2018-2019 | ISSUE NO. 2
USC-UNESCO
GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
T HE US C L E V A N I NS T I T UT E F OR HUMA NI T I E S A ND E T HI CS
USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science & Ethical Inquiry ISSUE 2
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2018-19
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COHORT 2
USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science & Ethical Inquiry
Dr. Lyn Boyd-Judson, UNESCO Chair on Global Humanities and Ethics Education Isabella Carr, Assistant Director, USC Levan Institute for Humanities and Ethics
Editors-In-Chief BROOKE HELSTROM AND JONATHAN HORWITZ Layout & Design ISABELLA CARR Special Thanks VICTORIA MARTINEZ HADIYA CULBREATH EMILY PETRUCCI HAMEEDHA KHAN MILO SMILEY Copyright 2019 the USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without the express written consent of the USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry. Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.
Contents Letter From the Editors BROOKE HELSTROM AND JONATHAN HORWITZ
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Mitigating Opioid Crises in the United States, India, and Greece: A Comparative Case Study of Government Policies AAROHI MAHABLESHWARKAR 3 From Xenia to Xenophobia: Evolving Moral Foundations of Asylum in Greece KURTIS WEATHERFORD 28 Moving Towards Human Rights in the Voluntourism Industry MIA POYNOR 39 Unraveling Iraq: The Effects of the 1990–2003 UN Sanctions Regime on the Hussein Government and Iraqi Civilians SAMA SHAH 50 God Dam It: International Responses to Water Weaponization During the Iraqi Civil War EMILY WULF 65 Implementing Ethics in Transboundary Water Management CATHERINE KNOX 79 A Mixed Blessing: Colonialist Legacies and the Natural Resource Curse Theory in Botswana and Angola BROOKE HELSTROM 99 The Presence of the Past: Memory and Narratives of Sexual Violence of the Nanjing Massacre VIRGINIA BULLINGTON 116 The Dilemma of Decision Making: Ethical Leadership, National Security and the Use and Abuse of Power ANUSHKA SAPRA 133
Dedication:
First and foremost, we would like to thank Isabella Carr for her steadfast support to the Journal and her countless hours managing its budget and design. We could not have published this issue without Isabella advocating for the Journal to the powers that be at USC. In addition, she has designed this issue to look sleek and professional. Because of Isabella, we can all feel proud of the research we pursued and the beautiful layout in which it is presented. Thank you Dr. Lyn Boyd-Judson for sponsoring the journal and reminding us that our voices matter as undergraduates. We would also like to thank Dr. Jill Sohm and Dr. Darren Ruddell for inspiring our research cohort with your ideas on research design, data analysis, and geographic information. You did not have to take time out of your busy schedules to meet with us, but you did. We are very grateful. Lastly, we would like to thank all of our researchers who committed six months to pursue their topics, write these papers, and present at our second annual USCUNESCO Research Conference. Our research fellowship is an unpaid and unrecognized position. Yet even with a full slate of coursework, jobs, and other extracurriculars, our fellows dedicated an extraordinary amount of time to meetings, workshops, reading, writing, and re-writing. Fellows, we thank you for your hard work, and we hope that you will continue to pursue these topics beyond the fellowship. Your writing brings light to underexposed but absolutely essential themes of leadership, international comity, and common ethics. Thank you, Brooke and Jonathan
Letter from the Editors To the reader: The USC-UNESCO Journal was established to bring light to stories from around the world that raise ethical dilemmas or human rights concerns. In this issue, our researchers address some of the most intractable public policy challenges of our times including climate change, drug addiction, human migration, international development, genocide, and ethical leadership. As undergraduates, we do not pretend to have solutions to these puzzles. Nevertheless, we attempt to contribute to the dialogue on global affairs in ways that are novel and interdisciplinary. We hope that you learn something new as you read through our researchers’ unique takes on today’s biggest challenges. Aarohi Mahableshwarkar examines market solutions to opioid epidemics by comparing crises in the United States, Greece, and India. She argues that American policymakers can learn from policy interventions in Greece and India to find effective solutions to the drug plague ravishing America’s heartland. Kurtis Weatherford looks at Greece’s asylum process through an innovative yet ancient lens. While modern human migration has reached an unprecedented scale both globally and in Greece, the origins of asylum can be traced back to the Classics, including Homer’s Odyssey and other eminent tales of Greek heroes. Ancient Greek notions of xenia, hospitality, and xenophobia, fear of outsiders, continue to shape the debate on Greece’s responsibility for the thousands of migrants who reach its shores from the Middle East and North Africa. Mia Poynor’s paper on the good and bad of voluntourism, a form of tourism in which travelers participate in voluntary work, also stems from an experience she had with refugees in Greece. Poynor examines the existing literature on voluntourism, and the budding ways in which it is shaping tourism and international development. Sama Shah examines the effect of international sanctions on Iraq’s development since the Gulf War. She weighs the pressure of sanctions on the Hussein regime with the toll on the standard of living for middle-class Iraqis. Emily Wulf also looks at the role of international intervention in Iraq’s affairs via her case study on the Islamic State’s seizure of the Mosul Dam in August 2014. Wulf considers the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians from IS’ threat to use the dam to starve or flood millions of Iraqis. She addresses the international dilemma to recognize the State of Iraq’s sovereignty over the Mosul Dam while refusing to acknowledge the Islamic State as its legitimate replacement.
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Catherine Knox warns of a less imminent but more impactful threat in global water politics: the failure of institutions to adapt to climate change and demographic growth. Knox would like international policymakers to consider fairness and egalitarianism in future transboundary water sharing agreements. She makes a compelling case for her argument by contrasting an ineffective Nile River agreement with a better alternative along the Mekong that was established on those same ideals. Brooke Helstrom uses case studies on Angola and Botswana to ruminate over the trueness of ‘resource curse theory,’ the paradoxical notion that less-developed countries with abundant natural resources nevertheless endure long spells of economic contraction. Perhaps, Helstrom writes, other factors including colonial legacy and domestic politics are the real causes of variation in economic development. Virginia Bullington examines testimony from survivors of the Rape of Nanking. She studies the power of language, colonialism, and gender over the way in which individuals recall traumatic and deeply personal events. Bullington contemplates whether such personal testimony can be considered in isolation of society’s collective memory of history. Anushka Sapra also analyzes the interaction between society and the individual, but in a completely different way. Sapra scrutinizes the decision-making process made by Indian President Indira Gandhi in 1984 before she sent forces to invade the Golden Temple, a sanctuary for Sikhs and the hiding spot of an extremist government dissident. She ponders whether democratically elected leaders carry special moral burdens or privileges, a timely question for today’s largest democracies and their strongmen leaders. Altogether, this issue reminds us that the world is becoming increasingly interconnected at an accelerating rate. Multidisciplinary approaches that consider history, contemporary events, and ethics are windows through which we can look at the world in new ways in order to draw connections between seemingly disparate phenomena. Bearing in mind that there is no single solution to complex global issues, hopefully we can adopt a mentality that encourages teamwork and togetherness in problem-solving. Enjoy, Brooke Helstrom and Jonathan Horwitz Editors
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AAROHI MAHABLESHWARKAR
Mitigating Opioid Crises in the United States, India, and Greece: A Comparative Case Study of Government Policies USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry May 2019
ABSTRACT: Opioid addiction crises can be caused and resolved by two categories of drivers and solutions: demand-side, such as economic downturn and de-addiction treatment, and supply-side, which includes new forms of opioids and law enforcement. The United States, India, and Greece have all experienced opioid addiction crises in the last decade with the common demand-side contributing factor of economic downturn. In the case of the United States, over-prescription of opioids gave rise to a large addiction crisis which in turn drove up heroin use. These demand-side factors were exacerbated by economic downturn and the influx of fentanyl to cause an addiction and overdose epidemic. While supply-side policies have been in place for decades, the epidemic has only begun to stabilize as the government has instituted stronger demand-side policies. In India, increased heroin trafficking from Afghanistan and economic downturn have contributed to an increasingly fatal epidemic in the northern states of Punjab and Kashmir. Current government efforts have focused on supply-side policies and yet the crisis has only worsened. In both the United States and India, maintenance of ineffective policies would be unethical and therefore policy changes ought to be made. Finally, in Greece, the 2009 financial crisis and Greece’s role in various smuggling routes precipitated a rise in heroin abuse. However, the presence and augmentation of strong demand-side policies mitigated the human cost of the epidemic and was therefore ethical. Ultimately, the outcomes of these three cases suggest that demand-side policies are ultimately more effective in combating opioid addiction crises even when crises have strong supply-side causal factors. Further, this efficacy of demand-side policy results in reduced human suffering and hence is the more ethical policy choice.
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INTRODUCTION Opioids are a class of drugs that have been used for centuries both recreationally, owing to the feelings of euphoria they induce, and to relieve pain. Originally solely derived from the poppy plant, today, they come in many forms, including heroin, morphine, codeine, semi-synthetic varieties such as oxycodone and hydrocodone, and various region-specific forms that have been traditionally used. Over the course of the last century, increasingly potent synthetic varieties have been created, including methadone, tramadol, and fentanyl.1 While opioids are used for their positive effects such as pain relief, addiction can be an unfortunate consequence. Consistent use of opioids can lead to opioid use disorder in which the user feels unable to stop. Opioids can cause particularly strong addictions that are psychologically and physically difficult to break. This dependence means that discontinuing use will lead to painful withdrawal symptoms. Dependence also leads to the phenomenon in which, after extended use, one must use more of a substance to feel the same effects.2 Since overdose occurs when one has used too much of a substance, to the point of slowing or stopping breathing, dependence and addiction increase the chance of overdoses. If an overdose is not treated immediately, it often leads to death3. Addiction and overdoses occur on an individual basis, but can become widespread, causing societywide problems and even reaching epidemic proportions. When addiction has reached an epidemic level, there are usually large-scale factors driving it and thus commensurate actions must be taken to combat it. Such driving factors, and also solutions to these factors, may be divided into two categories: demand-side and supply-side. Demand-side refers to the drivers and solution for opioid addiction that respectively increase or mitigate the use of opioids. Examples of such drivers include the price of drugs, economic distress, and cultural norms. Examples of demand-side solutions include addiction treatment facilities and social welfare programs. Supply-side refers to the drivers and solutions that involve the drugs themselves. Examples of drivers include poor law enforcement, cheaper production methods, and increased legal prescriptions. Examples of solutions include stricter law enforcement, drug trafficking monitoring systems, and restricted legal prescriptions. As both demand-side and supply-side factors contribute to opioid addiction and overdoses, both demand-side and supply-side policies should be thoroughly enacted to combat them. However, as government policymakers’ choices are often limited, the question becomes, is demand-side or supply-side policy more necessary and ethical when it comes to resolving opioid epidemics? Indeed, addiction crises are not a novel problem and one that will likely occur again in the future. The study of the crises in the United States, India, and Greece is valuable in the answers it provides to this question.
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Durham, Melissa, and Aarohi Mahableshwarkar. 26 Mar. 2019. Ibid. 3 “Opioid Addiction.” U.S. National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, Nov. 2017, ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/opioid-addiction. 2
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The United States, India, and Greece have all experienced their own opioid epidemics. The United States and India are currently in the middle of their own and Greece faced a crisis during its economic crisis beginning in 2009 that has since been resolved. While the situation in each country is highly complex and dynamic, they have similarities that make them worthy of being compared. Firstly, all three countries have faced acute addiction crises contributed to by economic downturn. Secondly, all three crises were exacerbated by supply-side factors. Then, their differences in policy make them valuable to contrast. In terms of drivers, the extent to which supply-side factors influenced the crises varies between the countries. Further, they each have contributing factors unique to their case. In terms of distinct solutions, in the United States supply-side policies have been pursued since the 1970s but it was not until more aggressive demand-side policies have proliferated in the last five years that overdose deaths have begun to stabilize. In India, the current crisis has mostly been addressed by the government through supply-side policy but shows no signs of abetting. Finally, in Greece the crisis was met with a pre-existing demand-side policy infrastructure, mitigating its consequences. The comparison of these three countries suggests that demand-side policy is ultimately more effective than supply-side policy in reducing the human cost of opioid crises. More effective demand-side policy means that crises are mitigated to a larger extent in a shorter time frame than with supply-side policy. Since the crises are mitigated more quickly, relatively fewer people suffer the adverse consequences of opioid addiction such as deterioration of social networks, overdose, and death. Therefore, since the cases of the United States, India, and Greece suggest that demand-side policy is more effective at reducing human suffering than supplyside policy, it is ultimately more ethical. CASE STUDIES: THE UNITED STATES While opioid addiction in the United States has been caused by both demand- and supplyside factors and has in the past been combated with supply-focused interventions aimed at curbing the drug supply into and within the country, recent demand-side policy seems to be more effective at slowing the growth of the epidemic and therefore more ethical. The crisis was caused by two separate but related trends: the over-prescription of medication and the rise in use and fatality of illicit drugs.4 While it is true that both aspects are being caused by drugs belonging to the same chemical family, the causes, effects, and policy options in both cases are largely distinct. Nothing better illustrates this than the fact that while over-prescription rates have slowed, overdoses and addiction rates continue to rise.5 A major supply-side cause of the American opioid epidemic was the over-prescription of opioid painkillers. This story began in the 1970s with the introduction of the analgesics Vicodin and Percocet. In the decade that followed their release, few doctors felt comfortable prescribing them 4
“Opioid Overdose Crisis.” National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health, Jan. 2019, www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis. 5 “Prescription Opioid Data.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US Department of Health & Human Services, 19 Dec. 2018, www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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owing to the risk of addiction. It was not until OxyContin came to the market in 1996 that overprescription began in earnest.6 Owing to physicians’ continued reluctance to prescribe painkillers, Purdue Pharma, the makers of OxyContin, embarked on an aggressive marketing campaign. This “Partners against Pain” campaign spent the next five years convincing healthcare professionals and consumers that the risk of addiction was less than 1%. This statistic came from a now-discredited 1980 letter in the New England Journal of Medicine (BMJ). The campaign was ultimately successful and prescription rates sharply increased.7 Compounding the efforts of Purdue Pharma were the efforts of the American Pain Society in the early 1990s to include pain as a fifth vital sign. (Vital signs are the basic measurements of a person’s physical state used to initially assess them in healthcare settings). This change was combined with the decreasing amount of time physicians had with each patient in hospital settings, leading to situations in which doctors often had to treat pain without understanding its source (i.e. painkillers were the easiest option).8 This coupled with the marketing efforts of Purdue Pharma and other pharmaceutical companies meant that healthcare professionals began to treat pain more aggressively. The key shift came as medical norms shifted away from only prescribing opioids for acute severe pain, post-surgery pain, and pain associated with terminal illness. It instead became increasingly commonplace to prescribe opioids for chronic pain, a practice that increases the risk of addiction.9 Prescription rates continued to rise for the next decade, reaching their zenith around 2012. Despite recent reductions in opioid prescriptions, prescription rates had risen so dramatically that the number of opioids prescribed in 2015 was still fourfold as many as 1999.10 The rise of prescription rates was accompanied by a rise in addiction and overdose rates, a trend that, according to the Center for Disease Control, is causational.11 The number of overdose deaths involving a prescription opioid increased from 3,442 in 1999 to 17,029 in 2015. In other words, there was an almost fivefold increase in deaths, closely paralleling the fourfold rise in opioid prescriptions.12 While the over-prescription of opioids largely began the United States opioid epidemic, illicit drugs have continued and transformed it into a larger, deadlier, and far more difficult to manage crisis. On the demand-side of contributors, it is likely that many people transitioned from prescription drugs to illicit opioids. Indeed, according to a study conducted by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, individuals who abused prescription opioids were 19 times more likely to try heroin than those who have not.13 This is supported by the fact that despite the stabilization and then decrease of opioid prescriptions since 2012, the number of opioid overdose 6
“OxyContin History.” Rehabs.com, American Addiction Centers, Inc., luxury.rehabs.com/oxycontin-rehab/history/. Elkins, Chris. “The Opioid Epidemic: What Caused the Heroin Epidemic.” DrugRehab.com, Advanced Recovery Systems, www.drugrehab.com/featured/opioid-epidemic-causes/. 8 Durham, supra n. 1 9 Elkins, supra n. 7 10 “Prescription Opioid Data,” supra n. 5 11 Ibid. 12 “Opioid Overdose Crisis,” supra n. 4 13 Gray, Eliza. “Heroin Gains Popularity as Cheap Doses Flood the U.S.” TIME, TIME USA, 5 Feb. 2014, time.com/4505/heroin-gains-popularity-as-cheap-doses-flood-the-u-s/. 7
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deaths has since skyrocketed.14 Further, the proportions within annual opioid overdose deaths have shifted over the last decade: a smaller proportion is now due to prescription drugs and a larger proportion is due to illicit drugs such as heroin and fentanyl. Between 1999 and 2017, the number of overdose deaths involving heroin rose from 1,960 to 15,482, an eightfold spike in less than two decades.15 Particularly alarming is the fact that since 2013, the number of deaths that involve synthetic narcotics has risen from almost no portion of total opioid overdose deaths to more than half.16 On the supply-side, the increasingly common and more potent synthetic narcotics, with fentanyl being the most prevalent, have significantly contributed to the dramatic spike in overdose deaths over the last five years. From 1999 to 2007, overdose deaths involving heroin increased by about 400 annually. However, beginning in 2011, as the number of deaths in which fentanyl were involved began to rise, so too did the number of overall drug overdose deaths involving heroin. Further confirming the role of fentanyl in the severity of the epidemic is the fact that overdose rates are much lower in the western United States, where fentanyl is less likely to be mixed in with heroin owing to its black tar variety versus the powdered form more common in the rest of the country.17,18 Thus, the overall fatality of the heroin epidemic has become closely related to the level of fentanyl in illicit drugs in the United States. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid, meaning that it is synthesized in a lab rather than grown and is 100 times more potent than morphine. Since it is made synthetically, it is far cheaper to produce than plant-based opioid drugs. As such, dealers and traffickers are increasingly augmenting heroin with fentanyl to reduce costs. However, the consumer is almost never aware that their heroin is laced with fentanyl. This increases fatalities, as often people will take the same amount of a substance that is actually more potent than one is accustomed to. It is therefore by the increasing fentanyl supply that the opioid epidemic has been becoming drastically more fatal. According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the vast majority of fentanyl ending up in the American market is synthesized in China and then trafficked to the United States. Additionally, methods of distribution have been changing so frequently that both Chinese and American law enforcement have been unable to keep up. Methods include convoluted forwarding routes, mislabeling shipments, and making slight modifications to the chemical compound to circumnavigate American regulations.19
14 Katz, Josh. “Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever.” The Upshot, 5 June 2017, www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-overdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-thanever.html. 15 “Opioid Overdose Crisis,” supra n. 4 16 Katz, supra n. 14 17 Katz, Josh, and Margot Sanger-Katz. “‘The Numbers Are So Staggering.’ Overdose Deaths Set a Record Last Year.” The York Times, 29 Nov. 2018, www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/29/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html. 18 Katz, supra n. 14 19 “United States. Congress. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Fentanyl: China’s Deadly Export to the United States. By Sean O’Connor. 2017. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report_FentanylChina%E2%80%99s%20Deadly%20Export%20to%20the%20United%20States020117.pdf.
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While fentanyl has been responsible for the increasing fatality of opioid use on the supplyside, economic downturn has further increased the demand for opioids. Deaths caused by drug overdoses, suicides, and alcohol abuse have been on the rise since 1999 in a trend labelled “deaths of despair.” These “deaths of despair” are closely related to economic and social deterioration. Specifically, socioeconomic conditions, such as rising income inequality, loss of industrial jobs, and the dismantling of the American social safety net, contribute to this epidemic. Such deaths are especially notable because they are particularly prevalent among young and middle aged white men, a group that in modern times has only seen a rise in life expectancy (other than in wartime).20 Further confirming the trend, this phenomenon has been concentrated mainly in the Midwest, Appalachia, and New England, which are also the regions where opioid overdoses have been the greatest.21 All of these factors have contributed to an epidemic that is unprecedented in size and deadliness. According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, over two million Americans are estimated to be addicted to opioids.22 In 2017 alone, over 42,000 people died from opioid overdoses.23 Further, overdose deaths in which fentanyl was involved increased from 3,000 to 28,000 between 2013 and 2018. Drug overdoses are currently the most common cause of death for adults younger than 55, corresponding to the first decrease in average life expectancy since World War II.24 American policy to address this crisis on the demand-side is the responsibility of the federal government in terms of funding and regulations, largely up to states in terms of specific demandside programs, and organized by both the federal and state governments in terms of supply reduction. The federal government has allocated funds, passed laws, directed federal agencies, and instituted stricter regulations to combat the crisis whereas state governments have been implementing treatment programs and working to expand public healthcare. For example, the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act was signed into federal law in 2016, allocating $181 million each year for the purposes of law enforcement, criminal justice reform, overdose reversal, prevention, treatment, and recovery.25 Thus, it is intended for both demand- and supply-side policy.26 These $181 million are parsed out to state governments each year for demand-side, state-level programs and to federal government agencies for supply control purposes.27 Then, the 21st Century Cures Act, also passed in 2016, designated $1 billion over two years to help fund measures passed under CARA
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Case, Anne, and Angus Deaton. “Rising morbidity and mortality in midlife among white non- Hispanic Americans in the 21st century.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America vol. 112,49 (2015): 15078-83. doi:10.1073/pnas.1518393112. 21 Katz, supra n. 17 22 “Opioid Overdose Crisis,” supra n. 4 23 Lopez, German. “2017 Was the Worst Year Ever for Drug Overdose Deaths in America.” Vox, Vox, 16 Aug. 2018, www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/16/17698204/opioid-epidemic-overdose-deaths-2017. 24 Katz, supra n. 17 25 “The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA).” CADCA, Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America Institute, www.cadca.org/comprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act-cara. 26 Axeen, Sarah, and Aarohi Mahableshwarkar. 20 Mar. 2019. 27 “The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA),” supra n. 25 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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including wider access to treatment and healthcare professional training.28 Further, in late October 2017, President Trump declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency. Despite hopes for change, this declaration only really served to speed up bureaucratic processes, in the case of NIH research and starting public coverage for opioid treatment programs in two states.29 Government policy in regard to demand-side policy has had two main components: expanding access to addiction treatment under Medicaid on the state level and funding research on opioid addiction and treatment. The extent of the federal government’s control of Medicaid, the public version of health insurance primarily for low-income individuals, is essentially allocating money to and regulating state programs. This means that the federal government has to approve new Medicaid programs. For example, Ohio, Vermont, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Louisiana have all seen expansions of medication-assisted addiction treatment, which utilizes less dangerous opioids to help patients avoid using more dangerous opioids, under Medicaid in the last four years, which the federal government had to approve of.30,31 This translates into better and wider coverage for addiction medication and treatment. However, the level of coverage Medicaid provides for addiction treatment varies greatly from state to state, ranging from 4% to 100%.32 Further, access to opioidsubstitution treatment medications such as methadone and buprenorphine is imperative as they have been proven to be the best form of treatment in order to avoid withdrawal symptoms, relapses, and overdoses.33 For example, Dayton, Ohio went from having one of the highest overdose death rates in the country to decreasing that number by over 50% by expanding Medicaid and establishing over a dozen new treatment centers that included Medicaid-covered medication-assisted treatment programs.34 However, owing to stigma among lawmakers that such treatments simply “replace one drug with another,” widespread access will be difficult to achieve.35 Currently, fewer than 50% of treatment facilities offer opioid addiction medications and only one in five people with opioid use disorder receive specialty treatment.36 Despite the fact that efficacy of this type of treatment has already been proven in many clinical settings, the other main function of the federal government is 28
“Legislative Summary of the 21st Century Cures Act.” Louisiana Society of Health-System Pharmacists, Louisiana Society of Health-System Pharmacists, lshp.org/main/LegislativeAlerts/Copy_of_First_Action_Alert.aspx. 29 Hirschfeld Davis, Julie. “Trump Declares Opioid Crisis a ‘Health Emergency’ but Requests No Funds.” The New York Times, 26 Oct. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/politics/trump-opioid-crisis.html. 30 Diep, Francie. “One Year After Trump Declared Opioid Addiction a Public-Health Emergency, What's Changed?” Pacific Standard Magazine, 25 Oct. 2018, psmag.com/news/one-year-after-trump-declared-opioid-addiction-a-publichealth-emergency-whats-changed. 31 Lopez, German. “Trump Declared an Emergency over Opioids. A New Report Finds It Led to Very Little.” Vox, Vox Media, 23 Oct. 2018, www.vox.com/policy-and- politics/2018/10/23/18010304/trump-opioid-epidemicemergency-gao-report. 32 Scott, Dylan. “Visualized: What Medicaid Pays for Addiction Treatment Meds, State by State.” STAT News, 14 Mar. 2017, www.statnews.com/2017/03/14/medicaid-addiction-treatment/. 33 Durham, supra n. 1 34 Goodnough, Abby. “This City’s Overdose Deaths Have Plunged. Can Others Learn From It?” The New York Times, 25 Nov. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/11/25/health/opioid-overdose-deaths-dayton.html. 35 Durham, supra n. 1 36 Lopez, German. “Trump Declared an Emergency over Opioids. A New Report Finds It Led to Very Little.” supra n. 31 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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in funding further research regarding opioid addiction and treatment. President Trump’s declaration of a public emergency and the slough of bills passed by Congress in 2018 both provided more funding for research.37,38 When it comes to supply-side policy, the federal government has a more coordinated approach addressing both prescription medication and illicit means of supply. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, as supply control and prescription laws are supra-state issues, they are largely the responsibility of the federal government. Secondly, the federal government first declared its ‘War on Drugs’ in the early 1970s and has therefore been working to control the drug supply, with the relevant framework and agencies in place, for almost fifty years.39 In regards to prescriptions, in the many opioid-focused bills passed by Congress in 2018, several concentrated on the prescription of drugs as well as their tracking, packaging, and disposal.40 On the state level, as of 2018, 33 states had enacted legislation placing limits on opioid prescriptions.41 However, as prescription rates have been falling since 2012, it seems that policies enacted over the last few years cannot be fully responsible.42 Instead, this drop in prescriptions is thought to be largely at the behest of pharmaceutical companies who are in turn responding to greater public awareness of the crisis. This awareness first began to spread in 2000 when the United States Attorney of Maine published an alert about the abuse of OxyContin and Purdue Pharma’s role in its proliferation. Since then, through the actions of the media and public officials, awareness has grown about the high risk of addiction to OxyContin and similar opioid analgesics.43 Curbing the illicit supply of opioids has largely been the responsibility of the FBI, DEA, Coast Guard, local police, and US Customs and Border Protection. The FBI, DEA, and local police forces are responsible for addressing domestic drug trafficking while US Customs and Border Protection, the State Department, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) combat international smuggling.44 In response to the current epidemic, the federal government has been working to improve information sharing, adaptability, and cooperation both between federal agencies and between the US and other countries. In recent years, the State
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Diep, supra n. 30 Sanger-Katz, Margot, and Thomas Kaplan. “Congress Is Writing Lots of Opioid Bills. But Which Ones Will Actually Help?” The New York Times, 20 June 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/upshot/congress-is-writing-lotsof-opioid-bills-but-which- ones-will-actually-help.html. 39 Elkins, supra n. 7 40 Sanger-Katz, supra n. 38 41 “Prescribing Policies: States Confront Opioid Overdose Epidemic.” National Conference of State Legislatures, National Conference of State Legislatures, 31 Oct. 2018, www.ncsl.org/research/health/prescribing-policies-statesconfront-opioid-overdose- epidemic.aspx. 42 Sanger-Katz, supra n. 38 43 Meier, Barry. “Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew Its Opioids Were Widely Abused.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 May 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/purdue-opioids-oxycontin.html. 44 “Addressing the Opioid Crisis.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. State Department, www.state.gov/j/inl/opioid/index.htm. 38
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Department and INL have greatly increased their counter narcotics assistance to countries that play a large role in the American illicit opioid supply, such as Mexico and China.45 Overall, the epidemic is slowly responding to policy changes, continued attempts at supplyside policy and the introduction of novel demand-side policy, with deaths believed to have begun plateauing in 2018. However, the epidemic is still at a level that is three times what it was in 1999, with no expected significant decrease in sight.46 In accordance with this, while the current policy measures are a start, experts say that further expansion of demand-side solutions, specifically medication-focused treatment accessibility, is imperative.47 Ultimately, this opioid epidemic began due to unethical actions by pharmaceutical companies and prescription practices and it is necessary to be more mindful of the human suffering that was previously neglected in ending it. The further expansion of demand-side solutions is the more ethical choice moving forward. As supply-side policy in the United States has been ineffective at curbing drug abuse, and therefore not reduced human suffering, since it first became a federal policy focus, it would be unethical to further contribute finite government resources and efforts towards it. In contrast, since demand-side policy is showing signs of success, it would be more ethical to continue expanding these policies. CASE STUDIES: INDIA The opioid epidemic has also hit several Indian provinces hard, although in India, as opposed to the United States, opioid use has been a cultural norm for centuries. The crisis is mainly present in Punjab and Kashmir. The northern state of Punjab is a mostly rural state responsible for twothirds of the total production of grain in the country with among the best infrastructure in the country.48,49 Economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s facilitated the development of infrastructure, healthcare, and education. However, the agricultural modernization that once made it one of the most prosperous states has since stagnated.50,51 While the official unemployment rate is around 6%, only about 17% of the workforce earns a regular wage.52 Then, Kashmir is part of the historically disputed 45
Felter, Claire. “The U.S. Opioid Epidemic.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 17 Jan. 2019, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-opioid-epidemic. 46 Katz, supra n. 17 47 Sanger-Katz, supra n. 38 48 “Know Punjab.” Government of Punjab, India, Government of Punjab, punjab.gov.in/know-punjab. 49 Singh, Manmohan, and Surinder M. Bhardwaj. “Punjab State, India.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 22 Mar. 2019, www.britannica.com/place/Punjab-state-India#ref46040. 50 Rao, Ankita, and Bibek Bhandari. “Struggling to Save Punjab's next Generation.” Public Radio International, 3 July 2014, www.pri.org/stories/2014-07-03/struggling-save-punjab-s-next-generation. 51 Handoo, Bilal. “Punjab's Fading Prosperity Is Fueling Unemployment and Worker Unrest.” Business Standard, Business Standard Pvt. Ltd., 2 Mar. 2017, www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/punjab-s-fadingprosperity-is-fueling-unemployment-and-worker-unrest-117030200157_1.html. 52 Wilkes, Tommy. “In India's Punjab, Jobless Youth Take a Chance with...” Reuters, Reuters, 3 Feb. 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-india-election-punjab/in-indias-punjab-jobless-youth-take-a-chance-with-antiestablishment-party-idUSKBN15I025. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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state Jammu and Kashmir. Geographically located at the north most tip of India, India and Pakistan have fought over the region since Partition in 1947. The decades of war have led to a state of chronic instability, ubiquitous violence, and the proliferation of various militant groups also vying for control.53 The causes of the opioid epidemic in either state are distinct and thus must be described separately. In the state of Punjab, supply- and later demand-side factors caused the epidemic and government efforts at combating it have mainly been supply-side, to no avail. On the supply-side, increased trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan caused a shift from traditional forms of opium consumption to heroin. Opium use (also known as doda or phukki) has been a cultural norm for centuries.54 Much less potent than heroin or pharmaceutical drugs and grown locally, it was a nonproblematic, commonplace substance in most Punjabi communities. Two main supply-side events were responsible for the shift from these traditional forms of opioids to heroin. Firstly, the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s closed off the typical Balkan route for the trafficking of heroin. Heroin was instead smuggled to India and from there sent around the world.55 Secondly, at the turn of the 21st century, the American invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent destabilization of the country caused a rise in poppy cultivation, drug production, and smuggling. Increasing amounts of heroin were being trafficked through smuggling networks by various drug syndicates from Afghanistan through Pakistan, and then to India, a trend Border Security Forces say is still increasing.56 Indeed, the US government has classified Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India as “major illicit drug producing and/or drug transit countries” in a trifecta known as the Golden Crescent.57 Since Punjab shares a sizable border with Pakistan, much of the heroin crossing the India-Pakistan border is coming into Punjab, with 70% of all drug seizures in India happening in border states.58 Smugglers utilize a variety of methods to transport the drugs over the border including hiding in normal trade trucks, digging tunnels under the border fencing, and even simply throwing packets over the fencing.59 While much of it is sent on to Delhi and around the world, a sizable proportion stays in the state. This has shifted consumption habits over the last two decades towards heroin and away from traditional forms of opium. It is currently estimated that over 220,000 people in Punjab are addicted to opioids, with 53% of using heroin, 33% using opium/doda/phukki, and the remaining 14% using various other forms 53 Hayden, Michael Edison, and Sami Siva. “North India's Heroin Epidemic.” Pulitzer Center, Pulitzer Center, 29 Mar. 2015, pulitzercenter.org/project/asia-india-pakistan-heroin-public-health-drug-use-epidemic. Health and Health Care: The Greek Case," American Journal of Public Health, vol. 103, no. 6, 2013, 973-979. 54 Kumar, Rajesh, et al. “Punjab Opioid Dependence Survey: Brief Report.” Department of Health and Family Welfare, Society for Promotion of Youth & Masses, 2015, p. 1 pbhealth.gov.in/scan0003 (2).pdf. 55 Das, Pushpita. “Drug Trafficking in India: A Case for Border Security.” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, May 2012, p. 8, idsa.in/system/files/OP_DrugTraffickinginIndia.pdf. 56 Hayden, supra n. 53 57 “United States, Congress, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control.” International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control, vol. 1, United States Department of State, 2018, pp. 11. 58 Das, supra n. 55 at 7 59 “Punjab's Drug Menace: 'I Wanted My Son to Die'.” BBC News, BBC, 23 Nov. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-india-46218646.
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including prescription medication.60 Corruption among the police, local governments, and border patrol forces have further allowed for this drug flow to proliferate as law enforcement at points of control and local government officials are often bribed into inaction.61 Interestingly, while India has a roughly $20 billion pharmaceutical manufacturing industry (the 3rd largest in the world by volume), diversion within the country is not a significant issue. Rather, the international community has been seeing a diversion of drugs and precursor chemicals from India into the international market, with the US government currently classifying India as one of the “major precursor chemical source countries.”62 The demand-side causes of the opioid epidemic in Punjab are twofold. Firstly, as opium use was already integrated into the cultural fabric of Punjab, the flux of heroin into the market was not as culturally taboo as it could have been. This thus eased and sped up the transition of use of heroin.63 Even though traditional forms are relatively cheap as they are sourced from local poppy cultivation, the amount of heroin entering the market, and its more euphoric and addictive qualities, was enough to overtake traditional forms. Indeed, one study found that 69.9% of respondents began heroin use for “fun,” while 43.9% began because of peer pressure.64 Secondly, economic downturn, as agriculture shrunk from employing 63% of the workforce to 36% by 2011, transformed heroin use in the region into an epidemic. Heroin use steadily increased throughout the 2000s, but did not take on epidemic proportions until 2012 when economic stagnation and high levels of unemployment swept through the state.65 Once one of the richest states in India, unemployment and underemployment, particularly among the youth and in rural areas, has left Punjab with the second highest rate of underemployment in the country and youth unemployment at 16.6%. Indeed, while previous economic prosperity encouraged many young people to seek higher education, lack of investment meant that few jobs requiring such education were available.66 These harsh economic realities have translated to high rates of heroin addiction among young men, with 76% of all opioid dependents in Punjab aged between 18 and 35 and 99% of all users being male.67 Although statistics on the epidemic are notoriously poor, estimates of the rate of addiction among Punjabi men between
60
Kumar, supra n. 54 at 2 Hayden, supra n. 53 62 “United States, Congress, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control,” supra n. 57 at 11 63 Gunjikar, Vikram, and Aarohi Mahableshwarkar. 20 Jan. 2019. 64 Kumar, supra n. 54 at 2 65 Hayden, supra n. 53 66 Gill, Indermit. “What's in Store for India's Punjab?” Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute, 3 Mar. 2017, www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/03/03/whats-in-store-for-indias-punjab/. 67 Kumar, supra n. 54 at 2 61
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16 and 35 range from 20% to 50%.68,69,70 Indeed, a study by the Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies found that 65% of families in rural districts contain at least one member who is addicted to opioids.71 Lack of accurate data is also the main reason why, in the case of India, statistics are largely about addiction rates rather than overdose or death rates. The causes of the addiction and overdose epidemic in Kashmir, while similar to Punjab, are different enough to require a separate description. On the supply-side, as with Punjab, the supply of heroin into Kashmir comes from the border it shares with Pakistan. However, in Kashmir, the drugs are largely distributed and protected by the local militant groups. Indeed, many militant groups in Kashmir are known to source much of their funding from drug trafficking and typically utilize the same smuggling routes for both heroin and arms.72 Further, the state of instability and conflict means that local police and military forces are more focused on the violence at hand and thus spare little attention for the drug problem. While widely known to have a high burden of addiction, the lack of stability in the region also means that there is no trustworthy statistical data specifically describing the burden.73 It is the demand-side causes that make the situation in Kashmir wholly distinct from Punjab. Rather than a specific case of economic stagnation, it is mainly the physical and psychological stress of being raised in a conflict zone that causes the majority of users to begin use.74 As opposed to the situation in Punjab, but similar to the United States, many begin using prescription painkillers owing to a physical injury and then turn to heroin. In other cases, individuals initially turn to opioids to combat the psychological stress and horror of living in a war zone.75 Federal and state level policy has focused on expanding and improving supply control programs. The main agencies in charge of controlling the supply of heroin are the Central and State Bureau of Narcotics (a state level was created in 2016 in Punjab to tackle the particularly severe crisis there), Border Security Force, and Central Board of Excise Customs. The Bureaus of Narcotics work on controlling the drug supply on the state and national levels while the Border Security Force and Central Board of Excise Customs focus on drugs crossing the border.76 Since the drug supply, with specific consideration of the acute crises in Punjab and Kashmir, is both a supra-state and within-state issue, both state and federal agencies are necessary to combat it. However, according to Union Home Minister Shri Rajnath Singh, these efforts are bogged down by ineffective 68
Dua, Rohan. “Drug-Related Crime Reported Highest in Punjab: National Crime Record Bureau.” The Times of India, 1 July 2014, timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chandigarh/Drug-related-crime-reported-highest-in-PunjabNational-Crime-Records-Bureau/articleshow/37547777.cms. 69 Kumar, supra n. 54 at 4 70 Sharma, Bhuwan et al. “Drug abuse: Uncovering the burden in rural Punjab.” Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care, vol. 6,3 (2017): 558-562. doi:10.4103/2249-4863.222037. 71 Rao, supra n. 50 72 Das, Pushpita, and Aarohi Mahableshwarkar. 28 Mar. 2019. 73 Hayden, supra n. 53 74 Ibid. 75 Gunjikar, supra n. 63 76 “United States, Congress, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control,” supra n. 57 at 195 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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communication between the state and national level, poor intelligence gathering during drug seizures, delays between seizure and prosecution, lack of up-to-date legislation, and ineffective courts.77,78 In an effort to reduce these issues, the Indian government has continued to institute new regulations to expand, make more efficient, and make more effective current programs. Such regulations include: “destruction of 5601 acres of opium fields, banning of the sale of opium husk in 2016, increased surveillance by BSF, new logging system to discourage licit opiate diversion,” and participation in the American Projects Cohesion and Prism to coordinate international efforts to reduce illegal trafficking and maintain knowledge of novel trafficking strategies.79,80 In contrast, government efforts to ensure that legal pharmaceuticals are not being abused have been very successful. After the passage of the 1985 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the use of medical morphine dropped 97%.81 Next, efforts by the state government of Punjab have become more aggressive in recent years. For example, Operation Clean was established in 2014 to find and arrest those involved in smuggling and dealing networks.82 In 2016 efforts began to deal with corruption issues that also bog down supply reduction efforts.83 For example, 68 employees of various security forces in Punjab were arrested due to involvement in drug smuggling. The newly elected Chief Minister Amarinder Singh in 2017 followed suit with large numbers of arrests.84 Currently, there is no specific federal government policy aimed at demand reduction in the opioid epidemic. The only slight exception to this is the National AIDS Control Programme, which has a state-level branch in Punjab as well.85 This program has been executing Needle and Syringe Exchange Programmes to reduce the 21.1% of heroin users with HIV/AIDS.86 Instead, the federal government helps fund NGOs working on demand-reduction through two programs: "Assistance to Voluntary Organizations for Prevention of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse" and "General Grant-in-Aid Programme for Financial Assistance in the Field of Social Defence."87 All other efforts taken thus far have been by the state government of Punjab. Firstly, the Outpatient Opioid Assisted Treatment 77
“Union Home Minister Shri Rajnath Singh Reviews Working of Narcotics Control Bureau.” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 6 July 2016. 78 Jaswal, RPS, and Aarohi Mahableshwarkar. 29 Mar. 2019. 79 Ibid. 80 “United States, Congress, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control,” supra n. 57 at 196 81 Shariff, Um-e-Kulsoom. “An Epidemic of Pain in India.” The New Yorker, Conde Nast, 5 Dec. 2013, www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/an-epidemic-of-pain-in-india. 82 Hayden, supra n. 53 83 Das, Pushpita and Aarohi Mahableshwarkar, supra n. 72 84 Bhargava, Kshitij. “The Chitta Economy: How the Business of Drugs Works in Punjab.” The Economic Times, The Economic Times, 1 Sept. 2018, economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/et-explains/the-chitta-economy-how-thebusiness-of-drugs-works-in-punjab/articleshow/65634397.cms?from=mdr. 85 Rao, Ravindra. “The journey of opioid substitution therapy in India: Achievements and Challenges.” Indian Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 59,1 (2017): 39-45. doi:10.4103/psychiatry.IndianJPsychiatry_37_17. 86 “HIV Prevalence among Injection-Drug Users in Punjab Is 21.10%: Official.” The Times of India, 6 Feb. 2015, timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/HIV-prevalence-among-injection-drug-users-in-Punjab-is-21-10Official/articleshow/46147777.cms. 87 Das, Pushpita and Aarohi Mahableshwarkar, supra n. 72 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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program started in 2018 established de-addiction clinics around the state in which each center has two physicians, a data entry officer, and a nurse with medication-based treatment being used and buprenorphine provided. Currently, 50 centers exist, augmenting the 90 private addiction clinics in the state. However, they are less effective than they could be owing to lack of widespread access by the population and continued clinical hesitation regarding OST. Further, despite government efforts at awareness campaigns in schools, most rural families are not aware of treatment options.88 Secondly, and owing to this lack of awareness, in March 2018 Chief Minister Amarinder Singh created a position within the police force entitled Drug Abuse Prevention Officers whose responsibility it is to execute drug addiction programs with the police force and community.89 Addiction rates in Punjab have not responded to government policies thus far, which include robust supply-side policy and minimal demand-side policy, and are still rising. Some government officials are perplexed by this, with Punjab’s Minister of Health Brahm Mohindra expressing that since the government of Punjab had managed to reduce the supply of drugs into the state, he could not explain why addiction and overdose rates rose between 2017 and 2018.90 In contrast to efforts in Punjab, the volatile situation in Kashmir means that there are no government efforts in the region. Any work done is through NGOs active in the region. Thus, owing to the lack of both accurate data regarding the addiction burden and government policy, it is not possible to conclude how addiction rates are shifting in response to policy. This demonstrates that greater attention to addiction issues in the state is required. The government responses in both Punjab and Kashmir could both be more ethical than they currently are. In Punjab, while supply-side policy has been effective in reducing the quantity of opioids coming over the border, it has not been effective in reducing addiction and overdose rates and as such is not the most ethical policy choice. Since this supply-side strategy has not been found to be effective in reducing the human cost of the epidemic, it would be unethical to continue it, as human suffering would likely remain as is or continue to proliferate. Thus, demand-side policy, which will more directly focus on addiction and abuse, and which has thus far not been a government priority, ought to be expanded to a greater extent. In Kashmir, addiction issues have not been addressed by the government. While this is understandable when one considers the many other issues the region faces, it would be more ethical for the Indian government to pay attention to the addiction crisis, especially considering the fact that the conflict between the Indian and Pakistani governments has largely caused it. Even further, a coordinated government effort to reduce the crisis would be more ethical than the current work of individual NGOs owing to the larger resource base and reach of the government. Overall, as the current policy course has not been effective at reducing human suffering, it would not be ethical to continue it, meaning that adjustments ought to be made.
88
“Punjab's Drug Menace: 'I Wanted My Son to Die,’” supra n. 59 “Punjab Govt to Launch Unique Doorstep Programme against Drug Abuse on March 23.” Government of Punjab, India, punjab.gov.in/key-initiative?view=show&pp_id=27343. 90 “Punjab's Drug Menace: 'I Wanted My Son to Die,’” supra n. 59 89
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CASE STUDIES: GREECE The opioid crisis in Greece is the one case studied here that has already passed. Opioid analgesics are tightly controlled in Greece and thus the opioid crisis specifically involved heroin. It was mainly caused by a demand-side factor, although supply increases exacerbated it, and was resolved by expanding demand-side interventions. The efficiency and effectiveness with which this policy choice worked makes it an ethical decision by the Greek government. Heroin abuse rose 11.6% beginning in 2008, peaked in 2011, and fell to historic lows by 2016.91 HIV incidences attributable to intravenous drug use increased almost eighteen-fold between 2010 and 2012, coming back down to three times the 2010 rate in 2016. However, the seemingly contradictory statistic is that while heroin abuse and HIV cases were on the rise, between 2010 and 2016 overdose deaths declined by two-thirds.92 To determine why, one must parse out the causes of the crisis and the policy choices that followed. The most significant demand-side cause of the opioid crisis in Greece was the Greek financial crisis. Largely owing to an oversized public debt, at 180% of GDP, Greece entered a financial crisis that lasted from 2009 till roughly 2016 and shrunk its total GDP by 25%. The unemployment rate grew threefold between 2009 and 2015, with youth unemployment reaching 58% in 2013, and suicide rates increased by one-third the pre-crisis number. The level of recession was exacerbated by the strict austerity measures that accompanied the European Union’s three bailout packages.93 This economic downturn resulted in an 11.6% rise in the problematic drug use rate, with heroin being the primary drug abused. Even more alarming, the rise in the abuse rate among individuals aged 35 to 64 was 88.4%. It is likely that the high abuse rate among 35 to 64 year-olds was predominantly due to relapses. The fact that average age of initial drug use at the time was 22.4 years old also correlates with the especially high unemployment rates of individuals under 24.94 Further exacerbating the crisis were austerity measures that slashed government funding, translating to a sharp decrease in government services. Indeed, the Ministry of Health’s total healthcare expenditure was reduced by 23.7% between 2009 and 2011. Services cut included clean needle distribution programs, funding for medication, prevention services, and addiction treatment programs. Thus, not only were more people using, but treatment services were greatly reduced. This translated to an increase in consequences from use, such as HIV/AIDS. Indeed, new cases of HIV/AIDS increased by 100% between 2010-2012 when the clean needle program was halted.95 91 Kondilis, E., et al., "Economic Crisis, Restrictive Policies, and the Population’sHealth and Health Care: The Greek Case," American Journal of Public Health. 2013 Jun, vol 103, 6, pp. 973-9. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2012.301126. Epub 2013 Apr 18. 92 “Greece: Country Drug Report 2018: The Drug Problem in Greece at a Glance.” European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction , June 2018, www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries/drug-reports/2018/greece_en. 93 Coppola, Frances. “The Terrible Human Cost Of Greece's Bailouts.” Forbes, Forbes Media, 31 Aug. 2018, www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2018/08/31/the-terrible-human-cost-of-greeces-bailouts/#10d27fec4b31. 94 Stylianou, Lucy Rodgers & Nassos. “How Bad Are Things for the People of Greece?” BBC News, BBC, 16 July 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33507802. 95 Coppola, supra n. 92
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On the supply-side, owing to its geographic position at the intersection of three continents, various drugs coming from Asia, Africa, and Europe are heavily trafficked, and increasingly so, through Greece to pass between continents.96 Specifically in regard to heroin, Greece is known to be a transit country for heroin produced in Asia and sent to Europe through the “Southern Balkan Axis.”97 Said trafficking is more easily facilitated by the fact that Greece has many small, sparsely inhabited islands and very uneven and mountainous land borders. Thus, the heroin supply is difficult to track and control.98 Further, since 2009, and especially since 2012, the supply has been steadily increasing for reasons not entirely known. This trend has corresponded to and been confirmed by the rise in drug law offences reported by the Hellenic Police since 2012. It has been speculated that the current rather porous state of Greece’s borders owing to the refugee crisis may be a contributing factor.99 A side effect of this rise in trafficking has been a decrease in the price of heroin.100 While this increase in trafficking has likely not shifted consumption habits, as these smuggling routes have existed for decades, the decrease in price has certainly made the drug more accessible, thus being a possible exacerbating factor of the rise in abuse levels during the crisis. On the demand-side, it was the Organization Against Drugs’ (OKANA) already existing treatment infrastructure and adaptation to the crisis that explains why, even though drug abuse was increasing, overdose deaths decreased during this period. Drug addiction policy from the demandside is largely organized and facilitated by one central government agency, OKANA, as part of the centralized public healthcare system. The organization was founded in 1995 owing to high drug abuse rates as part of a wider effort to expand and improve the public healthcare system that took place between 1995-1996, which now accounts for most healthcare expenditure. Indeed, with the first legislation establishing a national public healthcare system only passed in 1983, it is a relatively new endeavor in Greece. OKANA operates through the 92 prevention and treatment centers it has established all over Greece.101 During the first five years of the program, these centers focused on treatment-free programs and therapeutic communities. However, from 2000 on it began to shift towards medically assisted treatment, which had much higher rates of success. This reflected an ideological shift in policy towards “harm-reduction,” with the idea being that the primary purpose of treatment is to keep people alive and as healthy as possible rather than an “all-or-nothing,” “cleanor-relapsed” mindset. Despite medically assisted treatment’s proven track record, this treatment ran into opposition from both politicians and the public owing to the belief that it was simply “giving
96
Kokkolis, Konstantinos, et al. “OKANA.” 13 Feb. 2019. Souliotis, Yiannis. “Greece a Hub for Drug and Human Trafficking, Police Report Shows.” Kathimerini English Edition, The Kathimerini, 14 Apr. 2018, www.ekathimerini.com/227657/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-a-hub-fordrug-and-human-trafficking-police-report-shows. 98 Kokkolis, supra n. 95 99 “Greece: Country Drug Report 2018: Drug Laws and Drug Law Offences.” European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, June 2018, www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries/drug-reports/2018/greece/drug-laws-and-drug-law-offences_en. 100 Kokkolis, supra n. 95 101 World Health Organization. Health care systems in transition: Greece. No. CARE 04 03 06, Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1996. 97
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users another form of drugs.”102 That misconception eventually gave way when it became apparent that MAT was far more effective than the therapeutic communities. Indeed, initial MAT programs tested in 1999 were found to be 60-79% effective compared to the treatment-free programs’ and therapeutic communities’ success rate of 26%.103 This already existing addiction treatment infrastructure meant that when the 2009 financial crisis caused abuse rates to rise, there was a treatment framework in place, albeit one that had been diminished by budget cuts. The second turning point in OKANA’s effectiveness came in 2010 and 2011 during the crisis. As abuse rates continued to rise and most healthcare funding was greatly diminished, it became apparent to policymakers at OKANA that something had to be done. Since their reduced funding meant that they did not have the resources to open up more centers, they instead focused on expanding the capacity of the centers they did have in 2010 and 2011. According to the EMCDDA, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, treatment capacity increased 18.8%, and the number of people receiving treatment increased by 9.1% when this occurred.104 Then, the Minister of Health expanded OKANA’s mandate in 2013, through emergency EU funding, to require all public hospitals to contribute a certain number of beds to OKANA. This had the effect of almost doubling their capacity overnight. Further, OKANA altered certain programs to make them more cost effective. For example, while the formal clean needle exchange program had been halted for budgetary reasons, OKANA switched to distributing clean needles on the street.105 This in turn reduced HIV diagnoses by 80% in two years.106,107 Thus, while OKANA budgets were slashed just as much as the rest of the Greek public sector, they shifted their policies to be more relevant and “streamline(d) expenditure” given the reality of the situation.108 This is the ultimate reason why overdose deaths decreased in spite of the increase in abuse rate. Since treatment centers already existed, only adaptation of the program was necessary, as opposed to the creation of something new, which would have been much more expensive and time-consuming. Therefore, it was the dual factors of an already existing demand-reduction program and the modification of said program to meet the predicament at hand that explains these paradoxical trends. Further, an additional component of Greece’s ‘harm-reduction’ strategy was the 2011 shift in law mandating that drug users could largely not be charged on criminal offenses.109 This further demonstrated the Greek government’s commitment to treating drug addiction as a public health issue rather than a criminality issue.
102
Kokkolis, supra n. 95 Lambropoulou, Effi. (2003). Drug Policy in Greece: A Balance between Enforcement and Persuasion. European Journal of Crime Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. 11. 18-39. 10.1163/157181703100383516. 104 Kondilis, supra n. 90 105 Kokkolis, supra n. 95 106 Ibid. 107 “Greece: Country Drug Report 2018: The Drug Problem in Greece at a Glance,” supra n. 91 108 “2011 National Report (2010 Data) to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: Greece: New Development, Trends and in-depth information on selected issues." University Mental Health Research Institute, 2011, pp. 11-12 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_191705_EN_Greece_2011.pdf. 109 “Greece: Country Drug Report 2018: Drug Laws and Drug Law Offences,” supra n. 98 103
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The supply-side policies, in contrast, did not change very much during the financial crisis. Instead, at the time of the Minister of Health’s mandate to expand OKANA in 2013, supply reduction efforts were sought to be maintained rather than augmented.110 Drug supply control is the responsibility of the police, Customs Service, and military who follow the standards set by the 1988 UN Drug Convention and EU Common Risk Management Framework to monitor and control the flow of illicit substances between countries.111,112 The EU strategy, which is adhered to in Greek National Drug Strategy reports, places an emphasis on strengthening both demand and supply reduction efforts.113 While supply control policy was not specifically amended during the height of the crisis, it has more recently been amended to improve generally and adapt to changes in international trends since 2014. For example, while charges for users were mostly dropped to be non-criminal, sentencing for dealing, trafficking, and crimes committed by health professionals have all become stricter.114 Further, supply control policies were modified in efforts to be more effective against the rise of synthetic opioids and new trafficking and manufacturing technologies.115 Ultimately, the expansion of the already existing demand-side policies and the maintenance of supply-side policies were effective in reducing heroin abuse, overdose deaths, and HIV incidence to levels at and even below pre-crisis figures.116 That being said, Greece’s efficiency in expanding and adapting policy were aided by two main factors. Firstly, Greece’s centralized public healthcare allowed for a unified approach to this issue. Secondly, Greece is relatively smaller than both Punjab and the United States and mainly saw its crisis focused in urban areas, meaning than the implementation of policy would be logistically easier. Thus, while the policy types and results may be compared, it would be unrealistic to compare the specific policy actions with the United States and India. The Greek government’s approach to drug addiction is generally ethical owing to its explicit focus on harm-reduction strategies. Such strategies are more ethical in that they are more understanding of the especially powerful grip of opioid addiction, for which reason they have also been shown to be more effective than the all-or-nothing approach (once again making them ethical). In terms of the specific addiction crisis during the financial collapse, the expansion of demand-side policy was ethical because of the effectiveness with which it brought down abuse rates. Its effectiveness ultimately meant that fewer people overdosed, contracted HIV, and felt the social
110
“2011 National Report (2010 Data) to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: Greece: New Development, Trends and in-depth information on selected issues," supra n. 107 at 43-44 111 “The Measures: Customs Risk Management Framework (CRMF).” Taxation and Customs Union - European Commission, European Commission, 20 Dec. 2018, ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/general-informationcustoms/customs-risk-management/measures-customs-risk-management-framework-crmf_en. 112 Kokkolis, supra n. 95 113 “2011 National Report (2010 Data) to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: Greece: New Development, Trends and in-depth information on selected issues," supra n. 107 at 12 114 “Greece: Country Drug Report 2018: Drug Laws and Drug Law Offences,” supra n. 98 115 “2011 National Report (2010 Data) to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: Greece: New Development, Trends and in-depth information on selected issues," supra n. 107 at 11-12 116 “Greece: Country Drug Report 2018: The Drug Problem in Greece at a Glance,” supra n. 91 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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consequences of opioid addiction and abuse. Thus, this set of policy choices was ethical as it was effective at mitigating human suffering. CONCLUSION The comparison of these three cases ultimately suggests that demand-side policy is more effective and ethical in resolving opioid crises than supply-side policy, even when significant supplyside causal factors are involved. In the case of the United States, the epidemic has only begun to abet as demand-side treatment has become more robust, despite long-existing supply-side policies. In the case of India, while supply factors are a significant contributor to the crisis, supply-side policies have not been effective in reducing the epidemic. In Greece, the presence of an already existing infrastructure of demand-side policies helped mitigate the human cost of the crisis, even without more robust supply-side interventions. Before comparing the three countries, it is first necessary to enumerate their similarities and differences. As has been established, these three situations are unified in that they are all cases of an opioid crisis that was to a certain extent precipitated by economic downturn. Thus, all three situations faced a demand-side crisis. These crises have all been exacerbated by supply-side factors as well. However, each situation has additional distinctions that make them unique cases. Firstly, the extent to which supply-side factors exacerbated each crisis is different. In the United States, overprescription began the crisis and the introduction of fentanyl has been a significant contributor to why the crisis has become more fatal, and in India, increased smuggling from Afghanistan shifted consumption patterns away from traditional opiates in favor of heroin. In contrast, while an increase in smuggling has increased the supply and decreased the price of heroin in Greece, it did not have a causational effect on abuse or overdose rates to the extent seen in the United States and India. Then, each crisis and country is demographically distinct. While the crises in the United States and India have largely been growing in rural regions, the crisis in Greece was more relegated to urban areas. Next, the crises occurred on a much larger scale in the United States and India than in Greece owing both to the overall population differences between these countries and the level of severity of each crisis. The already existing addiction treatment infrastructure in Greece also contributed to this contrast. Further, each crisis took place in a culturally unique environment with its own traditions and histories. For example, while Punjab has a history of social opiate use, Greece and the United States do not. Finally, while India and the United States share a healthcare structure in which the federal government relegates money to state governments to create and enact policies, the healthcare system in Greece is mainly publicly funded and centrally organized. This means that healthcare policy in India and the United States is more piecemeal and disjointed whereas healthcare policy in Greece is more unified. The similarities between the crises mean that they can be effectively compared, while the differences limit the level of comparison that may be conducted. The fact that the three crises share a major causal factor, economic downturn, indicates that they are similar in nature. This similar nature allows for comparison. However, the additional distinct causes as well as differences in setting and situation mean that, when drawing conclusions about the efficacy of certain types of USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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policy, the specific policies themselves cannot be directly compared. This comparison would not be valid as they are being applied to different circumstances. For example, a comparison of an American congressional bill to provide funding for treatment programs could not be compared to a Greek parliamentary bill to directly build more treatment centers as the governing systems in either country are different and thus dictate the specific policy actions allowed. Rather, it would be more appropriate to determine the efficacy of either type of policy i.e., demand-side and supply-side policy, in each case individually and then compare the results between cases in order to ultimately come to a conclusion as to which type of policy is more effective and ethical. In the case of the United States, while it is evident that the crisis has been caused by both supply and demand-side issues, demand-side policies have been more effective at combating the epidemic. On the supply-side, over-prescription of opioid drugs and the increasing prevalence of fentanyl have fueled the epidemic. On the demand-side, addiction caused by prescription opioid use and economic stagnation have contributed to the issue. As evidenced in the case study, supply-side factors are being addressed. Opioid prescriptions, while still very high, have been on the decline due to public pressure and government regulations, and government law enforcement agencies are working to adapt to fentanyl supply chains. Indeed, the federal government began a ‘War on Drugs’ in the 1970s in which it has been trying to stem the drug supply for the last fifty years. Thus, the infrastructure necessary for supply control is already in place. However, while the demand-side causes have also played a significant role in the crisis, they have not in the past been addressed with as much vigor by the federal and state governments. It has only been in the last five or so years that demand-side policy such as access to opioid substitution treatment has really been expanded.117 Indeed, despite the strong focus on supply-side policy for decades, the current crisis has only shown signs of slowing down in the last few years, as demand-side policy has been expanded. In the case of Punjab, India, as in the United States, both demand and supply-side factors have exacerbated the crisis, but supply-side policies have not been effective in mitigating it. Trafficking from Afghanistan and economic stagnation have combined to create a deadly epidemic. Also similar to the United States, supply-side policies have thus far been focused on to a greater extent than demand-side policies. Efforts such as Operation Clean, improvements of the Border Security Force, and participation in the Projects Cohesion and Prism have all targeted the supply of drugs. Only the Outpatient Opioid Assisted Treatment program has directly focused on the demandside burden and is as yet too small and not well known enough to be successful. This focus on the supply-side is confirmed by the fact that public statements by the Chief Minister of Punjab have largely focused on the improvements needed in supply control efforts. Despite the fact that a large contributor to the crisis has been supply-side, trafficking from Afghanistan, and the main efforts at combating it have been supply-side as well, the crisis is only worsening. Thus, these supply-side policies are not effective and demand-side policies must be focused on to a greater extent. In Greece, the heroin abuse crisis was precipitated by a demand-side factor, exacerbated by an already-existing supply-side factor, with the augmentation of demand-side policies being 117
Huhn, Andrew S, and Kelly E Dunn. “Why aren't physicians prescribing more buprenorphine?.” Journal of substance abuse treatment vol. 78 (2017): 1-7. doi:10.1016/j.jsat.2017.04.005. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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effective in quelling the crisis. The crisis was precipitated by economic downturn and likely contributed to by the increase in already-existing trafficking and the subsequent decrease in the price of heroin. The supply-side policy of controlling the drug supply remained constant throughout the crisis but in general has proven difficult to enforce. In contrast, demand-side was adjusted to meet the growing need. Since treatment infrastructure already existed, it was able to be adapted relatively quickly. Thus, even though addiction and HIV rates rose, the overdose death rate remained steady. Indeed, it was once OKANA began to adjust its demand-side policies and expand in 2010 and 2011 that overdose rates decreased. These policies were effective in greatly reducing the addiction burden and related health issues in a matter of years. Thus, this case demonstrates that strong demand-side policy, even without particularly strong supply-side policy can prevent the human cost of an addiction epidemic. Ultimately, the comparison of these three cases suggests that even with a wide variety of causal factors, demand-side policy is necessary to combat an opioid epidemic. In the case of the United States, the causes were both demand- and supply-side. In Punjab, the causes were strongly supply-side but also demand-side. In Greece, the cause was largely demand-side. Despite these differences, supply-side policy has been consistently less effective than demand-side policy in stemming these epidemics. In the United States, the supply reduction efforts in existence since the inception of the War on Drugs in the 1970s did little to quell the current epidemic. The epidemic has only begun to show signs of slowing down as demand-side policy has proliferated. In contrast, in Greece, the improvements upon demand reduction efforts in place since the early 2000s greatly reduced the severity of the epidemic even though supply reduction efforts were not specifically amended. In India, despite the strong supply-side causal factors, supply-side solutions have been ineffective in stemming the crisis. The respective causes and results of each case study show that, in these three cases, supply reduction policies are not effective in combating an already-existing crisis. Indeed, this makes sense when one considers that even when crises are caused by supply-side factors, an increase in supply can increase demand, as has been demonstrated in the cases of the United States and India. This is especially logical when one considers the strength of opioid addiction. Thus, once demand has been increased, either through demand- or supply-side factors, demand-reduction policies are necessary to combat the crisis. Consequently, these cases suggest that demand-side policies are more effective when it comes to resolving opioid epidemics. The greater significance of demand-side policy being more effective than supply-side policy is that the two styles of policy reflect two different paradigms and ethical models in how an addiction epidemic is treated. Demand-side policy, which focuses on addiction treatment and prevention, assumes that the problem is largely one of human health and wellbeing. Thus, harm-reduction is the main aim to be achieved. In contrast, supply-side policy, which focuses on reducing the drug supply itself, inherently views a drug epidemic as a legal or criminal issue. This is reflected in policies that mainly focus on law enforcement and security. Thus, demand-side policy is more ethical because it both proves more effective in combating crises, thus reducing human suffering, and has an altogether more humanistic approach with its direct focus on human wellbeing.
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Scott, Dylan. “Visualized: What Medicaid Pays for Addiction Treatment Meds, State by State.” STAT News, 14 Mar. 2017, www.statnews.com/2017/03/14/medicaid-addiction-treatment/. Shariff, Um-e-Kulsoom. “An Epidemic of Pain in India.” The New Yorker, Conde Nast, 5 Dec. 2013, www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/an-epidemic-of-pain-in-india. Sharma, Bhuwan et al. “Drug abuse: Uncovering the burden in rural Punjab.” Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care, vol. 6,3 (2017): 558-562. doi:10.4103/2249-4863.222037. Singh, Manmohan, and Surinder M. Bhardwaj. “Punjab State, India.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 22 Mar. 2019, www.britannica.com/place/Punjab-state-India#ref46040. Souliotis, Yiannis. “Greece a Hub for Drug and Human Trafficking, Police Report Shows.” Kathimerini English Edition, The Kathimerini, 14 Apr. 2018, www.ekathimerini.com/227657/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-ahub-for-drug-and-human-trafficking-police-report-shows. Stylianou, Lucy Rodgers & Nassos. “How Bad Are Things for the People of Greece?” BBC News, BBC, 16 July 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33507802. “Timeline: America's War on Drugs.” NPR, NPR, 2 Apr. 2007, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490&t=1554508092806. “The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA).” CADCA, Community Anti- Drug Coalitions of America Institute, www.cadca.org/comprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act-cara. “The Measures: Customs Risk Management Framework (CRMF).” Taxation and Customs Union - European Commission, European Commission, 20 Dec. 2018, ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/general-informationcustoms/customs-risk-management/measures-customs-risk-management-framework-crmf_en. “Union Home Minister Shri Rajnath Singh Reviews Working of Narcotics Control Bureau.” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 6 July 2016. “United States, Congress, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control.” International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control, vol. 1, United States Department of State, 2018, pp. 1–294. “United States. Congress. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Fentanyl: China’s Deadly Export to the United States. By Sean O’Connor. 2017. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report_FentanylChina%E2%80%99s%20Deadly%20Export%20to%20the%20United%20States020117.pdf Wilkes, Tommy. “In India's Punjab, Jobless Youth Take a Chance with...” Reuters, Reuters, 3 Feb. 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-india-election-punjab/in-indias-punjab-jobless-youth-take-a-chance-with-antiestablishment-party-idUSKBN15I025. World Health Organization. Health care systems in transition: Greece. No. CARE 04 03 06, Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1996.
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REFLECTION I conducted research for this paper through a combination of a literature review and personal interviews. My extensive literature review consisted of a variety of academic, non-academic, governmental, and non-governmental sources. After this, I sought to fill the gaps in my knowledge by speaking with experts in the United States, India, and Greece. To learn about the United States, I interviewed Dr. Sarah Axeen, Assistant Professor in Emergency Medicine at the USC Keck School of Medicine, and Dr. Melissa J. Durham, Assistant Professor of Clinical Pharmacy at the USC School of Pharmacy. Dr. Axeen provided me with further insight regarding the legal regulation of prescription opioids in the United States and Dr. Durham shared with me her expertise in pain management and addiction as well as her personal experience as a clinical pharmacist. Then, I spoke to the following Indian experts: former Major General Vikram Gunjikar regarding his roughly three years of experience stationed in Kashmir, Dr. Pushpita Das, research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in Delhi, about her expertise in border security and drug trafficking, and former Border Security Force deputy Inspector General RPS Jaswal, on the subject of his time working in Punjab. Finally, as I am studying in Athens, Greece this semester, I met and interviewed Dr. Konstantinos Kokkolis, a psychiatrist and Senior Director of Programmes Implementation, and Dr. Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Head of the Department of Research & Assessment, at the Greek Organization against Drugs (OKANA) to learn more about the Greek government’s addiction treatment policy and the history of opioid abuse in the country. Overall, this process allowed me to further develop my research and interview skills and gain useful perspectives on my research. Despite the depth of this paper, the vast scope of opioid abuse issues means that there is much more to be learned and analyzed. Moving forward from this paper, I hope to further delve into the ethics of various types of policy as well as the ethics and efficacy of private sector interventions. I would also like to explore these issues in other countries that have faced addiction crises such as the Netherlands and France.
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KURTIS WEATHERFORD
From Xenia to Xenophobia: Evolving Moral Foundations of Asylum in Greece USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry May 2019
ABSTRACT: The field of refugee studies is lacking in terms of historical analysis. Without such a perspective, the status quo is often taken as given, immutable, or even natural. One aspect of the field where this status-quo bias can become counterproductive is the moral justification of the asylum practice. Moral psychology tells us that different moral foundations can be used to justify the same behavior, and that some foundations are more convincing than others to certain people. If advocates wish to make effective moral arguments in favor of a coherent and humane asylum regime, they should maximize the number of moral arguments at their disposal. This paper attempts to provide additional moral foundations for asylum through a historical analysis of the practice in Greece, a country for which displacement has almost always been a salient issue. This analysis, contrasted with contemporary asylum politics in the country, provides insights into the origins of and potential replacements for the current moral boundaries of asylum politics both in Greece and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION As Greek heroes go, few are more legendary than Odysseus. The exalted King of Ithaca and vanquisher of the Trojans stands as a paragon of virtue and a consummate leader in Greek mythology. During his well-chronicled travels, Odysseus serves as a military commander, a captain, a diplomat, and a king. But, he also occupies another role that today might seem far less prestigious: that of a refugee. Multiple times during his journey home from Troy, the hero is said to have landed on the shores of various Greek islands, often alone and in need of basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter. The reactions of these island occupants in the face of Odysseus’ supplication establish both the moral boundaries of hospitality in Ancient Greek society and the moral foundations upon which those boundaries are based. Of course, the story of Odysseus is only a myth. Despite the best efforts of archaeologists, no conclusive proof exists that such a man even lived let alone interacted with deities and other supernatural beings. However, the story’s veracity has no bearing on its ability to illustrate the moral thinking of those who created it. If anything, myths may serve as the perfect time capsule through which the values of ancient cultures may be ascertained. That being said, themes of travelling, hospitality, and asylum in Greece are not limited to the realm of legend. Due in part to its geographic location at the boundary of Asia, North Africa, and Europe, Greece has always played an active role in the drama of human migration. Archaeological evidence shows that trade in goods such as wine, olives, figs, and pottery was taking place both within Ancient Greece and with other civilizations in Asia Minor, Egypt, and the Levant. Ancient Greek history is also teeming with stories of conquest and the expulsion of people from their homes by invading forces. With conquest and trade comes the movement of people and the development of cultural norms around how to treat strangers. As the recent refugee crisis in Greece illustrates, migration is still a salient issue in Greece. Now as in Ancient times, the Greek people and governments are forced to grapple with the inherently moral question of their obligations to those seeking protection within their communities. Sometimes, they display exceptional hospitality. Often, such hospitality is only selective. And occasionally, hospitality is abandoned altogether in favor of rejection and even violence. As the treatment of asylum seekers has changed, so too have the moral justifications for hospitality. Sanctity, solidarity, reciprocity, nationalism, and xenophobia all worked to shape the responses of the Greek people and their government to outsiders seeking refuge. The primary moral foundations used to justify granting or withholding asylum changed as Greece progressed from a loose union of ancient city-states, to a modern Westphalian state, to a member of contemporary supranational union. Just as these shifts in governance structure led to changes in the moral foundations of asylum, so too did changing economic, religious, and political trends. Knowing this, it stands to reason that a historical analysis of the moral foundations of asylum in a country like Greece would yield valuable insights into the moral foundations of our current global asylum regime. However, it does not appear that such an analysis exists. In fact, scholars are beginning to recognize that the field of refugee studies itself is sorely lacking in
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historical perspective.1 Since its creation in the 1980s, the field has had no problem looking outwards towards other fields such as political science, sociology, and even psychology, but it has struggled to look backwards to learn the lessons of history. While this paper is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of the historical moral foundations of asylum, it does seek to contribute to the nascent historical discussion of asylum by exploring the rich and often tragic history of a country that has been dealing with the phenomenon for millennia. ANCIENT GREECE Historians generally use the term Ancient Greece to describe the civilization that existed in and around the Aegean Sea between about 800 BCE and 500 CE. This time period spans over 1000 years and includes some of the most important developments in not just Greek but western history as a whole. Homer’s epic poems, The Iliad and The Odyssey, were said to have first been composed around the beginning of this time period. Just four hundred years later, the great Athenian playwright Sophocles composed his three Theban tragedies depicting the fate of Thebes during the reign of King Oedipus. Not long after that came the Golden Age of Athens, the latter part of which included the celebrated reign of King Pericles. From the birth of democracy, to the development of the city-state, to the emergence of a Hellenistic cultural and political identity, Ancient Greece was replete with breakthroughs in the way that human beings related to one another and governed themselves. Unfortunately, few official records exist which might be useful in discerning how the Ancient Greeks thought about the concept of asylum. However, there are numerous myths which, regardless of their historical veracity, accurately capture the moral foundations of Ancient Greek society. After all, it was through myths and legends that the traditions and conceptions of right and wrong were generally passed between successive generations. Given that Ancient Greece consisted of small clans and, later, city-states spread out across the islands and shores of the Aegean Sea, asylum, hospitality, and displacement are all common themes found across Greek mythology. As Isayev observes, “investigations into ancient mobility challenge prevailing conceptions of a natural tie to the land and a demographically settled world, showing that much human mobility was ongoing and cyclical.”2 In short, the Greeks had welldeveloped and recorded attitudes and customs relating to travelers, strangers, and asylum-seekers. In fact, the word asylum itself has its origins in the Greek asylos or asylon meaning inviolable.3 The Ancient Greeks also had a word for the custom that governed the way strangers or visitors ought to be treated. This word, xenia, which means hospitality or guest-friendship4 is full of
1
Marfleet, Philip. "Refugees and History: Why We Must Address the Past." Refugee Survey Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2007): 136-48. 2 Isayev, Elena. "Between Hospitality and Asylum: A Historical Perspective on Displaced Agency." International Review of the Red Cross 99, no. 1 (2017), p., 77. 3 Plaut, W. Gunther. Asylum: A Moral Dilemma. Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1995. 4 Isavey, "Between Hospitality and Asylum” USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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religious significance. In fact, the surname given to Zeus in many Greek myths is the related Xenios which, like xenia, comes from xenos meaning stranger or alien.5 As these etymologies indicate, religion and divine justice provided a strong moral foundation and logic for the accommodation and even celebration of strangers in Ancient Greece. At the core of this logic was an idea that seems antithetical to how many view migrants today. The Greeks believed that strangers were magical, even sacred, and that the failure to grant them refuge would bring down the wrath of the Gods. The Xenios surname given to Zeus indicated both that the king of gods himself was a stranger and that he acts as a “protector of guests” ready to “mete out harsh punishment on those who transgress the rules of hospitality.”6 The religious importance and divine enforcement of the asylum custom pervades Homer’s Odyssey, which centers around the protagonist’s experience as a migrant and supplicant on his journey home from Troy. Along the way, he is both granted and deprived of divine guest rights, and the resulting fates of his hosts demonstrate the seriousness of the custom. For example, the Cyclopes Polyphemus directly subverts the custom of feeding his guests by eating a few of Odysseus’ men when they visit his cave. Although the gods do not directly visit retribution upon Polyphemus, Odysseus blinds him by shoving a wooden stake through his one eye. When the other giants ask Polyphemus who blinded him, the Cyclopes gives them the clever name Odysseus used to introduce himself: “No one.” This leads them to believe that Polyphemus was indeed blinded by the gods in exchange for his poor treatment of his guests. Earlier in the story, the goddess Athena tests the virtue of Odysseus’ son Telemachus using the principle of xenia by visiting him while disguised as a guest. Having internalized the “sanctity of guests” principle, Telemachus treats the disguised Athena as if she were a god. After his demonstration of this good behavior, Athena provides him with the advice and protection throughout the remainder of the story. If the parables contained in Homer’s epics used a religious foundation to illustrate and preserve a custom of asylum for the various clans that populated the Aegean in the beginning of the Ancient Greek era, Sophocles’ Theban tragedies did the same for the residents of the Greek city-states that emerged later. In particular, the story of Oedipus at Colonus demonstrates that cities, as well as individuals, may be punished or rewarded based on how they treat strangers. When Oedipus first arrives in the city, he is considered a foreigner and he demonstrates his ignorance of the local culture by walking through a sacred grove. At first, the village elders are simply angry at this obvious transgression. However, their anger quickly turns to horror when the stranger admits that he is Oedipus, known throughout Ancient Greece for patricide and incest. Nevertheless, they do not harm Oedipus or even ask him to leave. Rather, they teach him the customs of their village and eventually grant him the right to dwell on their land. They do this because they believe Oedipus’ body will offer them protection after his death so long as they welcome him.7 This expectation of divine protection illustrates yet another aspect of the religious 5
Plaut, W. Gunther. Asylum: A Moral Dilemma. Isavey, "Between Hospitality and Asylum” p., 78 7 Reitzammer, Laurialan. "For the Ancient Greeks, Immigrants Were Both A Boon and Threat to Homeland Security." Zócalo: Public Square, April 10, 2017. 6
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foundation for the granting of asylum in Ancient Greece. So strong was the belief in Xenia that some cities even “recognized [the] divine injunction in their positive law.”8 While the threat of divine intervention may provide us with the simplest explanation for the way that Ancient Greeks treated strangers who arrived on their shores, reciprocity also played an important role. To find evidence to support this claim, we may return once again to Homer’s Odyssey and the parable of the Phaeacians. After he escapes from the clutches of Calypso, Odysseus’ ship is destroyed in a storm and he washes ashore on an island called Scheria. That island is home to a people called the Phaeacians and the king and queen of the Phaeacians are exceptionally hospitable to their guest. Before they even know his name, the royal couple offers Odysseus a ship for his journey home and holds a feast in his honor. In short, they show him kindness for no reason other than that he is a guest from far away. However, their kindness is more than a simple act of altruism. In fact, its reciprocal nature is obvious to the reader from the beginning. Even though Odysseus appears as an anonymous beggar to the King and Queen, “we, the all-seeing listeners and readers of the story, know Odysseus’ true identity all along—a member of the privileged elite who has the capacity to reciprocate or provide equal service.”9 While the King of the Phaeacians may not specifically expect to be in desperate need of Odysseus’ help in the future, it does make intuitive sense that the various clans dispersed across the thousands of Greek islands might want to foster a culture of reciprocal hospitality in order to facilitate communication, travel, and trade amongst themselves. In many ways, the same principle of reciprocity continued to apply as the clans of the Greek isles grew into powerful city-states a few hundred years after the agrarian, clan-based time period in which The Odyssey is set. As this transformation occurred, the preservation of asylum went from being a virtuous act to a necessary one. Robert Gorman points out that the practice of using exile, or banishment from one’s home, as a punishment for criminal or immoral acts was widespread in the ancient Greek city-states. In his words, “banishment was viewed by the ancients as a potentially useful tool of the criminal justice system and as a means of preserving the integrity of the state from violent political upheaval.”10 However, the common practice of banishment needed a corresponding practice of asylum if the system was to sustain itself. Exiled individuals essentially became antiquity’s version of stateless persons. In both cases, individuals having no state (or city) identity undermine the coherence of the system itself. Therefore, accommodations must be made to resolve their status. Gorman is using this argument when he says that exile “made asylum a matter of necessity rather than virtue,” and it serves as evidence that the ancient Greek asylum regime was based in part on reciprocity. The final moral foundation upon which the Ancient Greeks appear to have justified their accommodation of asylum-seekers was reputation. In the era depicted in Homer’s Odyssey, the 8
Gorman, Robert F. "Citizenship, Obligation, and Exile in the Greek and Roman Experience." Public Affairs Quarterly 6, no. 1 (January 1992) p., 16. 9 Isavey, "Between Hospitality and Asylum” p., 81 10 Gorman, "Citizenship, Obligation, and Exile" p., 15.
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various villages and kingdoms subscribed to the belief that “the actions and decisions within hostguest encounters determined the positioning of a society on the spectrum of just, civilized or barbarian.”11 There are many reasons why a group might want to position itself toward the former end of this scale, including trade and military alliances. As small island villages became full-fledged city-states, the necessity and desire to maintain a good reputation remained. In a famous speech recounted by Thucydides, the celebrated Athenian King Pericles explains that Athens opens its doors to strangers, even though such a policy is dangerous. This, Pericles argues, stands in direct opposition to the close-minded and unsophisticated Spartans (Athens’ rival city-state).12 In this speech, we can see that asylum and general openness to migrants is used to construct a desirable reputation for a city, especially visa-vis its rivals. To be sure, the tradition of welcoming strangers in Ancient Greece was not always applied universally. Oftentimes, individuals and groups seeking asylum would base their claims on kinship bonds to the potential hosts. For example, in Isocrates’ Plataicus, the Plataeans make the following claim to their potential Athenian hosts: “For indeed we are not aliens to you; on the contrary, all of us are akin to you in our loyalty and most of us in blood also; for by the right of intermarriage granted to us we are born of mothers who were of your city. You cannot, therefore, be indifferent to the pleas we have come to make.”13 The success of claims such as this one indicate that xenia may not have been universally applicable. Or, at the very least, it was strengthened by increased familiarity between the guest and the host. If true, this factor may have placed a constraint on Ancient Greek hospitality, limiting it only to those who could prove some sort of relation to the Greeks. That being said, technological constraints also present at the time probably made it unlikely that the Greeks would encounter people from far outside the Mediterranean. In addition to exploring the various moral foundations for asylum as they existed in ancient times, it is also important to consider how they changed within the 1000+ year era we refer to as Ancient Greece. Many of the major changes observed by scholars corresponded with changes in social organization from the clan or tribe to the much larger city-state. As this transformation took place, much about the custom of asylum changed. First and probably most noticeably, the physical and emotional space between the asylum-seeker and the potential host grew larger. Instead of a supplicant making a claim directly to a head of household (as Odysseus does in The Odyssey), people seeking asylum in city states were often made to take sanctuary in a temple on the outskirts of the city while their plea was made to the city leaders through an intermediary.14 Additionally Plaut notes that the development of the city-state led to a subtle change in the way the right to asylum was conceived. Before, it was the right of the individual to ask for refuge. After the citystate, Greeks considered it the right of the city to offer asylum 11
Isavey, "Between Hospitality and Asylum” p., 78 Reitzammer, "For the Ancient Greeks” 13 Isocrates, et al. Works: With an English Translation by George Norlin and by Larue Van Hook. W. Heinemann, 1961. 14 Isavey, "Between Hospitality and Asylum” 12
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CONTEMPORARY GREECE As in ancient times, Greece finds itself at the center of the drama of human migration. Following outbreaks of violence in the Middle East, especially in Syria where civil war and the Islamic State drove millions from their homes, the shores of the Greek islands have again become a destination for many of the almost two million refugees fleeing their homes to seek asylum in Europe. At first, Greece was seen as the first stop on a long journey through Europe. Most refugees entering Europe in 2015 or early 2016 wanted to end up in countries like Sweden or Germany where they imagined they would have the best chance to start a new life. About one million people passed through Greece as part of this journey. However, in March 2016, the Balkan countries through which the refugees travelled on their way to central and northern Europe closed their borders. This event is known as the closing of the Balkan route, and overnight it changed Greece from a waypoint to a final destination, forcing the Greeks to once again confront a phenomenon that played such an important role in their cultural past. Before describing and judging the way Greece has dealt with the tens of thousands of refugees now inside its borders, it is important to note the role that the European Union (EU) plays in this story. To provide an in-depth explanation of the Common European Asylum System would be outside the purview of this paper, but it is necessary to say that Greece, unlike many states around the world, does not have complete control over its own asylum policy. Because the EU allows for the free movement of people within its Schengen Area, it also imposes regulations on states like Greece which form the external border of the union. These regulations dictate who can and cannot be admitted as refugees. Additionally, the EU provides much of the funding that Greece uses to provide basic needs for refugees and manage the processing of their asylum claims. Outside of these parameters, Greece also makes many of its own decisions about how to treat the refugees within its borders. Many critics would argue that Greece has made these decisions based not on welcoming ideals of peaceful integration and xenia, but on a xenophobic desire to deter potential asylum seekers.15 There is much evidence to support this claim. For example, in 2016, as cold winter temperatures threatened the lives of refugees housed in tents on the Greek mainland, the Greek migration ministry rejected a bid from a German NGO that would have winterized one of the most vulnerable camps for $1.6 million. Instead, they proposed a similar $8 million plan which EU and humanitarian donors obviously rejected. In addition to rejecting vital housing improvements for refugees, the Greek government also failed to implement effective education for refugee youth who often make up at least half of the refugee population. Despite having already developed a successful “reception class” system for migrant children prior to 2015, the government discarded this method in favor of using substitute teachers who lacked the necessary training for teaching refugee children. Finally, the clearest evidence of a deterrence motive in Greece’s treatment of refugees came when Greece’s chief of police was caught on tape saying, “We have to make life
15
Howden, Daniel. “Greece: Between Deterrence and Integration.” Refugees Deeply, May 2017. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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here unbearable … The other guy needs to know that if he comes to this country he is going to be put inside, otherwise we’re doing nothing.” This deterrence-based strategy for dealing with asylum seekers could not be further from the hospitality custom espoused in Ancient Greek mythology. Its existence therefore raises the question of whether the moral foundations upon which the treatment of strangers is based have changed significantly. Those who closely follow the debate around the treatment of refugees in this part of the world will broadly understand the boundaries of the current moral battle. On one side are those who argue that solidarity and compassion should be the priorities of refugee policy. In Greece, this group is represented by the hundreds of NGOs that provide necessities like food, clothing, and healthcare to refugees in the name of fellowship and alliance. For example, more than 50 “solidarity clinics” have been set up across the country to provide healthcare to refugees (“Solidarity Clinics”). When these organizations and their supporters make arguments in favor of helping refugees, they often use language that includes words like compassion, conscience, and solidarity.16 On the other side of the moral battlefield are those who argue in favor of deterring asylum seekers or simply refusing their claims. In Greece, the most well known of these groups might be the Golden Dawn party, a far right political movement responsible for many xenophobic demonstrations, some of which have been violent. This group and its less extreme relatives base their positions on a different sort of moral foundation. Scholars like Alexandra Androusou of the University of Athens point to factors such as Islamophobia and fear associated with an already weak Greek economy as potential foundations for these positions. CONCLUSION To explain all the factors which precipitated a shift in the moral foundations of asylum between Ancient and contemporary Greece would be far too ambitious a task for this paper. That being said, it would be safe to assume that changes in the structure of governance likely played an important role. Even within the period known as Ancient Greece, the distance between asylum seeker and potential host gradually grew. As the agrarian clans of Archaic Greece (800 BCE-500 BCE) transitioned into larger, self-governing, and occasionally democratic city states, asylum seekers had to make their claims to increasingly larger political groups. As this transition occurred, evidence of responsibility shirking began to surface. For example, in Aeschylus’ tragedy The Suppliant Women, King Pelasgos of Argos first refuses to grant asylum to a group of women fleeing Egypt, telling them, “You are not sitting at the hearth of my house. If the city as a whole is threatened with pollution, it must be the concern of the people as a whole to work out a cure.”17 Here, King Pelasgos is not saying the women are necessarily unworthy of asylum, only that he can’t grant it to them because they are not requesting sanctuary in his personal home. The women rightly argue that, as head of state, he does have the authority and also the responsibility to offer 16 17
Ki-moon, Ban. “The Refugee Crisis Is a Test of Our Collective Conscience.” The New York Times, 16 Sept. 2018. Isavey, "Between Hospitality and Asylum” p., 82 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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them refuge. But, even today we see responsibility shirking based on similar logic. As city-states became states and states joined into supranational unions like the EU, the distance between the asylum seeker and the potential host has grown greater and greater. As this distance grows and as states prioritize national interest above all else, moral foundations based in religion, reciprocity, and reputation may become less persuasive as reasons to grant asylum. Regardless of why the moral foundations of asylum have changed in Greece, it remains useful to explore the different foundations that have been used throughout history. At its most basic level, such an exploration allows us to better recognize and understand the moral boundaries of the contemporary asylum debate which we often take as given. However, scholars of moral psychology such as Jonathan Haidt argue that we may be able to do more than that. Haidt and his colleagues have developed a framework for understanding people’s particular affinities for certain moral arguments.18 The theory is called Moral Foundations Theory (MVT) and, put simply, it posits that the persuasiveness of certain moral logics varies across and even within cultures. In other words, an argument based on compassion may be more persuasive to one person than another who might be more convinced by an argument based on loyalty to a group. The important lesson of MVT is that advocates can create a wider base of support for a policy or issue by appealing to different moral foundations. Knowing this, it can be argued that a historical analysis which unearths alternative moral foundations of a particular behavior might also provide current advocates of that behavior additional ammunition with which to make their case. Perhaps those arguing for a more welcoming asylum regime in Greece and even in the EU could make more progress if, in addition to making arguments based in solidarity and human rights, they also espoused the reputational, reciprocal, and even religious reasons why such a regime would be preferable. As Haidt and his colleagues show, different people find different moral foundations persuasive. In fact, the people who normally oppose liberal immigration and asylum regimes are often not convinced by arguments based in compassion and human rights. Maybe they might be more effectively persuaded by some of the arguments used in ancient times. Regardless, exploring the moral foundations of asylum in Ancient Greece, the cradle of so many of our society’s institutions and practices, allows us to better understand the origins of and alternatives to our current moral debate on the subject.
18
Haidt, Jonathan. The Righteous Mind Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Penguin Books, 2013.
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REFERENCES Cartwright, Mark. “Trade in Ancient Greece.” Ancient History Encyclopedia, Ancient History Encyclopedia, 28 Mar. 2019. Editors, History.com. “Ancient Greece.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 5 Mar. 2010, www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/ancient-greece. Gorman, Robert F. "Citizenship, Obligation, and Exile in the Greek and Roman Experience." Public Affairs Quarterly 6, no. 1 (January 1992): 5-22. JSTOR. Haidt, Jonathan. The Righteous Mind Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Penguin Books, 2013. Howden, Daniel, and Apostolis Fotiadis. “The Refugee Archipelago: The Inside Story of What Went Wrong in Greece.” Refugees, News Deeply, 31 Mar. 2017. Howden, Daniel. “Greece: Between Deterrence and Integration.” Refugees Deeply, May 2017. Isayev, Elena. "Between Hospitality and Asylum: A Historical Perspective on Displaced Agency." International Review of the Red Cross 99, no. 1 (2017): 75-98. doi:10.1017/s1816383117000510. Isocrates, et al. Works: With an English Translation by George Norlin and by Larue Van Hook. W. Heinemann, 1961. Ki-moon, Ban. “The Refugee Crisis Is a Test of Our Collective Conscience.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 16 Sept. 2018. Kokkinidis, Tasos. “Philoxenia: The Ancient Roots of Greek Hospitality.” News from Greece, 21 Sept. 2018. Marfleet, Philip. "Refugees and History: Why We Must Address the Past." Refugee Survey Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2007): 136-48. doi:10.1093/rsq/hdi0248. Plaut, W. Gunther. Asylum: A Moral Dilemma. Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1995. Reitzammer, Laurialan. "For the Ancient Greeks, Immigrants Were Both A Boon and Threat to Homeland Security." Zócalo: Public Square, April 10, 2017. “Solidarity Clinics.” Greece Solidarity Campaign, greecesolidarity.org/?page_id=1114.
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REFLECTION The Dunning-Kruger effect describes a process of learning that begins with high confidence despite one’s lack of knowledge and ends with high confidence as one achieves mastery in a subject area. In between these two peaks is a trough of low confidence that occurs when one learns just enough information to realize that they know nothing. This trough is called “the Valley of Despair,” and it’s where I spent a good portion of my research process over this past year. Despite its eerie name, the Valley of Despair is not a terrible spot to occupy. I found it humbling, curiosity-inducing, and even exciting to realize just how much there was to learn about the history of asylum around the world. It seemed like every time I would read a new article on the subject, I would discover a new question that needed answering. How did the custom of asylum come to be? What moral foundations was it built upon? Are these foundations present today? When did asylum become an institutionalized process? Did institutionalization improve or worsen outcomes for asylum seekers? While it was exhilarating to be awash in curiosity, it was also overwhelming. I felt like I needed to have answers to all of these questions if my paper was to be comprehensive, and I felt like those answers had to lead to a novel conclusion for my paper to be interesting. With the help of Jonathan and Brooke, I eventually limited myself both geographically and temporally to Ancient Greece in order to create a cohesive argument for my paper. I enjoyed exploring the rich corpus of Greek mythology to find examples of asylum and hospitality, and I was frankly surprised at how many I found. It was also interesting to compare the stories of an ancient culture to contemporary event taking place in the exact same location. In the end, I believe I was able to draw some interesting conclusions about asylum politics and policy from my historical analysis, but along the way I certainly found more questions than answers!
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MIA POYNOR
Moving Towards Human Rights in the Voluntourism Industry USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry May 2019
ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the current state of voluntourism discourse and what could be done to orient the industry towards a more human rights perspective. Background on voluntourism is provided and an overview of the varying opinions of the industry are discussed. Lastly, the integration of human rights in voluntourism is attempted.
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INTRODUCTION Tourism is a billion-dollar industry heightened by the increasingly globalized world. Within the industry lies the sub-sector of volunteer tourism, better known as “voluntourism.” In recent years, with greater exposure to the uneven consequences of globalization, the world has seen a huge expansion of voluntourism trips. With the industry becoming larger, more complex, and overlapping in areas like humanitarian aid and sustainable development, understanding voluntourism is increasingly more difficult as its expansion seems to be somewhat limitless. This paper is not the first to note this influence and importance. Now, as a serious area of academic investigation, definitions and typologies, benefits and consequences, and further ontological and epistemological discussions of voluntourism are being explored. To add to this discourse, this paper will analyze the current gaps in voluntourism literature and its implications on operationalizing human rights in practice through programming and evaluations using a perspective that incorporates human rights principles. WHAT IS VOLUNTOURISM AND WHY IS IT SO HARD TO DEFINE? There is very little consensus within the academic sphere about definitions and concepts of voluntourism. As scholar Jacklyn Durham notes, “nobody knows what [voluntourism] is”; the only two things that scholars agree upon are that it is a practice that combines volunteering and traveling, and it is one of the fasting growing sub-industries within the tourism and travel industries.1 Taplin (2014) states that the realm of voluntourism is expanding and becoming more interdisciplinary, consequently failing to create a uniform, generally agreed upon definition.2 Due to this lack of clarity and consensual discourse, monitoring and evaluation for these programs have proven to be challenging, ultimately creating negative impacts in practice. The most frequently quoted definition comes from Stephen Wearing (2001); voluntourism excursions are made up of “those tourists, who for various reasons, volunteer in an organised way to undertake holidays that might involve aiding or alleviating the material poverty of some groups in society, the restoration of certain environments or research into aspects of society or environment.”3 Geographer James Keese offers a simpler definition where voluntourism is “a combination of development work, education and tourism.”4 While both definitions are succinct, I will propose a much longer definition for voluntourism. For the purpose of this paper, I will define voluntourism as:
1
Durham, Jacklyn. “Protecting the Voluntoured. An Explanatory Human Rights Impact Assessment for Ethical Voluntourism in Nepal.” The University of Sydney, Global Campus Asia-Pacific, 2015, pp. 1–80. 2 Taplin, Jessica, et al. “Monitoring and Evaluating Volunteer Tourism: a Review and Analytical Framework.” Journal of Sustainable Tourism, vol. 22, no. 6, 16 Jan. 2014, pp. 874–897., doi:10.1080/09669582.2013.871022. 3 Wearing, Stephen. Volunteer Tourism: Experiences That Make a Difference. CABI, 2001. 4 Keese, James R. “The Geography of Volunteer Tourism: Place Matters.” Tourism Geographies, vol. 13, no. 2, 8 June 2011, pp. 257–279. doi:10.1080/14616688.2011.567293. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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an act, an industry, and a process in which people (usually in their 20s-30’s and hailing from the Global North) will deliberately travel to another country, complete a voluntary service (usually in the form of teaching, building infrastructure, playing with children, providing medical services, etc.), while also seeking out a traditional enrichment of tourism elements in art, culture, and other recreational activities (adapted from 3, 4, 5).
This definition is not perfect and missing some dimensions such as how voluntourism might be defined for the various stakeholders (i.e. local community, local government, etc.). However, this is reflective of the gap that exists between voluntourism discourse and theory and the reality of on-the-ground operations. The implications of not having a generally agreed upon definition will be discussed later in the paper. VOLUNTOURISM CHARACTERISICS Despite voluntourism having unsolidified definitions and concepts, there are many clear characteristics in the trips. This list is adopted from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Tourism Working Group’s paper Voluntourism Best Practices in the Asia-Pacific Region (2018): Criterion (i): The duration is short (Usually less than 1 year) Criterion (ii): Organized by a company Criterion (iii): Incorporation of recreational activities or leisure activities Criterion (iv): A form of payment to a company or organization Criterion (v): Packages including accommodations, meals, and other leisure activities Criterion (vi): Access to a community that a voluntourist would not usually be able to interact with6
For clarity purposes, I provide a table of the different types of voluntourism, popular organizations that coordinate trips, the focus areas of voluntourism trips, and the outcomes of the trips. This ontological evaluation attempt is rudimentary and based on my understanding of what kind of voluntourism trips currently exist. According to APEC (2018), within the industry there are six main stakeholders: the voluntourist, the sending organization, the host organization, the host community, the servicing organization, and the government (National and/or Local). All benefit differently from voluntourism, which is why incorporating acknowledgement and research into the varying stakeholders is important and necessary.7
4
Keese, James R supra 1 at 1 Wearing, Stephen, and Nancy Gard McGhee. “Volunteer Tourism: A Review.” Tourism Management, vol. 38, 9 Apr. 2013, pp. 120–130. 6 Milne, S, et al. Voluntourism Best Practices: Promoting Inclusive Community-Based Sustainable Tourism Initiatives: Final Report. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat, 2018, Voluntourism Best Practices: Promoting Inclusive Community-Based Sustainable Tourism Initiatives: Final Report. 7 Milne, S, et al. Voluntourism Best Practices 5
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Type of Voluntourism
Popular Organizations
Focus Areas
Objective Outcomes
Self-initiated Commercialized (Tourism Business) Non-commercialized (NGO)
Cross Cultural Solutions International Volunteer Headquarters (IVHQ) AIESEC Global-Vision International
Environment Refugee Support Health Children Business Art Women Education Construction/Building
Teaching hours Built Infrastructure
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE VOLUNTOURISM DEBATE The purpose of this section is an overview of voluntourism literature: if it is good or bad, and the potential impacts the act of voluntouring has on the voluntourist and the voluntoured. To contextualize voluntourism in literature and the tourism sector in general, I will use Jafari’s (1990) advocacy, cautionary, adaptancy, and scientific platforms.8 Jafari proposes that after World War II, due to a variety of factors, the perspectives of tourism in general became more introspective, thus leading the advocacy, cautionary, adaptancy, and scientific perspectives within tourism literature.9 These platforms have been used to understand the emergence of non-traditional types of tourism (such as sustainable or eco-tourism) and have proven to be useful in understanding how tourism has developed.10 I will adapt this framework to focus on voluntourism and its evolution. This method of analysis was first introduced into voluntourism literature by Wearing and McGehee (2013) to demonstrate how its academic understanding has evolved and matured over time, emphasizing that each platform influences and builds upon one another.11 LITERATURE REVIEW: ADVOCACY There is a substantial amount of literature that suggests a potentially beneficial outcome of voluntourism or the needed tools to make one recognize the potential of it. Tourism in general is meant to satisfy the tourist’s personal needs, whether that be physical or emotional.12 Smith and Hannam (2014) note that voluntourism is enhanced when people are caring for those in perceived
8 Jafari, Jafar. “Research and Scholarship: the Basis of Tourism Education.” The Journal of Tourism Studies, vol. 1, 1990, pp. 33–41. 9 Jafari, Jafar. “Research and Scholarship” 10 Ibid. 11 Wearing, Stephen, and Nancy Gard McGhee. “Volunteer Tourism: A Review.” Tourism Management, vol. 38, 9 Apr. 2013, pp. 120–130. 12 Milne, S, et al. Voluntourism Best Practices
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need.13 Many voluntourists seek out emotional experiences of vulnerability, distress, and kindness; these desires are brought to fruition through the voluntourism packages advertised to make participants feel good through acts of service. Dr. Anne Zahra and Dr. Alison J. McIntosh (2007), academic researchers in the tourism field, agree with this assertion and see these emotions as a necessity to catalyze and evoke the desire to create change.14 The nature of these trips is often accompanied with emotional shock and intensity that can result in a positive and proactive transformation within the voluntourist.15 Their studies suggest that the experience of being exposed to such absolute contrasts in impoverished environments is needed to have a lasting sense of proactiveness and urgency. Communication scholars Dr. Kirstie McAllum and Dr. Anne Zahara (2017) reinforce this idea by describing how “Othering” (the way in which people view others as inherently different and consequently inferior) can be used as a tool for introspective change.16 In literature against voluntourism, Othering is seen as a destructive force that furthers power imbalances between wealth and race; it is often synonymous with marginalization and colonialism.17 However, McAllum and Zahara (2017) note that the relationship between one’s self and an “Other” is fluid and malleable; they identify an opportunity to reshape the space between voluntourist and community in a positive trajectory. LITERATURE REVIEW: CAUTIONARY This platform recognizes the negative impacts of voluntourism, doubting its potential benefits from advocacy.18 Many scholars argue that voluntourism is an increasingly commercialized industry based on neoliberal values. There are no regulations or ethical standards that the voluntourism industry is held up to. Voluntourism trips are marketed and somewhat justified by the process of Othering, where voluntourists are displayed as the active agents of change and the community as passive people unable to help themselves.19 Thus, many of these trips perpetuate tones of power imbalances and colonialism. As McGloin & Georgeou (2015) note, “companies have appropriated the language of humanitarian development in order to trade on the idea that they send people to ‘help’ others.”20 13
Smith, Peter, and Kevin Hannam. “International Volunteer Tourism as (De)Commodified Moral Consumption Moral Encounters In Tourism. Current Developments In the Geographies of Leisure and Tourism, edited by Mary Mostafanezhad, Routledge, 2014, pp. 31–46. 14 Zahra, Anne, and Alison J. Mcintosh. “Volunteer Tourism: Evidence of Cathartic Tourist Experiences.” Tourism Recreation Research, vol. 32, no. 1, 2007, pp. 115–119., doi:10.1080/02508281.2007.11081530. 15 Zahra, Anne, and Alison J. Mcintosh. “Volunteer Tourism: Evidence of Cathartic Tourist Experiences 16 McAllum, Kirstie, and Anne Zahra. “The Positive Impact of Othering in Voluntourism: The Role of the Relational Other in Becoming Another Self.” Journal of International and Intercultural Communication , vol. 10, no. 4, 23 Jan. 2017, pp. 291–308. 17 McAllum, Kirstie, and Anne Zahra. “The Positive Impact of Othering in Voluntourism:” 18 Jafari, Jafar. “Research and Scholarship” 19 McGloin, Colleen, and Nichole Georgeou. “‘Looks Good on Your CV’: The Sociology of Voluntourism Recruitment in Higher Education.” Journal of Sociology, vol. 52, no. 2, 26 Jan. 2015, pp. 403–417. 20 McGloin, Colleen, and Nichole Georgeou. “‘Looks Good on Your CV’” USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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These processes normalize poverty in the Global South and promote the idea that any help is good, thereby allowing untrained people to perform services they are not qualified to do. This dichotomy is harmful for the community and its development, causing more damage than good. Many arguments against voluntourism also assert that voluntourism trips and programs foster onedimensional or superficial experiences for the benefit of the voluntourists by augmenting their image either personally or professionally. But we cannot blame those for wanting this; the industry advertises voluntourism as an act of civic service, an experience that translates into good character in the job market.21 Voluntourism is seen as socially impactful through a system the industry has self-created and the privatization of voluntourism companies have maintained this powerful system that feeds into our society’s economic institutions.22 This makes it difficult for voluntourists to understand the consequences of the respective country’s structural issues (political corruption, infrastructural challenges, etc.) that they are trying to help in the first place. LITERATURE REVIEW: ADAPTANCY The adaptancy platform was created in response to the previous issues in the advocacy and cautionary platforms. As Durham (2016) points out, “all adaptancy voluntourism literature should be understood as seeking adaptation to an already adapted model.”23 This confusing, standstill movement of voluntourism discourse shows that there has been very little recognition of voluntourism’s main purpose: to be a more ethical and sustainable solution compared to mass tourism.24 However, within the voluntourism sector, there has been an attempt to create more ethical and sustainable voluntourism trips. An example of this is Global Volunteers, a company that has consultative status with the UN and focuses on the community needs first. Interestingly, voluntourism is the result of adaptancy in response to the issues faced by mass tourism and the attempt to overcome them. Ultimately, this has failed. While there has been some promise to adapt voluntourism to higher ethical standards, the delivery has not been fulfilled. LITERATURE REVIEW: SCIENTIFIC Lastly, the scientific platform posits that a more holistic, interdisciplinary, and methodsoriented approach should be used in order to understand voluntourism.25 The previous three platforms are inherently biased; therefore, we cannot assume that one is exactly right or wrong.26 This has brought up the more recent debate in voluntourism literature: is voluntourism tourism or
21
McGloin, Colleen, and Nichole Georgeou. “‘Looks Good on Your CV’” Ibid. 23 Durham, Jacklyn supra 1 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 22
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international development? There is a major gap of unanswered questions for voluntourism; this will be discussed in more depth in the following section. LITERATURE REVIEW: LITERATURE GAPS One of the largest issues found in voluntourism literature is that it continues to be analyzed from a tourism perspective, which consequently prioritizes the needs and wants of voluntourists and not the voluntoured. While it is important and valuable to understand the sensemaking of a voluntourist, it is overdone and creating a one-dimensional dominating discourse. As the research has shown, a resulting stalemate of unclear definitions, concepts, and lacking perspectives exists. This has consequently inhibited the discourse to move forward. In order to move voluntourism discourse towards a more holistic and interdisciplinary approach, researchers must dismiss the tourism framework and the focus of the voluntourist by introducing other fields and disciplines into the discourse. We are now starting to see voluntourism being more integrated and accepted into the international development sphere, thus prompting the debate of whether voluntourism truly does belong within a tourism or international development framework. At the moment, voluntourism exists on an expanding continuum,27 where tourism and international development are stationed and generally understood separately at opposite ends. As Durham notes, these “two sectors are inherently at odds.”28 The intersection between both tourism and development that exists is so small because the two contradict in principles, purpose, and intent.29 Tourism is understood more as an economic goal; maximizing profit through experiences seems to be its top priority whereas international development focuses on closing gaps in poverty and increasingly sustainability. Because voluntourism is researched almost exclusively through a tourism lens, it is most associated as an act of tourism and not a form of international development. However, most agree that in explicit and implicit ways, voluntourism is part of the international development sphere, even though it is often only associated within tourism. A clear connection between the two has yet to be officially made. The growing influence of voluntourism within development can be seen in the United Nations’ (UN) implicit recognition of the industry’s actions and potentiality in the development sector. In 2016, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 70/129, recognizing the significance of “volunteering” in international development. The Resolution states, “volunteerism is an important component of any strategy aimed at such areas as poverty reduction, sustainable development, health, education, youth empowerment, climate change, disaster risk reduction,
27
Mcgehee, Nancy Gard. “Volunteer Tourism: Evolution, Issues and Futures.” Journal of Sustainable Tourism, vol. 22, no. 6, 2014, pp. 847–854., doi:10.1080/09669582.2014.907299. 28 Durham, Jacklyn supra 1, 4 29 Sharpley, Richard. The Myth of Sustainable Tourism. Centre for Sustainable Development, 2009, pp. 1–14, The Myth of Sustainable Tourism. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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social integration, social welfare, humanitarian action, peacebuilding and, in particular, overcoming social exclusion and discrimination.”30 The Resolution outlines the potential importance of “volunteer-involving organizations,” as a tool for achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.31 Governments are encouraged to incorporate volunteering into their policies.32 Even though it is not directly mentioned, voluntourism falls under “volunteer-involving organizations” doing all of the mentioned activities within the Resolution. This recognition has provided growth in the very small intersection of tourism and development that we currently have an understanding of. Some say voluntourism should have a role in development and some say it shouldn’t. Despite these opinions, voluntourism is already being integrated into international development, which is why we need to address these gaps in literature. The connection between the two must be made so the incorporation of other perspectives within international development can be integrated, and therefore voluntourism can grow. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTOURISM: WHAT IS A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE? Many researchers attempt to understand the world through a human rights perspective; these ideas are often found through various disciplines, including international development and tourism. In order to understand the implications of voluntourism, we must first familiarize ourselves with what human rights are. As a basic definition, the United Nations (UN) defines human rights as: “rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights without discrimination.”33 These ideas may seem a little abstract especially because the original human rights definition refers to the relationship between the individual and the state. However, the current reality of human rights discourse and its scope transcends large institutions and politics and has found a place in arguably every discipline, including voluntourism studies. Looking at this framework, we can translate how the presence of human rights within voluntourism discourse can offer a new perspective in programming. While there is an increasing amount of documentation regarding human rights violations on the voluntoured in the voluntourism industry,34 existing literature has only focused on the perspective of the voluntourist. This apparent gap offers an 30
United Nations, General Assembly, Integrating volunteering into peace and development: the plan of action for the next decade and beyond: report of the Third Committee, A/70/481 (17 December 2015), available from https://undocs.org/A/RES/70/129. 31 Durham, Jacklyn supra 1, 4 32 Ibid. 33 UN Practitioners' Portal on Human Rights Based Approaches to Programming. “About the Portal.” HRBA Portal, United Nations, hrbaportal.org/about-the-portal-2. 34 Durham, Jacklyn supra 1, 4, 5 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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opportunity to approach this issue in a new way. I call for furthering the use of a human rights perspective in the field, starting at academic research and through programming, operations and evaluation. A Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) is found at the core of humanitarian and environmental work.35 While the approach is not perfect, there is no denying its strength in incorporating all stakeholders and attempting to fulfill human rights. The approach focuses on three main concepts: application of international human rights, human rights principles, and accountability of all stakeholders.36 Geographer Dr. Rebecca Frilund (2018) is one of the very few scholars that attempts to reverse this paradigm in her fieldwork.37 Her approach to interview all of the stakeholders (local Tibetans, government officials, and volunteers) offers a positive step towards the future of voluntourism studies where it is not dominated by the voluntoured customer. HRBA’s successes come from case studies in public health and humanitarian aid. The similarities of these areas are not dissimilar to voluntourism; thus, it would be logical and beneficial for the industry to release the tourism framework and adopt one in development and human rights in order to make the space for human rights to be considered in programming. However, it is important to note that the scope of an HRBA is too large for this paper alone. Therefore, most of the analysis provided is of exploratory nature and should be understood as an introductory attempt to analyze voluntourism and human rights. A rights-based approach could drastically change the way the voluntourism industry operates, how help is given to the community, and how on-the-ground operations are accountable and do no harm. It is important to help catalyze this shift of voluntourism towards human rights, especially in the context of the refugee crisis because there are very vulnerable populations subjected to the consequences of voluntourists and voluntourism organizations. CONCLUSION: ROOM FOR FURTHER RESEARCH The need for a human rights perspective is most urgent for the operating voluntourist companies helping with the refugee crisis. Arguably one of the largest issues of our time, the refugee crisis has presented the world with millions of people without a home, living in poor conditions, and waiting for refuge in another country. As shown by the UN Resolution, voluntourism is being “called upon globally,”38 but has faced challenges in meeting these needs. Despite the vulnerable situations, voluntourism companies still persist. Because of this, there is a need to incorporate a human rights framework to voluntourism to ensure that all stakeholders, especially those in vulnerable situations are ensured their inalienable human rights.
35
Sharpley, Richard. The Myth of Sustainable Tourism. UN Practitioners' Portal on Human Rights Based Approaches to Programming. 37 Frilund, Rebecca. “Teasing the Boundaries of ‘Volunteer Tourism’: Local NGOs Looking for Global Workforce.” Current Issues in Tourism, vol. 21, no. 4, 11 Sept. 2015, pp. 355–368., www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13683500.2015.1080668?scroll=top&needAccess=true. 38 Durham, Jacklyn supra 1, 4, 5 36
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REFERENCES Durham, Jacklyn. “Protecting the Voluntoured. An Explanatory Human Rights Impact Assessment for Ethical Voluntourism in Nepal.” The University of Sydney, Global Campus Asia-Pacific, 2015, pp. 1–80. Frilund, Rebecca. “Teasing the Boundaries of ‘Volunteer Tourism’: Local NGOs Looking for Global Workforce.” Current Issues in Tourism, vol. 21, no. 4, 11 Sept. 2015, pp. 355–368., www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13683500.2015.1080668?scroll=top&needAccess=true. Jafari, Jafar. “Research and Scholarship: the Basis of Tourism Education.” The Journal of Tourism Studies, vol. 1, 1990, pp. 33–41. Keese, James R. “The Geography of Volunteer Tourism: Place Matters.” Tourism Geographies, vol. 13, no. 2, 8 June 2011, pp. 257–279., doi:10.1080/14616688.2011.567293. McAllum, Kirstie, and Anne Zahra. “The Positive Impact of Othering in Voluntourism: The Role of the Relational Other in Becoming Another Self.” Journal of International and Intercultural Communication , vol. 10, no. 4, 23 Jan. 2017, pp. 291–308. Mcgehee, Nancy Gard. “Volunteer Tourism: Evolution, Issues and Futures.” Journal of Sustainable Tourism, vol. 22, no. 6, 2014, pp. 847–854., doi:10.1080/09669582.2014.907299. McGloin, Colleen, and Nichole Georgeou. “‘Looks Good on Your CV’: The Sociology of Voluntourism Recruitment in Higher Education.” Journal of Sociology, vol. 52, no. 2, 26 Jan. 2015, pp. 403–417. Milne, S, et al. Voluntourism Best Practices: Promoting Inclusive Community-Based Sustainable Tourism Initiatives: Final Report. Asia Pacifc Economic Cooperation Secretariat, 2018, Voluntourism Best Practices: Promoting Inclusive Community-Based Sustainable Tourism Initiatives: Final Report. Sharpley, Richard. The Myth of Sustainable Tourism. Centre for Sustainable Development, 2009, pp. 1–14, The Myth of Sustainable Tourism. Smith, Peter, and Kevin Hannam. “International Volunteer Tourism as (De)Commodified Moral Consumption .” Moral Encounters In Tourism. Current Developments In the Geographies of Leisure and Tourism, edited by Mary Mostafanezhad, Routledge, 2014, pp. 31–46. Taplin, Jessica, et al. “Monitoring and Evaluating Volunteer Tourism: a Review and Analytical Framework.” Journal of Sustainable Tourism, vol. 22, no. 6, 16 Jan. 2014, pp. 874–897., doi:10.1080/09669582.2013.871022. UN Practitioners' Portal on Human Rights Based Approaches to Programming. “About the Portal.” HRBA Portal, United Nations, hrbaportal.org/about-the-portal-2. United Nations, General Assembly, Integrating volunteering into peace and development: the plan of action for the next decade and beyond: report of the Third Committee, A/70/481 (17 December 2015), available from https://undocs.org/A/RES/70/129. Wearing, Stephen, and Nancy Gard McGhee. “Volunteer Tourism: A Review.” Tourism Management, vol. 38, 9 Apr. 2013, pp. 120–130. Wearing, Stephen. Volunteer Tourism: Experiences That Make a Difference. CABI, 2001. Zahra, Anne, and Alison J. Mcintosh. “Volunteer Tourism: Evidence of Cathartic Tourist Experiences.” Tourism Recreation Research, vol. 32, no. 1, 2007, pp. 115–119., doi:10.1080/02508281.2007.11081530.
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REFLECTION The themes discussed in this paper are based on a personal experience of mine in Lesvos, Greece. I enrolled in a civil engineering class that had the intention of conducting user research in two refugee camps in Lesvos and then creating a “life changing product” that would “save the lives of millions around the world.” However, it was not the experience I expected. Between the two camps, we, a group of untrained university students, handed out food to refugee families and unaccompanied minors, interviewed survivors of war, abuse, or other extreme circumstances, and painted murals on their temporary homes. For me, our actions reflected voluntourism (volunteer tourism), something I associated a negative connotation with due to its potentially exploitative consequences. Despite my open skepticism towards the nature of the trip, many of my peers were convinced that we made a meaningful impact in these people’s lives. In order to process the entirety of the trip, I have funneled my thoughts through the perspectives of various scholars in the field and hope to provide insight into the increasingly controversial field. Because of my personal attachment to the topic, this paper was not easy for me to write. I mostly relied on my passion to write it, meaning that my methods were not structured; I often wrote sporadically and out of order. I found it difficult to incorporate human rights since it’s not necessarily a thing that can just be applied; it takes adaptation and different approaches to the respective obstacles in the field. It was also difficult to explain what voluntourism was (especially in the Introduction and background sections) and then try to justify through the implicit biases of many academics. At some point I realized I could read a million papers and still not have a definite answer. Before officially writing my paper, I consulted one of my previous professors (Dr. Sofia Gruskin) who gave me insight on how I should focus my paper and how human rights could be incorporated. Overall, this was a valuable experience, and I hope to see the field move forward in the future. Next Steps: This paper just scratches the surface of research that should be explored and further developed. In the future, there should be an official guide or regulations that govern the field, especially since it is part of international development. That would require extensive research like interviewing all stakeholders (local communities, local governments, businesses, etc.) and the creation of an actual human rights framework that voluntourism companies can follow. To my understanding, there is no research study that attempts to do this in the voluntourism sector. If I continue this research, it would be a long undertaking, but I would want to start interviewing people who work at voluntourism companies to explore intentions and impacts.
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SAMA SHAH
Unraveling Iraq: The Effects of the 1990–2003 UN Sanctions Regime on the Hussein Government and Iraqi Civilians USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry May 2019
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INTRODUCTION In 1996, Sabir Salah scraps together enough money to feed his family by defusing Valmara in Iraqi Kurdistan.1 He used to be a farmer, but because he could no longer afford a tractor, he has turned to dismantling mines, unscrewing the tops with a wire in order to collect the aluminum around the explosives, and working until he collects enough to sell at a nearby shop, which allows him to feed his family of eight for the night.2 Recently, Salah has been bringing his children to the fields so they, too, can earn money for the family.3 Another local, Abdullah Ahmad, who works for the British-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG), states “You can divide people in Penjwin into those who make their money from dismantling mines and selling the aluminum and those who don’t.”4 This profession has cost over 2,000 Iraqi Kurds their lives, yet it is a job many have been forced to undertake in order to feed their families under the UN Security Council-imposed sanctions regime on Iraq from 1990 to 2003.5 Notably, it was not only those in Iraq’s isolated rural communities who suffered as a result of the sanctions, but also residents of her major cities. Before the imposition of sanctions, journalist Patrick Cockburn estimates that about one third of garbage in Baghdad consisted of food scraps.6 The most critical health issue facing Iraqi children was obesity.7 By 1998, Cockburn reports that those scraps had disappeared and an estimated 58% of Iraqi children under five were malnourished.8 And it is not simply Iraqis’ access to food that witnessed a staggering decline. Before the sanctions, 93% of children in urban areas attended elementary school; afterwards, attendance rates dropped significantly, so that less than 75% of children were enrolled.9 Just fifteen years prior to the imposition of sanctions, Iraqi citizens enjoyed a standard of living comparable to that of their counterparts in Greece.10 Yet, thirteen years under sanctions was enough to bring the nation toward near-collapse, disrupting Iraqi society in ways it has yet to recover from. As the aforementioned statistics demonstrate, and as I will continue to demonstrate throughout this paper, the imposition of sanctions divided contemporary Iraqi history so that out of one nation there arose two distinct time periods: pre- and post-sanctions. And despite the fact that, since independence, Iraq has been plagued by a number of coups and a series of authoritarian leaders, I argue that it is not solely the fault of Iraqi leadership for the current state of the country; rather, a number of factors coalesced to create the devastating images coming out of Iraq today. To better understand the severity of the issues facing Iraq as it rebuilds today, I argue that we must 1
Cockburn, location 671 Ibid, location 671-677 3 Ibid, location 695 4 Ibid, location 682 5 Ibid, location 682 6 Ibid, location 656-662 7 Ibid, location 728-733 8 Ibid, location 662-733 9 Gottstein 10 10 Cockburn, location 272 2
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first understand the impact of the sanctions, for their imposition marked the beginning of Iraq’s journey toward institutional collapse, economic strife, and extremism. However, before I deconstruct the effects of, and what I understand as the ethical concerns behind the imposition of, sanctions, I will begin with a description of what comprehensive economic sanctions entail and why they were imposed on Iraq in the first place. While never explicitly using the term “sanction,” the Charter of the United Nations states, in Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.11
Thus, despite the fact that the term sanction does not officially appear in the Charter, moving forward, when I speak of “economic sanctions,” I am referring to this “complete or partial interruption of economic relations,” which is also what governments, other international organizations, and the UN itself, outside of the wording of the Charter, understand economic sanctions to mean.12 Granted the power to call for the severance of economic ties with foreign nations and non-state actors, since 1966 the UN Security Council has established 30 sanctions regimes, meaning that the Security Council imposed sanctions on 30 states and non-state actors, 14 of which are still in effect.13 The UN describes sanctions as “tak[ing] a number of different forms,” including “comprehensive economic and trade sanctions to more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and financial or commodity restrictions,” with the following aims: “support peaceful transitions, deter non-constitutional changes, constrain terrorism, protect human rights and promote non-proliferation.”14 Moreover, unlike sanctions imposed by individual nations on another nation, economic sanctions based on Chapter VII must be implemented by all members of the United Nations, given that Article 25 of the UN Charter requires member nations follow UN Security Council decisions.15 In the case of Iraq, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions as punishment for Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait after the former president accused Kuwait of slant drilling in order to gain access to Iraq’s oil wells. Invoking Chapter VII, the Security Council imposed arguably the most comprehensive, restrictive economic sanctions that had ever been imposed on a nation on Iraq, despite ethical concerns raised by international organizations and UN employees.16 Nonetheless, these sanctions endured for years, with estimates of the death toll ranging from hundreds of thousands to up to two million Iraqi deaths.17
11
UN Charter art. 41 Ibid 13 “Sanctions” 14 Ibid 15 UN Charter art. 25 16 Cockburn; Crossette; MacAskill 17 Shah; Simons xiii 12
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Ultimately, what I will argue in this paper is that economic sanctions on Iraq as punishment for Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait failed at enforcing international law, leading to the starvation of innocent Iraqis while the Hussein government clung to power, thus illustrating the difficulties of imposing sanctions that punish the violators of international laws rather than average citizens. The failure of the sanctions regime to correct Hussein’s abuse of his people and disregard for international law then brings me to my larger question: are comprehensive economic sanctions, as opposed to partial restrictions on trade such as arms embargoes or the prevention of certain financial transactions, ethical? To conclude this paper, I will suggest alternatives to inflicting comprehensive economic sanctions on a nation, emphasizing approaches that uphold the dignity and human rights of the people whose land the offending government occupies. 1990–2003 UN SANCTIONS REGIME Having articulated the direction of the paper, I will now provide a more in-depth look into the series of events that prompted the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions and their specific implications for Iraq. On September 22, 1980, just after the Iranian Revolution and after multiple border disputes between Iraq and Iran, Hussein directed the Iraqi army to invade Iran, seizing the oil-rich province of Khuzestan. Backed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as by the US Central Intelligence Agency, the Iraqi army used chemical weapons against Iranian troops and civilians, and committed similar atrocities against Iraqi Kurds.18 Overall, neither side came out of the war victorious, mostly due to both sides’ use of trench warfare and blockades, and both suffered great civilian and financial losses. Post-war, unable to pay the more than $14 billion it had accumulated in debt to Kuwait, Hussein accused Kuwait of robbing Iraqi petroleum through slant drilling, the process of drilling non-vertical wells in order to reach oil and gas. Essentially, Hussein accused Kuwait of drilling wells at an angle in order to reach oil within Iraq’s territory. Notably, Hussein had long viewed Kuwait as a natural part of Iraq, parted from the rest of the country due to Britain’s and France’s self-interested carving up of the Middle East. In addition, Kuwait possessed vast oil reserves that would have greatly enriched Iraq if Hussein had the ability to occupy the small Gulf state. Thus, on August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In response, the UN Security Council gave Iraq several opportunities to retreat; however, when Hussein refused to end his military occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq and the US, Britain, and France intervened, liberating Kuwait in under onehundred days. As these military events were unfolding on the ground, the UN Security Council was taking diplomatic action from its headquarters. On August 2, 1990, the same day Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Council, citing Articles 39 and 40 of the UN Charter, issued Resolution 660, which:
18
Harris and Aid USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990; 3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States; 4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolutions.19
When Iraq failed to meet the demands laid out in Resolution 660, the Security Council adopted Resolution 661, imposing comprehensive economic sanctions as punishment for the Iraqi government’s behavior and establishing a committee dedicated to evaluating Iraq’s progress in implementing the Council’s demands.20 Per the Resolution, imports from and exports to Iraq and Kuwait were banned, funds were barred from being transferred to both countries, and affected bank accounts were frozen.21 The only exceptions made were for “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs” as well as “payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.”22 Subsequent resolutions, such as Resolution 670, which affirmed that Resolution 660 applied to all types of transport, including aircrafts, clarified the details of the sanctions and their limits and set guidelines for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, as well as took into consideration the requests for aid from countries that experienced difficulties arising from the sanctions regime.23 However, due to Iraq’s open defiance of the various resolutions through its continued occupation of Kuwait, the Council adopted Resolution 678, which allowed Iraq “one final opportunity, as a pause of good will, to [comply fully with Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions],” also stipulating that, if Iraq continued to defy the rules laid out by the Council, the member states working with Kuwait were permitted “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the resolutions” and “to restore peace and security in the area.”24 The Council gave Iraq until January 15, 1991 to fully cooperate and implement the various pertinent resolutions, yet Hussein let the deadline pass without retreating from Kuwait, and the US-led Gulf Coalition subsequently attacked Iraq. With Kuwait liberated in less than one-hundred days, the Security Council brought a fragile end to the conflict by pressuring Iraq to accept Resolution 686. This Resolution commanded Iraq to end all hostile acts toward Member States; halt its territorial ambitions in Kuwait; accept liability for any losses, damages, or injuries in Kuwait and return seized property to Kuwait; immediately release detainees and prisoners; and identify any mines, booby traps, and other explosives, in addition to any chemical or biological weapons, used in Kuwait.25 The following resolution,
19
S/RES/1990/660 S/RES/1990/661 21 Ibid 22 Ibid 23 S/RES/1990/670 24 S/RES/1990/678 25 S/RES/1991/686 20
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Resolution 687, set forth a formal ceasefire on April 3, 1991.26 However, the sanctions regime was kept in place for another twelve years to pressure Iraq to fulfill the obligations outlined in Resolution 686. For the sanctions to be lifted, the Iraqi government had to comply with these regulations, which were some of the most stringent conditions imposed on a sanctioned nation, leading to an increase in rates of malnutrition and infant mortality, and the resignation of several UN officials in protest, one of whom—UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq Denis Halliday— labeled the sanctions regime as “genocide.”27 It is Halliday’s criticism of the sanctions regime, rooted in his experience living in Baghdad and coordinating the Oil-for-Food program, which I plan to explore in this next section. After a 30-year long career with the United Nations, Halliday resigned from his position due to his concern that he was complicit in a “genocidal” sanctions regime that was murdering the “innocent of Iraq.”28 In his 2003 Gandhi International Peace Award acceptance speech, which he received for his work in raising awareness about the suffering of Iraqis under sanctions, he countered criticisms lobbied against him by those who believe the Hussein regime was solely responsible for Iraq’s decline, presenting a more nuanced argument: Some will tell you that the leadership is punishing the Iraqi people. That is not my perception, or experience from living in Baghdad. And were that to be the case—how can that possibly justify further punishment, in fact collective punishment, by the United Nations? I don’t think so. And international law has no provision for the disproportionate and murderous consequences of the ongoing UN embargo—or well over 12 long years.29
In The Impact of the UN Sanctions on the People of Iraq, Halliday further explains his opposition to the sanctions, stating that their effects have been “counterproductive:” If indeed it is the will of the international community ultimately to establish and develop mutually beneficial political, economic, and social interaction among all member states, and in this particular case with Iraq, and to promote the kind of governance the UN Charter seeks, then the imposition of the most comprehensive sanctions regime the world has ever known is counterproductive. Whereas the original intention of the economic sanctions was to influence the leadership of Iraq, the result has been and continues to be otherwise, with appalling costs paid by the Iraqi civilian population, including infants and children in no way involved in the decision making that led to the invasion of Kuwait and the deliberately comprehensive destruction brought about by the retaliation of the Gulf War coalition forces.30
Ultimately, Halliday’s argument is as follows: “The human cost and human rights violations that the sanctions have introduced… are tragically incompatible with the spirit and word of the United Nations Charter, the UN Convention on Human Rights, and the UN Convention on 26
S/RES/1991/687 Siegal 28 “2003 Peace Award: Denis Halliday” 29 Ibid 30 Halliday 30 27
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the Rights of the Child.”31 Inspired by Halliday’s arguments, I will explore international conventions—specifically the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—not necessarily to make legal arguments, but rather to understand the sanctions regime as running counter to the principles that these conventions were founded on. The Geneva Conventions, negotiated in the aftermath of WWII, are a set of rules designed to uphold the rights of those not or no longer participating in armed conflict. And while I do recognize that the period which I am discussing is not classified as wartime or a period of armed conflict between Iraq and the other member states of the UN, I do find it important to analyze the spirit of the Conventions from an ethical standpoint. This is to say, that, while I am not making a legal case against the imposition of sanctions based on the Geneva Conventions or the Convention on the Rights of the Child, I do hope to explore the fundamental principles that the Conventions enshrine and the ways in which those principles have been neglected during peacetime. Enshrined in Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 is the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare against civilians.32 This prohibition stems from the belief that civilians, who are not representatives of their governments nor responsible for the actions of their governments, maintain the right to access food as a matter of survival. Furthermore, Article 54 also bans the destruction or removal of objects necessary to civilian survival, “such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”33 Despite this prohibition, items such as baby food, rice, and water purification chemicals were all banned by the UN Sanctions Committee from entering Iraq.34 Malnutrition rates among children under five were estimated to be anywhere between 30 and 58 percent even under the Oil-for-Food program, which did not generate enough funds for Iraq to be able to import meat or dairy products.35 From Baghdad, Cockburn recounts this statement from Dr. Nada al-Ward, a public health specialist at the World Health Organization, on the impacts of starvation on Iraqi infants: In 1989– 90 the number of babies in Iraq who died before they were 12 months old was 36.5 out of 1,000. Currently the figure has more than tripled to 120 out of 1,000.36 In fact, increasing death rates among infants and children pushed 70 members of US Congress, Democrat and Republican in 1999 to urge then president Bill Clinton to lift the sanctions on Iraq, calling the sanctions regime “infanticide masquerading as policy” while also acknowledging that the “embargo has not hurt Saddam Hussein or the pampered elite which supports him, but has been devastating for millions of Iraqi people.”37 Ultimately, the medical catastrophe resulting from Iraqis’ limited access to food and clean drinking water should also call our attention to a principle outlined in Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention—the right to 31
Ibid 37 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I art. 54 33 Ibid 34 Simons 118 35 Cockburn, locations 728-734; Halliday 31 36 Cockburn, locations 715-717 37 “US congressmen criticise Iraqi sanctions” 32
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humanitarian assistance. According to Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, nations are obligated to facilitate the free distribution of the following relief items in times of international armed conflict: Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity case.38
Furthermore, Article 70 of Additional Protocol I affirms that all members of the civilian population have the right to receive relief goods necessary for survival.39 Despite this, among the items vetoed by the UN Security Council for entry into Iraq prior to the Oil-for-Food program are: children’s clothes, leather material for shoes, thread for clothes, shoe laces, soap, sanitary towels, medical swabs, medical gauze, medical syringes, medical journals, cobalt sources for X-ray machines, Xray film, X-ray equipment, catheters for babies, nasogastric tubes, Nitrous Oxide for women in labor, medication for epilepsy, intravenous drips, disposable surgical gloves, bandages, oxygen tents, surgical instruments, stethoscopes, dialysis equipment, and ambulances, among other supplies needed in hospitals and homes.40 Ultimately, if, even in wartime, medical supplies and clothing for children are to be allowed entry into a nation, then the question of why Iraqis were denied access to these supplies even after the Iraqi military retreated from Kuwait becomes one worth interrogating. Quoting an Iraqi doctor, Cockburn notes that, after being denied access to critical medical supplies, diseases that had once been nearly eradicated in Iraq made a comeback during the 1990s: We now often find children with thickening of the wrist, which means rickets or calcium deficiency, things we used to know about only from textbooks.41 Lastly, I want to note that I focus extensively on the suffering of children under the sanctions regime as all UN member states, except for the US, note in Articles 6 and 24 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that “every child has the inherent right to life” and “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.”42 These are both provisions which, as evidenced by the ban on children’s clothes, catheters for infants, and various medications, among other items, as well as the heightened rates of malnutrition and infant mortality, were not upheld during the years between 1990 and 2003. Again, I want to note that I am not making a legal case based on what I perceive as violations of the Geneva Conventions or the Convention on the Rights of the Child; rather, I assert that the sanctions regime violates the ethical principles behind the creation of such
38
Fourth Geneva Convention art. 23 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I art. 70 40 Simons 118 41 Cockburn, locations 713-715 42 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 6 and 24 39
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conventions, and that that violation alone necessitates greater interrogation of the use of such stringent measures. The aforementioned statistics, anecdotes, and criticism paint a picture of an impoverished, suffering people; however, there was one Iraqi that managed to survive effects of sanctions— Saddam Hussein. Lest anyone think Hussein stood by his people during more than a decade of strife, they can turn to his continued construction of presidential palaces and statues in honor of himself to prove otherwise.43 A 1999 U.S. State Department study estimated that Hussein had spent at least $2 billion building nearly 50 palaces since the 1991 Gulf War.44 In fact, when journalist Colin Freeman visited Baghdad in 2003, he found himself perplexed at the fact that Iraqis pointed him in all sorts of contradicting directions when asked “Where is Saddam’s palace?”45 Recalling his experiences, he writes: Did I mean the Presidential Palace downtown, with its four giant cast-iron heads of Saddam Hussein? Did I mean the Domes Palace next door, with its oval swimming pool, waterside bar and king-size bedrooms decorated with erotic Arab art, thought to have been used as a Barry Whitestyle love nest by the psychotic, sexually predatory Uday? Or could I be looking for the ‘Victory over America Palace’ out in west Baghdad, a place tailor-made for the phrase ‘monument to hubris,’ commissioned in anticipation of a US defeat but wrecked by US bombers before it was even halfcompleted?46
If the sanctions were imposed in order to punish Hussein for his breaching of international law, then they failed in that respect, for Hussein continued to flaunt his power. But the construction of palaces while his people starved was not the worst of his response. Arguably more devastating was Hussein’s game of playing along with the sanctions, making their effects more pronounced for innocent Iraqis than they had to be. Hussein and the Ba’ath Party were notoriously corrupt. Under the Oil-for-Food program, which allowed Iraq to sell some of its oil in the world market in exchange for food, medicine, and other humanitarian necessities, the Iraqi government was allowed to select the foreign companies with which it wanted to engage in business.47 However, even this program, set up to ease the burdens of the Iraqi people, was manipulated by Hussein, who used this provision to set up a well-orchestrated system of kickback schemes in which a contract would be signed at far more than the cost of fulfilling it, with the difference deposited secretly by the selected contractors in Iraqi government-controlled accounts all over the world.48 Hussein and elite members of the Ba’ath party got rich off the sanctions, and many other Arab businessmen got their share of the wealth, too, all at the expense of the Iraqi people.49 In addition to generating profits, Hussein was also able to utilize the Oil-for-Food program to garner 43
Freeman Ibid 45 Ibid 46 Ibid 47 Rieff 48 Ibid 49 Ibid 44
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greater support for his regime and party, both within Iraq and around the Arab world.50 Many Iraqis, desperately in need of food, viewed the food rationing program Hussein set up under the Oil-for-Food program in a positive light, thus increasing support for his party and heightening antiWest sentiment, as illustrated in this statement from a former officer in the Iraqi Army: ‘Saddam could do many things to the people,’ a former Iraqi Army officer named Raed Mohammed told me, ‘but while he could kill them, he could not afford to starve them. So yes, he made sure the Ministry of Trade organized things correctly. As a result, the rationing was popular. It helped the regime maintain its legitimacy. Most people thought, ‘Saddam is feeding us while the Americans are trying to starve us to death.’51
In addition to manipulating Iraqis into supporting his regime, Hussein would also go to great lengths to launch a propaganda war against the West, using images and films of the horrors the sanctions wrought on Iraqi civilians to turn mainstream opinion in the West in favor of lifting the sanctions.52 As one Iraqi doctor explained, Hussein would instruct hospital staff to, whenever a child died, keep the corpse in the morgue rather than [bury] it immediately as mandated by Islamic custom. ‘When a sufficient number of bodies accumulated,’ [the doctor] explained, ‘the authorities would stage a mass funeral, railing against the sanctions.’53 In addition to holding these mass funerals, the Iraqi government would also withhold medical supplies from hospitals, waiting until medications were near or past expired before administering new supplies, and then accuse the UN of extreme callousness and brutality against Iraqis, successfully playing the propaganda game at the expense of innocents.54 Overall, as illustrated in these examples, the imposition of sanctions did not alter Hussein’s behavior for the better; instead, it heightened the suffering of Iraqis to a devastating degree, ultimately punishing civilians for the actions of their leader. Yet, one argument in favor of economic sanctions is the notion that just because they failed to achieve the desired effect in the case of Iraq does not mean that the international community can write them off altogether as a means of enforcing international law. However, we see even in present day sanctions regimes the unjust suffering of civilian populations. In North Korea, for example, as recently as this past January 2018, UNICEF reported that an estimated 60,000 children face starvation if international sanctions, which are slowing aid deliveries, are not reconsidered.55 The combination of brutal dictatorship and the severance of trade relations proves most devastating, ultimately, for the citizens of the rogue state, not elites who are able to retain their political dominance. And while some may cite Iraq as an isolated mistake, I argue it must be understood as an example of how dangerous comprehensive economic sanctions can be in terms 50
Halliday 37 Rieff 52 Ibid 53 Ibid 54 Ibid 55 Nebehay 51
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of their human toll, and ultimately question the notion that only after a certain threshold should human suffering be prioritized; rather, the international community should come together to ensure that the minimization and ultimate alleviation of human suffering is central to foreign policy. CONCLUSION At this point, the question of what other methods states can turn to when they feel compelled to take action against a brutal dictator must be addressed. A variety of ideas initially come to mind, none too appealing. For one, other nations and the UN can simply do nothing. But while this may prevent loss of life due to war or intervention by other means, it sends a message to criminals that they can commit crimes and the international community will simply look away. Another option is declaring war. Yet, if the main ethical concern with sanctions is the loss of life that results from their imposition, then war is no better. There is, then, the option of instigating regime change and setting up free and fair elections. However, this method will, rightfully, earn the backlash of those concerned about Western imperialism and international policing without the support of local populations. Moreover, what if the next leader is worse than the one who came before? Do we then continue to replace dictators until we find one to our liking? With all this in mind, what is the just alternative to economic sanctions? Ultimately, the Iraq case demonstrates that punishing civilians in order to pressure their leader to comply with international law proves futile. Hussein was not toppled until the US invaded, and in present day countries currently suffering under sanctions, rulers generally still remain in the positions of power they held before the sanctions (ex. North Korea, Iran, Venezuela). Yet, in every case, there exists suffering of varying levels of severity being imposed on an innocent population as punishment for the actions of heads of state. Harming the civilian population through starvation, through denying them medical supplies, through stagnating their economy, strips whatever moral argument compelled the imposition of sanctions in the first place. Ultimately, the international community has had enough experience imposing sanctions while other methods have gone unexplored. For one, what of the International Criminal Court (ICC)? This international tribunal has the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes when national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute criminals. Cases can be referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council or by individual states. And while the ICC began functioning on July 1, 2002, a little too late to prosecute Hussein given the impending US invasion, it should be utilized more, for it was expensive and difficult to create and has publicly indicted so few criminals out of the many leaders and government officials who have, since 2002, committed the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. And while forcing a leader (and, in the case of the ICC, African leaders) to stand trial for his crimes leads to cries of imperialism, it must be noted that political and economic imperialism should be opposed because of the oppressive violence it institutes—such as that violence visited on hundreds of thousands of Iraqi victims of economic sanctions for thirteen years—not for the marginal good it might occasionally do. This is a means worth exploring, and
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one that would result in less civilian death than sanctions, punishing the dictator for his actions, not the civilian population. Subsequent elections would have to be monitored by representatives from the international community or peacekeepers from the United Nations. Fundamentally, however, I believe that there are more humane alternatives to sanctions worth exploring. There exists the option of engaging in further diplomatic exchange, rewarding leaders when they do comply with international law rather than punishing whole states when they do not, and supporting human rights focused advocacy and civil society organizations working to create political and social change within their countries. Ultimately, it is time the United Nations and individual states look toward other methods of enforcing international law, ones that, through their imposition, do not violate the dignity and human rights of the populations they aim to protect.
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REFERENCES “2003 Peace Award: Denis Halliday.” The Gandhi Foundation, 14 Nov. 2008, gandhifoundation.org/2003/01/30/2003-peace-award-denis-halliday-2/. Cockburn, Patrick. The Age of Jihad: Islamic State and the Great War for the Middle East. Kindle ed. Verso, 2017. Cockburn, Patrick. “UN Aid Chief Resigns over Iraq Sanctions.” The Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, 1 Oct. 1998, www.independent.co.uk/news/un-aid-chief-resigns-over-iraq-sanctions-1175447.html. Crossette, Barbara. “Iraq Sanctions Kill Children, U.N. Reports.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 1 Dec. 1995, www.nytimes.com/1995/12/01/world/iraq-sanctions-kill-children-un-reports.html. Freeman, Colin. “Saddam Hussein's Palaces.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media Group, 16 July 2009, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/5824615/Saddam-Husseins-palaces.html. Gottstein, Ullrich. “The Effects of Sanctions on the Civilian Community of Iraq.” Medical Association for Prevention of War, 1998, www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/Gottstein%20%20The%20Effects%20of%20Sanctions%20on%20the%20Civilian%20Community%20of%20Iraq.pdf. Halliday, Denis J. “The Impact of the UN Sanctions on the People of Iraq.” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 1999, pp. 29–37., doi:10.1525/jps.1999.28.2.00p02087. Harris, Shane, and Matthew M. Aid. “Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 26 Aug. 2013, foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-proveamerica-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. MacAskill, Ewen. “Second Official Quits UN Iraq Team.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 15 Feb. 2000, www.theguardian.com/world/2000/feb/16/iraq.unitednations. Nebehay, Stephanie. “60,000 North Korean Children May Starve, Sanctions Slow Aid – UNICEF.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 30 Jan. 2018, uk.reuters.com/article/uk-northkorea-missiles-unchildren/60000-north-korean-children-may-starve-sanctions-slow-aid-unicef-idUKKBN1FJ1F7. Security Council resolution 1990/660, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/1990/660 (2 August 1990), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/11/IMG/NR057511.pdf?OpenElement Security Council resolution 1990/661, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/1990/661 (6 August 1990), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/11/IMG/NR057511.pdf?OpenElement Security Council resolution 1990/670, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/1990/670 (25 September 1990), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/20/IMG/NR057520.pdf?OpenElement Security Council resolution 1990/678, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/1990/678 (29 November 1990), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement Security Council resolution 1991/686, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/1991/686 (2 March 1991), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/22/IMG/NR059622.pdf?OpenElement Security Council resolution 1991/687, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/1991/687 (3 April 1991), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/23/IMG/NR059623.pdf?OpenElement
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Rieff, David. “Were Sanctions Right?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 27 July 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/were-sanctions-right.html. “Sanctions.” United Nations Security Council, United Nations, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information. Shah, Anup. “Effects of Iraq Sanctions.” Global Issues, 2 Oct. 2005, www.globalissues.org/article/105/effects-ofsanctions. Siegal, Mark. “Former UN Official Says Sanctions against Iraq Amount to 'Genocide'.” Cornell Chronicle, 1 Oct. 1999, news.cornell.edu/stories/1999/09/former-un-official-says-sanctions-against-iraq-amount-genocide. Simons, G. L. The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice. 2nd ed., St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1998. U.N. Charter, art. 25, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html U.N. Charter art. 41, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/ Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx “US Congressmen Criticise Iraqi Sanctions.” BBC News, BBC, 17 Feb. 2000, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/646783.stm.
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REFLECTION I was drawn to the topic of Iraq under the 1990–2003 sanctions regime because it lay at the intersection of my two fields of study: Political Science and the Middle East. I had taken a course previously about humanitarian intervention in the event of conflict, and began grappling with the recurring issue of what the international community should do when it wants to punish a leader for violating international law but does not want to cause harm to the offending nation’s civilian population. The case of Iraq drew my interest both because I was familiar with the political landscape of the country due to my coursework in the Middle East Studies department and because it has been cited often as an example of the devastating effects comprehensive economic sanctions can have on a nation. Ultimately, through the journey of conducting research for and writing this paper, I learned a great deal about the process through which the UN Security Council outlines and imposes the terms of sanctions, the ways in which sanctions contribute to institutional decline, and authoritarian resilience in the face of international condemnation and punishment. I was also able to discuss my paper with Prof. Douglas Becker of USC’s School of International Relations. Together we explored the larger question of whether the effects of sanctions match the purposes they were implemented to achieve, and, if they do not, what alternatives exist. Overall, this question of alternatives is one I was only able to explore briefly in my current paper; however, it remains a question I hope to pursue further in order to find avenues through which international bodies can correct the actions of autocrats while simultaneously upholding the dignity and human rights of the people living under oppressive conditions.
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EMILY WULF
God Dam It: International Responses to Water Weaponization during the Iraqi Civil War USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry May 2019
ABSTRACT: Vagueness in international agreements regarding water in armed conflict has left states unsure of how or if to involve themselves. Environmental emergencies—the current term that has circulated in international documents that interpret natural disasters, climate change, water weaponization, etc.—must be broken down into two categories: environmental emergencies that occur naturally versus the direct use of environmental emergencies as a mechanism for war. This separation is imperative because there is an increased militarization of water infrastructure, displayed through the Islamic State’s military strategies utilizing dams, yet no precise design on how to address mass dangers to civilians that are not directly inflicted by a human or weapon. The latter concept should be explicitly included in an international agreement such as the Responsibility to Protect doctrine that delineates appropriate prevention and intervention requisites.
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I. INTRODUCTION Ever since the Tigris and Euphrates carved the earth, the rivers have served as an enduring, plenteous resource at the foundation of every civilization that has existed within its watershed. The prosperity of ancient Babylon was entirely reliant upon the unwavering support of the rivers, reflective with its alternate label of the “land between two rivers.” This dependency is not only what sustained and preserved Babylon, but what allowed for the end of its empire. Herodotus’ Histories recounts Cyrus the Great, a Persian King, recognizing this reliance and altering his military strategy to target the Euphrates river instead of the protective walls enclosing Babylon. In 539 BCE, Cyrus used a man-made canal to divert the water of the Euphrates into the artificial lake of Nicrotis, where the water sunk to only be as deep as “midway up a man's thigh,” enabling his men were to walk through the city gates where water once flowed and seize the city. This was among the first documented cases of manipulated water resources used strategically in military operations, but certainly not the last. Some 2500 years later, there is a rebirth of the weaponization of the Euphrates, as we see a new rendition of this narrative from antiquity. In June 2015, the terrorist group of Sunni Islamic extremists, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), seized the Ramadi barrage, which was not the first water structure, nor the last, to be strategically targeted by ISIL. Here, they closed the gates of the dam to withhold the water of the Euphrates, effectively cutting off water supplies to the pro-government forces downstream. With the river drained and riverbed exposed, ISIL militants were able to cross it and reach parts of Baghdad otherwise impenetrable because of progovernment forces. And just as Cyrus seized a whole civilization, ISIL gained control of most of modern day Iraq, leaving millions with food and water shortages. What disrupts the parallels in these stories are that the actions and reactions in each scenario are inverted. The city of Babylon was oblivious to the diversion schemes occurring beyond their city walls, for “had the Babylonians been apprised of what Cyrus was about, or had they noticed their danger, … they would have made fast all the street gates which gave access to the river.”1 Modern day Iraq and the international community do not have the same explanation for their lack of reaction. The world was aware of the vulnerability of Iraq’s water infrastructure to terror attacks. It knew that IS could use dams on the Euphrates as a strategic weapon. Though ISIL had executed similar operations in water weaponization in Syria three years prior, the world remained on the periphery and watched as ISIL seized and manipulated four major dams in Iraq—only most of these, especially the Mosul dam, were so structurally unsafe, that they were obligated into repairing them only after serious concerns over a catastrophic collapse arose. The incidents surrounding the Mosul dam in 2014 brought attention to the overlooked significance of water manipulation in war. It is for this reason that intentional uses of water as a weapon, and all other forms of environmental weaponization, should be within the scope of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Seeing as water weaponization is only becoming more frequent, this would recognize these situations 1
Herodotus. Herodotus : The Histories. London, Eng. ; New York :Penguin Books, 1996. Print.
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deserving of prevention efforts, and provide clarity on appropriate actions to be taken, which does not yet exist in international legal literature. II. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT The international community has a record of nonintervention in civil conflicts that explains why foreign actors did not stop the occupation of the Mosul dam by ISIL. In addition, the international community perceived that ISIL’s control of the dam was a lesser threat to human rights than direct armed conflict. Yet, in reality the opposite could be true. With control of the dam, ISIL could control Mosul’s freshwater supply and manipulate deadly floods. The additional mask of a dam becoming an environmental weapon being merely a possibility—whether probable or not—makes it much easier to disregard when ISIL is certainly committing any and all other human rights violations. These degrees of separation from its potential damage have led to a convoluted understanding of how the international community intends to respond to cases like these. Before analyzing the international community’s involvement in the weaponization of water infrastructure, it is important to introduce the existing documents that, more or less, outline the course of action they agreed they would take under such risks to the civilian population. Canada pioneered the discussion on intervention with the formation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, transforming the outdated ideology of the “right to intervene” to the “responsibility to protect.” In short, this outlines the idea that if a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, the responsibility shifts onto the international community. In 2005, the concepts of the 2001 Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine were incorporated into a UN outcome document. However, the scope of the doctrine was much narrower than the ICISS had intended; nearly unanimously, all 150 member states agreed to protect populations of other states from “war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”2 As of today, the 2005 Responsibility to Protect doctrine is one of the few documents that explicitly states circumstances in which foreign intervention is not only justified, but encouraged. The destruction and manipulation of water infrastructure can be defined as a war crime using preexisting international documents agreed upon by all UN member states, the Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 49: “Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as… drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.3 2
ICISS (2001). The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre. 3 Water and War: ICRC Response. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2009, Water and War: ICRC Response, www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0969.pdf.
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Dams are at the core of “drinking water installations” and “irrigation works,” and though ISIL may not have intentionally destroyed the dams, they certainly did attack them. Despite this application, it was clear that in 2005 the authors of the RtoP had curated the terms “war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity,” as so that the RtoP only applied to crimes of mass violence. The weaponization of water infrastructure has also been debated by the international community to be categorized as an environmental emergency. The original document of the ICISS in 2001 included environmental or natural disasters as a reason to intervene, but it was omitted in the final outcome document of the UN.4 The UN Secretary General has repeatedly denied the application of the RtoP to environmental emergencies,5 as broadening the scope of the document would dilute “its capacity to mobilize international consensus.”6 What is not specified in this document, or anywhere else for that matter, is the use of environmental crises as a mechanism for war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. A clear example even within Iraq is how Saddam Hussein used dams in a version of ethnic cleansing himself,7 as he withheld water from the native Shiite population in the South, a religious minority known as the Marsh Arabs,8 which destroyed the natural resources essential to their livelihood.9 Exhibited here, and later on with ISIL, are mass atrocity crimes surfacing from, subjectively, less extreme human rights violations.10 The effectiveness of water to assert control and suffering over a population is of significance clouded by the overarching term of “environmental emergencies,” which not only includes purposeful environmental damage but natural ones as well. Categorizing environmental emergencies into those that are immanent and deliberate between those that are natural is the first step to creating a proper document that details international intervention in cases like the Iraqi Civil War. The current explanation is that states can interpret the four mass violence crimes listed to apply to the weaponization of dams; however,
4
Bajoria, Jayshree, and Robert McMahon. “The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2013, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dilemma-humanitarianintervention. 5 Malone, Linda A., Gareth Evans, and Edward C. Luck. Responsibility To Protect In Environmental Emergencies. Cambridge University Press, Washington, 2009. ProQuest, http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/848717474?accountid=14749. 6 Evans, Gareth. “The Responsibility to Protect in Environmental Emergencies.” Crisis Group, International Crisis Group, 29 Dec. 2016, www.crisisgroup.org/global/responsibility-protect-environmental-emergencies. 7 Malone, supra n.5 8 Kaufman, Alexander C. “The Savior Of Iraq's Garden Of Eden Says He Knows How To Stop The Next Big War.” HuffPost, HuffPost, 19 Mar. 2018, www.huffpost.com/entry/azzam-alwash-iraqwar_n_5aa840e1e4b018e2f1c27649. 9 Collard, Rebecca. “Iraq: Why U.S. Is So Desperate to Take Mosul Dam Back From ISIS.” Time, Time, 16 Aug. 2014, time.com/3126423/iraq-isis-mosul-dam-airstrikes/. 10 Evans, supra n.6 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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without an explicit definition and obligation outlined, such an interpretation can be met with profound indifference. Doctrines aside, it is evident that the weaponization of water had multiple effects on a large population: water diversion severely altered the agricultural landscape, entire towns were left without water, and millions could have been engulfed in a wave if the dam had collapsed. This alone, although literally no blood is shed, has consequences of similar gravity to the four mass violence terms listed. Regardless of the application of the Responsibility to Protect in these circumstances, a deeper discussion on a course of action is overdue and imperative, especially considering water involvement in conflicts is expected to only increase as water becomes limited.11 It is here that it should be emphasized that the consequences of dam manipulations and collapses are not immediately reparable: dams themselves take years to build, a damaged marsh ecosystem takes decades to re-balance, and a major portion of a country will be left with no centralized water system, surely to cause a refugee crisis of its own. Considering the gravity of the consequences, the pillar of prevention becomes all the more important. The protection of dams becomes an extremely preventative measure, which is why the Mosul dam was grossly overlooked as a threat until ISIL forces stepped foot onto it. It is for this reason that I will outline the foreign intervention during the ISIL occupation of the Mosul dam with the RoP three-pronged framework for effective prevention: early warning, preventative toolbox, and political will.12 III. BATTLE FOR THE MOSUL DAM The Iraqi Civil War began on January 1, 2014, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant successfully controlling 4.5 million Iraqi citizens until its defeat in December 2017. Unsurprisingly, ISIL made it a clear goal to prioritize gaining territory that contained crucial water infrastructure. Early on into the war, ISIL had already gained control of two dams in Iraq, one being the Fallujah dam that was likely controlled by ISIL within the first weeks they entered Iraq.13 ISIL in June made substantial progress and defeated Iraqi forces in Mosul, gaining them control of one of the largest cities in Iraq home to nearly 2 million people. Their next step in governing Mosul was to take control of the Mosul dam 25 miles north of the city, the primary water source for Mosul and much of the land in the region. The Mosul dam, located on the North end of the Tigris river, is the largest dam in Iraq, holding a massive 11 billion cubic meters of water in the reservoir behind it, providing hydroelectric power and water for most living downstream of it. On August 7, 2014, 1500 Kurdish forces on the dam retreated surrendering the structure to ISIL. The workers of the Mosul dam fled,14 so for the first time since the dam’s conception in 1984, the 11
King, Marcus Dubois. “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq.” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4, Routledge, Oct. 2015, pp. 153–69, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2015.1125835. 12 ICISS (2001), supra n.2 13 The Middle East Blue Strike List. vol. 3, Strategic Foresight Group, 2019, pp. 1–13, The Middle East Blue Strike List. 14 Environmental Issues in Areas Retaken from ISIL: Mosul, Iraq. UN Environment, 2017, pp. 1–29, Environmental Issues in Areas Retaken from ISIL: Mosul, Iraq. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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dam’s constant, daily maintenance was neglected because of ISIL’s failure to operate its basic functions.15 Even after the dam was recaptured, grouting operations, processes that inject the eroding foundation with cement, were still fragmented because ISIL’s occupation of the facilities that produced the cement.16 Just four days after, the Wall Street Journal reported that a wave of “biblical proportions,” estimated at 65 feet,17 could engulf the city of Mosul and even flood the city of Baghdad 450 km downstream, if the dam was not immediately re-administered its uninterrupted upkeep.18 Shirouk al-Albayachi, a member of the Iraqi Parliament and former adviser to the Ministry of Water Resources, formally acknowledged Iraq’s inability to respond and said, “we need help from the international community.”19 The sudden occupation of ISIL upon the largest, most critically unstable, and fundamental dam in Iraq sparked an international reflex in retaking the dam immediately. What ensued after these calculations of a catastrophic collapse was a massive international entrance into the war, and can be pointed to as the single trigger of what came to be the United States’ massive aerial campaign against ISIL.20 These efforts successfully forced ISIL out of the dam, with President Obama confirming the Mosul Dam was back into Iraqi hands on August 18, 2014.21 Although ISIL had occupied dams before, numerous ones being in Syria, the imminent threat of a dam collapse during the Battle for the Mosul dam that endangered millions of civilians as a result of the militarization of water infrastructure brought attention to the gaps within international agreements; the United States and other countries intervened militarily because of this, however, nowhere in the international legal sphere was there a basis on how to respond. If the international community had formally acknowledged the risk of water infrastructure becoming a tool within war, then perhaps the they could have intervened further as to prevent such a close call. As explained in the RtoP, a lack of early warnings is often used as an “excuse not an explanation,” however, it has been evident since before the dam existed that a structure of that size on such a malleable terrain would inevitably be of concern. What is lacking is not basic data, but translation into “policy or prescription,” a decisive aspect of international reactions that, because of absence, almost cost the lives of millions.
15
Rivett-Carnac, Mark. “Iraq: U.S. Warns Citizens to Prepare in Case of Mosul Dam Collapse.” Time, Time, 1 Mar. 2016, time.com/4242563/iraq-u-s-citizens-mosul-dam-collapse-isis/. 16 Janssen, Bram, and Susannah George. “U.S. Army Study: Iraq's Mosul Dam at 'Higher Risk' of Failure.” Military Times, Military Times, 8 Aug. 2017, www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/02/09/u-s-army-study-iraqs-mosul-dam-at-higher-risk-of-failure/. 17 Malas, Nour. “Mosul Dam's Takeover by ISIS Raises Risk of Flooding.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 11 Aug. 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/mosul-dams-takeover-by-isis-raises-risk-of-flooding-1407799954 18 Filkins, Dexter. “A Bigger Problem Than ISIS?” The New Yorker, The New Yorker, 8 Aug. 2017, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/a-bigger-problem-than-is 19 Collard, supra n.9 20 King, supra n.11 21 “Transcript: Obama’s Remarks Monday on Ferguson and Iraq -- WSJ Blog.” Dow Jones Institutional News, Dow Jones & Company Inc, 18 Aug. 2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/2075504992/. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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IV. EARLY WARNING: A. Mosul Dam The Mosul dam has been of international concern before it even existed. Before the dam was constructed, the Iraqi government was deliberating on where to build a hydroelectric dam to provide water, irrigation, and power to its growing population. In 1975, however, western geologists hired to evaluate optimal dam locations concluded that all sites that were observed contained unsafe levels in the ground of gypsum,22 a water-soluble material that, very literally, erodes the structural integrity of the dam.23 West German and Italian construction companies were hired to construct the dam despite intense concerns from these engineers. Completed in 1984, Saddam Hussein used it as a symbol of strength to boast Iraq’s strength and his leadership, which undoubtedly contributed to him encouraging decisions regarding the dam that may have not been the safest. Within a year, sinkholes and leaks appeared, frightening the Iraqi government into discussing, but never completing, a backup dam downstream.24 The US Army Corps of Engineers evaluated the state of the dam in 2006, naming the Mosul dam the “most dangerous dam in the world,”25 also referred to by many as an “engineering disaster waiting to happen.”26 The ability for an international body to intervene here is hard to judge. Hydroelectric dams do more than just provide water. They are integral for flood control, sanitation, electricity, and all other centralized functions needed to serve a growing population in a developing country. In this case, offering research and planning advisement is the best form of aid without being grossly intrusive, or actively advising against a nation taking measures to increase the quality of life of its citizens, which is the role international bodies took. However, having predicted the future ancillary projects needed to stabilize the dam, the international community could have remained more active in supervising the dam’s health so they were not struck to panic when ISIL stepped foot onto it. It is also important to remember that the majority of the Mosul dam’s lifespan existed under a sovereign nation, though it was one that inadequately developed this infrastructure. Under the RtoP, it is arguable that no nation ever had the responsibility to intervene with the dam construction and upkeep itself. B. Strategic Target Another glaring red flag that should have been identified early on is the concentrated power of dams in securing most aspects of Iraq’s civilization. The Euphrates and Tigris river provide 95% of Iraq’s water, meaning control of the rivers equates to control over almost the entire 22
Filkins, supra n.18 Pearce, Fred. “Mideast Water Wars: In Iraq, A Battle for Control of Water.” Yale E360, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 25 Aug. 2014, e360.yale.edu/features/mideast_water_wars_in_iraq_a_battle_for_control_of_water. 24 Janssen and George, supra n.16 25 Collard, supra n.9 26 Pearce, supra n.23 23
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population in Iraq.27Crucial aspect of dams is it does not just provide water nor pose a lifethreatening threat to millions in Mosul, but rather it is at the root of everything: water, food, the economy, life, especially in a country as arid as Iraq. The influence of dams, and the value of controlling them, has long been recognized and exploited in Iraq. In 2003, the United States made capturing the Haditha dam a strategic priority,28 and spent significant military resources to control the electricity and water facilities they occupied.29 As previously mentioned, Saddam Hussein capitalized on his control of dams in his aggression against the Marsh Arabs. ISIL, also in the years preceding the Battle for the Mosul dam, had a series of very successful dam occupations.30 The most explicit early warning given to the international community was the Middle East’s history of vulnerable dams being militarized successfully. This in itself could be sufficient enough of a pretext to have allocated resources in defending Iraq’s dams during the Iraqi Civil War, especially the Mosul dam, given its fragility. ISIL engaged in five instances of tactical weaponization in Iraq, where water was used as a direct mechanism for military operations.31 The instances of strategic weaponization are much higher at 14, where ISIL utilized dams to bring about their image of sovereignty and provide them another means of funding.32 Water as a weapon has allowed ISIL a tool of “territorial acquisition and control over vulnerable populations,” which has proven immensely successful, especially since gaining control over a small geographical area with a smaller number of men can yield control over much larger areas and populations.33 The significance of control over water throughout ISIL’s successful three-year presence in Iraq is indisputable, as the decline of ISIL in 2017-2018 can be correlated to their loss of control of territories with important water infrastructure.34 Water in the Middle East has played such an influential role in the trajectories of armed conflict, yet it is still a matter overlooked. C. Dams Necessary for Establishing a Caliphate Another warning that could have been diagnosed before ISIL entered Iraq was the strategic importance it served ISIL in not just control over the populations, but the ability to govern these populations and legitimize their vision of sovereignty. In their ultimate goal of establishing a
27
Collard, Rebecca. “Iraq's Battleground Dams Are Key to Saving the Country from ISIS.” Time, Time, 8 Sept. 2014, time.com/3303403/strikes-against-isis-in-iraq-dams/. 28 Vidal, John. “Water Supply Key to Outcome of Conflicts in Iraq and Syria, Experts Warn.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 2 July 2014, www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/02/water-key-conflict-iraqsyria-isis. 29 Collard, supra n.27 30 Shapiro, Sarah, and Gabrielle Hobson. “Weaponization of Water: Iraq and Syria.” Arcgis.com, ESRI, www.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=fa4af81f5e03449a82016afa375d08ad. 31 King, supra n.11 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 The Middle East Blue Strike List, supra n.13 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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caliphate, an Islamic state, they must first operate state services.35 This is something the Islamic is rather sophisticated in, as one analyst describes that “ISIL’s capacity to govern is more worrying than the capacity of their fighters.”36 Keeping ISIL’s ultimate goals in mind, it is clear why dams proved central to their military strategies and temporary success;37 providing efficient water management is a pragmatic way to earn support among their occupied populations.38 D. Effects of Dam Collapses and Manipulations Looking specifically at the Mosul dam, the mere effects of a catastrophic collapse present a valid foundation for foreign intervention. The language used in the RtoP align well with appropriate measures to be taken in these circumstances: “For military intervention to be justified for human protection purposes, there must be: serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: 1. Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation…”39 Ever since the Army Corps reported the Mosul dam’s alarming instability, this could have been classified as a “large scale loss of life,” of about 2 million residents in Mosul, that was “imminently likely to occur” as a result of “state… inability to act” in maintaining basic grouting functions.40 This same logic, however, can be applied to any moment where the dam was evaluated to be at a high-risk of collapse. In 2014, and a few years prior, everyone’s eyes were focused on ISIL. Only when ISIL stood upon the Mosul dam did the international community’s gaze expand onto the Mosul dam itself, consequently realizing its danger. Whether intentionally or not, the dam collapse could have effectively served as what some label a weapon of mass destruction41 and an environmental disaster of “epic proportions” according to the US Intelligence Agency.42 A dam collapse would prove equally, if not more, fatal than direct ISIL violence.43In Iraq, there is estimated to have been 87,590 civil deaths between 2014 and 2017.44 A dam collapse could effectively kill 5 times the amount of civilians over a four year period in just a few hours: the US 35
Collard, supra n.9 “Chapter 7: Mosul.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 20 Sept. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/podcasts/caliphate-transcript-chapter-seven-mosul.html. 37 Zenko, Micah. “Guest Post: The Islamic State's Water War.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 May 2015, www.cfr.org/blog/guest-post-islamic-states-water-war. 38 King, supra n.11 39 ICISS (2001), supra n.2 40 Id. 41 Dearden, Lizzie. “Iraq Crisis: Why Is the Mosul Dam so Important and How Could It Kill.” The Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, 19 Aug. 2014, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-crisiswhy-is-the-mosul-dam-so-important-and-how-could-it-kill-half-a-million-people-9677923.html. 42 King, supra n.11 43 Pearce, supra n.23 44 “Civilian Deaths in Iraq War 2003-2019 | Statistic.” Statista, 2019, www.statista.com/statistics/269729/documented-civilian-deaths-in-iraq-war-since-2003/. 36
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Army Corps wrote a letter to the Iraqi government immediately when they calculated 500,000 potential deaths if the dam collapsed.45 The Ramadi Barrage, the first dam to be manipulated by ISIL in January 2014, also serves as an example of what the more inadvertent damage the militarization of dams can do. The dams 10 gates were closed by ISIL for the majority of the time they occupied it, making the water shortages faced downstream not only leaving populations with limited drinking water, but substantial harm to agriculture and the ecology of the river. A town particularly hard hit was Babel, where the agriculture and livestock were especially diminished.46 The impact on the agricultural industry translated into an economic crisis, as this incited food shortages and led to 58% increase in food prices.47 These effects on Iraqi farms are often overlooked, but can amount to $20 billion dollars in damage according to the US Army Corps in 2017.48 What makes this harder to heal is that the river itself faces permanent alterations because of its manipulation to 50% says the Engineering Design Center at the Water Resources Industry, meaning reverting back to normal agriculture practices is especially difficult.49 Such severe consequences that are longitudinal, dimensional, and not directly remediable certainly would prompt effect prevention measures. V. PREVENTATIVE TOOLBOX It was predicted since the dams inception that a possible flood could occur, and the engineering solution to it is very clear. An important safety measure to be taken was to build the first ever “protection dam,” a dam to provide flood control for another dam.50 Construction for the Badush dam began in 1988, to be located 40 km south of the Mosul dam.51 However, in 1991, construction halted due to UN economic sanctions in Iraq that left the country with no way to pay for this dam that costs nearly $2 billion.52 Although there have been multiple attempts to restart construction, none have resulted in the completion of the dam. After the United States invaded and retreated from Iraq in 2003, the US launched a $27 million US project in 2005 to fix the Mosul dam.53 The reconstruction package included equipment and training by the US Army Corps in hopes that Iraq would eventually become self sufficient in
45
Dearden, supra n.41 Shapiro and Hobson, supra n.30 47 Kaufman, supra n.8 48 Michaels, Jim. “Iraq’s Mosul Dam puts 4 million lives at risk.” USA Today, 30 May 2017, p.01A Academic OneFile, https://linkgalegroup.com.libproxy2.usc.edu/apps/doc/A493712038/AONE?u=uaocalmain&sid=AONE&xid=de003 9a. 49 Shapiro and Hobson, supra n.30 50 Janssen and George, supra n.16 51 Id. 52 Id. 53 Id. 46
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managing their dams.54 Despite such efforts, a review of the project concluded that there was “little or no progress” in rehabilitating the dam.55 It is important to note that prevention efforts from another country are sensitive to how turbulent the countries’ relations are. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine acknowledges that such prevention efforts can come in many different ways, such as “development efforts.”56 The doctrine emphasizes the importance of “clos[ing] [the] gap between rhetorical support for protection and a tangible commitment.” In this case, it could have been considered intrusive for other countries to involve themselves further than rhetorical support. It is here where countries are presented the dilemma of infringing on state sovereignty and assuming control over a dam in order to fix it, or remain silent but risk a catastrophic flood. Whether these limited prevention efforts were in respect to state sovereignty or mere passivity, in many ways the international community could be seen to have responded rightfully. Excluding the debilitating UN economic sanctions, international involvements in the Mosul dam before ISIS included offers of financial support, engineering advisement, and the integration of a small foreign workforce. ISIS occupation of the dam not only propelled the international community to pass the threshold of “political will,” but offered them an excuse to justly insert themselves in comprehensively repairing the Mosul dam. Although I cannot speak on the ethical means of intervention and justify airstrikes, I can understand that the time in which foreign state established a “tangible commitment” was rational, as it was a response to the dam becoming an active warzone. CONCLUSION ISIS’ targeting of the Mosul dam sparked a response from the international community to address the structural issues of the Mosul dam that had long endangered the citizens of Iraq. It is indisputable that ISIS’ use of dams was essential to their success in Iraq.57 The Battle for the Mosul dam was a sobering forewarning of the dangers of water weaponization. Dams used strategically as a means to obtain leverage in armed conflict, combined with the preexisting dangers of dams to civilian populations, prompt a necessary clarification in international prevention protocols. The pervasiveness of the weaponization of dams is reason enough to inspire its distinction from other environmental emergencies. The US Intelligence Community has predicted that in the next decade water weaponization will only become more common, likely because of climate change and overpopulation adding increased stress on water resources.58 If the international community wishes to avoid the panic that followed ISIS’ occupation of the Mosul dam, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine should be formally considered applicable to deliberate environmental emergencies in armed conflict. 54
Mosul dam reconstruction continues. (2005). Water Environment & Technology, 17(12), 18. Dearden, supra n.41 56 ICISS (2001), supra n.2 57 Shapiro and Hobson, supra n.30 58 King, supra n.11 55
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REFERENCES Bajoria, Jayshree, and Robert McMahon. “The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2013, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dilemma-humanitarianintervention. “Chapter 7: Mosul.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 20 Sept. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/podcasts/caliphate-transcript-chapter-seven-mosul.html. “Civilian Deaths in Iraq War 2003-2019 | Statistic.” Statista, 2019, www.statista.com/statistics/269729/documented-civilian-deaths-in-iraq-war-since-2003/ Collard, Rebecca. “Iraq's Battleground Dams Are Key to Saving the Country from ISIS.” Time, Time, 8 Sept. 2014, time.com/3303403/strikes-against-isis-in-iraq-dams/. Collard, Rebecca. “Iraq: Why U.S. Is So Desperate to Take Mosul Dam Back From ISIS.” Time, Time, 16 Aug. 2014, time.com/3126423/iraq-isis-mosul-dam-airstrikes/. Environmental Issues in Areas Retaken from ISIL: Mosul, Iraq. UN Environment, 2017, pp. 1–29, Environmental Issues in Areas Retaken from ISIL: Mosul, Iraq. Dearden, Lizzie. “Iraq Crisis: Why Is the Mosul Dam so Important and How Could It Kill.” The Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, 19 Aug. 2014, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraqcrisis-why-is-the-mosul-dam-so-important-and-how-could-it-kill-half-a-million-people-9677923.html. Evans, Gareth. “The Responsibility to Protect in Environmental Emergencies.” Crisis Group, International Crisis Group, 29 Dec. 2016, www.crisisgroup.org/global/responsibility-protect-environmental-emergencies. Filkins, Dexter. “A Bigger Problem Than ISIS?” The New Yorker, The New Yorker, 8 Aug. 2017, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/a-bigger-problem-than-is Herodotus. Herodotus : The Histories. London, Eng; New York :Penguin Books, 1996. Print. Janssen, Bram, and Susannah George. “U.S. Army Study: Iraq's Mosul Dam at 'Higher Risk' of Failure.” Military Times, Military Times, 8 Aug. 2017, www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/02/09/u-s-armystudy-iraq-s-mosul-dam-at-higher-risk-of-failure/. Kaufman, Alexander C. “The Savior Of Iraq's Garden Of Eden Says He Knows How To Stop The Next Big War.” HuffPost, HuffPost, 19 Mar. 2018, www.huffpost.com/entry/azzam-alwash-iraqwar_n_5aa840e1e4b018e2f1c27649. King, Marcus Dubois. “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq.” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4, Routledge, Oct. 2015, pp. 153–69, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2015.1125835. Malas, Nour. “Mosul Dam's Takeover by ISIS Raises Risk of Flooding.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 11 Aug. 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/mosul-dams-takeover-by-isis-raises-risk-of-flooding1407799954. Malone, Linda A., Gareth Evans, and Edward C. Luck. Responsibility To Protect In Environmental Emergencies. Cambridge University Press, Washington, 2009. ProQuest, http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/848717474?accountid=14749. Mosul dam reconstruction continues. (2005). Water Environment & Technology, 17(12), 18. Retrieved from http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/205339852?accountid=14749 Pearce, Fred. “Mideast Water Wars: In Iraq, A Battle for Control of Water.” Yale E360, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 25 Aug. 2014, e360.yale.edu/features/mideast_water_wars_in_iraq_a_battle_for_control_of_water. Rivett-Carnac, Mark. “Iraq: U.S. Warns Citizens to Prepare in Case of Mosul Dam Collapse.” Time, Time, 1 Mar. 2016, time.com/4242563/iraq-u-s-citizens-mosul-dam-collapse-isis Shapiro, Sarah, and Gabrielle Hobson. “Weaponization of Water: Iraq and Syria.” Arcgis.com, ESRI, www.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=fa4af81f5e03449a82016afa375d08ad.
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The Middle East Blue Strike List. vol. 3, Strategic Foresight Group, 2019, pp. 1–13, The Middle East Blue Strike List. “Transcript: Obama’s Remarks Monday on Ferguson and Iraq -- WSJ Blog.” Dow Jones Institutional News, Dow Jones & Company Inc, 18 Aug. 2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/2075504992/. Water and War: ICRC Response. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2009, Water and War: ICRC Response, www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0969.pdf. Vidal, John. “Water Supply Key to Outcome of Conflicts in Iraq and Syria, Experts Warn.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 2 July 2014, www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/02/water-key-conflict-iraq-syriaisis Zenko, Micah. “Guest Post: The Islamic State's Water War.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 May 2015, www.cfr.org/blog/guest-post-islamic-states-water-war.
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REFLECTION My research paper surrounds the necessity to include deliberate environmental manipulations used as a mechanism for war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity to be included within the 2005 Responsibility to Protect doctrine. This must firstly be accomplished through distinguishing the vague term used today in international legal literature, “environmental emergencies.” This term can be argued to encompasses everything from climate change to a weaponized dam, providing an unspecific, and thus dangerous, foundation for intervention. The distinction must then be made between natural environmental emergencies, and deliberate environmental emergencies used towards mass violence. This matter is urgent, as there is an increased use of water as weapon, especially evident within the Iraqi Civil War. My paper is largely a conjunction between an evaluative approach and case study approach, looking at the case of the Mosul dam as a major influence in all aspects of military involvements, on the side of ISIS and its adversaries. To navigate the arena of ethical international intervention, particularly in such a diluted concept of water weaponization, I was fortunate enough to consult Professor Patrick James, head of the International Relations department at the USC Dornsife College. He reviewed my paper and discussed with me for over an hour his reactions and suggestions, which I translated into the final draft of my paper. I hope this paper to be a solid starting point for a research topic that I hope to explore much further in the future. I acknowledge my inherent inexperience in deliberating the ethics of intervention, and realize my argument lacks review of other aspects of intervention that could have similar influential roles in its consequences: historical relations with the nation intervening, alternative motives for providing aid, etc. My next steps in exploring this topic would be to look more into the inherent nature of what types of intervention exist, rather than the moments in time in which it’d be reasonable or justifiable to intervene. I understand that intervening at the correct moment can still have an unethical execution, a conversation I ran into in analyzing the precipitation of US air strikes following ISIS’ occupation of the Mosul dam. Overall, I consider the experience of engaging in a semi-longitudinal independent research project invaluable, especially as a freshman, and feel much more confident in pursuing this and other research topics in the future!
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CATHERINE KNOX
Implementing Ethics in Transboundary Water Management USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, and Ethical Inquiry May 2019
ABSTRACT: As climate change and population growth around the world threaten water supplies, it will be necessary to have sustainable, flexible, and just agreements for the management of transboundary waters. While many river basins are currently managed cooperatively by riparian states, nearly two-thirds of transboundary basins lack international governance agreements. Consequently, they are inefficiently managed. This paper will argue that basing water management agreements and institutions on the ethical principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence will lead to long-lasting and fair strategies for the management of transboundary water. Both the Nile and Mekong Rivers will be presented as case studies for how current methods of water governance vary and the impacts those institutions have on the management of each river. This paper will look at opportunities to improve these agreements and the rising threat of hydropower development on cooperation between states along either river. Following the discussion on both rivers, this paper will present a simple framework for how these principles can be incorporated into diplomatic discussions surrounding binding agreements for transboundary water management and the implications that these ethical principles could have on implementation of new integrated water management technologies in transboundary river basins.
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INTRODUCTION Around the world, 263 river basins and lakes cross the borders of 145 states. 60% of transboundary waters are without any formal agreements for water division or management. This has the potential to lead to future instability and conflict in the face of growing development and climate change. Managing these water sources sustainably has large impacts on the health of all people depending on them for survival.1 In order to build lasting agreements for the management of transboundary water sources, a certain degree of cooperation is required from all states within a source’s watershed. One way to ensure the longevity of these agreements is to ensure that division of resources is equitable and ethical, ensuring a stable water supply for all states depending on the water source. Critical to the success of these agreements is the role that scientists and engineers play in the formation and execution of negotiations and technical details. In the past two centuries, growing levels of international cooperation and globalization have led to the creation of more than 300 bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding use and development of transboundary waters. About two-thirds of these agreements were made in the last 50 years.2 This suggests an exponential increase in the development of these bilateral and multilateral agreements, implying that recent activities have exacerbated concerns surrounding the water sources. One way to strengthen existing agreements and build sustainable new transboundary water management strategies is to shape them around ethical principles. Four key principles often used in the study of bioethics naturally align with water management and should be considered as pillars for future water management strategies. These principles are: (1) the respect for autonomy, (2) beneficence, (3) nonmaleficence, and (4) justice. The intersection of these principles can be seen in the idea of global egalitarianism and the underlying theories that support international resource management.3 Global egalitarianism is complicated to define and was nicely summed up as “a family of views holding that, at a fundamental level, justice places limits on permissible global inequalities.”4 In other words, ideas of justice suggest that resources should be shared, at least to some extent, between separate states. Looking at transboundary resource management through a global egalitarianism perspective suggests a right to sufficient clean water for all. This viewpoint supports the sixth UN Millennium Development Goal, to “ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation.”
1
UN Water. “Transboundary Waters | UN-Water.” UN Water, United Nations, www.unwater.org/waterfacts/transboundary-waters/. 2 Vollmer, Ruth, et al. “Institutional Capacity Development in Transboundary Water Management.” UNESCO, 2009, 3 https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000181792 3 Fabre, Cecil. “Global Distributive Justice: An Egalitarian Perspective.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 35:sup1, 2005, pp.139-164, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2005.10716852. 4 Barry, Christian, and Pablo Gilabert. “Does Global Egalitarianism Provide an Impractical and Unattractive Ideal of Justice?” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 84, no. 5, 2008, pp. 1025–1039. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25144935.
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While inherently contradictory, these principles have been used to ensure that the most beneficial courses are followed by forcing a comprehensive analysis. One such contradiction is the right to autonomy allowing a leader to choose a course of action that is not beneficial to all, but rather only to their own constituents. Another can be found in the principle of justice: an upstream state may rationalize the decision to withdraw a larger share of water because the headwaters of a river are in within their borders without thought to other needs downstream. Despite these contradictions, a well-balanced system of the four principles can lead each basin to raise questions on ethics regarding the use of water. When it comes to water resource management, there is no single correct course of action due to the complexity of the problem. Balancing these four principles will help to ensure long-term sustainability of a shared water source in terms of decreased likelihood of conflict, increased conservation, and maximum benefit from the resource. Despite the complexity of these ethical principles, transboundary water agreements that consider all four principles are likely to be more “just” from a global egalitarianism perspective and are more likely to be sustainable through a changing climate. Such qualities can be seen in the success of formal agreements on rivers such as the Danube. Institutions have been put into place to ensure water quality, including holding every nation accountable to pollutants that enter the river. Because water use and need are inextricably linked to agriculture and energy, population growth and economic development are linked closely with future water needs. Additional stresses from the impacts of climate change and increased variability of available water flows also increase risk to the longevity and stability of a water source. When there is inadequate or unequal distribution of transboundary water, the likelihood of conflict between riparian states begins to increase. Increasing amounts of water stress around the world exacerbates the need for transboundary water management. According to a study by Mekonnon and Hoekstra, two-thirds of the global population lives in areas that see water stress for at least one month a year.5 Water stress exists when there is a larger demand for water than a demand for supply in a specific geographic location and refers to the availability, quality, and accessibility of water (CEO Water Mandate).6 When looking at global patterns of water stress, it can be seen that certain regions, such as North Africa, maintain much higher levels of water stress than other regions, such as South America. The lack of precipitation, few natural water storage systems, and lack of effective water management strategies exacerbate water stress. According to the UN, water stress is a function of natural and sociopolitical factors, and most scarcity worldwide is caused by a combination of dryness and institutional failure to deliver clean water.
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Mekonnen, Mesfin, and Arjen Hoekstra. “Four Billion People Facing Extreme Water Scarcity.” Science Advances, vol. 2, no. 2, 2016, DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.1500323 6 CEO Water Mandate. "What Do ‘Water Scarcity,’ ‘Water Stress,’ and ‘Water Risk’ Actually Mean?" Understanding Key Water Stewardship Terms. UN Global Compact. 29 Mar. 2019 <https://ceowatermandate.org/terminology/>. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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In order to visually represent regions of higher water stress, world maps are an important tool to see the degree of water withdrawn compared to total freshwater resources available. Using data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, it is possible to sort the degree of water stress in almost every country.7 Although this does not specify variations in water stress within a country, it provides a valuable overview.
Figure 1: Global water stress shown per country as the percent of freshwater withdrawals out of total freshwater supplies in a county. The darker the color, the higher the degree of water stress, shown by the scale on the right. All values are in terms of percents (FAO). The figure above portrays the severity of water stress in countries as the proportion of freshwater withdrawals to total freshwater supplies. It is shown that certain regions of the world have little water stress, likely due to excess precipitation, water storage, and good management practices. While this map does not factor in water quality and infrastructure, it gives a good overview of the availability of water, especially in terms of how much withdrawals are occuring, and is a method to identify potential â&#x20AC;&#x153;trouble spotsâ&#x20AC;? in terms of long-term access to water. According to the withdrawal data, regions such as South America are not at a high risk for water shortages. Other regions, such as North Africa and the Middle East, are withdrawing larger
7
FAO. 2016. AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
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proportions of freshwater than is sustainable for future decades. However, another consideration when looking at this map is the implication of technological innovations in sustaining the longevity of aquifers and other freshwater sources. Novel water reuse systems, desalination, and conservation techniques have a large impact on water use that is difficult to quantify. For example, Israel’s ability to provide ample water from desalination will have impacts on their need to depend on water from the Jordan River, and therefore impact the way management strategies will be applied. While it seems like there is no perfect solution, there needs to be international systems in place to manage water sources before we reach a time of crisis and to limit the impacts of drastic events such as drought or extreme flood. In regions where water stress is a looming threat, managing water is a critical avenue forward. Agreements and institutions for transboundary water sources need to be implemented in locations without strong international governance, and current agreements need to be strengthened to face an uncertain future. By formulation agreements around the four above-mentioned ethical principles, consideration will be given to all parties (regardless of upstream or downstream location) and the future well-being of all will be taken into account. IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY While these principles are important for the creation of water management agreements and strategies, it is also critical that these agreements consider technology, both in terms of infrastructure expansion and real-time data monitoring. Infrastructure developments include the construction of hydroelectric dams, pipelines, and reservoir projects. Technology can be used in water management to stretch resources, to remove pollutants, and to expand the ability of a finite water resource to provide for a growing population. Summed up nicely by Fekete, “engineering solutions offer human societies a means to bypass ecosystem services and appropriate planetary resources directly to replicate the desired service.”8 As water stress increases, the implementation of current technology and future innovation provides an avenue to mitigate impacts associated with insufficient water. It is important for not only policymakers, but also engineers and scientists, to consider river management in an international context. Projects need to be evaluated comprehensively in order to ensure benefits outweigh costs for all parties involved. By considering every facet of a project in terms of those ethical principles, engineers can understand flaws in their design and determine mitigation strategies. Currently, hydropower potential remains largely untapped throughout Asia and Africa. The International Energy Association predicts that by 2050, installed hydropower projects will have twice the capacity of global hydropower today. Hydropower projects come with a multitude of potential challenges, such as holding back significant river flow during filling, interference with natural migration of species, flooding of delicate ecosystems, and environmental 8 Fekete, Balázs M., and János J. Bogárdi. "Role of engineering in sustainable water management." Earth Perspectives 2 (2015).
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catastrophe if poor design or maintenance leads to failure. When altering a river so drastically, it is important that engineers consider ethics that surpass immediate and obvious effects of a dam and consider more complicated and less visible risks. Engineers should be involved in initial discussions on sizing a dam, as this impacts both electrical generation capacity and storage capacity. Both of these criteria are very important not only to the state building the dam, but to the downstream states as well. People plan for dam failure, but it is less common to take action to mitigate impacts such as less variable flow or chain impacts in an ecosystem. Another important intersection between transboundary water management and technology has emerged in data sharing, regarding flood calculations, water quality, and climate models. Fast warning systems from a flood upstream can save countless lives if enough notice is given to evacuate on floodplains downstream. Additionally, data sharing on water quality is important in locating pollutant origins and the effectiveness of mitigation strategies. Knowledge around how a river functions is an important tool in evaluating water management practices. Without data sharing, states are forced to make decisions on incomplete models. If platforms are in place to have open communication and modeling that flows seamlessly along a river’s length, regardless of borders, decisions regarding water use can be weighed against accurate costs and benefits. If these developments are considered in the context of the ethical principles above, these considerations arise naturally. CASE STUDIES: THE NILE RIVER One of the most well-known rivers in the world, the Nile, traces its way from Ethiopia to the Mediterranean Sea, with a watershed that extends far into the African continent. Steeped in history, the region has seen the rise and fall of civilizations. Today, it weaves through nine riparian states, and the surrounding landscapes include everything from untouched nature to villages to bustling metropolises. In recent history, large withdrawals and the construction of dams have altered the river’s course and natural flow. Hydropower and dam building present a serious risk to the stability of the Nile River and the region. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) marks a true diplomatic challenge for the Nile states. Flows can be severely limited during dam filling and downstream countries are dependent on full flow for food and energy. Lack of cooperation over the building of GERD and other transboundary projects on the Nile stress the limited regional cooperation over the river and show the need for a comprehensive and long-lasting strategy for the Nile’s management in the coming decades. Aside from simply being timely, future development of the Nile’s riparian states will lead to an increased demand for electricity, part of which will be supplied by more hydropower projects along the Nile. Future expansion of cooperation on the Nile River offers the opportunity to ingrain ethics into management strategies for the Nile. The Nile River Basin extends through nine countries: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Although not all of these countries have direct contact with the Nile River, they contain tributaries that enter the Nile. This
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means that a shift in water collection or distribution in any of the countries will have some impact on the Nile’s flow. Of the nations listed, Egypt is often considered the most powerful from both an economic and military standpoint, but it is the last country the river flows through before it reaches the Mediterranean Sea.9 Sudan and Ethiopia, directly upstream of Egypt, are still developing economically and are lacking complex infrastructure required for hydroelectric transmission. As nations develop, infrastructure for electricity and energy also expands, increasing the access to, and therefore demand of hydropower. Two main rivers flow into the Nile—the White Nile and the Blue Nile. The White Nile flows from Lake Victoria, the second largest lake by surface area in the world, and originates in Ethiopia.10 Although the river used to flow unimpeded to the Mediterranean Sea, the development of dams along the river has hindered the flow in some areas and created large artificial reservoirs behind dams. Currently, there are large amounts of untapped potential for the creation of hydropower projects in Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia.11 Lake Nassar in Egypt is a reservoir created by the Aswan High Dam and is 6000 square kilometers. The Aswan Dam is currently the largest dam in place on the Nile and ensures reliable water for Egypt year round. Flows in the Nile can be highly variable, although the average flow of 84 billion cubic meters (BCM) has been accurate in the long term. Records as high as 150 BCM and as low as 42 BCM have been observed in recent history.12 The extreme variation in flows can lead to tension if flows are less than expected in a given year. Dams can be a necessity for a country, as they can help to mitigate some of the variability of the river. Additional impacts of climate change will only increase variability and increase water stress in the region. Multiple reports place an increase in temperature in the range of 3-4 degrees Celsius by the end of the century.13 With the potential for serious drought and heat in an already arid region, it is logical that Egypt is concerned about its future ability to access water. When considering increases in population and associated food and water demand, one study found that Egypt will aggravate its water shortage by 192%, considering both groundwater and water from the Nile.14
9
McKinney, Daene. “Transboundary Water Challenges: Case Studies.” UT Austin, Center for Research in Water Resources, 2011, 58. <https://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/ce397/Readings/TransboundaryWaterIssues.pdf> 10 Ibid 11 Id. 12 Noaman, N. M., and D. El Quosy. "Hydrology of the Nile and Ancient Agriculture." Irrigated Agriculture in Egypt. Switzerland: Springer International, 2017. 9-28. 13 Keith, Bruce, et al. “Considerations in Managing the Fill Rate of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Reservoir Using a System Dynamics Approach.” The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, vol. 14, no. 1, Jan. 2017, pp. 33–43, doi:10.1177/1548512916680780. 14 Mazzoni, Annamaria, Essam Heggy, and Giovanni Scabbia. “Forecasting water budget deficits and groundwater depletion in the main fossil aquifer systems in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.”Global Environmental Change, vol. 53, 2018, pp 157-173.
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Figure 2: The Nile Region (Map taken from Noaman and Quosy)
The most recent agreement for the Nile River is the Nile Waters Agreement between the Sudan and Egypt signed in 1959. The agreement negotiations took place during the planning of the Aswan High Dam, which had the capacity to store one average annual cycle of the river’s flow. As such, the agreement was shaped by the dam. Flow at the dam is 84 BCM, of which 55.5 BCM was allocated to Egypt, 18.5 BCM to Sudan, and the rest for losses. No other countries received allocations in the agreement.15 The agreement does state that if another country lays claim to water, both Egypt and Sudan will “study together these claims and adopt a unified view thereon. If such studies result in the possibility of allocating an amount of Nile water to one or the other of these territories, then the value of this amount shall be deducted in equal shares from the share of the two Republics.”16 However, until recent plans to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), this treaty had not been challenged in a major way.
15 16
McKinney supra r.9 note 61 Id. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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Figure 3: Methods to analyze water distribution in the Nile In order to put the 1959 agreement into a clearer depiction, water use in the Nile can be â&#x20AC;&#x153;allocatedâ&#x20AC;? in a few ways. Five countries were selected from the basin for the purpose of this analysis: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. These states are major contributors and major players in policies regarding the Nile. In the figure above, the first grouping shows water allocation between Egypt and Sudan, the only two parties in the treaty. We see that no other country has any water allocations at all, given the remaining flow was left for evaporation and other losses. The rest of the groupings use data from the world bank for population, GDP, and energy from hydropower per country. Hypothetical ratios of flow were attributed to each country in proportion to population out of total population of all five countries, GDP per country out of all five countries, and energy use per country out of all countries. Although I do not think any one of these scenarios are a good solution to water management in the Nile, it does show the inability to base water allocation on only one simple metric. For example, we can see that if we base water purely on population, Ethiopia should get a much larger portion of water than currently allocated, even surpassing Egypt. Basing water division on GDP gives a more realistic balance, although Uganda would still have rights to almost negligible water. Basing water draw on proportion of energy use from hydropower, we see Egypt is actually least dependent on hydropower along the Nile. For this reason, disruptions between the upstream countries may have a larger impact. In order to facilitate a larger degree of cooperation along the river, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was established in 1999 as a way to increase communication over the Nile River. It is seen as a transitional institution until legal frameworks are created by member countries to ensure sustainable development in the basin. For this reason, the NBI holds promise as the start of cooperation, but it is important to note that we are still a long way from binding water agreements. Given the cooperative nature of the NBI, agreements formulated in this mechanism allow decisions
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to be based on ethical principles. Agreements over rights to water need to be considered around the four principles previously mentioned: autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence. Water allocations need to be discussed in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s context, with the needs of all riparian states included. While each state does have a right to take water within their borders (autonomy), they also have a duty to share that resource with downstream neighbors, especially when we consider global egalitarianism. A looming threat to the stability of flows in the Nile River is the building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia, which was planned with limited input from any downstream nation. While the hydropower produced by the dam could provide electricity and revenue to Ethiopia, filling the reservoir has been a diplomatic challenge. The total capacity of the reservoir will be about 63 cubic kilometers, which is about 1.5 times the yearly flow down the Nile.17 Damming a river is a complex engineering feat that requires extensive communication and analysis with all beneficiaries both downstream and upstream of the dam. While a full reservoir offers a stable (if small) amount of flow regardless of precipitation for Ethiopia and all downstream countries, the filling of a reservoir depletes downstream flow, as water is retained in the reservoir. For this reason, a comprehensive analysis of dams must be completed before construction. Having strong transboundary management agreements in place prior to the construction of a dam would increase transparency around projects and has the potential to limit tensions like those currently seen in the Nile region. From the initiation of the damâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s proposal, Egypt publicly condemned the dam due to the capability to limit flow into Egypt.18 To put the size of the dam and the implications for Egypt into perspective, imagine that all of the flow passing the dam is held back, and no flow is released downstream. This could go on for a year and a half without the dam being forced to spill water. Because of the reductions downstream, Egypt benefits more if the dam is filled very slowly, over a matter of decades, ensuring that the majority of flow still reaches Egypt. However, Ethiopia requires water to a minimum operating level to begin hydropower generation, a level that they are eager to reach. Reasons to fill the reservoir quickly include maximizing energy production, possibility to mitigate variation in future flows due to climate change, and increased amounts of upstream storage capacity in the event of drought. Arguments against a rapid filling of the dam include impacts of a temporary loss of water on Egyptian agriculture, incomplete energy transmission infrastructure, and the fact that maximum energy production will likely only be reached 3-4 months of the year anyway.19 With a diversion of 11-19 cubed kilometers of water per year to fill a dam, about 2 million farmers could lose their lands and livelihoods. This could have massive impacts on the Egyptian economy, in addition to completely destroying the way of life for farmers along the Nile.
17
Keith, supra r.13 Id. 19 Id. 18
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With the creation of the dam, Ethiopia has generated a political weapon that greatly threatens the water supply of Egypt. Technological processes can generate potable water from ocean water through desalination or from wastewater through potable reuse processes. For this reason, it is likely that excess water will always be available to those who can pay enough for it. Therefore, the true burden of a significant decrease in flow will be felt most heavily by the farmers along the river who depend on the Nile for yearly irrigation purposes. Placing the burden of drought on those who have little say in water politics goes against global egalitarianism, where it can be argued that all are equally deserving of adequate water. Even if the Nile’s flow is seriously hindered by the fill rate of the GERD, technology can be implemented to ensure enough water for survival. However, using desalination to provide enough water for the entirety of the nation would be incredibly difficult, incredible costly, and building enough plants would require years of design and construction. This means that the nation could satisfy their thirst for a short time, until they die of hunger. Despite this threat to the water supply in Egypt, the dam offers a stable water source to the people of Ethiopia, in a geography plagued by drought. The dam is also able to provide a maximum of 6000 MW,20 which could lead to rapid economic growth in the region. A reliable energy source in Ethiopia could expand industry and improve the quality of life for many people. Although hydropower development, especially on a large scale, results in some destabilizing forces, proper management can limit contention along a river. In the Nile, the struggle to select a middle-ground fill rate represents an opportunity for more cohesive water management. Looking at the four principles from the introduction—autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice—it is easy to find practical applications in the formation of new management strategies. For example, water allocations could be shifted from a set volume per country to percentages of flows, which is more realistic in the face of climate change and impeded flow due to reservoir filling. Flows need to be steady throughout the year, fill rates of reservoirs should limit the economic toll they take on the upstream states, and proper scientific and environmental research needs to be completed before construction. This would allow each country to protect their autonomy in regards to how they use their water. The implementation of ethical principles for transboundary water cooperation in the Nile Basin could create fair and open dialogue between states on how to share and protect the river. Without a strong and just agreements, with realistic metrics and enforceable standards, use of water from the river could turn into a mad dash to grab as much as possible before time is out. Each state has to feel secure that they are heard and that their right to water will be protected. While the autonomy of a state should not be interfered with, diplomacy can pave the way to an agreement that satisfies both conditions.
20
Goitom, Gebreluel (2014) Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa's Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?, The Washington Quarterly, 37:2, 25-37, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2014.926207 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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CASE STUDIES: THE MEKONG RIVER While both the Nile River and Mekong River are transboundary rivers, there are many differences between the two. The clearest, when considering geography and climate, is the dependency on the Nile for basic access to water, as one of few water sources in the region. Despite this, there are also great similarities. Both rivers flow through states in varying stages of development, and this leads to an unequal power dynamic, with some states wealthier and more able to exert influence in the region than others. Additionally, both rivers are severely threatened by hydropower development. Rapid construction of dams, and especially large dams, will have monumental impacts on both rivers. Aside from the environmental impacts, developments in hydropower lead to issues including poorer river quality, shrinking of river deltas, and disruption of fishing and agriculture sectors along the river. Although the Nile River has made great progress in management of the Nile River, the international support behind the Lower Mekong Initiative and management practices on the Mekong offer a brief lesson as to how to consider these ethical principles in the foundation of water use agreements. The management of the Mekong River is often heralded as a model for future transboundary water management programs due to both the riverâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s overall health and the creation of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), an international organization governing the lower part of the river. While there is still room for improvement, the basin overall has experienced a positive shift towards cooperation and communication. The river basin has an area of 795,000 square kilometers and meanders through six countries: Myanmar, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.21 Approximately 90 million people live in the Mekong River Basin and many depend on it for their livelihood. The majority of water use from the Mekong is for agricultural purposes. There are some small hydroelectric projects along the river, but much of the river area suitable for such development is in China, where the river sees a steep drop in altitude. Future threats to the dependability of the river include rapid economic growth in the region, urbanization, and the development of hydropower, especially in the mountainous region of China at the headwaters. Since China is not a member of the LMI, their actions in the future can have a huge impact on the overall river sustainability. The LMI holds countries accountable to communicate individual management practices and collaborate on development projects that interfere with the river across boundaries. Without being a member, China is not held to discuss hydropower developments with the downstream countries. A rapid increase of hydropower development on the river prior to sufficient environmental and economic analysis could be devastating for a river with such sensitive ecosystems. Filling a large reservoir behind a dam could lead to a drop in volume of water reaching the downstream nations and will put pressure on the lower Mekong region. The Mekongâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s initial tributaries begin in the Tibetan Himalayas, and travel through the mountains of China before reaching the flatter territory of the lower Mekong states.22 A key characteristic of the Mekong is the Tonle Sap, where the river course actually reverses flow to 21
McKinney, supra r.9, note 111 Id.
22]
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create the largest lake of Southeast Asia during the region’s dry season.23 Preserving the Tonle Sap’s functionality is vital. First, it is a common breeding ground for fish and other aquatic species which most of the region depends on as both a food source and economic outlet. The Tonle Sap’s constant flow and freshwater composition also minimizes saltwater intrusion from the South China Sea into the Mekong Delta, even during the dry season. Additionally, because the Tonle Sap regulates flow, Vietnam experiences an influx of fresh water all year long.24 Due to the unique nature and ecosystem in the Tonle Sap, it is very important to have the minimum flow volume to generate this phenomenon every year which could be inhibited by Chinese hydroelectric development. The region has a long history of cooperation over the Mekong river. In 1957, the United Nations founded the Mekong River Committee to regulate development in the Mekong River and initiate international cooperation.25 In 1995, the Mekong Agreement was signed, which establishes the Mekong River Commission (MRC) as a structure to govern the river. The MRC mandate calls for “cooperation in all fields of development, utilization, management, and conservation of water and related sources to optimize the multiple use and mutual benefits and minimize the harmful effects.”26 The second article stipulates that the MRC form a development plan to ensure best use of the water, recognizing that the plan has to include respect for “sovereign equality and territorial integrity” and other articles ensure the right of each country to develop independent projects in cases where there are no risks to others.27 In these articles we see direct links to the ethical principles laid out earlier. By allowing some degree of autonomy in small scale projects, the principle of autonomy is respected. The phrase “mutual benefits” ties directly into the principle of beneficence and the words “minimize harmful effects” demonstrate the principle of nonmaleficence. In 1995, the “Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin” was signed by the MRC.28 Projects that divert flow from the river during the dry season have to be approved by all members of the MRC, all efforts should be taken to preserve minimum flow during the dry season, and the MRC has to negotiate agreements on a determination of minimum monthly flow to the river, create a procedure to evaluate projects related to water use, and design a management plan for the river in the near future.29 This agreement discusses principles on cooperation but never allocates water between the member countries. In this agreement, the application of beneficence, justice, and non-maleficence throughout the agreement are clear. Today, the MRC is continuing to negotiate water use on the 23
Id, note 112 Id. 25 Id, note 113 26 Hussein, Hussam, Filippo Menga, and Francesca Greco. "Monitoring Transboundary Water Cooperation in SDG 6.5.2: How a Critical Hydropolitics Approach Can Spot Inequitable Outcomes." Sustainability 10 (2018): 3640. 27 Id. 28 Mekong River Commission. "Mandate." Mekong River Commission. 29 Mar. 2019 <http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/mandate>. 29] Id. 24
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Mekong. Current plans to alter the natural Mekong River system include inter-basin transfers, growing water withdrawals to fuel cities, and irrigation expansion.30 Each proposed project requires a comprehensive governance plan that ensures the sustainability of the river, something that has been recognized by the states along the Mekong for decades. In the past, the Mekong River has not been a significant source of regional tension because water availability in the region exceeds current needs.31 However, growing populations and increasing development of the Mekong region might drastically increase regional water demands. Until very recently, China and Myanmar had not been involved in planning the international basin, but also did not have any plans for river development.32 In recent years, China has announced its intent to expand hydroelectric capacity along the Mekong, making them a critical player in its future management. Unlike other transboundary water sources, management efforts for the Mekong river began before reaching a crisis in water management. The initiative spanned from the lower riparian states with the guidance and aid of the United Nations and other international organizations.33 With the support of established cooperative institutions, the LMI was created with financial and technical support. The regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rapid development threatens water management along the Mekong River. In the last ten years, economic growth has increased in energy demand by 8% per year. Approximately 20% of people in the greater Mekong sub-region still lack electricity in their homes and are turning towards hydropower for infrastructure expansion.34 This means water demand is expected to expand by 80% by 2035, especially considering how closely linked energy needs and water demand are.35 In the initial Mekong cooperation agreements, ethical principles of justice, autonomy, beneficence, and non-maleficence are clearly considered, and are visible in the agreements signed and in the charge of the MRC. This region has also seen cooperation and diplomatic relations grow because of this framework. While basing institutions around ethical principles is not solely responsible for the success of transboundary management in the lower Mekong region, the clear concern for the sustainability of the river and for beneficial uses of the river contributed greatly. Given regional potential for tension and conflict around the Mekong, it is important now more than ever to negotiate proper revisions to initial agreements that encapsulate these principles. Without ethical and effective diplomatic intervention, water demand could quickly escalate into widespread conflict.
30
Dore, John, Louis Lebel, and Francois Molle. "A framework for analysing transboundary water governance complexes, illustrated in the Mekong Region." Journal of Hydrology 466-467 (2012): 23-36. 31 McKinney, supra r.9, note 113 32 Id, note 115 33 Id, note 116 34 Carius, Alexander, Aaron T. Wolf, Diana Nenz, Oliver Hensengerth, Julie E. Watson, Elsa Semmling, and Janine Uhlmannsiek. Transboundary Cooperation and Hydropower Development. Rep. Vientiane: Deutsche Gesellschaft fĂźr Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2014. 35 Id. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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FRAMEWORK In the face of climate change and rapid population growth, institutions and agreements regarding transboundary management require strengthening to survive increasing water stress. While both of these cases exemplify ways transboundary water agreements can be rooted in ethical principles, there are opportunities to strengthen new agreements for transboundary water management around the world. The research regarding the application of ethics to water fields has begun to be explored recently by scholars, NGOs, and policymakers.36 By recognizing specific principles, I hope to provide a reliable starting point for future transboundary water agreements, rooted in justice, equality, and well-being of all. I propose implementing four principles to guide transboundary water management agreements: (1) the respect for autonomy, (2) beneficence, (3) nonmaleficence, and (4) justice. These principles were originally proposed as four guiding principles for medical practice. In a book in 1979, Jim Childress and Thomas Beauchamp outlined these principles that have since been implemented in health-care systems world-wide.37 In medicine, one strives to improve the lives and health of the human race, ensuring an overall better system for patients. Innovations are highly analyzed before implementation, and risks of side effects are always weighed against an improvement of health. Despite their origin in medicine, I believe these principles could apply beyond the realm of bioethics and toward water management. Medicine and water management share in principle the idea that actions should be taken to better humanity as a whole and improve the systems in which they operate. While this is not always true in practice, institutions such as the UN and the MRC encourage such actions on global and basic scales respectively. The connection between access to water, sanitation, and human health makes the applicability of bioethical principles even more potent. Although academic discourse regarding transboundary water management often discusses the role of ethics, frameworks are rarely applied prior to implementation of water agreements or formation of managing institutions. The four principles can be applied as follows: I.
Respect for autonomy: This principle derives from the idea that rational agents make informed and voluntary decisions. No decision should be controlled or influenced in a way that would compromise
their will to choose.38 In water resources, each riparian state with a stake in a transboundary water source has the right to decide whether to enter an agreement based on their own benefit. II. Nonmaleficence: In essence, â&#x20AC;&#x153;do no harm.â&#x20AC;? This principle requires that every action does not deliberately harm or injure and avoids unnecessary risk.39 In water resources, it means that every action taken must be considered in a large picture that does its best not to hurt any one state or individual. 36
Rossi, Giuseppe. "Achieving ethical responsibilities in water management: A challenge." Agricultural Water Management 147 (2015): 96-102. 37 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Fourth Edition. Oxford. 1994. 38 McCormick, Thomas R. "Principles of Bioethics." Bioethic Tools: Principles of Bioethics. 1 Oct. 2013. University of Washington School of Medicine. 29 Mar. 2019 <https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/tools/princpl.html>. 39 Id. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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III. Beneficence: This principle suggests that every action taken is to add benefits. While similar to non-maleficence, this principle takes the idea one step further by increasing benefits from an action. If that is impossible, then do no harm. In water resources, this suggests that every actor should act first to improve a source’s sustainability before considering individual country needs. IV. Justice: The principle of justice centers on “giving to each that which is his due” and involves the equitable distribution of goods or resources.40 In the case of water management, the justice principle is closely intertwined with the theory of global egalitarianism. It can be shown by each individual, depending on the water source, having an equal right to a sufficient share. This principle means it would be unjust for a nation upstream to restrict a river’s flow, just as a nation that pollutes a shared water source is unjust.
While these principles can be at odds with each other, including all four principles in transboundary water management can lessen conflict over water resources in the future.
Figure 4: Ethical Principles The intersection of these four principles has been illustrated in the figure above. Each principle acts to balance out the other in order to create a fair and lasting agreement. In the face of growing uncertainty of climate change’s impact, new water treatment methods, and a growing desire for hydropower, now more than ever, transboundary water management strategies require focus on equity. It is important to note that water management will almost always leave one party with a larger advantage than the other, but such is the nature of resource management and diplomatic agreements. However, it is still necessary to try and make agreements as fair and flexible as possible in order to create a strong framework for future relations.
40
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In order to evaluate how well an agreement adheres to the principles above, a system of measurable attributes will need to be developed. Quantitative evaluation is necessary to judge where an agreement sits. Although the applicability of metrics will vary from agreement to agreement, there are a few that are widely applicable. Metrics can be separated into quantity and quality when evaluating water. For instance, water quality in terms of biological oxygen demand (BOD), turbidity, and nitrate and phosphate pollution along a transboundary river can indicate that no one nation is polluting all water downstream. This is closely linked to the principle of nonmaleficence. Another metric could be the proportion population receiving a minimum quantity of water for day-to-day life. This is linked to justice and the right to clean water. When considering beneficence, improvements in water quality and management, from treatment plants to more efficient irrigation leading to lower withdrawals, can be useful metrics. Principles of autonomy are a tricky topic in the Nile region, where geopolitical tensions are already high between states along the Nile. Egypt has been very vocal about their concerns over the filling of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), even going as far as to threaten military action if the filling rate of the dam exceeds that which is acceptable to Egypt. Ethiopia needs energy to develop, but it has been suggested that the dam can only provide 6000 megawatts during a few months of the year. Two scenarios arise: either construction continues without open communication or a legal framework, exacerbating tensions in the region, or the dam is discussed by engineers and policymakers before filling of the reservoir begins. Ideally, the dam would have been discussed in an open international forum long before construction began, but that moment has passed. Now, open dialogue could ensure that Ethiopia gets to build a dam on their portion of the river that generates plenty of electrical capacity without compromising river access downstream. That is not to say that Egypt can maintain their current water use. As development in the region increases, more and more water will be demanded from the Nile by all riparian states. The community needs a plan to protect the river, ensure stable flows, and to diversify their water portfolio. In order to continue in a practical manner, Egypt has to recognize Ethiopiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s right to build the dam, and ultimately, the right to the Nile, and Ethiopia has to be conscious about impacts to the Egyptian farmers and the Egyptian economy. The tensions over the GERD reflect the weaknesses of the Nile Basin Initiative. This kind of strain on governing institutions could be avoided in the future if there is a more comprehensive and flexible system in place to manage the Nile River in an international sphere. In comparison, in considering methods established to govern the Mekong River, there are clear examples of the application of ethical principles. To begin with, the process to regulate the river began from the region itself, which is a clear manifestation of the idea of autonomy. Unlike other river agreements, the initiation of regulation for the water source began in the region. The UN provided technical expertise and technology to the region in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the river as a baseline, while the lower Mekong countries created a governance framework. In the resultant processes, health of the river and sustainability are at the forefront of every action.
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One key difference in the Mekong agreement is that no documents discuss allocations of water for each state. Instead, it focuses on principles of allocation and procedures for how to evaluate projects along the river. This means that the established management structure can grow and change with pressures from a changing climate. Additionally, we can see these principles emerge in the language of the MRC, with key articles mentioning “sovereign equality,” “no harm,” and “socially just.”41 The inception of the MRC began on these ethical pillars, and we have seen the ability of the MRC to thrive throughout the past decades. While no agreement is perfect, management of the Mekong is on a sustainable path. While these two agreements exist in vastly different geographic and political landscapes, management of their respective challenges still need to be rooted in the same ethical framework. Although these regions face differing core challenges, the management of both rivers can be approached the same way. The agreements also emphasize the ability of each state to have a say in projects that would affect their use of the water (justice), yet still use the water without oversight under certain criteria (autonomy). The overall goal of management is to ensure adequate water for all riparian states and to not harm the health of the river (beneficence and non-maleficence). CONCLUSION In the face of a growing global population, water management strategies and institutions are necessary for sustainable use of freshwater resources. Increasing uncertainty in weather patterns due to climate change only increases the need for strong management regulations and institutions. In order to meet demand while adapting to growth, agreements need to be made for basins without any current institutions, and current agreements need to be strengthened to overcome potential challenges. These management strategies should be designed to ensure longterm sustainable management of the water source, including satisfying the needs of all riparian states equally and justly. By considering water sources as both resources and human rights, agreements rooted in ethical principles will be sustainable in the long-run. Agreements should be able to address four ethical principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. By considering these facets when originally outlining transboundary water agreements, resulting decisions will ensure that the needs of all individuals and states are satisfied while still allowing some degree of autonomy in how water resources are used. It is this flexibility and focus that will allow for sustainable and appropriate use of a water source.
41
Mekong River Commission. "Mandate." Mekong River Commission. 29 Mar. 2019 <http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/mandate>.
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REFERENCES Barry, Christian, and Pablo Gilabert. “Does Global Egalitarianism Provide an Impractical and Unattractive Ideal of Justice?” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 84, no. 5, 2008, pp. 1025–1039. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25144935. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Fourth Edition. Oxford. 1994. Carius, Alexander, Aaron T. Wolf, Diana Nenz, Oliver Hensengerth, Julie E. Watson, Elsa Semmling, and Janine Uhlmannsiek. Transboundary Cooperation and Hydropower Development. Rep. Vientiane: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2014. CEO Water Mandate. "What Do "Water Scarcity", "Water Stress", and "Water Risk" Actually Mean?" Understanding Key Water Stewardship Terms. UN Global Compact. 29 Mar. 2019 <https://ceowatermandate.org/terminology/>. Dore, John, Louis Lebel, and Francois Molle. "A framework for analysing transboundary water governance complexes, illustrated in the Mekong Region." Journal of Hydrology 466-467 (2012): 23-36. Fabre, Cecil. “Global Distributive Justice: An Egalitarian Perspective.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 35:sup1, 2005, pp.139-164, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2005.10716852. FAO. 2016. AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Fekete, Balázs M., and János J. Bogárdi. "Role of engineering in sustainable water management." Earth Perspectives 2 (2015). Gleick, Peter H."Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security." International Security, vol. 18 no. 1, 1993, pp. 79-112. Project MUSE, muse.jhu.edu/article/447074. Goitom, Gebreluel (2014) Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa's Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?, The Washington Quarterly, 37:2, 25-37, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2014.926207 Hussein, Hussam, Filippo Menga, and Francesca Greco. "Monitoring Transboundary Water Cooperation in SDG 6.5.2: How a Critical Hydropolitics Approach Can Spot Inequitable Outcomes." Sustainability 10 (2018): 3640. Keith, Bruce, et al. “Considerations in Managing the Fill Rate of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Reservoir Using a System Dynamics Approach.” The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, vol. 14, no. 1, Jan. 2017, pp. 33–43, doi:10.1177/1548512916680780. Mazzoni, Annamaria, Essam Heggy, and Giovanni Scabbia. “Forecasting water budget deficits and groundwater depletion in the main fossil aquifer systems in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.”Global Environmental Change, vol. 53, 2018, pp 157-173. McCormick, Thomas R. "Principles of Bioethics." Bioethic Tools: Principles of Bioethics. 1 Oct. 2013. University of Washington School of Medicine. 29 Mar. 2019 <https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/tools/princpl.html>. McKinney, Daene. “Transboundary Water Challenges: Case Studies.” UT Austin, Center for Research in Water Resources, 2011. <https://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/ce397/Readings/TransboundaryWaterIssues.pdf> Mekonnen, Mesfin, and Arjen Hoekstra. “Four Billion People Facing Extreme Water Scarcity.” Science Advances, vol. 2, no. 2, 2016, DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.1500323 Mekong River Commission. "Mandate." Mekong River Commission. 29 Mar. 2019 <http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/mandate>. Noaman, N. M., and D. El Quosy. "Hydrology of the Nile and Ancient Agriculture." Irrigated Agriculture in Egypt. Switzerland: Springer International, 2017. 9-28. Rossi, Giuseppe. "Achieving ethical responsibilities in water management: A challenge." Agricultural Water Management 147 (2015): 96-102.
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Swain, Ashok. “The Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too Little Broth.” SAIS Review, vol. 22, no. 2, 2002, pp. 293–308., doi:10.1353/sais.2002.0044. UN Water. “Transboundary Waters | UN-Water.” UN Water, United Nations, www.unwater.org/waterfacts/transboundary-waters/. Vollmer, Ruth, et al. “Institutional Capacity Development in Transboundary Water Management.” UNESCO, 2009, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000181792
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BROOKE HELSTROM
A Mixed Blessing: Colonialist Legacies and the Natural Resource Curse Theory in Botswana and Angola USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, and Ethical Inquiry May 2019
ABSTRACT: A country’s level of natural resource endowment is often related to its levels of political and economic growth. According to natural resource curse theory, countries with abundant natural resources tend to grow less rapidly and are more conflict-prone than countries with resource-scarce economies. Most academic literature on the resource curse concludes that good governance determines the extent that resource abundance contributes to growth. Through examination of political and economic factors, one can determine whether natural resource abundance will be a blessing or a curse for a specific country. I will argue that researchers must examine factors beyond political and economic climate when labeling a country as either resource-blessed or resource-cursed. Because of Botswana’s large diamond endowment and relatively stable democracy, researchers have dubbed the country as an exception to the resource curse. On the other hand, Angola’s diamond and oil endowment, coupled with its conflict ridden past, have led researchers to dub the country as resource-cursed. The difference between Angola’s and Botswana’s resource management is also due to their colonial pasts. The difference in colonization tactics by Portugal in Angola and Britain in Botswana not only helped shape each country’s post-independent state, but directly influenced each country’s natural resource wealth management.
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I. INTRODUCTION Most natural resource curse literature that exists today focuses on contemporary political and economic factors. However, in order to properly account for the divergent outcomes of these countries, we must examine factors outside those already common in natural resource curse theory. Historical colonial legacies have helped determine the political and social outcomes of each country in the post-colonial era.1 The Portuguese in Angola had very different colonization tactics than those of the British in Botswana. Directly after its independence, Angola entered into a 27year civil war. The country’s potential for growth was quickly dampened by corruption. Contrarily, Botswana, a country with similar geography and resources, entered a period of relatively strong democracy directly after its independence and has remained stable ever since. Generally, the demands for minerals and land made by colonial Europe often occurred at the expense of indigenous welfare.2 Examining a country’s economic and political influences without simultaneously examining the root of these influences does not merit a holistic analysis. Through the consideration of colonialist factors in this paper, my intention is not to perpetuate the narrative of green imperialism—which attributes environmental ideals as originating from colonialism. Europeans mistakenly did cause a lot of the issues that exist today in Africa. It would be inconsistent, however, to blame all of Angola’s resource curse on Portugal, subsequently connoting Portugal as the evil colonizer, while simultaneously attributing all credit of Botswana’s success to Batswanas. In both instances, the Motswana and Angolan governments have responsibility over their respective country’s plight or success. I by no means intend to redistribute all responsibility back to each country’s colonizer, as I believe that that would problematically restrict each country’s own autonomy. Dr. Slavoj Žižek lays out these concerns in his 2019 address at the Oxford Union, a student debating society in Oxford, England.3 Patronizing ways of speech that conclude ‘it’s not their fault, they’ve been victimized’ can be, in a way, insulting to the supposed victim. In the context of colonialism, pardoning a former colony of any responsibility is equally insulting. To deny complete responsibility is to deny the sovereign rights of autonomy and agency. Portugal and the presence of oil and diamonds are not the sole variables in Angola’s plight. Likewise, Britain and the presence of diamonds are not the sole variables in Botswana’s success. Therefore, in this paper, I merely aim to explore all causes of an issue—political, economic and historical. This paper does not contain any solutions; however, I emphasize the importance of the past in addition to the value of an accurate contemporary analysis. British and Portuguese colonialism have undeniably had huge impacts on both countries’ current state. To recognize their 1
Vimpi, B. (2013, May). Natural Resource Curse Theory: Angola and Botswana (Doctoral dissertation, Western Illinois University, 2013). Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://search.proquest.com/openview/0f034fdf620b082e76b8d76c4f07e74c/1?pq origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y (UMI No. 1538827). 2 Gilberthorpe, E. ed. Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods, Hilson, G. (2014). Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods . Surrey, UK: Ashgate at 2. 3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=545x4EldHlg. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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colonial legacies does not take away from Angola and Botswana’s autonomy and their ability to develop and make decisions as sovereign countries. I will be comparing the resource management of two resource-endowed countries— Botswana and Angola—first through an economic and political lens and then through an analysis of their colonial pasts. I will begin with brief and factual summaries of Angola’s history of conflict and Botswana’s history of peace, paying particular attention to the role played by natural resources in the presence (or absence) of conflicts. In the following section, I will discuss the common political (Rent-seeking) and economic (Dutch Disease) factors that lead to a resource curse or resource blessing and how these factors fit into the examples of Botswana and Angola. I will then extend this analysis to include colonial rule, examining the difference in each country’s precolonial rule, the difference in Portugal and Britain’s colonial strategies, and how the time of natural resource discovery impacted the country’s rates of development. I will conclude the paper by considering alternate strategies to cope with the challenges of resource-led development. II. COUNTRY PROFILES Both Angola and Botswana are resource-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1). The countries differ in population size—Botswana’s stable population of two million versus Angola’s rapidly growing population of 29 million suggests that Angola is catching up to its southern neighbors (Figure 2). Despite similar geography and natural resources, Angola and Botswana have very different social, economic and political histories. A further look into each country’s history will aid in our understanding of the resource curse in Angola and blessing in Botswana.
Figure 1. Souce: ArcGISonline.
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A. Angola Angola is a sub-Saharan African country with a population of approximately 29,700,000. It is classified as a lower middle income country, despite its bountiful natural resource mix. Petroleum, diamonds, agro-favorable land, a generous climate, and hydroelectric potential are all present in Angola.4,5 Angola’s oil industry is the second largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, second to Nigeria, and its diamond production is the fourth largest in the world. Outside of these two sectors however, Angola’s economy has been in recession for nearly a quarter century.6 The Portuguese arrived in Angola in 1483 and established a major trading arena for slaves in the 17th and 18th centuries. From the end of the colonial era (1975) to the end of Angola’s postcolonial civil war (2002), Angola experienced over four decades of almost constant conflict. The last colonial military campaigns ended in 1941, marking the beginning of Angola’s only period of peace in the 20th century. A mere 20 years later, in 1961, the first anti-colonial revolts began.7 Immediately after Angola received independence from Portugal in 1975, they descended into further war.8 Portugal’s ruling of the Angolan colony consisted of a “systematic policy of segregation.”9 The Portuguese divided the population into indigenas (indigenous peoples), assimilados (assimilated nonwhites), and Europeans. Indigenous peoples required identification cards, were subject to economic control, and lacked diplomatic rights. There was very little opportunity for assimilation. The struggle for independence from Portugal began in 1961 and did not succeed until 1974. The already divided indigenous population created three distinct nationalist movements, each with their own ideology and orientation. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which later received support from South Africa and the United States, lacked clear ideology. The second movement, Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), received international support from the Soviet Union and Cuba. The third initial movement was the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). These three separate and opposing groups deeply weakened the overall anti-colonialist movement and accentuated existing ideological and ethnic divisions.10 In January of 1975, the three nationalist groups signed the Alvor Accord with Portugal, which planned for elections to be held in November of that same year. However, the accord did not hold and heavy fighting broke out among the three movements. Portugal did not hand over power to any particular pro-independence movement, and intra-state conflict quickly broke out. MPLA defeated FNLA with support from Cuba in the 1970s. MPLA, lead by Agostino Neto, declared Angola independent and self-installed the new government on November 11th, 1975. War between the MPLA and UNITA lasted for 27 years, 4
“Angola.” The World Bank, 2019, data.worldbank.org/country/angola. Hodges, Tony. Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State. 2nd ed., Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2004 at 1. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 4. 8 Bauer, G., & Taylor, S. D. (2011). Politics in Southern Africa: Transition and Transformation (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner at 151. 9 Id. at 156. 10 Id. at 157-8. 5
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with two substantial attempts at peace in 1992 and 1994.11 Oil and diamond wealth fuelled the conflict between the rebel UNITA and the Angolan government. This large resource imbalance between both sides eventually gave the Angolan government an advantage, and the war ended in 2002 when Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, was assassinated.12 Angola’s long lasting armed conflict destroyed large parts of the country’s social and economic infrastructure.13 Nearly four million Angolans were displaced because of the war. Land mines were scattered along the countryside, which made cultivation of land impossible and contributed to a large number of amputees.14 Immediately after the civil war, Angola’s public health system was in disarray; in 2010, the life expectancy at birth was 39 years, and the the adult literacy rate was at 67%, one of the lowest overall rates in southern Africa.15 Since 2005, Angola has received billions of dollars in credit from China, Brazil, and several other European countries. Such funds have allowed Angola to increase oil production and have given the Angolan government some autonomy to govern.16 Angola’s economy is heavily dependent on the oil sector, which contributes about 50% of GDP and more than 70% of government revenue (Figure 3). Low oil prices and slow growth in non-oil sectors have reduced growth prospects in Angola. Corruption in extractive industries also poses a long-term economic threat.17 B. Botswana Botswana is a landlocked sub-Saharan Africa country with a population of just over two million (Figure 1).18 It is classified by the World Bank as upper middle income and is one of the most economically developed and stable countries in Africa.19, 20 Botswana is extremely ethnically homogeneous—about 80% of its population is Tswana.21 Botswana’s ethnic homogeneity, especially when compared to Angola’s heterogeneity, will be discussed in later sections of this paper. In pre-colonial Botswana, the primary form of wealth accumulation was via cattle (which is still the case today). The Kalahari desert does not necessarily provide a significant draw for European settlers and their dreams of African agriculture. Therefore, neither agricultural prospects, 11
Id. at 158. Hodges, supra n. 5 at 5. 13 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 152. 14 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 152-3. 15 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 153. 16 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 151-2. 17 “The World Factbook: Angola.” CIA World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 Feb. 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 18 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 91. 19 Turton, A. (2003). A SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. Wilson Center,(9), 75-87. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/feature_turton.pdf. 20 “Botswana.” The World Bank, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana. 21 Tswana are further divided into eight important subgroups and tribes (Bauer, 94). 12
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nor mineral prospects (diamonds were discovered in Orapa after independence in 1967) were attractions to the British settlers.22 The British proclaimed the land a protectorate called Bechuanaland in 1885. In 1962, Seretse Khama founded the Bechuanaland Democratic Party, later to become the Botswana Democratic Party, and became prime minister in 1965. After Britain’s mild colonization, Botswana had a peaceful transition of power; Bechuanaland was granted independence and Seretse Khama became the first president of Botswana in 1966. Since its independence, Botswana has held free and fair elections. Botswana is considered a multi democracy, although the Botswana Democratic party is still clearly favored.23 Recently, significant factionalism within political parties has increased—indicating signs of both a maturing political system and potentially negative future disputes.24 Post-independence, Botswana experienced enviable economic growth—mainly attributable to the exploitation of diamonds. In an attempt to diversify its economy, Botswana has invested in social services and infrastructure, as well as cultivated a high-end tourist industry.25 Although income disparities remain prominent, Botswana in general has benefited from economic growth. Until the beginning of the global recession in 2008, Botswana sustained one of the world’s highest economic growth rates since its independence in 1966. Through fiscal discipline and management, Botswana transformed itself from one of the poorest countries 50 years ago to its current status as an upper middle income country. Diamond mining has fueled much of Botswana’s economic expansion and is currently 25% of GDP (Figure 3). Botswana increasingly ranks as one of the least corrupt nations in sub-Saharan Africa.26 Although Botswana has been a leader in confronting the AIDS crisis, the still-high prevalence is a threat to economic gains.27, 28
22
Bauer, supra n. 8 at 95. Bauer, supra n. 8 at 91. 24 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 91-3. 25 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 91-3. 26 “The World Factbook: Botswana.” CIA World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 Feb. 2018, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html. 27 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 93. 28 World Factbook, supra n. 26. 23
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Figure 2: Percentage change of resident population compared to previous year. Data from World Bank, last updated July 6th, 2018.
Figure 3: A comparison of Botswana and Angolaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s GDP by sector of origin. Data from CIA World Factbook. Figure 3 shows where production takes place in an economy. The distribution gives the percentage contribution of agriculture, industry, and services to total GDP. Agriculture includes farming, fishing, and forestry. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, energy production, and construction. Services cover government activities, communications, transportation, finance, and all other private economic activities that do not produce material goods. Angola has a much higher percentage of industry GDP, which includes mining, than Botswanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s percentage. The most recent World Factbook data provided data from 2011 for Angola and data from 2017 for Botswana; more recent Angola GDP sector data was not publicly available. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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Angola’s location positions it well to formally integrate with other strong southern Africa economies. Angola also has great military capacity, existing transportation infrastructure, fertile lands, hydrological power, and oil reserves. Despite all of these features, Angola in the 1990s suffered from dramatic inequality and poor socioeconomic factors.29 Why Angola, a tremendously resource rich country, deviated so far from the path of Botswana, a similarly resource-rich country, must be analyzed from a political and economic lens. III. THE RESOURCE CURSE IN BOTSWANA AND ANGOLA Typical natural resource curse theory concludes that good governance determines the extent that resource abundance contributes to growth. Political and economic facets lead to either a resource curse or a resource blessing. In this section, I will discuss these conventional factors as they relate to Botswana and Angola. The term ‘natural resource curse’ was first coined by Richard Auty in 1993 in his book Sustaining Development in Mineral Economics.30 Natural resources play a vital role in the onset, duration and reconciliation process of armed conflict, as well as in a country’s stability and peacebuilding potential. According to natural resource curse theory, the more natural resources present in a country, the more prone a country is to conflict. Additionally, the greater the reliance on mineral exports, the slower a country’s economy grows. Between 1960-1990, the GDP per capita of mineral rich countries increased by 1.7%, while the growth of mineral poor countries was 2.5-3.5%.31 However, the absence of effective wealth management, not the abundance of a resource, is what stunts growth.32 Quality of regulation and anti-corruption policies, such as amount of transparency and accountability in the public sector, are important for effective wealth management.33 Natural resource abundance encourages poor wealth management, which in turn stunts economic and democratic growth. Conflict and trade are often closely linked—certain types of commodity tend to spread conflict and insecurity. The signs of natural resource curse and its subsequent conflicts are extremely pronounced in Africa; oil and diamonds have financed ethnic and regional conflicts in
29
Bauer, supra n. 8 at 153. Auty, Richard M. 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. London: Routledge. 31 Meijia, Paula., & Castel, Vincent. (October 2012). Could Oil Shine like Diamonds? How Botswana Avoided the Resource Curse and its Implications for a New Libya. African Development Bank,1-14. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Could Oil Shine like Diamonds How Botswana Avoided the Resource Curse and its Implications for a New Libya.pdf at 2. 32 Id. at 7. 33 Iimi, A. (2006). Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse? International Monetary Fund Working Paper, African Department,1-29. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06138.pdf. 30
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Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria.34, 35, 36 Many scholars on this matter have identified several symptoms of the resource curse—revenue volatility,37, 38, 39primary product export dependency or Dutch disease,40 poor institutional quality,41, 42, 43, 44inadequate policy and distribution management,45 poor education,46, 47 and embryonic technological systems.48, 49, 50 Resource abundant economies tend to suffer from Dutch disease, insufficient economic diversification, rent seeking and conflicts, corruption and undermined political institutions, as well as loose economic policies.51, 52 A. Economic and Political Factors When a country’s economy focuses on one booming sector (the natural resource/mineral sector), the competitiveness of other sectors (usually manufacturing and agriculture) diminishes.53, 54 The expression Dutch disease first emerged in the Economist in 1997 as a way to describe the 34
Pippard, T., & Dodds, F. (Eds.). (2005). Human and environmental security : an agenda for change. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com at 95. 35 Auty, Richard M., and Alan H. Gelb. 2001. “Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States.” In Auty, R. M., ed. Resource Abundance and Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press. 36 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 8. 37 Auty, Richard. “Resource Abundance and Economic Development: Improving the Performance of Resource-Rich Countries.” The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics, 1998. 38 Mikesell, Raymond. “Explaining the Resource Curse, with Special Reference to Mineral-Exporting Countries.” Resources Policy, vol. 23, no. 4, Dec. 1997, pp. 191–199. 39 Karl, Terry. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California Press, 1997. 40 Sachs, Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, Working Paper 5398.” National Bureau of Economic Research , Dec. 1995. 41 Atkinson, Giles, and Kirk Hamilton. “Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis.” Word Development, vol. 31, no. 11, Sept. 2003, pp. 1793–1807. 42 Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and the Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton University Press, 1995. 43 Mehlum, Halvor, et al. “Cursed by Resources or Institutions?” The World Economy, vol. 29, no. 8, Apr. 2006, pp. 1117–1131. 44 Ross, Michael. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, vol. 53, no. 3, Apr. 2001, pp. 325–361. 45 Torvik, Ragnar. “Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare.” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 67, no. 2, May 2001, pp. 455–470. 46 Gylfason, Thorvaldur et al. “A Mixed Blessing: Natural Resources and Economic Growth.” CEPR WP 1668, 1997, pp. 204–225. 47 Kronenberg, Tobias. “The Curse of Natural Resources in the Transition Economies.” Economies of Transition, vol. 12, no. 3, 2004, pp. 399–426. 48 Buttel, Frederick. “Ecological Modernization as Social Theory.” Geoforum, vol. 31, no. 1, Feb. 2000, pp. 57–65. 49 York, Richard, and Eugene Rosa. “Key Challenges to Ecological Modernization Theory.” Organization and Environment, vol. 16, no. 3, Sept. 2003, pp. 273–288. 50 Gilberthorpe, supra n. 2 at 3. 51 Iimi, supra n. 33 52 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 2. 53 Hodges, supra n. 5 at 156. 54 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 3. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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breakdown of the Netherland’s manufacturing sector after the discovery of natural gas fields.55, 56 the term describes the cause and effect relationship of quickly induced growth, a phenomenon that often appears in the mineral sector because of its tendency for quick growth post-discovery of natural resource.57, 58 As was the case in Angola, Dutch disease often occurs in the form of appreciated exchange rates, which have harmful effects on other non-oil and non-mineral sectors.59 Lack of economic diversity, which stems from Dutch disease, is an additional economic problem that contributes to the natural resource curse. Economies that are resource abundant tend to overemphasize the importance of their resource/mineral sector, too highly depending on a mineral product in their market cycle.60 Angola in particular suffers from a lack of economic diversity; all non-oil sectors were extremely underdeveloped. Starting in the 1970s, the country’s economy was dependent on revenues from the oil industry, and these revenues were used to finance the oil industry itself.61 In addition, in the exchange-rates effects of the Dutch disease phenomenon, high oil revenues seem “to encourage complacency about the dismal state of the rest of the economy.”62 This state of complacency is evident in Angola by the lack of investment in social and physical infrastructure. This negative feedback loop created an environment of instability and insecurity. Terry Karl, in his 1997 book The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, argues that commodity dependence not only contributes to economic instability, but also shapes social class and the nature of regimes. Rents from such mineral exploitation go mainly to the state, suggesting that mineral economies are related to the relationship between state and society.63, 64 In the 1990s, the oil industry in Angola enabled UNITA to sustain a system of public support. Similarly, diamond production allowed UNITA to sustain its regime after the loss of international support due to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa.65 Thus, Angolan officials used their resources only for the sponsorship of conflict, failing to invest in economic diversification or development of human capital. Furthermore, a lack of stability and intergenerational equity creates uncertain long-term sustainability for natural resource-led economies. Botswana’s economy is dependent on a nonrenewable resource (diamonds), which causes a constant trade off between current and future revenue.66 The presence of highly-valued commodities such as oil and diamonds encourages
55
"The Dutch Disease" (November 26, 1977). The Economist, pp. 82–83. Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 16. 57 Hodges, supra n. 5 at 3. 58 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 17. 59 Hodges, supra n. 5 at 156. 60 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 3. 61 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 32. 62 Hodges, supra n. 5 at 156. 63 Hodges, supra n. 5 at 3. 64 Karl, supra n. 39. 65 Hodges, supra n. 5 at 100-41 66 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 3. 56
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“predatory warlords and politicians” to seek rental property.67 In Angola, such warlords and politicians took the form of European colonizers. B. Resource Curse in Angola Angola’s abundance of natural resources elongated their civil war. Oils and diamonds proved powerful loot-seeking motives and financed the war effort on both sides.68 Counterintuitively, Angola’s civil war preserved their part of the Okavango Delta. The prevalence of unexploded landmines around the delta hindered industrial developers and human settlers from building around the fragile ecosystem. After the civil war, Angola suffered, and continues to suffer, from poor governance and low social inclusion. Shadow war economies of smugglers and terrorists plagued the country along trade routes and in the form of criminal networks.69 Such corrupt institutions exploit a country’s fragile state post-civil war. The war destroyed much of Angola’s already limited social and economic infrastructure. Land mines littered along the countryside prevented farmers from growing food. Post-war, Angola stop receiving food donations from international donors. No more donations, coupled with the country’s inability to cultivate land, left half of Angolans undernourished.70 Difficult transitions post-war created stark dichotomies between a small elite (the ruling party) and a poor majority. Tony Hodges in Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, states that Angola was attempting a quadruple transition post-war: (1) war to peace and reconciliation; (2) humanitarian emergency to rehabilitation and development; (3) authoritarian one party system to pluralist democracy; (4) command economy to one based on laws of market.71 C. Resource Blessing in Botswana Botswana’s experience with wealth management contrasts greatly with Angola’s. Most literature claims that Botswana escaped the resource curse because of its good governance, stable economy and high economic diversification. This, to some extent, is true. Despite it being one of the largest producers of diamonds in the world, Botswana turned the curse into a blessing.72 There is no single explanation as to how Botswana has prospered. Botswana has maintained a stable economic balance between its dependence on diamonds and export of cattle.73 Botswana was one of the 25 poorest countries in the world, yet became an upper-middle income economy in 1998, and reached a per capita GDP of 9,200 USD in 2004.74 Similar to the “developmental states of 67
Pippard, supra n. 34 at 95. Bauer, supra n. 8 at 154. 69 Pippard, supra n. 34 at 95. 70 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 152-3. 71 Hodges, supra n. 5 at 199. 72 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 2. 73 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 36. 74 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 2. 68
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East Asia, Botswana has been labeled an African ‘miracle’ by some observers.”75, 76 Good governance, political stability and strong fiscal discipline all contributed to Botswana’s escape of the curse.77 According to economists Paula Ximena Mejia and Vincent Castel, good management of its natural resource wealth took a three-pronged approach: (1) Botswana pursued economic diversification, (2) de-linked expenditure from revenues to make resource revenue less susceptible to price fluctuations, and (3) invested in surplus revenue for future generations.78 The government has used revenues from the diamond industry towards economic development, encouraging foreign investment of goods and services.79 Investment in physical and human capital is also an important component to Botswana’s success.80 These policies worked in Botswana because of good governance and the remarkable leadership skills of early presidents.81, 82 V. COLONIZATION AND THE RESOURCE CURSE Effectiveness of governance determines whether natural resource abundance will be a blessing or a curse. Weak governance exacerbates political and economic factors and ultimately leads to the failure of institutions.83 However, one must look beyond these surface level factors when examining the reasons why a country experiences institutional failures. Natural resource curse analysis of Angola and Botswana should include the consideration of colonialist factors. Prior to colonial rule, Botswana and Angola had very different social and economic policies. Democratic values were prevalent in Botswana. Angola, on the other hand, did not exist as one cohesive country prior to Portugal’s arrival. The land was made up of Kingdoms that did not speak the same language.84 This hierarchical structure centered around each chief. While not as democratic as Botswana’s pre-colonial state, Angola’s pre-colonial kingdoms were extremely successful. Angola’s kingdoms had a high potential for peaceful development and advancement.85, 86 This could suggest that the degree of change endured by the host country plays a role in their post-independence success. Because of Botswana’s relative cultural homogeneity and presence of democratic processes prior to Britain’s arrival, not too much changed while under British colonial rule. This made for an easier transition once the British left. Angola experienced a much greater magnitude of change from their prior state to their colonized state. Portugal, quite literally, created 75
Bauer, supra n. 8 at 92. Samatar, Abdi Ismail. An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonialist Legacy in Botswana Development. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. 1999. 77 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 6. 78 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 2. 79 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 3-37. 80 Leith , J. Clark. Why Botswana Prospered . McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005. 81 Meiji, supra n. 31 at 2. 82 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 93. 83 Pippard, supra n. 34 at 95. 84 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 41. 85 Tvedton, I. (1997). Angola—Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 86 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 42. 76
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the state of Angola. This sharp contrast perhaps contributed to Angola’s struggle postindependence. Difference in Portuguese and British colonial strategies played a role in the effectiveness of the post-independent political systems of Angola and Botswana. Portugal’s colonialist tactics were lacking in a single strategy. After the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, European countries divided up Africa. Portugal, one of the fourteen countries present at the conference, was mainly interested in economic gain. With no single colonization policy, Portugal’s main interest was to extract riches from its colonies. They did just this—through taxation, forced labor and cultivation of marketable crops like cotton.87, 88Portugal divided the population and provided rights and privileges to a small minority elite, ‘assimilados.’ The divided Angolan population had very little opportunity for assimilation. Unlike Botswana, native leaders played very little role in the administration of the colony. Angolans also had very limited access to health services.89 After independence, Angola inherited these restricted and discriminatory policies. Portugal created the weak state of Angola, as prior to its colonization, the state of Angola effectively did not exist. This weakness prompted a civil war, corrupt institutions and criminal networks. Terrorists take advantage of weak states and exploit the lack of transparency—such lack of transparency is a remnant of Portugal’s prejudicial colonialism.90, 91Angola’s resource management policies as an independent state reflect Portugal’s colonial legacy— they are highly corrupted policies that benefit the small elite. Britain’s colonial strategy was very different from Portugal’s, as it allowed for some autonomy. Britain’s more gentle colonialist policies aided in Botswana’s post-independence success and effective wealth management strategy. To Britain, Botswana itself was of little economic interest—the colonizers formed the British Protectorate of Botswana to protect their larger protectorate of South Africa against the Germans, who had annexed Namibia after the Berlin Conference in 1885. Britain’s primary interest in Botswana was its use as a “road to the interior” of South Africa.92, 93 This minor interest contrasts sharply with Portugal’s high economic interest in Angola. Britain allowed the kgotla, Botswana’s political and judicial system, to remain, which gave power to local chiefs and other legal institutions.94 The Tswana elite were able to create national institutions that did not conflict with regional interests.95 Furthermore, Botswana’s
87
Guus, M. and David, B. (2004). Angola from past to present: From military peace to social justice? The Angolan peace process. Conciliation Resources. 10-15. 88 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 43. 89 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 156. 90 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 45. 91 Pippard, supra n. 34 at 95. 92 Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2001). An African Success Story: Botswana. Retrieved on February, 2013 from http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/284. 1-53. 93 Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 46. 94 Bauer, supra n. 8 at 93. 95 Orenstein, M. (2009). Botswana, Comparative National System Report. Retrieved on January 2013, from http://www.mitchellorenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Botswana.pdf. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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peaceful transition to power in 1966 avoided the need to use natural resources as weapons. This relatively mild colonization thus relied on indigenous leaders and durable judicial practices, creating a much less hostile environment than the one cultivated by Portugal in Angola. The time period when natural resources are discovered plays a critical role in a country’s resource management policy. Ali A. Mazrui analyzes the relationship between natural resource discovery and democracy: if natural resources are discovered after democracy has started to mature, then the discovery will further stabilize the country. If discovery comes before democratization, the discovery withholds democratic progress.96, 97 In Angola, the Belgian oil company Petrofina discovered oil in 1955 in the Kwanza Basin, 20 years before the end of the colonial empire. Oil quickly became the central economic focus of the Angolan economy—by 1973, it was Angola’s principle export and remained so throughout the entirety of its colonial period.98 In Botswana, diamonds were discovered in 1967 by De Beers in Orapa, after democratic institutions had already been established by an independent Botswana. Rent-seekers want to take advantage of resource-rich, unstable economies. Portugal did just this with Angola; Angola then tunnelled into a cycle of inefficient transitions and instability. Because of the opportune timing of diamond discovery in Botswana, no rent-seekers entered the country. Trading conflict minerals more often than not involves european brokers. This did not occur in Botswana, as diamonds were discovered after independence, therefore excluding European middle men.99 CONCLUSION Examining colonial legacies and their relation to this phenomenon provides a broader and more accurate analysis of natural resource curse theory. Generally, it is quite difficult to cope with the challenges of resource-led development. The modern era of resource extraction, dominated by globalization, requires a new discourse around Sustainable development and must recognize its previous colonial atrocities, and focus on how to facilitate economic and social growth while encouraging autonomy. Big multinational corporations can and should adhere to voluntary codes such as the Extractive Transparency Initiative and the UN Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UNREDD) framework.100 Corporate needs must be balanced with the needs of local communities, as unfortunately, market economic factors have historically preceded environmental and local needs. Now, I think it is better understood that commercial extraction can negatively affect indigenous livelihoods, and yet, indigenous economies remain excluded from the mainstream economy.101 Indigenous populations must be acutely considered in resource led development. 96
Mazrui, Ali. (2011). Democracy and the Politics of Petroleum: Comparative African Perspectives. The Guardian. Vimpi, supra n. 1 at 62. 98 Shaxson, N. (2005) Angola’s Homegrown Answers to the “Resource Curse.” French Institute of International Relations, 51-102. 99 Pippard, supra n. 34 at 95. 100 Gilberthorpe, supra n. 2 at 2. 101 Id. at 3. 97
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REFERENCES Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2001). An African Success Story: Botswana. Retrieved on February, 2013 from http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/284. 1-53. “Angola .” The World Bank , 2019, data.worldbank.org/country/angola. Atkinson, Giles, and Kirk Hamilton. “Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis .” Word Development, vol. 31, no. 11, Sept. 2003, pp. 1793–1807. Auty, Richard M. 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. London: Routledge. Auty, Richard. “Resource Abundance and Economic Development: Improving the Performance of Resource-Rich Countries.” The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics, 1998. Auty, Richard M., and Alan H. Gelb. 2001. “Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States.” In Auty, R. M., ed. Resource Abundance and Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press. Bauer, G., & Taylor, S. D. (2011). Politics in Southern Africa: Transition and Transformation (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. “Botswana.” The World Bank, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana. Buttel, Frederick. “Ecological Modernization as Social Theory .” Geoforum , vol. 31, no. 1, Feb. 2000, pp. 57–65. Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and the Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton University Press, 1995. Gilberthorpe, E ed.Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods Hilson, G. (2014). Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods ). Surrey, UK: Ashgate. Guus, M. and David, B. (2004). Angola from past to present: From military peace to social justice? The Angolan peace process. Conciliation Resources. 10-15. Gylfason, Thorvaldur et al. “A Mixed Blessing: Natural Resources and Economic Growth .” CEPR WP 1668, 1997, pp. 204–225. Hodges, Tony. Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State . 2nd ed., Fridtjof Nansen Institute , 2004. Iimi, A. (2006). Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse? International Monetary Fund Working Paper, African Department,1-29. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06138.pdf. Karl, Terry. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California Press, 1997. Kronenberg, Tobias. “The Curse of Natural Resources in the Transition Economies.” Economies of Transition, vol. 12, no. 3, 2004, pp. 399–426. Leith , J. Clark. Why Botswana Prospered . McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005. Mazrui, Ali. (2011). Democracy and the Politics of Petroleum: Comparative African Perspectives. The Guardian. Retrieved on March 2013, from http://www.guardiannewsngr.com. Meijia, Paula., & Castel, Vincent. (October 2012). Could Oil Shine like Diamonds? How Botswana Avoided the Resource Curse and its Implications for a New Libya. African Development Bank,1-14. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Could Oil Shine like Diamonds - How Botswana Avoided the Resource Curse and its Implications for a New Libya.pdf. Mehlum, Halvor, et al. “Cursed by Resources or Institutions?” The World Economy, vol. 29, no. 8, Apr. 2006, pp. 1117–1131. Mikesell, Raymond. “Explaining the Resource Curse, with Special Reference to Mineral-Exporting Countries.” Resources Policy, vol. 23, no. 4, Dec. 1997, pp. 191–199. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2018: U.S. Geological Survey, January 2018. Orenstein, M. (2009). Botswana, Comparative National System Report. Retrieved on January 2013, from http://www.mitchellorenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Botswana.pdf. Pippard, T., & Dodds, F. (Eds.). (2005). Human and environmental security : an agenda for change. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com. Ross, Michael. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, vol. 53, no. 3, Apr. 2001, pp. 325–361. Sachs, Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, Working Paper 5398.” National Bureau of Economic Research , Dec. 1995. Samatar, Abdi Ismail. An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonialist Legacy in Botswana Development. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. 1999.
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Shaxson, N. (2005) Angola’s Homegrown Answers to the “Resource Curse.” French Institute of International Relations, 51-102. "The Dutch Disease" (November 26, 1977). The Economist, pp. 82–83. “The World Factbook: Angola.” CIA World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 Feb. 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. “The World Factbook: Botswana.” CIA World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 Feb. 2018, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html. Torvik, Ragnar. “Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare.” Journal of Development Economics , vol. 67, no. 2, May 2001, pp. 455–470. Turton, A. (2003). A SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. Wilson Center,(9), 75-87. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/feature_turton.pdf. Tvedton, I. (1997). Angola—Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Vimpi, B. (2013, May). Natural Resource Course Theory: Angola and Botswana (Doctoral dissertation, Western Illinois University, 2013). Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://search.proquest.com/openview/0f034fdf620b082e76b8d76c4f07e74c/1?pqorigsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y (UMI No. 1538827) York, Richard, and Eugene Rosa. “Key Challenges to Ecological Modernization Theory.” Organization and Environment , vol. 16, no. 3, Sept. 2003, pp. 273–288. Žižek, Slavoj. “Full Address and Q&A | Oxford Union,” YouTube video, 1:15:07, 1. Jan. 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=545x4EldHlg.
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REFLECTION My research experience with the USC-UNESCO journal cohort was simultaneously inspiring and grounding. My initial proposal was overly ambitious; I had intended to analyze environmental peacebuilding from all angles, and to apply the concepts to the countries of Botswana, Angola, and Namibia. This was partly inspired by time studying at the University of Botswana in Gaborone, and by my interest in the Okavango Delta as a shared vital natural resource between the three countries. I quickly fell victim to the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Dunning Krugerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; effect: the idea that the less you know, the more confident you are in your abilities (thank you to cohort member Kurt for introducing this term to me). As I did more research, I became less confident in my abilities to perform research in my subject areas. With the help of Jonathan and the other cohort members, I narrowed down my subject area to Botswana and Angola and moved away from an environmental peacebuilding theme. As an Environmental Studies and Philosophy student, the fields of comparative international relations and economics were, and still are, quite foreign to me. I nevertheless enjoyed the research process. The infinite amount of literature on natural resource curse theory was sometimes disheartening. However, with each source I read, there was something new to learn and to incorporate into my paper. I learned to treat this infinite amount of literature not as a deterrent or intimidation factor, but as inspiration to keep on reading. My paper is very much a work in progress. I would like to further explore colonialist legacies and apply these concepts to other countries.
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VIRGINIA BULLINGTON
The Presence of the Past: Memory and Narratives of Sexual Violence of the Nanjing Massacre USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry May 2019
ABSTRACT: In this paper I explore through a feminist lens not only the importance of what a culture remembers, but how a culture remembers it, and what we can glean from the language used to describe instances of sexual violence in atrocity. Through my analysis of testimony from witnesses of the Nanjing Massacre and survey of scholarship on the event and aftermath, I have found that while the Nanjing Massacre has been a point of shame for China, it has also allowed China to identify as a victim to Japanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pre-war imperialism. Japanese denial of the atrocity prolongs this conflict in the minds of the victims, and I argue, continues to shape how China views and discusses this massacre. Furthermore, shifting concepts of gender and the rights of women in China also have a hand in shaping how survivors talk about their trauma. Although there is greater acceptance of victims of sexual violence, many interviewees remain cautious and emotional in retelling stories of sexual violence perpetrated against them or loved ones. Throughout this process I stress the importance of recognizing my own biases as a nonMandarin speaking individual, as well as the biases of the interviewer, and the way in which the interviews were conducted could influence how the interviewees responded to sensitive questions.
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INTRODUCTION Initially, I set out to use Nanjing as a case study to investigate how sexual violence discussed in testimony influences current concepts of gender. Throughout my research, however, I found it was more meaningful to examine instead the way narratives of sexual violence reflect current concepts of gender and evolve over time depending on the context in which they are told. I found that narrative regarding this massacre has shifted throughout the years in relation to concepts of gender, victimhood, and Chinese national identity. Because I only examined testimony given in the past ten years, I recognize that it may seem presumptive to make sweeping claims about the way in which these narratives have changed over time. However, from the material available through the Visual History Archive (VHA) of the Shoah Foundation1 filmed in 2012 and 2014, I have taken note of multiple instances wherein survivors acknowledge how changing social norms have influenced their comfort in speaking out about the violence they witnessed. Some interviewees admit that their interview is the first time they have ever spoken on these matters at all. From this, I inferred that societal norms in contemporary China as well as the interview environment contribute to the way a victim tells their story. Or, in other words, testimony is related to the context in which it is given. Finally, I was drawn to this study because it is interdisciplinary in a number of ways. First, it allows me to employ a study of language and narrative structure that is similar in nature to critical theory of literature, which I use as a method to conduct a historiographical study. More significantly, however, my research probes the idea that history is dependent upon the people who record it. Therefore oral history, that is history relayed by mouth from one person to another, embodies the flaws and nuances of the human experience in a vivid manner. Oral history is an extremely rich source to draw from because it is a performance based on memory shaped in part by emotion and is dependent on its audience and the space in which it is told. In this way, the manner in which the past is discussed can offer much insight to our present situation. Throughout my research I identified a few patterns that were present in multiple testimonies to help me prove this point. These were: 1. Shame associated with sexual violence has changed over time, in other words, witnesses expressed how being raped would have once brought dishonor upon a family, but times have changed and in China today this would not be the case. 2. The perception and portrayal of women as human rather than as property, resulting again from more progressive contemporary ideas about gender. 3. Rape as a symbol of Japanese domination over China 4. Disguise as a defense mechanism for vulnerable women. 5. Portrayal of Japanese soldiers in testimony, which reflects how deep and real the wounds of this massacre continue to be in China, especially compounded with the continued denial of the event by Japanese nationalists. The way in which survivors characterize the Japanese soldiers they encountered speaks to this ongoing tension. 1 The Shoah Foundation was founded by Steven Spielberg in 1994 to videotape and preserve the testimonies of survivors from the Holocaust, but its library has since grown to include over 55,000 video testimonies from other genocides and massacres, including the Rape of Nanjing.
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In this paper I discuss concrete policy that has solidified some of these shifts in gender equality as context, but I also think it crucial to identify other structures at play which influence the interview given. This is the actual interview environment, such as who the interviewer is, as well as the Chinese Confucian ethic of filial piety. What and how we remember is significant, and the stories we tell about our past are shaped by the present but also have the capacity to influence the future. As Marianne Hirsch aptly puts in her introduction to Signs, “What a culture remembers and what it chooses to forget are intricately bound up with issues of power and hegemony, and thus with gender.”2 Through my research, I also realized that gender, the binary of masculinity/femininity is deeply tied to the Chinese sense of national identity. Therefore, I also had to question the way in which survivors construct narratives regarding violence, especially of a sexual, gendered nature, highlights how the people of a nation view themselves as citizens and how they want to remember a shared past. Sexual violence narratives and their relationship to the idea and role gender plays in a society is just one avenue through which to explore how memory and oral history can be viewed as a performance, and the subjectivity of history. This is not to say that there is no objective truth in history, but rather the way in which we frame these truths through language and how much we choose to reveal reflect the context in which we are relating history. METHODOLOGY To begin, I would like to briefly outline my research process, specifically in regards to how I went about my survey of testimony. I would first like to note the format and logistics of the videos I have been viewing. All of the testimonies I watched are available through the VHA and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall. The Visual History Archive, which hosts these videos of testimony online, contains 30 testimonies translated from Mandarin to English of survivors of the Nanjing Massacre. They were all conducted in Mandarin by a male interviewer named Yanming Lu between 2012 and 2014.3 Diligent scholars at the Shoah Foundation have worked to index these videos with metadata, terms that allow their audience to navigate the wealth of their video collection. For example, one can use the indexing search tool to select a term, such as mistreatment and death, and then under this broad term, one is presented with more narrow options such as humiliation, sexual assaults, etc. which may have even more specific terms beneath them. One can select a term and an experience group, such as survivors and Nanjing, and get a list of all of the instances in testimony when, for example, witnesses are indexed to have mentioned threats of sexual violence. I would like to make it clear that the indexing process is a useful tool to more 2
Hirsch, Marianne, and Valerie Smith. “Feminism and Cultural Memory: An Introduction.” Signs, vol. 28, no. 1, 2002, pp. 1–19. 3 Shoah Foundation, USC. “USC SHOAH FOUNDATION CONDUCTS FINAL 27 INTERVIEWS FOR NANJING MASSACRE COLLECTION.” Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education, University of Southern California, 8 Feb. 2017, sfi.usc.edu/news/2017/02/13059-usc-shoah-foundation-conducts-final-27interviews-nanjing-massacre-collection. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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efficiently sort through so many hours of video, but it is not perfect. Not every mention or allusion to sexual violence is indexed, and some could be indexed under another term. When I searched for evidence of sexual violence in this manner, I primarily focused on moments when witnesses brought up topics such as sexual assault. The VHA has paid close attention to when interviewees hint at or allude to sexual violations, and have carefully indexed instances when interviewees will mention that the Japanese soldiers “were looking for beautiful young girls” or “dragged women away”4 as moments describing sexual violence. This attention to detail is crucial as it demonstrates how much can be obtained from these interviews if paying attention to the smallest nuances. While I endeavored to watch as much testimony as I could that touched on issues of sexual violence, I am certain I missed some discussion of it along the way. Because nuanced language matters in identifying recollection of sexual assault, as a nonMandarin speaker I recognize that my analysis is vulnerable to the discretion of Yanming Lu, the translator of each interview. Since I was reading subtitles translated from Chinese, I was receiving information through Lu, a third party. Still, Lu’s translations have been carefully vetted and should not be biased in any significant way. Other than the third parties who added the metadata and translated the interviews, the testimony from the Nanjing Massacre is a firsthand account. The survivors are speaking on their experiences. For this reason, it was a suitable archive for me to study the ways in which survivors recall traumatic instances of sexual violence. By tracing their personal narratives, we have the ability to analyze history as a story. This allows us to engage in social history, as well as a historiographical inquiry, as we can analyze how a survivor’s current context may influence their discussion of their lived past. Nanjing is also an interesting case study because the sexual violence committed during this massacre is central to how it is remembered. It is sometimes referred to as the “Rape of Nanjing,” but this is a contested term. Japan does not recognize it as such. Because of the clear societal divides in how Nanjing is remembered, for example between China and Japan, I can engage my framework to analyze not only the personal context that affects how a victim recalls testimony but the societal context, as well. Moroever, these testimonies were useful in my study because of the patterns and universality of the narratives. Needless to say, every witness was unique, however, there were certain experiences and uses of language that recurred. Some of the commonality of these narratives, such as the prevalence of stabbings and bayonettings by Japanese soldiers or the Japanese soldiers going from house to house in search of women, can be explained by the systematic way in which the Japanese launched these attacks. People were massacred in large groups in a repetitive manner by the Japanese. Therefore, it follows that many survivors share identical experiences. And while every witness portrayed their experiences in their own way, I was able to notice patterns in narrative constructions. One such example would be frequent usage of 4
Nanjing Collection, Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation. Accessed February 2019.
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the words “shame,” “humiliation,” and “pity,” or descriptions of women and girls disguising themselves to evade attention. These subtleties I viewed with a lens attuned to the social context of the massacre as well as how contemporary culture shapes these retellings. Finally, I examined how the massacre has been discussed in contemporary academic literature and its evolving role in the Chinese imagination, from its treatment in textbooks to public memorials. Also relevant to my research has been the complicated relationship Japan has to this massacre, as there are still fervent nationalists at the political and academic level that deny that these atrocities ever occurred. This research does not pretend to be quantitative, although I attempted to engage in a balanced and ordered method of study. Instead it is my own qualitative inquiry into the stakes of historiography and the intersection of gender and memory studies. For this reason, I have found it necessary to examine my own biases and gaps in understanding, as well as the ways in which environmental forces of the interview itself played out, such as the gender of the interviewer Yanming Lu, and the capacity for him to influence the construction of narratives. BACKGROUND INFORMATION After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, China descended into a chaotic power vacuum, riddled with warlords.5 Tensions emerged between two emerging political parties: the conservative, nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the budding Communist Party (CCP).6 In 1937, the country’s capital was located in Nanjing, and the government was headed by the KMT with the reluctant cooperation of the CCP, as collaboration was necessary in order to keep encroaching Japanese interests at bay. The conflict that would later lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War between China and Japan began in 1931 with the Japanese occupation of the southern region of Manchuria. Japanese forces had set up a puppet state called Manchukuo, and the Chinese feared further encroachment by the Imperial Army. Full-fledged war broke out in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge incident, which was a skirmish on a bridge just outside of Beijing. After this incident, the Japanese Imperial Army launched a full fledged invasion of China and by December of 1937, as Japanese forces drew nearer to the capital and invasion seemed unavoidable, KMT leader Chiang Kai Shek fled the city. By December 13, Japanese forces had stormed and begun occupying the capital in Nanjing.7 Initially, as F. Tillman Durdin, a correspondent for the New York Times wrote on December 17, the Japanese occupation was welcomed by civilians, and seen as the potential for a cessation of the “fearful bombardment” and a restoring of some sense of governmental structure since 5
Hotta, Eri. Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945. Palgrave Macmillan,, 2007, doi:10.1057/9780230609921. Elleman, Bruce A. “Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China.” Modern China 21.4 (1995): 450–480. Web. 7 Lew, Christopher R., and Leung, Pak-Wah. Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War . Second edition., The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2013. 6
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Chiang Kai Shek’s departure. However, it quickly became obvious that Japanese forces would be more than “severe,” as Durdin reports of “wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder of civilians, the eviction of Chinese from their homes, mass executions of war prisoners and the impressing of able-bodied men” in just two days after the occupation began.8 CHINESE CONCEPTS OF GENDER OVER TIME: SHAME AND HUMANITY This section will outline are the ways in which women are depicted in testimony as human, rather than as property meant to be traded through marriage. The empathy with which interviewees describe the violence women experienced acknowledges both the implications of these attacks (imbuing Chinese women with shame, or rendering them ineligible to marry or bear children, for example) and how views of victims have changed over time. I will employ both evidence and examples from testimony and dissect them, basing my analysis in historical context and theoretical literature on culture and women's development. Although interviews I devoted my time to studying are filmed nearly 80 years after the events of Nanjing, some witnesses are quite open in discussing their experiences. Some people, like Xiuying Qui, will even provide their opinion on Japanese soldiers and the events: “We would hide if we saw Japanese soldiers. They raped women in turns, even those who were pregnant. They stabbed some women to death. What a disgraceful behavior!”9 Qui is direct but efficient in her language; she uses the words “rape” and “stab” but does not add any gory detail. Furthermore, she does not fault or pity women in this telling, although she does shame the Japanese soldiers. This candidness and unflinching condemnation of the actions of the Japanese can be attributed in part to the way women’s roles in China have changed over time. However, the humiliation experienced by witnesses and survivors is still central to the narratives they weave, regardless of the time elapsed and current concepts of gender and marriage. This is exemplified in the testimony given by a 91 year old male survivor of the Nanjing Massacre named Changfa Wang, who describes how his sisters who had been raped by Japanese soldiers “felt embarrassed to tell others”10 so opted only to reveal their trauma to close family members. Yiying Ai, a female survivor also echoes the hopelessness and isolation that victims of sexual assault felt, as she recalls watching a woman commit suicide after being raped. “People at that time were very traditional and that woman considered it an unforgivable shame.”11 This particular quote has two fascinating prongs. The first is the suggestion that at that time there were cultural norms and traditions of thought that have now become unfashionable, which I will explore later on with an investigation into how initiatives to aid gender inequality in Communist China may 8
Durdin, F. Tillman. “ALL CAPTIVES SLAIN; Civilians Also Killed as the Japanese Spread Terror in Nanking.” New York Times, 18 Dec. 1937, p. 1. 9 Qui, Xiuying. Interview 52119, Segment 20, December 14, 2012 Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation. Accessed February 2019. 10 Wang, Changfa. Interview 53422, Segment 19, September 28, 2014 Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation. Accessed February 2019. 11 Ai, Yiying. Interview 53437, Segment 29, October 1, 2014 Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation. Accessed February 2019. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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have altered the way people conceptualize sexual violence and women’s rights. The second idea of note made plain in her testimony is that this woman felt that the shame of the violence committed against her by Japanese soldiers was her burden to bear. Rather than feeling that this crime reflected poorly on her aggressors, the implication of this “unforgivable shame” is that she must take on the responsibilities of this atrocity, rather than be viewed as an innocent victim. This troubling thought is brought up again in Wenying Chen’s testimony when she discusses watching her own sister be brutally gang raped and murdered. Through tears, she explains, “My third sister was so pathetic… It’s so humiliating and so sad… Her experience was so inhuman.”12 This memory provides more insight though, as Chen takes on two different perspectives. She describes her sister as “pathetic,” which reiterates the helplessness of these victims and their inability to exercise any kind of agency. Simultaneously, however, Chen does not blame his sister for her situation, as she describes her experience as “inhuman.” Therefore, Chen’s words reflect both an acknowledgement of the powerlessness of the girls and women attacked, but also recognize that this was a product of oppressive circumstances and not the fault of the victims. The shame Chen expresses is derived, then, as Qui may assert, more from the manner in which Japanese soldiers denied victims any dignity than from the victims themselves. This revelation is significant, especially considering that for a millennia, women in China were not generally afforded much dignity at all. As previously mentioned, a woman’s worth in dynastic society was inextricably tied to her virginity, which determined ability to marry and thus produce children. This idea is demonstrated in Wang’s testimony. He is recorded speaking on the rapes of his sisters, saying that “Such things that happened to my family became a family secret, and we never told anybody else. If we told others, you know, it was embarrassing and it may become more difficult for my sisters to marry someone.”13 Chinese marriage practices involved dowries and viewed women as pieces of property whose sole purpose was to provide domestically for their husbands and bear children to further his genetic line, and a woman who was raped would not be able to purely further this line. As Xiaorong Li writes in her article “Gender Inequality in China and Cultural Relativism,” “In the traditional family, a woman had no inheritance rights as a result of being perceived as not fully human; she was merely an instrument for housework and reproduction; she remained at home and was subjected to restrictive and humiliating rituals, enslaved by the father, brother(s), and husband.”14 This is evidenced by other cultural norms, such as footbinding, which was a painful process that involved breaking young girls’ toes to fold them under their soles with tight binding in order to achieve the appearance of daintier feet for aesthetic purposes. Cuilan Yi experienced the negative impacts of this tradition firsthand as he recollects how a man felt sympathy for his mother and decided to help their family: “He pitied my mom
12 Chen, Wenying. Interview 55255, Segments 14-15, December 18, 2015 Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation. Accessed February 2019. 13 Wang, supra n. 10 at Segment 12 14 Li Xiaorong. Gender Inequality in China and Cultural Relativism. In: Women, Culture, and Development. Oxford University Press; 1995. doi:10.1093/0198289642.003.0018
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when seeing her work so hard on her tiny feet.”15 However, keeping women immobile was evidently attractive, as many women felt obligated to adopt this modification or otherwise, according to Zhou Gizhen, “at the time, if you didn't bind your feet, no one would marry you.”16 This is another testament to how critical a marriage was to a woman’s identity in China at this time. Women were willing to undergo extremely painful body modifications in order to ensure that they would find a husband. Erego, widespread rape and the shame it produced deeply affected and offended Chinese women’s sense of value in society. We see this in how painful these memories appear to be for survivors, who make strong distinctions between the past and present, evident in the prefacing of “at the time” and suggest female feelings of repression and powerlessness. These subtle hints that marriage and virginity are not all that define women today and highlight the progress Chinese society has made in terms of gender equality and the treatment of women by cultural norms. In 1937, many of the oppressive notions of femininity, marriageability, and aesthetics that witnesses discuss were still prevalent in China. It was not until the implementation of the Marriage Law in 1950 by the Communist Party in China that equality of the sexes was made a priority. Under this law women were given equal rights in property holding, options of employment, and the chance to divorce.17 These political developments allow women to be viewed as more human in society, which is reflected in the ways that many survivors recount their experiences or the experiences of women in their lives as human ones. The shift women have undergone, from property to person can also be read in testimony, as Changfa Wang notes during his interview. When speaking on the rapes of his sisters he says that although the family long kept secret the trauma their daughters endured, “in modern society, it doesn’t matter now.”18 In modern society, Wang feels comfortable giving testimony about his personal experiences with sexual violence and Nanjing. His reference to the ways in which this narrative used to be constructed emphasizes how different its construction is now. Furthermore, as Qui hinted, Wang points out that today in China, being a victim of rape is not something to be ashamed of and will not hinder one in finding a spouse. This furthers the idea that the China that Wang remembers is not the same one in which he resides today, especially in terms of women’s repression. RAPED WOMEN, RAPED NATION, AND IMPACTS ON CHINESE MALENESS Although China has indeed experienced progress in terms of women’s equality, concepts of gender and notions of shame are still deeply tied to one another. Infanticide rates disproportionately affect female children, and only around 23% of the People’s Parliament is made 15
Yi, Cuilan. Interview 54325, Segment 14, Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation. Accessed February 2019. 16 Lim, Louisa. “Painful Memories for China's Footbinding Survivors.” NPR, NPR, 19 Mar. 2007, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=8966942. 17 Hong, Lawrence. The Role of Women in the People’s Republic of China: Legacy and Change. Social Problems. 1976;23(5):545-557. doi:10.1525/sp.1976.23.5.03a00040 18 Wang, supra 10 at Segments 64-66 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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up of women.19 These are just a couple of examples of how gender equality is still an issue that China faces. This is also exemplified in the ways in which the Rape of Nanjing is remembered, specifically in terms of how the female victims of rape have come to symbolize the occupation of the nation as a whole, and while survivors may not hold onto shame regarding their personal experiences, there is an element of national shame regarding the massacre that China has yet to reckon with. Indeed, while shame is often discussed by interviewees in the past tense in terms of inhumane treatment by Japanese soldiers, there is also profound shame in Chinese memory in terms of how widespread rape symbolized Japanese triumph over China. Victims, typically female, are seen as vulnerable objects that are then rendered dirty, immoral, and broken by acts of sexual violence. Male survivor Cuilan Yi remarks on the rape of two girls by Japanese soldiers “They were ruined. What a pity!”20 This, again, speaks to an archaic view that women exist in a world of binaries where they are goods that are either pure or impure, and either functional or nonfunctional. A rape is a pointed disruption of a woman’s perceived function in a community, and therefore works not only to “ruin” a woman but also the ability for her to fulfill her role and duty as a mother and wife. Furthermore, to speak to the genocidal aspect of this massacre and its implementation of rape, a woman who has been raped can no longer “purely” continue her family’s genetic line, as her violation renders her damaged. The enduring quality of this mindset is evidenced by the actions taken, and the profound silence that revolves around the topic of Chinese women who became pregnant as a result of such rapes committed by Japanese soldiers. As Iris Chang writes, “The subject of Chinese women impregnated by Japanese rapists in Nanjing is so sensitive that it has never been completely studied… Not a single Chinese woman has to this day come forward to admit that her child was the result of rape… One can only guess at the guilt, shame, and self-loathing that Chinese women endured when they faced the choice of raising a child they could not love or committing infanticide.”21 The dearth of literature on this subject matter signals how in the Chinese imagination, women become symbolic of nation, which works to dehumanize them and their experiences. For a Chinese woman to raise a child that was half Japanese would be a confirmation and representation of the violence and humiliation that not only the individual mother suffered, but that of the nation as a whole. As Veena Das writes in Social Suffering, “the woman’s body must be made to bear the signs of its possession by the enemy… a narrative trope… that equates the violation of the nation with the violation of its women.”22 This presents an intriguing perspective that views bodies and offspring as narratives unto themselves, with deep political implications.
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“China: The National People's Congress.” Women Political Leaders Global Forum, www.womenpoliticalleaders.org/parliament/china-the-national-people-s-congress/. 20 Yi, supra n. 15 at Segment 14. 21 Chang, Iris. The Rape Of Nanking The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. New York: Basic Books, 2012. 22 Kleinman, Arthur., Das, Veena., and Lock, Margaret M. Social Suffering . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Print. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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In other words, the possession of women’s bodies by the enemy and an invasion of land and property does not only reflect poorly on the wellbeing of a nation, but more specifically, works to emasculate male citizens. Therefore, female Chinese survivors represent a time of weakness for the Chinese masculine identity. Besides taking advantage of the vulnerability of women, rape on large scales represents the inability for the men in their lives to protect them, as Das goes on to explain: “The inscription of nationalist slogans on the bodies of women… or proclaiming possession of their bodies… would create a future memory by which men of the other community would never be able to forget that the women as territory had already been claimed and occupied by other men.”23 Nanjing was a moment for the Imperial Japanese Army to claim and occupy both China and Chinese women, and intentionally deprived Chinese men of their masculinity on a grand stage. Thus, as Ueno also argues, rather than view rape as a result of violent conflict, it is perhaps more accurate to see it as a weapon in its own right, intentionally and systematically deployed. “In reality rape in wartime frequently occurs in places where there is an audience… symbolically acting as the ultimate insult to men on the enemy side.”24 By ravaging a city and a people, the men whose “duty” is to guard, are revealed to be weak and incapable, violated women are a sign of this. This grand emasculation and defilement of Chinese identity occurred through a variety of avenues, which have become evident through certain recurring themes in testimony, including the tendency of Japanese soldiers to stab victims (a phallic, penetrative form of violence), the rape of daughters and wives in front of male family members, and the slaughter or torture of men who attempted to defend women.Take the narrative that female survivor Guixang Chen tells with clarity and poise. She begins by recalling that after being caught by Japanese soldiers, two elder female family members knelt on one knee and begged the soldiers to let her go. They complied, but a 14year-old peer of hers was not so lucky. “Her mother was too scared to beg for the life of her own daughter,” Chen remarks. Thus, the young girl was taken away by seven Japanese soldiers “and raped in her own house.” When the soldiers finally left, Chen and her family came into the room to find her dead and killed by a bayonet. “Seeing this, my uncle told my grandmother that they would leave the place because it was dangerous,” says Chen, but when her grandmother requested that he bring Chen along, he refused: “He thought I would bring disasters to him.”25 There are several salient elements to this story that point to how the violation of women continues to be perceived as an attack on the property of the nation and on Chinese male identity. The first component that resonates is the emphasis Chen places on ownership. The scene she sets is made even more atrocious because a woman cannot defend her own daughter, and this daughter is raped in her own house. This outrage reflects a greater outrage of Japanese occupation of China in general, as this massacre occurred on China’s own soil. Furthermore, it is relevant to note the frequency with which survivors describe stabbings and death by bayonet wounds. Japanese 23
Id. at 85 Ueno, Chizuko. Nationalism and gender. ISBS, 2004. 25 Chen, Guixiang. Interview 52115. Segment 7. Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation, December 2012. Accessed March 2019. 24
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soldiers had a tendency to stab and and murder victims by bayonet, and in this instance the sexual metaphor of her death by penetration of this violent, phallic symbol is not insignificant. Documents from the Nanjing Safety Zone recount one instance when a girl resisted rape and was stabbed to death with a bayonet instead. Another report recalls an old woman who was first raped and then “stabbed by a bayonet in her vagina and killed.”26 In many ways, this violent penetration with the sharp bayonet end functions in the same way that rape does. Both are done with a phallic instrument in order to colonize or lay claim to a body, both through violent, destructive means that are intended to desecrate. As Guixiang Chen later explains about Japanese soldiers, “wherever they went, they would loot everything.”27 This includes the bodies of women, as they take their chastity, ability to progenate, or their lives. Even when not directly related to rape, survivors have countless memories of being prodded, tortured, and threatened with bayonets. The prevalence of this specific weapon alludes to Japanese imperial aims of penetration and domination and the ways in which it has imprinted on Chinese memory. How does this imagery relate to the disintegration of Chinese male identity? We have also seen from Chen’s testimony the sinister way in which rape turns families against one another, and specifically men against women they deem to be dangerous or impure. In the scene Chen describes, an uncle disowns a niece, as he sees her as a potential threat, or something that could draw danger. His immediate urging to run away points to his desire to protect what little family he has left, which has also forced him to take stock of necessary eliminations for the good of the group. Das also examines this phenomenon, as she describes a common myth of sacrificing a daughter in order to maintain a family’s unsullied honor: “To be masculine when death was all around was to be able to hand death to your violated daughter without flinching.”28 Therefore, we can view the actions of Chen’s uncle as one last stab at salvaging his pieces of territory that have not yet been penetrated by Japanese imperial pursuits, and in doing so, his sense of manhood. DISGUISE It is not hard to imagine why Chen’s uncle would want to distance himself from her, or from any young female at this time in this place. A constantly recurring theme in testimony is the instance when Japanese soldiers burst into a home or refuge, or are marauding the streets in search of “young women” or “beautiful girls.” Simply being female was exceedingly dangerous, especially if you were young. Therefore, many interviewees remember girls disguising themselves as a survival technique. Suxia Fang describes in her testimony how her older sister, who was 16 at the time of the massacre, “put boiler ash on her face and covered her head by the veil so as to pretend to be an old woman.” Women and young girls are taught to conceal their beauty and youth, as in times of conflict it becomes a danger to them. As Fang goes on to explain, it was perilous not 26
Lu, Suping. They Were in Nanjing: the Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by American and British Nationals. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004. Print. 27 Chen, supra n. 25 at Segment 8 28 Das, supra n. 22 at 77 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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to dress down, “otherwise the Japanese soldiers would notice you if you were a young lady.”29 This emphasizes how the way females are viewed in societies makes them vulnerable, especially when faced with violent upheaval. Xiuhong Zhang’s testimony also sheds light on the peril and objectification that women’s appearances engendered, as she recalls how Japanese soldiers would “select the pretty ones. Give you water to wash your face until you were pretty. And then they’d pull her away, drag her. The ugly ones, they just shot them.”30 Thus, women were often faced with a decision between rape or death, as they are viewed as either being objects for pleasure and/or to be discarded. This decision is a cousin to the one previously discussed that faced women impregnated by rape. Oftentimes, the preservation of honor comes at the cost of one’s life. Death on one’s own terms may have appeared the more attractive option because even then, those that were raped were often murdered after, and thus there was little hope for surviving at all. This depiction of Japanese soldiers also brings up interesting questions regarding the relationship between honor and sexuality. Survivors’ descriptions and the questions that Lu asked emphasize the predatory, almost animalistic nature of Japanese soldiers. The way they are portrayed is as if they are demons, with some witnesses, such as Xiulan Guo, referring to them as “Japanese devils,”31 and Cuilan Yi lamenting that “I was so afraid. Those Japanese soldiers couldn’t be reasoned with.”32 Portraying Japanese soldiers as monsters, rather than men that are beyond human emotion or reason, allows Chinese survivors to reimagine and redefine the shame that they were made to feel. Rather than this massacre proving that Japanese men could best Chinese men, it is instead depicted as an immoral, ghastly performance beyond human imagination. In discussing the Japanese army in such terms, Chinese survivors are able to reclaim their experiences as victims of an atrocity, rather than losers of a battle. GENDER OF INTERVIEWER Noting the gender of the interviewer is also significant, as I am primarily interested in the construction of history and its influence of notions of gender. It is impossible to know, for instance, how a survivor would alter their story, consciously or unconsciously, depending on who they were dictating it to. The majority of the interviews available through the VHA on the Nanjing Massacre are conducted by a man named Yanming Lu. He works for the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall and conducts the interviews entirely in Mandarin. There are certain aspects of these interviews and their context that makes the gender of the interviewer and the interviewee a less important part of the general dynamic. While one may anticipate that women would be less inclined to vocalize their experiences with sexual violence to 29 Fang, Suxia. Interview 53432. Segments 16-17. Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation, October 1, 2014. Accessed March 2019. 30 Zhang, Xiuhong. Interview 52116. Segment 17. Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation, December 10, 2012. Accessed March 2019 31 Guo, Xiulan. Interview 52117. Segment 28. Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation, December 11, 2012. Accessed March 2019. 32 Yi, supra n. 15 at Segment 14
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a man, this does not appear to be the case in these interviews. I attribute this to two factors. The first being that perhaps the gender of the interviewer as a male is cancelled out by the age gap. There is a considerable difference in age between the interviewer, Lu, and his subjects. This is a significant factor when taking into account the tenant of filial piety, which is a central virtue in Confucian ethics. Confucianism continues to shape Chinese culture and society, as Mary Evelyn Tucker of Yale University writes, “The influence of Confucianism has been significant in political thought and institutions, social relationships and ritual exchange, educational philosophy and moral teaching, cultural attitudes, and historical interpretation.”33 Thus, the age of the interviewees allows survivors a degree of authority, as filial piety emphasizes importance of respecting and supporting the elders of a community or society. The second factor is related to these concepts of support and respect, as the nature of this particular interview environment is inherently and especially supportive and respectful of survivor’s stories. This is due to the institutions that are collecting these interviews. The American partner, the USC Shoah Foundation, as previously mentioned, is an educational non-profit committed to preserving the narratives of survivors of genocides and similarly categorizable conflicts. The Chinese institution supporting the collection of these interviews is the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall (also known as the Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders) in Nanjing, China. The Memorial Hall is an establishment sympathetic to the experiences of the survivors, and, as previously stated, prominently displays a death toll of 300,000 in bold lettering carved into a stone wall. Oftentimes, I noted, that Lu would ask specific questions about quantity, interrupting survivors to ask them “how many girls” were in Ginling College, or “how many Japanese soldiers” took a girl away by force. This reflects the controversial nature of the death toll, and an attempt to prove the volume of the atrocity. This is also seen in the way Lu will at times request that survivors qualify statements. In his interview with Cuilan Yi, after hearing about a Japanese soldier taking a girl away he asks, or states, according to the subtitle, “Took her away by force,” to which Yi responds “By force.”34 Another instance where Lu emphasizes the intensity of a particular event is when he asks Guixiang Chen how she felt when she first saw “the outrages committed by the Japanese soldiers.”35 Here, Lu already establishes how evil the Japanese acted, and it is just up to Chen to express how it made her feel. This speaks to my sense that the purpose of these interviews are not to interrogate subjects, but instead to memorialize them and their stories for the public and future generations to access. This context is important to consider because it all factors into an interviewee’s environment when giving testimony, which I believe influences how testimony is told.
33
Tucker, Mary Evelyn. “The Forum on Religion and Ecology at Yale.” Confucianism | Religion | Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology, Yale University School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, fore.yale.edu/religion/confucianism/. 34 Yi, supra n. 15 at Segment 10 35 Chen, supra n. 25 at Segment 8 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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CONCLUSION The purpose of my study was to examine the ways in which survivors of the Nanjing Massacre construct narratives of sexual violence that occurred during the Japanese occupation. I used this as a case study to question how the way in which we construct history is shaped by our current culture. I saw this evidenced through the development and specific word choice of narratives of the past told in the present. I surveyed how these narratives of sexual violence provided insight to how a society conceptualizes gender post-conflict, and whether or not the collective memory and trauma of sexual violence inflicted during a massacre influences these conceptualizations. The testimonies I viewed were filmed years after conflict had ended and illustrate how memory is shaped by the passage of time, current society, and the interview environment. Studying how survivors of the Nanjing Massacre chose to tell their stories in a current context allowed me to examine how this atrocity is remembered in contemporary China, as well as the interplay between historiography and gender studies. Through this study, I learned much about the unique and complicated nature of oral history and its place in the discipline of historiography as well as the ways in which testimonies can be viewed as performances of the past. Taking this into account was essential in providing a balanced view of the primary source material I was studying. Chizuko Ueno, a prominent Japanese feminist and critic of Japanese revisionist history, provided me with some invaluable tools with which to deconstruct and think critically about the biases that the interviewer, Lu, may have brought to the table and the significance of the relationship he develops with witnesses. She touches on this phenomenon in her book “Nationalism and Gender” translated from Japanese. She writes, in regards to power dynamics inherent in oral history, “People placed in a position of weakness tend to tell the story that the audience (as the more powerful party) wants to hear,”36 but this required further questioning of the forces at play in these interviews, including, perhaps most centrally, what does Yanming Lu want to hear? And how can we guess at his aims based on the context and the questions he asks? Can we draw any conclusions about current Chinese social norms from the ways in which he communicates with his subjects? I was most interested in studying specifically social norms regarding gender, and certainly, women’s roles and freedoms in Chinese society have progressed markedly since the 1930s. When considering the policies implemented by the CCP that emphasized women’s emancipation and equality and did away with restrictive marriage practices, one can safely say that the state of women’s rights in China is far better than it was a century ago. I question, however, whether these progressive ideas about women's roles and victimhood is solely attributable to the work of the CCP in regards to achieving gender equality. While domestic social policy is certainly a factor, could the evolution of women’s roles be more complex and layered? How much are shifting concepts of gender a result of China’s increased globalization? Could the relaxation of certain taboos surrounding sexual violence and women’s issues also be in reaction to Japan’s ongoing denial of
36
Ueno, supra n. 24 at 130 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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atrocity where women are positioned as martyrs in order to evoke feelings of indignation against Japanese nationalism? These questions guided me as I attempted to identify patterns in testimony and scrutinized how and why survivors chose to open up about instances of sexual violence, though many of them continue to be unanswered. While I watched people discuss the past, contemporary China and the world they occupy now was always in my peripheral vision. I found that for many, these interviews in a modern context offered survivors an opportunity to speak openly about experiences that for many decades were too shameful or painful to discuss. More progressive concepts of gender and women’s more varied roles as well as the supportive environment of the interview allowed many witnesses to tell stories they had concealed. Therefore, while memory of Nanjing may continue to be a complicated subject wrapped up in ethical issues of identity, gender, and violence, allowing survivors a platform on which to share their experiences is important to the healing process. For many witnesses this was the first chance they had had to use their voice and feel they were being listened to. In certain moments, this relief is palpable, as Wenying Chen tearfully exhales, she says, “I never talked about those things before. I never did.”37
37
Chen supra n. 12 USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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REFERENCES Chang, Iris. The Rape Of Nanking The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Print. “China: The National People's Congress.” Women Political Leaders Global Forum, www.womenpoliticalleaders.org/parliament/china-the-national-people-s-congress/. Durdin, F. Tillman. “ALL CAPTIVES SLAIN; Civilians Also Killed as the Japanese Spread Terror in Nanking.” New York Times, 18 Dec. 1937, p. 1. Elleman, Bruce A. “Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China.” Modern China 21.4 (1995): 450–480. Web. Hirsch, Marianne, and Valerie Smith. “Feminism and Cultural Memory: An Introduction.” Signs, vol. 28, no. 1, 2002, pp. 1–19. Hong, Lawrence. “The Role of Women in the People’s Republic of China: Legacy and Change.” Social Problems. 1976; 23(5):545-557. doi:10.1525/sp.1976.23.5.03a00040 Hotta, Eri. Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945. Palgrave Macmillan,, 2007, doi:10.1057/9780230609921. Kleinman, Arthur., Das, Veena., and Lock, Margaret M. Social Suffering . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Print. Lew, Christopher R., and Leung, Pak-Wah. Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War . Second edition., The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2013. Lim, Louisa. “Painful Memories for China's Footbinding Survivors.” NPR, NPR, 19 Mar. 2007, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=8966942. Li Xiaorong. “Gender Inequality in China and Cultural Relativism”. In: Women, Culture, and Development. Oxford University Press; 1995. doi:10.1093/0198289642.003.0018 Lu, Suping. They Were in Nanjing: the Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by American and British Nationals. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004. Print. Nanjing Collection, Visual History Archive, USC Shoah Foundation. Accessed February 2019. Shoah Foundation, USC. “USC SHOAH FOUNDATION CONDUCTS FINAL 27 INTERVIEWS FOR NANJING MASSACRE COLLECTION.” Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education, University of Southern California, 8 Feb. 2017, sfi.usc.edu/news/2017/02/13059-usc-shoah-foundation-conducts-final27-interviews-nanjing-massacre-collection. Tucker, Mary Evelyn. “The Forum on Religion and Ecology at Yale.” Confucianism | Religion | Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology, Yale University School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, fore.yale.edu/religion/confucianism/. Ueno, Chizuko. Nationalism and Gender. ISBS, 2004.
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REFLECTION My name is Virginia Bullington and I am a junior majoring in narrative studies. I have always been equally interested in history and literature, therefore, I thought that studying storytelling would be a great way to blend my two passions. I had my first experience conducting research as a fellow at the USC Shoah Foundation last summer where I examined narratives of sexual violence from the Armenian, Guatemalan, and Rwandan genocides and thought about how the way these experiences are talked about shape and are shaped by current contexts. I was not satisfied to end my work on this topic when the fall came; therefore, I applied to the USC-UNESCO Journal to continue my research, employing testimony from the Nanjing Massacre in China as a case study. I had never written anything that was more than 2,000 words, let alone a research paper to be published, but the process was extremely appealing to me, and I felt prepared from my time with the Shoah Foundation. The most challenging part of writing this paper and conducting this research was coming to terms with the enormity of the topic I had chosen. Oftentimes during meetings, my peers and I would discuss feeling wholly unqualified to discuss our chosen topics, and awed at the seemingly infinite amount of information available to us. Sifting through and selecting sources and avenues of analysis was difficult because I found every new insight I read about or came up with more fascinating than the last. Editing and reigning in my interest was hard, and I have Brooke and Jonathan to thank for helping me to pare down the scattered enthusiasm of my drafts. I am excited to continue pursuing my work in memory studies, gender, and historiography and hope to apply to a Fulbright to research the genocide of indigenous people in Chile as well as narratives of sexual violence and oppression that occurred during the coups in the Southern Cone region.
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ANUSHKA SAPRA
The Dilemma of Decision Making: Ethical Leadership, National Security and the Use and Abuse of Power USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry May 2019
ABSTRACT: There are some decisions taken by world leaders that stand out as historical milestones. They were decisions that were unbelievably hard to make and that, in theory, had multiple alternatives to them. These decisions shook entire communities and nations to their core. One such decision was taken by the former Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in 1984. The decision was Operation Blue Star, and the outcome affected a religious community and the entire country so deeply that remnants of it are still present today. I hope to bring light to this story, largely untold to the Western world, to illustrate an ethical paradox. This story demonstrates just how hard it can be to make a decision that can have consequences one could never hope to foresee at the time. It highlights the fact that while theoretically multiple alternatives exist, there is a myriad of complications one has to navigate before concluding that the number of actual viable solutions and options is extremely few. Applying the levels of analysis framework to Operation Blue Star demonstrates the significance of individual psychology and personality on decision making. Its interaction with ethics and morality creates a unique forum for the eventual actions to play out.
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CASE STUDY On June 2, 1984, the Indian army extricated Sikh extremist and fundamentalist preacher, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his armed militants, from Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab. In doing so, the army destroyed the structure of the Golden Temple, the holiest site of worship in the Sikh religion. The area of the Golden Temple was originally a lake in the midst of a quiet forest. The founder of Buddhism, Gautama Buddha, is said to have meditated and lived there. Long after his time, another philosopher and saint by the name of Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, spent time by the lake as well.1 After his passing, the lake continued to be visited by many of Nanak’s followers. Over the years, it started to take on the role of the central place of worship for Sikhs. Subsequent leadership of the religion began the construction of the physical temple around the lake, and the most important building of all, the Akal Takht, was built in the middle of the lake. For centuries, the temple had to be defended and protected against other religious powers. It was continually attacked and demolished by invaders, especially the Mughals, during the 1600 and 1700s. However, each time it was rebuilt and made even grander. Eventually, by the mid 1700s, the Sikhs had gained enough strength in numbers in order to be able to stand tall in the face of foreign invasions. The city of Amritsar is also extremely important to the Sikh religion. The original lake was called Amritsar which translates to “pool of ambrosial nectar.” The surrounding city was given the same name because the early residents believed that it used to be the abode of the gods who drank the water from the lake to harness their powers. There exists a divine presence in the city that permeates through the temple, the houses and everything in between. The preservation of the city and, of course, the temple is of great priority to the Sikh community because they have had to defend it before from foreign forces. They never fathomed having to protect the temple from domestic powers as well. Therefore, Operation Blue Star hit a soft spot of the Sikh religion in the place that hurt the most. The very need to carry out the operation can be traced to the Khalistan movement and one individual by the name of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Jarnail Singh was born in 1947 into a peasant family in a small village called Faridkot in Punjab, India. He attended a residential Sikh seminary growing up and eventually became the chief of the seminary in 1977. He took on the name of Bhindranwale, from the word Bhindran, which was the name of the village where the seminary was located. Bhindranwale was known for his charisma and acute knowledge of the scriptures. His extensive preaching of the Sikh religion and his speeches on politics and exposing the barbarity of the Indian government earned him fame within Sikh circles. He was looked upon as a leader of the Sikhs who had reminded them of their glorious past, great sacrifices and bold feats of destroying oppression, tyranny and injustice. His words kindled and awakened the inner spirits of the Sikhs and caused them to realize their political and religious slavery at the hands of the Indian government. The reminder of Sikh history and religious tenets inspired the Sikh people to become more religiously devout followers of their faith. People started to abandon drinking, smoking, cutting their hair and many other “immoral” 1
“The Golden Temple, Amritsar.” Sacred Sites, sacredsites.com/asia/india/golden_temple_amritsar.html. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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practices as termed by the Guru Granth Sahib, the holy scripture of the religion. There was widespread adoption of the Sikh religion. All of this, however, did not at all suit those who were keen on seeing the complete downfall of the Sikhs and their complete amalgamation into the folds of Hinduism. During the colonial era, the Sikh community, largely concentrated in Northern India, had been loyal to the British government until the Jallianwala Bagh massacre that took place in Amritsar in 1919. The massacre was in response to the Rowlatt Act, passed by the British government permitting incarceration without trial. Around 400 people were killed in the massacre and over 1000 were left injured.2 The Sikhs then turned their backs to the British and began to demand the creation of a separate Sikh state similar to the demands made by the All India Muslim League for Pakistan. While the League’s original purpose was to safeguard the political rights of Muslims in India, an early leader in the League, Muhammad Iqbal, was one of the first to propose (1930) the creation of a separate Muslim India. The Sikhs tried to do the same for their religion, however, their attempts to secure the same demands were unsuccessful because of two reasons. The first was the fact that there were way fewer Sikhs than Muslims in India and secondly, the Sikhs were not concentrated to a particular region that could be isolated as a separate state. The presence of party politics in Punjab was also a contributing factor to the divide between the Sikhs and the rest of the community. The two rival parties trying to establish supremacy in the region were the Akali Dal and the Indian National Congress (INC). The INC under Mrs. Gandhi’s term adopted an aggressive and confrontational approach to party politics and decided to break up the electorate to ensure the Akali Dal would never gain majority. To take on the Akali Dal leadership, she decided to foster a candidate of her own in the 1970s. This candidate was none other than Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale who, at the time, was just a Sikh preacher and orator. He was quite flamboyant and radical in his speeches, thus making Mrs. Gandhi believe that he could rally the public towards the INC and away from the Akali Dal. In a standoff against the Narankari (reformist Sikh movement) followers who were protesting against the government, which ended in a shooting, Bhindranwale cared for the wounded. The public saw him in a different light and he gained their trust and support. Things got out of hand when Bhindranwale realized his own power and potential. His preaching became less against these rival groups and more against the actions of the central government. The Congress and Mrs. Gandhi had created a force they could not control anymore. Bhindranwale’s preaching started to take a violent turn when he began to propagate his own brand of Sikhism that he believed would make the central government take him seriously and give in to his demands. This kind of Sikhism interpreted the roles of the followers as defenders of their faith, even if that meant undertaking violent measures to ensure its protection. This was completely in opposition to the peaceful interpretation of the religion that most Sikhs at the time
2
“Jallianwala Bagh Massacre.” 2011: 284–285. Print.
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practiced.3 The organization of ‘killer squads’ in villages around Punjab to remove any opposers to this new brand of Sikhism was the last straw. The communal violence resulted in a state of emergency being declared in Punjab and Bhindranwale and his followers ended up seeking refuge in the Golden Temple. They remained there for nearly a year, with the temple authorities providing them with the supplies needed to sustain themselves. Bhindranwale and his followers had entered the premises in mid-1983 and set up camp. They were wanted by the government for multiple acts of violence related to the larger movement taking place in India at the time: the demand for a separate Sikh state called Khalistan. After nearly a year of negotiations and deliberations with the extremists, then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, decided to order Bhindranwale’s forceful extrication via military infiltration. This operation was called Blue Star. On the evening of June 4, 1984, a curfew was imposed throughout the state of Punjab. Not only were people not allowed to move around but also food supply, amenities, water, electricity and communication were brought to a grinding halt as well. The operation started when the Indian army fired at one of the buildings of the Golden Temple, the ‘Guru Ram Das Langar,’ which is where the extremists were located.4 Amidst severe bombardment, a representative of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, an organization responsible for the management of gurudwaras, the term for Sikh temples, in North India, was sent to negotiate with Bhindranwale. However, he was unsuccessful in his attempts. Bhindranwale was resolute and could not be negotiated with. The next morning, the army continued to take back buildings under their control and slowly proceeded into the complex. The next obstacle in their path was the Akal Takht, the holiest center within the temple premises. Tanks were deployed, and while the structure was still standing at the end of the operation, it suffered serious damage. Ultimately, the army took back the entirety of the Golden Temple and Bhindranwale and his followers were killed in the crossfire. The Indian army lost around 85 soldiers and another 250 were injured.5 On the other hand, around 500 lives were lost and another 80 were injured. The former sparked a rebellion across the country against the government’s decision, including protests by Sikh soldiers in the army. The Sikh community in India and around the world were hurt, betrayed and shocked at the defilement and destruction of their place of worship. The aftermath of this operation was one even Mrs. Gandhi could not have foreseen. She was executed by her two Sikh bodyguards later that year in October. Riots continued even past her death, killing thousands of Sikhs around the country. Operation Blue Star might have been the singular most challenging and important decision Mrs. Gandhi had to make during her tenure. 3 “Religions - Sikhism: Sikh Beliefs.” BBC, BBC, 24 Sept. 2009, www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/sikhism/beliefs/beliefs.shtml. 4 Full Text of "Operation BlueStar - The Untold Story", archive.org/stream/OperationBluestarTheUntoldStory/OperationBluestar-TheUntoldStory_djvu.txt. 5 “33 Years of Operation Blue Star: The Big Story about the Incident.” Mid, 13 June 2017, www.midday.com/articles/32-years-of-operation-blue-star-the-big-story-about-the-incident/17298176.
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ALTERNATE CHOICE The psychology of decision makers is such that they tend to attribute their adversaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s actions to internal motivations and their own to the external circumstances they are operating in. In the case of Blue Star, the option taken prioritized national security and the safety and well-being of the Indian citizens in the face of a dangerous extremism. In Mrs. Gandhiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s opinion, given the circumstances, all other variables and considerations faded away when the safety of the country was in question. No matter what the cost or consequences, any decision that meant the elimination of the suspect with the least number of casualties was justified and valid. The Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Prakash Chandra Sethi, and the Minister of Defence, Mr. Venkataraman, at the time, apprised the Prime Minister of the potential repercussions of storming the temple. They laid out potential alternatives as courses of action that could be pursued. For example, some people believe laying siege to the Golden Temple and waiting for the rebels to come outside, which they would eventually have to do, could have been a smart course of action to pursue. No lives would have to be sacrificed, the Golden Temple would have remained untouched and the entire standoff would have ended with the eventual capture of Bhindranwale. However, the attempted negotiations with the extremists had been going on for almost a year. They had completely taken control of the temple grounds and established a firm base. The negotiations led by Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, a Sikh moderate, were going nowhere. Additionally, one might argue that the perception of the Indian army as weak and reliant on soft power was being perpetuated. It was also a risk to bank on the fact that the extremists would not resort to using violence themselves on the innocent public in and around the temple. Another option could have been to continue to negotiate with Bhindranwale with the hope that direct diplomacy would eventually succeed. Rogue states and rogue actors can be reformed and there have been countless cases of diplomatic success that can stand as evidence to corroborate this such as the eventual dismantling of the Libyan nuclear weapons program. Keeping up the negotiations with Bhindranwale could have eventually led to a successful compromise. However, this argument falls apart for two reasons. The first being that it is almost entirely operating under the presumption that Bhindranwale would eventually cave, a chance the Indian government would, and rightly so, have been unwilling to take. Secondly, from a more ideological standpoint, bargaining with terrorists is not something a state likes to engage in and therefore would like to avoid at all costs. It paints a picture of the state and national government as weak. The least desirable course of action would have been to stand clear of Bhindranwale and his followers while they were in the premises of the Golden Temple. To simply not engage with them during that period and then accost them after they had moved on. They were seeking refuge in the premises of the temple because they knew the Indian government and army were after them. They were refueling, recharging and recuperating after being on the run for a while and were under the assumption that a temple would be like a safe haven or a sanctuary from their enemies because no would dare chase after them with arms and ammunition in a place that sacred. They were proven wrong but if we had let them be proven right, they would have ultimately emerged from the Golden
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Temple and moved on. Therefore, a safe bet to make is that they would have given the Indian army multiple occasions to accost them in the future and that the one singular act of storming the temple was not the only chance to capture them. However, this would mean current inaction which is an undesirable option as “lack of action” is almost never a successful method of dealing with contested issues. The government of a country derives its authority from the actions it undertakes for the welfare and protection of its people. Deciding to not do so can undermine said authority and put the government in an uncomfortable position. These possible choices are indicative of larger dilemmas that world leaders face in tough situations. While a direct attack is one option, diplomacy, negotiation and compromise are others. These are all alternatives that are considered, and decisions are taken following multiple cost benefit and stakeholder analyses and after looking at the issue from various perspectives. In spite of these potential alternatives, each with their own pros and cons, Mrs. Gandhi was assured by the then Chief of Army Staff, Mr. Arun Vaidya, that entering and extricating Bhindranwale from the temple was the only way forward. Having been at the site itself, Vaidya had experienced firsthand the severity of the situation in Amritsar. He knew the negotiations with Bhindranwale were going nowhere and, therefore, advised the Prime Minister accordingly. AFTERMATH Shortly following Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984, there was an outbreak of violent riots against the Sikh community all over the country. These riots were planned by Congress supporters and activists. In Delhi, areas that had a high concentration of Sikhs were infiltrated by rioters who entered homes with iron rods, clubs, knives, and combustible material including kerosene.6 People were murdered, their houses and shops ransacked. The central government, with the Indian National Congress party in power, was severely criticized for not undertaking enough steps to counter these violent attacks.7 Some even accused them of coconspiring on the attacks since it was electoral lists that were used to find and locate Sikh families. The president of India at the time was Zail Singh, a Sikh man, which is ironic because the parliamentary form of government makes him simply a figurehead with no actual powers. The Sikh demand for Khalistan still exists today. With each new government in the states of Northern India, one can notice when the debate crops up and dies down, when it finds its way into party manifestos and when it’s clearly left out. The very concept and feasibility of secession is a hotly debated topic, especially in the case of India. The country’s travails with various ethnic and religious communities wanting a separate state to be created for them go back decades in history to the independence and partition of India and Pakistan by the British colonial powers. There was a lot of discussion over Kashmir and which country it would belong to. The citizens of 6 Singh, Dilpreet. “Sikh Genocide - November 1984.” Medium, Medium, 4 Nov. 2015, medium.com/@singhdilpreet/sikh-genocide-november-1984-3bf84ea3e381. 7 Van Dyke V. (1996) The Anti-Sikh Riots of 1984 in Delhi: Politicians, Criminals, and the Discourse of Communalism. In: Brass P.R. (eds) Riots and Pogroms. Palgrave Macmillan, London
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Kashmir wanted their own country. However, this remains an unsolved issue and the biggest source of conflict in the region even seventy years later. There were some cases of the demand for separate statehood within the country itself, in the South, which led to the creation of a new state— Telangana—in South India. However, Khalistan, if created, would be a separate country, not a state, thus making it a more complex matter.8 CONCLUSION When it comes to ethical decision making, there are a few questions to consider. The first is the degree of transparency that needs to be maintained with the public. Especially in democracies where the leadership holds their said office upon election by the people, one could argue that the people should have the right to know the details of a situation of such national significance. However, it is also important to consider that knowing too much can cause mass hysteria and the vocalization and projection of too many opinions of what should and shouldn’t be the due course of action. Upon electing their leader, the public has in turn handed over a portion of their decisionmaking power to that individual and his/her government. With that comes a level of recognition of a leader’s capabilities and faith in the fact that they will make decisions keeping the best interests and welfare of the people that put them in that position in mind. In the case of Operation Blue Star, the details of the siege on the Golden Temple by Bhindranwale and his followers as well as the eventual storming by the Indian army were public knowledge. The former made no effort to hide his intentions and made multiple efforts to broadcast them so as to garner public sympathy. However, the public was not party to the various alternatives and process of elimination Mrs. Gandhi and the government considered before the going in. There were speculations, but no official statements released until a week after the incident. The government issued an official press release declaring the reason behind their actions as the increasingly troubling demand for Khalistan by the Sikh separatists.9 Prior to the Operation, the government had not given much credence to the Khalistan movement. In fact, many believe the movement only garnered popularity after the incident. ''Only a minuscule proportion of Sikhs subscribed to Khalistan before the temple was stormed,'' said Khushwant Singh, a journalist and writer who is a reputable authority on Sikh history and affairs. One could posit that greater transparency from the government during the operation about their motives backed by evidence on why they believed so would have added credibility to their actions and assuaged some of the public backlash. In the same line of leaders owing it to their people to be transparent, it is also posited that they should have the ethical responsibility to apologize for any actions they take that have devastating consequences such as this one. The official press release was one of the few instances where the government spoke directly to the public. Amongst those few, there weren’t any 8
Jodhka, Surinder S. “Looking Back at the Khalistan Movement: Some Recent Research on Its Rise and Decline.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 36, no. 16, 2001, pp. 1311–1318. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4410511. 9 Kundu, Apurba. “The Indian Armed Forces' Sikh and Non-Sikh Officers' Opinions of Operation Blue Star.” Pacific Affairs, vol. 67, no. 1, 1994, pp. 46–69. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2760119. USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY
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apologies, condolences or words of understanding for what the Sikh community had and was going through. This added to the skepticism that some critics of the operation continue to voice in which they stress that there seemed to be an abject lack of empathy displayed by the Indian government. There also exist conspiracy theories stating that the incident was not entirely the prime minister and cabinet in power’s idea. It is theorized that two other political parties, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the other most powerful political party in India apart from the Congress, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),10 an Indian right-wing, Hindu nationalist, paramilitary volunteer organization, offered to support the Congress in the upcoming 1984 general elections. The RSS and BJP are known to be anti-secular and willing to take any chance they can get to quell movements, ideas, and people who do not subscribe to their extremely narrow-minded views on nationalism and what it means to be Indian. It is, therefore, not invalid to question if the government would have taken the same measures had it been a Hindu temple in consideration instead. When it comes to ethical decision-making, the eminence of the role of the individual leader in consideration cannot be undermined. If we were to look at this question from a levels of analysis framework, in the case of Operation Blue Star, we can clearly see multiple forces at work. In particular, there is a clash between the first and second levels of analysis, between an individual leader, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and domestic politics, especially religious conflict. While the ultimate decision was taken by the individual in power, in this case, Mrs. Gandhi, the role of political parties and religious groups all contributed to the decision. Therefore, in the research process, it is important to consider the group dynamics that make up the structure for the individual psychology to play out. The question then becomes, is it better to prioritize the ever-shifting variables that differ greatly for each situation and make decisions according to the structure they create or to cast them aside and allow decision makers to exercise the autonomy they have been vested with and, in doing so, greatly reduce the variables taken into consideration? In other words, is it advisable to put the onus of every decision on the leader making them, or on the variables of second-level analysis? The answer is subjective and contingent on the ideology, socio-economic, political and cultural circumstances and historical traditions of the community and country in question. Operation Blue Star, in the Indian context, is a landmark decision of a leader to ignore everything and prioritize national security. The reverberations of this decision today are reflective of its gravity and ability to set a precedent. I think the path forward is to continue to put the interests of the collective nation above all else, but to do so within the context of an established ethical framework.
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“Rajiv Gandhi Sought RSS Help During 1984 Elections, Claims Book.” News18, News18, 9 Apr. 2018, www.news18.com/news/politics/then-congress-pm-candidate-rajiv-gandhi-sought-rss-help-during-1984-electionsclaims-book-1712115.html.
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REFERENCES “33 Years of Operation Blue Star: The Big Story about the Incident.” Mid, 13 June 2017, www.midday.com/articles/32-years-of-operation-blue-star-the-big-story-about-the-incident/17298176. Full Text of "Operation BlueStar - The Untold Story," archive.org/stream/OperationBluestarTheUntoldStory/OperationBluestar-TheUntoldStory_djvu.txt. “Rajiv Gandhi Sought RSS Help During 1984 Elections, Claims Book.” News18, News18, 9 Apr. 2018, www.news18.com/news/politics/then-congress-pm-candidate-rajiv-gandhi-sought-rss-help-during-1984elections-claims-book-1712115.html. “Religions - Sikhism: Sikh Beliefs.” BBC, BBC, 24 Sept. 2009, www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/sikhism/beliefs/beliefs.shtml. Singh, Dilpreet. “Sikh Genocide - November 1984.” Medium, Medium, 4 Nov. 2015, medium.com/@singhdilpreet/sikh-genocide-november-1984-3bf84ea3e381. “The Golden Temple, Amritsar.” Sacred Sites, sacredsites.com/asia/india/golden_temple_amritsar.html.
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REFLECTION I began this research project with a few questions in mind. Is there a framework leaders use when making decisions that impact the lives of their citizens? What is ethical and what is not? How can we best understand the psychology and mindset of a person in a position of such immense power? These are daunting but important questions to ask. Great leaders are often faced with situations where they have to make hard choices. While doing so, they have to walk the fine line between the use and the abuse of power. There is no objective right answer, simply multiple variables to consider before making a decision. In the case of Indira Gandhi and Operation Blue Star, the socio-economic and religious circumstances of India make it a slightly different and more challenging framework to make decisions within. Therefore, what is ethical and what is not is subjective. I seek to explore the variables leaders are typically faced with and then analyse if the decisions they make are justified in light of those variables. I chose to carry out this research through a case study approach. Having grown up in a pretty small city in Northern India that was deeply affected by the incident in 1984, I assert Operation Blue Star serves as the epitome of a decision taken by a world leader that had consequences that still reverberate amongst the impacted community even today. In an effort to extricate a violent extremisg, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, and his followers from the premises of the Golden Temple (the holiest place of worship for the Sikh religion) in Amritsar, Punjab, Prime Minister Gandhi ordered the Indian National Army to storm the temple. Bhindranwale was killed in the crossfire but the building itself was also decimated, leaving the Sikh community in India and around the world absolutely infuriated. In the face of national security, the decision can and was justified but with multiple variables such as religion at play, the presence of alternatives are also worth considering. To further discuss my ideas on the structure of the paper, I met with Professor Jacques Hymans in the International Relations department at USC. Professor Hymansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s research expertise is in international security and its connection with national identity. After taking IR 212 with him my freshman year, I learnt of his interest in the Indian subcontinent and therefore, felt like he would be the right person to consult for this project. His insight was most helpful and he was able to shed light on the feasibility of the alternative courses of action I was considering. I was also able to interview some of my grandparentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; friends back home in Chandigarh over winter break about what it was like living near Amritsar when the incident took place around thirty five years ago. A couple of them are retired army officers and, therefore, provided an extremely nuanced perspective on the situation. I was able to use the information they gave to construct a narrative from various angles. One of the biggest challenges I faced in this project was accepting the fact that there is no one right answer to such questions. My focus changed from trying to answer these questions to an attempt to highlight the gravity of these decisions and the thought behind them. While my own moral compass often distinguishes very clearly between right and wrong, the realization of the fact that under a universal framework of ethics lies a myriad of choices that fall in the grey area is a
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major learning I took away through this research. From starting out the paper with a detailed recount of the incident itself to addressing potential alternatives, the aftermath, the personalities of the key players and ultimately concluding with the levels of analysis approach, I gained a new perspective on ethical decision making in the field of international relations theory.
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