24 minute read
The Failure of Utah's First Sugar Factory
The Failure of Utah's First Sugar Factory
BY CHARLES L. SCHMALZ
SUGAR WAS A SCARCE AND EXPENSIVE COMMODITY in pioneer Utah. The prospect of extracting a sweetener from locally grown sugar beets excited the first settlers. LDS church leaders took an active part in promoting beet culture among the Saints. Early communications from the Salt Lake Valley advised prospective emigrants to bring sugar beet eed. The U.S. Department of Agriculture was attempting to establish a domestic sugar beet industry during this period also. John Bernhisel, Utah's representative in Washington, D.C., acquired beet seed from the USDA and sent it to Utah in the spring of 1850.
DESERET MANUFACTURING COMPANY
John Taylor was an early advocate of sugar production in Utah. In the fall of 1850 he told church members at a conference in Manchester, England:
The following spring, near the end of his French mission, Taylor organized the Deseret Manufacturing Company (DMC) to bring the sugar beet industry to Utah. The company consisted of Taylor and three English converts—John W. Coward, a Liverpool merchant; Joseph Russell, a shipbuilder; and Philip DeLaMare, a native of Jersey who was a blacksmith and builder. During 1851 Taylor visited beet sugar factories in France and machinery firms in France and England. He also started to build a technical staff. Henry MoUenhauer, a "sugar making expert" from Liverpool was employed by the DMC September 10, 1851. He subsequently visited French sugar beet factories with Taylor and DeLaMare.
A consignment of sugar beet seed was sent to Utah in June 1851 with Loran Babbitt, a returning missionary. Instructions for planting and growing the beets were also sent. Taylor planned to grow a crop of beets during the summer of 1852 and process them with the machinery scheduled to arrive in Utah that fall. The machinery was ordered from Faucett, Preston and Company; an established Liverpool firm with considerable experience in the fabrication of machinery. The equipment was apparently scheduled to be shipped from England in February 1852.
An advance party of the DMC left Liverpool January 10, 1852, on the ship Kennebec. This group, which included Philip DeLaMare and two other blacksmiths, was sent ahead to prepare wagons and assemble teams for the journey across the plains. Joseph Russell, the majority stockholder, is reported to have accompanied this group but is not listed in the Emigration Record nor on the Kennebec's passenger list.
The DMC employed a group of English workers (most of whom were also LDS converts) to come to the valley and operate the machinery. There is little recorded concerning these workers, their names or skills. The party to accompany the machinery was under the supervision of Elias Morris. Since Morris canceled his reservation on the February emigrant ship, the Ellen Marie it is probable that delivery of the machinery was delayed.
The machinery left Liverpool March 6, 1852 on the ship Rockaway. It arrived in New Orleans on April 26, 1852, where it was met by John Taylor and Joseph Vernon, an English engineer employed by the DMC. They had also left Liverpool March 6, traveling on the steamship Niagara, via Boston. The party with the machinery included thirty people. According to the Rockaway's passenger list, however, only two in the group listed sugar skills. They were John BoUwinkle and Ebnor Connor.
Taylor and Vernon proceeded on to Utah ahead of the machinery, reaching Salt Lake on August 20, 1852. They immediately began to prepare a plant site in Provo. By the end of September contracts for adobe brick, shingles, and building stone had been written. Taylor and others conducted a survey for a ditch to carry water from the Provo River to the factory site. Commitments were also made for charcoal "as required for the factory." Notes indicate that a lime kiln was also planned.
Meanwhile, the sugar machinery was being freighted across the plains. It finally began to arrive in the Salt Lake Valley early in November and reached Provo a few weeks later. Records indicate that the wagons straggled into Provo over the better part of a month. An unknown amount of the machinery was left in Weber Canyon due to heavy snow. This would logically have included the largest and heaviest components, most likely the steam boiler, the vacuum pan. and the two "heaters" (actually large open-topped, steam-jacketed copper tanks weighing in the neighborhood of a ton each). The items known to have made it into the valley that winter include the beet washer, the evaporating vessels, and at least one rasp and one beet press.
Sometime in late November it was decided to abandon, temporarily at least, efforts in Provo. The Deseret News for November 27, 1852, reported:
It was becoming apparent that the erection of a sugar factory was going to be a major time and resource consuming venture, greater than previously thought. The project missed its initial shipping date and suffered additional delays en route. It was at least three months behind schedule. Obviously they were not going to process sugar beets in Provo that winter. The DMC, anxious to produce sugar and no doubt urged by Brigham Young, made the move back to Salt Lake in midDecember. There the machinery was set up using available water power in the old blacksmith shop on Temple Square. Beets were washed, rasped, pressed, and evaporated into molasses in February 1853. There is no record of any sugar being produced at this time.
Significantly, after these initial attempts the prospect of making granulated sugar essentially disappears from public utterances. Virtually all subsequent references to the sugar beet project speak of molasses as the end product. Experiences during the Temple Square tests seem to have caused second thoughts about the chances of crystallizing sugar from beet juice.
Some public outcry developed during the Temple Square trials— complaints about wasting scarce fuel as well as disappointment at the failure to produce sugar immediately. The latter was answered by a statement that there had been no intent to produce sugar during the initial trials, due in part to the poor condition of the beets which had been stored through most of the winter. In retrospect it appears that another reason for the failure to produce sugar at this time could have been that the vacuum pan, in which sugar was crystallized, had apparently been left in the mountains east of Salt Lake. The accounts of the Temple Square trials mention the evaporating pans but not the vacuum pan. As it was one of the heaviest pieces of equipment, weighing some 3,300 pounds, it was most likely left behind. This theory is supported by Truman Angell's later comments implying that the 1854 efforts to work with the vacuum pan represented the first time that it had been assembled.
THE CHURCH TAKES OVER
By the end of the 1853 tests the DMC was broke. The two principal stockholders. Coward and Russell, turned their interest over to the LDS church. In return the church assumed the outstanding debts of the company. It had already provided financial aid, paying the import duty in New Orleans and subsidizing the overland transportation of the machinery. Brigham Young held a meeting with DMC personnel on March 17, 1853, at which he announced the change in ownership. He dismissed John Taylor and assumed the role of manager of the project. He appointed Orson Hyde to "superintend the erection of a suitable building for the manufactuary." The exact timing here is unclear as other records indicate the decision to turn the DMC over to the church had been made as early as February 22, 1853.
Some confusion exists about the specific roles played by Young and Hyde in the Sugar House project. In light of its subsequent failure it is not too surprising that later writers have minimized Brigham Young's involvement. There are, however, numerous references to visits by Brigham Young or his representative to the sugar works during construction. It would have been unusual for any church venture of this magnitude not to have been under the general direction of President Young.
Orson Hyde does not appear to have had too much to do with the project. His comments, in the DMC meeting minutes and elsewhere, seem to imply that he had doubts that sugar could be made from beets. One published statement devotes as much space to alternate uses for the machinery as it does to sugar manufacture. A few visits by Hyde to the site or the architect's office are noted.
Brigham Young called Truman Angell to design the sugar factory. This Angell proceeded to do over the next six months. He had never seen a sugar factory, and although he was a talented architect and builder he was not an engineer. He had no background in machinery design or chemical process operations. He was given a field piled with fifty-odd wagonloads of machinery, John Taylor's notes, and Brigham's blessing. Angell was aware of the challenge and of his limitations. His journal for this period recounts the effort and his concern for the quality of the work.
The actual construction of the factory building was probably under the direction of A. O. Smoot, the first bishop of the Sugar House Ward. A record listing those laboring on the Sugar Works building was kept by Joseph Vernon who was apparently working as clerk to Bishop Smoot. It is logical to assume that a church public works project such as this would have been under the immediate direction of the bishop of the local ward.
Following the church takeover some of the original DMC personnel left the venture. The exact number is not clear, but it is certain that John Taylor and Philip DeLaMare both left at this time and very little is subsequently said about Henry Mollenhauer. Their absence would have been critical as they were the only people in Utah who had actually visited a sugar beet processing factory. John Bollwinkle was the only original sugar worker of record when the Sugar House factory was operating. His experience, so far as can be determined, was in Liverpool sugar factories. Prior to 1868 the English sugar industry was exclusively engaged in cane sugar refining, so it is doubtful that he had any experience with sugar beet processing.
John Taylor's notes are reasonably complete and accurate. A few details are sketchy and a number of terms are not fully explained, but the essential information required to successfully process sugar beets is present. To one who had not seen the equipment in operation the information could have been somewhat confusing, however.
The English engineer Joseph Vernon was also working on the project. His skills appear to have been more with fabrication than operation. His recorded efforts are in the area of the actual factory building construction. Not too much is known about Vernon himself other than that he was reputed to have worked for Faucett Preston, joining the DMC and the church in Liverpool. The language of a talk he gave a few year's later indicates that he was fairly well educated. He traveled with John Taylor to Utah and was involved with the sugar project to the last, operating the factory with Henry Wilde its final season. Vernon later moved to Hawaii where he subsequently died.
THE SUGAR HOUSE FACTORY
Delays plagued the project. Other church construction projects such as the Salt Lake Temple competed for men and materials. Ground was broken April 25, 1853, but actual construction did not begin until April 15, 1854. Foundations were completed September 9, 1854, and the machinery installed later that fall. A photograph of Angell's July 1853 drawing for the Sugar House factory survives. It is reputed to be one of the most detailed drawings Angell produced. All of the machinery needed to produce sugar is present and appears to be placed properly.
Truman Angell appears to have been the individual most concerned with the actual installation of the sugar machinery, although Frederick Kesler, the pioneer millwright, apparently worked on the drive machinery. From September 1854 through February 1855 Angell worked full-time at the sugar works. He appears to have devoted his entire energies to the project, doing much of the actual work himself. On October 19, 1854, he made his only journal entry during the period:
An indication of Angell's devotion to the sugar project is his failure to even mention the December 25, 1854, dedication of the Seventy's Hall, a project Angell had devoted much time and effort to earlier. His next journal entry, dated February 1, 1855, reflects his discouragement that the sugar factory was having numerous difficulties.
Despite forecasts that the factory would be ready to operate in the fall of 1854, it was February 1, 1855, before the machinery actually started processing beets. Between then and March 17, 1855, when it shut down, approximately 22,000 bushels of beets were ground and pressed but no sugar was made. Comments about the operation seem rather optimistic in retrospect. The following from a letter by George A. Smith was published in the St. Louis Luminary on March 31, 1853:
The second year's operation was started on July 1, 1855. As in the previous year, all efforts appear to have been directed toward molasses production. A combination of drought and grasshoppers almost wiped out the sugar beet crop and there were few beets to process that year. One report, dated September 30, 1855, states: "the Sugar Works have ceased operations, in consequence of the failure of the beet crop."
Truman Angell does not appear to have had anything to do with the sugar works after the spring of 1855, for there is nothing noted in his journal concerning the second season. In the spring of 1856 he was called on a mission to England. While there he managed to visit a cane sugar refinery in Liverpool. He also traveled to Ireland and visited that country's first sugar beet factory at Mountmellick, built in 1851. Although it produced "an acceptable sugar," it was apparently not a financial success and was closed about 1860. Angell summarized the visits and recommended improvements at Sugar House in a letter tr Brigham Young.
The letter apparently arrived too late to save the venture; at least there is no record of any action being taken. Angell's first speech in Salt Lake after returning from the mission field makes no mention of sugar. He did retain an interest in sugar production, though. For a number of years he conducted sorghum or "Chinese sugar cane" growing experiments in his Salt Lake City garden.
Little is recorded concerning the 1856 season's operation. An announcement stating that Vernon and Wilde had been appointed by Brigham Young "to manufacture molasses for the Church" was published. It went on to say that "new processes" developed at the sugar works would be used. The announcement was signed by Joseph Vernon. No subsequent references to the operation of the sugar works have been found, nor any information as to what the new processes were. The factory does not appear to have been used to process beets after the fall of 1856.2
During the winter of 1856, however, the church still maintained a public position that the sugar works could be successfully operated. The Fourteenth General Epistle stated:
The reasons for the above statement are not clear, but it appears to have been made primarily for public consumption. Obviously such feelings were not held by all concerned, as the Sugar House project was essentially shut down at the time.
PROCESS ANALYSIS
One factor inhibiting the production of usable sweeteners from sugar beets is that crude beet juice contains too many dissolved salts to be edible. In order to make a usable product the juice has to be treated to separate the sugar from the bitter-tasting salts. Modern science has techniques such as ion exchange to remove unwanted salts; unfortunately, such technology lay eighty years or so in the future when Sugar House was running. Crystallization, an efficient technique for separating sugar from dissolved impurities, would have permitted the production of an edible sweetener, but there is no record that crystallization was ever accomplished at Sugar House.
The equipment purchased by the DMC and brought to Utah does not appear to have been faulty. Faucett Preston was a reputable firm established in 1758 as a foundry. By 1850 it had developed a reputation as a supplier of ships' engines and cast cannon. Subsequent to the production of the DMC's equipment the firm filled numerous orders for sugar machinery throughout the world. Although the DMC order was one of the firm's early sugar machinery orders, the equipment, with the possible exception of the vacuum pan, appears to have functioned as designed.
There is no evidence that any of the DMC's machinery was lost or damaged on the long journey west. Tales that some of the machinery was lost in the Missouri River when the steamer Saluda blew up are highly unlikely since the Saluda accident occurred on April 9, 1852, and the sugar machinery did not reach New Orleans until April 26, 1852. A number of those who had traveled with the DMC advance party, including William Dunbar, the elder who had baptized PhUip DeLaMare, were on the Saluda. The DeLaMares, delayed in St. Louis by illness, were not on the Saluda.
Some heavy components, presumably including the vacuum pan and steam boiler, were left in the mountains east of Salt Lake during the winter of 1852-53 but did not appear to suffer for the experience. At least there is no mention of problems resulting from the rigors of the trip. There obviously was some mix-up and confusion during the moves from Provo to Temple Square to Sugar House. This is borne out by Angell's comments concerning searching out various components when assembling the machinery.
Actually, there was not too much difference between the machinery at Sugar House and that used later at the successful Lehi, Utah, plant. The major difference was the addition of crystal separation equipment to reflect industrial improvements made in the 1870s. Lehi did have bone char equipment, but, as far as can be determined, it was not used. One other component unique to Lehi, German-trained sugar technologists, brings to mind Angell's comment that Sugar House needed a set of strangers to operate it.
Purification of sugar beet juice was an infant technology in 1851. Lime (calcium oxide) had been used for a number of years to precipitate impurities. The use of carbon dioxide was introduced in France in 1849. John Taylor's notes and the inclusion of a gassing tank in Angell's design indicate that the DMC planned to use carbon dioxide. Lime/carbon dioxide purification does not remove sodium or potassium salts, the source of the strong, bitter taste that makes sugar beet juices inedible.
There is no indication that lime purification caused any problems at Sugar House. Lime burning was a common industry in pioneer Utah. Carbon dioxide production was carefully detailed in Taylor's notes, and the simple equipment needed could have been fabricated locally if it had not been brought from Europe.
For years the stated reason for the Sugar House factory's failure was the lack of bone char, a form of activated carbon used to purify cane sugar syrups. The principal source of this theory is the account written some years later by Phllip DeLaMare. He blames the failure on the absence of bone char production retorts. Angell's journal also mentions the lack of "animal charcoal to bleach and purify the juice." Carbon will remove color and some calcium salts from crude beet juices but has little effect on other properties. Both of the above comments dealt with operations where edible syrup was the goal. In that context a lack of bone char might have made the production of a usable syrup difficult. In light of the relatively high sodium and potassium content of Utah beets, however, it is doubtful that even bone char treatment would have made the beet syrup edible. Carbon treatment does not remove sodium and potassium compounds.
DeLaMare's account deals with experiences during the 1853 Temple Square trials. By the time Sugar House was started DeLaMare had moved to Tooele. He does not appear to have had any association with sugar after the spring of 1853.
The references to a lack of charcoal are somewhat puzzling. In the absence of retorts charcoal can be prepared and regenerated in kilns similar to those used for the burning of limestone to lime. Also it can be partially regenerated by letting it ferment and then washing it with water. Furthermore, it is highly doubtful that men as practical as Brigham Young would have installed the large number of char filters in the Sugar House factory without some means of preparing the absorbent material itself (e.g., the previously cited contract for charcoal). Truman Angell's letter from England bears this out in that he makes no mention of problems associated with the char filters, despite his earlier comment about their lack. Rather, he states that "the [char] filtering should be carried out as calculated in the plan in the valley."
The principal problem at Sugar House appears to have been sugar boiling—the final evaporation stage where the syrup is thickened under carefully controlled conditions until crystallization takes place. The notes taken by John Taylor indicate that the basic information needed to produce sugar was available to the operators of Sugar House. "Directions for Boiling the Vacuum Pan" are correct as far as they go and should have resulted in sugar production.
Sugar is boiled under vacuum in an airtight vessel. The Sugar House vacuum pan followed the design of E. C. Howard, an early British engineer. It was a spherical vessel, approximately six feet in diameter, similar to those used in other nineteenth-century sugar factories. The pan was equipped with an integral condenser and air pump to produce the vacuum. Steam was introduced into a spiral coil or "worm" in the bottom to heat the syrup charge. Thermometers, a pressure gauge, and "proof stick" were provided for control.
The boiling point of a solution containing dissolved compounds rises as their concentration increases. The "boiling point rise" is the basic technique used by sugar boilers to determine the saturation of the syrup and control the crystailization process. Since the boiling point is also dependent on the pressure in the pan, pressure control is critical. Taylor's instructions call for boiling an initial graining charge to a temperature of 165-170° F at an absolute pressure of 145-160 mm mercury. Under these conditions the syrup would be supersaturated with sugar and crystallization should have occurred spontaneously. Continued careful operation of the pan as described would have resulted in the production of sugar. However, if the pressure in the pan were higher than 160 mm the syrup would not be supersaturated at 165-170°.
The instructions do not detail the critical graining step—at that time typically involving physically shocking the mass of syrup, usually by a sudden change in the pan's pressure or striking the side of the pan —however, the temperatures and pressures given would have placed the syrup in a condition where crystallization should have started spontaneously.
The most likely factor in the failure to produce sugar was an inability to produce and hold the required vacuum. Others, writing about the operation of Howard pans, discuss the difficulties encountered in this area. Angell discusses his observations on vacuum-pan operation in some detail in his 1856 letter to Brigham Young and goes on to note the shortcomings of the Sugar House pan. Especially interesting is his surprise at the large quantity of water he saw being used in England to condense steam from the vacuum pan. By implication the Sugar House pan did not have a sufficient supply of cooling water.
Angell also comments on problems with the Utah pan's vacuum pump installation: the pump's pulley was not the proper size and the pump was running more slowly than those he observed in England. A pump running at reduced speed and with an inadequate supply of cooling water would have been hard-pressed to produce the vacuum required. As noted previously, insufficient vacuum raises the boiling point of a solution. Thus, the Sugar House syrup would not have been supersaturated at the temperature noted in the boiling instructions, and crystallization would not have taken place.
OTHER FACTORS
The quality of the Utah beets may have played a part in the failure, especially as far as edible molasses production is concerned. The beets most certainly had a higher salt content than those grown in France. Modern processors know that beets grown around Great Salt Lake and Utah Lake have a higher salt level than those grown elsewhere in the West. The salts would give the beet juice a stronger flavor, making it inedible even after purification. Crystallization would have been the only means of producing usable sugar. Higher salt levels reduce the yield of sugar crystals but do not prevent crystallization.
External events could also have influenced the decision to give up on sugar beets. By the summer of 1857 Brigham Young and the Saints had other problems. Johnston's Army was on the march to Utah and the situation was uncertain. Most public effort was going into preparations for the expected invasion. In addition, the general hard times made it difficult to sustain the various enterprises of the church. There were many demands on limited resources. The sugar works, less than a smashing success, would have had a very low priority.
Alternate uses for the machinery could also have contributed to the demise of Sugar House. These would have provided a graceful means to abandon the sugar-making venture. For instance, Thomas Howard was making paper in Salt Lake by the middle of the decade. The idle sugar machinery, especially the large vats and presses, was an inviting resource begging to be used.
Finally, Brigham Young, sensitive to criticism of his management of any of the church's affairs, would have been less than eager to pursue a project that had been such an obvious and public failure. The Saints had been promised sugar "Real Soon Now" for over five years and received nothing but quantities of poor-quality syrup which while sweet could hardly be classed as edible. The statement that an error had been made and important parts left behind would have been more palatable than the admission "we just don't know how to boil sugar." This was especially true in light of the official theory that anyone could do anything if sustained by prayer and desire. In addition, those responsible for the purchase and transportation of the machinery were conveniently out of the valley. Those trying to operate it were present and available for criticism.
In retrospect it seems that the pioneer effort to produce sugar was a near success. Delays resulted in the loss of the most knowledgeable individuals before the plant actually started operating. The missing know-how, particularly concerning the vacuum pan, could have made the difference. All of the necessary equipment was there, but critical knowledge appears to have been lacking.
For full citations and images please view this article on a desktop.
