Teapot Dome Revisited: Reed Smoot and Conservation in the 1920s

Utah Historical Quarterly

Vol. 45, 1977, No. 4

Teapot Dome Revisited: Reed Smoot and Conservation in the 1920s

BY THOMAS G. ALEXANDER

WITH THE CREATION OF THE National Park Service in 1916, and the passage of the Smoot General Leasing Act and the Federal Power Commission Act in 1920, the general body of progressive conservation and land legislation was completed. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 was basically the application to the remainder of the public domain of the principles which had already been applied to forest reserves, and the Boulder Canyon Act simply enlarged work already being done under the Newlands Act. As has been indicated elsewhere, Reed Smoot had played an important part in the development of the legislation.

A senatorial supporter of Gifford Pinchot and Theodore Roosevelt, Smoot had been rewarded with appointment as chairman of the forestry section of the National Conservation Congress. He had played an important part in the passage of the National Parks Service Act and had been the chief architect of the General Leasing Act. When the Harding administration took office in 1921, Reed Smoot as chairman of the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys could look back on an era of considerable progress in conservation development.

In the public mind, however, the events of the 1920s tended to overshadow the solid accomplishments of the previous years. Smoot and his colleague Irvine L. Lenroot of Wisconsin suffered considerable vilification during the Teapot Dome investigation. The available evidence leads to the conclusion that far from abandoning conservation, Smoot's actions there and during the remainder of the decade were quite consistent with his previous activity.

The principal issue of the early 1920s—at least in the national press —was the disposition of the naval oil reserves created during the Taft and Wilson administrations. As early as May 1921 Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby offered to turn over management of the reserves to the Department of the Interior because he believed that only by drilling and pumping could the federal government stop the apparent loss of oil to private companies. Denby hoped the Department of the Interior could lease drilling rights in the reserves and transport the oil for federal storage to places such as Pearl Harbor, where it could be saved for future need rather than being drained away. The reserve at Buena Vista Hills, California (Reserve Number 2) had been practically ruined, and reports indicated that drainage had begun to be a problem at both Elk Hills, California (Reserve Number 1) and Teapot Dome, Wyoming (Reserve Number 3). President Warren G. Harding approved Denby"s recommendation and authorized the transfer to the Interior Department, whereupon Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall negotiated leases that he let in early April 1922 to Edward L. Doheny of the Pan American Oil Company for drilling in California and Harry F. Sinclair of the Mammoth Oil Company for drilling at Teapot Dome.

Negotiated in secret, the leases included competitive bidding only in the case of the California operations; and they became public knowledge only after the Wall Street Journal reported their existence on April 14. Interior officials had told Sen. John B. Kendrick of Wyoming on April 10 that no contracts had been made. On April 15 Kendrick called for a report; on April 18 Assistant Secretary Edward C. Finney revealed the existence of the leases; and on April 21 Sen. Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin introduced a resolution asking Fall to explain the leases to Congress. After some consideration, the Senate adopted the La Follette resolution by a unanimous vote.

The introduction of the resolution appears to have been the first that Smoot knew of the leases. He filled his diary during the Sixty-seventh Congress up to that point with evidence of work on the Emergency Tariff bill and on the Fordney-McCumber bill, and he spent considerable time with lobbyists who were trying to change tariff rates; but he said nothing of the leases on naval oil reserves.

On June 8, 1922, Harding sent Fall's report to Congress together with nearly six thousand pages of supporting documents. Smoot had the report printed in the Congressional Record. The Utah senator then talked with Fall on June 9. Fall thought that if the committee examined the report and documents it would not need to hold hearings. The committee majority seems to have agreed at first. Fall made it clear in his report that the leases had been made because of the oil drainage problem and the desire to have the government's oil more readily accessible.

In opposition to the committee majority, however, a number of people wanted hearings opened. Harry Slattery, one of Gifford Pinchot's close associates, and La Follette pressed for an investigation to begin early in the fall of 1922; but Thomas Walsh, senator from Montana, insisted upon carefully going over the evidence before acting. Kendrick increased pressure for action in August. And in November, Walsh introduced a resolution that called for an inquiry into the leases on the ground that certain corporations might have leased more than the land area allowed in the Smoot General Leasing Act. After the passage of the resolution, Smoot's diaries show no concern with the leases again until January 1923.

The first order of business was securing expert testimony to confirm or deny Fall's claim. Smoot, as chairman of the committee, assisted Lenroot and Walsh in choosing geologists to investigate the condition of the oil reserves. He also introduced a resolution early in February to keep the investigation open. Before the committee could arrive at any valid conclusions the members would have to hear testimony. The sessions were scheduled for October 15, 1923.

At first the committee seemed interested principally in determining the validity of Fall's allegation that the leases were necessary to protect the oil. Then, a number of events and revelations changed the complexion of the investigation. Fall resigned after a controversy over Forest Service policy and Alaskan development; and during the congressional recess, while Smoot was in Europe, Harding died. Thereafter, charges and suspicions of fraud and corruption in the administration changed the investigation from an administrative hearing to a political forum.

Chairman Cordell Hull of the Democratic National Committee had begun to sense the political implications of the hearings. By October 15 Smoot had become convinced that the "Democrats are going to endeavor to make political capital out of" the hearings. He wrongfully thought, however, that "little will come out of it."

Despite the developing political climate, the hearings got off to a slow start. On October 15, 1923, when they were to have begun, only Smoot and two other members were present. When they actually got underway on October 22 only five of the eleven committee members were present: Smoot, Lenroot, Walsh, Andrieus A. Jones of New Mexico, and Edwin F. Ladd of South Dakota—two Democrats and three Republicans. 9 The two committee-appointed geologists testified that the Teapot

Dome contained less than 70 percent of the oil it was originally thought to contain. Smoot concluded that this justified Fall's leasing the reserves. But Walsh, who emerged as Fall's principal antagonist, charged that there had simply been a miscalculation of the original supply. That allegation was, at that point, impossible to confirm or refute. On October 29 Walsh called his own geologist to contradict the testimony of the committee appointees, despite the fact that he, Smoot, and Lenroot had agreed on the committee consultants. During the early part of November some time was spent studying the geological reports.

Smoot concluded that Walsh was fishing around to discover something political to use against the administration. At this stage of the investigation Walsh moved ahead, like the superb lawyer he was, from the substantive question of the quantity of and clanger to oil reserves to the legal question of whether the Harding administration had overstepped its authority in leasing drilling rights and storing oil. The hearing reports and Smoot's diary show- that Walsh believed not only that Harding had made an error of judgment in the drilling and storage but that his actions had been illegal as well. Smoot disagreed. He met with attorneys for Sinclair and Doheny in Washington, told them that Walsh would try to have the leases set aside, and asked them to furnish him with all possible information justifying the administration policy.

On October 23 Fall began testifying. The proceedings continued as Denby, Sinclair, and a number of government employees and officials presented testimony. A bombshell dropped on the committee as questions began to arise concerning purchases of land and livestock for Fall's ranch in New Mexico. By November 16 Walsh was convinced that Fall had bought the items with money paid by Sinclair. Fall telephoned Smoot on November 15 to explain the ranch purchases. Though Smoot did not report what Fall told him, it is probable, in the light of subsequent events, that Fall lied to the senator. After talking with Fall, Smoot thought Walsh simply wanted to discredit the Republican party. On December 19 the manager of Sinclair's farm testified that the oil magnate had sold livestock to Fall, and this seemed to corroborate Smoot's beliefs.

To clear the air, Smoot visited Sinclair at the Wardman Park Hotel on the evening of December 27 after Walsh had continued probing the oilman's business affairs. They discussed how far Walsh should be allowed to go and worked out an arrangement to allow Walsh to continue with the previous line of questioning while protecting Sinclair's rights to privacy. Then on December 31 Smoot, Lenroot, Ralph H. Cameron of Arizona, and Holm O. Bursum of New Mexico met and agreed to "allow him [Walsh] to go a long way with Sinclair as we do not want the country to get the idea that w r e want to cover up anything in which Mr. Sinclair is connected in the oil lease." He then met with Sinclair and his lawyers to tell them of the decision.

On December 27, the day of his meeting with Sinclair, Smoot received what he considered "a splendid letter" from Fall who explained that he had borrowed the money to fix up his ranch from Edward B. McLean, publisher of the Washington Post, and denied that he had approached Doheny or Sinclair for the money. Had Smoot known the truth at that time, and had he urged Fall to lie, as Fall later claimed, it seems improbable that the senator would have wanted to keep the Sinclair matter before the committee as he decided to do. McLean later testified that he had indeed given the money to Fall, but that the ex-secretary had returned the checks uncashed.

A week later, on January 3, 1924, Smoot relinquished the chairmanship of the committee to Lenroot as he became chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and could not hold both positions. Then, on January 21 a break came in the investigation. Attorney General Harry Daugherty told Smoot about a meeting between Senator Lenroot and President Coolidge on the Teapot Dome matter. Fall was not going to be allowed to leave the United States because Archie Roosevelt, son of the late president, would testify that Sinclair's private secretary told him of a $69,000 check (later it was said to be $68,000) Sinclair had given to Fall. Daugherty made it clear that he was not going to shield Fall or any guilty person. Smoot, Lenroot, and Walsh held a conference to discuss the development. The three men talked over the administration position. Smoot had asked Daugherty to be present, but he was unable to do so. In the afternoon Walsh reported McLean's testimony on Fall's uncashed checks, then called Roosevelt who told his story. Sinclair's secretary followed to deny Roosevelt's report.

The secretary's testimony convinced Smoot that Roosevelt had been mistaken. "I do not believe," he confided to his diary, "Archie Roosevelt was told what he claims but was mistaken and misunderstood the secretary. No one can read the tesimony and believe otherwise in my opinion." Fall reinforced this belief in a telephone call from Florida. In addition, he told Smoot that his attorney and Edward Doheny would testify and blow up Walsh's case. Smoot urged Fall to return to Washington to testify. Fall said he would if he thought it best after the lawyer and the oilman had spoken. Smoot apparently still believed Fall and was convinced that the testimony to that point had done irreparable harm to the former secretary of the interior. He thought that Fall would "never live long enough to wipe away the blot."

On January 23 Coolidge ordered Attorney General Daugherty to have a representative attend the hearings and take whatever steps were necessary to protect the interests of the government. On that same evening, J. W. Zeveley, Sinclair's attorney, called on Smoot to explain the $68,000 in checks of which Archie Roosevelt had spoken. The lawyer explained that Sinclair's secretary's explanation had been untrue because the checks had been paid to the manager of Sinclair's farm and not to the manager of Fall's. Smoot then resolved to bring both Roosevelt and Zeveley back to testify in order to clear the air.

The next day, January 24, Edward Doheny created a sensation by testifying that he had loaned $100,000 to Fall. Doheny offered to cancel the lease if that were necessary in view of the circumstances. Though Smoot believed Doheny had "handled himself very well ... on the question of the lease it would be . . . referred to the courts for decision."

The following day, Zeveley testified that he had loaned Fall $25,000 for Sinclair in June 1923. This came as a surprise to Smoot, even though the loan had been made fourteen months after the lease had been negotiated and after Fall had already resigned from office. On the same day, Coolidge told Smoot he had almost concluded to have the government bring proceedings against the two oilmen to declare their leases void.

On January 26 Smoot and Lenroot met to discuss the leases with Doheny's attorney. Smoot suggested some modifications in the leases and made arrangements for the attorney to talk with Walsh. At the hearings that day the attorney presented the proposition. Then the committee met in executive session and agreed upon a resolution W r alsh was to offer on January 28 authorizing Coolidge to bring an immediate suit to cancel the leases. Coolidge prepared a statement to be released on Sunday, January 27, calling for bipartisan action to annul the leases. On January 29 the full Senate debated the committee resolution for six hours. The principal difference of opinion came over statements by Walsh who declared that the leases were illegal and by Lenroot who simply doubted their legality. On January 31 the resolution was unanimously adopted. 19 Coolidge proceeded to annul the leases by appointing Owen J. Roberts, a Republican, and Atlee Pomerene, former Democratic senator from Ohio, to represent the government.

While the Senate debated the resolution, the committee prepared again to hear Albert Fall. On the day of the Senate debate, Fall's attorney said that the former secretary could not appear to testify but suggested that the committee question him at his bedside. Walsh objected and requested Fall's physicians to testify on the former secretary's condition in executive session. When the committee heard the medical testimony, Walsh called Fall a liar. The committee decided that Smoot and Walsh would select three doctors to examine and report on Fall's health. Two days later Fall appeared and read a statement in which he declined to answer questions on the grounds of possible self-incrimination. The committee went into executive session and agreed to adopt another resolution renewing its authorization for the investigation. Fall had questioned the one under which they were operating because it had been passed at the previous Congress.

On the same day, Doheny appeared and opened new wounds by revealing some financial dealings with a group of Democrats. He testified he had paid some $250,000 to the son-in-law of Woodrow Wilson, former Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, $50,000 to former Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, $2,000 to former Attorney General Thomas Gregory, and $5,000 to Wilson's former public information chief George Creel.

In December 1922, before the hearings had begun, Smoot himself had developed a rather unfortunate business connection with Doheny, the revelation of which might have damaged the senator's political career just as it did McAdoo's. Smoot's son Harold R. Smoot had lost a sizeable sum by selling short stock in one of Doheny's companies. Doheny controlled all outstanding shares and the senator had to negotiate a loan, which he personally guaranteed, with the oilman to buy stock for his son. Both the senator and his son believed that the younger Smoot had been tricked into selling the stock short. Nevertheless, Harold Smoot continued his business connection with Doheny; and as late as November 30, 1923, during the hearings, Smoot interceded for his son with the oilman.

After January 1924 charges were made that throughout the investigation, the relationship between Walsh and Smoot had been strained and that Smoot and Lenroot had tried to whitewash Fall. The latter allegation is untrue. With regard to the former, Smoot believed Walsh was using the investigation for political purposes, and that created ill feelings between the two. After the hearings turned up financial links between Fall, Doheny, and Sinclair, Smoot cooperated fully and even went out of his way to see that the investigation was continued. Actually, at the time Coolidge announced the intention of the government to bring suits to annul the leases, and for a short time thereafter, Walsh and Smoot were probably closer than they had been before or would be after. On February 2, 1924, two days after Doheny testified, Smoot played golf with Walsh, Jones, and Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas at the Chevy Chase Country Club. They decided to have the Federal Trade Commission accountants examine the books of Hibbs and Company and report the names of those dealing in stocks of Sinclair's and Doheny's companies at about the time of making the leases. Smoot agreed to this, despite the fact that such an investigation might have turned up the name of his son Harold and thereby linked him to Doheny.

Thereafter the relationship between W^alsh and Smoot deteriorated as Walsh and the Democratic members of Congress had a field day slinging mud at Republicans. Between February 7 and 11 the Senate discussed a resolution, which Walsh supported, calling for Secretary Denby's resignation. Smoot considered it "an outrage." Nothing had linked Denby to any payoffs. Then the hearings got out of hand. By February 15 the committee had listened to a number of irresponsible witnesses who knew nothing of the case but were apparently seeking publicity.

An attempt was made to connect Senators Smoot and Lenroot to Fall and the oil scandals. Western Union telegrams to and from Washington and Palm Beach between Fall, McLean, and government officials were subpoenaed. Smoot was convinced that the "real object was to involve the administration and myself and Senator Lenroot with the oil scandals. They will fail in as far as myself is concerned." Smoot gave an interview to a representative of the Hearst newspaper chain in which he told of the meeting that he and Lenroot had held with Fall at the W T ardman Park Hotel in late December 1923. At that meeting, which Walsh agreed had been perfectly proper, Smoot and I^enroot had urged the former secretary to tell the committee where he had secured the money. Fall had refused but said he would take it under consideration. After the Washington Herald published Smoot's interview, the senator said that the reporter had lied about his statements.

Sen. J. Thomas Heflin, Democrat oi Alabama, discussed the story in the Senate, insinuating that Smoot and Lenroot had done wrong in contacting Fall. This seems unwarranted, Neither man denied meeting with Fall, and both agreed that they had urged Fall to make a full disclosure of his business dealings. Moreover, the interview was held with the full knowledge of Fall's chief antagonist, Thomas Walsh. Nevertheless, the Hearst papers continued to attack the Utah senator.

Shortly thereafter, Lenroot resigned as chairman and member of the committee. It has been alleged that he did so as a result of the Wardman Park conference revelation; but Smoot, who was close to the situation, believed that Lenroot had taken the step because of poor health. Smoot was sorry that it happened "particularly at this time." Edwin F. Ladd of North Dakota, a Republican insurgent just as Lenroot had been, took the Wisconsin senator's place.

On June 6, 1924, one day before the first session of the Sixty-eighth Congress ended, Walsh filed the committee's majority report. Walsh, Ladd, Jones, Kendrick, Peter Norbeck of South Dakota, Alva B. Adams of Colorado, C. C. Dill of Washington, and Key Pittman of Nevada signed the report. Five members of the committee led by Selden P. Spencer of Missouri and including Smoot, Robert N. Stanfield of Oregon, Cameron, and Bursum refused to sign and filed a minority report shortly after the opening of the second session.

Walsh, in an obvious bit of hyperbole, called the majority report "an unimpassioned and impartial narrative of the proceedings before the committee and the disclosures made by the hearings." In answer to the statement of the minority members that they had had insufficient time to consider the issues, Walsh pointed out that the hearings had ended on May 14, and he had submitted the draft to the committee on June 4. Senator Spencer had tried earlier to get a preliminary copy, but the Montana senator refused until he submitted it to the entire committee on June 4. During the two-day consideration of the report, during the last days of the session, Walsh pointed out that only Smoot, Stanfield, and Spencer of the dissenting group had been able to spend any significant time in the committee deliberations, and none of them was there all the time. The debate between Spencer and Walsh showed, however, that the committee members did not review the evidence, in spite of its tremendous implications, but merely proofread the report and corrected it in the light of their own recollections. To have given the evidence a careful examination, as Spencer pointed out, would have been "physically impossible" in only two days.

The majority report began with a recitation of the facts leading up to the transfer of jurisdiction over the reserves by executive order. It then alleged that the transfer, the methods by which the leases had been made, and the contracts for the construction of storage facilities had been illegal. The majority admitted that the problem of oil loss was a matter of professional opinion but thought the leases unnecessary. The essential points of the majority argument rested upon a narrow interpretation of the power of the president, secretary of the interior, and secretary of the navy; upon the money given Fall by Sinclair and Doheny; and upon a view that held the value of the oil lost through drainage less significant than the cost of constructing storage facilities in Hawaii.

In view of the lateness in the session, the minority members chose to wait until they had a further opportunity to examine the records of the hearings, submitting their report after the opening of the next session of Congress. They were at a decided disadvantage, principally because both they and the majority agreed that Fall had been found guilty of dishonesty. The other questions were matters of interpretation. The minority accepted the Bureau of Mines view that the oil was being drained away and praised the oil tank policy and Fall and Denby for inaugurating it.

Ultimately, the majority would not allow the Harding administration to be painted in shades of grey and demanded complete exoneration or condemnation. The vote on the two reports was, in essence, a vote to support or condemn Secretary Fall, and the result was a foregone conclusion. On January 20, 1925, the Senate rejected the minority report by a vote of 28 to 42 and adopted the majority report by 41 to 30.

The majority view' was certainly not "unimpassioned" nor that of the minority unbiased. The majority report reflected, perhaps as clearly as any document of the times, the political climate of the 1920s. It demonstrated the continued Progressive sentiment on the one hand and the feeling of liberal impotence in the face of rampant probusiness Republicanism on the other. Here was a way to slap at the Republicans and the business community, both of whom professed their righteousness, and land a blow for Progressive principles.

The views of the minority, on the other hand, while supporting the administration, represented a continuation of the conservationist tradition of the previous decades. Once lost, the oil from Teapot Dome could not be recovered. To the minority, the only sensible solution was to recover the oil and store it for future use. In line with the rather broad interpretation of conservationist policy characteristic of the Theodore Roosevelt administration, the minority viewed the transfer and drilling as a matter of administrative discretion. This w r as much like Smoot's support of Roosevelt's creation of forest reservations. Pinchot and Roosevelt had set them aside to control the use of the timber and make it available for future generations.

In the suits for canceling the oil leases, the United States district courts in Wyoming and California sustained the minority view of the executive powers, and the United States Supreme Court sustained the majority view. Later, Fall was convicted of taking a bribe from Doheny and Sinclair was sentenced for contempt of court for tampering with a jury. Doheny went free, and neither Doheny nor Sinclair was convicted of bribery.

As for Smoot's connection with the scandal, there is no evidence that he was guilty of any impropriety. As committee chairman, he allowed Walsh and others the greatest latitude and went as far as to negotiate with Sinclair to allow Walsh to investigate the oilman's business affairs. Smoot had conducted business with Doheny, but he was willing to risk exposure of those dealings by investigating stock transfers in which his family name might have been implicated. Smoot agreed on the need for removing oil from the ground and storing it in tanks, but this feeling developed in the interest of conservation for naval use of this valuable resource. His disagreement with Walsh on the powers of the executive branch do not constitute a crime but merely a difference of constitutional interpretation.

Smoot's commitment to conservation must be seen in context. Though a major issue of the 1920s, Teapot Dome was not the only instance of the Utah senator's taking a stand on conservation questions. Probably because of his duties as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee after January 1924, Smoot was not as intimately connected with conservation as he had been before 1921. Still, his views demonstrate a pattern consistent with his previous proconservation record.

In an earlier article on Smoot's activities through 1920, I argued for the development of a new category of conservationist—the businessminded conservationist—to which I assigned Smoot and a number of his colleagues. Smoot seems to have favored a combination of preservation, public development, and private and state use of natural resources. He sought cooperation between the federal government, the states, and private business. He favored the creation of national parks for the preservation of scenic wonders. Where governmental activity seemed necessary, he supported it. If, on the other hand, it seemed likely that private business or the states could handle the matter adequately, he favored that method of control. As a case in point, Smoot's position on hydroelectric and reclamation projects was consistent with his earlier views.

Though Smoot had compromised on the Water Power Act of 1920 to achieve development of this important natural resource, he vehemently opposed federal construction of generating facilities on projects where he thought private business could do as well. He considered Sen. George W. Norris's Muscle Shoals bill for improvement of the Tennessee River, in his words, "rotten." He also opposed the Boulder Dam project for development of federal power generating facilities on the Colorado River.

In November 1922 representatives of the seven Colorado River states signed a compact to divide the river's water between the upper basin (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico), and the lower basin (Nevada, Arizona, and California). After Arizona—fearing the loss of Gila River water rights—refused to ratify the compact, the other six states negotiated and ratified a new agreement. Thereafter, California Rep. Philip D. Swing and Sen. Hiram W. Johnson pressed for the construction of a high dam at Boulder Canyon to generate power and store water.

Smoot strongly opposed the Swing-Johnson bill. His opposition was quite consistent with the position he had taken on earlier legislation. He appears to have differentiated between federal power projects which he opposed and reclamation projects which he supported because users repaid the cost of construction and development. Though Charles W. Nibley, Utah Republican leader and presiding bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, thought Smoot's views would hurt him in the West, other political leaders were also opposed. Particularly vigorous in opposition were Sen. Henry F. Ashurst of Arizona, Gov. George H. Dern of Utah, Gov. Frank C. Emerson of Wyoming, and power company officials such as Sidney Z. Mitchell and D. C. Green.

Smoot, like Governor Dern, feared Utah might lose the rights to water in the Colorado River if provisions were not written into the bill to protect the states from appropriations by southern California. In private conversation, early in 1927, Smoot warned Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover and Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work that unless the bill contained guarantees to protect Utah's interests in the river, he would recommend that the Utah legislature repeal the six-state compact. When such protection was not added to the bill, both he and Governor Dern recommended repeal, which the legislature soon accomplished. Thereafter, Smoot lobbied to secure enough votes to prevent cloture on the bill, and an Arizona-sponsored filibuster defeated the measure in 1927. The realization by California representatives that they could not run roughshod over the interests of other Colorado River states led to compromises on the legislation. Coolidge and Hoover, both of whom had previously opposed the Swing-Johnson bill, changed their positions and came out in favor of the bill before it passed in December 1928.

In spite of Smoot's opposition to these federal water-power projects, he avidly supported federal appropriations for reclamation. In January 1920 Smoot met with delegations from the West, among whom were Gov. Simon Bamberger, Utah irrigation promoter William Wallace, former Gov. William Spry, and Gov. David W. Davis of Idaho to work out programs to secure further appropriations to the reclamation fund. Legislation designed to make terms of payment for farmers more lenient was passed annually in 1921 through 1924. Smoot also attempted to promote a bill that would have allowed the Bureau of Reclamation to offer its services to private groups at their expense to assist in the development of private projects. This was opposed by more conservative states' rights senators like William H. King who feared increasing the federal bureaucracy.

Smoot was particularly dissatisfied with Utah's share of the reclamation fund. As of 1920 the only federal project completed in Utah was at Strawberry Valley. The senator began to work for reclamation on the Provo and Weber rivers. In December 1922 the Bureau of Reclamation began a number of studies on the two rivers. Beyond this, in December 1925, Coolidge asked Smoot and Sen. Lawrence C. Phipps of Colorado to confer with Secretary Work after it became apparent that the people of the West had become displeased with the progress of the reclamation program. Smoot complied, and eventually projects on the Weber and Provo rivers were inaugurated in 1927 and 1935, in part owing to the senator's efforts.

In addition to reclamation, Smoot's interest in the Forest Service continued in the 1920s. During every session of Congress, bills were presented for exchange of privately owned lands within forest reservations for federal lands outside the forests. To promote an orderly and efficient development of the forests, Smoot sponsored a general measure to allow the exchange of lands without congressional approval. He was unable to secure the general legislation which he wanted, however.

In the spirit of his earlier efforts, Smoot continued to work for the creation and enlargement of national parks and monuments. He successfully secured legislation creating both Zion and Bryce National parks and Cedar Breaks National Monument in Utah, and he worked on other legislation including the enlargement of Mount McKinley National Park in Alaska, Hot Springs National Park in Arkansas, and a special presi- dential forest reserve in the Kiabab National Forest near Grand Canyon. He pressed also for the preservation of sites on the Mormon Trail in Nebraska.

The available evidence indicates that the blot the Teapot Dome investigation left on his conservation activities was quite unwarranted. His opposition to the Boulder Canyon Act came in part from his conservation views because of his dual commitment to maintaining an adequate water supply for the upper basin states and to private development where feasible. The image of Smoot as myopically probusiness, however, is quite wrong. His support of federal control of reclamation, forest reserves, and national parks is evidence of that. The best definition of Smoot's position seems to be that he was a business-minded conservationist who favored a combination of private, state, and federal control, preservation, and development of natural resources.

The proconservation commitment of Walsh and the majority in the Teapot Dome investigation has been overrated. Had Walsh's view of executive power in conservation been applied to the actions of Theodore Roosevelt, private interests could have run roughshod over the public domain and the federal government would have been powerless, in the absence of specific legislation, to prevent it. That Fall had committed a crime was irrelevant to the question of conservation. Oil reserves once depleted could never be renewed, as we are finding out much to our distress today. Smoot recognized that. Although he agreed that Fall needed to be punished for his wrongdoing, he also realized that making a political issue out of conservation would do nothing to preserve the natural resources of the nation.

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