A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS
VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM
KENT STATE MASSACRE: A LOOK BACK By Jerry M. Lewis and Thomas R. Hensley
HUNTING AL-QAEDA PART II By Michael Yon
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM FUELING TERRORISM WORLDWIDE By Dr. Joshua Sinai
ONE SURGEON’S VIEWPOINT
By Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army
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CONTENTS
ISSUE 3, MAR 2015 8
HUNTING AL-QAEDA PART II By Michael Yon
18 KENT STATE MASSACRE, A LOOK BACK By Jerry M. Lewis and Thomas R. Hensley 34 A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 36 KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM FUELING TERRORISM WORLDWIDE By Dr. Joshua Sinai
CONTENTS
44 ONE SURGEON’S VIEWPOINT By Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army
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By Michael Yon
HUNTING AL QAEDA
FRONTLINES
8
HUNTING AL QAEDA
PART II
W
SUMMONING FIRE WITHOUT FLINT
By Michael Yon
hen we dropped ramp in the “Mechanics” section of Baqubah, and linked up with Iraqi soldiers, I heard my danger chimes peal. Minutes after we hit the ground— POW!—a shot was fired close by and dust kicked in the air. An Iraqi soldier had managed to accidentally fire a shot from his AK-47. They are getting much better, but not there yet. I am not sure what tipped me off that this particular group
of Iraqi soldiers wasn’t entirely squared-away, but that shot only underscored the feeling. Back in 2005, I would seek cover whenever Iraqi Army approached. It’s not like that in 2007; they are becoming a real army, but there is still room for improvement. We headed out to the palm groves next to the Diyala River. Along the way, the Alpha-company commander, Captain Sheldon Morris , kept everyone moving in the right direction. Back at the COP, Captain Morris is quick to make soldiers laugh, but out here he’s all business. Captain Morris spotted an oxygen factory. “Hmmmm….” he said (which made me laugh) but then he closed in to have a look. Morris was clear that his job was to accomplish the mission and secure the population even if it meant losing himself or his people. Mission comes first.
By Michael Yon
HUNTING AL QAEDA
FRONTLINES
10
We walked and walked, and soldiers kept asking me if I was okay. Especially one soldier named Staff Sergeant Chuomg Le, who kept asking if the heat was getting to me. I kept saying I would be carrying him before he would be carrying me. He just laughed. Other soldiers said Le is a physical animal. But one of the tricks I’ve learned to combat reporting is you don’t have to be tougher than all the soldiers, just tougher than one.
ed.” It’s all smoke and mirrors. I drink water like a fish and dive for every sliver of shade, thinking of the body like a battery that gets drained quickly by the heat and sun. With only so much juice, taking every sliver of shade, even if it’s only for 30 seconds, and pounding that water continuously, all adds up to a longer charge. Al Qaeda still lurks in the area, so the farmers were happy to see us. One woman said that seeing the Army out there was a blessing from God, which made the soldiers happy. There’s not a lot
Date palms: food every where. A perfect place for al Qaeda, where a savage enemy could live, terrorizing the people, making slaves of them, with a steady supply of food nearby and ready access to bombmaking materials. When the first one collapses, and they stop to stick an IV into him, you also get a break. In fact, the next day three soldiers would collapse from the heat during some fighting, and two of them were so dehydrated that their veins collapsed, proving once again that you don’t have to be tougher than everyone, just the guys who don’t drink enough water. If you can beat those guys, you are like the Lion King for reporters. Soldiers say, “I can’t believe the photographer is still standing when sergeant so-and-so face-plant-
of happiness to be had here, but the soldiers respond when people show gratitude. It charges their batteries. And they really love those cards from home where kindergartners and first graders ask all kinds of funny questions like, “Is it hot in the desert?” Yes, a little bit. But along the waterways in Iraq, such as here next to the Diyala River, it’s hot and humid. Practically steaming. Even the mosquitoes must sweat here. Much food was growing all around us, and I was getting hungry, but for some reason I felt a twinge of danger. Couldn’t quite put my finger on it. Just a general feeling that something unexpected might happen.
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FRONTLINES
HUNTING AL QAEDA
By Michael Yon
Date palms: food every where. A perfect place for al Qaeda, where a savage enemy could live, terrorizing the people, making slaves of them, with a steady supply of food nearby and ready access to bomb-making materials.
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I watched during the Senate hearings on 11 September 07 as some Senators attempted to grill General Petraeus, insinuating that the war in Iraq was a distraction from the fight against al Qaeda. It was clearly that during the initial invasion, but not today. These photos were taken at the center of what al Qaeda claimed to be their worldwide headquarters. Listening to some of the Senators’ questions, the true magnitude of the gulf between what is happening in Iraq and what people in America think is happening in Iraq became apparent. Some Senators clearly had been doing their homework and were asking smart questions--if negative at times-but others seemed completely ignorant of the ground situation here, which adds nothing meaningful to the debate. During the mission, we kept hearing shots maybe a quarter mile away, and there also were some large bombs exploding in the further distance. Voices over the radio said some were just IEDs getting blown up.
The medics kept working.
Eventually we worked our way through a village then down the Diyala River, facing the river which flows from left to right, toward Baghdad. The Diyala is an old river without great elevation change in this area, and so it twists and bows several times in and through Baqubah. All along the river, as with all Iraqi waterways, people suck out the water like human mosquitoes, sucking out far more than they need, wasting the water, and complaining about the people upriver who do the same.
We took a break beside the river. Iraq Soldiers from the 5th IA started spray painting the outside wall of an Iraqi house to show they had been there. Captain Morris heard the hiss of the spray paint, and came around the corner, fit to be and told them to stop painting people’s property! CPL Matt Desmond briefing othertied, 2 Para soldiers
In the groves: The gear on this soldier’s back is called the “breach kit,” and it’s used to open just about everything.
Before the war, our people had no street credibility in Iraq. Iraqis thought American soldiers were soft, and that the body armor was a type of personal air conditioner. But if the Iraqis knew back then what they know now about American willingness to suffer and fight, it’s doubtful that Saddam would have taunted an angry America.
Although the Iraqi soldiers are nearly always embarrassed when an American like Captain Morris bolts around and tells them to cut out the idiocy, the most interesting dynamic is how it also engenders respect from the Iraqi soldiers for the Americans. Before the war, our people had no street credibility in Iraq. Iraqis thought American soldiers were soft, and that the body armor was a type of personal air conditioner. But if the Iraqis knew back then what they know now about American willingness to suffer and fight, it’s doubtful that Saddam would have taunted an angry America. Yet today, knowing our soldiers to be actually aggressive and able killers when the switch gets flipped to ON, they also see how our people are more competent street fighters than the Iraqi Army, even without the high-tech tools. The man-to-man respect is there. And so when someone like Captain Morris points out to Iraqi soldiers something they already know they are doing wrong (like painting the wall of someone’s house, for instance), their respect for Americans grows. Day after day, Iraqis come to Americans asking for justice, because they see countless thousands of daily actions by people like Captain Sheldon Morris. Our military is a powerful tribe. The break was over. We kept hearing fighting, and it seemed to be roaming around slightly downriver. Captain Morris was monitoring comms. The Bradleys that had dropped us off had been watching some activity in the area of the fighting. At 0855, for instance, they spotted a man, wearing all black, running off with an AK-47. We continued the clearance operation. At about 0905, small arms fire was coming from the same area where the man in black had run off with the AK. We continued the clearing, but the light fighting in that area also continued. At 0959, Apache 27 (one our Bradleys) reported a silver van carrying several men. Apache 27 saw the men drop off a large white sack on Route Burga, a few hundred meters to our south, and then the van drove west. Route Burga had not been cleared (not everything was cleared during Operation Arrowhead Ripper), and so might be riddled with IEDs. In fact, what we didn’t know was that some 1920s were in a firefight
FRONTLINES
HUNTING AL QAEDA
By Michael Yon
with what they later would say was al Qaeda. I heard a report that at least one 1920s guy was dead already, but we didn’t know this yet.
14
At around 1005 we started moving to contact (meaning: trying to engage in the fight). We walked south, moving toward the firing, linking up with SSG Michael’s squad and the IA with him. By now the fighting was a few hundreds meters away. All small arms. I didn’t hear any explosions. Some civilians were caught in the crossfire and a woman got shot in the neck and was slightly wounded, though we did not yet know this. The fighting was light: may-
cross the open area in an inverted wedge formation. We were accompanied by dozens of Iraqi soldiers from the 5th IA, and they recognized the signal and also got into the wedge. These Iraqi soldiers were vastly improved from 2005. As we crossed the field, the silver van started driving in front of us at about 1020. We could see it driving from our right to our left on Route Burga a couple hundred meters to our front. The van was well within accurate small arms range. I was unaware of the radio chatter about the armed men in the van, and the white sack; so to me it was just a van that was driving near us with four men, while a firefight was going on nearby. But to Captain Mor-
American soldiers closed in. This was fantastically dangerous. I remember wondering what their families might think about them moving in to take the guys alive, when this could cost American lives. How would I write about such soldiers should they get blown up by a suicide vest planted to specifically take advantage of our soldiers’ sense of decency? be 1 PKC machinegun and 4-5 AKs. But ris and the others hearing the chatter, and to often big fights start as other elements, those soldiers in the Bradleys peering with exfriendly and enemy, are drawn in. cellent optics, the men in the van were clearly armed and also were not displaying any sort We approached a wide open field of recognition signal. The van was in area just before Burga and we could now where there was fighting going on, and see Route Burga perhaps a couple hun- where American forces had killed about 7 dred yards in front of us. Staff Sergeant during the past 24 hours, and where we Le gave the hand signal for everyone to knew for a “fact” that al Qaeda was.
By Michael Yon
HUNTING AL QAEDA
FRONTLINES
16
My video had been running for several minutes. One of the Bradleys saw what he thought were bullets kicking up in our direction, as if someone were shooting at us, or at least in our direction. But at this time--the silver van now nearly directly in front of us--I heard no shots nor saw any contact. As the van closed the range at about 200 meters, our guys Much food was growing all around us, and I was getting hungry, but for some reason I felt a twinge of danger. Couldn’t quite put my finger on it. Just a general fired several warnfeeling that something unexpected might happen. ing shots. The van sped up. The Soldiers rained heavy small arms fire and were kicking up dust, diers stayed back with her and for security and Corporal Antony Johnson fired for the rest of us as we kept closing in. We a 40mm grenade, but the van just were now on Route Burga, which had not kept speeding away when --BOOM! been cleared. Our guys could all be blown BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! -- a Bradley to pieces, but they kept moving forward. fired 4 shots from the 25mm cannon. Al Qaeda operatives often wear suicide All four high explosive rounds impacted and the van careened off the road vests, and given the way al Qaeda fights, our guys would have been justified in calland crashed out of site. ing Apache 27 forward and ordering it to Apache 27 saw a woman rush out obliterate the van. Clearly the guys were to the van and scarf up an AK and run armed and those who were still alive were off into a palm grove. I was beside SSG also still combatants. But instead, at great Le when he had her in his sights, but risk to their own lives, our guys moved forhe did not fire, even though she was ward toward the van. now considered an armed combatAmerican soldiers closed in. This was ant. As we moved out toward the van, there were reports that some of the fantastically dangerous. I remember wonguys had gone into a house. Our guys dering what their families might think were going to attack the house, but about them moving in to take the guys that report apparently was wrong. At alive, when this could cost American lives. the same time, the woman who had How would I write about such soldiers been shot in the neck by someone should they get blown up by a suicide vest else came running to us and screaming planted to specifically take advantage of for help. The medic went to work on our soldiers’ sense of decency? her, but it was fortunately only a flesh All four men were kitted out, and two wound and she was pretty tough and just wanted to sit down. A few sol- AKs were found. One was on the scene,
and the woman had run off with the other. The Soldiers would have been completely justified in shooting the woman the moment she picked up that weapon: she was then a combatant on the battlefield. Instead, other American soldiers entered her home, got the AK and left her and the family alone. Before the medics could go to work, the four guys who had been hit had to be searched. Hand grenades could be in every pocket. Iraqi men approached waving a white flag, which often has been used as a ploy to attack our people. The one without a shirt had a bandage on his left hand. (I would recognize him in tomorrow’s fighting
by that hand.) They wanted to tell us that the men who had been shot were their friends.
others received only minor flesh wounds. The next day we would go into the same area with Iraqi Army soldiers and 1920s irreguThe men were detained, and lars, and we would see the 1920s the treatment may look rough here, in action, as they got attacked by but in actuality, they were treat- an IED and engaged their enemy ed well, given ice cold water, and in a serious firefight. brought back to COP White Castle. American soldiers closed in. They continued to be treated This was fantastically dangerous. decently but firmly at COP White I remember wondering what their Castle, where one soldier noticed families might think about them that this man was in pain, so his moving in to take the guys alive, flex cuffs were removed and he was when this could cost American told to keep his hands behind his lives. How would I write about back. After some hours, they were such soldiers should they get blown up by a suicide vest plantall released. ed to specifically take adIt turned out that the two men vantage of our soldiers’ who died were 1920s men. Two sense of decency?
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KENT STATE
BY JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
HISTORY
THE MAY 4, 1970
SHOOTINGS
AT KENT STATE UNIVERSITY:
THE SEARCH FOR HISTORICAL ACCURACY
O
By JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
n May 4, l970 members of the Ohio National Guard fired into a crowd of Kent State University demonstrators, killing four and wounding nine Kent State students. The impact of the shootings was dramatic. The event triggered a nationwide student strike that forced hundreds of colleges and universities to close. H. R. Haldeman, a top aide to President Richard Nixon, suggests the shootings had a direct impact on national politics. In The Ends of Power, Haldeman (1978) states that the shootings at Kent State began the slide into Watergate, eventually destroying the Nixon administration. Beyond the direct effects of the May 4th, the shootings have certainly come to symbolize the deep political and social divisions that so sharply divided the country during the Vietnam War era.
BY JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
HISTORY
KENT STATE
20
In the nearly three decades since May 4, l970, a voluminous literature has developed analyzing the events of May 4th and their aftermath. Some books were published quickly, providing a fresh but frequently superficial or inaccurate analysis of the shootings (e.g., Eszterhas and Roberts, 1970; Warren, 1970; Casale and Paskoff, 1971; Michener, 1971; Stone, 1971; Taylor et al., 1971; and Tompkins and Anderson, 1971). Numerous additional books have been published in subsequent years (e.g., Davies, 1973; Hare, 1973; Hensley and Lewis, 1978; Kelner and Munves, 1980; Hensley, 1981; Payne, 1981; Bills, 1988; and Gordon, 1997). These books have the advantage of a broader historical perspective than the earlier books, but no single book can be considered the definitive account of the events and aftermath of May 4, l970 at Kent State University.(1) Despite the substantial literature which exists on the Kent State shootings, misinformation and misunderstanding continue to surround the events of May 4. For example, a prominent college-level United States history book by Mary Beth Norton et al. (1994), which is also used in high school advanced placement courses,(2) contains a picture of the shootings of May 4 accompanied by the following summary of events: “In May 1970, at Kent State University in Ohio, National Guardsmen confronted student antiwar protestors with a tear gas barrage. Soon afterward, with no provocation, soldiers opened fire into a group of fleeing students. Four young people were killed, shot in the back, including two women who had been walking to class.” (Norton et al., 1994, p. 732) Unfortunately, this short description contains four factual errors: (1) some degree of provocation did exist; (2) the students were not fleeing when the Guard initially opened fire; (3) only one of the four students who died, William Schroeder, was shot in the back; and (4) one female student, Sandy Schreuer, had been walking to class, but the other female, Allison Krause, had been part of the demonstration. This article is an attempt to deal with the
historical inaccuracies that surround the May 4th shootings at Kent State University by providing high school social studies teachers with a resource to which they can turn if they wish to teach about the subject or to involve students in research on the issue. Our approach is to raise and provide answers to twelve of the most frequently asked questions about May 4 at Kent State. We will also offer a list of the most important questions involving the shootings which have not yet been answered satisfactorily. Finally, we will conclude with a brief annotated bibliography for those wishing to explore the subject further.
WHY WAS THE OHIO NATIONAL GUARD CALLED TO KENT? The decision to bring the Ohio National Guard onto the Kent State University campus was directly related to decisions regarding American involvement in the Vietnam War. Richard Nixon was elected president of the United States in 1968 based in part on his promise to bring an end to the war in Vietnam. During the first year of Nixon’s presidency, America’s involvement in the war appeared to be winding down. In late April of 1970, however, the United States invaded Cambodia and widened the Vietnam War. This decision was announced on national television and radio on April 30, l970 by President Nixon, who stated that the invasion of Cambodia was designed to attack the headquarters of the Viet Cong, which had been using Cambodian territory as a sanctuary.
In late April of 1970, however, the United States invaded Cambodia and widened the Vietnam War. This decision was announced on national television and radio on April 30, l970 by President Nixon, who stated that the invasion of Cambodia was designed to attack the headquarters of the Viet Cong, which had been using Cambodian territory as a sanctuary. Protests occurred the next day, Friday, May 1, across United States college campuses where anti-war sentiment ran high.
BY JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
HISTORY
KENT STATE
22
Protests occurred the next day, Friday, May 1, across United States college campuses where anti-war sentiment ran high. At Kent State University, an anti-war rally was held at noon on the Commons, a large, grassy area in the middle of campus which had traditionally been the site for various types of rallies and demonstrations. Fiery speeches against the war and the Nixon administration were given, a copy of the Constitution was buried to symbolize the murder of the Constitution because Congress had never declared war, and another rally was called for noon on Monday, May 4. Friday evening in downtown Kent began peacefully with the usual socializing in the bars, but events quickly escalated into a violent confrontation between protestors and local police. The exact causes of the disturbance are still the subject of debate, but bonfires were built in the streets of downtown Kent, cars were stopped, police cars were hit with bottles, and some store windows were broken. The entire Kent
police force was called to duty as well as officers from the county and surrounding communities. Kent Mayor Leroy Satrom declared a state of emergency, called Governor James Rhodes’ office to seek assistance, and ordered all of the bars closed. The decision to close the bars early increased the size of the angry crowd. Police eventually succeeded in using tear gas to disperse the crowd from downtown, forcing them to move several blocks back to the campus. The next day, Saturday, May 2, Mayor Satrom met with other city officials and a representative of the Ohio National Guard who had been dispatched to Kent. Mayor Satrom then made the decision to ask Governor Rhodes to send the Ohio National Guard to Kent. The mayor feared further disturbances in Kent based upon the events of the previous evening, but more disturbing to the mayor were threats that had been made to downtown businesses and city officials as well as rumors that radical revolutionaries were in Kent to destroy the city and the university. Satrom was fearful that local forces would be inadequate to meet the potential disturbances, and thus about 5 p.m. he called the Governor’s office to make an official request for assistance from the Ohio National Guard.
WHAT HAPPENED ON THE KENT STATE UNIVERSITY CAMPUS ON SATURDAY MAY 2 AND SUNDAY MAY 3 AFTER THE GUARDS ARRIVED ON CAMPUS? Members of the Ohio National Guard were already on duty in Northeast Ohio, and thus they were able to be mobilized quickly to move to Kent. As the Guard arrived in Kent at about 10 p.m., they encountered a tumultuous scene. The wooden ROTC building adjacent to the Commons was ablaze and would eventually burn to the ground that evening, with well over 1000 demonstrators surrounding the building. Controversy
BY JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
HISTORY
KENT STATE
24
continues to exist regarding who was responsible for setting fire to the ROTC building, but radical protestors were assumed to be responsible because of their actions in interfering with the efforts of firemen to extinguish the fire as well as cheering the burning of the building. Confrontations between Guardsmen and demonstrators continued into the night, with tear gas filling the campus and numerous arrests being made. Sunday, May 3rd was a day filled with contrasts. Nearly 1000 Ohio National Guardsmen occupied the campus, making it appear like a military war zone. The day was warm and sunny, however, and students frequently talked amicably with Guardsmen. Ohio Governor James Rhodes flew to Kent on Sunday morning, and his mood was anything but calm. At a press conference, he issued a provocative statement calling
campus protestors the worst type of people in America and stating that every force of law would be used to deal with them. Rhodes also indicated that he would seek a court order declaring a state of emergency. This was never done, but the widespread assumption among both Guard and University officials was that a state of martial law was being declared in which control of the campus resided with the Guard rather than University leaders and all rallies were banned. Further confrontations between protestors and guardsmen occurred Sunday evening, and once again rocks, tear gas, and arrests characterized a tense campus.
WHAT TYPE OF RALLY WAS HELD AT NOON ON MAY 4? At the conclusion of the anti-war rally on Friday, May 1, student protest leaders had called for another rally to be held on the Commons at noon on Monday, May 4. Although University officials had attempted on the morn-
ing of May 4 to inform the campus that the rally was prohibited, a crowd began to gather beginning as early as 11 a.m. By noon, the entire Commons area contained approximately 3000 people. Although estimates are inexact, probably about 500 core demonstrators were gathered around the Victory Bell at one end of the Commons, another 1000 people were “cheerleaders” supporting the active demonstrators, and an additional 1500 people were spectators standing around the perimeter of the Commons. Across the Commons at the burnedout ROTC building stood about 100 Ohio National Guardsmen carrying lethal M-1 military rifles.
Substantial consensus exists that the active participants in the rally were primarily protesting the presence of the Guard on campus, although a strong anti-war sentiment was also present. Little evidence exists as to who were the leaders of the rally and what activities were planned, but initially the rally was peaceful. WHO MADE THE DECISION TO BAN THE RALLY OF MAY 4?
widespread consensus existed that the rally should be prohibited because of the tensions that existed and the possibility that violence would again occur. Canterbury further testified that Kent State President Robert White had explicitly told Canterbury that any demonstration would be highly dangerous. In contrast, White testified that he could recall no conversation with Canterbury regarding banning the rally. The decision to ban the rally can most accurately be traced to Governor Rhodes’ statements on Sunday, May 3 when he stated that he would be seeking a state of emergency declaration from the courts. Although he never did this, all officials -- Guard, University, Kent -- assumed that the Guard was now in charge of the campus and that all rallies were illegal. Thus, University leaders printed and distributed on Monday morning 12,000 leaflets indicating that all rallies, including the May 4th rally scheduled for noon, were prohibited as long as the Guard was in control of the campus.
WHAT EVENTS LED DIRECTLY TO THE SHOOTINGS?
Conflicting evidence exists regarding who was responsible for the decision to ban the noon rally of May 4th. At the 1975 federal civil trial, General Robert CanShortly before noon, General Canterbury made terbury, the highest official of the Guard, testified that the decision to order the demonstrators to disperse.
BY JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
HISTORY
KENT STATE
26
A Kent State police officer standing by the Guard made an announcement using a bullhorn. When this had no effect, the officer was placed in a jeep along with several Guardsmen and driven across the Commons to tell the protestors that the rally was banned and that they must disperse.
This was met with angry shouting and rocks, and the jeep retreated. Canterbury then ordered his men to load and lock their weapons, tear gas canisters were fired into the crowd around the Victory Bell, and the Guard began to march across the Commons to disperse the rally. The protestors moved up a steep hill, known as Blanket Hill, and then down the other side of the hill onto the Prentice Hall parking lot as well as an adjoining practice football field. Most of the Guardsmen followed the students directly and soon found themselves somewhat trapped on the practice football field because it was surrounded by a fence. Yelling and rock throwing reached a peak as the Guard remained on the field for about ten minutes. Several Guardsmen could be seen huddling together, and some Guardsmen knelt and pointed their guns, but no weapons were shot at this time. The Guard then began retracing their steps from the practice football field back up Blanket Hill. As they arrived at the top of the hill, twenty-eight of the more than seventy Guardsmen turned suddenly and fired their rifles and
BY JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
HISTORY
KENT STATE
28
pistols. Many guardsmen fired into the air or the ground. However, a small portion fired directly into the crowd. Altogether between 61 and 67 shots were fired in a 13 second period.
HOW MANY DEATHS AND INJURIES OCCURRED? Four Kent State students died as a result of the firing by the Guard. The closest student was Jeffrey Miller, who was shot in the mouth while standing in an access road leading into the Prentice Hall parking lot, a distance of approximately 270 feet from the Guard. Allison Krause was in the Prentice Hall parking lot; she was 330 feet from the Guardsmen and was shot in the left side of her body. William Schroeder was 390 feet from the Guard in the Prentice Hall parking lot when he was shot in the left side of his back. Sandra Scheuer was also about 390 feet from the Guard in the Prentice Hall parking lot when a bullet pierced the left front side of her neck.
Nine Kent State students were wounded in the 13 second fusillade. Most of the students were in the Prentice Hall parking lot, but a few were on the Blanket Hill area. Joseph Lewis was the student closest to the Guard at a distance of about sixty feet; he was standing still with his middle finger extended when bullets struck him in the right abdomen and left lower leg. Thomas Grace was also approximately 60 feet from the Guardsmen and was wounded in the left ankle. John Cleary was over 100 feet from the Guardsmen when he was hit in the upper left chest. Alan Canfora was 225 feet from the Guard and was struck in the right wrist. Dean Kahler was the most seriously wounded of the nine students. He was struck in the small of his back from approximately 300 feet and was permanently paralyzed from the waist down. Douglas Wrentmore was wounded in the right knee from a distance of 330 feet. James Russell was struck in the right thigh and right forehead at a distance of 375 feet. Robert Stamps was almost 500 feet from the line of fire when he was wounded in the right buttock. Donald Mackenzie was the student the farthest from the Guardsmen at a distance of almost 750 feet when he was hit in the neck.
WHY DID THE GUARDSMEN FIRE? The most important question associated with the events of May 4 is why did members of the Guard fire into a crowd of unarmed students? Two quite different answers have been advanced to this question: (1) the Guardsmen fired in self-defense, and the shootings were therefore justified and (2) the Guardsmen were not in immediate danger, and therefore the shootings were unjustified. The answer offered by the Guardsmen is that they fired because they were in fear of their lives. Guardsmen testified before numerous investigating commissions as well as in federal court that they felt the demonstrators were advancing on them in such a way as to pose a serious and immediate threat to the safety of the Guardsmen, and they therefore had to fire in self-defense. Some authors (e.g., Michener, 1971 and Grant and Hill, 1974) agree with this assessment. Much more importantly, federal criminal and civil trials have accepted the position of the Guardsmen. In a 1974 federal criminal trial, District Judge Frank Battisti
dismissed the case against eight Guardsmen indicted by a federal grand jury, ruling at mid-trial that the government’s case against the Guardsmen was so weak that the defense did not have to present its case. In the much longer and more complex federal civil trial of 1975, a jury voted 9-3 that none of the Guardsmen were legally responsible for the shootings. This decision was appealed, however, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a new trial had to be held because of the improper handling of a threat to a jury member. The legal aftermath of the May 4 shootings ended in January of 1979 with an out-of-court settlement involving a statement signed by 28 defendants(3) as well as a monetary settlement, and the Guardsmen and their supporters view this as a final vindication of their position. The financial settlement provided $675,000 to the wounded students and the parents of the students who had been killed. This money was paid by the State of Ohio rather than by any Guardsmen, and the amount equaled what the State estimated it would cost to go to trial again. Perhaps most importantly, the statement signed by members of the Ohio National Guard was viewed by them to be a declaration of regret, not an apology or an admission of wrongdoing: In retrospect, the tragedy of May 4, 1970 should not have occurred. The students may have believed that they were right in continuing their mass protest in response to the Cambodian invasion, even though this protest followed the posting and reading by the university of an order to ban rallies and an order to disperse. These orders have since been determined by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to have been lawful. Some of the Guardsmen on Blanket Hill, fearful and anxious from prior events, may have believed in their own minds that their lives were in danger. Hindsight suggests that another method would have resolved the confrontation. Better ways must be found to deal with such a confrontation. We devoutly wish that a means had been found to avoid the May 4th events culminating in the Guard shoot-
ings and the irreversible deaths and injuries. We deeply regret those events and are profoundly saddened by the deaths of four students and the wounding of nine others which resulted. We hope that the agreement to end the litigation will help to assuage the tragic memories regarding that sad day. A starkly different interpretation to that of the Guards’ has been offered in numerous other studies of the shootings, with all of these analyses sharing the common viewpoint that primary responsibility for the shootings lies with the Guardsmen. Some authors (e.g., Stone, 1971; Davies, 1973; and Kelner and Munves, 1980) argue that the Guardsmen’s lives were not in danger. Instead, these authors argue that the evidence shows that certain members of the Guard conspired on the practice football field to fire when they reached the top of Blanket Hill. Other authors (e.g., Best, 1981 and Payne, 1981) do not find sufficient evidence to accept the conspiracy theory, but they also do not find the Guard self-defense theory to be plausible. Experts who find the Guard primarily responsible find themselves in agreement with the conclusion of the Scranton Commission (Report , 1970, p. 87): “The indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.”
WHAT HAPPENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SHOOTINGS? While debate still remains about the extent to which the Guardsmen’s lives were in danger at the moment they opened fire, little doubt can exist that their lives were indeed at stake in the immediate aftermath of the shootings. The 13 second shooting that resulted in four deaths and nine wounded could have been followed by an even more tragic and bloody confrontation. The nervous and fearful Guardsmen retreated back to the Commons, facing a large and hostile crowd which realized that the Guard had live ammunition and
BY JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
HISTORY
KENT STATE
30
had used it to kill and wound a large number of people. In their intense anger, many demonstrators were willing to risk their own lives to attack the Guardsmen, and there can be little doubt that the Guard would have opened fire again, this time killing a much larger number of students. Further tragedy was prevented by the actions of a number of Kent State University faculty marshals, who had organized hastily when trouble began several days earlier. Led by Professor Glenn Frank, the faculty members pleaded with National Guard leaders to allow them to talk with the demonstrators, and then they begged the students not to risk their lives by confronting the Guardsmen. After about twenty minutes of emotional pleading, the marshals convinced the students to leave the Commons. Back at the site of the shootings, ambulances had arrived and emergency medical attention had been given to the students who had not died immediately. The ambulances formed a screaming procession as they rushed the victims of the shootings to the local hospital. The University was ordered closed immediately, first by President Robert White and then indefinitely by Portage County Prosecutor Ronald Kane under an injunction from Common Pleas Judge Albert Caris. Classes did not resume until the
Summer of 1970, and faculty members engaged in a wide variety of activities through the mail and off-campus meetings that enabled Kent State students to finish the semester.
WHAT IS THE STORY BEHIND THE PULITZER PRIZE WINNING PHOTO OF THE YOUNG WOMAN CRYING OUT IN HORROR OVER THE DYING BODY OF ONE OF THE STUDENTS? A photograph of Mary Vecchio, a fourteen year old runaway, screaming over the body of Jeffery Miller appeared on the front pages of newspapers and magazines throughout the country, and the photographer, John Filo, was to win a Pulitzer Prize for the picture. The photo has taken on a life and importance of its own. This analysis looks at the photo, the photographer, and the impact of the photo. The Mary Vecchio picture shows her on one knee screaming over Jeffrey Miller’s body. Mary told one of us that she was calling for help because she felt she could do nothing (Personal Interview, 4/4/94). Miller is lying on the tarmac of the Prentice Hall parking lot. One student is standing near the Miller body closer than Vecchio. Four students are seen in the immediate background. John Filo, a Kent State photography major in 1970, continues to works as a professional newspaper photographer and editor. He was near the Prentice Hall parking lot when the Guard fired. He saw bullets hitting the ground, but he did not take cover because he thought the bullets were blanks. Of course, blanks cannot hit the ground.
WHAT WAS THE LONG-TERM FACULTY RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTINGS? Three hours after the shootings Kent State closed and was not to open for six weeks as a viable university. When it resumed classes in the Summer of 1970, its faculty was charged with three new responsibilities, their residues remaining today. First, we as a University faculty had to bring aid and comfort to our own. This began earlier on with faculty trying to finish the academic quarter with a reasonable amount of academic integrity. It had ended about at mid-term examinations. However,
the faculty voted before the week was out to help students complete the quarter in any way possible. Students were advised to study independently until they were contacted by individual professors. Most of the professors organized their completion of courses around papers, but many gave lectures in churches and in homes in the community of Kent and surrounding communities. For example, Norman Duffy, an award winning teacher, gave off-campus chemistry lectures and tutorial sessions in Kent and Cleveland. His graduate students made films of laboratory sessions and mailed them to students. Beyond helping thousands of students finish their courses, there were 1900 students as well who needed help with gradation. Talking to students about courses allowed the faculty to do some counseling about the shootings, which helped the faculty as much in healing as it did students. Second, the University faculty was called upon to conduct research about May 4 communicating the results of this research through teaching and traditional writing about the tragedy. Many responded and created a solid body of scholarship as well as an extremely useful archive contributing to a wide range of activities in Summer of 1970 including press interviews and the Scranton Commission. Third, many saw as one of the faculty’s challenges to develop alternative forms of protest and conflict resolution to help prevent tragedies such as the May 4 shootings and the killings at Jackson State ten days after Kent State.
WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MAY 4 SHOOTINGS? Although we have attempted in this article to answer many of the most important and frequently asked questions about the May 4th shootings, our responses have sometimes been tentative because many important questions remain unanswered. It thus seems important to ask what are the most significant questions which yet remain unanswered about the May 4th events. These questions could serve as the basis for research projects by students who are interested in studying the shootings in greater detail. (1) Who was responsible for the violence in downtown Kent and on the Kent State campus in the three days prior to May 4th?
As an important part of this question, were “outside agitators” primarily responsible? Who was responsible for setting fire to the ROTC building? (2) Should the Guard have been called to Kent and Kent State University? Could local law enforcement personnel have handled any situations? Were the Guard properly trained for this type of assignment?
BY JERRY M. LEWIS and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
HISTORY
KENT STATE
32
(3) Did the Kent State University administration respond appropriately in their reactions to the demonstrations and with Ohio political officials and Guard officials? (4) Would the shootings have been avoided if the rally had not been banned? Did the banning of the rally violate First Amendment rights? (5) Did the Guardsmen conspire to shoot students when they huddled on the practice football field? If not, why did they fire? Were they justified in firing? (6) Who was ultimately responsible for the events of May 4, l970?
WHY SHOULD WE STILL BE CONCERNED ABOUT MAY 4, 1970 AT KENT STATE? In Robert McNamara’s (1995) book, “In Retrospect:The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam” is a way to begin is an illustration of the this process. In it he says that United States policy towards Vietnam was “... terribly wrong and we owe it to future generations to explain why.” The May 4 shootings at Kent State need to be remembered for several reasons. First, the shootings have come to symbolize a great American tragedy which occurred at the height of the Vietnam War era, a period in which the nation found itself deeply divided both politically and culturally. The poignant picture of Mary Vecchio kneeling in agony over Jeffrey Miller’s body, for example, will remain forever as a reminder of the day when the Vietnam War came home to America. If the Kent State shootings will continue to be such a powerful symbol, then it is certainly important that Americans have a realistic view of the facts associated with this event.
Second, May 4 at Kent State and the Vietnam War era remain controversial even today, and the need for healing continues to exist. Healing will not occur if events are either forgotten or distorted, and hence it is im-
portant to continue to search for the truth behind the events of May 4th at Kent State. Third, and most importantly, May 4th at Kent State should be remembered in order that we can learn from the mistakes of the past. The Guardsmen in their signed statement at the end of the civil trials recognized that better ways have to be found to deal with these types of confrontations. This has probably already occurred in numerous situations where law enforcement officials have issued a caution to their troops to be careful because “we don’t want another Kent State.” Insofar as this has happened, lessons have been learned, and the deaths of four young Kent State students have not been in vain.
About the Author Jerry M. Lewis Emeritus Professor of Sociology Kent State University Kent, Ohio 44242 Office: Merrill Hall #334 Telephone: 330-672-2708 Fax: 330-672-4724
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY Bills, Scott. (1988). Kent State/May 4: Echoes Through a Decade. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press. This book provides town and gown reactions to May 4th. It has the best annotated bibliography available on the literature on the shootings and is the basis for the annotations that follow. Casale, Ottavio M. & Paskoff, Louis (Eds.) (1971). The Kent Affair: Documents and Interpretations . Boston: Houghton Mifflin. This is an early, useful volume which reproduces local and national newspaper articles on the shootings as well as radio and television broadcasts. Davies, Peter. (1973). The Truth About Kent State: A Challenge to the American Conscience. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. This is a detailed narrative and analysis of the events of May 4 and their aftermath. He argues that the Guard conspired to fire upon the students. 74 photographs are included. Eszterhas, Joe & Roberts, Michael D. (1970). Thirteen Seconds: Confrontation at Kent State. New York: Dodd, Mead. A very quick publication by two Cleveland journalists who use interviews of students, faculty, and Guardsmen to provide a background and narrative of May 1970 events. Grant, Edward J. & Hill, Michael (1974). I Was There: What Really Went on at Kent State . Lima, OH: C.S.S. Publishing Co. The only book written by members of the Ohio National Guard, the authors provide a view of the hostile environment in which the Guardsmen found themselves. Hare, A. Paul (Ed.) (l973). Kent State: The Nonviolent Response. Haverford, PA: Center for Nonviolent Conflict Resolution. A series of articles by noted peace activist Paul Hare as well as many Kent State faculty members. The common theme is the search for nonviolent approaches to conflictual situations. Hensley, Thomas R. (1981). The Kent State Incident: Impact of Judicial Process on Public Attitudes. Westport, CONN: Greenwood Press. This is a detailed examination of the legal aftermath of the shootings, focusing upon the impact of various legal proceedings on public attitudes about the shootings. Hensley, Thomas R. and Lewis, Jerry M. (1978). Kent State and May 4th: A Social Science Perspective. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt. This collection brings together a number of previous articles on May 4 that were published in social science journals, but articles covering the Kent State litigation and the 1977 gymnasium controversy were written specifically for this volume. This book also contains the excellent analysis
of the events of May 4 written by James Best. Kelner, Joseph and Munves, James. (1980). The Kent State Coverup . New York: Harper and Row. Kelner was the chief legal counsel for the students and parents in the 1975 federal civil trial. He presents a harsh analysis of the handling of the trial by Judge Donald Young. The book has a strong bias, but it provides the only detailed analysis of this long and important trial. Michener, James. (1971). Kent State: What Happened and Why . New York: Random House and Reader’s Digest Books. This is undoubtedly the most widely read book on May 4th because of Michener’s reputation and the wide publicity it received. The book suffers from being produced so quickly, however, containing numerous factual errors. Payne, J. Gregory (1981). Mayday: Kent State. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt. The book provides a rather sketchy overview of the May 4 events, presents excerpts from letters written by participants in the events, and discusses the made-for-TV movie on May 4 to which Payne served as a consultant. Report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest. (1970) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Reprint edition by Arno Press. This remains the best single source for understanding the events of May 4. The report examines not only the shootings at Kent State but also the student movement of the sixties and the shootings at Jackson State University. Excellent photographs are included. Stone, I. F. (1971). The Killings at Kent State: How Murder Went Unpunished. New York: Review Book. This is a rather sketchy book written with a strongly held viewpoint that the Guardsmen committed murder. Taylor, Stuart; Shuntlich, Richard; McGovern, Patrick; & Genther, Robert. (1971). Violence at Kent State, May 1 to 4, l970: The Student’s Perspective. New York: College Notes and Texts, 1971. A study of the perceptions, feelings, attitudes, and reactions of Kent State students based upon a questionnaire sent to all Kent State students shortly after the shootings. Seven thousand students responded, and although this is not a random sample, it has the best data available about the views of Kent State students about May 4. Tompkins, Phillip K. and Anderson, Elaine Vanden Bout. (l971). Communication Crisis at Kent State: A Case Study. New York: Gordon & Breach. This book presents a harsh analysis of the communications problems that permeated the University during May 1970. Warren, Bill (Ed.) (1970). The Middle of the Country: The Events of May 4th As Seen by Students & Faculty at Kent State University . A hastily
compiled set of essays put together by a Kent State University sophomore containing various reactions to the shootings by Kent State students and faculty members.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES Best, James J. (1978). “Kent State: Answers and Questions” in Thomas R. Hensley and Jerry M. Lewis .) Kent State and May 4th: A Social Science Perspective . Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt. Haldeman, H.R. (1978). The Ends of Power. New York: Times Books. McNamara, Robert. (1995). In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books. Norton, Mary Beth; Katzman, David M.; Escott, Paul D.; Chudacoff, Howard P.; Paterson, Thomas G.; & Tuttle, William M. (1994). A People and a Nation: A History of the United States. Fourth Edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
NOTES 1.In addition to the many books on the Kent State shootings, numerous reports, book chapters, and articles have been written. The most comprehensive and accurate commission investigation is The Report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) chaired by William W. Scranton. An excellent book chapter on the shootings is by James J. Best (1978). The most comprehensive bibliography on the shootings is in Bills (1988). 2. Professor Hensley, the co-author of this article, became aware of this reference to the Kent State shootings because his daughter, Sarah, was taking Advanced Placement United States History at Kent Roosevelt High School with Mr. Bruce Dzeda. We thank Mr. Dzeda for reading this article and offering his reactions, although he bears no responsibility for the ideas expressed in this article. 3. In addition to Guard officers and enlisted men, Governor James Rhodes was also a defendant in the civil trial and signed the statement. PUBLISHED IN REVISED FORM BY THE OHIO COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES REVIEW, VOL 34, NUMBER 1 (SUMMER, 1998) PP. 9-21
NUMBERS NUMBERS
A GLOBAL VIEWPOINT
$1.747 TRILLION
MILITARY BUDGET GLOBAL 2013
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_ military_and_paramilitary_personnel
150 MILLION
If women farmers had the same access to resources as men, the number of hungry in the world could be reduced by up to 150 million. (Source: FAO, 2011)
$500 PER SECOND
The U.S. federal government spent over $15 billion dollars in 2010 on the War on Drugs, at a rate of about $500 per second. Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy
$1.1 TRILLION
School Expenditures, by Type of Control and Level of Instruction in Constant (2009 to 2010) Dollars Source: U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of
NUMBERS
Education Statistics, annual.
12.3 MILLION
There are at least 12.3 million enslaved adults and children around the world “at any given time.” Of these, at least 1.39 million are victims of commercial sexual servitude, both internationally and within national borders. More than half, 56 percent, of all forced labor victims are women and girls. http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/human-trafficking
34
$2141 $16.2 TRILLION
DOLLARS PER AMERCAN FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE http://en.wikipedia.org
GDP in billions - PPP$ http://www.uis.unesco.org
36
TERRORISM BY DR. JOSHUA SINAI
KIDNAPPING
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM RE-PUBLISHED WITH PERMISSION OF THE IACSP
K
FUELING TERRORISM WORLDWIDE BY DR. JOSHUA SINAI
idnapping for ransom (KfR) is considered one of the primary sources of revenues that fuel the operations of numerous terrorist groups worldwide. In general, while the majority of worldwide kidnappings for ransom are perpetrated by organized criminal groups (including tribes in countries such as Yemen or vessel-borne pirates off the coasts of east or west Africa), this tactic is increasingly being used by landbased terrorist groups – especially those affiliated with Al Qaeda – making this criminal tactic for monetary gain a significant component in their warfare activities in conjunction with their killing attacks against their adversaries.
BY DR. JOSHUA SINAI
KIDNAPPING
TERRORISM
38
Although kidnappings have always been used as a terrorist tactic, in this new trend they are being frequently employed – even by supposedly religiously-based militant groups – for monetary ransom, rather than as coercive bargaining chips against their government adversaries to compel them to give in to their political demands or to release their
taking situations in which a terrorist group will hold hostages in a barricaded location while being surrounded by counterterrorism forces, accompanied by negotiations that may or may not resolve the crisis without loss of life of the victims. Terrorist groups generally employ
Four factors make such high risk countries especially vulnerable to kidnappings by terrorist groups: weak and failing central governments, widespread anarchy and lawlessness in the countryside, the presence of terrorist groups that establish their own safe havens in such ungoverned territories, and the presence of foreigners – whether tourists, employees of multinational corporations operating in such resource-rich (e.g., petroleum extraction) but high risk environments, or humanitarian relief workers.
imprisoned terrorists. Such tactics present governments with a serious dilemma, since, as with the justified insistence of governments not to give in to such coercive-based terrorist demands in general, governments risk having the terrorist kidnappers kill their captives when their ransom demands are not met. It needs to be pointed out that kidnappings for ransom also differ from hostage
a supporting network, such as, in certain countries where lawlessness is pervasive, of corrupt local merchants or tour and transport operators to identify foreign visitors for potential kidnap operations. Hostages are either held in the countries where they are captured or taken by their captors into a second
BY DR. JOSHUA SINAI
KIDNAPPING
TERRORISM
neighboring country. In Kenya, for example, humanitarian relief workers and foreign tourists have been kidnapped by al Shabaab-affiliated terrorists and then held in nearby Somalia, where the group maintains its safe havens. According to various organizations that compile such data, countries of high risk to the threat of kidnapping for ransom by terrorist groups include (in alphabetical order): Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Mali,
multinational corporations operating in such resource-rich (e.g., petroleum extraction) but high risk environments, or humanitarian relief workers. Thus, in an impoverished country such as Yemen, armed tribesmen often collaborate with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)-linked militants to take foreign hostages in order to exchange them for ransom. In other coun-
Other regions include the Latin and South American countries of Mexico and Colombia, although the rate of kidnapping in Colombia has reduced significantly as the FARC insurgency has weakened and the central government has increased its control over the country’s territory, while narco-criminal organizations in Mexico have escalated their kidnapping for ransom activities.
40
Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Four factors make such high risk countries especially vulnerable to kidnappings by terrorist groups: weak and failing central governments, widespread anarchy and lawlessness in the countryside, the presence of terrorist groups that establish their own safe havens in such ungoverned territories, and the presence of foreigners – whether tourists, employees of
tries, such as Mali, the instability and anarchy that led to the French-led intervention in early January 2013 unintentionally resulted in increasing the risk of kidnapping of foreigners throughout the Sahel region, with the most prominent example the hostage takeover by an Al Qaeda affiliate of the natural gas plant near the town of Amenas in eastern Algeria (although it could also be
considered a botched operation, since the hostage takers were killed and no ransom was paid to the group). On the other hand, Al Qaeda-affiliated groups, such as Boko Haram, operating in Nigeria and Niger conduct numerous kidnappings of foreign workers, resulting in substantial ransom payouts. In another significant conflict zone where terrorist groups operate, the Syrian civil war has witnessed numerous kidnappings for ransom of foreign nationals, particularly media personnel (reporters and photographers), humanitarian relief personnel, and other foreigners active in the country. Other long-standing kidnapping for ransom campaigns by terrorist groups include the Philippines, where Abu Sayyaf operatives abduct foreign nationals for long periods of time in exchange for large ransoms. Other regions include the Latin and South American countries of Mexico and Colombia, although the rate of kidnapping in Colombia has reduced significantly as the FARC insurgency has weakened and the central government has increased its control over the country’s territory, while narco-criminal organizations in Mexico have escalated their kidnapping for ransom activities. According to various reports, the total amounts that have been paid in terrorist ransoms from 2008 to 2014 range between $60 million to more than $70 million (with these amounts, which are unverified, likely to be higher than these projections) with an average of between $3 million to $5 million paid for high profile captives – often depending on the locations of the kidnapping incidents, with ransoms in the
Sahel or Yemen estimated to be higher than those in Syria. Once the ransom payouts are distributed to the various operatives involved in a kidnapping operation, including intermediaries, these funds are generally used to pay for a group’s weapons and explosives procurement, training camps, travel, and, for certain groups, such as the Mokhtar Belmokhtar-led faction in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), personal enrichment of their top leadership.
•
•
HIGH PROFILE CASES Recent high profile KfR cases include the following: • In November 2008 David Rohde (a reporter for The New York Times) and two associates were kidnapped and held for ransom by the Taliban in Afghanistan. After being held captive for eight months, Rohde and one of his associates escaped and made their way to safety. • In 2009, Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler was kidnapped by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of the AQIM faction al-Mulathameen Brigade, with the Canadian government reportedly negotiating a $1.1 million in ransom (with this figure is not verified), through a third party, to secure his release. • In 2009 Saharan jihadist operatives kidnapped a group of European tourists in Mali and held them for ransom. Following the payment of ransom, most of
•
•
•
those kidnapped were released, with the exception of Edwin Dyer, of the UK, who was murdered In August 2011, Warren Weinstein, an American aid worker, was kidnapped in Lahore, Pakistan. As of mid-2014 he was still being held captive by his alleged Al Qaeda (or AQ affiliated) kidnappers. In January 2012 Giovanni Lo Porto and Berndt Muehlenbeck, aid workers for the relief organization Welthungerhilfe, were kidnapped in Multan, in the Pakistani Punjab province. On January 16, 2013 terrorist operatives linked to Al Qaeda in Mali took over the Amenas gas plant in eastern Algeria, holding its employees hostage. Although the hostage takers’ demands included the release of Islamists held in Algerian prisons, ransom was also considered a motive for the attack. In February 2013, Boko Haram, the Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group, kidnapped a French family in Cameroon, with a ransom of $3 million reportedly paid for their release. In December 2013, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) kidnapped Swiss, Austrian and Finnish personnel in Yemen, eventually releasing them in exchange for a reported (although not verified) payment of $22 million, which was arranged by intermediaries from a nearby Gulf Arab country.
BY DR. JOSHUA SINAI
KIDNAPPING
• In February 2014 five Malians working for the Red Cross were kidnapped by the Islamist Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Gao, northern Mali. • In early March 2014, 13 nuns and three attendants were released from their three-month captivity, following their kidnapping from their monastery in the ancient Christian town of Maaloula in Syria. It is reported (although not verified) that Qatar had paid a ransom of $4 million for their release.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES While some governments, particularly the United States, adhere to a strict policy of not paying ransom to kidnappers, other countries do accede to the kidnappers’ demands. At the June 2013 G8 summit at Lough Erne in Northern Ireland, for example, while the assembled government leaders agreed to ban such payments and also called on private corporations to refuse to provide money to terrorist kidnappers because they encourage more kidnappings, in practice the agreement does not appear to be holding, with countries such as France, Italy, Japan, and Spain reported to continue to meet the demands of the kidnappers of their nationals. It is difficult to find fault with such concessions to terrorist demands on humanitarian grounds, since these governments face domestic backlash when their citizens are paraded on hostage videos with threatening guns to their heads if they do nothing to obtain their release. Moreover, the corporations that employ many of the kidnapped personnel often lobby their governments to permit them to pay ransom to secure the release of their employees. An additional factor is that in many countries it is legal to pay ransom for criminal kidnappings, thus blurring the legal line between criminal and terrorist kidnapping incidents.
CONCLUSION
TERRORISM
Based on current trends, kidnappings for ransom by terrorist groups are likely to continue on an upward trajectory, particularly in countries experiencing high-intensity terrorist activities, such as (in alphabetical order) Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In another trend of concern, with al Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s August 2011 call on Muslims to kidnap Westerners (citing their success in abducting American humanitarian aid worker Warren Weinstein, from his home in Lahore, Pakistan, in August 2011), the organization’s worldwide affiliates are likely to target high profile Westerners for kidnappings not only for ransom but for use as bargaining chips to free prominent Al Qaeda and AQ-affiliated operatives, such as Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, who is currently imprisoned in the United States.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
42
Joshua Sinai is a Washington, DC-based consultant on counterterrorism studies. He is the author of “Active Shooter – A Handbook on Prevention” (ASIS International, 2013). He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
BY Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army
DEPLOYMENT
ONE SURGEON’S
44
Editors Note: This short story was penned by the author of his experiences during the very first part of OIF when he served as a BN surgeon in Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq.
I
ONE SURGEON’S VIEWPOINT BY Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army t was 3:00 A.M.. Although the sun’s rays had retreated hours before, its hot breath refused to dissipate from the steppes of Kuwait’s Ad Dibdibah plain. The heat attacked us from all sides. Airborne sandy powder hung above us and dimmed lights as if in a London fog.
One by one, all members of the battalion encircled our small “Band of Brothers” and cluster of convoy vehicles-they had, without being ordered, chose to wish us safe passage on our sojourn to Iraq. As the Chaplain prayed, we all wondered if our souls were ready should He request an inventory of our lives. My army unit was being tasked for a mission in Iraq. That morning, I prepared to move out with a small lead element that was to reconnoiter an area where the main body would relocate to-our destination
was Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq. This was lieve God had had a hand in south of Babylon; where civiliza- my being allowed to serve, in the military, in a time of war. tion had begun. Although a 9mm pistol hung Intelligence briefings warned from my belt, He allowed me that insurgents had been active to serve Him, and the Army, along the route we were to trav- without it ever leaving its el. Appropriate Force Protection sand encrusted holster. info was given-suddenly, the desiccated saliva in my throat grew The sun, a most unwelto the size of a dry, furry tennis comed fiery orb, soon began ball; swallowing failed to amelio- its westward migration, and rate the choking sensation. our vehicles, pregnant with supplies, groped the sizzling Why was I there, in Kuwait, hardball with the speed of and now heading for Iraq? Col- a glacier. Each glance, form lectively, that question was in- right to left, recorded a cefecting us all. In retrospect, I be- rebral picture as vivid as a 10
DEPLOYMENT
ONE SURGEON’S
BY Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army
billion pixel image-charred tank skeletons, gun emplacements that had lost their duels with “smart bombs”, breached sandy berms and towns with masses of children attacking us with smiles and thumbs up gestures.
46
Although I was tasked to keep our battalion’s health in check, my real job was waiting for me up the road. My itinerary was prepared by God, and the Army afforded the venue. Serving in a fixed base, air conditioned “C.A.S.H” hospital (where everyone wore daily fresh fatigue uniforms) was not to be.......instead, I was to travel, eat, sleep and suffer with a line unit. Working out of a canvas M-5 aid bag was as high tech as it got. I, the PA, nurse and medics were tapped to minister to wounded Iraqis, and Islamic insurgents, in the city prison. Upon arriving at our destination, Camp Edson, the U.S. Marines greeted us and did all they could to assist us in our mission. Soon, a dedicated Iraqi physician showed up at the compound gate and asked for our assistance. The city hospital was critically low on medicine and supplies. After visiting the local hospital, I realized that God was again involved in my odyssey.
Although not officially sanctioned, the medics “procured” a huge cache of medical supplies. Daily, we made our way to the hospital where the medicines were received with smiles of biblical proportions. That Iraqi hospital was choked by a sea of desperate souls-limbless, weak, filthy and dying-looking into their eyes told vivid stories about how miserable things had been. Work at the prison was grueling, hot, frustrating and endless. Within its sand colored walls were fly infested cells that reeked. I often thought of the infamous Black Hole of Calcutta and how similar it must have been to where we worked. Al Queda, Hamas Baath Party and street thugs were crammed into sweltering cells. All seemed to have an eclectic array of maladies-infected bayonet/gunshot wounds, abscesses, burns and festering, maggot laden sores.
Administering whatever antibiotics we had, to the sick, would have triggered a peer review investigation, in the U.S.; however, there, by God’s hand, no matter what was used afforded improvement, and the wounds healed.
made me believe that what was being done, as crude as it seemed, was appreciated.... again, God was there.
My tour of duty eventually came to a close. My exit from Iraq was in the belly of a Marine helicopter. After lift off, I Despite the heat, sweat, filth gazed down at the barren, lifeand flies, seeing the prisoners’ less-appearing Syrian Desert smiles, on our daily rounds, and reflected on my mission. I
was blessed to have served my country, fellow soldiers and the wounded enemy. Somehow I know that our efforts made a difference.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Written by Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army ........after his first tour of duty in Iraq-2003.
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