

Home Office (1993) Circular ES 5/ 1993: The Government’s Approach to Emergency Planning, Home Office: London.

Home Office (1997) Dealing With Disaster (3rd Ed), Brodie Publishing Ltd: Liverpool.

Milne-Henderson, S. (1992) ‘Britain at Risk: Accountability and Quality Control in Disaster Management’, in Parker, D. and Handmer, J. (eds) Hazard Management and Emergency Planning, London: James and James.

Norman, S. and Coles, E. (2003) ‘Order out of chaos? A critical review of the role of central, regional and local Government in emergency planning in London’, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol.18, No.2; 98–107.

Parker, D. and Handmer, J. (eds) (1992) Hazard Management and Emergency Planning Perspectives on Britain, London: James and James.

Scanlon, J. (2005) ‘Strange Bed Partners: Thoughts on the London Bombings of July 2005 and the Link with the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 26th 2004’, International Journal of Mass emergencies and Disasters, Vol 23, No.2, 149-158.

The Times, (2005) ‘Disaster looms in the City – but please don’t leave the office’, Monday 28 November 2005.

Tierney, K. J., Lindell, M. K. and Perry, R. W. (2001) Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States, Washington: Joseph Henry Press.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Emergency Risk Management in the United Kingdom and the Case of Management Arrangements for London Post 9/11â&#x20AC;&#x2122; Coles, E. (2006) Coventry Centre for Disaster Management, Coventry University, UK. Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;A response we can be proud ofâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Dobson, R. (2005) Fire Magazine, September, p.26-27.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

UNIT 7 Disaster Inquiries in the United Kingdom

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

Contents 7.1

Aims and Objectives of this Unit

7-5

7.2

Introduction

7-5

7.3

Public Inquiries

7-6

7.3.1 Types of Inquiry

7-6

7.3.2 Powers and Procedures

7-8

7.4

Inquests

7-10

7.5

Legal Proceedings

7-12

7.5.1 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

7-13

7.5.2 Corporate Manslaughter

7-15

7.6

Conclusion

7-19

7.7

Guide to Reading

7-20

7.8

Suggested Further Reading

7-20

7.9

Study Questions

7-20

7.10 Bibliography

7-21

7.11 Table of Cases

7-22

7.12 Types of Inquiry

7-22

Reading

7-23

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7.1 Aims and Objectives of this Unit This Unit describes the different institutions which comprise the system of public inquiry into deaths and disasters in the United Kingdom and explains the roles these institutions play in the investigation of cause, in the allocation of blame and in the formal construction of those events. The Unit is divided as follows: Introduction, Investigations, Inquests, Legal Proceedings and Conclusion.

It will become clear that there is no ‘system’ as such, that the inquiries may or may not be ‘in public’, that the legal institutions of England and Wales differ from those in Scotland, and that the formal attribution of blame through the legal process is complex, variable and subject to many influences. Although the structures and institutions which are described may be invoked in many other circumstances, the Unit assumes that there has been an event in which there are multiple deaths occurring more or less simultaneously.

Increasingly we question causal aetiologies (the reasons for an event) such that even a gun massacre, a so-called ‘random’ killing, may be traced to social or legal origins such as upbringing or licensing controls. (Consider, for example, the circumstances of the Dunblane gun massacre in Scotland, United Kingdom, where an embittered gun enthusiast used legally held weapons to kill a number of schoolchildren.) However, here it is assumed that the disaster has no one human agent as its immediate cause.

After the introduction, Section 7.3 covers the diverse public inquiry system and police investigations. These are characterised by their discretionary operation reflecting a flexibility in institutional response as well as disclosing some confusion of purpose.

The coronial inquest system, whose sphere of operation is analysed in Section 7.4, is also characterised by discretion in relation to procedure, although not in relation to the requirement to hold an inquest. This Section concludes with discussion of Home Office proposals to streamline the inquiry and inquest process.

Legal sequelae (consequences) of disasters in the form of civil suits for compensation and prosecutions on criminal charges are described in Section 7.5. Proposals for a new offence of ‘corporate killing’ (or ‘corporate manslaughter’) are analysed here.

7.2 Introduction There are three possible phases to the investigation of untoward death — public inquiry; inquest (or fatal accident inquiry (FAI) in Scotland); and legal proceedings (civil or criminal).

Police investigations may also be undertaken before or after any inquiry or inquest. All of these phases may be invoked, or only some, and duplication is often a major problem. The background to this Unit is informed by a series of disasters in the UK over the last 30

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years, from Aberfan in 1966 to Hillsborough in 1989, a period which has seen significant changes in social and legal perceptions of disasters. It is argued that there has been a cultural shift towards blaming corporations (Douglas, 1992) with the result that perceived corporate negligence is more likely to be translated into calls for a manslaughter prosecution.

Compensation is also more frequently sought and the range of harms recognised has extended beyond financial and physical loss to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

In this Unit we are concerned with the institutional arrangements which accompany or facilitate those claims, and to a lesser extent with the substance of the legal issues involved.

The apparently seamless web of legal responses to death belies important changes in the part played by the different components; it is also important to take note of the interaction between each element and between the structure as a whole and wider cultural and political developments. The relationship between public reaction, media responses, risk perception and causal attribution is inevitably complex. Legal explanations or constructions of events are as much products as progenitors of these inter-relations.

7.3 Public Inquiries Major disasters are almost always followed by some form of inquiry. Public inquiries following disasters have a number of functions and purposes. As well as providing a forum in which those directly affected, whether bereaved or survivors, can transact their grief and anger or other emotions in a controlled and public manner, they can also furnish an opportunity for the event to be held up to public obloquy (criticism) and to exert pressure for policy changes. The purposes of an inquiry are to establish the facts, survey causes and identify any culpability. This section looks first at the different types of public inquiry, and secondly at their powers and procedures.

7.3.1

Types of Inquiry

We freely use the term ‘public inquiry’ as though everyone was clear about what is meant. This is far from the case. Not only is everyone not clear but it would be almost impossible to achieve any degree of clarity. ‘Public inquiry’ is a generic term which provides a useful cover for a labyrinthine sub-structure. Broadly, inquiries can be divided into two types: technical investigations and judicial inquiries. Technical investigations are those which have to be held following certain types of accident. For example, rail accidents, air and shipping accidents all have their own statutory systems of mandatory inquiry. Often these are conducted in private by an Inspector, although in general a report is published. These technical inquiries generally attract little attention although in terms of avoiding future disasters their findings may be extremely valuable. That is, they may be a means to ‘active learning’.

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Judicial inquiries take a number of forms. Many statutes which provide for the mandatory technical inquiries described above also give discretion for a more formal investigation in the nature of a public inquiry to be set up. A disaster may often trigger the exercise of this discretionary power; for example, after the Herald of Free Enterprise capsized with the loss of 182 lives off Zeebrugge in 1987, the Minister of Transport ordered a Formal Investigation under Merchant Shipping legislation (Sheen, 1987). The Kings Cross underground fire later that year gave rise to a formal investigation under the Regulation of Railways Act 1871 (Fennell, 1988). These investigations are closer to the ad hoc judicial inquiry than they are to the technical accident investigation (despite sharing the same legislative base as these latter).

Ad hoc inquiries are set up where there is no specific provision for accident investigation. The football stadium disaster at Hillsborough prompted the Home Secretary to appoint Lord Justice Taylor to conduct an inquiry. Lastly, there is a very special type of ‘discretionary’ or judicial inquiry — those set up under the Tribunals of Inquiry Act 1921. Only 21 Tribunals of Inquiry have ever been set up, the most recent being the Cullen inquiry into the shootings at Dunblane in Scotland in 1996.

This was the first Tribunal of Inquiry for 14 years, although it was closely followed by the establishment of another — into child abuse in North Wales children’s homes, which for obvious reasons is being conducted in private. Of the disasters studied here, only Aberfan gave rise to a ‘1921’ Inquiry. Tribunals of Inquiry carry great weight, and they require the authorisation of both Houses of Parliament that the matter is ‘of urgent public importance’. They are always chaired by a senior judge and exercise High Court powers. (See Appendix 1 for an analysis of recent disaster inquiries.)

The lack of uniformity between types of inquiry leaves significant discretion in the hands of the government as to how to orchestrate the public response to a disaster. As we see below, there are variations in the powers and procedures between these types.

Predicting which type of inquiry will be used is an inexact science but the following indicators can be used: the more serious the incident, the more likely that a judge will chair it; the more serious the incident, the more likely that a form of inquiry allowing witnesses to be compelled to give evidence on oath will be used (thus pointing to an ad-hoc judicial or Tribunal of Inquiry). Whichever form of inquiry is set up, it will be reported as ‘a public inquiry’ — the people who will know the difference will be the lawyers and those who have to give evidence. This generalised reporting may not help public understanding of exactly what type of inquiry is being undertaken.

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7.3.2

Powers and Procedures

Judicial inquiries share the following general characteristics: they become high profile, are usually held in public, and will be chaired by a judge or (‘1921’ Tribunals excepted) senior Queens Counsel. More specifically, the inquiry will have terms of reference; the Chair will probably appoint a Counsel to the inquiry — whose job it will be to elicit and lay before the inquiry relevant evidence, and bring members and/or expert assessors in to assist.

The Inquiry’s powers will be partly determined by its terms of reference within which it must always act. However, these are generally very broad such as those for the Hillsborough Inquiry: ‘To inquire into the events at Sheffield Wednesday football ground on 15 April 1989 and to make recommendations about the needs of crowd control and safety at sports events’ (Taylor, 1989), or for Piper Alpha: ‘An inquiry to establish the circumstances of the accident and its cause’ (Cullen, 1990). Note the opportunity for isomorphic and active learning in the former Inquiry’s terms of reference.

Tribunals of Inquiry under the 1921 Act, and many judicial inquiries set up under specific Acts of Parliament, provide powers to compel witnesses to appear, to compel the production of documents, and to require evidence to be given on oath. Departmental inquiries do not. One reason why Ministers’ thoughts turn to 1921 Act Tribunals of Inquiry rather than the discretionary inquiry is because of the powers they bring.

It can be difficult to predict the procedure which will be adopted since even the same type of inquiry may be conducted differently according to the circumstances, including the personality of the Chair. This is a good moment to consider why judges are used for many inquiries. Judges bring a number of qualities. First, they impart what can be called ‘borrowed authority’. It can be politically useful for government to have the shield of a senior judge. So it might be said that the greater the potential embarrassment to the government, the more senior the judge. Secondly, judges import professional expertise in the conduct of hearings, in sifting evidence, and appraising the veracity (truthfulness) of witnesses. Thirdly, they have ‘lofty detachment’ from the rough and tumble of party politics. Of course, the very reasons that lead government to rely on judges (their authority, expertise and detachment) also mean that they are likely to exercise an independent attitude to procedure. (Although not a disaster inquiry, the most pertinent example lies with the Scott Inquiry into Arms for Iraq.) It is also worth asking to what extent judges, often drawn from a narrow social elite, understand the experiences of, and pressures on, ‘ordinary’ people.

The procedure adopted will reflect the general purposes of inquiries — establishing facts, determining cause and allocating blame. Many of the procedural difficulties arise not from the lack of a single model but from the nature of the inquiry process

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itself, which is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Although individual reputations and public safety may be affected, inquiries do not give rights in relation to such matters as legal representation, cross-examination or appeal.

One of the major difficulties (from a lawyer’s point of view) which inquiries present is how they fit into the legal scheme of things. Our court tradition is built on the adversarial model under which the judge acts as umpire between two sides, each of which presents facts and law. This adversarial model of procedural fairness depends, among other things, on notice and disclosure, confrontation and cross-examination, and a reasoned decision. An inquiry is clearly not like that. It is not a trial, with an allegation, or a statement of claim, with a burden of proof, and with a determination at the end that one side has made out the case. The inquiry itself is responsible for gathering evidence, questioning witnesses and determining the progress and direction of the proceedings. On the other hand, as with so many attempts to divide up the world into neat categories, there is more of a continuum than this might suggest with some inquires having more adversarial elements than others, different groups of individuals having different sets of interests. Survivors and those bereaved clearly have agendas at variance with those of corporations, or the police.

Public inquiries have probably been discussed and debated in government departments more in the last 5 years than at any other time. The Scott Inquiry into Arms Sales to Iraq raised some difficult questions. Lord Justice Scott’s independent line led to a review commissioned by the Lord Chancellor’s Department and published as advice by the Council on Tribunals in February 1996 (Council on Tribunals, 1996). This recommended that inquiries should, where possible, be held in public; that there should be a preliminary public hearing at which the inquiry’s procedural ground rules can be announced, explained and discussed with ‘the major interested parties’. This covers all those likely to be called as principal witnesses. Witnesses would have advance notice of the inquiry’s areas of concern and the extent to which they may be vulnerable to criticism. If damaging evidence emerges after the witness has given evidence, there should be an opportunity to respond.

The document draws a distinction between legal advice — in the form of help in preparing for the inquiry — which should always be allowed, and representation — speaking through a lawyer — which should not be an absolute entitlement. This, along with other aspects of how the inquiry actually goes about its work, should be at the discretion of the inquiry chair. Lastly, the Advice approves the practice which the Piper Alpha report exemplifies of providing an executive summary of the findings as well as the full report (Cullen, 1990).

To summarise this section, there is no simple structure of public inquiry; neither the type of inquiry nor the procedural safeguards adopted is capable of prediction but in practice there are many areas of commonality. Difficulties arise because of the inquisitorial model and because of the relationship between inquiries and inquests, discussed further in the next section.

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7.4 Inquests Any public inquiry is overlaid on the normal day-to-day, official processing of death.

Death is a state event as well as a private concern (whether the deceased is Royalty, ex-Royalty, a government Minister or ‘commoner’). Death is officiated in England and Wales by a coroner, with the help of the medical profession. In the case of a disaster, these proceedings are not replaced by an inquiry: the two processes are forced to interact with no necessary or clear co-ordination between them.

Over the last century, the inquest has been subordinated to the role of the medical profession in processing death, with most deaths being certified by a doctor, and only about a quarter by a coroner. The police and prosecuting authorities have also taken over some of the roles previously exercised by inquests. Only about one in eight deaths gives rise to an inquest, and not all inquests involve a jury. Inquests are mandatory where there is reasonable cause to suspect a violent or unnatural death and therefore death in disaster gives rise to one. There has to be a jury where death is caused by an accident notifiable under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, or where the death occurred in circumstances the continuance or possible recurrence of which is prejudicial to the health and safety of the public or any section of the public. Most disasters will satisfy one or both of these conditions. But it is important to note that an inquest is held into each individual death, rather than into the disaster as a whole.

The jury’s verdict has to be accompanied by a statement which identifies the deceased and describes how, when and where the deceased came by her/his death. Under the current rules, a number of verdicts are ‘suggested’; accident or misadventure, unlawful killing or an open verdict. In order to bring a verdict of unlawful killing the jury needs to be convinced on the criminal standard of proof (i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt) that the deaths were caused unlawfully which means, at a minimum, through gross negligence. That is, the jury needs to be certain beyond all reasonable doubt that deaths resulted from the gross negligence of a third party.

Inquest procedure is largely at the coroner’s discretion and there is no legal aid for the family of the deceased to be represented. The Hillsborough inquest gave rise to (in 1997, ongoing) controversy when the coroner refused to hear evidence of events after 3.15 p.m. on the day of the disaster, thereby preventing an inquiry into many aspects of the police and ambulance service response.

Coroners often say that the purpose of an inquest is not to determine civil or criminal liability, and at one level that is right. The inquest cannot determine these matters, but on the other hand, in order to answer the questions an inquest is mandated to answer (in particular, how the deceased came to die), an answer in terms of civil or criminal liability may be unavoidable.

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The main mechanisms for avoiding this clash of purpose are that coroners are required to adjourn any inquest pending police investigation of any possible homicide charges, and that any inquest held after a trial cannot record a verdict inconsistent with the finding of the trial. Therefore, the sequence of events following the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster was most unusual. There the inquest jury returned unlawful killing verdicts before the question of prosecution had been considered. This demonstrates clearly the socio-cultural impact on legal proceedings: the idea that a company running a ferry service might be indictable for manslaughter did not apparently occur to the police and no investigation was launched. The combination of an inquiry report in which Mr Justice Sheen condemned P&O’s sloppy management and disregard for safety, and the inquest verdicts, facilitated by a legal challenge to the coroner brought by the Herald Families Association (Regina v. Coroner for East Kent, 1990), led to a belated examination of criminal proceedings. P&O were eventually prosecuted (see Section 8.4). The Marchioness Riverboat disaster in 1989 also gave rise to unusual proceedings. The inquests were delayed while the Captain of the dredger was tried for an offence under the Merchant Shipping Act, a process which took some time. The coroner’s decision in 1992 not to resume the inquests on the grounds that this would be an unnecessary formality was successfully challenged (R. v. Inner West London Coroner, 1994). The inquests were eventually held six years after the tragedy when the jury returned verdicts of unlawful killing.

The relationship between inquiry and inquest can be difficult to predict, but in general the inquest will usually await any inquiry. Part of the problem with the proceedings following Marchioness was that the inquiry (conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch) was held in private and the report withheld until August 1991— nearly two years after disaster. The eventual inquest revealed evidence which contradicted that of the official inquiry. All this contributed to the relatives’ not unreasonable belief that they had been deprived of the opportunity of a public forum in which to transact their grief and achieve some sort of catharsis. Broadly, inquiries might be seen as serving a public need to establish causes and recommend preventive measures. Inquests are more an individually based investigation. Relatives seem to regard them as very important, for two main reasons: first, that it allows them to grieve over their own particular loss and to separate their relative from the disaster as a whole (we might call this the ‘individuation’ and ‘personalisation’ of inquiry), and secondly, that inquests, with their juries, are seen as a useful way of exerting pressure on authorities to consider criminal proceedings.

The Home Office has recently conducted an interdepartmental investigation into the roles of the public inquiry and the inquest following disaster (Home Office, 1997). The duplication which currently occurs is thought to be both wasteful and also difficult for witnesses. Three options were considered: to subsume the inquiry into the inquest, to

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subsume the inquest into the inquiry, or to retain both with a limited role for the inquest. The first was thought to be problematic because coroners are not the sort of authority figures who would reassure the public. The second would require a number of statutory changes since inquests are mandatory in these circumstances while inquiries are not. Therefore, the third option found favour.

Not only — as now — would an inquest be adjourned pending any public inquiry, but coroners would only be able to resume for limited purposes after the inquiry. The resumed inquest would be without jury and would allow admission of documentary evidence (for example, the Inquiry Report) thus saving witnesses from having to rehearse oral evidence once more. Thus the inquest would effectively be subordinated to the inquiry. It is anticipated that these proposals would be controversial since the symbolic and instrumental pull of the jury is strong.

However, Scotland’s equivalent of the inquest, the fatal accident inquiry, functions without a jury. One of the reasons for rejecting the second option was that the experience after Piper Alpha of combining the fatal accident inquiry with the public inquiry led to a lengthy process of dealing with the individual deaths before the inquiry itself could proceed.

7.5 Legal Proceedings Disasters may give rise to civil or criminal liability or both. The object of civil proceedings is to seek compensation, and civil law claims are one of three sources of compensation for those affected by disaster (the others being charitable or trust funds and statutory schemes). Two features of disaster aftermath of great significance to the likelihood and nature of legal proceedings are the role of the media and that of support groups. Personal injury law has been described as a ‘lottery’ and fewer than 12 per cent of those injured in accidents institute claims. Disaster victims are less likely to be deterred from claiming because they have the benefit of numbers. Many of these civil claims are settled without subsequent court action. Post-traumatic stress claims have, however, been fought over in court litigation, culminating in the House of Lords decision in relation to the relatives of those killed in the Hillsborough disaster.

This section will cover those claims and the campaign for corporate manslaughter which followed the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster.

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7.5.1

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

Psychological stress accompanied by physical injury caused by another’s negligence generally gives rise to no difficulty in terms of legal compensation. But the net of psychological effect will often fall much wider, including those involved but uninjured, rescuers, and friends and relatives not actually present at the scene. Some but not all of these may be able to recover. Two recent trends are noticeable. One is the development of a fuller understanding of the potential that disasters have for causing severe psychological damage. The other, perhaps not unconnected, tendency has been a restrictive attitude from the appellate courts.

There is now wide acceptance that the psychological effects of disaster extend beyond the immediate aftermath, and affect not only survivors but those engaged in rescue and relief work or those involved through kinship. Legal recovery for psychological damage, termed ‘nervous shock’, pre-dates the naming and syndromising of PTSD. At first, courts were reluctant to acknowledge psychological damage but by the beginning of the century, recovery was allowed where the ‘shock’ was a direct result of fear for one’s own personal safety at the scene of an accident. This was extended to fear for the safety of one’s immediate family, but not to a mere bystander who came upon the aftermath.

Trauma resulting from fear for one’s own life is one clearly recognised category.

Rescuers can recover too, including volunteers, even though the shock was not induced by fear for themselves or even for others, but by the sight of the accident and involvement in salvaging casualties. The category which has caused the most soulsearching has undoubtedly been that where the trauma arises, not from fear of one’s own safety, but from fear for others. Here the courts originally required presence at the scene and sight of the accident as well as a clear and close relationship with those for whom the fear was felt. That type of relationship appeared confined to spouse, parent or child. This was extended in the 1980s to cover cases where the accident was within earshot and the plaintiff witnessed the immediate aftermath.

It was against this background that many recent disaster settlements included amounts for psychological stress. In most of these cases, there was little difficulty in establishing that people were either clearly within the accepted categories because they feared for themselves or their close relatives or clearly outside because they did not come upon the immediate aftermath. Hillsborough proved to be the breaking point, where two different groups of claimants sought to use this new elasticity to recover damages for psychological stress. The first group were present at the ground but were not in danger themselves. They were witnesses to an event which, they correctly feared, would result in the deaths of their non-immediate family, such as brothers-in-law. The other group were closer relatives who witnessed the unfolding tragedy on television or radio and who later identified the bodies of their loved ones in the mortuary.

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In Alcock v. Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police (1992) the House of Lords held that these two groups fell outside the legal limits for compensation. In all, 95 people were killed and 400 injured when South Yorkshire police, who were responsible for crowd control, allowed too many supporters on to the terraces at one end of the pitch. As more entered the back of the standing area, those already there were pushed against the mesh barrier dividing them from the pitch. When the match started, the crowds surged causing those in this part of the terrace to be crushed. Scenes from the ground were broadcast live on television and recordings shown later. The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire admitted liability in negligence in respect of deaths and physical injuries. The House was unanimous in holding that PTSD must arise in the immediate aftermath of the event. Viewing the body eight hours later in the mortuary was not close enough. The tension between the legal construction of death as a ‘normal’ occurrence for which fortitude can be expected, and the development of greater knowledge of the psychology of the bereavement process, is again evident. The fact that some people do suffer severe psychological trauma while others do not is no different than the fact that some people have thick skulls and others thin. But while the law copes with physical difference by holding defendants liable for the particular victim, psychological difference is translated into categories of liability.

The technology of communications means that, even with the immediate aftermath limitation on liability, a person could be both miles away and also contemporaneously witnessing the disastrous event. Again, the House of Lords was keen to keep a secure lid on the box it had been asked to investigate. Presence at the scene within sight or hearing brings a person within the frame. Those at the ground were counted as sufficiently proximate witnesses, but the television viewers and radio listeners were not.

In order to recover they would need not only to have been bereaved by the defendant’s negligence and to have suffered PTSD, they would also need to have had the right relationship with the deceased and to have been at the scene of the disaster. Although the result in Alcock must have appeared to the appellants to be verging on the capricious, it makes a certain sense in relation to the history of nervous shock cases.

Its major failing is that it leaves open too many opportunities for litigation and too few guidelines for settling cases. The reality of the civil claims process in the sphere of disasters is that it is easier to fend off a claim than to pursue one. Defendants are usually corporate bodies, backed by insurance, with much to gain from delay and dispute. The decision encourages defendants to force psychiatrically damaged plaintiffs to provide evidence of a ‘particularly close tie’ with a relative outside the presumed class or to displace the presumption that a parent was emotionally close to their dead child, or that a wife was attached to her dead husband.

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A general point is that the permissibility of a claim for PTSD is very much a matter of opinion. Depending upon the view taken by the legal system, the net can be drawn as widely or as narrowly as the ‘experts’ see fit. In other words, the permissibility of a claim is contingent upon socio-legal judgements.

7.5.2

Corporate Manslaughter

The paradigm of criminal law is an offender caught by the police, tried by a jury and punished appropriately probably with a term of imprisonment. There are important respects in which this view needs to be challenged. Many offences, especially those concerned with aspects of industrial safety, are contained in regulatory legislation enforced on a compliance model. Prosecutions for breach are the exception rather than the norm, and the level of fines has tended to be low (Bergman, 1994). Although there is evidence of some change as a result of decreasing levels of public tolerance and perceptions of business safety, in relative terms breaches of safety regulations would need to increase dramatically to compare with the sorts of criminal penalties imposed for conventional offences of violence.

Until recently, corporate defendants found themselves facing this relatively benign regime of regulatory enforcement. One of the significant legal developments from recent disasters is the way that debate about corporate responsibility now concerns the serious offence of manslaughter. It is not altogether surprising that, when the issue did arrive on the public and legal agenda in the P&O case, legal doctrine was found to have difficulty in accommodating this development.

Corporate criminal liability is unfamiliar territory for most British lawyers and it raises questions and challenges core assumptions about the nature and purposes of criminal law as traditionally conceived. Corporate liability for crime has had a chequered history inevitably entwined with the development and perceptions of regulatory offences.

Although corporations have been found liable for criminal offences for more than 100 years, corporate manslaughter has presented great difficulties. Part of the explanation has already been given, that corporate liability has been confined to a specific area, the regulatory sphere. But corporate criminality has a much wider spread and it is to this that the emergence of the idea of corporate manslaughter is a response. ‘Corporate manslaughter’ is a phrase which has only recently entered popular vocabulary. At the time of the Aberfan disaster in 1966 there was little talk of collective criminal liability.

The trend towards responding to disasters in terms of corporate manslaughter seems to have begun with the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize in 1987.

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The varied and complex reasons for this change cannot be accounted for in legal terms.

The Inquiry Report after Aberfan is eloquent and categorical in its condemnation of the National Coal Board (a state-funded and owned ‘nationalised’ industry, accountable (in theory) to Parliament) for failures which led to the disaster in the same way as the Sheen inquiry did not shirk from damning criticisms of P&O. Yet there is no contemporary discussion of a possible corporate manslaughter charge after Aberfan.

The Inquiry Report does not connect its condemnation of the Board for negligence with the possibility of this having criminal consequences. Things have changed. It is clear from the P&O prosecution that corporate manslaughter now has a cultural as well as a legal meaning. But there is much institutional resistance to the translation of those meanings to an actual conviction, or even a prosecution.

The prosecution of P&O for manslaughter following the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster was the first involving a corporation for nearly 30 years and only the third in English and Welsh legal history (Scotland has its own system of law). When a major disaster happens, it may not occur to anyone that this might come within the legal definition of unlawful homicide, especially if there is no particular individual to whose recklessness it can be attributed. A disparate range of factors, amongst which the legal definition of the offence plays a necessary but certainly not a sufficient part, determines whether a prosecution is brought, whether a conviction results (especially given the reliance in the Anglo-American system on juries) and the severity of sentence imposed.

There may be many other recklessly caused deaths which could fit the legal paradigm of manslaughter but which are never considered through a lack of fit with the social or cultural paradigm. The desirability or likelihood of a prosecution for corporate manslaughter following transport or other disasters caused by management disregard of safety policies or precautions are thus not matters which can be assessed from a purely legal standpoint.

After the long build-up, the trial of P&O for manslaughter eventually took place in 1990. With seven individual defendants, ranging from the Assistant Bosun on the Herald to the company’s senior directors, as well as the company itself, defence counsel far outweighed those for the prosecution. A near reversal of the normal balance of power between the state and the accused was thus achieved. But the judge brought the trial to a close before the end of the prosecution’s case and directed acquittals of the company and the individual defendants. He did so because he was not convinced that the prosecution could establish that one sufficiently senior member of the company’s management could be said to have been reckless. No one could be said to have created an obvious and serious risk, one which a prudent person would have realised, that the ferry could sail with its doors open. ‘We have heard a weight of evidence’, Mr Justice Turner said, ‘to the effect that experienced seaborne personnel

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never thought for a moment that, with the system in force, there was any risk of that event happening. It was not obvious to any of those people until it happened; that is my intellectual difficulty’ (Regina v. P&O, 1991). That is, as the seaborne personnel (apparently) could not conceive of such a train of events as occurred, they could not be tried for failing in their duty. In effect, there was no ‘duty’ to observe, as the possibility of such a socio-technical failure had not occurred to them.

There has been a change in manslaughter law since the P&O trial. Instead of the ‘obvious and serious risk’ test, there is one of ‘gross negligence’ under which the question for the jury would be whether, ‘having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in their judgement to a criminal act or omission’ (Regina v. Adomako, 1994).

As yet, only one successful prosecution for manslaughter has been brought (against OLL Ltd as a result of the Lyme Bay canoeing tragedy in 1993).

The Law Commission, acknowledging some of the obstacles to a successful prosecution against a large company with a management divorced from operational concerns (OLL was effectively a one-man company), has recommended the introduction of a separate offence of corporate killing (Law Commission, 1996). Instead of relying on culpability tests which apply equally to human and corporate defendants, as now, the offence would be based on ‘management failure’. A corporation would be guilty of corporate killing if: (a) management failure by the corporation is the cause or one of the causes of a person’s death; and (b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can reasonably be expected of the corporation in the circumstances.

Management failure would be evidenced when the way in which its activities are managed or organised fails to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in or affected by those activities. The Commission suggests that the penalty should be a fine together with the possibility of making remedial order.

The reasons for the failure of the P&O trial have exercised many commentators and the search for a mechanism which would capture the essence of the company’s failings as described in the Sheen Report clearly concerned the Law Commission which claims that the corporate killing offence would be ‘P&O proof’. Recall that P&O were indicted for manslaughter following the drownings of 188 people when their ferry the Herald of Free Enterprise capsized as a result of leaving Zeebrugge harbour with its bow doors open. The assistant bosun who was responsible for shutting the doors had fallen asleep and the Chief Officer whose responsibility it was to ensure the doors were shut had failed to do so.

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The Sheen Inquiry found that no reference was made in the company’s ‘Ship’s Standing Orders’ to the closing of the doors and that this was not the first occasion on which the company’s ships had gone to sea with bow doors open (Sheen, 1987).

Recall also that the law applicable at the time presented three potential hurdles to a successful prosecution of P&O (success here measured either by a conviction or by the issue at least being put to the jury). First, could a corporation commit manslaughter?

That question was resolved as an initial point of law. Secondly, the restrictive, identification doctrine of corporate liability meant that the company could be liable only through its ‘directing mind’, in this case represented by some of its directors.

Thirdly, the application of the ‘obvious and serious risk’ test for manslaughter gave rise to problems. (That last difficulty has now been removed.) Would the outcome in the P&O case have been different even without the new management failure route?

If the PO case occurred again, the Report argues, ‘it would probably be open to a jury to conclude that, even if the immediate cause of the deaths was the conduct of the assistant bosun, the Chief Officer or both, another of the causes was the failure of the company to devise a safe system for the operation of the ferries; and that that failure fell far below what could reasonably have been expected.’ Can that claim be reconciled, however, with the claim that the P&O trial was bound to fail because there was no obvious and serious risk perceptible to a prudent master that the ferry might sail with its doors open? Are these not two different ways of putting the same question? We can either say ‘the company’s failure to provide a safe system fell far below what was reasonably expected’ or ‘the company [i.e. the directors] failed to realise that there was an obvious risk that a ship might sail with its doors open’. If the risk were not obvious, as the judge concluded, why should we expect the company to devise a safe system to prevent it?

Another point is exactly where does the trail of culpability end? If the directors had been found guilty of failing to respond to an ‘obvious risk’, what, then, could be said of the naval architects who designed the Herald with an open car deck? Open car decks, if flooded, make ships unstable. Water ingress is rapid and its movement in the belly of the ship uncontrolled. Capsize becomes a distinct possibility. Given that naval architects have been aware of this weakness for some time should they, too, not have faced prosecution? Where does the trail of culpability and blame end? Is the public not culpable in some degree for preferring rapid embarkation/disembarkation from car ferries? And what about the international authorities which have taken so long to address the problem?

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7.6 Conclusion It is sometimes thought that plaintiffs turn to civil law because criminal proceedings have failed. Disasters have presented the converse, the use of criminal law where previously civil law has been seen as the appropriate forum. Different reasons have been suggested for this trend. Campaigning for criminal liability is also sometimes thought to be used as a means of applying pressure to the civil process, but evidence from the Piper Alpha aftermath suggests otherwise. Settlements were prompt and generous and predated the pursuit of criminal proceedings against Occidental. The campaign represented something other than a means of obtaining leverage for compensation. One reason for the persistence of the Marchioness relatives in pursuing a private prosecution for corporate manslaughter, was that there was little scope for argument in the claim for damages. As young adults with no dependants, the victims’ deaths resulted in bereavement damages of limited value. Trying to establish what people do ‘want’ from the legal system involves examining a deep, challenging and elusive seam of human psychology and cultural preference. Seven years after the Herald capsize, a family which survived was reported to be still suffering from PTSD. They were one of 20 families yet to settle with P&O. One family member commented: ‘You know, the worst thing is that to this day, no one from P&O has ever written us a letter saying sorry. That would have gone a long way, wouldn’t it?’ It would appear that bereaved relatives use law for a number of different purposes, including venting anger or frustration or both, seeking revenge, demanding compensation and wanting to prevent future tragedies. Procedural justice is now regarded by many to be as significant as substantive justice.

As this Unit demonstrates, a variety of legal institutions and different types of legal process can be invoked in the search for satisfaction which appears to go beyond mere compensation in the quest for something like ‘truth’ or ‘justice’. Whether this is properly called a blamist culture is an open question. Amidst this diversity clear patterns emerge which affect and reflect broader cultural attitudes. One such pattern is the increased use of criminal in addition to civil proceedings. The formal institutions of inquiry sometimes inhibit and sometimes assist those seeking compensation in the courts. There is no one procedure for use in disasters. Instead a medley of generic institutions battle with each other in what appears to be an unchoreographed performance. What happened after one disaster will affect how the next one is dealt with. The recognition of corporate manslaughter following the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster actually resulted in the possibility of using the inquest to put pressure on the prosecuting authorities being much reduced in the aftermath of later disasters. Many different groups are involved, some with professional interests such as lawyers, others with financial or governmental interests. The aim of this Unit has been to provide an understanding of some of the structures which make up the legal response to disasters in the United Kingdom, refracted through a selection of recent disasters.

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It is axiomatic that we should endeavour to learn as much as possible from disasters.

Via isomorphism, passive and active learning, future disasters may be ameliorated — even avoided. The prerequisite of isomorphic learning is data — much of it supplied by those involved in a disaster. It is worth asking to what extent the voluntary provision of such data might be affected if those involved are open to charges of corporate killing?

Blamist cultures can inhibit the free exchange of information, data and experience (Browning and Shetler, 1992: 484) — quantitative and qualitative resources vital to those who strive to make socio-technical systems safer. At the same time, of course, legal mechanisms for the apportionment of blame may go some way to satisfying those who seek ‘justice’ for past misdemeanours. At the end of the day a balance muse be struck between the interests of past, and potential future victims.

7.7 Guide to Reading You should now read the two supplied extracts, ‘Disaster Case Studies’ and’‘Public Investigation of Disaster’, pp. 20-51 and 71-84, from Wells, C. (1995), Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters, London: Sweet and Maxwell.

7.8 Suggested Further Reading Bergman, D. (2000) The Case For Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Violence and the Criminal Justice System, London: Disaster Action.

Wells, C. (2001) Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

7.9 Study Questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of the material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University.

1.

Outline the institutional responses to deaths by disaster in England and Wales and describe their respective roles.

2.

In what ways do civil and criminal proceedings differ?

3.

Suggest reasons why the law relating to corporate manslaughter might be in need of reform.

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7.10 Bibliography Bergman, D. (1994) The Perfect Crime: How Companies can get away with Manslaughter in the Workplace, Britain: West Midlands Health and Safety Advice Centre.

Browning, L. D. and Shetler, J. C. (1992) ‘Communication in Crisis, Communication in Recovery: A Postmodern Commentary on the Exxon Valdez Disaster’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 10(3): 477–98.

Colvin E. (1995) ‘Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability’, Criminal Law Forum 6(1): 8–25.

Council on Tribunals (1996) Advice to the Lord Chancellor on the Procedural Issues Arising in the Conduct of Public Inquiries Set up by Ministers, London.

Cullen (1990) The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, Cm 1310, London: HMSO [the Cullen Inquiry].

Department of Transport (1990) Report of the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents into the Collision between the Passenger Launch Marchioness and MV Bowbelle with the loss of life on the River Thames on 20 August 1989, London: HMSO. Douglas, M. (1992) Risk and Blame. London: Routledge.

Edmund-Davies (presiding) (1967) Report of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire into the Disaster at Aberfan on 21 October 1966, (HC 553), London: HMSO [the Edmund-Davies Inquiry].

Fennell (presiding) (1988) Investigation into the Kings Cross Underground Fire, Cm 499, London: HMSO [the Fennell Inquiry].

Hidden (presiding) (1989) Investigation into the Clapham Junction Railway Accident, London: HMSO [the Hidden Inquiry].

Home Office (1997) Report of the Disasters and Inquests Working Group, London: Home Office.

Law Commission (1996) Report No 237, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter, London: HMSO. Popplewell (presiding) (1986) Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds, Cmnd 9710, London: HMSO [Popplewell Inquiry into the Bradford Stadium Fire].

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Sheen (presiding) (1987) MV Herald of Free Enterprise: Report of the Court, (No. 8074), Department of Transport, London: HMSO [the Sheen Inquiry].

Taylor (1989) The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster 15 April 1989 , Cm 962, London: HMSO [the Taylor Inquiry].

Wells, C. (1993) Corporations and Criminal Responsibility. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

7.11 Table of Cases Alcock and others v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 Regina v. Adomako [1994] 3 All ER 79 R. v. Inner West London Coroner, ex p. Dallaglio and others, The Times 16 June 1994 R. v. Kite and OLL Ltd, Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994, unreported

Cases arising from Herald of Free Enterprise: R. v. HM Coroner for East Kent, ex p. Spooner (1989) 88 Cr Ap R 10 [judicial review overruling coroner’s refusal to allow verdicts of unlawful killing] R. v. P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App R. 72 [the judge’s legal ruling on corporate manslaughter] R. v. Stanley and others, 19 October 1990 (CCC No 900160) unreported [the trial itself]

7.12 Types of Inquiry Types of Public Inquiry — Recent Disaster Inquiries Aberfan Dunblane Bradford Hillsborough Herald King’s Cross Clapham Marchioness Piper Alpha

1921 Tribunal of Inquiry 1921 Tribunal of Inquiry Judicial — general powers (High Court Judge) Judicial — general powers (Court of Appeal Judge) Judicial — statutory Formal Investigation (High Court Judge) Judicial— statutory (Queens Counsel) Judicial — statutory — High Court Judge Technical — Marine Accident Investigation Branch Technical (Petrie) plus Judicial (Court of Session Judge)

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READING ‘Disaster Case Studies’ and

‘Public Investigation of Disaster’ Wells, C. (1995) Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters, pp. 20-51 and 71-84, London: Sweet and Maxwell Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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UNIT 8 Managing Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome/Disorder (PTSS/D)

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Contents 8.1

Introduction

8-5

8.2

Aims and Objectives of this Unit

8-6

8.3

Historical Overview of an understanding of PTSD

8-6

8.3.1 Children and Trauma

8-8

8.3.2 Conceptual Models of PTSD

8-9

8.4

8.5

8.6

Definition of PTSD

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8.4.1 The Three Groups of Symptoms

8-12

8.4.2 Influences on Development of PTSD

8-15

Treatment of PTSD

8-16

8.5.1 Some Techniques Used in Treatment

8-17

8.5.2 Psychological Debriefing/ Critical Incident Stress Debriefing

8-18

8.5.3 Other Forms of Support

8-19

Some Examples of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder

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8.6.1 1966: Aberfan, South Wales, United Kingdom

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8.6.2 1979: Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, USA

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8.6.3 1984: Bhopal, India

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8.6.4 1989: Hillsborough Association Football Ground, Sheffield, United Kingdom

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8.7

Conclusions

8-22

8.8

Guide to Reading

8-23

8.9

Suggested Further reading

8-23

8.10 Study Questions

8-24

8.11 Bibliography

8-24

Readings

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8.1 Introduction It can be argued that definitions of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) given by the American Psychological Association (1980, 1987, 1994) and supported by a range of research (e.g. Freedy and Hobfoll, 1995) are contemporary attempts to describe in scientific terms experiences and outcomes that philosophy and religion have long acknowledged.

In fact one of the aims of philosophy has always been to explore the meaning of basic concepts such as justice, truth, evil and suffering and each religion has tried to produce a consistent and satisfactory explanation for suffering and death. Like philosophy and religion, psychology sees shock, loss and suffering as unavoidable, but places the emphasis on how we choose to respond to such events in emotional and cognitive terms. One example of such thinking is Frankl (1961) who concludes that despair is caused by the perception that suffering has no meaning or purpose rather than by the suffering itself.

A survey of the concept of PTSD reveals that in previous eras soldiers often suffered panic and stress both before and after battle (Trimble, 1985) and PTSD symptoms can be identified in Shakespeare’s descriptions of a soldier (Henry IV, Part I) and a murderer (Macbeth). In this century a clearer understanding of the effects of trauma began to develop after observing soldiers in the First World War (Salmon, 1919) and concentration camp survivors (Chodoff, 1963). It is now recognised that war and conflict can affect civilians as well as soldiers (Lewis, 1942), and that natural disasters (Freedy et al., 1993), technological failures (VandenBos and Bryant, 1987), violent crime such as sexual and physical assault (Kilpatrick et al., 1989), torture (Basoglu, 1992), accidental injury (Scotti et al., 1995) and refugee status (Eisenbruch, 1991) may also lead to the development of PTSD symptoms.

However, even before the emergence of a psychological perspective on trauma, humanity was always at risk from so-called natural disasters, often termed ‘acts of God’, such as earthquake, flooding, hurricane, volcanic eruption and storm – although it is increasingly debatable how far human changes to and destruction of the environment directly contribute to such events. A second category of disasters, arising from the nature of humanity itself, can be found in the way people treat each other in wartime, or in peacetime, as they attack, rape, abuse or threaten each other. Technology has led to a third potential for disaster when such advanced systems fail, resulting in transport crashes, fires and explosions in buildings, and chemical and nuclear pollution.

Beck (1992) summarises this latter category of disaster under the rubric of the Risk Society. Perrow (1999), of course, considers such disasters to be a normal aspect of the application of technology to the satisfaction of human wants and needs. As technologies become more complex, so does the potential for unanticipated interactions, both within the confines of the system itself and between the system and its operating environment.

Some of these interactions may escalate out of control, leading to disaster.

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Once the death of loved ones fell into the category of natural events but, with improvements in medical and health care, there have been changes in people’s perceptions of ‘natural’ death. Thus, improvements in technology and medicine have increased the chances of more disasters, and on a larger scale, as well as raising our expectations of what can be done to prevent or delay death. As this Unit will show, beliefs about oneself, other people and the world are fundamental to an understanding of PTSD.

8.2 Aims and Objectives of this Unit Although it can be argued that PTSD is not a new phenomenon, its definition is (APA, 1980, 1987, 1994) and its frequency (whether from ‘natural’ causes, technological failure or human nature) is increasing. In order to link together these apparently differing perceptions, this Unit will give an historical overview of the development of an understanding of PTSD, discuss conceptual models and definitions, and the various treatments that have been developed.

8.3 Historical Overview of an Understanding of PTSD During the First World War soldiers were often described as suffering from ‘shellshock’ – a state believed to be induced by the explosions of shells and bombs all around them on the battlefield – since this was the only thing that would seem to account for such symptoms as shaking and twitching of limbs, insomnia, hypervigilance, depression and loss of speech. In time, ‘shell-shock’ came to be known as ‘battle-shock’, ‘battlefatigue’ or ‘battle-stress’ and, by the Second World War, was recognised as a specific reaction to conflict and war. To counteract this reaction troops were given periods of rest or leave from the conflict area whenever it was possible, and rest and recreation (R and R) is common today for soldiers in western armies during a tour of duty in order to reduce stress and to keep them in touch with normal life.

In addition, crisis intervention or ‘front-line’ treatment in response to acute stress reactions arising from combat are widely employed today. Such treatment uses three principles: •

proximity (the person is treated as close to the combat area as possible);

•

immediacy (the person is treated as soon as possible after symptoms develop);

•

expectancy (the person is expected to return quickly to the combat situation after treatment) (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991).

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The experience of American soldiers returning from Vietnam further advanced our understanding of the effects of battle and its aftermath since, despite psychological preparation and training, many Vietnam veterans found that they could not cope with ordinary life, make relationships, display emotions or come to terms with what they had done or witnessed, or what had been done to them. Some of their personal reactions were further compounded by American society’s reluctance to accept that both American soldiers and Vietnamese civilians had been traumatised during a war that was ultimately regarded by some as unjust and by many as unnecessary: Veterans coming home were generally greeted with disinterest by the public at large or treated as some sort of war criminals by youthful radicals.

Certainly, large numbers of Americans supported the war’s aims [to prevent the spread of Communism domino-like throughout the Pacific rim] but there was an increasing disillusionment with the way it was being carried out and the serving soldier or veteran felt a growing alienation even from those who were loudly backing him. At the end of the day, even the socalled ‘silent majority’ couldn’t really understand what the war was all about or why their sons were being asked to die in it.

(Beckett, 1985: 117) The manner in which draftees were inducted into the war may have increased stress levels. Whereas in the Second World War, units trained and fought together, in Vietnam troops were drafted into units singly as existing members reached the end of their twelve-month tour of duty. Age and world experience may also have played a role. In the Second World War the average age of the Allied soldiers was 26. In Vietnam, the average age was 19.

(Some of these themes have been explored by Hollywood. Born on the Fourth of July, for example, featured Tom Cruise as a disabled Vietnam veteran unable to assimilate himself back into conventional American society. Earlier, The Deer Hunter charted the efforts of a Vietnam veteran played by Robert DeNiro to re-make the life he had enjoyed before going to fight. So alienated is he that he fails to attend a welcome home party organised by his friends.)

Visiting Hiroshima seventeen years after the nuclear explosion, Lifton (1983) clarified five key experiences described by survivors which are still central to an understanding of PTSD as defined by DSM IV (APA, 1994) (see Section 4.1): •

a ‘death imprint’ or indelible imagery of the encounter with death comprising sights, sounds, smells and sensations;

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•

feeling guilty (either ‘existential guilt’ about why the event happened or why the person was selected to experience it, or guilt about actions done or not done at the time);

•

psychic numbing (behaving logically and coolly at the time of the event because of being stunned or dazed and reacting in less controlled ways afterwards);

•

being suspicious of offers of help or interest in the event from outsiders or wary of discussing it afterwards (because of a feeling that no-one else can understand or that those involved are being judged for what they did or did not do);

•

seeking a meaning for the experience (often in terms of why it happened, how and why survivors escaped, why they feel as they do, what these feelings mean for them as people, and what the experience itself means with regard to having an understanding of the totality of life).

8.3.1

Children and Trauma

In the UK the vulnerability of children to disaster from technological failure was highlighted in October 1966 when a coal tip fell on to Aberfan killing 144 people of whom 116 were children, and more recent events involving UK school groups have been well reported: the sinking of the cruise ship Jupiter (October 1988); the canoe activity holiday disaster in Lyme Bay, off the south coast of England (March 1993); and the minibus crash on the M40 (a motorway in Britain) (November 1993). In addition, due to improved national and international communications, large-scale murder or manslaughter (Hungerford, Waco, Tokyo subway, Tasmania), particularly involving young children (Dunblane, March 1996), has been highlighted. When children die, society’s perceptions of timely and untimely death, love and justice, and the meaning and purpose of life are challenged more than usual. Psychological Debriefing/ Critical Incident Stress Debriefing is aware of this and, when it is appropriate, asks people how they responded to the deaths of children (see Section 5.3).

It was once thought that children involved in stressful situations including major disasters might display socially handicapping emotional disorders but that they were not long lasting. Garmezy and Rutter (1985) considered that children, unlike adults, did not need a specific diagnosis for PTSD because they tended not to experience psychic numbing, flashbacks or amnesia. However, after working with 42 child and teenage survivors of The Herald of Free Enterprise, City of Poros and Jupiter, Yule (1989) disputed this view, suggesting that the following reactions are the most common in the first few months after a life-threatening event: sleep disturbances; difficulty in separating from and/or an overwhelming desire to be with parents; lack of concentration; poor memory;

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intrusive thoughts (often triggered by stimuli such as the sight of tables laid out like the ship’s cafeteria, the movement of a vehicle, the sound of running water or breaking glass); desire to talk with peers and to avoid talking with parents; heightened awareness of travel dangers; a sense of having a foreshortened future; and fears of travelling by sea and air, swimming, or of rushing water.

It is important to recognise that children and teenagers are likely to respond in the same way as adults to any traumatic event but their inexperience in dealing with the events of life and their perception that adults (whom they expect to cope) cannot do so, may prevent them displaying such symptoms. Adults, in their turn, often find the death of children upsetting because the natural order of living and dying is challenged and incidents involving school parties in which multiple deaths occur are particularly distressing for rescue workers (see also Section 5.3).

8.3.2

Conceptual Models of PTSD

The concept of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder developed from work in different fields: victims of personal and mass disaster, hostage taking, armed robbery, the atom bomb, holocaust survivors and war veterans. Community-based studies reveal a lifetime prevalence for PTSD ranging from 1 percent to 14 percent, depending on populations sampled and methods used (DSM IV; APA, 1994).

Many conceptual models from psychology and biology have been proposed (Freedy and Donkervoet, 1995) and both learning theory and cognitive processing try to account for the fear factor present in PTSD. Learning theory, which has been used to explain combat and crime-related trauma, explains avoidance behaviour as an attempt to escape fear which, originally appropriate in response to a threat to personal safety, has been transferred to other situations. Cognitive processing, on the other hand, suggests that a fear-based memory network develops during trauma related to elements such as stimuli, responses and the meaning of the event. Re-experiencing symptoms (e.g. memories and nightmares) reflect an inability to activate the fear network for long enough in order to change elements of the original memory.

PTSD is also conceptualised by Hodgkinson and Stewart (1991) as a fear structure that causes a rupture with a person’s personal history and coping strategies which had previously represented a stable belief system about oneself, the world, normal life events and usual behaviour patterns They suggest that this fear system is a cyclical process of intrusion, appraisal, distress, avoidance and inevitable repeated intrusions and that PTSD can be viewed as ‘a loss of faith in the world’ (p. 22).

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Biological studies, mainly using animals, show that exposure to inescapable shock leads to the depletion of certain neurotransmitters (e.g. dopamine) which produces symptoms similar to PTSD in humans (e.g. social withdrawal and constriction of affect).

Furthermore, repeated exposure to inescapable shock creates a state of analgesia caused by the release of endogenous opiates which may become addictive so that when the opiate-stressor is removed, withdrawal symptoms (anxiety, startle response and hyper vigilance) arise.

However, absence of data to completely support or reject any one particular model have led to the development of more complex integrative models such as that of Foy et al.

(1993). Their model proposes that trauma exposure (through either personal experience, vicarious experience or observation) can lead to conditioned emotional reactions that become either acute or chronic forms of PTSD, and that psychological, social and biological factors may increase or decrease the probability of PTSD developing.

Contemporary psychology views the many complex reactions to traumatic incidents as those of normal human beings to sudden, unexpected and terrifying events in their lives. Unless they are members of specific rescue or law and order services, many people who are affected by it are simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and are usually unprepared for what will happen and what they will see and do. Reactions can occur during as well as after the event itself and often depend on the previous experiences of the person involved. For example, witnessing a shocking event such as the drowning of fellow passengers may be more traumatic for someone recently bereaved or already feeling depressed than for someone not affected by such earlier events. For police officers, fire and rescue services, ambulance crews and armed forces the likelihood of experiencing PTSD may be potentially higher than for, say, lawyers, teachers and shop workers because the daily work of the latter does not normally bring them into contact with death, bloodshed or traumatic situations.

Other helpers such as doctors, clergy and counsellors are also, inevitably, involved either at the time of the event or later and, as well as families and friends of the victims, rescuers and helpers, other people (some many miles away) may be vicariously involved as a result of high profile media reporting and an apparent increase in the number of such events reported by the media. It is also becoming recognised that people working within criminal justice â&#x20AC;&#x201C; lawyers, judges and jurors â&#x20AC;&#x201C; may be affected by what they see and hear, and that jurors may be especially affected because, as ordinary members of the public, they are not prepared for what they will be told and shown (Neustatter, 1996).

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8.4 Definition of PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder was first given official recognition as a general diagnostic category in 1980 in the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III) (APA, 1980). Since then there has been a revision of this manual (DSM III R,1987) and a fourth edition (DSM IV, 1994). Six criteria (A1, A2, B, C, D, E and F) are currently (1994) given for diagnosis, three of which (B, C and D) describe symptoms. Such a description is an attempt to provide standard criteria for identification and a way of distinguishing between reactions to different trauma (e.g. PTSD and Acute Stress Disorder). It also allows for links to be made between groups of people experiencing trauma caused by different stressors.

Criteria for assessment of PTSD: DSM IV (1994: 427–9) gives the following diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder: A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were present: 1. the person experienced, witnessed or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others; 2. the person’s response involved fear, helplessness or horror.

B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the following ways: 1. recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts or perceptions; 2. recurrent distressing dreams of the event; 3. acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations and disassociative flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated); 4. intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event; 5. physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or resemble an aspect of the trauma.

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C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following: 1. efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings or conversations associated with the trauma; 2. efforts to avoid activities, places or people that arouse recollections of the trauma; 3. inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma; 4. markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities; 5. feeling of detachment or estrangement from others; 6. restricted range of affect (e.g. unable to have loving feelings); 7. sense of a foreshortened future (e.g. does not expect to have a career, marriage, children or a normal life span).

D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by two (or more) of the following: 1. difficulty falling or staying asleep 2. irritability or outbursts of anger 3. difficulty concentrating 4. hypervigilance 5. exaggerated startle response E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in criteria B, C and D) is more than one month.

F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.

8.4.1

The Three Groups of Symptoms

Persistent re-experiencing of the event (criterion B) The type of event experienced is likely to influence the extent and nature of the images.

Intrusive imagery may range from faint impressions of what happened to vivid and detailed memories that abruptly and repeatedly enter consciousness and are difficult to disperse. Illusions and hallucinations seem to occur less frequently than nightmares.

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Nightmares tend to include elaborate detail and are often exact replicas of the event itself. They usually occur early in the sleep cycle and are frequently accompanied by considerable body movements which are disturbing to bed partners who may even be attacked. Other types of bad dreams include having feelings of being ‘threatened’ or dreaming of similar events such as fires or car crashes in general, rather than the particular fire or car crash in which the person was involved.

Intensification by reminder may occur on the anniversary, or when similar vehicles or buildings are entered, or when situations are experienced which have similar features such as raised voices, certain gestures or particular smells and sounds.

Children also re-experience traumatic events in which they have been involved. Eightyear-old ‘Bill’ (Yule and Williams, 1990), who was on the capsized Herald of Free Enterprise, became terrified while on the lower deck of a double decker bus with his father about three months later. As it swayed going round a roundabout he shouted, ‘It’s going over, Dad’ and had to get off the bus (p. 285). When interviewed, he said he often felt that his school desk was going over when he stood over it and that he also dreamed that the world was going over on its side with people going up in the air and getting separated from each other. Other ways in which children may re-experience traumatic events are through play, such as acting out the kidnapping (Terr, 1983) or drawing what they saw (Newman, 1995).

Table 1: Frequency of Re-experience Phenomena (percentages) Symptoms of intrusion

General trauma stress patients (1)

Terror victims with PTSD (2)

Terror victims without PTSD (3)

Building collapse victims (3)

Vietnam veterans (4)

Intrusive imagery

51

84

46

88

–

Illusions

26

–

–

–

–

Hallucinations

8

–

–

–

–

‘As if’

57

–

1

–

–

Nightmares

69

52

34

52

67

Intensification by reminder

–

78

56

37

–

Source: Hodgkinson and Stewart (1991: 12)

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Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (criterion C) Many of these symptoms are similar to Lifton’s (1983) description of ‘psychic numbing’ (see Section 3.1). Some people change their behaviour, routines and personal habits in order to avoid reminders of the event such as not using bridges, not travelling by bus, train or coach, not travelling by air or sea, and not showering or having a bath. Bank cashiers involved in armed raids often avoid returning to jobs involving face-to-face work with the public and many (female) rape victims avoid being alone with men.

Having a poor memory in general may result from suppressing particular thoughts of the traumatic event, and it is extremely common for people to lose interest in normal activities as they reflect on the unpredictablity of life events and the uncertainty of life itself. Many are detached from their surroundings and feel they can no longer enjoy the pleasures of life again. Some may even feel it is wrong to do so because of the suffering they have seen and experienced. Many people, including children (Terr, 1983), have a sense of a foreshortened future and do not expect to be involved in loving or long-lasting relationships.

Table 2: Frequency of Avoidance/ Numbing Phenomena (percentages) Symptoms of avoidance

General traumatic stress patients (1)

Terrorism victims with PTSD (2)

Terrorism victims without PTSD (2)

Building collapse victims (3)

Behavioural avoidance

69

53

36

40

Memory failure 34

38

18

27

Diminished interest

78

98

13

–

Detachment

–

10

2

29

Constricted effort

67

13

2

36

Source: Hodgkinson and Stewart (1991: 14)

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Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (criterion D) These responses tend to be physiological ones caused by cognitive recognition of similar situations or symbolic reminders of the event. When people perceive certain situations or ideas to be dangerous, their autonomic nervous system responds with palpitations or sweating in preparation for fighting the danger or fleeing from it. Because of this state of tension, people cannot easily fall asleep or concentrate on ordinary activities and they may become aggressive, angry, easily startled or over-cautious.

Table 3: Symptoms of Increased Arousal (percentages) Symptoms of arousal

General trauma stress

Terrorism victims with PTSD (2)

patients (1)

Terrorism victims without

Building collapse victims (3)

PTSD (2)

Sleep difficulties

–

96

84

50

Irritability

83

–

–

35

Angry outbursts

42

6

4

–

Concentration difficulties

92

38

18

–

Hyper-vigilance 69

66

53

Exaggerated startle

34

45

Source: Hodgkinson and Stewart (1991: 16) 8.4.2

Influences on Development of PTSD

There is some evidence that childhood experiences, family history, social support, personality and pre-existing mental disorders may influence the development of PTSD although, if the stressor is extreme, it can develop in people without any predisposing conditions. Overall the most important factors affecting the likelihood of the development of PTSD are the severity, duration and proximity of an individual’s exposure to the traumatic event (DSM IV; APA, 1994).

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When disturbances such as feelings of distress and changed behaviour are no longer elicited by reminders of the event and there is a return to everyday behaviour, emotional processing of the event can be deemed satisfactory. Hodgkinson and Stewart (1991) suggest that three areas seem to influence the way in which a person emotionally processes an event: â&#x20AC;˘

dimensions of the person (e.g. neuroticism/introversion; personal or family psychological problems; childhood or adult sense of security);

â&#x20AC;˘

dimensions of the trauma itself (e.g. heat, noise, darkness, water, fire; sudden or anticipated; short or long duration);

â&#x20AC;˘

dimensions of the recovery environment (e.g. social support; religious and cultural rituals; media attitudes).

8.5 Treatment of PTSD Raphael (1986) and Hodgkinson and Stewart (1991) suggest that different strategies, described below, may be of particular use for each element of the fear cycle that PTSD is recognised to be. (a) The traumatic event and memories of it.

The events themselves need processing either in immediate Psychological Debriefing (see Section 8.5.3) or later in individual psychotherapy of which cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) is one form (see Section 8.5.2). (b) Cognitive appraisal and the development of dysfunctional beliefs.

Since new beliefs (e.g. the world is not a safe place in which to live) arise in order to replace the old ones that have been shattered by the traumatic event, cognitivebehavioural therapy addresses distorted thinking, irrational beliefs and automatic negative thoughts. It can also teach techniques to manage anger and irritability and to distract from intrusive thoughts. (c) Disturbed feelings and over arousal.

Relaxation methods and techniques known as systematic de-sensitisation and imaginal flooding (see Section 8.5.2) can help to generally reduce arousal as well as specific images and thoughts. Medication may also help some people by reducing bodily feelings of arousal.

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(d) Avoidance and disruption to everyday life and behaviour.

By cognitively reliving the situation using de-sensitisation (see Section 8.5.2) or imaginal flooding techniques, anxiety and other avoidance tactics can be controlled.

Activities can also be structured in such a way that a gradual return to everyday life is achieved and, in cases where marriages and relationships are under stress, family or marriage counselling can help.

8.5.1

Some Techniques Used in Treatment

Psychological Debriefing will be discussed in Section 8.5.3. Other techniques and therapies mentioned above are: relaxation, systematic de-sensitisation, imaginal flooding, individual psychotherapy and cognitive-behavioural therapy.

Relaxation enables the person to relax the muscles of the body so that tension and stress is reduced. In time, as cue words become associated with the feelings of relaxation, the use of muscular relaxation can be omitted. Training in recall of pleasant imagery will also increase the sense of relaxation and improve the personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to deal with intrusive thoughts.

Systematic de-sensitisation involves mentally taking the person through each step of the traumatic event. Relaxation techniques are used to overcome anxiety at each step and, only when no anxiety is registered is the next step in the event contemplated. Such a procedure may take many sessions in order to allow the whole event to be recalled without anxiety or to prevent thoughts and images about any part of it intruding into everyday life.

Imaginal flooding is a similar technique of remembering except that it allows the person to focus for several minutes at a time on traumatic imagery as the therapist talks the person through the event step by step. The emphasis is on being able to stay with traumatic mental images of the event for longer and longer, interspersed with periods of relaxation.

Like de-sensitisation, this approach needs to be built up in duration over several sessions.

Cognitive-behavioural therapy addresses the notion, first recorded by Epictetus, that people are disturbed by the view they take of events rather than by the events themselves.

The views people take depend on their background beliefs, the advice and encouragement they receive, and what is available in their environment. Therapy may involve learning to contain (rather than immediately eliminate) intrusive images for specific periods of time; cognitively restructuring the event in order to de-emphasise traumatic images (e.g. the face of a dead child) and to emphasise positive aspects (e.g. the number of people saved or helped); balancing out the good and bad times in oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s life in order to recognise that the former actually outweigh the latter; and realistically reassessing the degree of threat in everyday life. De-sensitisation and flooding techniques may also be employed.

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8.5.2

Psychological Debriefing/ Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (PD/CISD)

This approach, developed by Dyregrov (1989) and Mitchell (1983), can be used with individuals, couples, families or groups. It is concerned with how people have reacted psychologically and emotionally to what happened to them, rather than with discussing the event itself. It involves one or more sessions framed within a formal structure lasting for a morning, afternoon, a day or several days and should be carried out within 48 hours of an event, although not immediately after it.

This kind of ‘debriefing’ needs to be distinguished from the debriefing used in the armed forces and other organisations and services to give or obtain information after an incident or exercise. PD/CISD, unlike these other forms, specifically addresses emotions and feelings rather than facts and data. Parkinson (1993) suggests that it should be seen as a normal activity for everyone involved in traumatic events – such as an accident, disaster, shooting, hostage, war and combat, robbery, rape, or other acts of violence – and ought to be standard procedure for the armed forces, police, fire and rescue, and ambulance services and all survivors, witnesses, helpers, carers and their families. Following the San Francisco earthquake, a specific model for disaster workers has been devised (Armstrong et al., 1991). The implication that anyone is mentally ill must be avoided during PD/CISD. Outline of stages of Psychological Debriefing/Critical Incident Stress Debriefing 1.

Introductions and establishment of ground rules.

2.

Discussion of expectations and facts (e.g. Did you expect death and injury, mutilated bodies, or dead and dying children?)

3.

Discussion of thoughts and impressions (on arrival, during the event, and at the end) including: What meaning did the event have for you?

4.

Discussion of emotional reactions (e.g. fear, hopelessness, helplessness, frustration, guilt, anger, depression, shame, bitterness, sadness, failure, blame).

5.

Discussion of physical, cognitive, emotional and behavioural signs of distress (at the time, afterwards and now).

6.

Normalisation of reactions discussed (e.g. What kind of help and support do you think you need now? What have you learned from others in the group?).

7.

Ending and disengagement.

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8.5.3

Other Forms of Support

There have been a number of initiatives for both adults and children in many countries.

The following are a few of those more widely reported.

The United Kingdom •

The Allen Report (1991) was commissioned by the UK government from the Disasters Working Party which, convened by Cruse Bereavement Care, was set up in response to the effects on local communities of previous disasters. It recommended that each local district should prepare a team, co-ordinated by social services, of trained counsellors and mental health professionals to offer appropriate help following future so-called disasters.

•

In response to the apparent rise in disasters affecting school children, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation distributed a free copy of Wise Before The Event (Yule and Gold, 1993) to every UK school in order to encourage school personnel to plan for the kind of event they hope will never happen.

The Children’s Traumatic Stress Clinic, 73 Charlotte Street, London, was opened in 1993 to assess, treat and ultimately help to place children affected by: murder in the family; witnessing other murder; attempted murder or severe injury to family members; severe domestic violence; child abduction; Manchausen syndrome by proxy; war or civil conflict; humanly-made and natural disaster; parenting failures.

United States of America •

After the 1988 earthquake in Armenia, staff from the Trauma Psychiatry Program, University of California at Los Angeles, worked in schools with young people to help decrease stress.

•

The International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF), 5018 Dorsey Hall Drive, Suite 104, Ellicott City, Maryland 21042 explores the impact of critical incident stress (CIS) on families where a member is employed in public safety.

It also offers training in basic critical incident stress identification, team development, clinical psychotraumatology and peer counselling techniques.

Norway Atle Dyregrov, Director, Centre for Crisis Psychology, Fabrikkgaten 5, 5037 Solheimsvik, Bergen

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Israel Ofra Ayalon, Community Oriented Preparation for Emergency (COPE), University of Haifa, prepares professionals trained in stress inoculation to help others cope in emergencies.

Conferences •

European Conference on Traumatic Stress (first one held in England in 1988)

•

World Congress on Stress, Trauma and Coping in the Emergency Service Professions (organised by ICISF, USA)

8.6 Some Examples of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Although so-called natural disasters (see Introduction) account for most incidents throughout the world involving loss of life and damage to property, those caused by the failure of technology and/or lack of human planning seem to receive more publicity.

The following internationally known incidents show how PTSD has been identified and treated within both developed and developing societies.

8.6.1

1966: Aberfan, South Wales, United Kingdom

When heavy rain caused one of the seven coal tips on the edge of Aberfan to collapse, the small Welsh mining village suddenly became nationally and internationally known. Within two hours 116 children from inside Pantglas primary school – over half of the village children – and 28 adults were dead, and the landscape was substantially changed. Local community representatives and inhabitants of the valleys had warned for years that the tips were unstable. The Merthyr Express had articulated residents’ fears as long ago as September 1960. Indeed, ‘... hundreds of letters from residents, some written in the 1950s, foresaw the disaster’ (Heath, 1998). Despite such lay insights, nothing was done.

Meaningful compensation was never really obtained from the National Coal Board despite long running campaigns, and the community itself, rather than statutory services, provided most of its own support. Initially, the National Coal Board offered £50 to each bereaved family. Eventually, ‘... the NCB paid out a total of £160,000 – £500 for each child, money for traumatised survivors, and compensation for damage to property’ (Heath, 1998). Not one member of the NCB was prosecuted, or even fired. As McLean (1998) explains:

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The Coal Board spin-doctored its way all along. It controlled the agenda from the day of the disaster. Despite the Tribunal’s strongly-worded report, Lord Robens [NCB Chairman] did not resign, nor was any blameworthy member of the Coal Board staff dismissed or prosecuted.

Outsiders perceived that Aberfan’s strong sense of community enabled the town to recover, and professionals noted an appreciable rise in the birth rate within five years (Raphael, 1986). There was a tendency for media reports to identify people as ‘the parents of Aberfan’ and a television documentary (BBC2, 1996), shown to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the disaster, continued to draw public attention to the way in which the town’s people still feel about their loss. The suddenness of this incident, the nature and size of the village and the lack of well organised official support is in contrast to the incident at Three Mile Island.

8.6.2

1979: Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, USA

All pre-school age children and pregnant women within a five mile radius of the Three Mile Island nuclear power station were evacuated when there was a threatened meltdown of the reactor core. Although a full meltdown never occurred, nobody died and no residential property was damaged, the reactor building was still highly contaminated four years later and local residents lived with the permanent threat of contamination until 1985 when one of the undamaged reactors was restarted. Distress was especially displayed through obsessive-compulsive thoughts, suspicion and hostility and higher levels of norepinephrine and cortisol in their bodies than controls (Davidson and Baum, 1994). Mothers of young children and pregnant women showed most signs of depression and anxiety, and impaired mental health was greatest for those who lived closest to the plant (Raphael, 1986). The prolonged nature of the incident which enabled it to be the most thoroughly studied and intensely media reported may also have added to the residents’ distress.

8.6.3

1984: Bhopal, India

The escape of a cloud of toxic gas from the Union Carbide plant in the city of Bhopal is, to date, the greatest ever chemical catastrophe with nearly 3,500 dead and over 55,000 needing hospital treatment for blindness and choking (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991). Weisaeth (1994) observes that the human instinct to run from danger was the cause of many deaths as people tried to run ahead of the cloud rather than sealing themselves inside their homes. Apart from the high loss of life, local business and community life also suffered as the factory became feared and unworkable. Much less research has been done on this community of survivors than on those who ‘survived’ Three Mile Island, but it is likely that there is a fear of similar looking clouds and

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smells and intense anger at the company responsible. Chronic and prolonged stress is likely because of loss of employment, fear of the environment and dread that the health of future generations has been affected.

8.6.4

1989: Hillsborough Association Football Ground, Sheffield, United Kingdom

Ninety-six people died as a result of over-crowding in an enclosed area of a football ground, most of whom were male and in their teens or twenties. Almost immediately telephone helplines were set up and, for the first time in such circumstances, health and social services planned their support together (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991).

Schools in Liverpool and Sheffield – as well as many others in the country – had to decide in the first few days after the incident how to respond to the sudden death of members of their population. There were many public displays of grief with wreaths, bouquets and scarves placed in schools and at football grounds and several religious services were broadcast to commemorate the dead. A commission of inquiry was held amid claims of police mismanagement of the situation, one result of which was a change in the design of football grounds throughout the United Kingdom.

These four examples reveal an increasing public awareness of the impact of such incidents. In developed countries there is now an expectation of co-ordinated professional support at the time and afterwards, as well as greater criticism of companies and institutions deemed responsible for technological and human error.

Schools have also been encouraged to plan for critical incidents.

8.7 Conclusions Post-traumatic stress disorder is a recently defined mental disorder of which people are becoming increasingly aware. Although it is fairly certain that humans have always suffered from the kind of symptoms that DSM IV (APA, 1994) describes, the greater likelihood in contemporary society of technological failure (Perrow, 1999) together with the apparent increase in natural disasters and the ever present inhuman treatment of some people by others have raised our overall awareness of these issues. Children suffer from PTSD no less than adults, although their symptoms may be less apparent or less easily communicated to parents, carers and teachers.

It is generally recognised that fear – whether of encountering similar circumstances or of seeing, hearing or experiencing reminders of the traumatic event – is at the heart of the three main groups of symptoms: persistent re-experiencing, persistent avoidance of associated stimuli and numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent

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symptoms of increased arousal. Some people appear to be more at risk of developing PTSD symptoms because of previous life experiences or pre-existing mental disorders.

A range of treatments have been developed to help individuals return to normal life by changing their feelings, thoughts and behaviour and, in time, Psychological Debriefing (or Critical Incident Stress Debriefing) may become standard procedure for the armed forces, police, fire and rescue services as well as for survivors, carers, witnesses, helpers and family members in order that the emotions experienced at the time of the traumatic event can be shared and normalised.

But despite such progress, there are still important issues to be resolved. For example, in light of the almost immediate and sometimes graphic reporting of disasters (not only in one’s own country, but across the globe), exactly how many people may be affected by disaster-induced stress? It could be argued that anyone who hears, views or even reads a media report of a distressing incident is vulnerable – in some degree – to post-traumatic stress. The in-depth reporting of several distressing incidents may have a cumulative effect on entire populations. Feelings of hopelessness and resignation (fatalism) may develop.

8.8 Guide to Reading There are four readings for this Unit.

The first reading is the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2005) Quick Reference Guide: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Clinical Guideline 26.

The second reading is an article ‘Ryan’s Legacy still Haunts a Policeman’ from Police, (October) 1997:8-9.

The third reading is Husband’s article ‘Disaster Survivors Talking’ from Options, (August) 1993: 44-47.

The fourth reading is two short newspaper articles from 2003 on the health costs of stress.

8.9 Suggested Further Reading See chapter 5 ‘The Management of Trauma’ in McLean, I. and Johnes, M. (2000) Aberfan: Government and Disasters, Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press.

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8.10 Study Questions You should now write approximately 300 words in answer to each of the questions below. We believe that this is an important exercise that will assist your comprehension of material and aid your progress on the course. Your answers are intended to form part of your own course notes and should not be forwarded to the University.

1.

Discuss the impact of trauma on children and the impact on helpers of disasters involving children.

2.

Discuss the three main group of PTSD symptoms and explain how they can be identified.

3.

What problems and benefits do you think will arise from using Psychological Debriefing/ Critical Incident Stress Debriefing?

8.11 Bibliography Allen, A. J. (Chair, Disasters Working Party) (1991) Disasters: Planning for a Caring Response, London: HMSO American Psychiatric Association (1980) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd edn, Washington, DC: APA. American Psychiatric Association (1987) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd edn revised, Washington, DC: APA. American Psychological Association (1994) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edn, Washington, DC: APA. Armstrong, B., W. O’Callahan and C. R. Marmar (1991) ‘Debriefing Red Cross Disaster Personnel: The Multiple Stressor Debriefing Model’‘, Journal of Traumatic Stress 4(4): 581–93.

Basoglu, M. (ed.) (1992) Torture and its Consequences: Current Treatment Approaches, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

BBC 2 (1996) Timewatch, 15 October.

Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society, London: Sage.

Beckett, B. (1985) The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War, Poole: Blandford Press.

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BPS (1990) Psychological Aspects of Disaster, Leicester: British Psychological Society.

Chodoff, P. (1963) ‘Late Effects of the Concentration Camp Syndrome’, Archives of General Psychiatry 8: 323–33.

Davidson, L. M. and A. Baum (1994) ‘Psychophysiological Aspects of Chronic Stress Following Trauma’, in R. J. Ursano, B. G. McCaughey and C. S. Fullerton (eds) Individual and Community Responses to Trauma and Disaster: The Structure of Human Chaos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DeFazio, V. (1975) ‘The Vietnam Era Veteran’, Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy 7: 9–15.

Dyregrov, A. (1989) ‘Caring for Helpers in Disaster Situations: Psychological Debriefing’, Disaster Management 2(1): 25–30.

Eisenbruch, M. (1991) ‘From Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Cultural Bereavement: Diagnosis of Southeast Asian Refugees’, Social Science Medicine 33(6): 673–80.

Foy, D. W., S. S. Osato, B. M. Houskamp and D. A. Neumann (1993) ‘Etiology of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, in P. A. Saigh (ed.) Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: A Behavioural Approach to Assessment and Treatment, Pergamon.

Freedy, J. R. and J. C. Donkervoet (1995) ‘Traumatic Stress: An Overview of the Field’, in J. R. Freedy and S. E. Hobfoll (eds) Traumatic Stress: From Theory to Practice, Plenum.

Freedy, J. R. and S. E. Hobfoll (eds) (1995) Traumatic Stress: From Theory to Practice, Plenum.

Freedy, J. R., D. G. Kilpatrick and H. S. Resnick (1993) ‘Natural Disasters and Mental Health: Theory, Assessment and Intervention’, Journal of Social Behaviour and Personality 8(3): 49–103.

Garmezy, N. and M. Rutter (1985) (2nd edn) ‘Acute Reactions to Stress’, in M. Rutter and L. Hersov (eds) Child and Adolescent Psychiatry: Modern Approaches, Oxford: Blackwell.

Heath, T. (1998) ‘Aberfan families offered just £50’, The Independent, 13 February.

Hodgkinson, P. E. and M. Stewart (1991) Coping with Catastrophe: A Handbook of Disaster Management, London: Routledge.

Horowitz, M.J., M. Wilner, N. Kaltreider and W. Alvarez (1980) ‘Signs and Symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, Archives of General Psychiatry 37: 85–92.

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Husband, S. (1993) ‘Disaster Survivors Talking’, Options, August: 44-47.

Kilpatrick, D. G., B. E. Saunders, A. Amick-McMullan, C. L. Best, L. J. Veronen and H. S. Resnick (1989) ‘Victim and Crime Factors associated with the Development of Crimerelated Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, Behaviour Therapy 20: 199–214.

Lewis, A. (1942) ‘Incidence of Neurosis in England under War Conditions’, Lancet 2: 175–83.

Lifton, R. J. (1983) ‘Responses of Survivors to Man-made Catastrophes’, Bereavement Care 2: 2–6.

Loughrey, G. C., P. Bell, M. Kee, R. J. Roddy and P. S. Curran (1988) ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Civil Violence in Northern Ireland’, British Journal of Psychiatry 153: 554–60.

McLean, I. (1998) in T. Heath (1998) ‘Aberfan families offered just £50’, The Independent, 13 February.

Mitchell, J. T. (1983) ‘When Disaster Strikes ... The Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Process’, Journal of Emergency Medical Services 8: 36–9.

Neustatter, A. (1996) ‘When jury service can become a trial’, You: The Mail on Sunday, 28 July: 34–7.

Newman, M. (1995) ‘Helping Children after a Traumatic Bereavement’, Bereavement Care 14(2): 18–19.

Parkinson, F. (1993) Post-Trauma Stress, London: Sheldon Press/SPCK. Perrow, C. (1999) Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Police (1997) ‘Ryan’s Legacy Still Haunts a Policeman’, October: 8-9.

Raphael, B. (1986) When Disaster Strikes: A Handbook for the Caring Professions, Unwin Hyman.

Salmon, T. W. (1919) ‘The War Neuroses and their Lessons’, New York State Journal of Medicine 59: 993–4.

Scott, M. J. and S. G. Stradling (1992) Counselling for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, London: Sage.

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Scotti, J. R., B. K. Beach, L. M. E. Northrop, C. A. Rode and J. P. Forsyth (1995) ‘The Psychological Impact of Accidental Injury’, in J. R. Freedy and S. E. Hobfoll (eds) Traumatic Stress: From Theory to Practice, Plenum.

Terr, L. C. (1983) ‘Chowchilla Revisited: The Effects of Psychic Trauma Four Years after a School-bus Kidnapping’, American Journal of Psychiatry 140: 1543–50.

Trimble, M. R. (1985) ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: History of a Concept’, in C. R. Figley (ed.) Trauma and its Wake: The Study and Treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Brunner/Mazel.

VandenBos, G. R. and B. K. Bryant (eds) (1987) Cataclysms, Crises and Catastrophes: Psychology in Action, American Psychological Association.

Weisaeth, L. (1994) ‘Psychological and psychiatric Aspects of Technological Disasters’, in R. J. Ursano, B. G. McCaughey and C. S. Fullerton (eds) Individual and Community Responses to Trauma and Disaster: The Structure of Human Chaos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilkinson, C. B. (1983) ‘Aftermath of a Disaster: The Collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel Skywalks’, American Journal of Psychiatry 140: 1134–9.

Yule, W. (1989) ‘The Effects of Disasters on Children’, Association for Child Psychology and Psychiatry Newsletter 11(6): 3–6.

Yule, W. and A. Gold (1993) Wise Before the Event: Coping with Crises in Schools, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

Yule, W. and R. M. Williams (1990) ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Reactions in Children’, Journal of Traumatic Stress 3(2): 279–95.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Quick Reference Guide: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2005) Clinical Guideline 26.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING ‘Ryan’s Legacy Still Haunts a Policeman’ (1997) Police (October), 8-9.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Disaster Survivors Talkingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (1993) Options (August), 44-47.

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING ‘Have they got it all wrong’ Page 8 from The Times, 29 October 2003

‘Counting the cost of stress’ Page 27 from The Guardian, 25 October 2003 Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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UNIT 9 Conclusion

MSc in Emergency Planning Management

Contents 9.1

Introduction

9-5

9.2

In whom we trust

9-5

9.2.1 Britain’s experience of the ‘Nuclear Age’

9-6

9.2.2 Out of Impotent Dependency, Unspoken Shame

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9.2.3 Institutional Viability in the ‘Risk Society’

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A Risk Society Odyssey

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9.3.1 Disclaimer

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9.3.2 Pro- and Anti-Nuclear

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9.3

9.4

Observations

9-10

9.5

Readings

9-11

9.6

Bibliography

9-11

Readings

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9.1 Introduction The Unit commences with a summary of Wynne’s (1996) essay ‘May the sheep safely graze?’ published as a chapter in Lash et al’s (1996) Risk, Environment and Modernity, Towards a New Ecology. The intention is to examine the ‘Risk Society’ thesis through the debate surrounding the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing facility in Cumbria, on the west coast of Britain.

The Unit concludes with a ‘Risk Society Odyssey’ - a subjective diarised account of a 1998 encounter with the British nuclear debate.

9.2 In whom we trust When discussing trust in scientific and technological progress, Giddens distinguishes between trust in the time of ‘simple modernity’, and trust in our present ‘reflexive modernity’ (Giddens in Lash, Szerszynski & Wynne, 1996: 44-83). In ‘simple modernity’, says Giddens, trust was willingly and freely invested in the modernist institutions of science and technology (which in the British experience of modernity would include the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA)), and in their products, like petrochemicals and nuclear power. However in today’s ‘reflexive modernity’ the investment of trust is a matter of ‘deliberative choice’. The public no longer trusts such institutions ‘by default’.

Rather, they choose whether or not to invest their trust in science and technology.

This means that such vanguard institutions of the modernist project, like British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL), the state-owned company that runs the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing facility in Cumbria, England, can no longer presume the unequivocal support of the British public. Rather, such institutions have to convince a sceptical public that they are worthy of public trust, and then actively and continually cultivate that support. Wynne summarises Giddens’ argument thus; In the face of contestation of expert claims, publics invest active trust in expert systems - that is trust is invested in particular experts via deliberate choice between recognised alternatives. Previously...in ‘simple modernity’ they simply trusted and believed, as a taken-for-granted.

(Wynne in Lash et al, 1996: 47-48) The British public’s relationship with its nuclear industry provides a valuable test of Giddens’ (and Beck’s) theories of ‘reflexive modernity’.

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9.2.1

Britain’s experience of the ‘Nuclear Age’

It is widely believed that opposition to the nuclear industry had its origins in the birth of the environmental movement in the 1970s. But, says Wynne, the absence of overt dissent before this decade should not be interpreted as unequivocal acceptance of and support for the industry. Rather, feelings of helplessness and powerlessness in the face of a pro-nuclear British political establishment may have persuaded people that there was little point in overt dissent. Alienation and lack of agency promoted quiescence.

9.2.2

Out of Impotent Dependency, Unspoken Shame

In 1972, a dam-burst in the mining town of Buffalo Creek in America’s Appalachian Hills caused much suffering. Buffalo Creek was a ‘company town’, owned and run by a coal company which ‘held the residents in ruthless disregard’ (Wynne in Lash et al: 51). The disaster forced the community to confront its dependence on an institution that cared little for its fate. The community’s public recognition of “...their implicit and long-standing sense of self-denigration” (Wynne in Lash et al: 51) born of dependency intensified their grief and sense of violation. For years, the residents of Buffalo Creek had, for pragmatic reasons, refused to make explicit their discontent. Now, the reification of the company’s systematic neglect - the dam-burst - forced them to confront their powerlessness and marginality. The lesson of Buffalo Creek, says Wynne, is that dependent communities may find it less painful to deny their marginality and lack of agency than to admit to their systematic humiliation at the hands of a powerful corporation. Public denial anaesthetises the troubled mind. But public denial exacts a price - private shame.

According to Wynne, feelings of powerlessness and alienation are commonplace in a world increasingly dominated by powerful, anonymous, globalised and globalising corporations. As in the case of the residents of Buffalo Creek, such anonymous, overarching corporate power may produce “a sense of cultural disorientation, a feeling of powerlessness, a dulled apathy, and a generalised fear about the state of the universe” (Wynne in Lash et al: 53). The ‘controlling human agents and relationships’ of such socio-technological systems may be so ‘complex, esoteric, diffuse and socially remote’ as to make it impossible to identify with the effective causes in such systems (Wynne in Lash et al: 53). However, given that such systems may have important impacts in our lives, it is important that we negotiate some sort of relationship with them. This we do through rationalisation. We may, for example, construct the technology as a ‘spectral object’, thereby providing a focus for our concerns.

Where socio-technological systems render the public powerless and uncomprehending, a deferential relationship may result. Such deference is a pragmatic response to a situation of humiliation and incapacity.

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9.2.3

Institutional Viability in the ‘Risk Society’

According to Beck (1992: 37), the ‘boomerang effect’ of scientific and technological development, where supposedly life-enriching innovations conspicuously fail to improve the human condition, has undermined the legitimacy of those institutions (which in Britain might include the UKAEA) that promote scientific and technological development. As Wynne explains; [M]odernity’s quintessential institutions of technology and science self-refute their own enlightenment promises and programmes...[T]he failure of those institutions to control the risks they have created...has generated a more profound and pervasive sense of risk...As the contradictions grow more...intense, so the sense of risk grows, and the legitimacy of those institutions which have designated themselves the saviours erodes correspondingly.

(Wynne in Lash, Szerszynski & Wynne: 56) In Britain’s case, says Wynne, the process of self-refutation has been especially marked in the nuclear industry, specifically at the Sellafield (ex-Windscale) nuclear reprocessing facility in Cumbria. Following the Chernobyl disaster, government scientists predicted that the radiocaesium contamination that deposited itself on Cumbria’s hills “...would fall below levels at which action was required...within three weeks” (Wynne in Lash et al: 63). Thus it was assumed that the blanket ban on the movement and sale of sheep in certain designated areas would be lifted at the end of this period. The scientists’ view was characterised by a tone of absolute certainty. It did not appear to be in any sense assumption-based or conditional. However, the scientists’ prognosis was based on a highly specific model of the chemical make-up of Cumbria’s soil - one that assumed it to be composed uniformly of alkaline clay. Unfortunately for the scientists and farmers, however, in some areas acid peaty soils predominated. Such soil conditions rendered the model inaccurate. While alkaline soils would have safely ‘locked up’ the radiocaesium contamination, acid soils would have provided a less satisfactory pollution sink. The scientists changed their advice accordingly. However, in doing so they neither a) admitted that their starting assumption had been erroneous nor b) admitted to the public that they had made any sort of mistake. Perhaps more significantly, only 50% of the radiocaesium found in soil samples could be attributed to the explosion at Chernobyl. The other 50% of deposited radiocaesium could not be traced to the explosion. These deposits may have come from nuclear weapons testing, or from the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant itself. The farmers, for their part, were sceptical of BNFL’s initial assertion that the Sellafield plant had nothing to do with radiocaesium deposits. However, unable to generate their own knowledge, the farmers had little choice but to listen to the scientists’ account. As one farmer put it;

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The scientists tell us its all from Chernobyl. You just have to believe them - if a doctor gave you a jab up the backside for a cold, you wouldn’t argue with him, would you?

(Wynne in Lash et al: 66) When formal scientific discourse is the only explanation/modus operandi, then the public is sufficiently pragmatic to listen to and follow whatever advice is given. However, as Wynne explains, we should not misinterpret such pragmatic quiescence as a firm belief in science and scientists. Quiescence, born of dependency, may cloak other publicly unexpressed - emotions.

9.3 A Risk Society Odyssey 9.3.1

Disclaimer

The following diarised account of an encounter with the nuclear debate in Britain circa 1998 makes no claim to objectivity. It should therefore be treated with an appropriate degree of (methodical) scepticism.

9.3.2

Pro- and Anti-Nuclear Just after Leeds the lecturer handed out the info-packs. Carefully composed, they contained roughly equal amounts of pro- and anti-nuclear material.

The students speed-read the hand-outs as the Ford Transit rattled along the tarmac. There were few questions. Perhaps they were already familiar with the debate...or just bored with the whole thing.

The lecturer had arranged to meet an anti-Sellafield campaigner in a car park in a village just inland from the plant (which is located right on the Irish Sea). The road to the village was tortuously hilly, but the scenery the low peaks of the Cumbrian Hills - was breathtaking. The party arrived late. After a quick cigarette, the anti-nuclear campaigner sat in the Transit’s passenger seat to act as guide on a tour of the plant’s environs. The tour lasted two hours. Cued by the campaigner, the students and lecturer left the van at various points to take Geiger readings of background radiation levels. In one remote estuary, the readings were ten times the ‘control’ radiation reading taken in the car park by the campaigner. Of course, the students and lecturer had no way of checking that the Geiger counter had been calibrated correctly.

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During the tour, the campaigner told her life-story. Originally from Holland, she had settled in Cumbria. She used to take her children to play on the beaches close to the Sellafield plant. One of her children had developed leukaemia, and died. She now devoted all her energies to the local anti-nuclear group, Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE). CORE had over a hundred members, but as with most voluntary associations, not all members were active. Hostility towards the group had diminished in recent times. The campaigner said that BNFL were very keen to get involved in community projects, and ‘would give money to virtually anyone who asked’. In return, she said, BNFL insisted they were given public recognition by the groups they benefited.

The following day, the lecturer and students went to the Sellafield Visitors’ Centre, located just outside the plant’s alarmed perimeter fence. The exhibition began in a sphere containing a diorama of what BNFL believed an energystarved world might look like - dark, cold, forbidding. Beyond the diorama, the story of the nuclear industry unfolded. The exhibition - optimistic, colourful and interactive - concluded with another diorama, this time of a family from the 21st Century discussing their nuclear world, where 70% of energy needs were generated from nuclear power. The contrast between this diorama and the first was stark. Where the first exhibit had been dark, cold and forbidding, this was bathed in a brilliant white light, that accentuated the pristine whitepainted figures at its centre. Located just before the cafe at the very end of the exhibition was a souvenir shop, where such things as Sellafield pencil tins could be purchased, along with prints of the Cumbrian landscape and maps of the Lake District for walkers and hikers.

The lecturer and students concluded their visit with a coach tour of the site.

A running commentary was provided, along with a police escort. Before setting off, each visitor completed a card for the policeman on the main gate.

The card recorded each visitor’s name, nationality and occupation. The tour was most informative. Each major building had a large sign explaining its function. It did not seem that these were entirely for the benefit of the work force. The tour passed a ground-level pipe from which issued a fine, misty spray. The guide reassured the tour that this was steam.

At certain points, the plant seemed to show its age. Weathered steel-grey concrete proliferated. Sellafield (then called Windscale) had been built after the war to supply Britain’s nuclear weapons programme with plutonium.

Now the plant had an altogether more peaceful purpose - the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel elements, and the storage of low, medium and high-

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level nuclear waste. Sellafieldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s management was especially proud of its reprocessing contracts with countries like Japan, which earned large sums of money for the country.

The police escort left the coach as it left the site to disembark its passengers at the Visitorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Centre. The lecturer and students returned to the Transit, and headed south. The party stopped at the southern tip of Lake Windermere, not too far from Sellafield. A large pleasure boat had just disgorged its complement of tourists into an up-market hotel.

(Scarman Centre Field Trip, March 20-21, 1998)

9.4 Observations The Sellafield plant provides the people of Cumbria with a large number of reasonably well paid skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Hill farming has only ever provided Cumbrians with a marginal existence. Most people seem to accept the plant, although what they may think in private is another matter. Perhaps, like the residents of Buffalo Creek before the dam-burst, they have adopted a position of pragmatic quiescence, ashamed to (publicly) admit their dependency on the nuclear enterprise. Or perhaps they are perfectly sanguine about their situation, and believe wholeheartedly in the nuclear project and its sponsoring institutions.

One of the most enduring impressions of the plant and its environs was the contrast sharp in extremis - between the towers, steel spheres and geometric block-houses of the plant, and the undulating beauty of the Cumbrian Hills. It seemed as if the plant had been dropped into the landscape from a great height, where it stood incongruous in the scenery. It seemed disjunctive, out of place. Or perhaps it was the landscape and its poor, marginal economy that was out of place. A relic of an outmoded form of socioeconomic and technological organisation? Such are the confusions and polarisations of the Risk Society. But this is the kind of society risk managers must come to terms with if they are to serve the short and long-term interests of private corporations, state enterprises, publics and governments.

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9.5 Readings Four readings are included. They illustrate the polarised/polarising nature of the nuclear debate in Britain.

The first is a Sellafield discourse produced by Friends of the Earth, together with an information sheet on CORE. The second and third is a collection of publicity material produced by BNFL at Sellafield, and by the Nuclear Forum, a London-based organisation that represents the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom.

The fourth is data on the UK nuclear industry.

9.6 Bibliography Beck, U (1992) Risk Society, London: Sage Lash, S., Szerszynski, B & Wynne, B (1996) Risk, Environment and Modernity, Towards a New Ecology, London: Sage

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Friends of the Earth Discovering the Environment Nuclear Powerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; C.O.R.E. Information Sheet Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Keeping our energy options open: The case for nuclear powerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; British Nuclear Industry Forum Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Beyond U235: What are the energy needs of the world we live in?â&#x20AC;&#x2122; BNFL Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Nuclear sites around Britainâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; British Nuclear Forum

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READING â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Jobs in the Nuclear Industryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; British Nuclear Forum

Following the Interim Decision of the Copyright Tribunal (announced on 13th December 2001), permission to make this copy is being obtained directly from the copyright owner.