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The U.S. Department of Justice in Utah Territory, 1870-90
Utah Historical Quarterly
Vol. 53, 1985, No. 3
The U.S. Department of Justice in Utah Territory, 1870-90
BY STEPHEN CRESSWELL
A SIZEABLE AND GROWING BODY OF literature has described federal efforts against polygamy and theocracy in Utah Territory in the late nineteenth century. The focus of this literature, however, has been almost exclusively upon the role of federal judges and the opinions issued by the United States Supreme Court. Virtually ignored has been the role of the employees of the U.S. Justice Department in Utah, this in spite of the fact that it was these men — the U.S. attorneys and marshals — who were most directly responsible for carrying out federal policy in Utah. After Congress enacted laws aimed at abolishing polygamy and the temporal power of the Mormon church, beginning in 1862, it was the U.S. attorneys and marshals who sought indictments, made arrests, summoned juries, and conducted the prosecutions. When the early congressional enactments proved inadequate, it was the Justice Department officials who sought stronger laws and by appealing cases to the U.S. Supreme Court cleared away the final obstacles to wholesale convictions for polygamy and related offenses.
During the territorial period there were in Utah three district courts presided over by judges appointed by the president and approved by the Senate. These district courts heard civil and criminal cases arising from territorial statute and also civil and criminal cases arising under federal laws. The sole prosecuting officer for these courts after 1874 was the presidentially appointed U.S. attorney, and the only executive officer was the U.S. marshal. As it was not always easy for these two men to attend court in three different districts, they often utilized assistant attorneys and deputy marshals.
The detailed story of the 1,100 convictions for polygamy and related offenses and of other actions aimed at Mormons and the Mormon church has been told elsewhere. But historians have failed to assess the caliber of the U.S. attorneys and marshals, their motivations and ideologies, the obstacles they encountered in performing their duties, and the aid they received.
Among the aid received, perhaps none was more important than that supplied by the U.S. Army. The strongest symbols of federal power in Utah Territory in this period were the courts and the army. And these two institutions had a reciprocal arrangement, each offering aid to and requiring aid of the other. Early in the 1870s, when there was a lack of funds for judicial expenses in the territory, Marshal M. T. Patrick found himself unable to afford guards or food for his prisoners. With the permission of the commanding officer at Camp Douglas, Lt. Col. Henry A. Morrow, Patrick kept prisoners at the base, where they were fed, quartered, and guarded by the army. Such actions were common throughout the seventies, until Congress began making adequate special appropriations for Utah's judicial expenses.
U.S. attorneys sometimes overstepped the bounds of decency in making requests of the army. After the second trial of John D. Lee for his role in the Mountain Meadow Massacre, Lee was held at Camp Cameron pending his execution. Meanwhile U.S. Attorney Sumner Howard requested a body of soldiers to guard Lee on the day of his execution and to "shoot him under the sentence of the court and the direction of the Marshal." Attorney General Alphonso Taft replied somewhat curtly that troops were not to be used in matters of civil justice, although if a military guard was essential to prevent Lee's release it would be provided.
In the other "church murder cases" Sumner Howard counted on the military to prevent the outbreak of violence during the arrest of Mormon suspects, then complained to Attorney General Charles Devens that just as arrests were about to be made, the force at Camp Douglas was being reduced. Devens replied that unfortunately the troops were needed for the Indian wars, and he warned that the marshal should not make arrests "until the military is ready to sustain." If there were not enough troops in Utah to back up the marshal, Devens would attempt to have President Hayes send more.
In 1886, when George Q. Cannon was finally located and arrested for unlawful cohabitation, troops were used to escort the marshal and the prisoner to Salt Lake City, the deputy marshal having reported "intense excitement" there over Cannon's arrest. The incidents here recounted are intended as examples only, as there were hundreds of cases where military escorts were provided to the U.S. marshal or where U.S. prisoners were kept at military bases because of a lack of funds or for additional security. And it should be added that the army and Justice Department officials aided each other in many matters that had nothing to do with the Mormons. In one instance the U.S. attorney defended Morrow in a lawsuit arising over damage to Salt Lake City property by soldiers from Camp Douglas. In another instance the U.S. attorney obtained an injunction to stop the Salt Lake Rock Company from polluting the water supply of Fort Douglas.
Another form of aid that benefited the U.S. attorneys and marshals in the performance of their duties came from the Justice Department itself in the form of authorizations for special detectives and the offer of rewards. As late as December 1878 Attorney General Devens complained to Congress that his office was "not provided with the means of any general system of investigation of infractions of the laws." Only six months later, U.S. Attorney Van Zile wrote to Devens, asking that he be authorized to hire detectives who would gather evidence of polygamous marriages. With proper evidence, Van Zile reported, "I could make Mormonism shake in her boots before next January." Devens answered, "I desire to assist you all in my power," and he sent the paltry sum of two hundred dollars. Van Zile, obviously taken aback, acknowledged receipt of the money and promised, "I shall undertake to use this carefully and make it accomplish as much as possible."
Several years later Van Zile's successor, W. H. Dickson, also wrote to the Justice Department suggesting a "secret detective service" to uncover violations of the Edmunds Act. Dickson pointed out that most Mormons who could afford it maintained separate residences for their wives and claimed to be living with only one. But doubtless "the husband visits and cohabits with all of them in turn. These visits are made under the cover of darkness and with all possible secrecy." Without a detective service, Dickson concluded, some convictions of the "masses" might be possible, but no more, and he felt it was important that church leaders be made to "realize the efficacy of the law and feel its might." Attorney General Benjamin Harris Brewster approved of Dickson's plan and sent six hundred dollars. Samuel H. Gilson was the first detectivehired, and he quickly obtained evidence that resulted directly in the indictment of ten important Mormon leaders, including the editor of the Deseret News, the president of the Salt Lake Stake, and one of the twelve apostles.
Shortly after this, U.S. Marshal Elwin A. Ireland also requested special funds from the department, this time for the hire of additional deputies for use in serving process. Although it was possible to serve warrants and subpoenas in the cities, Ireland reported that in the rural areas he encountered many obstacles, and the citizens resisted "by every means short of violence." Sheriffs, deputies, town police, and even telegraphers and railroad men were used to watch the marshal and his deputies and "to aid criminals and witnesses in escaping." When he asked to buy food in isolated areas he was told that "his kind is not wanted here" and was refused. The only hope was to strike at an unusual hour and round up the witnesses "like a lot of wild cattle," but this would require many deputies and additional funds. This time Attorney General Brewster wrote back that no special fund for the use of the marshal was necessary — but that if Ireland would seek the department's permission for special deputies in each case, the hire of such deputies would usually be approved. In 1886 Congress provided an appropriation of $5,000 for "more effective prosecution of crimes in Utah," and much of this money was used for the hire of additional deputies when needed.
Although the U.S. attorneys and marshals enjoyed the support of the Justice Department in the matter of detectives and special deputy marshals, in other ways the attorney general and his assistants in Washington were utterly useless to the officials in Utah. When asked for advice or instructions, the attorneys general almost invariably had none to give. The majority of the U.S. attorneys wrote to Washington shortly after their appointment, asking the attorney general for general instructions. Sumner Howard wrote, "I most respectfully ask you to send me such general and special instructions as you may have to give." His request was ignored. Philip Van Zile wrote to the attorney general, asking for a statement of the policy of the Department of Justice. Attorney General Devens's answer was framed in the usual way:
Nor were the attorneys general more helpful when specific problems were submitted. U.S. Attorney George Caesar Bates wrote to the department in 1871, complaining that there were no funds to try Brigham Young — "What are we to do? That's the question." Bates's request for help or advice was ignored, and he wrote again chastizing the attorney general for failing to respond "and I am left to grope on." Finally, Bates began issuing orders to the attorney general, telegraphing, "Instruct me to postpone cases until March and report to Congress in person." When U.S. Attorney Van Zile wished to come to Washington to discuss several important cases, Attorney General Devens discouraged him, saying "it would be impossible either for myself or any of my Assistants to go over with you the detail of the various cases in Utah." The U.S. attorneys were expected to make the important decisions, Devens concluded.
Evaluating the caliber of the men who served as U.S. attorneys and marshals is a difficult task. Most of them are truly forgotten men in American history, men about whom very little can be known. In the case of the U.S. attorneys, some are relatively well-known in Utah history (W. H. Dickson and C. S. Varian), while for others not even the skeleton of a biography can be constructed (William Carey and George Peters). Still others fall somewhere in between. The task of assessing most U.S. attorneys is, then, made difficult by the fact that we do not know where they were educated or what they did before they were U.S. attorneys, nor do we know what they did after they left office. Judging their actual performance in office is also difficult. In writing to thejustice Department, of course, they never declared themselves failures, while if someone else declared them to be a success or a failure we have to wonder about the motivation of the person making the report. Utah in the 1870s and 1880s was a politically charged place, and Gentiles screamed for the removal of slow-moving attorneys like Bates, while Mormons cried out for relief from aggressive U.S. attorneys like Dickson. In some cases both Gentiles and Mormons insisted on the removal of a U.S. attorney — Sumner Howard, for example. Howard was neither corrupt nor unsuccessful as a prosecutor, and all we can assume is that he was personally repugnant to the people of Utah, or at least he was politically unsuccessful in a place that was highly political.
That the caliber of the U.S. attorneys in Utah was probably high may be seen by the fact that they were highly sought after as private attorneys after leaving office — most notably by the Mormon church. Charles Hempstead resigned as U.S. Attorney in 1871 because the compensation was too small; several months later he appeared in the Third District Court as attorney for Brigham Young and defended him from the prosecution of the new U.S. attorney, George Caesar Bates. Bates was removed from office in 1872, and he quickly surfaced as a church attorney. Even W. H. Dickson, that vigorous prosecutor of polygamists, defended the Mormon church after he left office, in the case of The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States. The biggest catch by the Mormon church in their hiring of counsel was in the suits against the Utah Commissioners, which the U.S. Supreme Court heard in 1884; in these cases the church was able to hire former U.S. Attorney General Wayne MacVeagh.
The work of the Justice Department in Utah was hindered by a number of obstacles. One of these was the low salary paid to the U.S. attorneys. These men were paid $250 per annum, plus fees; this remuneration was uniform throughout the United States. One of the constant complaints of the attorney general was that he was unable to hold good men in the U.S. attorney positions — private practice was so much more lucrative. So in Utah U.S. Attorney Hempstead resigned in 1871 because his fees were "a mere bagatelle," and George Caesar Bates told the solicitor general that if he could only get his "official" cases out of the way, he hoped to "make a fortune out of mining litigation" on the side. Sumner Howard resigned in 1877, noting that he had served as long as possible, suffering much pecuniary loss. And in 1885 W. H. Dickson and his assistant submitted their resignations, their chief motivation in so doing being the "utterly inadequate compensation." It is certain that these U.S. attorneys were not simply dropping hints, hoping to have their salaries raised; they knew that the attorney general did not have the power to raise their salaries, and their dissatisfaction with pay was usually unvoiced until the time of their resignation.
Another financial problem of the U.S. attorneys and marshals was the lack of funds to carry on their official business. Each year the attorney general complained to Congress that the Mormon legislature refused to pay its share of the court expenses, and after much delay Congress usually provided the needed funds. In 1871 Charles Hempstead reported to the department that "The courts are without a dollar with which to carry on their business." His letter was also signed by the three district judges, the marshal, the clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, and the acting governor. In this situation Marshal M. T. Patrick eventually advanced the needed funds, taking out a loan in his ownname and using his army pension, while Deputy B. L. "Pony" Duncan mortgaged some property to raise money. In the absence of cash, jurors and witnesses were paid with "certificates of attendance," which were to be negotiable at some future date.
Similar financial crises occurred almost yearly in this period. In 1886 Marshal Ireland telegraphed thejustice Department, "Courts in first second & third districts in session. . . . Not a dollar for jurors & witnesses." In a follow-up letter, Ireland warned of the danger of postponing cases. The Mormon leaders, he wrote, "should not have the opportunity to delude and encourage their people in the belief that the Government is relaxing in the slightest degree its efforts to obtain obedience to the laws." The attorney general, apprised of the crisis, began the slow process of seeking relief from Congress.
Attorneys who came to Utah to serve the Justice Department found that on the frontier, law offices were managed differently from those back east. Philip Van Zile reported to Attorney General Devens that when he came to Utah, "I found the office in a perfect hurly-burly. No files of cases and papers all thrown in a heap." Similarly, George R. Maxwell recalled that when he was first appointed U.S. marshal he found
Marshal Maxwell exaggerated when he said that there were no courthouses, for the courts always had places to meet, such as they were. When Judge Edward B. McKean issued an order ousting the locally appointed "territorial marshal," he found himself ousted from his courtroom by the Mormon landlords of the building. For one and a half years thereafter his Third District Court met in a hayloft over a livery stable. Different courtrooms were rented from time to time; for many years the courtrooms at Salt Lake were so positioned as to be offended by the stench from nearby privies and for a time were located below a brothel. In 1884 Attorney General Brewster, noting that the rooms above the courtrooms "have a character that brings reproach upon the U.S. officers to some extent," ordered the marshal to take steps to rent the upper rooms as well, so as to remove "the objectionable parties."
Perhaps the greatest hindrance to the U.S. attorneys and marshals in the performance of their duties was the fact that they were in effect in an "alien land," far from their friends and families, and wholly ostracized from the tight-knit Mormon majority. Marshal Maxwell entered upon his duties with the announced intention of showing "malice towards none & charity towards all," but he felt that because of the Mormons' failure "to obtain a convert & instrument in me" he became socially ostracized and the target "for their most malevolent & deadly shafts." U.S. Attorney Varian, writing a brief account of his years in office, seemed particularly disturbed by the memory of an event that occurred when he and W. H. Dickson had been invited to the Tabernacle to hear the Mormons' "declaration of grievances and protests." After the meeting, Varian recalled, he and Dickson had risen to go and were then booed and hissed by the vast crowd, composed mostly of women. He attributed the crowd's action to the continual verbal attacks made on U.S. authorities by church leaders; certainly the U.S. attorney's role in prosecuting these women's husbands also played a part.
A number of other incidents of greater and lesser severity demonstrate the friction that occurred between Mormon citizens and Justice Department officials. One night in September 1885 unknown persons attacked the homes of U.S. Attorney Dickson, his assistant Varian, and U.S. Commissioner McKay, hurling glass jars full of human excrement through the windows, jars which broke on the interior walls and carpets.
Also during the tenure of Dickson and Varian, members of the Salt Lake City police force and others initiated an undercover operation, hoping to induce federal officials to commit crimes of lust. A brothel was opened in the city, with secret compartments for observation provided, and prostitutes were imported. Members of the police department, while off-duty, took turns watching at the peepholes, while the madam sent enticing notes to federal officeholders. The most important of the men thus captured was Assistant U.S. Attorney S. H. Lewis. He was tried for "lewd and lascivious conduct" before a justice of the peace, and three men testified that they had watched the act of copulation through a peephole. Found guilty, he took an appeal to the Third District Court as permitted by statute.
The motivations of the Mormons in the case was clear. The national press was full of talk about Mormon lust and liscentiousness; the plan here was to show that the very men who were prosecuting polygamists were clearly guilty of their own kind of lasciviousness. But before the Third District Court, C. S. Varian defended his colleague and attacked the Mormon witnesses: "I do not believe any American jury would believe such infamous scoundrels, who have crawled to the threshold of the house of the harlot." The judge agreed with Varian, pointing out that the police and their accomplices had committed a crime to induce others to commit crime, while the purpose of law was to prevent crime. Later, one of the policemen was tried and convicted for his part in the "conspiracy to open a house of ill fame."
In other cases armed conflict between the U.S. officers and the Mormons was either threatened or consummated. On one occasion during a trial in the "hayloft court," U.S. Attorney Carey was startled as the door was opened with a violent burst "and in rushed twenty or thirty stalwart men wearing pistols." They were believed to be members of the "Danites," a militant group of Mormons. Carey and the judge ignored the "menacing group," and nothing further came of this attempt to intimidate the district court. In another incident in 1877, Sumner Howard had brought Robert T. Burton before a U.S. commissioner, charging him with having committed murder in the Morrisite schism of 1862. Again the Danites, or men believed by Howard to be Danites, rushed in, and the commander of the Nauvoo Legion also came in and argued furiously. Howard and the commissioner were sufficiently intimidated to release Burton on bond. Howard reported, "It is very significant that Gen. Wells, their military leader, should be the first man to show a disposition to 'bulldoze' the courts." Howard promised to endeavor to "keep cool," but he sought and received assurances that the army was ready to sustain him.
In at least two instances friction between Justice Department officials and Mormons led to bloodshed. In November of 1885 Deputy Marshal Henry F. Collin was waylaid and beaten in a dark alley by one or more men; he managed to shoot one of his assailants and then fled. The injured man turned out to be Joseph W. McMurrin, a Mormon by faith and a watchman by trade. After investigation Collin was cleared of any possible wrong-doing; McMurrin, too ill to come into court, finally fled to Europe. He announced that his grudge with Collin was a personal one, but C. S. Varian was of the opinion that "there is no doubt that Collin was attacked because of his zeal and efficiency as a deputy marshal." Only two weeks before the McMurrin assault, Deputy Collin had been attacked by Andrew D. Burt, who believed that Collin was responsible for reports in the Tribune that Burt was a "spotter," a man who trailed the marshal and his deputies in order to keep the Mormons informed. Burt's only weapons were his fists, and Collin was not seriously injured.
One final incident will be recounted here; this was the case of Deputy Marshal William Thompson, who, while attempting to arrest one Edward M. Dalton for unlawful cohabitation, shot and killed the fleeing suspect. Many were of the opinion that because Dalton's crime was a mere misdemeanor, the deputy's actions were unwarranted. Thompson was charged with the territorial offense of manslaughter, and as in all territorial criminal cases, the U.S. attorney (actually his assistant, Varian) was responsible for prosecuting. "It was the duty of the United States Attorney to state the law governing the case to the court and jury," Varian wrote later. He took the controversial step of announcing that because of the wording of the territorial manslaughter statute, and federal laws dealing with marshals, Thompson was clearly not guilty. The Mormon community was furious at Varian's way of "prosecuting" Thompson, but the judge agreed with Varian and so charged the jury, which brought back an acquittal. Mormon leaders complained directly to the Department of Justice but received no satisfaction; the Deseret News denounced Thompson and Varian as murderers and was quickly met with a libel suit, which it settled out of court.
The final remaining question, and a very important one, concerns the ideology and motivation of the U.S. attorneys. How did they see their role in Utah? How did they personally feel about the Mormon church and the institution of plural marriages? One ideological tie bound together the U.S. attorneys in the period covered by this study: with one exception — Cleveland's appointee, George Peters — all were Republicans. And, as has already been made clear, none of the U.S. attorneys was a Mormon. Another trait that bound the U.S. attorneys together was that they invariably underestimated the tenacity of the Mormon church and the loyalty of polygamous Mormons to their families. Several hours after his arrival in Utah Territory in 1871, George Caesar Bates wrote to Attorney General Amos T. Akerman: "I can see clearly . . . that Judge McKean and I can within six months Enforce the Law, End Polygamy, and Give Peace to this beautiful Territory." In 1879 Philip Van Zile reported to the attorney general, "A few convictions of the 'big fellows' would settle the matter of polygamy." In February 1885 W. H. Dickson assured his superiors in Washington that "within one year if the present pressure on the guilty is continued . . . the church will command submisson to the laws."
Though federal efforts against polygamy, especially in the 1880s, have often been portrayed as a crusade by Protestant Christians against the Mormon church, the U.S. attorneys do not fit into this scheme. After extensive research, it has been possible to link only one of the nine examined U.S. attorneys with Protestant religion; if the others were church members they were not very vocal about it. Of two leaders of the alleged crusade, it is enlightening to note that Chief Justice Zane was an agnostic and C. S. Varian was a Unitarian. What disturbed the Justice Department officials in Utah about the Mormon church was not the religious side of the issues but the social and political side. Polygamy was wrong primarily because Congress had passed a law prohibiting it and also because the twospouse family was considered to be a cornerstone of American civilization. The Mormon church was wrong because it sought to maintain a strong political and economic role, and this was un-American. It is interesting to note that a number of Mormon beliefs were repugnant to Protestant Christianity, but only the illegal and socially wrong institution of plural marriage was noticed by the U.S. attorneys. Ignored were the practices of vicarious marriage, in which living persons were sealed to the dead for the benefit of the latter, and baptism for the dead, where the living were baptized on behalf of the dead. So far as it has been possible to ascertain, these two practices were never mentioned by the U.S. attorneys in their private writings; their concern was with polygamy and the political role of the Mormon church.
What was important to the U.S. attorneys may be most convincingly seen by looking at their own writings. Over and over W. H. Dickson reported to the attorney general that "the Mormon masses are today arrayed against the enforcement of the laws of the United States." Looking back at his service as U.S. attorney, C. S. Varian recalled, "Practically an entire people were in open hostility and rebellion against the Government of the United States." In the face of this perceived rebellion, the U.S. attorneys were not content merely to prosecute cases under the laws. They became lobbyists, orators, movers, and activists.
In perusing the Justice Department files, one is struck by the vast numbers of requests for leaves of absence by Utah's U.S. attorneys. Did these men really vacation so extensively? Then one notices the reasons given for the requested leave: "to come to Washington at my own expense." In Washington the attorneys (and marshals too) lobbied Congress, nagged the attorney general, assisted in arguments before the Supreme Court, and even met with the president. As early as 1870 U.S. Attorney ad interim Robert N. Baskin was in Washington lobbying for the Cullom bill, which sought to clarify the powers of Utah's federal courts. Although introduced by Congressman Shelby Cullom of Illinois, the bill was, in the words of Brigham Young, "concocted in Salt Lake City by a pettifogger named Baskin." The Cullom bill passed the House but stalled in the Senate. Later, the Poland Act supplied the power Baskin had worked for, and he was involved in lobbying for that piece of legislation as well. Only months after the passage of the Edmunds Act U.S. Attorney Van Zile found himself in Washington pushing for further legislation; Van Zile reported that the Edmunds Act would succeed in ending polygamy "in the course of time, but it would be a hundred years." The U.S. attorneys also performed acts of lobbying when a judgeship was vacant or about to be vacated. For instance, William Carey led the fight to save the zealous Edward B. McKean from removal, though to no avail.
As mentioned earlier, only one U.S. attorneys can be linked to organized Protestant religion, Philip Van Zile. He appears in written records of the Congregational church on only one occasion when he prepared an address, not for a single church,but for the annual conference of all the Congregational churches in his home state of Michigan. The address, entitled "The Twin Relic," was sent to Michigan, where it was read before the conference. It is the most outspoken condemnation of polygamy by any Justice Department official. Van Zile began by asserting that polygamy undermined the American family, a cornerstone of our civilization. The Mormon wife, instead of being a properly loving wife and mother, "is reduced to a mere animal or machine. She no longer lives, she simply exists, to be used by, and to serve the foul purposes of a licentious beastly man." These lurid words were tailored to a church audience, which would certainly have been less interested in a mere political treatment of "the Utah question." It is certain that they furnished the fodder for many an antipolygamy sermon in the churches of Michigan and influenced a great many people.
Van Zile also reached out to the East in one other important way. In December 1880 the editor of the Lnter-Ocean, an important Republican organ, wrote to Van Zile:
The editor, W. E. Curtis, concluded by asking Van Zile to supply the name of someone in Utah who might keep the Inter-Ocean apprised of the situation there. Van Zile volunteered his own services. No longer addressing a church audience, Van Zile used political arguments in writing for the Curtis paper. "The true Americans in Utah are the Gentiles and Apostates," began one Van Zile editorial. All that the Gentiles wanted, he added, was "to see the 'Mormons' obey the law and respect the government of the United States." Again intimating that the Edmunds Act would not be sufficient to end polygamy and the political domination of the church, Van Zile urged, "Turn over the Territory of Utah into the hands of loyal, true Americans, no matter if it falls into the hands of but ten men." He continued,
U.S. Attorney Dickson, too, in the mid-1880s, sought to serve as a molder of national opinion. He had his opportunity when members of the Grand Army of the Republic, a powerful veterans' organization, stopped in Salt Lake on their way to a huge encampment in San Francisco. At the "campfire" held at Salt Lake City, the veterans were greeted by a banner that read pointedly, "Our Loyal Citizens Welcome the Country's Veterans." Dickson was asked to address the meeting, and like Van Zile he tailored his argument to fit his audience. "The Mormon church is steeped in disloyalty," Dickson began. "The people who are adherants of this church are steeped in disloyalty." Church leaders regularly preached "that the government was the enemy of the Mormon church." Dickson specifically asked the Union veterans to support him in his call for disfranchisement of the Mormons: "Why should the government hesitate to wrest from these disloyal citizens the ballot? The people here do not really exercise the franchise. They do as they are told." One of the Grand Army leaders, Gen. James Beaver of Pennsylvania (himself a lawyer and a Republican politician) responded to Dickson's speech by saying that this was a great opportunity "for the government to show its power." The Mormon Deseret News noted sourly that Dickson's speech "made the heart of every man who had worn the blue beat as it had not done for twenty years."
Thejustice Department officials in Utah during the 1870s and the 1880s are without a doubt controversial. Both U.S. attorneys and marshals were guilty of working to break up families, to disfranchise citizens, even to disincorporate a church and seize its property. Certainly this chapter in American history provides the greatest example of the U.S. government moving against an organized religion.
But in fairness, actions of the Justice Department officials who moved against polygamy and "church control" in Utah should be judged in the light of the times. These federal officials believed that almost everything that was American was threatened in Utah — never mind that the Mormons professed patriotism. The monogamous family was threatened in Utah. The separation of church and state was threatened there. The tradition of nonsectarian public schools was threatened. The Republican and Democratic parties failed to take root in Utah. Trends toward private enterprise and laissez faire economic policies, so strong in the East, were not followed in Utah, where collectivism overseen by the church was the pattern. In the wake of the Civil War, with a newly strong federal government, great pride was taken in the fact that the United States was no longer merely a collection of states and territories but was a single, nearly unified, and homogenized nation. Utah threatened this, and thus Utah was targeted for action by the president, Congress, and then by the federal lawyers, judges, and other officials.
Utah emerged from the great struggle a more diversified place, with a strong Gentile community living peacefully alongside the Mormon majority. But the United States government by its actions made certain that unwanted diversity would be kept out of the Union. By 1896 Utah was, for better or worse, a place similar in most important respects to the nation of states it joined.
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