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Chained Stores: Utah's First Referendum and the Battle Over Local Autonomy
Chained Stores: Utah’s First Referendum and the Battle over Local Autonomy
BY TED MOORE
On January 20, 1941, Utah Senate president Wendell Grover introduced a bill to the legislature that would have levied a graduated income tax on chain stores operating ten or more units within the state. This tax was not unique to Utah and actually came at the tail end of a national movement that saw twenty-eight states and several cities pass similar legislation. Senate Bill 44 eventually became law after much debate and controversy, but it was never enforced because, for the first time in Utah’s history, voters used the referendum process to overturn a bill passed by the legislature. During the referendum campaign local and national businesses fought each other to sway voters through the legislative process, the court of public opinion, and the newspapers. This battle over corporate regulation and influence reveals the complicated and varied visions Utahns held regarding the economic opportunities, freedoms, and rights that they believed citizenship should offer, who would shape and define what those were, and how they should be secured. While both sides of the debate argued for preserving local and individual autonomy, each side sought to secure it in different ways; one emphasized communal prosperity through increased economic centralization and regulation, while the other stressed greater freedom for the individual through fewer regulations, more choice, and lower consumer prices. 1
Up until the 1870s, most Americans lived in rural areas as farmers who largely produced and traded with others for what they needed. Retail activity in the United States was dominated by small, independent merchants who were neighbors and friends to their customers. These retailers served a social and cultural function by providing a public space for people to interact and associate with one another. Their small and poorly stocked shops supplemented the goods most families could not produce for themselves. Merchants usually purchased merchandise in small quantities from supplying agents who represented wholesalers. The limited number of products purchased, combined with the agents’ sales commissions, drove up prices. This poor distribution system meant that manufactured goods were too expensive for most people to purchase in large quantities, especially in the rural areas of the South and the West. 2
Rowe and Kelly Company. Many department stores effectively used elaborate window displays to attract passersby into their stores. —
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By the 1890s retailers in Canada and the United States had developed new marketing and distribution strategies that helped make manufactured goods more accessible and affordable. The first new successful business models were mail-order catalogues and department stores. Sears & Roebuck, for instance, grew dramatically in the years after its founding, roughly doubling its sales from $388,000 in 1893 to almost $800,000 in 1895—and by 1908 seeing its annual sales soar to more than $40 million. Thanks to wholesaler catalogue stores like Sears, rural Americans purchased the same products as their city cousins and, in doing so, began to be more fully incorporated into a culture of corporate-driven consumption. 3
Those who consumed these mass-produced items were also actively participating in the process of identity making. American manufactured goods represented national ingenuity, superiority, and prosperity. Commercial goods became visible markers of social class status, cultural identifiers, and national unifiers as people in Nephi, Utah, purchased the same items that sold in Chicago or New York City. Urban shoppers were also in the midst of a similar revolution as large department stores challenged the primacy of the smaller shops. The department stores lured customers through new forms of advertising from ads in popular magazines to elaborate window displays, more selections, credit options, and services such as home delivery. 4
Local department stores took the lion’s share of retail business in the first decades of the twentieth century, but they saw competition for consumer dollars from chain stores. The first national chain store company in the United States was A&P Grocers which began business in 1859. By 1880 over a hundred small A&P stores were operating in and around New York City. It was not until after World War I, though, that these types of businesses began to fully capitalize on America’s enthusiastic turn towards consumption. Individual chains grew rapidly, especially in rural areas. For example J.C. Penney expanded from 312 stores in 1920 to 1,452 by 1930, with over half of these stores in towns of five thousand or fewer. In the same decade Walgreens expanded from twenty-three to 440 stores, and the A&P grocery chain increased to 15,737 stores. By the end of 1929 chains had accounted for almost eleven percent of all retail stores but more than twenty-two percent of total retail sales nationwide. In some areas, chains controlled even more of the market. For example, they accounted for more than forty-five percent of all shoe sales, ninety percent of all variety-store sales and almost forty percent of all grocery sales nationwide. 5
As the chain stores proliferated critics charged that the chains were antithetical to American values. They saw them as monopolistic, and anti-democratic, and threatening to the economic well-being of small business owners. These concerns are reflected in Alabama Senator Hugo Black’s warning to Congress in 1930:
Chain stores had several key advantages over their independent competitors that allowed them to sell their products for less. First, they served as their own wholesalers and distributors, buying directly from manufacturers and avoiding the added costs of middlemen. In addition to a more efficient distribution system, chain store corporations systematically leveraged their size advantages over local, independent stores. For example, chains required “brokerage fees” to market a company’s products. By 1936 A&P was garnering six million dollars in advertising allowances and another two million dollars in brokerage fees from food manufacturers annually. As part of the advertising allowance contracts the chains created special in-store displays for the products, sent out circulars, ran radio ads, placed these products in the most prominent spaces throughout their stores, and agreed to run special sales that offered the products at well below regular prices. 7
When manufacturers resisted or refused to comply with the brokerage fees, retailers “hid” their products at the back of the store and did not advertise their goods in weekly fliers until the fees were again paid. Locally owned stores could not leverage these types of deals because they could not provide as wide a distribution for the products. As one Fleischman’s Yeast official explained, “Now any discounts or payments that we make to A&P and Kroger for cooperation are due to the fact that they are the two accounts in the country that can give us a broad market operation in promoting the sales of our yeasts.” Fleischman’s yeast paid $12,000 a month to A&P in brokerage fees because it gave them distribution access in over 14,000 stores, something a local grocery store could not do. 8
Critics also charged that the chains squeezed farmers causing them to lose as much as three billion dollars a year in revenues from having to accept lower prices and that the chains paid lower wages to their workers. The chains recruited, trained, and paid their managers well in an effort to create company loyalty, and they made up the difference by often employing female teenagers as counter-help at a time when most store clerks were adult men. 9
To fight back local merchants organized “trade at home” clubs with local umbrella trade organizations with names such as the “Allied Businessmen’s Association” and the “Community Builders.” In 1930, of the over 260 anti-chain organizations in the nation, only thirty-one were located outside of the South or Midwest, and 69 percent were in towns of less than 10,000. These groups called for boycotts of chains as well as organizing politically to pressure local and state governments to enact protective legislation, which was first attempted in Missouri in 1926. 10
The courts routinely struck down early chain store laws for being discriminatory and arbitrary as they tended to only target national chain stores. Despite these failed attempts, in 1929, North Carolina and Indiana both enacted laws that managed to survive court challenges by imposing taxes on the second store operated by any owner. By taxing all multiunit retail operations the laws escaped charges that they arbitrarily discriminated against some chains while exempting others. Ultimately twenty-eight states passed anti-chain taxes between 1929 and 1941, thus setting the precedent for Utah’s legislation that same year. Of the state laws, twenty-two managed to survive court challenges and hostile referenda over the next decade. 11
In addition to the local and state efforts, there had also been an attempt at the national level to regulate chains. A group of independent store owners persuaded Congress to launch a series of investigatory hearings led by a congressman from Texas named Wright Patman. Many Americans blamed the Great Depression on too much corporate power and influence and they believed that more corporate regulations would help right the economy. This political climate meant that calls for more regulations to try and level the playing field could more easily find traction. As a result, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936. This law made it illegal for producers to offer their product at a discount to some retailers but not to others. The legislation also forbade retailers from selling their merchandise at a discount for an extended period of time in a specific region. Patman’s success emboldened him in 1938 to unsuccessfully introduce an anti-chain store bill that would have levied a tax of $49,000 per unit annually on any chain that operated 500 or more stores. 12
Patman’s failure reflected an ideological and policy shift that was taking place at the federal level. New Deal policy makers ultimately decided that regulations on corporations had reached its peak of effectiveness in combatting the Great Depression and they needed to do more to incentivize larger companies to start hiring more people. This could come through lower prices on products which would encourage consumption, which would spur more production and jobs. This would ultimately come at a cost to the small, locally owned businesses. As Professor of Law Richard C. Schragger notes, up through the late 1930s, “The anti-chain store movement urged federal and state interference into the workings of the national market in order to preserve local economic and political independence, not to supersede it. And it insisted that the government act to ensure both the prosperity of the nation as a whole and the prosperity of the particular communities in that nation.” 13
By 1940, though, the federal and state governments, in partnership with large corporations, had begun to push the idea that, “Being an avid, loyal consumer was everyone’s civic responsibility . . . True Americanism depended on spending . . . business (and government) thus placed consumer choice at the center of American liberty.” American corporations in particular pushed the idea that the freedom to choose in the marketplace is what helped to define freedom and citizenship and what made America unique. Thus, lower prices, along with increased competition from national chains, fit this new ideological re-conception of the economic structure that favored national wealth over local economic prosperity. It is in this shifting context that the Utah legislature began seriously considering its own tax on national chain stores in 1941. 14
Walgreen Drug Company, on southeast corner of 200 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, ca. 1930s. Walgreen expanded from twenty-three to 440 stores between 1920 and 1930. In 1934 the company opened its first “super store” in Tampa, Florida, which was more than twice the size of the average store. This was soon followed by the store pictured here in Salt Lake City. —
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References to a chain store tax in Utah begin to show up as early as 1933 in conjunction with a state imposed two percent sales tax and several other tax measures to cover government short-falls as the Great Depression worsened. The proposed chain store bill failed and the issue flew under the radar for several more years even though Idaho and Colorado passed bills in 1933 and 1934, respectively. In Idaho, the state
defended the tax on the basis that it would garner between $60,000 and $100,000 in tax revenue to fund public schools. Safeway and J.C. Penney took the state to court but dropped the suit and began paying the tax on their combined seventy-eight stores after the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in the state’s favor and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal. 15
In Utah by 1941 the number of national chain store units had reached as high as 387 compared to 6,000 independent stores. Yet the chains, depending on the industry, accounted for anywhere between 13 and 20 percent of all retail sales in the state, and that cut of the pie was steadily increasing. 16 With this mounting economic threat to local merchants, anti-chain legislation, or Senate Bill 44, was introduced by Senate president Wendell Grover from Murray and Senator Thomas Bailey representing Juab and Tooele counties. Grover had a reputation and a track record of being a sympathetic champion for workers’ rights while Bailey was the owner of the Bailey Grocery Company in Nephi and served as the director of the Commercial Bank of Nephi. The proposed tax was designed to discourage the national chains from further expansion in the state by taxing fifty dollars per unit for any company that had less than one hundred stores nationally and up to $500 per unit on companies that had more than five hundred stores nationwide. In other words, if a national chain had just one store in Utah but one hundred stores throughout the nation, the company would be taxed for all stores. Federal courts had already declared this part of the law to be legal since chains used their national infrastructures to subsidize local stores through advertising, marketing, and distribution. The more innovative aspect of Utah’s law rested with the clause that any preexisting store that expanded its square footage or relocated would face additional taxes. 17
H. C. Shoemaker was district manager for Sears, Roebuck and Company and the spokesman for the Utah Chain Store Association. Shoemaker opposed Senate Bill 44 because he felt that the bill would curb the success of chain stores and hurt taxpayers. —
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The legislation attracted immediate opposition from the national chains. The chain stores, having fought this national trend elsewhere, preemptively created the Utah Chain Stores Association in 1939 and published a pamphlet that would serve as the basis for their campaign in 1941. Among the document’s highlights were the claims that the chains contributed to the state’s economy by paying higher wages than local retailers, that they had annually paid more than $16.6 million dollars to Utah’s farmers and manufacturers, and $1.1 million dollars in local and state taxes, and that only three cents of every dollar spent in their stores was profit. The association was also very upfront in warning that they would pass along any new taxes to the consumer. Finally, the national chains cautioned that a tax would force them to leave the state and prevent them from buying surplus agricultural products from local farmers, thus resulting in financial ruin for those independent producers. 18
Consequently, resistance to the tax also came from many agricultural organizations. Some of the groups that fought against the legislation included the Utah Beet Growers Association, Utah Wool Growers’ Association, the Dairymen’s Association, and the Celery and Onion Growers Associations. A spokesperson representing Utah’s livestock and poultry producers also opposed the bill and echoed the chains’ threats by explaining that the tax would “close outlets for their products.” 19
The local groups leading the defense of the tax were the Utah Retail Grocers’ Association, the Utah Pharmaceutical Association, and the wholesale grocery firms. Donald P. Lloyd, a former secretary of the Utah Retail Grocers’ Association and a manager of the Associated Food Stores, claimed that the bill had not been designed to eliminate chains but to curb their growth to protect Utah-based business owners. His argument postulated that government policies should protect local economic opportunity. Lloyd asserted that chain stores, “bludgeoned their way to over 20 per cent of the retail business in the state. We do not want to destroy the chain stores. But we feel they have made all the advances they are entitled to in this state. Senate Bill 44 is designed to maintain the status quo. Its purpose is to curb monopoly and stimulate individual enterprise.” 20
As S.B. 44 was being debated in the legislature, proponents and opponents marshaled their forces and made their cases across the state to various clubs and influential community organizations. H. C. Shoemaker, district manager for Sears & Roebuck and the spokesman for the Utah Chain Store Association, presented the main brief for the opposition. He argued that the bill “was not a revenue measure because it would hurt the taxpayer, and the real purpose of the legislation was to destroy chain stores in the interest of a few disgruntled competitors.” Chains annually spent $27 million in the state by purchasing excess farm produce, he argued. If the bill passed it would harm farmers, producers, laborers, and consumers through higher prices. 21
Proponents of the legislation countered with several arguments that centered on fairness and the preservation of economic autonomy. Logan city commissioner Vern Muir for example, complained that chain operators in Logan benefitted from many services, such as utilities, that local residents had paid for in taxation. H. G. Ericksen, a Mt. Pleasant food distributor, offered that “chains mean the disappearance of small business owners.” Without much evidence, he also accused the chains of depressing farm produce prices through their buying and selling tactics. 22
The Utah Senate, which was controlled by the Democratic Party with nineteen of the twenty-three senators, was highly divided on the issue. In fact, the political divisions over the bill are not easy to categorize as they cut across party and geographic lines. For example, Democratic senator Stanley Child of Salt Lake City was in favor of the legislation: Grant Macfarlane, also a Democratic senator representing Salt Lake City, led the opposition against it. Thomas Bailey from rural Juab County was for the bill, while Abel S. Rich of rural Box Elder County opposed it as “un-American.” Both sides defined the bill in terms of their own definitions of personal freedoms, and they linked their arguments to economic “rights.” Those for the bill considered chain stores to be the enemy of free market capitalism and a stifler of community prosperity, while those opposed to the tax interpreted the bill as the enemy of the free market because it offered protective privileges to a few at the expense of the many. 23
When the bill came up for debate, Grant Mac- Farlane along with his fellow democratic colleague Abel S. Rich led the charge to defeat the measure. MacFarlane waged a filibuster against the bill by first threatening to read Gone with the Wind, but ultimately by delivering a “history lesson” on retail stores beginning with the Roman Empire. This prompted the Senate president to call a special session devoted exclusively to the legislation. The following day George Miller of Carbon County interrupted the filibuster and proposed that discussion be limited to ten minutes per person. Ira Huggins of Weber County objected by commenting that the suspension of the Senate rules was “mob rule.” The Senate’s “gag rule” issuance was met with even more heated debate when Huggins and Arthur O. Ellett of Utah County traded insults. Ellett, who was for the tax, accused Huggins of using “obstructionist politics.” Huggins responded by saying he would “say the meanest thing possible” about Ellett and then called on everyone to “examine his (Ellett’s) record.” Ellett then replied that “the record will show that I haven’t held the floor as long as has Senator Huggins.” They started yelling at each other until order was finally restored. Eventually the Senate passed the bill thirteen to ten, with ten Democrats voting for its passage along with three of the four Republicans. 24
The House had three alternative versions to the Senate bill, so it decided to wait on the outcome in the Senate before taking up the issue. Under the Senate Bill, banks, gas stations, and utility companies with showrooms that displayed and sold appliances were exempt from the tax. One amendment in the House attempted to de-exempt these entities and reduce the threshold of when the tax kicked in from ten units down to four, but it failed. The legislation passed the House with less theatrics, thirty-nine to nineteen, but many Representatives were still conflicted over the legislation. For example B. L. Frandsen of Carbon County reported receiving several telegrams from constituents opposing the tax, including one from the Price Chamber of Commerce, while he also received several from local farmers who were for the bill. L. N. Marsden Jr., a Republican from Iron County, voted against the bill because he thought it was wrong in principle, even though he was an independent owner who had been hurt by the chains. Meanwhile, Don Clyde, a Democrat from Wasatch County, opposed the bill in principle, but voted for it because so many of his constituents approved of it. 25
Members of the House and Senate also faced a fierce lobbying campaign laced with intimidation and deception. Senate President Grover complained being, “subjected to unusual pressure with respect to this bill. I was called at my home last night and asked whether I preferred this bill or the housing bill.” Clifton Kerr, a Republican from Box Elder County owned a wholesale clothing company and requested to abstain from voting after being notified by both the chains and independent stores he supplied that “my vote on this bill would determine my business in the future.” House rules forced him to vote and he ultimately sided in favor as, “experience had shown that there is an inequality between chain and independent merchants.” Finally, Ray H. Leavitt of Utah County complained that he had received twenty-nine unaddressed telegrams opposed to the tax. 26
It is clear that the state Democratic Party was already split philosophically on many economic issues—one faction hoping to secure local and state prosperity through protective and regulatory legislation, another believing that the key to the state’s economic security would only really happen through a “freer” local free market. This split had manifested itself in several issues prior to the chain tax. In the 1930s the state legislature had created “protective tariffs” for Utah businesses and farmers with a series of regulatory trade barriers. For example, an excise tax and a special licensing fee for non-Utah-based margarine manufacturers protected the state’s butter producers; beers, wines, and liquors distilled outside the state as well as many other out of state manufacturers faced a six percent “import” tax. 27
Once the chain store bill was passed many of these same tensions plagued Utah Governor Herbert Maw. The chain store tax bill was introduced at the same time that the governor was aggressively attempting to lure more manufacturing, outside capital, tourists, and permanent residents into the state. While the bill was being debated, Maw persuaded the legislature to reorganize the state government and give it more centralized powers as part of his economic strategy. The result was a new division within the state bureaucracy, the Department of Publicity and Industrial Development. This department’s mandate was to lure more tourists and industry into the state through tax incentives, aggressive lobbying in Washington D.C. and by creating a national advertising campaign that touted the state’s natural advantages as well as its business-friendly laws. 28
The chain tax seemed to contradict the governor’s goals of encouraging more local economic autonomy at the expense of the consumer paying a little more. The tax better reflected the national government’s shift towards encouraging consumption, broader prosperity, and privileging consumer choice and lower prices at the expense of some local autonomy. As the governor considered the bill, his office was flooded with letters from a wide range of organizations that represented agricultural and labor interests such as the Motion Picture Projectionists Local, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, the Northwestern Turkey Growers Association, and the Salt Lake Union Stock Yards, as well as from private citizens, (such as the president of the Box Elder News Journal), urging a veto. This group of letters complained that the law would ultimately be a tax on the consumers, and that Utah producers might face retaliation in other states through exclusion from the chain-controlled distribution networks. 29
Herbert B. Maw, Utah governor from 1941 to 1949. Caught between drawing more business to the state and upholding the chain store bill, Maw created a new governmental division called the Department of Publicity and Industrial Development. This new division attracted outside industry to the state by way of tax incentives combined with business-friendly laws. —
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Publically, the governor told petitioners that he was awaiting the attorney general’s opinion on the bill’s legality before making a decision. In some personal communications, however, he acknowledged the difficult political situation he was in. “The bill creates some issues,” Maw acknowledged to a trusted friend and advisor. “On the one hand, the Chain Stores are gradually eliminating the competition of small merchants because of their great financial power which makes it possible for them to purchase their products at a lower wholesale rate and to construct more attractive places of business.” The governor wondered if the benefits of limiting the chains outweighed the economic advantages, but he ultimately signed the bill, publicly explaining that, “If the present expansion program of the chain stores is permitted to continue, they will, within a period of a few years, obtain a virtual monopoly on the retail business of Utah. 30
Within five hours of the governor’s signature the Chain Store Association announced a petition drive to force the state’s first referendum. It would follow a similar strategy developed in California in 1936 where it discovered that a well-organized political campaign was more effective than trying to overturn already established laws in the courts. The California Chain Store Association had learned in its campaign there that despite consumers’ preferences of paying lower prices, they hated the chains. The California Chain Association hired Lord & Thomas, one of the most successful advertising agencies in the country, to run what would be a successful publicity campaign to overturn the law. 31
The strategy in Utah mirrored the one in California. The goals were fairly straightforward— convince voters that the tax would force the chains to leave the state or have to charge higher prices to stay in business. In either case it was the consumer who would have to pay the cost, either through higher taxes to make up for the loss of the stores leaving the community or through higher prices. The chains made the case that either way, the annual cost of living for Utah residents would increase by hundreds of dollars. The chain stores’ campaign began by first targeting employees and suppliers. For employees, the chains promised better working conditions, more company-sponsored recreational activities, to be more flexible with working hours, and acknowledging events like employees birthdays. The chains also struck an accord with the American Federation of Labor that in exchange for its opposition to the chain legislation it would allow the A.F. of L. to organize grocery workers. 32
The chains also met with farmers’ groups, promising to jettison injurious practices, including unreasonable discounting, and pledged to purchase surplus crops in return for their support. One example of this involved about two hundred potato growers in southern Utah. The Bryce Canyon Potato Marketing Association had attempted to sell their crops to ZCMI, Pacific Fruit Company, and Success Markets. These stores turned them down because the price was higher than what they would pay purchasing potatoes from Idaho. Safeway approached the association in November 1940 when rumors about the chain tax legislation began percolating. Safeway purchased the grower’s potatoes at the price they asked and was able to sell them in Arizona and California. The association credited Safeway with saving their crops and the farmers subsequently lobbied the governor to veto the chain legislation when it was passed. 33
Anti-chain store tax advertisement in the Milford News, September 24, 1942. The reference to the Chain Store “Death Tax” was a marketing tool to suggest the effect the tax would have not only on chain stores but local communities as well.
The chains had also already created what they called local advocacy groups that claimed to be “disinterested citizens,” focused on better community public relations.
This strategy had been put into operation in 1939 out of concerns over the possible passage of the Patman law, and now the chains amped up their efforts. They created groups with names intended to link chain stores to the community. For example, the “Salt Lake Citizens” group began a series of public seminars “educating” the public to vote “intelligently” on the referendum. The group claimed to have created a committee of “public-spirited citizens who have no special interest in chain stores, but who have volunteered to fight the ‘death tax’ as a matter of principle.” 34
Early on, the local chain store advocacy groups decided to target women in their campaign as well. Women were seen as the primary consumers in the home and by the end of World War I, advertisers had focused much of their attention on this demographic. Advertisers developed and spread the idea that “consumer sovereignty was women’s sovereignty,” and that brand-name choice was “a means for women both to exercise their superior taste and judgment and to defend their individual rights as consumers.” Thus, the chain store advocates routinely met with women from various LDS wards who were also members of the Democratic Party. They also visited some of the many women’s clubs to make their case and successfully convinced two influential organizations, the Women’s Legislative Council of Utah and the women’s auxiliary of the American Federation of Labor, to oppose the tax. 35
The association’s campaign was having the desired effect. By May 1941 the group had secured enough signatures on its petition drive to force the state’s first referendum of its kind. Governor Maw had been warned by some of his advisors of the possibility of a referendum challenge even before he signed the bill into law so he had already been strategizing on how to alienate the least number of voters on such an evenly divided issue. He announced that he believed in the initiative and referendum process and that the people of the state ought to decide the matter, thus positioning himself politically as someone responsive to the will of the people and the legislative process. 36
Perhaps the most effective tool that the chains used was an unprecedented media blitz. The chains launched a publicity offensive through every major newspaper and radio station that especially targeted rural Utahns. The campaign message explained that, “under-consumption rather than over-production throws the marketing machinery out of gear and results in irregular and unsatisfactory prices for farm products.” The chains’ media campaign slogan was “No. 2 is a Tax on YOU,” a reference to the proposition’s position of number two on the ballot. The advertisements consistently referred to the law as a “death tax,” and each piece of propaganda consistently struck the theme that if the law was upheld it would mean a higher cost of living, lower wages, and economic ruin for the state by means of less consumption. 37
A good example of the type of strategy that the chain store association used can be seen in this radio advertisement: “Consumers know that such a pyramiding tax burden would raise the cost of living. Labor knows that it would wipe out jobs. Property owners know that it would vacate stores and lower property and rental values. Civic leaders recognize that a law stultifying distribution seriously would impair the economy of the entire state and discourage the healthy flow of new capital and new enterprise of all kinds.” 38
As noted previously, the Utah Chain Association created a pamphlet in 1939 to combat the Patman legislation proposal, and it reintroduced that literature in the referendum campaign. The pamphlet offered a myriad of statistics claiming that chain stores paid far better than independent stores, that each chain’s average annual profit was only $271.40, and that their small-town stores “brighten up main street, offer fresh, new merchandise in wide variety, and make shopping in the small town just as interesting and economical as shopping in the nearby city.” The pamphlet also drew quotes from Franklin Roosevelt and economists about how the country’s weak economy was the result of poor distribution networks. It then proceeded to explain how the chains were successful by developing more efficient, modern distribution systems. Using quotes from President Roosevelt that resonated with the public, the pamphlet argued that chains would lower prices and help cure a nation that was still “ill-nourished, illhoused, and ill-clothed.” 39
The chains’ public media fight was also assisted by the alliance of the newspaper industry. The Utah State Press Association unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the chain store tax, calling it “a test tube for freak, business-baiting laws.” It justified its stance to residents by arguing that “such taxes are not in the public interest since they are paid by the consumer in higher prices for the necessities of life.” Many newspapers, though, had a financial stake in this issue, which caused them to offer favorable editorials in support of the chains. In 1939, for example, the corporate chains paid at least $600,000 in advertising to Utah’s newspapers. Many of the papers adopted the same language in their editorials that were used by the Utah Chain Store Association in its campaign by routinely referring to the bill as the “death tax.” 40
Many newspapers also published accounts of financial ruin and economic devastation from around the country where the chain store tax was in effect. The Davis County Clipper quoted a warning from a group of independent grocers in Massachusetts, that a similar “death tax” in Georgia forced the independents to leave that state because the distributors refused to pay the tax, thus leaving them without suppliers. They cautioned that the best course of action for Utah’s merchants and consumers to prevent financial devastation was to oppose the legislation. 41
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the chains also attempted to capitalize on the United States’ full-scale entry into World War II, by appealing to Utahns’ patriotism and emphasizing the link between freedom and consumption. The Chain Association sent a petition to Governor Maw requesting him to call a special session of the legislature to postpone the potential referendum vote until after the war ended. It also published a similar plea in every newspaper in the state, asking the governor and the legislature to suspend the law and calling on independent store owners to support a suspension of the vote as a show of patriotism. The association warned that without unity the nation could end up “paying taxes to the axis,” and that Hitler’s success came from his ability to divide his enemies through “propaganda and fifth column infiltration within the borders of each victim nation.” The Chain Store Association hoped that with a postponement of the referendum until after the war most Utah residents would forget about or change their opinions of the chain stores. Ironically, they tried to exploit the divisions in the state over the chain store tax that they created and to then call upon the state to coalesce against an enemy that used internal divisions to invade other nations. 42
When the tax proponents rejected the legislative moratorium, it only served to give the chains additional ammunition for their campaign. The Chain Association launched another state-wide advertising blitz announcing that its affiliated stores defended “real” American ideals and values. The chains pledged that (unlike independent stores) they would, “be aggressive in trying to sell war bonds and stamps . . . work hard to make sure that the flow of necessities continues for the moral on the homefront . . . keep prices as low as possible . . . work with Utah agriculturalists to make sure their products are sold and help them expand their markets to other states (and) . . . help all local chain stores in the state in their charitable and civil defense efforts.” 43
Proponents of the bill were less experienced and not as well organized in shaping public opinion or understanding shifting political trends. The combination of a new government emphasis on consumption and consumers along with the marketing efforts of national corporations to link citizenship, freedom, and democracy with consumption and choice made for a compelling argument. When combined with the fact that the Great Depression and a war threatened these components that were now used to define the American identity, it is not surprising that the chains were able to shape the debate in a manner that convinced most Utahns to favor their perceived ability to protect their standard of living at the expense of a few dollars of lost profit for local merchants.
J. J. Bowman of Kaysville, who was the president of the Utah Retail Grocers’ Association, revealed the independents’ initial lack of understanding of the shifting political climate:
By July of 1942, however, the pro-tax advocates began to realize that the chains were successfully shaping the debate. Shifting strategies by using much of the same rhetoric as the chain store coalition, they tried to couch the argument in terms of choice, democracy, independence, and American identity as well by associating economic opportunity and freedom with independent stores, and painting unregulated chains as akin to “monopoly and serfdom.” For example they began describing a vote for Proposition 2 as a “Vote for Independence.” They argued that since the bill was approved by the legislature and signed by the governor, it was part of the democratic system. They also contended that, “control was not considered necessary until a chain had gained such gigantic size that it suffocated individual enterprise. That is the one issue of this controversy: Whether individual enterprise is to be preserved in Utah.” 45
As the referendum neared, pro-tax groups also started using language linking the chains and a lack of economic and political freedom to Wall Street. As one political ad proposed, “It is up to us to decide whether our sons will go into business for themselves . . . or whether we wish to see all our retail trade pass into the hands of Wall Street controlled firms.” Another advertisement published just before the referendum posited that “the great middle class, which has been the backbone of our state and nation and the barrier between democracy and dictatorship will be the ones who suffer most from absentee control by corporate wealth.” 46
ZCMI shoppers at the hosiery counter, March 21, 1945. Women were seen as the main consumer demographic and so many intentionally targeted them in their ad campaigns. This photograph hints at the consumer craze that characterized the postwar economy. The craze was so large that in 1943 Salt Lake City’s department stores placed an ad seeking five hundred female sales clerks to meet the demand for more store help. They partnered with the city’s vocational education program in the high schools to start training clerks. —
USHS
These attempts at reshaping the meaning of the legislation came too late. The reality is that the anti-chain group was simply not as well organized or funded. The chains also had one more important factor in their favor, by 1942, Utah’s retailers were experiencing record sales. In January 1941 retail sales in the state increased 36 percent over those from the same month of the previous year. This dramatic increase continued even after U.S entry into World War II. Holiday spending in 1942 shattered all previous records in the state as well as nationally, store purchases were up a whopping 78 percent statewide beginning in October of that year. 47
The consumer buying frenzy of 1942 helped to diminish the immediacy of the economic threat posed by the chains. Thus, when voters went to the polls that November, they overwhelming rejected the tax by a count of 91,271 to 40,496. In some of the more rural counties the ratio
against the tax was five to one. The chain stores’ public relations blitz, the attention on war, and the improved economy all played a role. Additionally, other factors help explain the vote overturning the legislation. Unlike mail order stores, the chains employed locals, paid some taxes, spent a lot of money on advertising in the local newspapers, rented real estate, and participated in local business organizations. 48
Moreover, independent merchants were not universally loved. They were generally hostile to organized labor, and while they offered credit to farmers, they often charged higher prices for those goods. Some residents in rural communities also believed that having chains was good for independent businesses. The chains attracted more people from the outlying region who would also visit locally owned shops, and they forced the independents to be more efficient and innovative, leading to lower their prices. 49
The chains successfully controlled the campaign rhetoric and helped to shape the identity of rural towns while also making themselves an important part of that identity. They did this by emphasizing that having a store from a national company represented a necessary link to modernity, stability, and freedom. The chain store coalition also fostered a psychological and emotional relationship with townsfolk as evidenced by one of the statewide ads it ran during its referendum campaign. J.C. Penney had thirty-four stores in Utah by 1942 with all but two of them located in small towns such as Eureka, Helper, and Milford. The advertisement reminded Utahns that J.C. Penney had operated locally for over twenty-five years and that the reader probably had purchased their babies’ and children’s clothes from the store. It also cautioned that if the tax passed then these community institutions would likely leave and the townsfolk would lose “an old friend.” 50
The story of Utah’s first referendum thus shows the limits of state authority and the strong influence of corporations, especially as the economy improved. By voting down the chain store tax, Utahns believed they were voting for greater personal and local autonomy from state government controls, but they ultimately accepted a constricted yet protected sphere for themselves. In an unpredictable world the chains were able to dictate the dialogue regarding how residents defined themselves as Americans. The chains shaped the issues to mean that fewer regulations equaled greater personal freedom and choice, and they linked this to the idea that democracy could operate through the “unrestricted” consumption of consumer goods. Thus, a store like J.C. Penney was part of the local identity—an “old friend” that represented individual choice and competition. Chains were also backed by national corporate resources and would remain local anchors of economic stability as well as a cultural link to the rest of the nation in times of uncertainty. However, as chains proliferated they increasingly stifled competition and drained more money away from local economies. Eventually, most chains left the small towns, leaving those communities void of goods, services, and even less economic opportunity. 51
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Notes
1 Senate Journal, Twenty-Fourth Session of the Legislature of the State of Utah (Salt Lake City: Seagull Press, 1941), 73.
2 Richard H. Robbins, Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002), 10–20; Marina Moskowitz, Standard of Living: the Measure of the Middle Class in Modern America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
3 Robbins, Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism, 10–20; Moskowitz, Standard of Living.
4 Robbins, Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism, 10-20; Moskowitz, Standard of Living. Sales at Macy’s in New York for example topped $100 million dollars by 1929, or the equivalent of about $1.3 billion in 2013 dollars.
5 Alan R. Raucher, “Dime Store Chains: The Making of Organization Men, 1880–1940,” Business History Review 65 (1991): 152; Godfrey Montague Lebhar, Chain Stores in America, 1859–1950 (New York: Chain Store Publishing Corporation, 1952), 20–22, 25.
6 Richard Schragger, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940,” Iowa Law Review 90 (2005): 1025–26.
7 By contrast to the brokerage fees, in 1936 J.C. Penney paid $72,129, Safeway a little over $90,000, and Woolworth’s a little over $50,000 in taxes. See Alfred G. Buehler, “Chain Store Taxes,” Journal of Marketing 1 (Jan. 1937): 185; Lebhar, Chain Stores, 78–80, 206–218.
8 C. W. Hunt, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission in response to Senate Resolution #224, Seventieth Congress, Report of the Federal Trade Commission, “Chain Stores: Chain Store Leaders and Loss Leaders,” January 15, 1932 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932); Lebhar, Chain Stores, 208–209, 213–15.
9 Wages for chain store managers tended to be much higher than in local stores. In the Grant Stores chain managers in the smaller volume stores were paid $3,000 to $4,000 per year in the 1920s, while salaries for the most profitable stores netted $12,000 to $25,000 annually. See Raucher, “Dime Store Chains,” 132, 144–45; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), 969; Charles F. Phillips, “The Chain Store in the United States and Canada,” American Economic Review 27 (March 1937): 88–90. Federal records from the Bureau of Statistics and the U.S. Department of Commerce report support the negative claims against the chains. In 1929 there were 7,061 retail chain companies. By 1939, despite the Great Depression, there were 8,959. In 1929 these companies owned 159,688 stores or units nationwide. By 1939 this number had been reduced to 132,763. Nationally in 1939 1,624,655 independent stores garnered 74.7 percent of total sales. By contrast, the 128,195 chain units controlled 21.7 percent of all sales. Local chains controlled only 3.8 percent of the market. If one factors in the salary of managers, then the chains did pay their employees more on average than local chains and local independents.
10 F. J. Harper, “A New Battle on Evolution: The Anti-Chain Store Trade-At-Home Agitation of 1929– 1930,” Journal of American Studies 16 (December 1982): 412–18.
11 Hugh A. Fulton, “Anti-Chain Store Legislation,” Michigan Law Review 30 (December 1931):274–79; Maurice W. Lee, “Recent Trends in Chain-Store Tax Legislation,” Journal of Business of the University of Chicago (July 1940): 256–61.
12 Schragger, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 152–54; Lebhar, Chain Stores, ch. 9; David A. Horowitz, “The Crusade Against Chain Stores, Portland’s Independent Merchants, 1928–1935,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 89 (Winter 1988), 342–43; Parowan Times, December 23, 1938, 2; “Weekly News Analysis,” Piute County News, December 23, 1938, 2; “Tax on Chains Held Suicidal,” Salt Lake Telegram, April 12, 1940, 2; “Patman Bill Foes Finish Testimony,” Salt Lake Telegram, May 9, 1940, 4; “Group Tables Chain Tax Bill,” Salt Lake Telegram, June 18, 1940, 4.
13 Schragger, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 105.
14 Charles F. McGovern, Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890–1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 300; Schragger, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 105.
15 “Intermountain News,” Davis County Clipper, October 6, 1933, 6; “Intermountain News,” Parowan Times, June 1, 1935, 4; “Idaho Chain Store Tax Under Attack,” Salt Lake Telegram, July 22, 1933, 12; “Call for Drastic Economy,” Salt Lake Telegram, July 26,1933, 4; “Chain Store Tax Upheld by Court,” Salt Lake Telegram, September 29, 1933, 6; Lebhar, Chain Stores, 129, 238; “Weekly News Analysis,” Piute County News, December 23, 1938, 2.
16 The actual number of chain stores in the state is unclear. Publications of the chain stores variously claim at least 202 national chain stores in 1935 and 387 corporate chain units as of 1937. A referendum voter information pamphlet pegs the number at 123. See “Information For Voters Regarding NO. 2,” box 24, fd. 30, reel 46, Lieutenant Governor Election Papers, Series 364, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City; Utah Chain Stores Association, Inc., “Utah’s $27,000,000 Industry,” [1939], 3–4, PAM 1004, Utah State Historical Society, Salt Lake City; “Call for Drastic Economy,” Salt Lake Telegram, July 26, 1933, 4; “Throngs Hear Pros, Cons of Chain Store Tax Bill,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 1, 1941, 7.
17 Senate Journal, Twenty-Fourth Session, 73; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, Twenty-Fourth Session of the Legislature (Salt Lake City: Arrow Press, 1941), 398; “Wendell Grover is Aggressive Liberal; Helped Old Folks,” Murray Eagle, September 19, 1940, 1; “Chain Store Legislation Should Not Be Punitive,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 4, 1941, 6; “Governor Signs Chain Tax Bill; Firms Open Fight,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 25, 1941, 1; “Death Claims State Senator,” Salt Lake Telegram, February 20, 1941; Senate Bill No. 44 in box 4, fd. 50, reel 8, Governor Herbert Maw Correspondence, 1941–1948, Series 221, Utah State Archives.
18 Utah Chain Store Association, Inc., “Utah’s 27,000,000 Industry.”
19 Clyde C. Edmonds, Utah Poultry Producers Cooperative Association, to Governor Herbert Maw, March 20, 1941, box 4, fd. 50, reel 8, Governor Maw Correspondence; “Throngs Hear Pros, Cons of Chain Store Tax Bill,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 1, 1941, 7.
20 “Throngs Hear Pros, Cons of Chain Store Tax Bill,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 1, 1941, 7.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Senate Journal, Twenty-Fourth Session, 417, 507–508, 605; Journal of the House of Representative of the State of Utah, 398, 632–33; “State Senate Clashes Over Tax on Chains,” Salt Lake Telegram, February 25, 1941, 1.
24 Senate Journal, Twenty-Fourth Session, 507–508, 511, 600, 604–605; “Filibuster Bars Vote on Chain Store Tax Bill,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 11, 1941, 1; “Bill on Chain Tax Sidetracked in State Senate,” Salt Lake Telegram, March 4, 1941, 1; “Chain Store Tax Passes Utah Senate,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 12, 1941, 1; “Senate Passes Chain Tax Bill,” Salt Lake Telegram, March 11, 1941, 1; “Chain Tax Wins Utah Senate Test,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 26, 1941, 1. MacFarlane’s material for his filibuster came from the Chain Store Association’s 1939 pamphlet, “Utah’s $27,000,000 Industry,” wherein it spends several pages offering a “history” of retail and chain stores dating back to ancient Chinese and Roman empires.
25 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, Twenty-Fourth Session of the Legislature, 398; “House Votes Chain Store Tax, 39 to 19,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 13, 1941, 1; “Chain Tax Notes Swamp House,” Salt Lake Telegram, March 12, 1941, 7.
26 Senate Journal, Twenty-Fourth Session of the Legislature of the State of Utah, 1941, 605, 632–33, 647; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, Twenty-Fourth Session of the Legislature, 398; “Chain Tax Notes Swamp House,” Salt Lake Telegram, March 12, 1941, 7; “House Votes Chain Store Tax, 39 to 19,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 13, 1941, 1; “Chain Stores Tax Passes Utah Senate,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 12, 1941, 1.
27 “These Warring 48 States,” Salt Lake Telegram, May 11, 1942, 6; “Chain Tax Wins Utah Senate Test,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 26, 1941, 1.
28 “Maw Denies ‘Dictator’ Aims in Bill,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 8, 1941, 9; “Maw Wages Own Campaign to Boost Advertising Fund,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 8, 1941, 9; “Maw Plan Gets Right of Way in Lower House,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 20, 1941, 1; “Showdown Nears on Maw Plan in Utah Senate,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 27, 1941, 1.
29 Northwestern Turkey Growers Association, Salt Lake City, to Governor Maw, March 11, 1941; R. H. Hunt, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joins of America, Salt Lake City, to Governor Maw, March 13, 1941; J. E. Ryan, Box Elder News Journal, Brigham City, to Governor Maw, March 13, 1941; Merrill Parkin, Salt Lake Union Stock Yards, to Governor Maw, March 15, 1941; R. B. Peck, Motion Picture Projectionists Local 250, Salt Lake City, to Governor Maw, March 18, 1941; all in box 4, fd. 50, reel 8, Governor Maw Correspondence.
30 “Governor Signs Chain Tax Bill; Firms Open Fight,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 25, 1941, 1; Governor Maw to J. E. Ryan, March 18, 1941; Governor Maw to J. E. Wilson, Milford, Utah, March 22, 1941; both in box 4, fd. 50, reel 8, Governor Maw Correspondence.
31 Secretary of the State of Utah, “Copy of the tally of petitioners for the Chain Store Tax Referendum,” May 2, 1941, box 4, fd. 50, reel 8, Governor Maw Correspondence; Lebhar, Chain Stores, 223–26. For a referendum to be placed on the ballot the petitioners had to gather the signatures of 10 percent of registered voters who had voted for the governor in the previous election, and the voters had to come from at least fifteen of the twenty-nine counties.
32 Utah Chain Stores Association, Inc., “Utah’s $27,000,000 Industry”; Lebhar, Chain Stores, 228–33.
33 N. O. Henrie, Bryce Canyon Potato Marketing Association, Panguitch, Utah, to Governor Maw, March 13, 1941, and Utah State Federation of Labor to Governor Maw, March 13, 1941, box 4, fd. 50, reel 8, Governor Maw Correspondence; “Maw Scans Store Tax, Waits Ruling,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 14 1941, 7; Lebhar, Chain Stores, 228–30.
34 Utah Chain Stores Association, Inc., “Utah’s $27,000,000 Industry”; “Group Forms Fight on Chain Tax,” Salt Lake Tribune, September 14, 1942, 8; “Murray Girls against Store Tax,” Murray Eagle, October 1, 1942, 1; “Bountiful To Oppose Chain Tax,” Davis County Clipper, October 2, 1942, 1.
35 Charles F. McGovern, Sold American, 80; “Club Hears Discussion on Chain Store Tax,” Salt Lake Telegram, October 26, 1942, 13; “Labor Auxiliaries Oppose Chain Tax,” Salt Lake Telegram, September 15, 1942, 11; “Women’s Republican Club Sets Labor, Chain Store Tax Forum,” Salt Lake Telegram, October 30, 1942, 10; “Women Approve Chain Store Tax,” Salt Lake Telegram, February 27, 1941, 14.
36 Memo to Governor Maw, n.d.; memo from Governor Maw, n.d.; Utah Secretary of State, “Copy of the tally of petitioners for the Chain Store Tax Referendum,” May 2, 1941; all in box 4, fd. 50, reel 8, Governor Maw Correspondence.
37 “State Okeys Petition of Chain Stores,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 8, 1941, 17; Utah Chain Stores Association, Inc., “Utah’s $27,000,000 Industry,” 31.
38 “State Okeys Petition of Chain Stores,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 8, 1941, 17; Morgan County News, September 25, 1942, 4; Garfield County News, October 1, 1942, 4; Kane County Standard, October 2, 1942, 8; “Utah Merchants Warned against Chain Store Tax,” Millard County Chronicle, October 15, 1942,
39 Utah Chain Store Association Inc., “Utah’s $27,000,000 Industry.”
40 Ibid.; “Press Group Hits Chain Stores Tax,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 29, 1942, 13; “Press Opposes Chain Store Tax,” Roosevelt Standard, February 13, 1942, 4; Editorial, Morgan County News, October 9, 1942, 1; “Labor, Farmers Against Tax on Chain Stores,” Murray Eagle, October 8, 1942, 1; “Local Group Passes Resolution Against Chain Store Tax Bill,” Piute County News, October 30, 1942, 1; Editorial, Iron County Record, October 1, 1942, 5. In a random survey of newspapers to assess the amount of advertising space purchased by the different types of businesses to ascertain in some way how much the chains’ advertising dollar influenced the state’s newspapers, I found that the Deseret News on March 5, 1941, featured seventeen advertisements— twelve for national companies like Ford and Wonder Bread and five for local businesses. Iron County Record, December 4, 1941, published forty-two advertisements, thirty-four for local companies. The problem with a survey like this is that the advertising circulars and inserts either didn’t survive or are not available.
41 “Utah Merchants Warned Against Chain Store Tax,” Davis County Clipper, October 16, 1942, 1.
42 H. Tracey Fowler, Utah Chain Association, to Governor Maw, February 14, 1942, box 12, fd. 53, reel 25, Governor Maw Correspondence; “Let’s Stand Together,” Garfield County News, February 19, 1942, 4; “Let’s Stand Together,” Murray Eagle, February 19, 1942, 4; “Press Opposes Chain Store Tax,” Roosevelt Standard, February 13, 1942, 4; “Chain Store Tax is a Threat to Our Freedom,” Rich County News, October 9, 1942, 1; Davis County Clipper, February 20, 1942, 4; “A Proposal to Defer the Chain Store Tax Referendum in the Interest of a United War Effort,” Manti Messenger, February 20, 1942, 8; Millard County Chronicle, March 26, 1942, 8; Morgan County News, February 20, 1942, 4; “Let’s Stand Together,” Murray Eagle, February 19, 1942, 4; Murray Eagle, February 19, 1942, 3; “Plea for United War Effort Spurned,” Park Record, March 26, 1942, 2; Iron County Record, February 19, 1942, 4; San Juan Record, October 22, 1942, 5; “Let’s Stand Together,” Garfield County News, February 19, 1942, 4.
43 “Plea for United War Effort Spurned,” Manti Messenger, March 27, 1942, 4.
44 “Grocers’ Unit Challenges Chain Stores,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 9, 1941, 17.
45 “Businessmen Form League,” Salt Lake Telegram, July 29, 1942, 8.
46 “Tax Law Is Is [sic] Upheld,” Murray Eagle, September 24, 1942, 1; “Vote For No. 2,” Salt Lake Telegram, November 2, 1942.
47 “Retain Volume Gains in S.L.,” Salt Lake Tribune, December 11, 1942, 11; “Yule Buying Shatters All U.S. Records,” Salt Lake Tribune, December 20, 1942, 17A; “Yule Shopping Earliest Ever, Survey Indicates,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 18, 1942, 6; “S.L. Tops List in Sales Gain,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1942, 14B; “Utah Leads Entire West in Retail Sales Increase,” Salt Lake Tribune, October 24, 1942, 24; “Utah Leads Nation in June For Gains in Retail Sales,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 3, 1942, 9; “S.L. Department Sales Shoot Upward,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 1, 1942, 23; “Utah Stores Start Year With Big Gain,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 8, 1941, 28.
48 For example, in San Juan County the vote was 502 against and 83 for the tax, while in Garfield County it was 880 against and 171 in favor. See “Official Certified Election results by the Sec. of the State of Utah,” November 25, 1942, box 24, fd. 34, reel 47, Board of State Canvassers, Series 364, Utah State Archives; F. J. Harper, “A New Battle on Evolution: The Anti-Chain Store Trade-At Home Agitation of 1929–1930,” Journal of American Studies 16 (December 1982): 421–22; “Chain Store Tax Heads For Defeat, Salt Lake Tribune, November 4, 1942, 1; “Utah Voters Repudiate Chain Stores Tax Law,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 5, 1942, 16; Lebhar, Chain Stores, 233.
49 Harper, “A New Battle on Evolution,” 421–22; Lebhar, Chain Stores, 233.
50 For a list of openings and closings by state, see box 221, fd. 4, J.C. Penney Archives, A 2004.007, Southern Methodist University Archives; “Do You Want to Lose an Old Friend,” Davis County Clipper, October 16, 1942, 7.
51 Up until 1931 J.C. Penney avoided placing stores in larger cities. In that year it built its first in Seattle, Washington. With the success of that store it then began a slow transition away from smaller towns to larger cities. See David Delbert Kruger, “Main Street Empire: J.C. Penney in Nebraska,” Nebraska History 92 (Summer 2011): 60–61; David A. Fleming and Stephan J. Goetz, “Does Local Firm Ownership Matter?” Economic Development Quarterly 25 (August 2011); David Neumark, Junfu Zhang, and Stephen Cicarella, “The Effects of Wal-Mart on Local Labor Markets,” Journal of Urban Economics 63 (March 2008); McGovern, Sold American; Schragger, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement.”
