Statehood, Political Allegiance, and Utah's First U.S. Senate Seats: Prizes for the National Parties and Local Factions

Arthur Brown, left, a non-Mormon attorney, and Frankf. Cannon, right, journalist son ofIDS leader George Q. Cannon, won the top political prize associated with statehood— election by the first Utah legislature to the U.S. Senate. USHS collections.

Statehood, Political Allegiance, and Utah's First U.S. Senate Seats: Prizes for the National Parties and Local Factions

BY EDWARD LEO LYMAN

DURING THE PAST CENTURY HISTORIANS HAVE RATHER thoroughly treated Utah statehood from the standpoint of the predominantly Latter-day Saint population who sought the political independence that admission into the Union would deliver It is equally appropriate to examine more closely the main prize political leaders of each major national party expected to garner from finally granting that measure of self-government. Two new United States senators from Utah—and perhaps Mormon influence over similar selections in other states—has everything to do with the close balance of power then existing between Democrats and Republicans and the hope that Mormon voter preferences might alter that situation.

In the first decade after Reconstruction less than two percentage points separated the total national Democrat and Republican vote for congressmen in all but one election. Such margins made most politicians extremely cautious, and neither party possessed the majority necessary to govern effectively. The Democrats controlled the House of Representatives all but two years in the period from 1874 to 1888, while the Republicans usually held a similar majority in the Senate and controlled the presidency except for Grover Cleveland's first term.1 Strategists of both parties sought to break the stalemate. One of the best possible ways was the admission of additional states with new congressional delegations hopefully sitting on the proper side of the aisle Potential new states were almost exclusively located in the West, and because of the Mormon influence in surrounding states, Utah was perhaps the most important one from which a national party might seek to obtain predominance.

Democrat Grover Cleveland's election in 1884 triggered great jubilation in Utah Territory since past Republican administrations had become increasingly offensive to most Mormons. But when the new president allowed GOP appointees to complete their terms in keeping with the new civil service law, church leaders through chief political spokesman and strategist George Q Cannon expressed great disappointment Besides denouncing continued misrule, Cannon sought to inform Democratic advisors close to the president of the potential political implications of alienating Mormon voters He explained that the quarter million church members who "with very few exceptions were Democrats" were so positioned throughout the Intermountain West as to "hold the power to sway elections in Utah, Idaho and Arizona" and a strength "not to be despised in Nevada and Colorado." He also affirmed that Latter-day Saint numbers were increasing, and some party—he still hoped it would be the Democrats—would eventually "appreciate their value" and seek to win their favor by granting them a more fairly administered territorial government ifnot Utah statehood.2

Cleveland and several of his advisors cooperated fully in Utah's attempt at statehood in 1887, but no such sympathy was demonstrated by the majority in the Democrat-dominated House of Representatives. There suspicion persisted that despite the recently ratified state constitution prohibiting polygamy, the practice was still condoned in Utah. Party leaders informed the church hierarchy that unless Mormons summoned before the Utah courts on polygamy charges "shall promise to obey the law against these offenses" it would be impossible to "bring the Congress of the United States to believe" that church leaders had been "honest in adopting a constitution prohibiting polygamy." After due consideration, the Quorum of Twelve Apostles concluded that since plural marriage was still considered a covenant with God, "if such a promise was necessary as a condition to [their] securing statehood that [they] at once give the administration at Washington to understand that [they] could not accept it."3

Another major obstacle to Utah statehood in 1887 and 1888 was the general disinclination among Democratic party members to interfere with the existing Electoral College balance prior to Cleveland's bid for reelection in November 1888 They undoubtedly knew, as did Mormon agents, that Dakota Territory had a better claim to admission and would, if admitted, likely vote Republican. In such a contingency Dakota would have at least one more electoral vote than Utah could offer based on population. Party leaders had not forgotten that Samuel J. Tilden's loss of the presidency to Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876 was partly because Colorado, admitted earlier that year, had cast its electoral votes for the Republicans. Similarly, Mormon and Democratic politicians recognized the liability of Utah in the presidential year Church lobbyistJohn W Young anticipated that the Republicans were "anxiously waiting for the opportunity to charge the Democratic party of admitting the Mormon church into the Union" and therefore advised working quietly to prepare the party for action early in the congressional session immediately following the election.4

After Cleveland was defeated by Benjamin Harrison, Mormon agents Charles W. Penrose and Franklin S. Richards returned to the nation's capital for a last-ditch fight for statehood. In an hour-long interview with the lame duck President Cleveland, they reminded him of the implications of the situation of the Democrats, explaining that church agents could not exercise maximum political influence in the West while Utah remained in its helpless territorial condition. Cleveland was informed there was a growing number back home who were "inclined to the belief that perhaps the Republican party, would be more likely to accord them political freedom than the Democratic party," which was allegedly not living up to its principles of home rule by denying Utah citizens statehood The president favored the proposition that Utah should join the other territories then seeking admission; he promised to see SpeakerJohn G Carlisle on the matter and suggested northern Democrats who should also be visited. The Utah lobbyists conferred with the congressmen mentioned and others but found disappointingly little sentiment in favor of adding Utah to the omnibus bill providing statehood for Dakota, Montana, and Washington. The sponsor of the bill, Territorial Committee chairman William Springer, conceded that adding Utah was the only way to admit the territory and affirmed that since the Democrats were making a concession to the GOP in allowing two Dakotas, there was a chance for reciprocation. He promised to present the matter at the pending party caucus where party priorities for the coming session would be agreed upon. 5

The outcome of the Democratic congressional caucus held in December 1888 was a great disappointment to the Mormons. Utah Delegate to CongressJohn T. Caine admitted that there was a generally kind feeling toward Utah interests but claimed it was "very evident from the first that the members of the caucus had not the courage of their convictions. They were afraid to do for Utah what they felt in their hearts was their duty to do, and what they knew the territory was entitled to receive." Caine was given a generous time allotment to present Utah's claims He was followed by Speaker Carlisle who admitted, "the gentleman from Utah [had] made a very strong appeal in behalf of his territory." But, Caine reported, in spite of the justice of the claims for statehood, the Speaker was "not in favor of complicating the Omnibus Bill with any matter that would give the [Republican] Senate a semblance of an excuse for rejecting it." Caine concluded that the Speaker's comments carried great weight in the caucus. Carlisle's fellow Kentucky congressman, W. C.P. Breckinridge, followed with remarks Caine considered very favorable. He called attention to the fact that 'in leaving Utah out of the bill they were rejecting the claims of the only territory which was certain to come in as a Democratic state." However, the caucus voted to support the Omnibus bill as it was, without Utah. Soon after the final vote, in the midst of confusion as some began to leave the hall,J H Blount made a motion that the caucus recommend at least a separate bill for the admission of Utah.J. H. Outhwaite spoke strongly in favor of this. But S. S. Cox, main proponent of the Dakotas, stated that sponsoring Utah's admission would be "a fly in a pot of ointment." The recommendation passed for a separate bill proved useless.6

The Republicans held the Democrats in a hopeless position, especially with the threat of a special session immediately after Harrison's inauguration to deliver statehood solely under the auspices of the Republican party if the Democrats failed to cooperate and thus share some credit for admission of Washington, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The Democrats had no choice but to surrender and assist in granting the essential enabling acts President Cleveland signed the Omnibus bill into law on February 27, 1889, less than two weeks before his term and that of the Democrat-dominated House of Representatives was to end. This occasion also marked the failure of the sixth Utah attempt at statehood.

Though finished, in Utah at least statehood was not forgotten The next year, at a private gathering of leading Mormon politicians, Caine criticized Congress for not admitting Utah and blamed the Democrats for not insisting that all the territories come into the Union under the omnibus bill. He pointed out that if all of them had been brought in together the Republicans would not possess the large number of western senatorial seats they had subsequently garnered. In a letter to a former Democratic committeeman representing much of the West, George L. Miller, Caine even more candidly indicted his party, saying "I believe the Democratic party by its cowardice on the Mormon question through its refusal to admit Utah with an anti-polygamy constitution has lost the control of four states which the Mormon people could have given it, viz. Utah, Idaho, Arizona and Wyoming." He recalled the argument of the recently deceased S. S. Cox in the House Democratic caucus that if they entertained the proposition to admit Utah with the territories then asking admission, "Utah would be a fly in the ointment," concluding that "in straining at the fly the party lost the ointment, pot and all. In rejecting the only certainly Democratic territory they lost all the new states and the control of the government, for many years to come."

Indeed the party at that crucial juncture did not possess the leadership on the national level that their opponents would demonstrate in the 1890s primarily through James S Clarkson and James G Blaine And the Democrats' failure to show more commitment to the Mormon effort for Utah statehood would probably cost the party a crucial bloc of western votes not just in the immediate era but for much of the century to come. The period was to be one of transition, imperceptible at the time, but now recognized as significant for the gradual shift in political sentiments of a substantial number of Latter-day Saints. It would take several years before the mutual animosities between Mormons and Republicans would be sufficiently dissipated to allow many church members to consider entering the ranks of the GOP, but alienation from the Democrats was a necessary first step that was already under way.

Although Delegate Caine and his associates understood they had no influence with the incoming Harrison regime, they knew that church leaders had other lobbyists well prepared to carry on the struggle through the Republican party. Isaac Trumbo and Alexander Badlam, Jr., Californians with some Mormon roots, had been laboring for more than a year to alter the public image of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the principal medium of the era, newspapers Trumbo would eventually play a major role in securing Republican backing for statehood.7

As the Harrison administration, bolstered by a rare Republican majority in both houses of Congress, moved their long-awaited partisan agenda toward legislative and executive fruition, they included concrete efforts to bring the recalcitrant Mormons into conformity with the laws. The keystone of this was the Cullom-Struble bill, which would take the vote away from all members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, not just polygamists and women disfranchised by the Edmunds-Tucker Act three years earlier Another effort that probably alarmed church leaders even more was the attempt to free the four Utah temples from an earlier compromise with the government that allowed them to remain safely within Mormon hands when most other church property was escheated to federal receivers. Indeed, the heavy hand of the Republican administration was exerting irresistible pressure. Yet ironically, after forcing essential changes in church practice the Republicans benefitted almost permanently from a transition in Mormon political allegiance.

The first step in that dramatic about-face in church voter preference was the individual switch of George Q. Cannon, the main political leader of Mormondom throughout the entire era Early in 1890 President Wilford Woodruff sent Cannon to Washington. After a month of disappointments there, he confessed some disillusionment to a trusted assistant, L.John Nuttall, who concluded from their conversations, "the Democrats should not see us used up in Utah, Arizona, Idaho, and New Mexico for then they lose four states." He added that Cannon and Idaho church leader William Budge had gone to confer with Arthur P. Gorman, head of the Democrats in the LJ.S. Senate. They also met with Calvin Brice, chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Clearly the church agents were seeking the highest authorities in the party, and just as clearly they failed to receive satisfactory response. A few months later, when Cannon returned to the East, he commenced working with similarly prominent Republican party leaders and would remain a committed member of that party for the remainder of his life. With the able assistance of Isaac Trumbo, Cannon allied with friends among the GOP to fight against the Mormon disfranchisement threatened by the CullomStruble bill.8

Trumbo had enlisted several prominent California Republicans in the Mormons' behalf, including Morris M. Estee, chairman of the most recent Republican National Convention He also appealed successfully for assistance from the chairman of the Republican National Committee, James S Clarkson of Iowa Clarkson soon became a leading advocate of the view that if the Latter-day Saints were treated more fairly by the Republican party favorable political results were likely to occur. As Clarkson embarked on his labors he approached Secretary of State James G. Blaine, then the most influential of all leaders within the Republican party. As Clarkson later revealed to Wilford Woodruff, he and Blaine "were studying the elements of voters in the United States to try to secure a majority for the political principles in which [they] believed." They were impressed to learn from Trumbo "the magnitude of the Mormon people, the greatness of their development in many states besides Utah, and the large part they were sure to bear, for good or evil, in the destiny of this republic." The key event recounted by Clarkson was Blaine's appearance before a congressional committee considering the Cullom or Struble versions of the disfranchisement bill and "protesting against such an outrage upon any portion of a free people, asserting that no republic of free men could tolerate such a wrong and live." The Republican chairman concluded his overlaudatory account by stating to Wilford Woodruff that Blaine "stood in the small committee room and smote down with the giant strength of his indignant wrath this further attempt in a free government to degrade still further a people already wronged too much." The bill never passed.9

Wuhen George Q. Cannon returned to Salt Lake City he reported to fellow church leaders on the political outlook, saying that prospects were brighter for Utah than they had been for many years. That he had alluded to some tantalizing possibilities with Republicans is indicated from a later conversation on the subject in which he is quoted as saying that "we would doubtless have been disfranchised by the Struble Bill if the Republican leaders in Washington had not been given to understand that there were Republicans in Utah and that a wise course on the part of the Republicans would doubtless make more." Cannon was also quoted by his son Abraham as being optimistic that despite continuing anti-Mormon activity, "the Republican party are [sic] becoming more favorably impressed with regard to the importance of securing Mormon votes and influence." Historian and future apostle Orson F.Whitney stated that one of the arguments used to appeal to Blaine and his associates was that "Utah was not'hopelessly Democratic' [and] that many of her people were indoctrinated with Republican principles notably [tariff] protection—and that it was suicidal to antagonize the element that might make Utah a Republican state." In reflecting on the political discussions he had heard that day, Abraham Cannon stated, "the Democrats might have won several states had they but possessed sufficient courage when Cleveland was President to admit Mormons to political power, but they failed to do so and now realize their loss."10

Undoubtedly George Q. Cannon's recent experience in the East had great influence on the crucial decisions made on July 31, 1890, when Presidents Woodruff and Cannon met and discussed politics with at least four prominent Mormon Democrats: Heber J. Grant, Franklin S. Richards, Charles W. Penrose, and Richard W. Young. They heard that Democrats in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming were anxious to "get Mormon votes" and had approached church members for that purpose. After some discussion it was decided not to help Democrats in any of those states but to aid Wyoming Republicans "as a reward to Delegate [Joseph] Carey and his party for getting Wyoming admitted as a state without anti-Mormon legislation." Abraham Cannon's detailed account of the meeting includes the telling observation that "the Democrats when they had the power to do us good were afraid, and betrayed us so that now we feel as though the Republican party should be tried to see if they will be fair to us." The contrast between Idaho, where the Saints had voted Democrat, and Wyoming, where they had voted Republican, was on the minds of those present Abraham Cannon, usually an avowed non-partisan, concluded that "self-protection demands that we look to the Republicans for relief, now that the Democrats have proved themselves cowards on our question."11 These decisions had everything to do with the way George Q. Cannon had been treated by nationally prominent members of both parties over the past half year.

In subsequent months Mormon leaders, partly at the urging of Blaine and others, formulated policies through which they at least temporarily abandoned contracting plural marriages in the United States. The Woodruff Manifesto, fully discussed elsewhere,12 was an essential step in securing Republican backing for Utah statehood. Thereafter, members of the Harrison administration demonstrated marked cooperation in easing some of the harsh federal policies toward Mormon polygamists and in other ways indicated an intent to foster the growing favorable sentiment among church members toward the Republican party.

Of prime importance at that time was a set of population statistics requested by Trumbo, Clarkson, and Estee, that were eventually utilized to win much wider Republican cooperation for the Mormon cause. Church leaders assigned assistants to gather the information, asking one, "have you any data at hand to show what the number of our people is in Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada." By early December 1890 Estee was informed that the approximate number of Mormons in adjacent states was Idaho, 25,000; Arizona, 10,000; Colorado, 4,000; Nevada, 1,500; New Mexico, 1,000; and Wyoming, 300 President Harrison reacted to this information with some hostility, but arguments concerning potential Mormon voters proved more convincing to other key Republicans.13

Probably the most extreme use of the inflated Mormon voter figures was utilized among Republican United States senators. One of their main leaders, William B. Allison, was informed by one of his oldest and closest political allies, Clarkson, that the party national committee had recently met and concluded that the election of "the next president may lie in the action of the Mormon vote." An accompanying paper, not now available, was said to show "the number of votes of their people outside Utah and the remarkable manner in which they [were] so diffused as to have the probable balance of power in 8 or 10 states." Clarkson argued that at a time when the Populist party was gaining headway in the West and Midwest, the Mormons were the great balance of conservatism against that drift if properly utilized He continued that the information he had prepared was meant to influence senators who "may not understand the power of the Mormon vote," adding that all his committee agreed that the Utah admission bill should pass the Senate because "it [was] a vital matter to the future of the party."14 As Clarkson explained to Wilford Woodruff, he sometimes made even more extreme statements of church voting strength. He said, ". . . this was not merely a Utah question but that the Mormon people were spread through the valleys of eight or ten western states, and that sooner or later they would hold the balance of power in the election of every senator and of every electoral vote for president in these states." The Republican national committee chairman admitted he made such arguments the foundation of his efforts to "change the Republican party from being a party of opposition [to church political power] ... to one of friendship and support."15

There were certainly other obstacles to overcome before Utah was finally admitted as a state in 1896, but the greatest challenge of the entire process was gaining the approval of Republican members of the U.S Senate And that was clearly accomplished by convincing individual senators that not only was plural marriage dying in Mormondom but that there was a good chance of garnering church voter support for their party if the Utah statehood issue was properly handled This included quite possibly adding two Republican colleagues to their midst, which would be a crucial accomplishment in gaining congressional predominance One of the great ironies in Utah history is that the party which had been born in 1856 denouncing polygamy along with slavery as "the twin relics of barbarism" and had spent the ensuing three decades in hostile opposition to the church and Utah statehood—eventually forcing concessions through heavy-handed legislative threats—would in the century that followed command such a preponderance of allegiance from members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

With statehood achieved, attention then focused naturally on the first legislature's selection of the Utah senators. It had long been conceded that one of these positions would go to a non-Mormon. Under almost any circumstances the LDS senatorship would be granted enthusiastically to the first counselor in the First Presidency George Q. Cannon was one of the most astute political figures of his generation. His reputation, experience, and some perspectives transcended local bounds. Expelled as delegate to Congress in 1882 because of his involvement in plural marriage, he had harbored ambitions ever since to return in triumph as one of Utah's first senators Most of those who had helped Utah achieve statehood on the national level approved and assumed he would be so honored Yet all chance of his being selected by the Utah legislature were dashed by the rash act of one of his closest associates, Joseph F. Smith.

Although it was then the prerogative of the state legislature to select U.S senators, Utah Democrats nominated the candidates they intended to support for those offices as well as Utah's sole member of the House of Representatives prior to the crucial election campaign in the fall of 1895. Apostle Moses Thatcher was chosen as the Mormon candidate for the Senate and another general authority of the church, Brigham H Roberts, was named as the Democrats' congressional candidate. For some time, though, church leaders had tried to quietly limit political activism among the highest-ranking church authorities unless they had the approval of the First Presidency. In the heated partisan battle prior to actual statehood, some believed the two Democrats had violated church protocol.

During an obscure session of the semi-annual conference of the church in October, Joseph F. Smith made remarks that precipitated perhaps the most heated political controversy in Utah history. He was simply explaining that the church possessed living oracles whose counsel should be heeded in all matters of life This led to mention, perhaps as a spontaneous illustration by a man never known for being diplomatic or restrained in speech, of an apostle and member of the Seven Presidents of Seventy (Roberts), who had "done wrong in accepting obligations without first consulting and obtaining the consent of those who presided over them."

The obvious reference to the Democratic candidates generated little immediate notice, but it eventually led to the party reconvening its state convention and mounting a concerted protest against church interference in political affairs. Besides focusing on Smith's indiscretion, many former episodes considered detrimental to the Democrats were widely recounted. Most specifically, party members questioned the seemingly unlimited partisan activity of avid Republican ApostleJohn Henry Smith while a number of Democrats among the church hierarchy appeared to have been kept under close restraint Party leader Orlando W Powers queried, "why should a Democrat be called upon to counsel withJoseph F Smith, a Republican?" And in this they had a good case, although the excitement generated did not lead to victory at the polls.16

After the election of the first state officials, ratification of the constitution, and selection of Republican Clarence E. Allen as a member of the House of Representatives, Mormon leaders discussed the approaching state legislative session, expressing primary concern over the U.S senators to be elected While President Woodruff indicated his desire for George Q Cannon to go to the Senate, Cannon confessed a hope that Isaac Trumbo would not be one of those officers, saying "he [was] not a person whose manners and characteristics we should desire to represent us, for he is ignorant, and then he would be, no doubt, a boodler, accepting bribes for services which he would render." Later Cannon recalled in hisjournal that as much as Trumbo had done for Utah and the Mormons "it was never understood by [church leaders] that he was to be repaid for his services to [them] by being made a senator."17

Many of the negative public statements about Trumbo emanated from the Salt Lake Tribune whose editor, Charles C Goodwin, had aspirations to be the gentile senator himself. His supporters were closely allied with FrankJ. Cannon, whose chances for nomination as the Mormon senator were excellent—if his father was not in the contest. One of Goodwin's supporters, Idaho Senator Fred T. Dubois, sent a letter to Abraham H Cannon, admittedly intended for his father, cautioning against the elder man running and being subject to charges of church interference. Abraham answered, assuring Dubois that his father had declared himself unequivocally out of the Senate race and would not accept the nomination under any circumstances But, he continued, Cannon chose to remain publicly silent on the matter expressly to prevent Trumbo from retaliating against Frank should he learn of the dissolution of the presumed earlier alliance too soon. 18

About the same time, Trumbo's old lobbying associate,James S. Clarkson, wrote to President Woodruff to remind him of the men he and others on the Republican National Committee hoped would be chosen as Utah senators. He strongly urged the selection of George Q Cannon and Isaac Trumbo Woodruff answered that because of recent events, particularly the church interference controversy, he felt it advisable to abstain from active involvement in Utah politics He agreed that Cannon would be the best possible choice and acknowledged his own personal fondness for Trumbo as well as his service to Utah citizens. Nevertheless, he did not believe he and his associates then possessed sufficient political power to accomplish the election of either man. 19

On December 26, 1895, Trumbo engaged a sometime Southern Pacific Railroad lobby operative, R W Ruffin, to assist him in his senatorial campaign and particularly to facilitate his introduction to Henry E. Huntington, Collis P. Huntington's trusted nephew, then in charge of the company's political operations in California. The stated purpose of this meeting was to secure Huntington's "material and moral support" for Trumbo's Utah campaign Although Ruffin painted a bright picture of Trumbo's prospects—twenty-two legislators for him and nine whom financial aid from the SP could help him obtain—the Huntingtons decided against providing such aid. Other wealthy California businessmen similarly declined to back Trumbo.

For eight years Trumbo had been seeking a U.S. senate seat, but George Q. Cannon was correct about his lack of real qualifications, other than good political connections, and that he too often utilized methods not approved by church leaders. At one time he might have secured the votes of Mormon legislators and eventually, in some manner, the remaining support needed for election. But when his presumed ally George Q. abandoned him at least partially to assist his son to secure the "Mormon" Senate seat, Trumbo's dream of the Senate was thwarted. Trumbo's campaign manager, Charles Crane, warned Republican lawmakers that a proposed party caucus was an attempt to stampede them prematurely into commitments on the senatorial matter.20 But with enthusiasm for Frank Cannon mounting as his father finally announced his withdrawal from the race, the meeting was held and Frank nominated by acclamation. There was far less certainty about the "gentile" seat, but strategists for Salt Lake attorney Arthur Brown believed their man had more voter strength at the moment than any of his rivals, and they pushed for a rather unexpected ballot on that seat as well. Another Salt Lake attorney, Charles W. Bennett, had gained supporters; but with Goodwin's people backing Brown on the first vote, Brown garnered the requisite votes for election. Although some subsequently questioned how binding the party caucus decision was, it proved decisive and was soon made official in the legislative session.21

News of the selection of Utah's senators provoked considerable discussion around the nation, including among the members of Congress. Frank J. Cannon, the Utah delegate to Congress when statehood was actually granted, was accepted readily But, as in Utah, Brown's choice met with little enthusiasm. A special news dispatch from Washington to the Democratic Salt Lake Herald reported, "the impression prevailed here that Colonel Trumbo would be selected as one of the senators. Some of his friends declare Trumbo's defeat to be a piece of rank ingratitude" since his efforts on behalf of statehood were so well known and his reward still expected.22

Brown's short tenure as senator from Utah was indeed undistinguished And his subsequent murder by a discarded mistress permanently tarnished his image so far as his adopted state was concerned.23 But, actually, Frank Cannon may have been an even greater disappointment to most Utahns. The year of his election he bolted the Republican convention over its position on silver coinage and thereafter often sided with the Democrats. After his father's death he apostatized from the church, to which he had never been particularly committed spiritually. He eventually authored a muckrake-type expose of Mormonism, by that time no longer even residing in the state.24 Thus, the men who had worked longest and most directly in the successful struggle for Utah statehood, George Q. Cannon and Isaac Trumbo, failed to receive the senatorial rewards that many desired them to attain. And Utahns would soon admit that the men so favored did little to merit the honors bestowed upon them.

Actually, the Southern Pacific Railroad interests did secure Utah senatorial support, probably more loyal than Isaac Trumbo was ever likely to be. By the end of the summer of 1896 the ever-vigilant Collis P. Huntington, located in the East partly to oversee company affairs at the nation's capitol, instructed his nephew to quietly send Arthur Brown an unmarked package of one thousand dollars in currency This was undoubtedly some kind of unofficial retainer for a man old Huntington described as knowing what was right—presumably for the railroad company—and having the courage to do what was right. Thus the Southern Pacific secured favorable senatorial support at a far lower cost than it would have taken to assist Isaac Trumbo to purchase eight or nine legislators' votes.25

Achieving statehood was a difficult task, which made its accomplishment all the more appreciated In the process Utah and Mormon political allegiances shifted significantly in favor of the formerly hostile Republican party. In the hundred years since then Utah has shown a good two-party viability, but Democrats elected to state offices and congressional seats have generally been from the more conservative members of that party Presently there are few parts of the nation so firmly aligned with conservative Republicanism as is Utah The antecedents for this are many and complex, but their initial presence can be traced as far back as the period just prior to admission of the new state.

NOTES

Dr Lyman is a professor of history at Victor Valley College, Victorville, California.

1 R Hal Williams, Years of Decision: American Politics in the 1890s (John Wiley & Sons: New York, 1978), pp 5-9.

2 George Q Cannon to Daniel Manning, August 7, 1885, Grover Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress; Edward Leo Lyman, Political Deliverance: The Mormon Questfor Utah Statehood (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp 26-27, 29-30.

3 Heber J Grant Journal, September 29, 1887, Historical Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Salt Lake City, hereinafter HDC; Lyman, Political Deliverance, pp 53-54

4 John W. Young to Woodruff, Cannon, and Smith, December 8, 1887, January 23, 1888, John W. Young Papers, HDC; Charles W. Penrose to Woodruff, Cannon, and Smith, December 10, 30, 1887, Charles W. Penrose file, First Presidency Miscellaneous Papers, HDC.

5 C. W. Penrose and Franklin S. Richards to Woodruff and Smith, December 7, 1888, Charles W. Penrose Papers, HDC.

6 John T Caine to Woodruff, Cannon, and Smith, December 27, 1888; Washington Post, December 14, 1888.

7 Edward Leo Lyman, "Isaac Trumbo and the Politics of Utah Statehood," Utah Historical Quarterly 41 (1973).

8 Lyman, Political Deliverance, pp. 130-35.

9 James S Clarkson to Woodruff, July 11, 1894, copy in A T Volwiler papers, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana; See also Orson F Whitney, History of Utah, vol Ill (George Q Cannon and Sons Co.: Salt Lake City, Utah, 1895), p 743, an account by a contemporary with access to church general authorities, which also credits Blaine with stopping the Cullom and Struble bills.

10 A H Cannon Journal, July 10, 1890; Richard W Young to John Henry Smith, February 6, 1892, and accompanying notarized statement by Young dated February 7, 1892, John Henry Smith Papers, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Whitney, History of Utah III, p 743.

11 A H Cannon Journal, July 31, 1890; Joseph Carey to Caine, August 6, 1890, for account of Carey's service to the Mormons in the Wyoming statehood fight; E. Leo Lyman, "A Mormon Transition in Idaho Politics," Idaho Yesterdays 20 (Winter 1977): 2-11, 24-29.

12 Lyman, Political Deliverance, pp 132-41.

13 Lyman, Political Deliverance, pp 195-96, 209-10.

14 J S C [Clarkson] to Dear Senator [William B Allison] (undated papers of August, 1893), William B .Allison Papers, Iowa State Library, Des Moinss; Edward Leo Lyman, "The Mormon Quest of Utah Statehood," (Ph.D diss., University of California, Riverside, 1981), p 591, states: "Although the membership statistics were never officially published by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, they were substantially the same as those contained in the Report of Statistics of Churches in the United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. However, the manner in which that census report was arranged allowed for considerable distortion of actual membership strength particularly beyond the Intermountain region This was because most of the census treatment of the Mormons failed to differentiate properly between the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, whose membership figures were often included in L D S totals With the R L D S so added, the Mormons were designated as the twelfth largest religious denomination in the United States This report was not published until 1894, but someone as well acquainted with the federal bureaucracy as James S Clarkson could easily have gained access to the material for his political efforts in behalf of Utah Mormons, if needed in 1892 and 1893." Any Mormon voter strength in Illinois, Missouri, or California at that time would have been RLDS and certainly not in sympathy with Utah statehood.

15 Clarkson to Woodruff, July 11, 1894.

16 Lyman, Political Deliverance, pp. 269-72.

17 Edward Leo Lyman, "Isaac Trumbo and the Politics of Utah Statehood," Utah Historical Quarterly 41 (1973): 142-43; Jean Bickmore White, "Utah State Elections: 1895-1899" (Ph.D. diss., University of Utah, 1968), pp 95-108.

18 Fred T Dubois to A H Cannon, December 6, 1895, Dubois to P H Lannan, December 31, 1895, A H Cannon to Dubois (copy undated, received by Dubois December 11, 1895), all in Fred T Dubois Letterbooks, Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho.

19 Wilford Woodruff to James S. Clarkson, December 30, 1895, Wilford Woodruff Letterbooks, HDC.

20 Salt Lake Tribune, January 6, 1896.

21 Lyman, "Trumbo and Statehood," pp 144-45; Lyman, Political Deliverance, pp 283-84.

22 Salt Lake Herald, January 16, 1896.

23 Linda Thatcher, "The 'Gentile Polygamist': Arthur Brown, Ex-Senator from Utah," Utah Historical Quarterly 52 (1984): 231-45.

24 Leonard Schlup, "Utah Maverick: Frank J Cannon and the Politics of Conscience in 1898," Utah Historical Quarterly 62 (1994): 335-48.

25 Collis P Huntington to Henry E Huntington, August 28, 1896, Henry E Huntington Papers.