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The Replevied Present: San Juan County, the Southern Utes, and What Might Have Been, 1894-1895
The Replevied Present: San Juan County, the Southern Utes, and What Might Have Been, 1894-1895
By ROBERT S. MCPHERSON
December 1894 was a bitterly cold month with snow sweeping across the Great Sage Plain, piling high at the foot of Blue Mountain, located in San Juan County, Utah. Blustery south winds cheated the smoke of its heat as soon as it left the chimneys of the dozen homes braced against the Monticello winter. The Mormon settlers went about their daily tasks of feeding livestock, chopping wood, and hauling water, but something weighed heavily on their minds that year. True, Christmas was in the air, and for the children, there were preparations to be made and presents to get ready. The adults, however, were soon to be involved in their own preparations for something that had been discussed for years, but they never believed would happen. There were now hundreds of Utes either in southeastern Utah or on their way from Colorado to claim their present—all of San Juan County—as had been promised, in their mind, by the United States Government. The settlers would soon be looking for new homes.
Buckskin Charlie with his wife Emma Naylor Buck dressed in traditional Muache attire. He is among the best known Southern Utes, serving as their leader until 1936 when he died, blind and crippled, at the age of ninety-five. While not considered antagonistic toward the federal government, he questioned its right to remove the Utes from Colorado.
DENVER PUBLIC LIBRARY, WESTERN HISTORY COLLECTION
Preparation for this month had started years ago, in 1888, in the meetings of the Southern Ute Commission then empowered to modify land agreements promised in previous treaties. 1 Beginning on August 9 and ending on November 13, a series of eight councils interspersed with visits on both the Colorado reservation and in southeastern Utah, were held with representatives of the Capote, Muache, and Weenuche bands, identified collectively as Southern Utes. 2 Most prominent for those representing the Weenuche were Ignacio and Mariano. Buckskin Charlie spoke for the Muache, Severo for the Capote, with forty-five chiefs and subchiefs also attending the agency in Ignacio, Colorado. The problems facing these people were complex—loss of the ability to hunt and gather, shrinking reservation lands, incursions on Indian lands by white neighbors, neglected payment in rations and materiel, broken promises concerning agricultural assistance, and an active white public pushing for their removal. Add to this a volatile press, a land-hungry public, and a government who often did not take its treaty obligations seriously, and one can see why the Utes cast about for a clarification of their situation and an improved ability to provide for themselves.Yet they were tied to the land, while every possibility also had a down side.
Excerpts of the dialogue from these various meetings are instructive. 3 Insight is gained not only into what the Indians were thinking, but also their agreement with government officials that laid the groundwork for an explosive situation later. Ignacio, chief spokesman, echoed the sentiments of many when he suggested he was not even sure he wanted to leave his established home.
Ignacio: I am very glad that I have talked to my friends, and am also glad that my friends are talking to me. It is all right that you come to talk to us about this business. This is my land. The Great Father has told me before that this is my land. Consequently, I do not know how to sell it. I do not know myself what to do, or how my people will go into business. I do not know whether any other place is better than this. Also, because I was born here, was raised here, and have lived here all this time, this is the only place we have had to hunt for a long time. We have done everything according to what the government has ordered us to do. I have done nothing wrong. All I have done is just as I have been told. 4
Other leaders expressed similar concerns, but once the issue of removal to southeastern Utah arose, a number of new questions became apparent. Buckskin Charlie feared being pushed onto increasingly undesirable land.
Buckskin Charlie: Out there [San Juan County] there is no large river; there is no river like the Animas; there is no river like the Los Pinos or the Piedra.This land is worth a great deal of money; why should we wish to sell it? I have been here ten years farming and getting my family; the first year I did not like it, but the second year I liked it a little better because I got used to it. Here we have watermelons and muskmelons, and all kinds of fruits and vegetables, and here the children are happy and are satisfied, and if we go away we cannot farm, and what shall we eat?
The reason you say that it is a good idea for the Utes to go out there in the Blue Mountains is because it is a desert; but all the same, we are willing to go if you will give us what we ask.Afterwards, too, if we make a treaty with you, we have nothing to say. Here you cannot come and say we have got a farm, we have got a mighty good country then to farm in.Then you will not have to say,“Get out of here, Utes; you have got too good a land.” No other commission will have to say that.That is the reason I say now, and that the Utes all say, too, that we will take that land that you will not have to drive us out of there. 5
Buckskin Charlie had other concerns. He was well aware of the conflict existing between the Utes/Paiutes and the white settlers living in San Juan County and feared even more trouble once more Utes moved into that region.
Buckskin Charlie: When we leave this land you [Ute Commission] will have plenty of money.We want Rio Colorado, and want those Mormons taken away from there, for the Mormons have cattle and horses.As long as they are there and have cattle and sheep, they are bound to bother us on the reservation. If the Mormons are kept there the horses and cattle will go on the reservation, and then the Mormons will lie to the Utes and say the Utes stole their horses.And they will say I am lying and that the Utes killed it. If there are no Mormons there to interfere with us it is better. 6 Mariano, a frequent visitor to southeastern Utah, wanted to know what would happen to the Indians already living there.
Mariano: There is where I understand the Paiutes live, there in the Blue Mountains, and those Paiutes do not receive any money at all from the government. And when the snow comes, that is the place we go in the wintertime. We are together there. And there are also Paiutes living on both sides of the San Juan. That is the reason that I say all these places have people.
What I am telling you now is more for my people, not for me personally. I would like to have it always the same as it is, that we can go down south if we want to in the winter and come up here in the summer.
Ignacio saw massive changes take place for the Utes during his life. Representing the Weenuche in all of the major treaty negotiations beginning in the 1860s, he had a strong voice during the council in Monticello. When he died in 1913, the Utes lost a great leader. Photo taken 1898.
DENVER PUBLIC LIBRARY, WESTERN HISTORY COLLECTION
Chairman: [J.M. Smith] We know you own this reservation, but it is not wide enough for you, and just as soon as more white people come in they will object to you doing this, and the Utes will have to live on this reservation. The Paiutes have no reservation out there, and we can go out there and lay out a reservation large enough for all of you, both Utes and Paiutes. And you can sell this land to the government.
Mariano: I understand that where the Utes live is their own land. I understand that this land is not surveyed, but that is all their land.
Chairman: No, it is not. The Great Father can give you a reservation out there large enough for Chief you to live on and he will drive all the cattle away from there and give it to the Utes and Paiutes. (That is, he will drive the cattlemen away.)
Mariano: Then what will you do with these
Paiutes; they were born and raised there, and they live there? I understand that that land belongs to the Paiutes and it has always been known as their land.
Buckskin Charlie agreed and feared further consequences associated with removal.
The government always lies to us. When we lived over on the Cimarron they told us we could come here and live forever, we and our children and grandchildren, and that all could live here and die here, and we would never be bothered, and now they come and try to bluff and scare us out of here.They also said there were not cattle here, nor Mexicans, nor anybody else; but when we came here we found the country full of cows and people.
The government says: “Move from there over here. There will not be any Americans or anything to interfere with you.” As long as the Mormons stay, there will always be lies going back and forth with letters to Washington. If the Utes go there to that new country, the Americans will be very contented here....You probably do not hear, but I hear; that is the reason the Utes want it that way. If they are by themselves, nobody will make any complaint against them. 7
Following a visit to San Juan County, the Commission and the Ute delegation agreed that it was a desirable move and concluded their talks with an understanding that the settlers located at Bluff, South Montezuma Creek (Verdure), Dodge Spring, Monticello, and Indian Creek, lacking legal claim to the non-surveyed land, would be removed.These white men recognized the government’s right to do so. 8 Commission Chairman J. Montgomery Smith concluded his report of the negotiations stating,“This is considered a very fair and favorable treaty both for the Government and the Indians by all who have any knowledge of it.” 9 From all appearances, but especially from the Ute perspective, an agreement had been reached, was binding, and already set in motion.Years of congressional haggling and disinterest lay ahead—a modus operandi difficult for the Indians to fathom.
Ironically, even though indications from the Ute perspective seemed highly favorable for such a move, there were those anxious to protect them who felt duty-bound to prevent a terrible mistake. Beginning with Indian Commissioner Thomas J. Morgan, there arose a feeling that coercion and power politics were forcing the Indians into one more bad deal. He offered seven reasons for his opposition: the Utes had reluctantly agreed by coercion to the move; any progress previously made toward civilization would be negated; the government would find protecting the Indians more difficult; the allotment process would be put on the shelf, returning to the reservation system of land held in common; administration of the Indian program would face greater difficulties;it would be more difficult for them to become self-supporting; and shifting the responsibility from Colorado to Utah would just slow the civilizing process. 10 Besides, they “numbered less than two thousand” and did not require that much land.
The strident voice from members of the Indian Rights Association (IRA) headquartered in Philadelphia sounded a frequently loud warning cry.This organization founded in 1882, along with another reformer group interested in Indian affairs, the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends, organized a year later, were two watchdogs whose purpose was to advocate for education, support legal protection, and promote general welfare for various Indian groups. Based in the East, members traveled often to the West for inspection tours, gathering the necessary ammunition to fight Indian political battles in Washington, D. C. Herbert Welsh, founder of the IRA, outlined clearly in a letter to influence congressional representatives that the Utes should remain where they were, their lands allotted in severalty, and the remainder added to the public domain for settlement.The Indians’ reservation, with its water and agricultural land, could support the necessary civilizing process as outlined in the Dawes Act, frequent contact with sympathetic neighboring whites provided role models, and to place them on lands that were so “mountainous and inaccessible as to furnish a powerful temptation to lawlessness” was ill-advised. At the core of this view was the government’s “weightiest of obligations . ..to civilize Indians—to permit them no longer to live as Indians, and to require them to live as white men.” 11
Charles C. Painter, an investigative agent for the IRA, provided Welsh with much of his information and additional insight. After showing how the government abandoned many of the precepts of the Treaty of 1880, Painter argued that the present reservation did not bar white contact between the citizens of New Mexico and Arizona, but served more as a positive opportunity to interact with the Utes. 12 While the government was supposedly teaching agriculture to them and getting them away from hunting, it had expended a huge effort on their behalf so that they could hunt off their reservation in the La Sal Mountains, and where they could maintain their old customs. After providing a detailed list of areas in San Juan County where agriculture was possible, Painter pointed out that other than the San Juan River, which had been proven by the Mormons as unyielding to large scale agricultural efforts, there was limited arable land compared to holdings in Colorado. Livestock provided the only practical industry. But the end of the open range and profitable grazing were no longer possible. He next cited the fact that the government had received “more than eight hundred petitions” (signatures) from both Colorado and Utah protesting the removal and that there were over three hundred industrious taxpayers that would be displaced if the Utes took these lands. 13 Finally, there was the mixing of the Southern Utes with “renegade Paiutes” who had already had a fight. Citing the death of “Hatch, one of the Paiute chiefs, and two Utes, Cowboy and Kid ...[whose] bodies were by the side of the road two days after the fight, when the writer of this article passed through that country,” Painter cast aspersions at the “savage cut-throats” in this wild territory. 14 Civilization against savagery played as theme throughout his article.
Another person, Francis F. Kane from the IRA, traveled through the Southern Ute Reservation and much of San Juan County between August 24 and September 25, 1891. His detailed account is given with an eye to the resources of the land, noting every spring, homestead, and parcel of agricultural land encountered along the way. Surprisingly, he saw few Indians but did leave some impressions of the white men he met. With only a few exceptions, both Coloradoans and Utahns—white and Native American—felt that the Utes truly wanted to move to Utah. They viewed the Utes as a generally chaste people and felt Ignacio was a good man who faithfully paid his debts, and always picked the poorer cuts of meat, allowing his people the better part. He had promised that if the government supported the desired move, he and Mariano would send the Weenuche children to school; as for the Mormons, they spoke well of their Ute neighbors and had no problem with the Indians bringing their livestock off the reservation into the county; still, many of them were not anxious to depart. 15
A trader named “Gillett” (Peter or Herman Guillet?) owned a post at the confluence of McElmo Creek with the San Juan River. He told of the constant traffic of Utes traveling up and down the canyon, always inquiring if the government would keep its word. Many of them said that they were going to go regardless, but wiser heads prevailed against that.The trader felt “the best Utes never went to the Los Pinos Agency, for instance Benow, whom he seems to regard as perhaps the most powerful chief among the Southern Utes. Gillett seemed to think that the more self-respecting and energetic Wenuche were ashamed now to go to the government agency to be fed.” 16 As a side note, he pointed to some of his Ute customers redeeming cartridges, indicating the ammunition was used in place of money while gambling and “probably passed through his hands hundreds of times.”
Gambling in Washington took a different form. Letters to the public from the IRA urged that removal was synonymous to the “destruction of the Indian” and the civilizing process. Other bureaucrats countered that it was best for all concerned and that the Utes supported the transaction. 17 A letter from Ignacio, written to “Our Great Father” gave the Indian perspective. They wanted to go to Utah; “We are not children yet you treat us as such”; the Americans’ cattle ate all of their grass, Ute livestock would do better in Utah, the agent needed to live closer to the people, and they had agreed five years ago to this move and still nothing had happened. 18 It was also five years ago, on November 15, 1888, that the government withdrew the disputed territory of San Juan County from the public domain, and now the Utah settlers demanded through petition that it be remanded and opened for filing claims. 19 At the end of 1892 and the beginning of 1893, a gold rush erupted
This log church and school, built in 1888, served as the central meeting place for most Monticello activities before being replaced in 1912. The main twenty-by-forty foot room was where federal and state officials, settlers, and the Utes held their conference in 1894. Given the population of the town at the time, this photo probably includes most of its residents.
SAN JUAN COUNTY HISTORICAL COMMISSION
along the San Juan River, adding another voice to the white population who favored keeping the Utes where they were. 20 The Mancos Times hinted of the motivation for dispossessing the Indians when a patron wrote, “For the life of us we are unable to see just what great good can come from theremoval outside of the few ranches that will fall into the clutches of the old ring that is still in existence in Durango.” 21
Part of that “ring” very well could have been tied to David F. Day, new agent for the Colorado Utes appointed in the fall of 1893, who served for the next three and a half years. Day, prior to holding this position, worked as newspaper editor of the Solid Muldoon published in Ouray, Colorado, and was very aware of the issues swirling about Ute removal. When he transferred to Durango in 1892 he continued in the publishing business, starting the Durango Weekly Democrat through which he fostered additional business ties. As a newspaper editor, he took a combative stance in issues, hearkening back to his approach to life in earlier years. During the Civil War he had been wounded four times, slashed by a sword once, was a prisoner of war three times, and received the Congressional Medal of Honor, all before his discharge at age nineteen. 22 So when it came to Ute issues, he was not afraid of a fight.
Francis A. Hammond, LDS Stake President, recognized what he called a “cabal among a certain class in and about Durango” who, through their agent, had sent the Utes to southeastern Utah. In July he wrote of the sullenness of roving bands of Indians who had been subjected to a “conspiracy” to deceive them and that “this systematic deception is having its desired effect in arousing a resentful feeling among these deluded Indians.” All of this was due to the urging of their agent and land speculators waiting for the Indians to vacate their old reservation. 23 Others chimed in, saying that “Mr. Day ...is not a fit man to be in such a position” and that it was an outrage that the people of San Juan County “should be at the mercy of a lot of scheming land-grabbers of Colorado.” 24 To the settlers on the ground in Utah, Day had denied them their right to protection, had instructed the Utes that the whites had no call to be in that land, that speculators had convinced the Indians that they had already ceded their lands in Colorado, and that “the average Southern Ute mind evidently has been shrewdly educated” to believe that belligerence was justified. Day’s response: If there was going to be trouble, it would start with the cowboys and since the land had been withdrawn from settlement and use, all of the cattle companies grazing herds on the public domain were trespassing; it was up to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to decide what to do. Meanwhile, because of unsure boundary lines on the eastern edge of the Colorado reservation, “sooners” were claiming lands that were not theirs, but which also could not be denied because of boundary questions. 25
With the advent of the fall hunting season, matters became increasingly grave. Ignacio and Mariano along with many of their people moved to the Blue Mountains, leaving their livestock with their Capote and Muache relatives. Ignacio sent word to Day that he would not return; Day countered that his leaving negated the Treaty of 1880, which left him homeless and without annuities; according to Day, Ignacio’s response was that the “President, Commissioner, and General Armstrong say ‘all right’ when he was in Washington [recently] and I [Day] am like a ‘warrior when big Chief talk’ or in other words ‘I can saw wood.’” 26
Petitions, one with more than 151 signatures, flowed from the citizens of Grand and San Juan counties to Utah Governor Caleb W. West thence to Washington. Their complaints were literally at the grassroots level—which had been poor that year because of drought. Livestock was hard pressed to find feed; the Indians, estimated at 500, were camped around waterholes, denying access to the cowboys’ cattle; Day had directed the Utes to go to Utah but claimed innocence; the Indians threatened to call in the military (what a reversal) if the county residents interfered; Ute livestock had now appeared in large numbers (4,000 horses, 10,000 sheep and goats), but the women had left and more men were arriving, ready for a fight; there were 300-400 warriors and 120 white men spread throughout the county in a defenseless posture; plus there were 200 to 300 Navajos ready to ally with the Utes to drive the white man out for good. 27
Major General A. M. McCook, Commanding General of the Department of Colorado in Denver, based his response on Day’s position to these allegations, saying that the Utes had always wintered in San Juan County, were quiet, and these reports were fabricated by cowboys who were themselves the trespassers. There was no need for military intervention. 28 This was no comfort to Mormon Bishop F. I. Jones, who wrote to West following a conference with Ignacio and four sub-chiefs.The Indians’ position was clear. “Ignacio says their Agent sent them here and he further says that he will not leave even though the government commands him to. Our danger as settlers lies in their driving their stock down on the cattlemen’s winter ranges. Some of these men, commonly called cowboys, are hot-headed and may either shoot some of the Indians or their stock and thus bring on a war which would be very disastrous to our defenseless settlements.” 29
If there was going to be a war, it would start first in the newspapers. A Salt Lake paper sported headlines of “Indians—Utah Invaded by the Blood-thirsty Utes, Driving the Settlers Out.” 30 Citing documents from government correspondence, the author of the article put an additional spin on it when he wrote, “The militia of Utah is ready and willing, however, to go to the front at any time in behalf of the citizens of the Territory ...[and were] ready to call out at a minute’s notice.” Colorado papers, on the other hand, took an opposite stance. Day wrote that white use of reservation land had left little more than sagebrush with the interloping cattle driving the Utes to greener pastures. He added that the Indians only had 600 ponies and 200 sheep, far fewer than 300 warriors, had brought their families with them, and that President Grover Cleveland himself had told Ignacio during his spring 1893 visit to Washington that “he didn’t care a damn” if he [Ignacio] took his people to Blue Mountain. To Day, the whole problem fell squarely on Congress which had consistently dragged its feet in ratifying the agreement to move the Utes to southeastern Utah. 31 These sentiments should not be confused with those in another Coloradoan camp who accused the Indians of slaughtering deer, killing cattle, and acting “saucy.” There were bound to be cattlemen who would make some “good Indians.” To these people, “Truly Uncle Sam has in these Indians another case of the ‘white elephant.’ They won’t work, and they are not good to eat. They are simply an expensive ornament to the lands and beyond that are of no earthly use.” 32
In December the weather turned bitterly cold, though the controversy gained heat. Conflicting reports and constant finger pointing did little to ease tension. Everyone had an opinion, many of which disagreed. For example, one person reported that the Indians could muster two hundred men in six hours while another pointed out that they did not fight in cold weather, had brought all of their women and children with them, and now had all their livestock there, none of which portended war. This was countered with the Utes coming in such large numbers to winter in Utah, something never done before, and true they were quiet, but “so is a burglar” when invading a house and taking one’s possessions. 33 The Utes were peacefully camped in Dry Valley drying meat, but others offered that Indians were threatening to claim Grand Valley and the La Sal Mountains as well as San Juan County.
While hoping for a peaceful solution, the people of Grand County requested one hundred rifles and eight thousand rounds of ammunition from Governor West, who pulled them from National Guard units and delivered them to the Moab County Courthouse. 34 Rumor had it that on December 15th the cowboys would initiate hostilities and that they had gone to the Mormon settlements, requesting thirty men from each “to jointly go in and dislodge the Indians” if something were not done. 35 Day, swearing that “my Indians will not be shot down to gratify transgressive [sic] cowboys,” wrote to West and asked that he do “all in your power to protect my squaws and papooses who are ignorant of impending danger as well as the infirm and unarmed warriors who seek only grass upon unsurveyed lands for their starving herds.” 36 As for the Utes, Ignacio promised,“Soldiers can only kill me. I shall die in Blue Mountain,” the “old homestead,” underscoring the Indians’ “earnest desire for removal” to Utah. 37
Enough. Leaders representing the various factions needed to see for themselves. On December 7, Governor West boarded a train in Salt Lake City headed for Thompson Springs before disembarking to Monticello. That same day, General McCook ordered Lieuten-ant Colonel H. W. Lawton, Inspector General of the Army’s Colorado Department, to head for the same location. Not surprisingly, Day soon boarded the Denver and Rio Grande and sped off to the same appointment. 38
Governor Caleb West.
UTAH STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY
LDS church leader Brigham Young, Jr., on assignment to visit the saints in southeastern Utah, met with Ignacio, Benow, Mariano, and Colorow in Durango on December 4. They were there seeking letters of support from people who were aware of their previous trip to Washington and who would vouch for the veracity of their belief that President Cleveland said they could stay in San Juan County. “Ignacio prides himself upon always telling the truth,” and so Young wrote a letter giving tacit approval for their staying in Utah for the winter. 39 Ignacio also said that he had no choice but to keep his cattle there because there was no grass or water on the reservation. But “when the weather moderates and the snow melts so as to have water on the reservation, he will return.” Before parting,Young noted that all four swore to the President’s authorization, that Ignacio was “very friendly, especially with the Mormons,” and that Young summarized the situation as “All the Colorado Indians want peace; the renegade band of Utes would like a brush with the cowboys, I believe, and would like to rope in the Colorado Utes; [and] some of the cowboys would like to fight the Indians and rope in the Mormons to aid them. We [Mormons] have all to lose and they have nothing to gain.” 40 Unbeknownst to all, two days later the Commissioner of Indian Affairs directed Day to return the Indians to the Colorado reservation immediately.
Leaders were still descending on Monticello in most adverse conditions. LTC Lawton and Day give an apt description of what travel at this time of year meant. As soon as Lawton reached Dolores by train, he hired a buckboard, met the Indian agent, and started for the meeting.“The weather was very cold, snow deep [six to eighteen inches] and still snowing and a blizzard blowing.” 41 Fifteen miles out of Dolores, the rear wagon axle broke and so they rigged a pole under it and continued; ten miles further the front axle went.The two men unhitched the horses, left everything behind, and rode bareback most of the night until they encountered a lone man with a wagon camped on his way to Monticello.The three hunkered down against the cold awaiting daylight then traveled until noon before reaching their destination and ending their thirty-two hour fast.
On December 12, the discussion started in the log building that served as both school and church. Besides Hammond,Tatlock, (Colonel E.W.Tatlock of the Governor’s staff) and Lawton there was special interpreter Joseph O. Smith, who would later take Day’s place as agent. He had been there for a few days to gather information. Also there was Governor West who arrived about the same time from Moab, having arranged for fifty volunteers from Grand County to be on call as militia. In his buckboard lay a chest of rifles and ammunition, escorted by a group of San Juan County men. 42 He had already gone on record as saying that the Indians must leave immediately, that if the federal government would not act he would call out the territorial militia, and that Day and the government were responsible.“This speech put additional ‘pep’ into about thirty well-armed cowboys, some of whom had been drinking freely” and who were known participants in the massacre of Utes camped on Beaver Creek ten years before. West, hearing the cowboys were ready “right now,” realized he had aroused the wrong sentiments so turned on them, threatening arrest if they did not quiet down. 43
There were fourteen Indians present, Ignacio, Mariano, and Benow being the most prominent. They were convinced that the meeting had an already-agreed-upon agenda to remove them, although they had received no official word. West’s opening remarks increased the tension. Soon the Indians branded him as “Little Capitan the Mormons had found,” which shut him down and opened the floor to Lawton and Day, “Washington’s Big Capitans.” 44 Ignacio was adamant that orders for his return to Colorado were a trick and he would not do it.There was no way that the Weenuche could go back without Herculean efforts, loss of livestock and possibly people. Lawton realized that if soldiers were needed, there were two troops of cavalry available in Logan, Utah, more than 350 miles away, and four at Fort Wingate, New Mexico, more than 250 miles to the southeast, but their involvement would “entail great expense and also suffering for the Indians.” 45 Lawton assured his commander that the Utes had peaceable intentions, the settlers did not fear them unless the cowboys started some- thing, troops would not be necessary, and when a move occurred, “that every facility be given these Indians.” 46 As for those who had always been here, both Paiutes and Utes, he had no intention of moving them to Colorado, but if he did, it would be a different matter. He reported that Benow’s group had fifteen lodges or about ninety-five souls and the Paiutes approximately eighty. “Benow’s band belongs to the agency but has never resided there and do not now propose to move there....Troops only could move them.” 47 The colonel agreed with Day that West had made a big mistake in “arming additional cowboys when they are the hostile element” who could trigger what all hoped to avoid. 48
The discussion warmed. The Indians accused Day of having a “forked tongue,” interpreter Smith, although respected, was not perceived as defending the Indians’ rights and so Christian Lingo Christensen became the main translator using both Ute and Navajo to insure understanding. Accusations of Ute depredations led to a further “bedlam of voices.” 49 The Indians reiterated at every opportunity,“The land of their forefathers where they lived and died had been taken from them by the whites; their deer, elk, and antelope had been killed.They nearly foamed at the mouth when engaged in speaking on these subjects.” 50 Mariano went further:
Around four p.m. Lawton received an official dispatch that the Utes must return. “The air was filled with exclamations of ‘liar, traitor, split tongue,’ and many other Indian expletives.” Ignacio was incensed. He held up his fingers to represent telephone poles and said, “Mebbe so wire talk from heaven, mebbe so from hell.” Citing his impression that everything that came from Washington became garbled and misunderstood, “this message was dead and had gone into the ground.” 52
Hammond watched the tenor of the meeting and arose to urge the Utes to peacefully accept the directive and leave; Ignacio lashed out with an epithet and told him to sit down. He followed up with: “We were both in Washington; I sat in the president’s chair; you never sat in that chair; you are not fit to take part in this important move.” 53 Day offered to help with food (two beeves) for the Indians and hay (seven tons) for the livestock, which he bought from Mons Peterson’s store that was also doing a brisk business in Winchester cartridges—“legal tender at all stores in San Juan County”—in exchange for about one hundred deer and goat hides. This was on the same day that Governor West’s arsenal arrived. 54 Hammond and West became increasingly assertive, while Lawton sent a messenger to summon troops for the removal and to break the angry stalemate.
According to Christensen’s detailed account, the translator spent the rest of the night trying to persuade the Indians of the futility of resistance.They felt he had been a failure because he had not convinced the white leaders that the Utes should stay in San Juan County. Christensen sat around their campfire, piled up sand to represent all of the whites in the United States, used his thumb to represent all of the Indians in America, and argued that the Indians had no chance at resistance.
Ignacio, having been to Washington and stayed in a seven story building where people on the street looked like ants, agreed. Another convincing point was when the interpreter suggested that “buffalo soldiers” would arrive; “they wilted, for they have an extreme dread of colored troops.” 56 They responded, “Go wake up ‘Black Eye’ Lawton. Tell him we will go in the five days allowed us to move.” 57 The colonel countermanded the order for troops.
There were some happy people. Governor West left Monticello on December 14, for the railroad depot ninety-five miles away, secure in the knowledge that he had put on a good show and removed any soil that might tarnish the escutcheon of the soon-to-become forty-fifth state in the Union. The cattle companies—the Carlisles with their 20,000 head, Pittsburgh with their 12,000, and L.C. with its 10,000—were assured that the grass remained theirs. 58 The Mormons, for better or for worse, held onto their settlements waiting for other opportunities to sell to the government in the future. The military was glad that they had saved their department the costly effort of shipping cavalry troops in the dead of winter with all of the attendant inconvenience.
Even lower elevations like Dry Valley north of Monticello were deep in snow during the winter of 1895. Large pony herds, travois loaded with children, tepees, and equipment, lack of food and forage, very cold temperatures, and continuing storms made returning to southwestern Colorado difficult at best.
UTAH STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY
Among the whites most dissatisfied with this agreement was David Day. As the other officials left, he penned a letter to the Commissioner to explain how “———— ridiculous this entire proceeding” had been from the start. 59 The Indians were now trying to gather their livestock in the midst of a blizzard. The agent swore that he would get them back on the reservation as cheaply as possible because he regretted having to leave even a dollar in San Juan County. “The entire affair has been a shameful imposition” on many, “enlisting the disgust of the blanket Indian” who really were the ones to suffer. Not so for the cow men who got their grass or the governor who would receive “political preferment when statehood was achieved.” Day later wrote that Mormon Nephi Bailey swore that the cowboys had forced the settlers to sign the petitions that brought on the affair. 60 While this statement should be weighed against other actions to include the visitation of San Juan and Grand county residents in Governor West’s office, it does illustrate the tack that Day took following the incident. And it would continue months after when he and Tatlock opened a vehement dialogue, blaming each other for the problem, the diatribe being serialized in the Solid Muldoon, a Durango, Colorado newspaper published from 1892 to 1895.
Another enemy made that day was Johnny Benow, son of Benow, believing his father and the other chiefs were cowards for backing down and pulling out. He preferred to fight and felt his large herds of horses and livestock had as much right to graze on Utah grass as any cattle company owned by white men. In the future, he was involved in a number of altercations with cattlemen, law enforcement officers, and settlers, causing Christensen to claim that he “annoyed us many times since [and] is usually the instigator of all our troubles with the Paiutes.” 61
In spite of the rations for the Indians and feed for their livestock Lawton reported to McCook that the “condition of weather made it exceedingly dangerous for travel with women and children at this season.” 62 Snow descended for the next twenty-four hours adding another eighteen inches and forcing the Indians to take a more southerly return route. Day agreed to have hay, flour, and beef brought to the travelers in sheltered canyons along their way to Sleeping Ute Mountain. Although he recognized that the movement would be very slow due to the women and children and weather, he was anxious to get them moving because a delay might prove dangerous “as the Paiutes and renegade Indians urge the Utes to stay.” 63
By Christmas Eve, Lawton and Day, having spent six days in the saddle checking routes and Indian locations, were back in Dolores. 64 Each went his separate way, hoping that the affair was over.The new year proved it was not. Representatives from Grand and San Juan counties were in West’s office claiming the Utes had not returned to Colorado, but were killing and eating the white men’s cattle, and that Day had told them to remain in Utah but out of the way. Something needed to be done. On January 5th the governor issued orders to Captains George W. Gibbs (Battery A) and John Q. Cannon (Troop C) of the National Guard to determine the truthfulness of these allegations as well as the number and composition of the Indian camps—both Utes and “renegades.” The next evening the two men boarded the train heading for Thompson Springs. 65 In Moab the officers dressed as civilians, picked up a guide and horses and started their fact-finding tour.
At first together and later separated with their own individual guides, the two men covered much of both counties, rendezvousing roughly two weeks later at Moab before returning to Salt Lake City. They visited and reported on many of the wintering spots of the Indian groups, how mixed the Utes were with the San Juan County Utes/Paiutes, and the large size of the Indian livestock herds. They also provided important ethnographic and historical detail, which points to the complexity of the situation. For instance, the first Indian camp encountered, approximately nine miles below Moab on the Colorado River, belonged to Bridger Jack (“renegade”)—one lodge— and one-legged Dave Root (Ute) who spoke English well and presided over five tepees. There were fifteen men, fifty people total, and five hundred horses with another five hundred sheep and goats. 66
John Q. Cannon.
UTAH STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY
Cannon described Root as talking freely, explaining that agent Day had encouraged them to stay in Utah for the forage, but to remain inconspicuous. In the spring they planned to perhaps go to the Uintah Reservation in the Uinta Basin, but not return to Colorado; they wanted nothing more to do with their agent. This same conversation surfaced in other camps with warriors who were “sullen and full of curses against the agent and [who] reiterated the story that they had been deceived by him [so] would not go to Colorado ...their ponies will hardly need much more moving for scores of them are surely about to die of starvation.” 67
Following the dialogue with Root and Bridger Jack, Cannon made the mistake of unbuttoning his coat to get at his pocket watch, exposing his army belt and pistol. The ever-observant Indians noticed the distinctive hardware and “instantly took the form of clam-like silence. ...We were soon to learn that, travel as rapidly as we might—and we rode strong, grain-fed horses—the news of our presence and the nature of our inquiries had preceded us, and we found the transients uncommunicative and guileful. Only a few hours later, on arriving at Monticello sixty miles away, the storekeeper told me he had heard his Indian customers talking mysteriously about a ‘Mericat [American] Capitan’ who was in their midst fishing for information.” 68 Cannon was baffled as to how this communication occurred.
Both officers feared that the Utes would withdraw into even more inaccessible terrain once they realized people were interested in their whereabouts. That may be one reason that Gibbs and Cannon put a rush on a camp as soon as it was found. Once they located the tepees, they hastily rode into their midst, “dismounted instantly, and without ceremony entered the various lodges and began census-taking. Often times we were met with ugly looks but never was there any resistance, though on many occasions we could have been easily overpowered.” 69 They found the Utes “generally fat and contented, having obtained supplies from the agency but not yet having crossed into Colorado; their livestock, however, was not as fortunate, “dying by the hundreds. In one day’s ride over toward the Colorado boundary, I [Cannon] counted no less than sixty ponies which had perished on the trail.” 70 The San Juan Utes also were not faring well, being “poverty-stricken and their condition generally is deplorable.There is absolutely no game to be had and any depredations they or the Southern Utes may make upon the cattlemen’s and settlers’ herds are easy to account for.” 71 They also did not have many animals. Final tally for both groups: Utes—238 men, women, and children with 1,779 horses and 1,225 sheep and goats; the White Mesa Utes/Paiutes—125 total with 132 horses and 40 sheep and goats. 72 The former, in spite of their angry denials, were making their way back to Colorado while the latter remained where they were. Thus the two captains ended their nine hundred mile mid-winter odyssey. Two months later, Cannon became the Adjutant General of the Utah National Guard, promoted to the rank of brigadier general. 73
If for no other reason, the removal to Utah heightened awareness that the whole Ute question needed to be answered. Following acrimonious debate amongst Coloradoans, congressional members, Indian Rights Association activists, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, President Grover Cleveland signed the Hunter Bill on February 20, 1895, separating the Muache and Capote on the eastern end of the Colorado reservation from the Weenuche on the western end. When it was put to a vote of the 301 males living on the eastern end, 158 voted to accept the agreement which made the entire group eligible for allotment and the other provisions of the Dawes Act. Within a short time, 358 Southern Utes signed the necessary paperwork to receive their individual holdings and become United States citizens; four years later, with the opening of the Indian non-allotted lands for settlement, the number rose to 374 Utes accepting allotments. 74 For the Weenuche under Ignacio, the western end would not be allotted; the government established a new agency at Navajo Springs.The passage of this act also allowed the lands in southeastern Utah that had been tied up for years, to open for white settlement following a six month waiting period.
Through it all, agent Day received high marks for fairly representing the Indians, insuring that they had a clear understanding of policy and were not badgered into agreeing to something they did not want. Consequently, he became a target for expulsion from his position, but he stood firm. In his words, “The novelty of a Western man, a resident of this section who believes the Indians have rights and is willing to maintain them was too sudden for this people and as a result of my efforts in battling for law and justice as against prejudice and falsehood, I have won a degree of unpopularity in this vicinity that can only be duplicated by a ‘sound money’ advocate.” 75 His feelings, however, about the Weenuche—whom he referred to as “Chief Ignacio and his western worthless following”—were still colored by the recent Utah episode. 76
Today, with over one hundred years of hindsight, readers may shake their heads at the mistreatment of the Utes; at a governor supplying weapons at a time when more rifles were the last thing needed; at a church official providing permission that should have been rendered by the government; at the President of the United States giving the impression that he did not care where the Utes lived; at cowboys, who had already been whipped twice, seeking another confrontation; and at an agent who stiff-armed opposition when collaboration was in order. The entire incident illustrates the complexity of events—something to be kept in mind as new issues now unfold each day, relegated to a two-minute attention-getting blip on our television—the message designed to form an opinion. It is interesting to contemplate what southeastern Utah would be like now if it had become reservation land—what of its national parks, the uranium industry of the 1950s and 60s, the Moab recreation corridor, and other forms of economic development? While one can argue, “what might have been is not,” the transfer of land to the Utes was almost a fait accompli. Emotion and complexity, like oil and water, made a poor, temporary mixture at best. For the Ute question, its answer would await another day.
NOTES
Robert S. McPherson teaches at the College of Eastern Utah—San Juan Campus and serves on the Utah Board of State History. He thanks the Utah Humanities Council for the fellowship that assisted with research for this article.
1 Space does not permit including all of the congressional activity surrounding this twelve year process of establishing the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute reservations. For a good summary of the political activities involving federal and state government and special interest groups see, Gregory Coyne Thompson, Southern Ute Lands, 1848-1899;The Creation of a Reservation, Occasional Papers of the Center of Southwest Studies no. 1 (Durango, CO: March 1972): 37-59; also,Thompson,“The Unwanted Indians: The Southern Utes in Southeastern Utah,” Utah Historical Quarterly 49 (Spring 1981): 189-203.
2 There can be confusion over the term Southern Utes as used then and today. In anthropological literature these three bands are designated as Southern Utes as opposed to the Uncompahgre, Parusanuch, and Yampa in Colorado and the Uintah, Tipanogots, Pahvant, Sanpits, and Moanunts of Utah collectively known to Anglos as Northern Utes. Now there are two Southern Ute reservations in the southwestern corner of Colorado. The first is called the Southern Ute Reservation, headquartered in Ignacio, with residents who are primarily Muache and Capote.When a person refers to Southern Utes today, it often is limited to these people. The second reservation is the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation with headquarters in Towaoc, whose population is primarily Weenuche and are referred to as Ute Mountain Utes. Historically, in southeastern Utah there was a heavy mixing of Paiutes with Weenuche Utes. To avoid confusion, unless there is a reason to specify, the general term Ute will be used here. The name Weeminuche is often found in the historical record but the preferred spelling now is Weenuche.
3 All quotes from this meeting are found in U.S. Senate, “Ute Indian Commission,” Ex. Doc. 67, 50th Cong., 2d Sess. January 11, 1889.
4 Ibid.,30.
5 Ibid.,43.The Animas and Los Pinos rivers are located in southwestern Colorado and were important sources of water as well as hunting areas for the Utes.
6 Ibid.,54.
7 Ibid.,55.
8 Ibid.,71.
9 Ibid., 72-73.
10 Thomas J. Morgan, “Southern Ute Agreement,” Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1890): XLIII–XLIV.
11 Herbert Welsh to general audience, February 25, 1890, Indian Rights Association, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
12 Following the Meeker fight in 1879, the federal government, with the urging of Colorado citizens, removed all of the northern bands of Utes to Utah in accordance with the Treaty of 1880 ratified by Congress on June 15, 1880.
13 Charles C. Painter, “Removal of the Southern Utes,” Lend a Hand (“Magazine of Organized Charity”) 5 no. 4 (April 1890): 258-69.
14 Ibid., 267.
15 Francis F. Kane, “Diary of Francis F. Kane—Ute Removal, 1891,” Indian Rights Association Papers, 1868-1968, (Philadelphia: Office of the Indian Rights Association, 1891): 10, 14, 19, 23, 81.
16 Ibid.,68.
17 Herbert Welsh, “The Case of the Southern Utes,” Harper’s Weekly, April 2, 1892, n.p.; Welsh to the Public, open Letter, April 22, 1892; T. S. Childs, “A Statement and Appeal for the Southern Utes,” n.d., n.p., all in Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
18 Ignacio, et al. to Our Great Father, April 1, 1893, Letters Received, 1881-1907, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, National Archives. [Hereafter cited as Letters Received—BIA].
19 Caleb W.West to Hoke Smith, July 20, 1893, Letters Received—BIA.
20 See Robert S. McPherson and Richard Kitchen, “Much Ado about Nothing: The San Juan River Gold Rush, 1892-1893,” Utah Historical Quarterly 67 (Winter 1999): 68-87.
21 “The Ute Removal Bill,” Mancos Times (Mancos, Colorado), February 16, 1894, 1.
22 Helen M. Searcy, “Col. Dave Day,” The Pioneers of San Juan Country I, (Durango, CO: Sarah Platt Decker Chapter, 1942): 76-82.
23 F.A. Hammond to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 16, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
24 Charles H. Ogden to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 5, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
25 David Day to F. A. Hammond, July 3, 1894; Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 19, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
26 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 15, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
27 Willard Butt to Caleb W.West, November 23, 1894; C. J. Elliot to Frank Hobbs, November 24, 1894; A. Taylor to West, November 26, 1894, Territorial Executive Papers, 1850-1896, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City, Utah. [Hereafter cited as Territorial Papers.]
28 A. McCook to Adjutant General, U. S. Army (telegram), November 29, 1894, Letters Received— Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 94 National Archives. [Hereafter cited as Letters Received— AGO].
29 F. I. Jones to West, November 27, 1894,Territorial Papers.
30 “Indians—Utah Invaded by the Blood-thirsty Utes,” November 27, 1894, n.p., in file Letters Received—AGO. The clipping does not indicate the newspaper from which it is taken.
31 “The Ute Scare,” November 30, 1894, Durango Democrat.
32 Mancos Times, November 30, 1894, 1.
33 West to Secretary of the Interior, December 4, 1894; C. J. Elliott to Frank Hobbs, November 24, 1894,Territorial Papers.
34 McCook to Adjutant General of the Army, December 1, 1894, Letters Received—AGO; Grand County Petition, December 3, 1894,Territorial Papers.
35 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 5, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
36 Day to West, December 5, 1894,Territorial Papers.
37 Day to McCook, December 3, 1894, Letters Received—AGO.
38 McCook to West, and West to McCook, December 7, 1894, Territorial Papers; Day to Adjutant General of the Army, December 4, 1894, Letters Received—AGO.
39 “Ignacio’s Veracity,” December 7, 1894, Mancos Times,3.
40 Brigham Young, Jr., to F.A. Hammond, December 6, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
41 H. W. Lawton to McCook, December 13, 1894; Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 13, 1894, Letters Received—AGO.
42 Christian Lingo Christensen,“An Indian War Averted,” Improvement Era 31 (July 1928): 776-80.
43 Ibid., 777.
44 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 14, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
45 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 13, 1894; Lawton to McCook, December 13, 1894 (both telegrams), Letters Received—AGO.
46 Lawton to McCook, December 13, 1894, Letters Received—AGO.
47 Ibid.
48 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 8, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
49 Christensen,“An Indian War,” 777.
50 Ibid., 777-78.
51 Diary of Christian Lingo Christensen, Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, 164.
52 Christensen, “An Indian War,” 777.
53 Ibid.
54 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 14, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
55 D. L. Blake, “Indian Troubles Plague First San Juan County Settlers,” San Juan Record (Monticello, Utah), December 29, 1955, 6.
56 Christensen, “When the Utes Invaded Utah,”, Times-Independent (Moab, Utah), August 3, 1933,4; Christensen, “An Indian War,” 779.
57 Times-Independent, August 3, 1933, 4.
58 Christensen, “When the Utes,” 4.
59 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 14, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
60 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 16, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
61 Christensen, “An Indian War,” 780.
62 Lawton to McCook, December 14, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
63 Day to Secretary of the Interior, December 15, 1894, Letters Received—AGO.
64 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (telegram), December 24, 1894, Letters Received—BIA.
65 West to George W. Gibbs and John Q. Cannon, January 5, 1895,Territorial Papers.
66 Cannon and Gibbs to West, January 28, 1895,Territorial Papers.
67 Ibid.,5.
68 John Q. Cannon,“When the Utes Invaded Utah,” Improvement Era 32 (November 1928): 42.
69 Ibid.,45.
70 Ibid.,44.
71 Cannon and Gibbs to West, January 28, 1895,Territorial Papers.
72 Ibid.
73 Heber M.Wells to President and Gentlemen of the Senate,April 5, 1896,Territorial Papers.
74 Francis E. Leupp, The Latest Phase of the Southern Ute Question, A Report (Philadelphia, PA: Indian Rights Association, 1895): 24; Louis A. Knackstedt, “Report of Southern Ute Agency,” November 29, 1899): 285.
75 David F. Day, “Report of Southern Ute Agency,” September 15, 1895, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895): 141.
76 Day to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 30, 1895, Letters Received—BIA.
