Recovering the Sights and Sounds of Ottoman Sovereignty: Reflections on the Departure Ceremonies staged at Üsküdar preceding Murad IV’s Two Eastern Campaigns in 1635 and in 1638 P R O F .
D R .
R H O A D S
M U R P H E Y
University of Birmingham
Public acts and ceremonies performed for the benefit of wider audiences beyond the restricted company of the sultan’s own courtiers and members of the imperial divan, most of whom were exposed to the sight of the sultan on a regular weekly or even daily basis, formed an inescapable dimension of each ruler’s claim to political leadership and sovereign control. The physical attendance and visual presence of the sultan among his subjects lent substance to his rule and these appearances bore a particular practical as well as symbolic meaning in societies for which the written and even the spoken word was not the primary means for communicating and enforcing the sultan’s status, authority and political dominance. For such societies, performance of rituals and ceremonies to underline the collective and communal nature of high priority dynastic enterprises such as the declaration of war and readying of the community for the physical as well as psychological demands and sacrifices that war entailed performed a vital role in creating and reinforcing feelings of ownership, participation and social inclusion among the wider body politic, only a small percentage of whom were destined to play any direct participatory role in war either as warriors and bureaucrats or even among the auxiliary army of sutlers and provisioners who brought up the army’s rear.
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The ruler’s appearances and attendances sometimes accompanied by dramatic re-enactments of simulated battle with the enemy were if not commonplace then more usual sights for the inhabitants of Istanbul than for other imperial cities or even the suburbs of the capital in Üsküdar since both the leave taking and seeing off rituals (teflyii) and the celebration of the sultan’s returns (kudum) from periods of absence and residence outside the capital were mostly focused on his exits from and entrances through the land walls of Istanbul. Including other imperial cities in the privilege of sharing in the excitement and the exclusiveness of a royal visit or a tarrying of the sultan for more than a brief overnight stay while passing to and from the frontier on campaign offered exceptional opportunities, not just for the socialization of the ruler and the celebration of the dynasty, but also for commonplace subjects to share in the pomp and majesty of the court which was only rarely displayed for their benefit. On two occasions in the later part of the reign of Murad IV after he had reached his chronological majority and asserted and successfully demonstrated his ability to rule independently he made a deliberate choice in selecting Üsküdar as the location for prolonged stays and the staging ground for elaborate displays of courtly rituals connected with his departures to join armies massed near the eastern front. In addition to serving various utilitarian and pragmatic purposes such as troop assembly, muster and regimental review these residences in Üsküdar served a clear and equally important role in the creation of a political will and consensus on the eve of his departure; sought through a series of public gatherings, promenades, consultations, visitations and exchanges of well-wishing and mutual salutations that took place over extended periods lasting from two to four weeks. These temporary but extended royal residences were orchestrated and choreographed so as to present the sultan and the sultanate in a favourable light, a concern which for his own reasons the sultan was particularly preoccupied on the eve of his departures for Revan in 1635 and three years later as he was departing for the Baghdad front. On the two occasions when sultan Murad shared his presence/ company with the residents of Üsküdar and allowed them to host not just the imperial presence but a larger body of the assembled armed forces departing for the front, the ceremonies were performed with a care and elaborateness and on a scale that attracted the detailed attention of several contemporary historians, in particular Topçular Katibi and Hasanbeyzade. Although a rhymed account of the sultan’s participation in the Revan campaign was also prepared by Sidki Pasha, whose Gazavatname has recently been published by Mehmet Arslan, this account focuses more on the later phases of campaign during the siege and capture of Revan and thus provides disappointingly little information on the departure ceremonies or the rituals associated with the setting off of the army for the front (göç) from Üsküdar.1 The mobilization season for Ottoman armies bound for the front was typically in early spring to allow the horses an opportunity to graze prior to the army’s 122
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IV. Murad
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final departure and in the early seventeenth century the religious festivals at the end of the lunar year on the first of Shevval for the little bayram and the 10th of Zilhicce for the big bayram both coincided with the same season. Consequently, what was normally a leisurely and relaxed schedule for pre-departure preparations and provisioning became an even longer and more drawn out process to allow the sultan to be present to accept the compliments and test the loyalties of his own officials and court functionaries as well as prominent members of the Üsküdar community during the bayram season. Murad’s first pre-departure sojourn in Üsküdar lasted between the 11th of March and the 29th of March 1635 and included the celebration of the little bayram and the second, prior to his departure for Baghdad on the 8th of May 1638, lasted fully four weeks and included preparations leading up to as well as celebration of the big bayram itself holding audience with a wide variety of delegations of well-wishers and advisers with meetings often stretching well into the night. For this brief moment Üsküdar was transformed into assembly point, parade ground, festival venue and political nerve centre of empire where the high and mighty rubbed shoulders or at least presented themselves for view with the common ranks of humanity fortunate enough to be placed within visual reach of this gathering of humanity (both military and civilian) from all corners of the empire. In its comprehensives and universality of representation such a gathering would have represented for the residents of Üsküdar the seventeenth-century equivalent of a World’s Fair or International Exhibition organized with a wealth of central venues and attendant side shows to present and take pride in showing off the splendours of empire. To a degree, the sultan’s departures on both occasions could be regarded as potentially anti-climactic since both represented second send offs with the sultan heading the honour delegation for sending off the grand vizier Tabani Yassi Mehmed Pasha, whose departure from Üsküdar in autumn 1633 had been marked without much fanfare or public display, and again in late March 1637 for the seeing off the new grand vizier Bayram Pasha after Mehmed Pasha was relieved of his command. 2 But to ensure that his own send offs formed a more indelible impression on communal memory than those organized for his deputies the grand viziers the duration of sultanic visits were deliberately prolonged and the scale of the ceremonies deliberately expanded. The principal deciding factor in determining the departure timetable for any military campaign was undeniably the maximizing of efficiency and other pragmatic concerns associated with army mobilization, but there is also a deliberateness and purpose behind the curtailed ceremonies connected with the departure of a grand vizier as contrasted with the much grander scale in both conception and execution of the ceremonies performed to mark the leave taking between the sovereign and his subjects and courtiers on the occasion of sultanically-led campaigns. Promoting a sense of communal well-being, conveying an aura of confidence in the positive outcome and exhibiting the ruler’s power, charisma 124
RECOVERING THE SIGHTS AND SOUNDS OF OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY: REFLECTIONS ON THE DEPARTURE CEREMON‹ES STAGED AT ÜSKÜDAR PRECEDING MURAT IV’S TWO EASTERN CAMPAIGNS IN 1635 AND IN 1638
and control as a metaphor for his personal guarantee for the orderliness and safety of his realm during his absence at the front all delivered practical as well as spiritual benefits for those who were left behind as the sultan departed to take up his military command. Our account in this paper will focus particularly on Sultan Murad’s activities during his two-week stop-over in Üsküdar leading up to his first real military command as a young sultan on the threshold of his twenty-second birthday in March 1635 and focus on his success in manipulating and channelling public opinion in favour of his high-risk foreign policy initiatives against the neighbouring Safavid empire by the use of public appearances that made open appeal to popular support. Murad’s success in attracting support through displays of sulanic might and magnificence other crowd-pleasing manifestations of the éclat and brilliance (tantana ve debdebe) of the imperial court can be contrasted with Ahmed III’s two-month transfer of the court to Üsküdar in late summer 1730 at a time when the campaign season was already virtually over. The incongruity of this act stimulated not admiration and praise for the activism and energy of the ruling figure, but engendered instead a public relations disaster which resulted not just in a failed mobilization for campaign but led, within days of the sultan’s decampment from Üsküdar and his ignominious and furtive return to the capital under the cover of night on the 29th of September, to the unravelling of his rule and his forced deposition in favour of his nephew Mustafa I. 3After the loss of face and public humiliation suffered by Ahmed during his sojourn in Üsküdar, the restoration of the imperial dignity was, by popular consensus, deemed an impossibility. Keeping up appearances was a matter of conforming to the pace, rhythm and form established for court displays by long-standing tradition and dispensing with them, particularly if it was a case of retreating from a publicly announced and signalled intention such as a declaration of war, brought collective dishonour as well as loss of imperial dignity. Any divergence from the familiar sights and sounds of sovereignty and the form of courtly display was instantly detected by the public’s supersensitive eyes and ears, attuned to notice and accustomed to act upon the subtlest of sultanic gesture. In the case of declarations of war by the sovereign figure, the message of communal effort and mobilization of both human and material resources in preparation for war, the appropriate sequence of sultanic displays and sultanic appearances was unvarying. The communicating of the intent to go to war was achieved by the display of a royal symbol, the imperial battle standard or tugh in a visible location established by precedent, normally the cebehane or arsenal buildings on the edge of the palace compound.4 Once this symbol of royal intent and serious portent was in place and visible to the public eye, the active phase of mobilization began immediately and the battle standards of all commanders were also publicly displayed in simultaneous and universal mimicking of the act by the sovereign. Obedience to the unspoken message and instant recogni125
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Osmanl› ordusunun en etkili atefl gücü olan yeniçerileriler savaflta (sa¤ sayfa)
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tion of the meaning of visual and visible symbols applied as much to the end of war as to its beginning since the visible display of awards for battle distinction and success in military endeavour was also communicated by means of the placement of ceremonial plumes especially aigrettes of herons and cranes in the front part of the headdress of both the sultan and other favoured awardees in the aftermath of battle. Such silent but highly evocative material symbols of royal intent ranged from the simple and subtle to the highly elaborated and ornate. In the context of going to war, the pitching of the royal marquee in the field near the city walls or in the case of eastern campaigns at the first camping ground and assembly point at Üsküdar was another such unmistakable sign that, pending the sultan’s actual appearance in person, the army was in readiness for immediate departure. The actual time of departure and of the sultan’s actual appearance were subject to the sultan’s own determination and building up of anticipation or deliberately slowing of the pace of the pre-departure ceremonies and rituals could be manipulated and adjusted to achieve maximum effect. Controlling the rhythm, pace and timing of these standard procedures could, if carefully employed, be used as another way of demonstrating the sultan’s control and authority over both his aides, officers and military servitors and by extension over the course of the war about to be waged. Conveying the impression that the sultan was in full command of his forces and demonstrating his capacity for leadership before departure for the front achieved a two-fold purpose in boosting troop morale on the one hand and imbuing the general public at home with feelings of confidence and optimism in the outcome of the campaign. The two most forceful ways available to the sultan to make a visible impact on viewers and beholders of his royal majesty gathered at Üsküdar were parades, processions and formal muster procedures including troop review and inspection on the one hand and the handing over of physical objects confirming appointments to officers and the distribution in full public view to the masses of the standing armed forces of the sacks full of coin that bore an unmistakable message about royal patronage and at the same time were identified with him in a visual and personal way by the fact that they bore either his tughra or his name on the obverse. Hand-kissing and hem kissing ceremonies that accompanied some occasions for royal audiences especially at the time of the bayram formed another dimension of the display of order, subordination and sultanic authority whose message was unmistakable to all partakers and participants in the leavetaking ceremonies. Finally the deployment of ranks of soldiers and bodyguards on either side of the sultan’s route of passage between residences whether the palace or his otag-i hümayn formed another striking visual display of the sultan’s ability to create and maintain order wherever and whenever he chose to be in attendance. In addition to visual display of course auditory fanfare also accompanied all public appearances of the sultan. These auditory accompaniments had a similar
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range and diversity to the types of visual display already mentioned and included beating of drums to announce the sultan’s appearance, hand applause to acknowledge his arrival and the firing of gun salutes to mark occasions for celebration such as feasts, victory announcements and exceptional events that needed to be announced and disseminated beyond the immediate locality favoured by the sultan’s physical presence. These various forms of non-verbal communication might also accompany verbal proclamations in the form of victory bulletins sent home from the front which would have been recited out loud from the written text. But invariably the text itself was a carefully prepared physical object written on a scroll designed to be dramatically delivered, handed over, held aloft and gradually unrolled with the sultanic tughra typically in gold lettering prominently displayed at the head of the text for all to see before being delivered orally. All of these physical elements and external appearances were used and exploited by the court to enhance the drama of the events, signal and reinforce their exceptionality and accomplish their removal and elevation from the plane of the every-day and ordinary. Added to this, in the case of the texts of the fethnames composed by literary luminaries such as Sidki Pasha author of the Revan victory bulletin, was the deliberate choice by the composers of such texts to write in an elaborate literary language far removed from the every-day vernacular and speech of the attendees; opting instead for an obscure and inaccessible linguistic and lexical register that emphasized the elevated status of the absent sultan addressing them from his remote location on the eastern frontier of the empire. Use of such language gave the events as well as the sultan himself an immediacy and impact for the auditors that they could not hope to achieve through the use of a more common every-day vocabulary. The commemoration of exceptional events required expression by exceptional linguistic means especially devised for the occasion.5 Although the time and space allotted us will not permit a comprehensive recounting of the various ways and means employed by Murad IV for displaying the sights and sounds of sovereignty during his two-week attendance in Üsküdar on the eve of his departure for Revan in 1635, the following aspects are worthy of some further attention: (a) the nature of subliminal message behind troop inspections (b) the significance of Murad’s granting, in exceptional cases, of service exemptions to the frail and infirm (c) the significance of distributing of favours and offering of largesse including organization of feasts for both military and civilian gatherings (d) the purpose behind the holding of the bayram salutations and visitations prior to the army’s departure at a time when the army was still camped in the plain of Üsküdar and the meadows of Haydar Pasha. In 1635 the erecting of the royal marquee in Üsküdar took place on the 4th of the month at the beginning of Ramazan fast which corresponded to the 21st of 128
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February and thus signalled a dual purpose of celebrating the little bayram at the end of the month and the final phase of final troop assembly since according to a seasonably appropriate timetable the army’s immediate departure for the front was neither feasible nor really anticipated before the end of the month. By staging his own arrival to occupy the otag to transpire on the 22nd of Ramazan (11th March) the sultan was able to ensure that he was in place in good time both to observe at first hand the compliance of key contingents such as the Rumelian timariot forces with his mobilization orders, while at the same time joining in with the festive anticipatory spirit and making preparations for his public appearances, court audiences and public celebrations at the end of the fasting period on the 1st of Shevval. As far as his first objective is concerned we know that Murad IVth placed particular emphasis on the importance of full compliance of both military and auxiliary civilian groups called up for service and insisted that no service exemptions be awarded without his express permission and approval. Holding processions of the bakers, saddlers and other guild contingents assigned to accompany the army on campaign on the eve of his departure for Üsküdar on the 3rd of March marked the first occasion and opportunity for the sultan to verify their participation and make visible their compliance by organizing the procession of the guilds (esnaf alayi), a ceremony which also accompanied other demonstrations of sultanic power and control such as the sur-i hitan festivals marking the coming of age of the future heirs to the throne.6 In preparation for the sultan’s departure the onus was on the household troops (kapukulu ocaklar›) to set up camp well in advance so as to set up housekeeping and prepare for the arrival and proper welcoming of the royal entourage when it decided to set off. On the occasion of the setting out for Revan in 1635, the royal marquee was set up in Üsküdar on the 4th of Ramazan (21st February), the Janissary camp was established at Haydar Pasha on the 10th of Ramazan (27th of February) so that the stage was in readiness for his own arrival and the subsequent review of the seasonally mobilized Rumelian troops at the end of the first week of March. All this followed the sequence, order of precedence and familiar pattern approved by unvarying repetition and recurrence and Murad was alert to the importance of avoiding the impression of casualness, heedlessness or disregard for precedent which had caused both his predecessors Mustafa I and Osman II such difficulties in establishing their own authority and legitimacy in office. Born in the Istavroz palace near Beylerbeyi in July 1612 the return of the native son to the shores of Üsküdar in March 1635 marked both a sentimental journey and a political event whose niceties Murad was determined to observe and whose potential for receiving the acclamation of his subjects he was loath to squander. On this particular occasion both the arrival and the departure of the sultan were to be observed in quick succession on the Asian side of the Marmara and large crowds gathered to witness both his departure at daybreak from Istanbul and his mid-afternoon arrival at Üsküdar on the same day.7 The orderly procession of 129
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the royal train through the crowds gathered to observe its passage and the movements and relocations of the sovereign figure both in departure and arrival mode were themselves a metaphor for sultanic order and control that were signalled and conveyed and re-conveyed at each successive stage of the departure related ceremonies in Üsküdar. Three days after the sultan’s arrival on the Asian shore the arrival and reporting for duty and deployment in their assigned positions on the right side of the royal encampment was marked on the 24th of Ramazan (13th of March) with exchange of greetings and the passing of the troops in front of the sultan’s gaze to receive his approval and acknowledgement of their readiness to serve.8 The physicality and visibility of this process made the underlying message of sultanic control that much more forceful. On the occasion of the staged departure of Murad from Üsküdar bound for Baghdad three years later Naima’s account makes reference to the sultan’s appearance before the troops and the Uskudarian public in full battle dress mounted on an Arab charger thus provoking, most particularly on the part of the civilian observers, a spontaneous outcry of well-wishing and Godspeed in the form “aleyk avn Allah.”9 The reporting of the provincial troops on the eve of the army’s departure demonstrated their appreciation for the sultan’s assignment of a livelihood (dirlik) contingent on service and acceptance both of his beneficence and their subordination to his will. On the occasion of the 1635 departure for Revan the arrival and inspection of the Rumelian troops was immediately followed on the next day (25th Ramazan = 14th March) by the distribution of an immediate pre-departure instalment of the cash wages to his household troops once again underlying the sultan’s position as patron, benefactor and focus of their gratitude, loyalty and obedience.10 That such messages should be conveyed in public fashion to the soldiery at the time of general observation of rituals underlining filial gratitude and obligation at the time of the bayram on the 1st of Shevval was partly fortuitous, but at the same time offered opportunities for displaying the scale and substantiality of royal generosity and patronage on a greatly amplified basis and in a deliberate and far from accidental manner. Before turning to an account of the bayram celebrations in 1635 it will perhaps prove useful if we pause for a moment to consider the character and purpose of the troop inspections carried by Murad IV in April 1638 prior to his departure (on the 8th of May, once again on the heels of the id celebrations in the days leading up to 10th Zilhicce 1047 = 25 April 1638) on his second and in many ways even more critical eastern campaign undertaken for the recovery of Baghdad. His imperial prestige had suffered a setback after the recapture of Erivan by the Safavids in the spring of 1636 and at this juncture he was arguably even more in need of securing public approval through public demonstrations both of his power and determination and at the same time of his justice tempered by mercy. This aspect of his ruling persona was placed in deliberately high relief during the troop reviews held at Üsküdar prior to his departure for Baghdad when he 130
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insisted that all decisions about who should remain behind and who should accompany the imperial forces should be based on personal attendance by all categories of troops and personal interviews conducted by himself to determine the legitimacy and acceptability of each case for military exemption based purely on the merits of each case without intercession of any other patron or would be protector. Even those who had declared themselves unfit for service for medical reasons or due to old age or infirmity were required to present themselves in person to be judged by the sultan and offered either a gesture of understanding and royal generosity or compelled to take up their place among the ranks of the other soldiers reporting for duty. The spectacle if the sultan offering clemency to the genuinely unfit and those incapable of military service and its opposite the enforcing of strict standards of discipline and obedience for all others carried an easily intelligible message for all observers both military and civilian about the need to respect and to submit to the sultan’s will. According to the detailed account of these events and procedures offered in the narrative by Topçular Kat›bi, the sultan placed the old and infirm on half salary in recognition of their genuine infirmities, assigned others to administrative duties on the home front, but considered the petitions and requests of all by holding personal interviews asking each registered soldier about his military history, participation in previous campaigns and other service details including rate of pay for his salaried troops and recording all aspects of their oral testimony in registers kept for updating and verification at the centre. When the sultan was satisfied that the applicant for military exemption had a valid claim he entered his authorization for their exemption from service into the principal register with his own hand.11 The calling of the military roll when the sultan was actually in attendance became an occasion not just for the swift and efficient accomplishment of a necessary albeit tedious administrative task, but a pretext and opportunity for a dramatic display of his personal knowledge and involvement in affairs of state, his hands-on engagement in the realm of practical implementation of laws and regulations and at the same time his exercise of balanced judgement and where appropriate mercy in the awarding of royal dispensation. Both parties being there in person was essential for such enactments of royal justice and generosity to have their full intended effect. In many ways sovereignty and seclusion were two antithetical and at the same time incompatible dispositions. Sovereignty and sociability in the context of the bayram celebrations: the sultan’s reception of his court and his attendance at public events for distributions of largesse and receiving of homage The annual calendar of the court whether it was preparing for battle or enjoying the fruits of peace gave special prominence to the sovereign’s hosting of receptions and holding of audience with his chief officers as well as prominent members of the public to test their loyalty and receive their blessings and reciprocate with blessings and favours in like kind at the time of the lesser and greater bayrams. On both occasions in 1635 and again in 1638 the sultan made a con131
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scious and deliberate decision to pass this season of sociability and mutual respect and acknowledgement among his subjects in Üsküdar. Part of the process of establishing order in his realm prior to departure for the front had extra-military dimensions and in order to consolidate support, generate enthusiasm and elicit the necessary sacrifice and consensus necessary to make his campaign plans successful, the sultan needed to find ways of winning over the wider public both to acceptance of his leadership and acquiescence to his war plans. In general, the Ottoman polity and more generally Ottoman public opinion has had attributed to it a far greater degree of passivity, subservience and indifference to outcome than is either realistic or credible. The truth of the matter is that sultans had to work quite hard to win the approval of their subjects and it was through their public appearances and particularly gestures of generosity such as food distributions and sharing the company of people held in respect by the communities they represented that they achieved their own authority and public support as rulers. To be successful as a ruler it was necessary, at least periodically and ideally with some frequency, to take accurate measure of the pulse of the body politic and information gathering of this sort best achieved when it took place not just within the more formal context of public appearances during military parades and processions but sometimes also through mingling with some degree of familiarity aimed at establishing an intimacy between the governors and the governed and sultan and his subjects. Only this kind of more informal contact allowed for an exchange of views and the development of an ongoing dialogue and conversation between the ruler and the ruled. During the visitations which took place at the time of Murad’s second period of alighting at Üsküdar in April 1638 his visit coincided with the season of sociability and court receptions in the period leading up to the big bayram and he was in a position to witness and overhear and at the same time to participate and influence the course of discussions, debates and exchange of opinion about the second of his two major mobilizations and attempt to improve his performance rating among the inhabitants of this important Asian suburb of the capital before departing for the front. The display of the harsher and more vengeful side of sultanic judgement and justice involved a similarly public and visual display of this aspect of the ruler’s persona, but its manifestation is noteworthy by its absence during the lead up to his departure at which time the promoting of the feel good factor was at the top of the sultan’s agenda. However as part of the orderly process of mobilizing and preparing for war, just as it was essential to send a strong message discouraging truancy and non compliance among the soldiery, the sultan also had to take a tough stance on other forms of anti-social behaviour from thievery and banditry to succumbing to the temptation to engage in forms of corruption and embezzlement of all types and at all levels of society. Soon after the army broke camp at Üsküdar and wended its way towards the first halting stations at Gebze, Hereke and Izmid word began to filter back to Istanbul of the seriousness and 132
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fierceness of the sultan’s determination to pursue a policy of zero tolerance for acts calculated to disturb the peace. Though not visible to audiences in Istanbul the public executions for example of two muleteers and baggage carriers for acts of theft when the army was encamped at Hereke only two day’s march away from Üsküdar reported by Hasanbeyzade in his history, carried quickly and with telling effect to Üsküdar itself. 12 Such cases involving transportation of goods to the front by civilians had a particular resonance for the inhabitants of Üsküdar many of whom were involved in one way or another aspect of the transportation sector either as suppliers of animals or of the goods which they carried. Üsküdar served as a principal terminus and an embarkation point especially for goods travelling overland to the east. In the final section of our paper we will summarize some of the available information from the Üsküdar court records on the Üsküdar’s role and central importance in freight forwarding business in particular the dispatch of treasure shipments for the support of army’s deployed in the east or wintering over in regional capitals such as Diyarbakir between campaigns. Carrying the Sultan’s Coin: Üsküdar’s role in the carrying of specie to the front to sustain the army during eastern campaigns Apart being the city from which, in Yahya Kemal’s words, one could “conceive great dreams inspiring envy among all the great cities of the empire” Üsküdar was also the empire’s Rome for the two-thirds of the empire which lay east of the Bosphorus and the place to which all roads led. 13 The spectacle of supply trains departing for the eastern front or of commercial caravans in peacetime was thus not only a regular but a commonplace sight for Uskudarians. The supply convoys destined for the army did however, because of their impressive length, create a particularly impressive sight and especially when the cargo was coin for the soldiers’ wages, the message underlying the sultan’s power and control was, even in his own absence, unmistakable. The physical mass and weight of the coin and the economic leverage which it represented gave material substance to the sultan’s claims to hegemonic control and dominance over his military foes in a way that mere speeches or even the sight of the sultan donning his shining armour and helmet during public processions failed to equal. The sight of the army departing from Üsküdar offered one measure of the limitlessness of the sultan’s resources since the troops, baggage trains and army rearguard would have remained visible on the horizon for many hours after the departure of the vanguard, but the profile of treasure convoys which left sporadically either in advance of the army’s departure or in the intervals between extended campaigns, provided an even more evocative image of the sultan’s inexhaustible wealth displayed in concentrated cash form. Two such convoys are recorded in the Üsküdar sicills, the one in February 1635 just before the sultan’s departure for the east and the second in October 1636 in the interval between the Revan and Baghdad campaigns. Each involved the hiring of in excess of 100 pack mules supplied by transport consortia based in Üsküdar. The 133
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first treasure train consisted of five concessionaires who contributed a quantity of 30, 36, 25, 16 and 23 animals each to reach the total of 130. The contractor of these services was the lieutenant of the grand vizier Mehmed Pasha who was already in the field awaiting the sultan’s arrival and the sum paid to the concessionaires was 2730 gurush amounting to a rental charge of 21 gurush per animal for the journey between Üsküdar and Diyarbakir, equivalent to a sum of roughly 2,000 akçes at current rates of exchange. For the larger concessionaires providing 30 or more animals this represented a serious source of income since the sum of 60,000 akçes for one journey represented the salary equivalent of a senior ranking zaim within the provincial cavalry.14 On the second occasion, the providers of rental animals belonged to an Üsküdar-based consortium with seven concessionaires providing a total of 111 mules for a total sum of 220,000 akçes meaning that the rental charge for each animal was again 2,000 akçes yielding a revenue of at least 20,000 akçes even for the smaller operators who provided just 10 animals. 15 From this small indication it is clear that a fair share of both the costs (in taxes) and the rewards (in fees for supplies and services) of military engagement on the eastern front were being shared out among the residents of Üsküdar and that they looked on the spectacle of mobilization for war not as disinterested spectators, but also as participants and stakeholders in the events that were about to unfold on the far distant frontiers of empire. The outcome of far-away campaigns had real and sometimes painful consequences and repercussions for the sultan’s subjects on the home front so the sight of the material support in the form of supply and treasure convoys bound for the eastern front was, though perhaps not as deliberately staged and premeditated as the sultan’s appearance and subsequent departure from Üsküdar, nonetheless calculated to achieve a purpose in lifting the spirits and boosting morale of ordinary men and women awaiting his safe return. The drama and suspense of the sultan’s arrivals and departures, entrances and exits, leave takings and home returns were often as great in the anticipation as in their final form as concrete events. By the time the sultan eventually returned from the front the news of victory or defeat had long since reached his subjects at home making his physical return (depending on the season and other preoccupations of the court) a lower profile event than the departure ceremonies. Celebrating in the event of victory in any event followed a standard course of city illuminations and street revels which need not always include an appearance by the sultan except at the moment of his entry through the city walls; an event which was always marked by a ceremonial welcome. Typically it was always the departure of the court that was marked with greater elaborateness and ceremony, both because of the seasonal and annually repeated nature of such removals and the complexity of the political dimension when the reason for the sovereign’s removal was the pursuit of foreign wars. Ahmed III’s failed mobilization for a planned and announced eastern campaign in 1730 revealed not just his failed military leadership, but a more general fail134
RECOVERING THE SIGHTS AND SOUNDS OF OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY: REFLECTIONS ON THE DEPARTURE CEREMON‹ES STAGED AT ÜSKÜDAR PRECEDING MURAT IV’S TWO EASTERN CAMPAIGNS IN 1635 AND IN 1638
ure to establish a political consensus or engage in meaningful dialogue even with his own officials, let alone establishing a rapport with or an ability to rule by the consent of the broader masses of his subjects. The opportunity to engage in discussion, dialogue and debate and at the same time display the magnificence of his court in a bid to influence popular opinion in his favour was completely squandered by Ahmed who throughout the unprecedented long stay with his Uskudarian subjects over the two month period between 5th August and the 29th of September communicated with the army leadership through the mediation of the grand vizier and in general kept aloof from direct contact with the public either by appearance in public processions or audiences or active engagement in consultation (mushavere) aimed at reaching a compromise or consensus acceptable to the majority concerning his mobilization plans. The image of the immobilized and indecisive sultan failing to communicate his wishes and enforce his own officials’ compliance and follow through on the publicly announced decision to go to war against Iran inevitably gave rise to whispers of disapproval and before to long to louder shouts demanding his abdication. The state of passivity and immobility to which the sultanate was reduced during Ahmed’s presentation of the court to an audience of Uskudarian spectators in 1730 is captured by the image of the grand vizier acting as go-between between the army and sultan and the palace and the people; an effort in public relations ,management that in the end failed to win the hearts of minds of any constituency. The grand vizier’s interventions were regarded as lacking in conviction or authority unless backed up by the public support and acceptance which could only be signalled by the sight of the sultan himself in attendance and offering his own reassurances.16 Without the visual and physical presence of the leader in person, the words, pronouncements, promises and guarantees of his chief deputy and vekil-i mutlak carried little weight or substance. The failure of the sultan to perform his role as figurehead and embodiment of the will of the people, to fulfil his role as guardian and defender of the community and its interests (whether in war or peace) and to assume his expected posture as pater familias to clients, subordinates and subjects was not compensateable by his successes in other fields of endeavour such as printing and the arts where he had made incontestable advances. Not necessarily reclusive by nature Ahmed had achieved some success during peace time celebrations such as the lavish sur-i hitan organized for his sons and future heirs in 1720, but his withdrawal from the people witnessed during the time of prolonged residence in Üsküdar during the summer of 1730 demonstrated an incapacity for rule from which there was no hope of recovery. The contrast between the examples of Murad IV and Ahmed III on the eve of their respective departures or attempted campaign launches from Üsküdar demonstrate why the sounds and sights of the sovereign and his court in its full majesty (ihtiflam) were not empty gesture or dispensable symbol without much underlying meaning or functionality, but rather the very essence of successful sovereignty in its early-modern ‘oriental’ context. 135
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REFERENCES Abdulkadir Efendi, Topcular katibi A_dbdulkadir (Kadri) Efendi Tarihi (metin ve tahlil) (haz. Ziya Yilmazer) Ankara 2003. Hasan Beyzade, Ahmet, Hasan Bey-zade Tarihi (haz. Sevki Nezihi Aykut), Ankara 2004. Naima, Mustafa, Tarih-i Naima , Ravzat ül-Hüseyn fi hulasat-i ahbar el-haf›kayn ‹stanbul 1281-1283 [1864-1866]. Nezihi Aykut, “IV. Murad’›n Revan Seferi Menzilnâmesi”, ‹.Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, sy. 34 (‹stanbul 1984), pp. S›dk› Pafla, Gazavât-› Sultân Murâd-› Râbi’ (haz. Mehmet Arslan), ‹stanbul 2006. Subhi, Mehmed, Tarih-i Sami ve fiakir ve Subhi, Kostantiniyye 1198 (1785).
FOOTNOTES 1 S›dki Pafla, Gazavat-i Sultan Murad Rabi (Istanbul, 2006). 2 The gap between Mehmed Pasha’s ’s departure in October 1633 and the sultan’s departure at the end of March 1635 was seventeen months (Tarih-i Naima III: 301) while the sultan’s departure in May 1638 followed Bayram Pasha’s departure by thirteen months (Topçular Kat›bi Tar›hi II: 1076). 3 According to contemporary sources, the sultan’s return to the capital took place after the night-time prayers which (at that time of the year) would have been around 8:30 pm. His arrival at Saray Burnu at half past three ala turca corresponds to roughly midnight; see Mehmed Subhi, Tarih-i Subhi (Istanbul 1198), folio 6b. 4 For its location, see the map in Abdurahman fieref, “Topkap› Saray-i Hümayunu”, Tar›h-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuas› I/6 (1326), between pages 344 and 345. 5 For the text of the sultan’s address to his subjects on the home front delivered in Sidki Pasha’s fethname, see the Gazavati Sultan Murad-i Rabi edited by M. Arslan (Istanbul, 2006), transcription text, pp. 69-73. 6 A detailed description of the esnaf alayi held on 14th Ramazan 1044/ 3rd March 1635 is provided in Topçular Kat›bi Tar›hi II: 1012. 7 On the numbers of the common citizenry gathered to observe his early morning departure from the Eminonu docks Topçular Kat›bi offers the following description: “ alaylar ferman oldukta cemii Istanbul halk› ayan ve eflraf ve fükera u reaya guruh ile cemiyetde kesret-i insan izdiham bir mertebe saadetlu padiflah›m›za hayrdualarda; Topçular Kat›bi Tarihi II: 1012. 8 Topçular Kat›bi Tarihi II: 1014 : “ kaidelerince saflar ba¤lay›p [padiflah›n] icazeti ile canib-i yesarda kondular”. 9 Naima Tarihi III: 326. 10 Topçular Kat›bi Tarihi II: 1015. 11 Topçular Kat›bi Tarihi II: 1068: “ mubarek yedleri ile defterlerine hatt-i flerifle iflaret buyurup, mukabelede h›fz olunma¤›n ....” 12 Hasanbeyzade Tarihi (Aykut edition), III: 1048. 13 Yahya Kemal: “ Üsküdar bir ulu rüyayi görenlerin flehri / Sen› g›pta ile hat›rlar vatan›n her flehri.” 14 Üsküdar fieriyye Sicilleri, Volume 179, folio 85b. 15 Üsküdar fieriyye Sicilleri, Volume 181, folio 116a. 16 The image of Nevshehirli Ibrahim acting as go-between engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the various factions at court as the sultan’s agent in the sultan’s absence is captured very effectively in Subhi’s account (fol. 5b) : kendisi [yani Ibrahim Pafla] gah padiflah-i alem-penah hazretleriyle maen, gah ordu-i hümayun ile refakat ve gah serasker irsal eylemek ve avazelerini ilan ve iflaat ile sagir ve kebiri mübtela-yi elem-i hayret eyledi¤inden meada ….
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