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Senator Elbert D. Thomas and the Fate of European Jewry
Senator Elbert D. Thomas and the Fate of European Jewry
BY W. RAYMOND PALMER
Born in Salt Lake City, Utah, in 1883, Elbert Duncan Thomas was raised by parents who immigrated to Utah before 1865. Immersed in his faith as a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Thomas served as a missionary in Japan from 1907 to 1912. He grew to love the Japanese people, learned the language, and even translated a Latter-day Saint religious tract into Japanese; his time in Japan was instrumental in him becoming an internationalist. 1 The political scientist Frank Jonas described Thomas as “soft-spoken and mild-mannered,” and the Mormon Democrat from Utah served in the United States Senate from 1933 to 1951. 2 Although Thomas had a small Jewish constituency, consisting of approximately 1,400 people, he had developed a sympathetic outlook toward Jewry some twenty years earlier, following a 1912 visit to Palestine. 3
Senator Thomas was an intriguing person: he was an ardent Zionist, and he frequently championed Jewish causes. A backer of the New Deal who was generally loyal to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), Thomas supported an increase in the number of refugees admitted into the United States, even though FDR and many members of Congress were more reserved or opposed such measures. During his tenure in the Senate, Thomas became an outspoken advocate for European Jews and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. An approachable senator, Thomas occupied a seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for his entire term of service. This proved to be a good omen for several Jewish organizations. He was also an internationalist, a factor that influenced his views on Jewry.
Although a dearth of published literature exists on Thomas and the Holocaust, both Israeli and American scholars have written about him. They generally conclude that Thomas’s religious and moral convictions, as well as political considerations, motivated him to help Jewish peoples. 4 These scholars note that the United States responded inadequately to the Holocaust and that Thomas advocated for stronger actions, favoring rescue and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. For example, Thomas supported Hillel Kook’s nonsectarian pressure group because of its commitment to rescue. He also backed the American Zionist Emergency Committee because it advocated for the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine. 5
Edna Harker Thomas and Elbert D. Thomas, pictured with their three daughters. Elbert Thomas was a professor at the University of Utah, a major in the Utah National Guard, a president of the LDS Japanese Mission, and a United States senator. Utah State Historical Society, photograph 13947.
I agree with these arguments for Thomas’s underlying motivations and build upon them by highlighting the senator’s public actions on behalf of European Jews. This article thus begins to fill the scholarly gap on Thomas and the Holocaust: examining his 1934 travel to Germany; his association with Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the president of the American Jewish Congress (AJC) and cofounder of the World Jewish Congress (WJC); his interaction with groups such as Ambijan, the Jewish People’s Committee, and the New Zionist Organization of America;
and his reaction to the formation of the State of Israel. The piece also adds to the growing body of literature on the response of the United States to the Holocaust. I ask, in particular, why Thomas—a New Dealer and Roosevelt loyalist—sided with many of FDR’s opponents in advocating the rescue of European Jewry, and why Thomas chose to align himself with an ideologically diverse group of Jewish organizations. His cooperation with Jewish leadership in the push for the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine is integral to this article. Organized groups typically recruited public figures, such as Senator Thomas, to speak at their events. These issues lead to a broad assessment of Thomas’s quest to assist in efforts made by American Jewish organizations on behalf of their European to provide aid for those being oppressed by the Nazi regime.
In the summer of 1934, Senator Thomas visited Germany as an Oberlaender Fellow, under the auspices of the University of Utah Extension Division and with the blessing of FDR. Thomas and his wife, Edna, arrived in Berlin on July 20, 1934. 6 The visit played a key motivational role in what Thomas attempted to do for Jews during his tenure as a senator.
While attending a luncheon at the residence of the US Ambassador to Germany, William Dodd, on August 2, 1934, Thomas met the non-Zionist rabbi Morris S. Lazaron. Lazaron was a rabbi at the Baltimore Hebrew Congregation and was also the president of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, an organization that promoted interfaith dialogue between Christians and Jews. He and Thomas discussed the situation in Germany and the United States; they agreed to meet and talk in the future. This initial meeting was significant, as Thomas established a working relationship with a Jewish leader of national stature. The senator began developing Zionist views when visiting Palestine in 1912. While visiting Jerusalem, he came to believe that a Jewish state should be established there—an opinion, which, according to Thomas, was rooted in his religious beliefs. 7 His time with Lazaron also demonstrated that his Zionism did not prevent him from cultivating friendships with those who did not share that view. 8
A map of Birobidzhan in eastern Russia, from a 1929 report about the region. Joseph Stalin designated the area as the Jewish Autonomous Region within the Soviet Union in 1928. Creator, Boris L’vovich Bruk. Courtesy Library of Congress, 2018692339.
When Thomas returned to Utah he gave a series of speeches at the University of Utah and Brigham Young University, drawing several conclusions. He did not think Hitler would be in power for a significant length of time but condemned the persecution of the Jews. Thomas thought the Jewish boycott against German-owned businesses was a mistake because it could ultimately push Germans to unite against their Jewish countrymen. His position differed from that of Wise who, ultimately, supported the boycott. Thomas also believed that the German people knew what was occurring in their country but would not speak openly about it. Furthermore, he argued that any action against Germany would eventually turn the tables in its favor. 9 The views voiced by Thomas were not unique because many Americans, public servants and private citizens alike, held similar opinions.
During the 1930s, Thomas also spoke before several left-wing Jewish organizations that were affiliated with the US Communist Party, a decision that had negative political consequences many years later. His association with the Jewish left has received minimal attention in scholarly literature. 10 He commenced involvement with the American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidzhan, or Ambijan, in early 1936. Ambijan had been operating in the United States since the beginning of 1935, garnering support for a proposed Jewish settlement in the Birobidzhan region of the Soviet Union. Ambijan held a dinner in the honor of the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Alexander A. Troyanovsky, on March 11, 1936, in order to raise funds for the Birobidzhan project. Thomas spoke alongside dignitaries such as James Waterman Wise, the son of Stephen S. Wise, and New York State Supreme Court Justice Mitchell May at Ambijan’s inaugural event. Although a record of Thomas’s remarks has not been found, his participation at the dinner is important because it was the beginning of his relationship with Ambijan. 11 The leadership of Ambijan suspended its activities in 1939 largely due to the Soviet–Nazi alliance.
Senator Thomas also gave support to the Jewish People’s Committee (JPC). The JPC, a front for the US Communist Party, originated in 1936 when the AJC and WJC refused to admit representatives of known radical groups. A representative of the JPC approached Thomas and asked him to participate in a conference held on November 19, 1937. The gathering took place at the National Press Club and its participants objected to the oppression of Jews in Poland. Thomas spoke at the conference, although the text of his remarks has not been found. Several conference delegates, escorted by Thomas, met with and presented a petition to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. JPC representatives urged Hull to ask Polish leaders to guarantee the rights of their Jewish citizens. 12 While many JPC leaders held radical views, humanitarian motives—not political considerations—were key factors in Thomas’s decision to participate in a JPC function.
While Thomas worked with more radical groups, he also maintained ties with the influential Stephen S. Wise. Rabbi Wise sought congressional support for issues of importance to him and the AJC, which he led, and he was also a staunch supporter of FDR and the New Deal. 13 Thomas was one of many members of Congress with whom Wise corresponded. Since Wise likely knew of Thomas’s sympathy for Jewish causes and Zionism, the Utah senator was a logical contact. Thomas, who was a strong believer in human rights, may have seen Wise’s overtures as an opportunity to express his own views in public forums. Yet Thomas also took into consideration the potential political fallout from commentaries given to Wise, as evidenced by his refusal to make a statement on the situation in Romania (explored below). More often than not, however, Thomas complied with Wise’s requests. A picture of his attitude toward European Jewry begins to emerge through these public statements.
The prominent Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, as pictured in 1921 in New York City. Photographer, Underwood and Underwood. Courtesy Library of Congress, LC-DIGanrc-14228.
Wise contacted Thomas in 1936 requesting a statement from the senator on Palestine that Thomas provided. 14 An ardent Zionist and probably the most influential Jewish leader in America, Wise was close to FDR and frequently lobbied congressional leaders on Jewish matters. Wise and several other mainstream Jewish leaders were reluctant to make their own public statements concerning persecution and the Holocaust. They believed that their comments could contribute to an increase in anti-Semitism in the United States. Instead, Wise sought out non-Jews such as Thomas. He consulted with Thomas on a variety of issues but expressed particular concern about Jewish persecution in Germany and Poland.
On January 12, 1937, Wise wrote a letter to Thomas asking for a comment on behalf of the embattled Jews of Poland. Polish anti-Semitism became radicalized during the 1930s, often being patterned after Nazism. Many anti-Semites rallied around the “army, nationalism and Catholicism” banner. Pogroms were not uncommon in Poland during the mid- to late 1930s as the persecution of Jews escalated. 15 Approximately 3,500,000 Jews lived in Poland then, but the Polish government claimed that the country could only support 500,000. Nearly 3,000,000 Polish Jews, therefore, were threatened with expulsion. Wise told Thomas that “the plight of Polish Jewry [was] unparalleled in its misery and exceed[ed] by far the tragedy of the Jews of Nazi Germany.” Wise wanted to present a statement from Thomas at an AJC conference held on January 31, 1937. 16
Thomas responded to Wise by describing the situation in Poland as “tragic.” The senator wished Wise well in the upcoming gathering and gave a brief statement. According to Thomas:
Thomas took a stand in support of immigrants, minorities, and the question of citizenship when doing so was controversial. Similar situations are present in society today.
Wise contacted Thomas again in November 1937 concerning another AJC conference that was to be convened later that month. Topics open for discussion at the parley included anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews in Eastern and Central Europe. Wise wanted to present “a united, democratic front for the purpose of devising a new and more comprehensive program for the safety of our fellow Jews and the security of our American institutions.” He asked Thomas to provide “a message of encouragement and support.” 18 Thomas complied and provided the following message that was, indeed, presented at the conference. He declared:
In this instance, Thomas mentioned the pitfalls associated with forming opinions of people on the basis of race and religion.
Parliamentary elections took place in Romania on December 20, 1937. Provisions in the Romanian constitution required King Carol II to invite an individual to form a government following the elections. He chose the rightwing nationalist Octavian Goga of the National Christian Party for political reasons. This did not bode well for Romanian Jews. By February of 1938, an increase in anti-Semitism and oppression threatened some 758,000 Jews in Romania. Wise wrote to Thomas describing the conditions that Jews faced under the Goga government. Moreover, Wise asked the senator to assist him in an effort to raise the level of awareness concerning Jewish persecution in that country. As a mechanism for doing this, Wise suggested that Thomas deliver an address on the floor of Congress. The Goga government fell shortly after Wise sent the missive on Romania. Under those changing circumstances, Thomas thought it would be “unwise to say anything” relating to the issue. 20
By the middle of 1938, many Jews in America had attempted to create a united front against anti-Semitism. In connection with that movement, Wise contacted Thomas again requesting a statement, telling the senator that an expression of sympathy from a prominent national leader would benefit the cause. Thomas considered the matter carefully and made the following remarks:
Thomas’s association with Wise played a role in establishing him as a leading critic of anti-Semitism in the Senate. No known correspondence exists between Wise and Thomas during the war and postwar years. While the reasons for this are unclear, there is a possibility that Thomas’s cooperation with representatives of the Revisionist movement troubled Wise.
Even though Thomas’s correspondence with Wise apparently dropped off in the 1940s, the senator continued his involvement with other Jewish groups, including left-wing ones such as Ambijan, which had reinvented itself in 1941. Thomas participated in one Ambijan event during 1941, but little is known about what he said on the occasion. He was among the speakers at a dinner in honor of Soviet Consul General Victor Fediushine that took place in New York on December 3, 1941. According to a New York Times article, attendees donated $5,000 toward the purchase of a mobile x-ray machine for the use of the Soviet Union. 22
Hillel Kook, the Lithuanian-born Zionist who was known as Peter Bergson in the United States. Photographer, J. Stara. Courtesy Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, photograph 4158.
Ambijan sponsored a dinner commemorating the tenth anniversary of Birobidzhan that took place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York on May 16, 1944. Thomas participated in the event and received a warm reception from the more than one thousand attendees. Thomas’s opponent in the 1938 senatorial race, Brigham Young University president Franklin S. Harris, spoke as well. The festivities netted more than $27,000 in donations for Ambijan. In his keynote address, Thomas spoke highly of the USSR because he held the belief that the alliance between the United States and USSR should continue following the war. In his opinion, such an alliance would ensure “lasting peace.” Thomas also said that the Soviet army had “covered itself with undying glory” during the war. Then, he declared that in the USSR, “anti-Semitism [was] severely punished as treason against the entire nation.” Thomas stated that “implement[ing] the equal rights of the Jewish people” was one of the objectives of Birobidzhan. To that end, Ambijan did extensive work on behalf of orphans, which Thomas deemed “worthy of the great generosity of the American people.” 23
Ambijan held a national conference in New York on November 25–26, 1944; Thomas participated. Congressman Emanuel Celler, a New York Democrat, delivered a speech as well. Postwar reconstruction was the theme of the event, with Thomas giving a presentation in the context of Soviet-American relations. Although the text of Thomas’s remarks has not been found, the main thrust of the speech appears in a New York Times article. During a session in honor of Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, the senator complimented the Soviets for maintaining a “national minority policy of equality of all races.” 24 Gromyko would eventually serve as the Soviet minister of foreign affairs (1957–1985) and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1985–1988). Thomas’s praise of the USSR at the Ambijan events likely occurred because he believed that Jews enjoyed favorable treatment there. In reality, he may have been unaware of the harsh treatment that minorities and perceived “enemies of the state” received under the Stalin regime.
In Thomas’s support and advocacy for Jews during this time period, his relationship with the Bergson Group stands out—Revisionists whose style and methods were more provocative than those of mainstream Jewish leaders like Wise. His association with this organization started in 1942 when he came out publicly in support of the formulation of a Jewish army. Involvement with the Bergson Group strengthened his relationship with the American Jewish community. It did so by providing access to national leaders as well as an organizational structure to channel his passion and desire to help European Jews. Thomas supported the New Zionist Organization of America (NZOA) as well, which served as the arm of the New Zionist Organization (NZO) in the United States. The Revisionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky played a key role in the formation of the NZO during 1935. In 1939, a group of NZOA operatives, led by Benzion Netanyahu, arrived in America. The NZOA had two primary objectives, namely, to advance their campaign for a Jewish army and to paint a picture of the British as anti-Zionist. 25
Hillel Kook—a Lithuanian-born activist who went by Peter Bergson in the United States— led a faction of the Irgun Zvai Leumi that was based in the United States. The Bergson Group consisted of five nonsectarian committees that functioned between 1938 and 1948. The American Friends for a Jewish Palestine actively raised funds in the United States and sought public support for illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Committee for a Jewish Army (CJA) was established in 1941 to create a Jewish army to fight alongside the Allies in World War II. The emphasis of the CJA began to shift toward the rescue of European Jews in late 1942. To that end, Bergson formed the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe in July 1943. In 1944, Bergson created the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation and the League for a Free Palestine. Providing support for a “Hebrew” revolt against British forces in Palestine was the objective of both committees. 26
During the war, the underlying objective of the Bergson Group was to push either FDR or Congress or both into acting on the “Jewish problem” in Europe. They conducted an extensive public relations campaign and lobbied Congress in an effort to increase public awareness for causes they supported. Despite what appeared to be a well-intentioned effort, mainstream Jews in the United States despised Bergson’s organization. Thomas’s old friend Rabbi Wise was particularly vocal in this regard. He believed that Bergson’s “attack” ads increased anti-Semitism in the United States. Wise also claimed that the Bergsonites did not represent American Jewry as a whole.
Thomas’s past association with Wise did not prevent him from supporting individuals and organizations that the latter opposed. When Thomas joined the CJA is unclear, but he is listed as a CJA supporter in a February 20, 1942, advertisement. 27 Prominent public figures who were members of the Bergson committees typically agreed to have their names and titles placed in the full-page, so-called attack advertisements that were published in major American newspapers. Through this print media campaign, they wanted to increase public
support for Bergson’s proposals. Many of the ads criticized FDR and the State Department, as well as the American Jewish organizations, for failing to take steps to rescue European Jews.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu had persuaded Thomas to speak at a joint meeting of the NZOA and the Jewish State Party. The event took place at the Manhattan Center in New York on November 17, 1942. Reiterating his support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, Thomas held the belief that any Jew who wished to settle in the proposed locale should be able to do so. Thomas clearly stated that the time had come for the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration, the 1917 statement of Britain’s support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 28 Thomas’s comments reaffirmed his longheld position as a Zionist.
Senator Thomas was one of the signatories on the “Proclamation on the Moral Rights of the Stateless and Palestinian Jews,” sponsored by the CJA and published in the New York Times on December 7, 1942. Created by CJA chairman Pierre van Passen, the objective of the advertisement was to publicize Bergson’s proposal for a Jewish army, thereby pushing Congress and the White House into action. Palestinian and stateless European Jews would fight the Nazis alongside Allied forces if the organization emerged. The CJA looked toward America to take the lead and stop the destruction of the Jews of Europe. 29
In May 1943, Thomas received an invitation on CJA letterhead to “extend [his] support to the cause of the forgotten 5,000,000 Jews of Europe.” 30 One month later, word reached Thomas that the Bergson Group had organized an Emergency Conference to “serve as a basis for constructive plans for immediate and practical steps to save European Jewry from imminent slaughter.” 31 The Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe was founded at that conference. Thomas actively supported the conference, as well as the subsequent committee and its objectives.
On October 1, 1943, Thomas contacted Secretary of State Cordell Hull, proposing the creation of an agency to assist in the rescue of the Jews of Europe. Thomas acted on behalf of the
Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe. The proposed agency had been discussed at the Emergency Conference that created the committee in July 1943. The document sent to Hull argued that certain measures needed to be taken to rescue European Jewry. To formulate and coordinate rescue, a new organization composed of “military, economic and diplomatic experts” was required. While the document was written as a resolution that could be introduced in Congress, Thomas asked Hull if an agency could be created by executive order instead. 32 Thomas’s query foreshadowed FDR’s forthcoming action in this regard.
Hull did not respond to Thomas directly. Instead, he referred the matter to Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, who coordinated refugee policy for the State Department. A controversial figure, Long was accused by contemporaries, as well as by a number of subsequent scholars, of being unsympathetic— even anti-Semitic—toward Jews. 33 In a letter to Thomas, Long contended that the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, having been formed at the Evian refugee conference in 1938, was in place “for the purpose of bringing all immediate and practicable relief and rehabilitation to the oppressed peoples of Europe.” 34
The State Department position toward the proposed resolution became clear when Long wrote that “to create a new governmental agency to deal with the refugee problem composed of military, economic and diplomatic experts would appear unwarranted and liable to duplicate functions [that were] being carried out by the [State] Department.” Long concluded his missive to Thomas by stating that “the creation of a new refugee agency at this time would interrupt the relationships already established with the Intergovernmental Committee and might affect adversely the contribution this Government can make towards a solution of the refugee problem.” 35 While Long commented on “relief and rehabilitation” in the letter, he never mentioned actions concerning rescue, which was the major issue raised in the proposition made by Thomas.
On November 9, 1943, identical resolutions were introduced in the US House of Representatives and Senate advising FDR to create a separate agency to manage the refugee crisis. Proposed by Senator Guy Gillette (Iowa, Democrat) and Representative Will Rogers Jr. (California, Democrat), the resolution was commonly referred to as Gillette-Rogers. Thomas cosponsored the Senate version, which was similar to the document he had sent to Hull a month earlier. 36 The House Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the resolution because committee chairman Solomon Bloom (New York, Democrat) wanted to kill it and silence State Department criticism. Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator Tom Connally (Texas, Democrat) did not think hearings were necessary, and he had reservations about the full committee voting on the matter. Connally was ill near the conclusion of the term and agreed to call a special executive session to permit the Foreign Relations Committee to vote on Gillette-Rogers, one day prior to the adjournment of the Senate. In his absence, Thomas brought the matter before the committee, and the result was a unanimous vote in the affirmative. 37
The Gillette-Rogers resolution played a role in the decision made by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to discuss the possibility of relieving the State Department of its responsibility for refugee matters with FDR. Morgenthau’s conference with the president gave rise to the issuance of an Executive Order creating the War Refugee Board (WRB) on January 22, 1944. 38 Some three months after FDR’s announcement, Thomas said he believed the WRB would have difficulty rescuing large numbers of Jews unless Palestine became available as a haven. 39 This idea was clearly consistent with his Zionist views.
While Thomas advocated Bergson Group rescue initiatives, he also strongly supported their proposals that sought to open Palestine to largescale Jewish immigration. This was largely due to the Zionist approach to Jewish issues that he had developed early in his career.
The likelihood of the Allies attempting to rescue substantial numbers of refugees was slim unless a safe haven could be found for them. The British and, more often than not the US State Department, cited the lack of sufficient transportation and an absence of suitable areas for settlement as reasons for not pursuing rescue opportunities. In the opinion of Bergson Group leaders, Palestine provided a logical locale for the settlement of large numbers of Jewish refugees. To that end, they created the American League for a Free Palestine. One of its objectives was to gain the support of the American public for “the freedom and independence of Palestine that constitutes the life and death struggle of the Hebrew nation.” Bergson and his lieutenants asked Senator Thomas to support the organization. He wholeheartedly accepted. 40
The United States Senate approved a resolution introduced by Bergson Group supporter Senator Gillette on February 15, 1944. The legislation, which was originally presented on February 11, 1943, urged the US government to provide food for children in several Axis-occupied countries. Children in Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and France would benefit most from the proposed program. Thomas supported the resolution from its infancy, and Bergson sent Thomas a telegram thanking him for his assistance. 41
The Jewish playwright Ben Hecht and Gabriel Wechsler, the national secretary for Bergson’s Emergency Committee, contacted Thomas on March 29, 1944, concerning a British proposal to prohibit the entry of Jews into Palestine. That people would be excluded from Palestine based solely on “religious belief” was the primary concern Hecht and Wechsler expressed. They asked Thomas to make a “statement for national release” on the matter. He declined, saying, “A statement from me will not add much to the many others—I think it is better to let me do what I can—my own way.” 42 In this instance, Thomas refused to make a public statement on a politically charged issue. Instead, he preferred working behind the scenes.
An address to the Second Emergency Conference to Save the Jewish People of Europe, held on August 8, 1944, provides an example of this behind-the-scenes work. In the address, Thomas made several controversial statements that were censored. His remarks were broadcast via radio since he could not attend the meeting, but the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) suppressed several pertinent comments. For instance, CBS deleted a reference Thomas made to Jews in Hungary, holding visas for entry into Palestine, in which he had remarked:
This creates an entirely new situation in which the responsibility is thrown on our shoulders, and more particularly, on the shoulders of the British government. As an American and as a Christian, I venture to suggest to the British government, as the mandatory for Palestine, that it is their inescapable moral duty to answer the Hungarian government—through the International Red Cross—that every Hebrew will be admitted into Palestine. 43
Clearly, this statement could have been perceived as problematic because of Thomas’s direct attack on British policy.
The censor struck Thomas again in the radio broadcast when he made a reference to the opening of Palestine to largescale Jewish immigration as stated in the Republican and Democrat party platforms. He said: “This represents the will of practically the entire American nation. Certainly, we are all, therefore, for the immediate establishment in Palestine of emergency rescue shelters.” 44 The shelters, also referred to as “free ports,” would serve as locations where refugees could reside for the remainder of the war. After the war, they would be absorbed into a future Jewish state in Palestine or resettled elsewhere. This comment might have been deleted because it suggested considerable support in America for increasing Jewish immigration into Palestine.
CBS also omitted a statement concerning Thomas’s long-standing support for a Jewish army. Thomas remarked that the United Nations (UN) should allow the “Hebrew guerilla bands, who are today fighting the enemy in Europe, together with the 30,000 Hebrews in the Palestinian Regiments, be given a chance to fight in their own name and under their own banner in a Hebrew army.” 45 The United States and Great Britain had opposed the creation of a Jewish army since the origination of the concept several years earlier. That stance might have prompted the deletion of this portion of Thomas’s speech.
Senator Thomas attempted to assist Hungarian Jews in the summer of 1944 as well. The Hungarian government had enacted anti-Jewish legislation in prior years, primarily to appease the Nazis. German forces entered Hungary on March 19, 1944, with orders to ghettoize and deport the Jewish population to Auschwitz. Deportations started on May 15, 1944. Consequently, Hungary lost more than 400,000 of its Jews in less than sixty days. On July 9, 1944, the Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy issued an order halting the deportations. He took this action despite pressure from Germany to do otherwise. By the middle of July 1944, the Hungarian government decided to allow the departure of 7,800 Jews holding immigration visas for Palestine. The proposition was commonly referred to as the Horthy Offer. About one month later, representatives of the American Christian Palestine Committee (ACPC) sent telegrams to Hull and FDR urging them to act in support of the Jews in Hungary. 46 The British government, however, opposed any alteration of its immigration policy for Palestine, which cast doubt upon any possible successes that the proposal might have. Members of the Halutz movement successfully evacuated several hundred of the Jews included in the offer to Romania. Despite no direct involvement, the Bergson Group supported the Hungarian government’s approach. 47
On August 24, 1944, Thomas introduced a Senate resolution to complement the ACPC proposal. He suggested “the immediate establishment of mass emergency rescue shelters in the mandated territory of Palestine.” 48 Gillette and other supporters of the Bergson Group sponsored the resolution. The maneuver’s objective was to “define how . . . rescue” of Jews in Hungary could “be best accomplished.” 49 Thomas and the resolution sponsors stressed that it was “a humanitarian measure [and had] nothing to do with the political status of [Palestine].” 50
Despite good intentions, Thomas and his colleagues had acted too late. Use of customary immigration routes out of Hungary to Palestine was impossible because of the Soviet offensive taking place about the time Thomas brought his resolution before Congress. The Germans removed Horthy from office on October 18, 1944, for announcing that Hungary had signed an agreement with Russia and was withdrawing from the war. In spite of these deep disappointments and the cruel injustices against European Jews in World War II, Thomas remained steadfast in his advocacy of their plight and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Senator Thomas’s support for the European Jews remained firm following the war. He toured Europe between April 22 and May 7, 1945, and witnessed the atrocious conditions endured by those imprisoned in concentration camps. Following his return, Thomas continued to push for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Despite some concerns, he supported the UN partition proposal for Palestine.
Thomas was one of twelve representatives and senators who toured Europe for sixteen days in April and May of 1945. General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General George C. Marshall requested the visit because of the horrific conditions found by Allied forces at the end of World War II, particularly the concentration camps. Thomas and the delegation visited Buchenwald, Nordhausen, and Dachau. They confirmed the atrocities that newspapers had reported for several years. Representative Dewey Short (Missouri, Republican) described the conditions of the camps visited by the group in vivid detail. Short demanded the punishment of all those involved and stated that he would remember “the bestiality that he found in Germany.” 51
What Thomas saw troubled him spiritually. This led him to become philosophical in a radio address he delivered on June 30, 1945, following his return: “Ignorance and oppression, wherever they exist, should be rooted out, for they are a threat to freedom.” 52 Thomas also reflected on the servicemen returning to the states. He hoped they always remembered what they had seen in Europe and that the United States would not become an isolationist nation following the war. Thomas concluded his radio address by saying: “Let us hope that we can demonstrate to others the kind of faith in man that makes democracy a living thing.” 53
Thomas continued to support Jewish organizations in their push to create a Jewish state following the war. To that end, he made a speech before the Mizrachi Zionist Organization of America, an Orthodox group, on June 2, 1946. In a reference to Nazi Germany, Thomas declared that nations that persecute their minority groups “do not thrive.” He then strongly stated, “the Jewish people must have a homeland.” Speaking as a senator, not as a private citizen, Thomas clearly communicated that the United States would “not evade the responsibility of civilization towards the Jewish people.” Furthermore, he reported that America stood “four-square for a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.” 54
Thomas’s comments in the summer of 1946 underscored his commitment to Zionism. On June 12 of that year, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin issued a belated response to President Harry S. Truman’s proposal of July 2, requesting that Britain immediately admit 100,000 displaced European Jews into Palestine. Bevin suggested that the United States made the proposition because it did not want the refugees in New York. The assertion infuriated Thomas. Bevin also cited security concerns as a factor in his opposition to largescale immigration into Palestine. The foreign minister also hinted at the impending need for American troops in Palestine. In response, Thomas said that if a formal request for troops came it should be denied and referred to the UN. He also argued that if the British could not maintain security in Palestine “it [was] proof of her unfitness to continue to hold the Mandate, and indeed another reason for quickly relieving Britain of her trusteeship . . . over Palestine.” 55 Thomas’s commitment to Zionism was evident, and he clearly believed that creating a Jewish state in Palestine was essential.
Elbert D. Thomas. Utah State Historical Society, photograph 13945.
In other matters, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings concerning the UN International Refugee Organization (IRO) on March 1, 1947. The proposed resolution allowed Truman to accept membership in the IRO on behalf of the United States. The package also included an appropriation. Thomas acted as an advocate for Jewish Displaced Persons during the hearing. While questioning Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Thomas asked if the IRO would “help or hinder” the situation relating to the Jews in Germany and what it would have to do with the “Palestine question.” Acheson replied that the IRO would find places to resettle displaced persons and refugees. However, the IRO did “not deal directly with the Palestine problem.” Thomas continued pushing Acheson. He wanted to know specifically if the agreement creating the IRO would assist getting people to Palestine. Acheson answered that the proposal would “not open the door of Palestine.” Consequently, Thomas reacted by stating that the IRO would “not settle or help the Jewish question.” 56 Acheson denied that allegation. In a letter to Zionist leader Emanuel Neumann, Thomas apologized for his “complete failure” at the hearings on the IRO, referring to his failed attempt to use the IRO as a mechanism for the immigration of refugees into Palestine. Nonetheless, Neumann thanked him for his continuing efforts. 57
The problems relating to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine were turned over to the UN in the spring of 1947. This international organization created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) on May 13, 1947, to develop a partition plan. Following weeks of discussion, the UNSCOP submitted a proposal to the UN General Assembly that created an Arab state comprising 4,500 square miles and populated by 804,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. The proposed Jewish state was 5,500 square miles in area and would have a population of 538,000 Jews and 397,000 Arabs. 58
The proposed partition troubled Senator Thomas. He thought it “may and undoubtedly will bring trouble.” 59 To that end, he suggested that the United States should control arms sales to both Jews and Arabs. Thomas held grave concerns about war in Palestine after the partition. In the event his fears materialized, he advised Truman that America should remain neutral, not taking sides in any conflict that might occur. 60
Despite his concerns, Thomas lobbied members of several key undecided UN delegations in an effort to win support for the proposed partition. He and many of his colleagues believed that failure to approve it would leave Palestine in “anarchy and Arab-Jewish conflict.” 61 Additionally, Thomas thought that such a scenario was likely regardless of the outcome of the impending vote in the UN. Public opinion in the United States solidly favored partition. Members of the Senate told undecided ambassadors there would be a “deep appreciation to . . . favorable action in support of [the] Palestine partition.” Finally, the senators appealed to the sense of “international responsibility” that was confronting the undecided ambassadors. 62
The full UN General Assembly ratified the UNSCOP plan on November 29, 1947. The final vote was thirty-three in favor and thirteen opposed. All members dissenting were from Asian or Muslim-majority nations, with the notable exceptions of Cuba and Greece. 63
In the months following passage of the partition, the State and Defense departments, as well as the intelligence community, asked Truman to withdraw support. They believed that Arab opposition, lack of cooperation from the British, and likely hostilities in Palestine could damage US interests in the region. 64 Thomas opposed the idea. He argued that the viability of the UN was at stake if the United States did not stand by its word. He also was concerned that if nations could not cooperate with each other on the Palestine question, the chance of a future solution appeared unlikely. Thomas therefore advocated no retractions of pledged support for the partition.
Armed conflict between Jews and Arabs contributed to the abandonment of the partition plan. The British chose to end their mandate on May 14, 1948. Following this, David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency, announced the formation of the State of Israel. Thomas described the establishment of Israel on May 15, 1948, as “the fulfillment of the desire of nations” at a rally that took place at the Polo Grounds in New York. 65 He also expressed his hope for what Israel could become. Thomas said that Israel “should give the world an example of how freedom should work and what it can do.” 66 He made his remarks alongside Andrei Gromyko, Soviet ambassador to the UN, who received a warm reception from the audience. While the event had radical overtones, Thomas participated despite being asked to do otherwise by representatives of the American Jewish League Against Communism. A cause for which Thomas had fought long and hard for had finally come to fruition.
In summation, Thomas’s 1912 visit to Palestine and subsequent trips to Germany were crucial, and he became a staunch Zionist after 1912. The persecution that he saw in Germany in 1934 and further reports from Wise became motivational factors in the statements of support he made for the embattled Jews of Europe. There is also some wisdom in Bergson’s assessment of Thomas: “this was a religious thing . . . he felt a kind of moral-religious duty to do this.” 67 Thomas believed at an early stage that Palestine was the best location for the resettlement of Jewish refugees. His support for Bergson Group rescue initiatives and proposals to find safe haven for refugees played a role in his Zionist view. He was an advocate for increased Jewish immigration into Palestine during the war. Moreover, he continued to support the founding of a Jewish state after seeing the conditions confronting refugees in Europe following the war.
Senator Thomas spoke out against hate, oppression, racism, anti-Semitism, and bigotry. He believed that embracing those mindsets posed a threat to basic human rights. He also mentioned the importance of charity. These viewpoints were in alignment with Thomas’s religious convictions.
Thomas supported an ideologically diverse group of individuals and organizations, particularly during the pre-war and war years. He worked with the Zionist Rabbi Wise, as well as the non-Zionist Rabbi Lazaron. Speaking before Communist Front groups, such as Ambijan and the JPC, did not pose a problem for him. Thomas had a high level of involvement in Revisionist groups, namely the NZOA and the committees operated by Bergson. It should be noted that Wise had a certain level of hostility toward Bergson. Yet a desire to assist the European Jews was something that these groups and individuals had in common. Ideological differences did not appear to be relevant to Thomas in this situation. His motive for supporting such a variety of groups lies in the fact that he and they shared a yearning to do what was possible to aid the embattled Jews of Europe. It is worth noting that Thomas lost his Senate seat to Republican Wallace F. Bennett in 1950. His connection to known Communist groups proved to be a decisive factor in his defeat. 68
Thomas’s rebuke of Ernest Bevin in 1946 shows his steadfast wish for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Despite feeling uncomfortable regarding the proposed partition of Palestine, Thomas actively campaigned for its passage. When the military and intelligence community advised Truman to rescind US support for partition, Thomas’s endorsement was unwavering. His continued commitment to the Zionist cause played a role in his opposition to forces in the US government who opposed partition. Surely, Senator Thomas was an outspoken supporter of Jewry and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The formation of the State of Israel proved to be the culmination of Thomas’s work to promote ideas touted by an array of Jewish organizations, and the efforts that he made to assist European Jews are admirable and important.
Notes
1. Haruo Iguchi, “Senator Elbert D. Thomas and Japan,” Journal of American and Canadian Studies 25 (January 2007): 75–105.
2. Frank H. Jonas, Politics in the American West (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969), 361.
3. “Elbert D. Thomas, U.S. Official, Dead,” New York Times, February 12, 1953, 27.
4. Yehudit Even-Haim, “Senator Elbert D. Thomas and his Efforts on behalf of European Jewish Refugees and the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1932–1948” (PhD diss., Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 2009), i– xiv [Hebrew]. Even-Haim devoted much of her 2009 thesis to describing why Thomas advocated for Jewish peoples. First, she asserted that Thomas’s activity was politically motivated. Thomas did not wish to offend FDR or “jeopardize his political status” and therefore considered the potential political consequences of his actions. He adopted a “liberal approach” and had “a profound internal moral awareness and recognition of the connection between the Mormon and Jewish religions.” She further argued that throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the senator’s “deep religious belief” drove him to assist Jews.
5. Sharon Kay Smith, “Elbert D. Thomas and America’s Response to the Holocaust” (PhD diss., Brigham Young University, 1991), 87, 197; David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941– 1945 (New York: Pantheon, 1984); Douglas F. Tobler, “The Jews, the Mormons and the Holocaust,” Journal of Mormon History 18, no. 1 (1992): 59–92.
6. Edna Harker Thomas, Diary, July 20, 1934, box 3, Papers of Elbert D. Thomas, Mss B 129, Utah State Historical Society, Salt Lake City, Utah.
7. Smith, “Elbert D. Thomas,” 70–71.
8. William E. Dodd Jr. and Martha Dodd, ed. Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933–1938 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1941), 135–36, 138; Morris S. Lazaron to Elbert D. Thomas, September 13, 1934, and Lazaron to Thomas, September 28, 1934, box 8, fd. 15, Morris S. Lazaron Papers, MS-71, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio.
9. Three newspaper clippings summarizing Thomas’s speeches at the University of Utah, August 27, October 5, 1934, and undated, box 33, fd. 4, University of Utah Extension Division Records, 1912–1955, Special Collections, J. Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Thomas to Lazaron, October 7, 1934, box 8, fd. 15, Lazaron Papers; “Senator Thomas to Lecture on Germany Oct. 5,” Utah Daily Chronicle, October 4, 1934, 1; “Thomas Speaks at Assembly,” Provo (UT) Evening Herald, October 31, 1934, 1; “Thomas Discusses European Matters,” Salt Lake Telegram, November 1, 1934, 22; Franklin S. Harris, Diary, October 31, 1934, vol. 3, 864, MS 1611, LDS Church History Library, Salt Lake City, Utah.
10. Thomas’s association with Communists emerged during the 1938 senatorial campaign without mention of specific groups or individuals. See Linda Muriel Zabriskie, “Resting in the Highest Good: The Conscience of a Utah Liberal” (PhD diss., University of Utah, 2014), 174–83.
11. Henry F. Srebrnik, Dreams of Nationhood: American Jewish Communists and the Soviet Birobidzhan Project, 1924–1951 (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2010), 29– 52, and “An Idiosyncratic Fellow-Traveler: Vilhjalmur Stefansson and the American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidzhan,” East European Jewish Affairs 28, no.1 (1998): 40–42; Ambijan Committee, Birobidjan: A New Hope for Oppressed European Jews (New York: American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, 1936), 14–19; “Jews’ Plight Laid to Trade Crisis,” New York Times, March 12, 1936, 15; Program from a Dinner in Honor of Alexander A. Troyanovsky, March 11, 1936, box 39, fd. 85, Papers of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Mss-196, Rauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.
12. “Hull Gets Plea for Jews,” New York Times, November 21, 1937, 7; “U.S. Urged to Curb Pogroms in Poland,” Daily Worker, November 22, 1937, 2; “Jewish Group Hears Coffee’s Tolerance Plea,” Washington Post, November 20, 1937, 17.
13. Rafael Medoff, The Jews Should Keep Quiet: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, and the Holocaust (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press and Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2019); David Kranzler, “Stephen S. Wise and the Holocaust,” in Reverence, Righteousness and Rahamanut: Essays in Memory of Rabbi Dr. Leo Jung, ed. Jacob J. Schacter (London: J. Aronson, 1992), 155–92; Melvin I. Urofsky, A Voice That Spoke for Justice: The Life and Times of Stephen S. Wise (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982).
14. Thomas to Stephen S. Wise, March 28, 1936, box 27, Thomas Papers.
15. Leo Cooper, In the Shadow of the Polish Eagle: The Poles, the Holocaust and Beyond (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 64–81; William W. Hagen, “Before the ‘Final Solution’: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Political Anti-Semitism in Interwar Germany and Poland,” Journal of Modern History 68, no. 2 (1996): 351–86; Nechama Tec, “Polish Anti-Semitism and the Rescuing of the Jews,” East European Quarterly 20, no. 3 (1986): 301.
16. Wise to Thomas, January 12, 1937, box 27, Thomas Papers.
17. Thomas to Wise, January 15, 1937, Wise to Thomas, February 11, 1937, and Wise to Thomas, June 1, 1937, box 27, Thomas Papers.
18. Wise to Thomas, November 12, 1937, box 27, Thomas Papers.
19. Thomas to Wise, November 19, 1937, box 27, Thomas Papers.
20. Wise to Thomas, February 10, 1938, box 27, Thomas Papers. For information on the Goga government see, Jean Ancel, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, trans. Yaffah Murciano (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press and Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2011), 25–34; Paul A. Shapiro, “Prelude to Dictatorship in Romania: The National Christian Party in Power, December 1937–February 1938,” Canadian-American Slavic Studies 8, no. 1 (1974): 45–88.
21. Wise to Thomas, April 25, 1938, and Thomas to Wise, May 19, 1938, box 37, Thomas Papers.
22. Ambijan Board of Directors to Albert Einstein, October 30, 1941, box 54, fd. 8, Stefansson Papers; “Jews Make War Aid Gifts,” New York Times, December 5, 1941, 2.
23. Vihljalmur Stefansson to Franklin Harris, April 12, 1944, box 61, fd. 20, Stefansson Papers; Malcolm M. Davis to Henry H. Balos, memorandum, May 17, 1944; Press release, May 16, 1944; Public Meeting Report, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Number M-192, May 26, 1944, all in ProQuest History Vault, O.S.S. Collection, file 001717-033-2600-003, accessed July 2, 2019, hv.proquest.com; Harris, Diary, vol. 5, 1371–72; “Senator Thomas Praises Russians,” New York Times, May 17, 1944, 7; Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, 90, pt. 9, A2627–A2628; Srebrnik, Dreams of Nationhood, 108.
24. Ambijan National Conference on Emergency Aid and Reconstruction for the Victims of Nazism (New York: Ambijan Committee, 1944), box 61, fd. 20, Stefansson Papers; “Equality Is Urged for All Minorities,” New York Times, November 26, 1944, 26; Srebrnik, Dreams of Nationhood, 110.
25. Joanna Maura Saidel, “Revisionist Zionism in America: The Campaign to Win American Public Support” (PhD diss., University of New Hampshire, Durham, 1994), 32, 38–43.
26. Judith Tydor Baumel, The “Bergson Boys” and the Origins of Contemporary Zionist Militancy, trans. Deana Ordan (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005); Monty Noam Penkower, “In Dramatic Dissent: The Bergson Boys,” American Jewish History 70, no. 3 (1981): 281–309. For an analysis of the Committee for a Jewish Army and its origins, see Monty Noam Penkower, “Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, Hillel Kook-Peter Bergson and the Campaign for a Jewish Army,” Modern Judaism 31, no. 3 (2011): 332–73.
27. New York Herald Tribune, February 20, 1942.
28. M. I. Wheeler to M. W. Beckelman, November 19, 1942, ProQuest History Vault, O.S.S. Collection, file 001717– 018–0100–0012, accessed July 2, 2019, hv.proquest. com; “Zionists Demand National Status,” New York Times, November 18, 1942, 17; Rafael Medoff, Militant Zionism in America: The Rise and Impact of the Jabotinsky Movement in the United States, 1926–1948 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002), 82.
29. New York Times, December 7, 1942, 14; Monty Noam Penkower, The Holocaust and Israel Reborn: From Catastrophe to Sovereignty (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 66.
30. Peter Bergson to Thomas, May 13, 1943, and Thomas to Bergson, May 15, 1943, box 51, Thomas Papers.
31. Edwin C. Johnson to Thomas, June 5, 1943, box 51, Thomas Papers.
32. Thomas to Cordell Hull, October 1, 1943, State Department Decimal File 840.48 Refugees/4521, National Archives microfilm, M1284, roll 36, Department of State Central Files, RG 59, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, DC.
33. Rafael Medoff, Blowing the Whistle on Genocide: Josiah DuBois, Jr., and the Struggle for a U.S. Response to the Holocaust (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009), 22–23; David S. Wyman and Rafael Medoff, A Race Against Death: Peter Bergson, America, and the Holocaust (New York: The New Press, 2002), 151. For a balanced view of Long, see Richard Breitman and Alan Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 126–45. For another assessment of Long, see Henry L. Feingold, Bearing Witness: How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 171–75.
34. Breckinridge Long to Thomas, undated, 840.48 Refugees/4521, M1284, roll 36.
35. Breckinridge Long to Thomas, undated.
36. For the text of the resolution, see Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, 89, pt. 8, 10932.
37. Minutes of the Washington Emergency Committee, December 20, 1943, Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, HT 11–6/2, Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, accessed June 14, 2016, jabotinsky. org; Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 139; Wyman, Abandonment, 201.
38. For detailed accounts of Gillette-Rogers, see Wyman, Abandonment, 193–206; Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, 137–39; Wyman and Medoff, A Race Against Death, 141–55; and Sarah E. Peck, “The Campaign for an American Response to the Nazi Holocaust, 1942–1945,” Journal of Contemporary History 15, no. 2 (1980): 381–85.
39. Text of an address given by Elbert D. Thomas, April 29, 1944, Jabotinsky Institute, Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, HT 11–5/6, Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, accessed September 10, 2018, jabotinsky.org.
40. Johan J. Smertenko to Thomas, January 14, 1944, box 71, Thomas Papers.
41. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, 90, pt. 2, 1652; Bergson to Thomas, February 16, 1944, box 71, Thomas Papers.
42. Ben Hecht and Gabriel Wechsler to Thomas, March 29, 1944, box 71, Thomas Papers.
43. Text of an address by Elbert D. Thomas, August 8, 1944, Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, HT 11–1/3, Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, accessed December 22, 2018, jabotinsky.org; Bergson to Thomas, August 9, 1944, box 71, Thomas Papers; Newspaper clipping from the New York Post, August 9, 1944, box 71, Thomas Papers. A CBS executive vice president said that the deletions were suggested by an unnamed employee for “reasons that [were] not clear.” “CBS Regrets Editing of Thomas Address,” New York Times, August 10, 1944, 7.
44. Text of an address by Elbert D. Thomas, August 8, 1944.
45. Text of an address by Elbert D. Thomas, August 8, 1944.
46. Howard M. LeSourd to Thomas, August 22, 1944. Copies of proposals submitted to Cordell Hull, August 22, 1944, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 18, 1944, were sent to Thomas, box 71, Thomas Papers.
47. Deborah S. Cornelius, Hungary in World War II: Caught in the Cauldron (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 292–314; Thomas L. Sakmyster, Hungary’s Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1918–1944 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1994), 343–60; Asher Cohen, The Halutz Resistance in Hungary, 1942–1944, trans. Carl Alpert (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1986), 100–103; Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 1113–18; Bela Vago, “The Horthy Offer: A Missed Opportunity for Rescuing Jews in 1944,” in Contemporary Views on the Holocaust, ed. Randolph Braham (Boston: Kluwer- Nijhoff, 1983), 23–46.
48. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, 90, pt. 5, 7261; Guy Gillette to Thomas, telegram, August 24, 1944, box 71, Thomas Papers.
49. Statement by Senator Thomas and authors of a resolution on Emergency Rescue Shelters, August 24, 1944, Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, HT 11–1/6, Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, accessed December 23, 2018, jabotinsky.org.
50. Statement by Senator Thomas and authors of a resolution on Emergency Rescue Shelters, August 24, 1944.
51. Quoted in Nancy Beck Young, Why We Fight: Congress and the Politics of World War II (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2013), 162.
52. Transcript of a radio address by Elbert Thomas, June 30, 1945, box 78, Thomas Papers; see also, Louis Finkelstein, ed., Thirteen Americans: Their Spiritual Autobiographies (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), 155–56.
53. Transcript of a radio address by Elbert Thomas, June 30, 1945.
54. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946, 92, pt. 11, A3326.
55. Radio address by Elbert Thomas, June 18, 1946, American League for a Free Palestine, HT 12–5/1, Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, accessed November 7, 2018, jabotinsky .org.
56. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S.J. Res. 77, A Joint Resolution Providing for Membership and Participation by the United States in the International Refugee Organization and Authorization of an Appropriation Therefor, 80th Cong., 1st sess., March 1, 1947, 24, 25, 26.
57. Thomas to Emanuel Neumann, March 18, 1947; Neumann to Thomas, March 27, 1947, box 114, Thomas Papers.
58. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Knopf, 2007), 279–92.
59. Thomas to Harry S. Truman, November 15, 1947; Truman to Thomas, November 19, 1947, box 114, Thomas Papers. For an analysis of Thomas’s Zionist views in the context of the Thomas–Truman correspondence see Zabriskie, “Resting in the Highest Good,” 246–47.
60. Thomas to Truman, November 15, 1947, box 114, Thomas Papers
61. Thomas and other senators to the UN delegations of Haiti, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Argentina, Columbia, China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, Philippines and Paraguay, undated, box 114, Thomas Papers; V. K. Wellington Koo to Thomas, November 28, 1947; Gonzalo Restrepo Jaramillo to Thomas, November 28, 1947, box 114, Thomas Papers.
62. Thomas and other senators to the UN delegations.
63. Sachar, A History of Israel, 292–95.
64. Zvi Ganin, “The Limits of American Jewish Political Power: America’s Retreat from Partition, November 1947–March 1948,” Jewish Social Studies 39, no. 1–2 (1977): 1–36; Kenneth Ray Bain, The March to Zion: United States Policy and the Founding of Israel (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1979), 182–97; Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 129–46.
65. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, 94, pt. 11, A 3055; see also, “Wallace Hails Polo Grounds Palestine Rally,” Daily Worker, May 14, 1948, 3; “40,000 Say ‘Mazeltov’ to Israel at Rally Here,” Daily Worker, May 17, 1948, 3, 7.
66. “Rally Here Marks New Jewish State,” New York Times, May 16, 1948, 17.
67. Wyman and Medoff, A Race Against Death, 93.
68. Frank H. Jonas, “The Art of Political Dynamiting,” Western Political Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1957): 374–86; Frank H. Jonas, ed., Political Dynamiting (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1970), 83–108. While Jonas wrote about Thomas’s association with Communist groups as a factor in the outcome of the 1950 Senatorial election, his involvement with radical groups that supported Jewish causes is not mentioned.
