Asian Military Review - September/October 2022

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A US Marine Corps rifleman launches an AeroVironment Switchblade 300 during training at Twentynine Palms, California, in September 2021. New and advanced weapon systems such as this type of loitering munition is increasingly being acquired to boost front line kinetic firepower. (US Marine Corps)

LOITERING WITH INTENT

Loitering munitions are increasingly the ‘must have’ weapon, explains Tim Fish

UP FROM THE DEEP

INTELLIGENT DEVELOPMENT: MANAGING DATA THROUGH THE CMS

Dr Lee Willett and Andrew Drwiega review Combat Management Systems for naval warfare.

Submarine rescue, special forces equipment and more. Andrew Drwiega talks sub-surface with JFD.

Jon Lake looks at how China has established its area denial stance in the Indo Pacific.

US STRENGTHENS MULTI DOMAIN CONCEPT

he US Army’s annual convention, AUSA, gives an insight into how the force is looking to evolve towards the future.The focus had been towards 2030 but, in two meetings now, I am beginning to hear that replaced with 2035 and even 2040. The eve of 2030 is only seven years away which, as we know, in developmental terms is just around the corner.

The economic rise of China has fuelled a rapid expansion of all arms of its military, which has led to attempts to push out its region of influence including the South and East China Seas. It has assimilated Hong Kong back into the fabric of the nation and threatens to do the same to Taiwan, which is much against that nation’s wishes.

This strategic upsurge has combined with a resurgent Russia, witnessed by its ongoing barbaric attack on Ukraine which was launched earlier this year, an indication of a push back against NATO’s influence in eastern Europe.

The 2018 the US National Defense Strategy (NDS) pointed to the “reemergence of long-term, strategic competition”, recognising that the United States was again strategically challenged around the world, especially in Europe and the Indo Pacific. To that end, one aspect of the US Army’s modernisation has since been focused on the build up of forces to support its Multi Domain Operations (MDO) concept. Within that are three established Multi Domain Task Forces (MDTF). The first was founded in 2017 to serve in the Indo Pacific and is based in Washington State, while the second will operate in Europe from Germany and was established in 2021. There is now a third, activated in the last few months in the Pacific and will be based at Fort Shafter in Hawaii.

The MDO concept is defined by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as the “rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare [so that it can] counter and defeat a near-peer adversary capable of contesting the US in all domains [air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace] in both competition and armed conflict.”

With the rise of anti-access / area denial (A2/AD), a concept built up by China as it seeks to control the geographical areas previously mentioned, it is recognised that to compete and succeed operationally in such areas requires the unification of all effects across all domainsland, sea, air, space and cyberspace - and to be able to do this with allies when required.

MDTFs have been established to be theatre-specific and that embrace a range of capabilities, both kinetic and non-kinetic, to allow the penetration of and operation within a supposed A2/ AD area or region. Aside from kinetic capabilities, the MDTFs will also be specialised in cyber, electronic warfare, intelligence, and long-range capabilities.

In her statement at the opening ceremony of AUSA, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth stated that “the Army has been busy in INDOPACOM (Indo-Pacific Command), building partnerships through the multiple exercises that comprise Pacific Pathways.” These are exercises that are conducted by US Army Pacific Command that involve the militaries of allies and partners in the region. Secretary Wormuth later added that Japan and Australia were both building and modernising their own forces and “are [both] open to working with the US to develop their capabilities in line with multi domain task force.”

Andrew Drwiega, Editor-in-Chief

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LOITERING WITH INTENT

Loitering munitions have already proved their effectiveness in conflict and their development in terms of range and deployment methods continues to be explored.

by Tim Fish

Loitering munitions are becoming the new ‘musthave’ weapon in military inventories. The successful use of these weapons in recent conflicts from the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in September-November 2020, to the Yemen proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the start of the RussoUkraine War in February 2022, has spurred procurement efforts.

The capabilities that loitering munitions offer sits somewhere between an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and a missile. The ability to ‘loiter’ in a designated area for hours and search for targets means these munitions behave in a fashion similar to UAS running on a fuel-powered propulsion system and employing different wing-shape designs for mobility in the air. However, like missiles, loitering munitions are often launched from canisters and are expendable, fitted with a seeker and

warhead to destroy the targets required.

Aero Vironment, a UAS company that manufactures the Switchblade loitering munition, offered this description: “A loitering missile, sometimes called a ‘kamikaze drone’, is a category of small unmanned aerial systems equipped with a munition that can loiter, or wait passively in the air, and attack once a target is identified,” a spokesperson told Asian Military Review.

Loitering munitions offer a ranged precision strike capability that sits between that offered by artillery guns and missiles. They have the range to strike beyond the reach of artillery shells, but are not fast or lethal enough to engage targets that missiles can hit at much longer ranges. However, they are much cheaper to produce than missiles, can operate in swarms and are small and light enough to offer an organic strike capability to smaller units operating in a dispersed way to avoid detection.

The AeroVironment spokesperson

said that the great advantage of loitering munitions versus traditional artillery is their “ability to reach greater range, maintaining a safer stand-off for forces. In addition, their small size and low acoustic, visual and thermal signature make them difficult to detect, recognise or track, even at close range.”

These attributes mean that loitering munitions occupy an important place in a military arsenal but it is unlikely they will change the face or warfare to any considerable degree. Loitering munitions were important but not decisive in Nagorno-Karabakh and Yemen and alone they will not beat Russia’s invading army in Ukraine.

Speaking to AMR, Doug Barrie, the senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) defence think tank, said: “Loitering munitions have a real place in the inventory and they are not going to disappear, but on their own are they a war-winning technology – no.”

The Switchblade 600 weights 68lb (31kg) and has a two-axis, four-sensor (dual EO/IR) integrated sensor suite in the gimbal. With the ability to cruise at 60kts (112km/h) up to a maximum of 100kts (185km/h) it is operated using a tabled-based fire control unit using encrypted digital C2 and resilient GPS.

AeroVironment’s Switchblade Tactical UAS gained notoriety after the US announced in May that it was exporting 700 munitions to Ukraine as part of an additional $150 million towards its $4.5 billion security assistance package. The Switchblade 300 has a 5.3 nautical mile (10 kilometre) range and endurance of about 15 minutes. Weighing just 5.5 pounds (2.5 kilogrammes) it is tubelaunched, can be carried and operated by a single soldier who can finds targets using on board electro-optical cameras and an Infra-Red (IR) camera. The larger Switchblade 600 has an anti-armour capability and has an endurance of an hour.

The company did not comment on specific in-theatre use but the spokesperson said that both variants of Switchblade are “uniquely suited for this type of conflict in Ukraine” adding that both are man-portable and can be operated at the unit level.

Ghost Hunting

The Phoenix Ghost built by Aevex Aerospace is another loitering munition that is being sent by the US to Ukraine. Until it was announced in April by the Biden administration, there was little know about it. There is little information about it in the public domain beyond a general description that it is a small munition with a similar capability to Switchblade and has been developed by the US Air Force specifically for operations in Ukraine.

The development of more advanced technologies in sensors, communications and networking, autonomy and targeting mean that these latest loitering munitions are different from early versions of the weapon. Loitering munitions were first developed after the Vietnam War, inspired by “Wild Weasel” McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom and Republic F-105 Thunderchief flights against Surface-to-Air (SAM missile sites. They made their first appearance in the 1980s as a tool for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD).

The SEAD role is usually undertaken

by an electronic warfare-capable aircraft like the Boeing EA-18G Growler, which can detect enemy air defence radar and launch an anti-radiation munition against them. This allows the entry of strike aircraft to hit other targets. However, countries that could not afford these expensive aircraft could instead use loitering munitions for SEAD. They were pre-programmed and launched in advance of an air strike equipped with a radio frequency (RF) seeker that can detect air defence radar and automatically engage them.

However, as new technologies have come on stream it has enabled loitering munitions to undertake different roles. Using EO/IR sensors and communications networks allows a human-in-the-loop to view targets using a live video downlink and direct the munition to attack. Unlike the SEAD variants, where the RF seeker will only locate military signals, when using EO/ IR systems for targeting the operator confirmation of target sets is necessary to avoid mistakenly destroying civilian vehicles or buildings through a greater level of precision by providing eyes on target.

“As we are witnessing in Ukraine, conflicts of today, and into the near future, are going to be heavily unmanned,” the AeroVironment spokesperson said. “The sophistication of these smaller assets requires the most advanced technology in terms of processors, cameras, and other sensors for example – involving multiple fields of science.”

The Harop loitering munition from IAI has nine hours of endurance that means it could offer a maximum range of about 270nm (500km) if required although its communications suite only goes out to 108nm (200km). Canister launched it has an EO seeker and is controlled by a two-way data link with a man-in-the-loop.

The Mini-Harpy from IAI weighs 88lb (40kg) with a 17lb (8kg) warhead and has an operational range of 54 nm (100km) with two hours endurance. It operates at 1,000-5,000ft (300-1500m) with a loitering speed of 55-85kt (100-157km/h) and a maximum speed of 200kt (370km/h). Mini-Harpy has a dual EO/IR seeker and anti-radiation seeker.

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WB

combination of UAS - both armed and for intelligence gathering - alongside loitering munitions was shown to be effective against weak or poor air defences,” Barrie said. Azerbaijan used Israeli loitering munitions including the IAI Harop and Elbit SkyStriker to engage Armenian armoured vehicles including the Uralvagonzavod T-72 tank and MZiK S-300 air defence system.

In the Libyan civil war it was reported that Polish-built Warmate loitering munition from WB Group have been used. In Yemen, the Houthi rebel group Ansar Allah has deployed the Iranian HESA Qasef1 and their own Samad-2 and -3, although these are more like UAS with a warhead attached. These weapons proved their usefulness in such environments.

The Warmate loitering munition is just over one metre long, with a wingspan of 5.2ft (1.6m) weighing 11.6lbs (5.3kg). It has a 3lb (1.4kg) payload and a 70-minute flight time operating out to 8nm (15km) line of sight.

The impact of digital technology means that more processing power can be packed into an increasingly small space combined and with the low cost of sensors. This means loitering munitions can offer greater utility than previously possible. This ability to conduct precision strike on a wide variety of targets including personnel, armour, structures as well as SEAD at range in a cost-effective manner make loitering munitions a very valuable asset – but they are not a silver bullet.

“What you don’t want to do is pack these things full of expensive technology because they are not coming back,” Barrie said, so capabilities of loitering munitions will be limited by the need to keep costs down. If costs increase too much then it will be more effective to employ a precision-guided missile that is faster, has longer range, carries a larger warhead that can destroy more targets. Missiles are more capable against air defence systems offering a higher guarantee of success securing a kill. If a loitering munition fails to destroy a target, it not only alerts the enemy to the presence of forces nearby within the range of the munition, but they’ll move and then target the launcher. There is a balance to achieve between the level of capability for these weapons and specific

target sets to engage with them and cost.

There are further limitations, Barrie added, because any system that is “dependent or partially dependent on data link technology with a human in- or on-the-loop, becomes more difficult in an environment where the electro-magnetic spectrum is heavily contested with jamming and spoofing.” In addition, because loitering munitions are relatively slow moving, when they are used to engage a moving target (unless the weapon is close to the target) it will potentially have moved by the time munition arrives – so it needs to be deployed and loitering in the right area to engage as soon as the target is found.

Asymmetric Advantage

The extent that loitering munitions will be useful in battle depends on the warfare environment. Recent conflicts have seen rival forces engaging in operations against each other with little in the way of effective or persistent air defence. If they are employed in a counter-insurgency campaign where an enemy has limited air defence and ISR assets then loitering munitions can give forces using them the upper hand.

“The use of loitering munition technology by Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with a

“On the other hand, if you are facing a peer rival with similar equipment, reasonable air defences, ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) assets and a combat air capability, then vehicle launch systems will be a priority target in the first few days of the conflict,” Barrie said.

According to a June 2022 CNA report entitled Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in Russia, Rostec announced

The Lancet-3 seen here weighing 26lbs (12kg) is a larger version of the smaller 11lbs (5kg) Lancet-1 from Zala Aero, a part of Kalashnikov. Lancet-3 has a 40-minute duration, whilst the smaller brother can last 30 minutes.

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that the KUB and Lancet loitering munitions, both built by Kalashnikov, had been used by Russia in Ukraine to strike ground targets. But it stated that there was little evidence of either being successful and said that earlier in the war “several KUBs were either downed by the Ukrainian military or crashed in civilian neighbourhoods without detonating, suggesting either a successful Ukrainian countermeasure or an internal malfunction.”

Although loitering munitions offer a stand-off strike capability, the larger ones still only have a range of up to 27-54nm (50-100km) and therefore the launchers will be vulnerable to longrange missiles or air attack. Furthermore, once in the air – although they are small and hard to detect – loitering munitions are slow moving and this makes them vulnerable to anti-air defence systems. It means that units operating loitering munitions will have to be well hidden and mobile, with the weapons best used in an unpredictable fashion to make best use of their attributes.

“There is a utility for loitering munitions in Special Forces-type operations at the smaller end of the scale where they can be carried in a bergen, [giving them] an ability not just to look over the next hill or street, but when a target is found, to actually engage it,” Barrie said. “It can give smaller units organic firepower and the ability to attack at range and with precision whereas previously other platforms –fixed-wing, rotary, artillery – would have to be called in to conduct a strike.”

In Syria, it was reported that Russian special forces were using the Lantset-1

and -3 loitering munitions from Zala Aero Group.

Urgent Operational Need

The US Army has been buying Switchblade 600 and 300 systems under successive contracts with AeroVironment. One contract in April 2020 was worth $76 million and another in April 2021 worth $45 million, acquired under an Urgent Operational Need Statement. The Army is also buying the Altius-600 loitering munition under its Air Launched Effects (ALE) programme. ALE is designed to test swarming tactics, which will be the next significant development for loitering munitions as a way of overwhelming air defences, providing decoys and striking lots of targets.

“If there is a surface-to-air missile battery in the area you could use a swarm of loitering munitions with a mix of decoys and actual loitering munitions that look the same,” Barrie explained, “This makes targeting much harder if there are 10 or so flying about in a coordinated attack and it is not possible to find the two that have warheads. It poses an inventory cost on the defender, which has to use its own munitions to eliminate all the loitering munitions or risk being destroyed.”

The question of the inventory cost for defenders comes down to the weapons that air defence systems will need to effectively counter loitering munitions in a cost-effective manner. If launcher platforms cannot be destroyed on the ground and swarms of loitering munitions are already airborne then point defence options will be needed.

These are likely to be similar to the range of counter-UAS systems in use that include mix of electronic warfare (EW), rapid firing gun systems and highpower directed energy/laser weapons. These can rapidly destroy numerous targets at low cost.

Future developments of loitering munitions will include their use fired from unmanned adjunct or ‘loyal wingman’ aircraft. This will mitigate against the limited range and slow movement of loitering munitions by using a fast air platform to deliver it to the area of operations at the right time. It means that the loitering munition will operate in a similar fashion to missiles but with a loitering capability so it can engage an emitting target that has stopped emitting or use its sensors and precision to pinpoint a target.

“There’s going to be a fair amount of experimentation on this as armed forces try to figure out how best to employ loitering munitions in different ways to maximise their capabilities, or use them in a mix of effectors,” Barrie said.

As the proliferation and subsequent use of loitering munitions increases in the future, there will be more incidents when the weapons will be launched and are unable to find targets. As these weapons are not recoverable, more ways must be found to ensure that when they run out of fuel, they can find adequate space in or near the area of operations with few or no civilians to safely selfdestruct without remaining a threat to the local population.

Autonomous targeting is also an issue for loitering munitions that raises a whole host of ethical and legal issues relating to international humanitarian law in armed conflict that have not been fully explored. But loitering munitions are here to stay and offer a valuable costeffective stand-off strike capability that fits neatly above that offered by artillery systems and below that of missiles.

But these are still early days of their use. Loitering munitions have limitations and although development is continuing rival forces will acknowledge the early successes of these weapons in recent conflicts and start to employ more effective countermeasures. The ways in which loitering munitions are used operationally and the extent to which countermeasures can defeat them will dictate the level of their future utility on the battlefield.

The Samad-3 is estimated to be 9ft (2.8m) in length with 14.7ft (4.5m) wingspan and an 40lbs (18kg) payload. It is a long-range variant of the Samad family and has an extra fuel tank compared to the Samad-2. A smaller Samad-1 UAS is used for ISR.

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SETTING THE STANDARD FOR NAVAL C-UAS SOLUTIONS

UP FROM THE DEEP

Submarine rescue vehicles (DSRVs) is the strongest, but not the least, capability on which JFD has built its reputation among naval and special forces.

by Andrew Drwiega

The underwater world is the Earth’s least explored geographical area, primarily because it is so difficult for people to operate under the waves with ease and for long periods. The majority of naval submarines operate at depths below, often well below, 600 metres (2,000 feet). Some nuclear submarines have stronger hulls and have increased design depths that are mainly below 900m (3,000ft), but they are not the usual operational depths. The deepest area of the ocean, by contrast, is the Mariana Trench which has been measured at 11,034m (36,200 feet).

When a catastrophe happens onboard a military submarine, such as in the case of the Indonesian Navy’s Cakra-class Type 209/1300 diesel-electric attack submarines KRI Nanggala-402 in April 2021, the main concern is to locate it and try and rescue the crew in the

shortest possible time. Unfortunately, when wreckage was discovered it was at a depth of of 850m (2,800 ft), way beyond its stated crush depth of around 500m (1,600 ft).

But on the scene was a submarine rescue vessel from James Fisher’s rescue company JFD, a specialist global supplier of submarine rescue vehicles. Should circumstances have been different and the submarine had been discovered intact with a crew needing rescue, the specialist deep sea rescue vehicle (DSRV) would have been deployed to try and rescue the crew.

International rescue

“Submarine rescue is the core of what we do,” said Richard Dellar, JFD’s managing director speaking to Asian Military Review. The company’s Submarine Rescue Service (SRS) has a reputation and a customer base to match.

The Singaporean and Indian Navies are two of the stand-out customers. “We recently signed a 25 year support maintenance contract with the Indian Navy which began this year, said Dellar. The Indian Navy has fully embraced the capability, including having its own operators fully trained and able to operate the equipment independently. “India has done more live sub-mates - practising extracting crews out of submarines using the rescue vessel and into the hyperbaric chamber - in the three years that they have had the craft than some of our other customers who have had their kit for 20 years,” explained Dellar. He added that the Indian Navy had transitioned to maintaining and operating their own sub rescue systems.

Customers need to be aware of the logistics of deploying a DSRV. Originally transportable in the Antanov 225, now destroyed as a casualty of Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine,

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AERIAL SURVEILLANCE FOR MARITIME SECURITY

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smaller military transport aircraft are used but they cannot carry the same load meaning more flights over a longer period of time. “There is about 400 tons of our kit that is air portable, so that requires seven or eight flights. The DSRVs weight about 25 tons, but then all the other vital elements such as the hyperbaric kit, the launch and recovery systems and the power generators are needed. We turn up and presume the ship we will deploy on has nothing, said Dellar. This comes down to the detail of having to weld the launch and recover frame to the deck of the rescue ship.

There is also a consideration in the actual geographical location where any rescue will be conducted. Rather than having one ship dedicated to supporting any rescue with the DSRV, which may be hundreds of miles from where it is needed when an incident occurs, an air portable kit would usually same time provided the large enough transport aircraft such as Boeing’s C-17 or Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules can be called upon.

“Today, typical submarine crew is between 130-140 personnel. A typical rescue lift in the DSRV would be between 15 to a maximum of 20 people at one time - fewer if there are people with serious injuries to extract.more if some are injured. Two to three hours between mate, surface and ready to go again. We need to know what the customers mission is and then we can drive it from a modular perspective.

One of the problems facing naval operators is the training time that is required, especially for a DSRV pilot. “The training programme typically takes two and a half years, but often by the time someone has been fully trained they are close to being rotated out to their next assignment. Also they must have to have

a certain amount of dive time before we can train them, hence the need for us to train as many people as possible,” said Dellar. But this is reliant on the customer’s budget and is the reason behind JFD’s efforts to establish an unofficial club of operators - so that each operator may be able to call on other national operators in a time of crisis - and all crews are trained to the same standard.

JFD has a history of service with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) with a contract that ran for 15 years. The RAN’s DSRV is shortly coming up for either renewal or a major service and with the AUKUS (trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and

the United States) set to deliver Australia’s first fleet of nuclear powered attack submarines, any discussion about the requirements of a DSRV need to parallel the acquisition process.

Special Operations / Diver Delivery

JFD has a number of different capability areas other than the submarine rescue services, the other three being special operations; ‘black’ boats; and commercial systems. Alistair Wilson strategy, sales and marketing director at JFD explains that there is a growing desire to see a cross-over between ‘dry’ rescue vehicles which are not designed to be covert, and ‘wet’ diver delivery vehicles - the black boats. “We

Richard Dellar, JFD’s managing director says that his company works very closely with its customers: "There aren’t that many contractors that get involved in operation."

MV Swift Rescue supports the Republic of Singapore Navy's DSRV-6. It is stationed in Changi Naval Base

HOLISTIC INTEGRATED MARITIME BORDER SOLUTION

Maritime security challenges today are vast and complex, with dramatic implications for governments and militaries. International waters are experiencing increased crime and violence from emerging threats at sea, such as piracy, terrorism, armed robbery, smuggling of people and illegal goods, nuclear materials trafficking and firearms trafficking, illegal fishing and ocean pollution.

Sea conditions can often be rough, the weather is often harsh, visibility is poor, humidity is high, and navigating vessels is challenging. In these extreme situations, it is even more difficult to ensure safety.

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The tracking of ships is accomplished using radars, sensors, and cameras that work in unison to identify maritime traffic vessels; highly manoeuvrable fast objects are targeted by long-range identification and tracking systems; unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance aerial vehicles cover large maritime areas and can identify any attempt to breach territorial waters; line-of-sight sensors can be mounted easily aboard ships to both detect and neutralise unauthorised drones entering a secure perimeter using plug-and-play technology; protection from aerial threats using counter-unmanned aircraft systems; combined platforms display information about incoming threats by integrating all sensors and jammers into the Command & Control network.

In recent years there has been a sharp increase in pirate attacks. Maritime piracy remains the most visible manifestation of maritime insecurity. “In the past, pirates stole gold, silver, gemstones, and rum barrels. Nowadays, they are taking over merchant ships and looting onboard containers. Oil tankers are seized by pirates mid-

sea and are being held for ransom. The maritime freight transport industry is at risk”, says Ronen Hagag, TAR Ideal’s Head of Naval Department.

Hagag has extensive experience in naval warfare. A retired Colonel from the Israeli navy, he served as a captain of a Sa’ar 5-class corvette, a naval squadron leader, head of the doctrine and training department and a naval attache in Washington.

“A single vessel can be ransomed for tens of millions of dollars”, says Hagag, “Every day, container shipping companies, naval forces, and countries are faced with this grave threat. Insurance companies are raising their stakes. Their premiums will rise by hundreds of per cent for cargo shipments departing on a route known for pirate takeovers. A situation may arise in which the country in the same area does not provide real piracy solutions to this risk, so the ship will not be able to depart on this route with such a high premium.”

“Pirates are very sophisticated attackers. These are not amateurs on small fishing boats. They go out to sea in a command ship equipped with radar and means of communication, while several small boats are arriving from different directions. Pirates use small arms and shoulder-fired missiles,” adds Hagag, “Often, they lure the ships to reach them. The pirate ship transmits a distress signal through visible means of communication at sea. Vessels are obligated to assist the ship in distress upon receiving the signal. As a result, the vessel deviates from its original route, moves away from shore, and reaches the pirates’ area, and this is how a takeover occurs in the form of an impersonation of a distressed ship. It is a dangerous and cunning trap.”

Whether faced with pirates trying to take over merchant ships and loot containers or terrorist groups targeting sea vessels with loitering munition drones, maritime situational awareness is crucial to the safety of seas and marine vessels. The Avnon Group and its subsidiary companies have developed a comprehensive, fully customised and reliable solution for the global maritime concern.

have our wet tactical diving submersibles but recent defence papers point to new options [now under discussion] for crossing the water gap.” He added that there is a growing demand for different solutions, particularly for the role of special operator delivery and the number of people that can be delivered by one platform.

Although the company has standardised on two delivery platforms - the two man Torpedo Seal and four man Shadow Seal - JFD is considering this opportunity for alternative solutions. It can also offer customers the eightman Carrier Seal which can run on the surface and sub-surface, “We have other types of vehicle on our road map that will extend that existing family. There is more interest now in DSRV.”

Transporting special forces in a mobile platform that can operate autonomously without needing specialist back up support is increasingly being considered which will serve to drive the expand of the domain. “Just as there are options for surface and air delivery, so there is a growing desire for a suite of vehicles that you can pick from your [platform] toolbox for specific missions - and currently this is not very well served. We feel that the underwater domain market for moving things

and people is evolving quickly,” said Wilson.

“We are also moving towards autonomised craft,” he added. “One of the UK requirements is an Unmanned Surface / Subsurface Vehicle (USSV). We have a mature manned platform so we are looking at the next stage - an autonomised platform - which can be manned or unmanned. He offers the scenario of special forces needing to be collected from a shoreline, where an unmanned autonomous vehicle can be sent to pick them up and then once onboard, the operators can take over manned control. “We are excited about that as a transition for us in that we have the experience of mature manned platforms already. We are investing in this now.,” said Wilson.

Diver support is also one of JFD’s strengths, from personal rebreather systems to masks, hyperbaric chambers. “We have a successful Joint Venture (JV) in Germany who are our single biggest customer, supplying the German Navy with their rebreathers.

Full speed ahead

Investing in new craft and technology is something that JFD is doing, and is eager to expand. Often the company, in talking to its existing and potential customers, helps them

to develop their own concept of operations.

“The cross over between special operations requirements and commercial needs is enormous from a core technology perspective,” said Dellar. “It is all about life support systems. Irrespective of differing certification - one is always driving the other. Each one pushes different aspects which the other will also find useful.”

In addressing the development of new craft, JFD faces the dilemma of wanting to expand its product line, but only in line with what its current and future customers are going to require. While keeping cost under control is central to the price of any new development, the scope of special operations in particular is just beginning to expand beyond those few forces that have already embraced the concept.

JFD is looking to break into the US military market, particularly with the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and is trying to find the right US partner. “There are programmes of record where we would like to play a part and some where we would like to help shape the requirement,” said Dellar. There are potential opportunities in swimmer delivery vehicles and dry deck shelters, he added.

JFD's Shadow Seal can deliver divers or special operators over the surface and underwater. JFD bought Dutch company Ortega Submersible in 2019.

Saab

On 6 October, five warships from the US, Japan and South Korea conducted a ballistic missile defence exercise in the Sea of Japan, partly in response to North Korea’s continuing ballistic missile test over Japanese territory. Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force guided-missile destroyer JS Chokai, Republic of Korea Navy guided-missile destroyer ROKS Sejong the Great and US guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville are shown. The USS Chancellorsville has been upgraded to an advanced version of the Aegis combat system that makes it easier to send threat information to other units with similar combat systems.

INTELLIGENT DEVELOPMENT: MANAGING DATA THROUGH THE CMS

A combat management system (CMS) is as essential in a modern warship as any of the platform’s sensors and weapons.

by Dr Lee Willett

Discussion of naval ship and submarine capabilities often focuses on the sensors and effectors the platforms carry. Equally important onboard any platform, however, is and always has been the combat management system (CMS).

In the modern – and likely future – operational environment at sea, the role of the CMS is likely to become even

more pronounced. As navies, their joint and combined force partners, and senior military and political decision makers become more focused on the rapid and effective use of the increasing amounts of data naval platforms are bringing onboard, the outputs of a CMS will have greater impact.

Such impact can be quantified in several ways. For example, a CMS must integrate with other systems onboard

and with other platforms, and must process and disseminate data to ensure the right effects are delivered by the right platforms at the right place and time. A CMS must also be integrated with emerging technologies like autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI), to enable the more rapid and efficient processing and disseminating of such data. Emerging technologies like autonomy and AI are critical in alleviating the

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processing and disseminating pressure building on the human operator because of the increasing amounts of data being brought onboard, and thus in allowing the operator to focus on decision making and operational outputs.

Given the importance of the CMS in contemporary naval operations, it is thus no surprise that highly capable CMS systems are in much demand by navies; it is no surprise either that CMS systems are appearing more centrally in discussions about platform capability requirements. Given the increased focus on effective use of data, procuring the right CMS is at the heart of every discussion regarding every ship type, from aircraft carriers down to patrol vessels.

Aegis at heart

For a major navy like the US Navy (USN), its major platforms are dominated by a major CMS – in the USN’s case, Lockheed Martin’s Aegis combat system. Aegis has been developed now up to Baseline 10. The USN’s first Flight III DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Jack H Lucas, which was launched in June 2021, is fitted to Aegis Baseline 10 standard. The Flight III Arleigh Burkes require a CMS of such an advanced standard in order to rapidly process and disseminate the high levels of data they will bring in to meet their core task

of integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) – a task of increased significance in contemporary and likely future naval combat requirements.

However, as naval operations in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific

theatres return to a focus on highend warfare, so there is an increasing requirement to generate the kinds of CMS capabilities and outputs habitually available to larger platforms for smaller platforms as well.

Lockheed Martin’s COMBATSS-21 CMS is a core example of the development of a CMS designed to provide a capability similar to Aegis, but one that can be fitted to smaller platforms and even connected into Aegis itself.

On 21 May 2022, the USN’s latest Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was commissioned into service. The Freedom-class LCS platforms carry COMBATSS-21 as their CMS.

Some analysts see COMBATSS-21 as a ‘lighter’ version of Aegis, scaled for use onboard smaller ships. Crucially, however, as Lockheed Martin derived COMBATSS-21 directly from Aegis, the software make-up of COMBATSS-21 is closely linked and closely integrated to that of Aegis, especially through use of the Common Source Library (CSL).

In developing a contemporary CMS capability, the software within the CMS is far more important than the physical hardware of consoles bolted into a platform’s combat information centre. Thus, COMBATSS-21 is designed almost as a sub-set of Aegis, a CMS capability

The Aegis combat information centre (CIC) onboard the USN Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Higgins.

Leonardo’s Athena (Architecture & Technologies

Handling Electronic Naval Applications) combat management system

that can be integrated easily with the software and data generated by its Aegis ‘big brother’.

Open architecture

A central component of COMBATSS21’s design is an open architecture construct. This enables CMS capabilities to be tailored in the first instance for the platform in question, and then for subsequent software upgrades to be integrated seamlessly. Central to integrating COMBATSS-21 with Aegis is access to the CSL. According to Lockheed Martin, CSL is “a software repository that allows for sharing and reuse of code – without an additional cost. This way, when software is developed, debugged, or upgraded, it can quickly be released across a fleet, similar to how smartphones receive app updates”.

“Instead of developing new code, COMBATSS-21 brings existing code from an Aegis ship into a smaller ship. Because the navy has already invested in Aegis, using COMBATSS-21 reduces cost

for integration, test, and certification by eliminating redundancies,” Lockheed Martin stated.

COMBATSS-21 was developed originally for the Freedom-class LCSs. With LCS designed to be forward deployed, rapidly engaged, and flexibly used, a CMS that is quick in its processes and adaptable in its outputs is integral to the LCS concept. The commonality in software between Aegis and COMBATSS-21 reduces development, testing, integration, operational, and maintenance costs, and means that sailors – for example, in the case of the USN – can switch from Arleigh Burke destroyers to Freedom LCSs while having inherent familiarity with both CMS systems.

The utility of the Freedom-class LCS capability, including that of its COMBATSS-21 CMS, was demonstrated in mid-2022 when fifth-in-class Freedom LCS vessel USS Sioux City conducted a five-month deployment to the EuroAtlantic theatre and beyond into the

Middle East. Operating under US Sixth Fleet and US Fifth Fleet command, USS Sioux City was the first Freedom-class LCS to operate in these theatres. In the case of operating under US Fifth Fleet, USS Sioux City supported the USNled Combined Maritime Forces’ (CMF) multinational Combined Task Force (CTF) 153, which operates from the Red Sea down to the Gulf of Aden.

The ship was able to clearly demonstrate its adaptability. Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander US Fifth Fleet and Commander CMF, pointed to the ship’s ability to integrate immediately and seamlessly into CTF 153.

Integrated intelligence

One company looking to develop a robust role for AI in its CMS is BAE Systems, with its INTeACT product. INTeACT builds upon BAE Systems’ DNA/CMS-1 CMS, which is installed in a wide variety and number of UK Royal Navy (RN) surface ships – including from aircraft carriers to patrol vessels.

The Royal Bahrain Navy’s Al Taweelah fast attack missile boat which has received Leonardo’s Athena combat management system, the sixth of its type to receive this CMS.

Royal Bahrain Navy

Alongside integrating AI within the system, INTeACT is also designed around an open architecture software construct. Emphasising the focus on integrating software in enabling CMS output, INTeACT uses what BAE Systems refers to as a software development kit (SDK).

In a June 2022 update on INTeACT and SDK development, the company stated “The SDK offers open interfaces and emulation tools allowing software engineers to develop their own applications that can integrate with open CMSs such as INTeACT.”

SDK also brings, at this stage, a particular capability focus. “Initially aimed at applications dealing with tactical picture visualisation, track correlation, and track identity recommendations, the SDK consists of a collection of open interfaces and components supported by tutorials and API [application programming interface] documentation,” BAE Systems added.

The SDK approach is designed to shorten and de-risk software integration processes onboard platforms and with other CMS systems, the company

added. SDK also allows third parties to create software applications that can be integrated into in-service ships.

On the latter aspect, in May 2022 BAE Systems and the RN hosted an ‘INTeACT

SDK Codeathon’ in London, at which third-party teams brought different application ideas to test prospective integration into INTeACT through SDK.

In the June 2022 update, BAE Systems

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The Thales TACTICOS CMS will be integrated into the new Arrowhead140p frigate which will form the basis of the Royal Navy’s Type 31 and Polish Navy’s Miecznik (Swordfish) frigates

noted that “Development on the next release of the SDK is well under way.” It added that this release, INTeACT v2.2, was planned for the second half of 2022.

European CMS

Leonardo’s Athena (Architecture & Technologies Handling Electronic Naval Applications) is designed to handle increasing quantities of data into Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) as they develop. It can be used across all types of naval ships, from patrol boats through to aircraft carriers.

It is based on scalable architecture that increasingly includes command and control (C2) capabilities to manage a broader range of threats, including threat such as over the horizon hypersonic missiles. Information on threats from onboard and, crucially, off-board sensors need to be managed and shared to deploy a countermeasure in whatever form that will take.

In April, Leonardo completed the upgrade of the sixth and final Royal Bahrain Navy Ahmed Al Fateh-class guided-missile vessel Al Taweelah. This represented the completion of an upgrade order worth $50 million that was awarded in 2015.

Thales’ TACTICOS mature combat management system supports mission systems including sensor control, picture

compilation, situation assessment, action support and weapon control. According to the company

The TACTICOS has recently been selected for the Polish Navy’s new Miecznik (Swordfish) frigate procurement programme, which will be produced to Babcock's Arrowhead140PL design. The Polish Navy already operates with TACTICOS as do 24 other international naval customers, according to Thales.

The UK’s Royal Navy has also selected TACTICOS for its new general purpose, multi-role Type 31 frigates, which again is to be based on the Arrowhead-140 design, and which will replace the existing Type 23s. Five Type-31s are planned, to be known as the Inspiration-class, the first vessel to be laid down being HMS Venturer. The Royal Navy will work with Thales as the mission system integrator to shape its own version of TACTICOS.

Saab says that its mature 9LV CMS system can be integrated with any subsystem or weapons selected by the customer, whether developed by Saab or a third party supplier.

The 9LV can trace its development back to the late 1960s, and is now on the Mark 4 version which is used by several naval customers including on the Swedish Visby-class corvettes and

the Canadian Halifax-class frigates. It combines support for three dimensional warfare - air, surface and sub-surface.

The company has just been confirmed as the local provider of Combat Management Systems (CMS) for the Surface Fleet of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) after the signing of the final phase of the Enterprise Partnering Agreement (EPA). Saab will install the Australian CMS (AusCMS) onto the RAN’s six different classes of surface warship fleet.

“As a key part of the Government’s enterprise approach to shipbuilding, realisation of the EPA will see Saab’s AusCMS equip up to six classes of warships in the surface fleet, along with developing the Australian Interface for the Hunter and Hobart classes,” said Saab Australia’s managing director, Andy Keough

Saab’s 9LV combat system is integrated into the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) ANZAC class frigates. It’s CMS will be integrated on six classes of RAN warships following a recent agreement.

Saab

CHINA’S STEALTHY AREA DENIAL

Is

China already too far ahead with its A2AD strategy, or is it more of a political means to an end ?

by Jon Lake

When Low Observability (LO) to radar, or ‘Stealth’, was first talked about, the concept was widely misunderstood. People thought that stealth rendered aircraft effectively invisible to radar, thereby conferring invulnerability to enemy air defences. The truth was more nuanced, and was always about delaying detection, and about mission planning to avoid the most dangerous threats.

Anti-access/area denial (know widely as A2/AD) has been similarly misunderstood and over-estimated. The complex web of systems developed and deployed in an effort to achieve A2/AD capabilities does not create an impenetrable ‘keep-out zone’, nor does it guarantee the destruction of any enemy system foolish enough to enter an area, it just extends the range and area at which a given part of the battlespace may be judged to be more highly contested.

The term A2/AD is most closely associated with the People's Republic of China (China), which developed the concept after realising that it had no means of adequately countering or contesting US Navy carrier battle groups, which effectively had enjoyed uncontested access to waters that China viewed as its own. This situation became obvious in July 1995, when the US dispatched two US carrier battle groups to the Republic of China (ROC - Taiwan) after a series of Chinese missile firings and highly publicised amphibious assault exercises, and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could do nothing to halt it.

China was eager to prevent any future ‘interference’ with what it views as its ‘internal affairs’, and in particular to limit the USA’s ability to respond to Chinese moves against Taiwan. To achieve this, it needed to push US forces further back from China’s coast, and

it did this by deploying a raft of new systems, defensive and offensive, all linked via a better integrated command and control system. But this was not just a practical matter of preventing interference over Taiwan. The ability of the US Navy to operate unrestrained in China’s back yard was an affront to China’s national pride, and there was an emotionally-driven desire to be able to push US forces out of the maritime areas surrounded by the Nine Dash Line.

China based its A2/AD concept on the ‘Sea Denial’ or ‘Bastion Strategy’ favoured by the Russians, using very long-range land, air and sea-based precision fire and ballistic missile capabilities to hold enemy force elements at risk over much greater distances.

For anti-access, China relies on advanced land-attack ballistic and cruise missiles such as the DF-26 to threaten US ships, forcing America’s aircraft carriers back to a distance at

The US Navy’s perception of China’s anti-access area denial (A2AD) defensive layers in 2016. Hypersonic missiles are now in the mix and are a considerable threat to US Navy carrier operations.

Office of Naval Intelligence Image

which the effectiveness of their aircraft would be severely reduced, and forcing back surface ships so far that their Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) become an irrelevance. The same missiles also threaten military facilities on the vital Pacific islands of Okinawa and Guam. Guam, a base for American strategic bombers such as the Boeing’s B-1, B-2 and B-52, is now considered to be wholly at risk. China’s DF-26 has even been widely labelled as "the Guam killer.”

China’s long-range missiles are supported by a rapidly growing number of space-based sensors, including a constellation of Naval Ocean Surveillance System satellites. These provide persistent coverage of the waters surrounding China and could provide targeting for anti-ship ballistic missiles.

China’s anti-ship and cruise missiles can reach out to beyond the so-called First Island Chain. This string of islands includes the Kuril Islands, the Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands (notably Okinawa), Taiwan, and the northern part of the Philippines, effectively enclosing the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In some interpretations the First Island Chain runs down the northern part of Indonesia and on to Singapore, and thus includes all of the area enclosed by China’s infamous ‘Nine Dash Line’, which has been used to define and justify its extended claims on the territorial waters of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia.

Land based anti-ship missiles on the mainland already cover an area far beyond the First Island Chain, and almost as far as the Second Island Chain. But missile systems have also already been deployed on some of the manmade (or artificially expanded) islands and reefs in the South China Sea – most notably on Woody Island, the largest of the Paracel islands – further extending their reach. The deployment of 124 mile (200 kilometre) range HQ-9 surface-toair missiles (a derivative of the Russian S-300 system) to islands and reefs where there are already Chinese military bases and airfields would provide Surface-toAir Missile (SAM) coverage over large areas within the Nine Dash Line, while fighters or a longer range SAM system, like the Russian S-400 - designed to engage targets out to 250 miles (400 km) using 40N6 missiles - could create overlapping MEZs covering the entire area.

By extending the deployment of surface-to-surface weapons to the Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs virtually the whole area within the ‘Nine Dash Line’ would lie within the range of the 250 mile (400km) range YJ-62 ASCM (anti-ship cruise missile), while the 950 mile (1,550km) range DF-21 MRBM would be able to threaten Malaysia, Singapore, and most of Indonesia.

The 1,367 mile (2,200km) CJ-10 LACM would extend the area at risk to Jakarta and Palau. Even without these weapons, the DF-26B intermediaterange ballistic missile (IRBM), can hit targets out to distances of between 1,864 miles and 3,417 miles – placing Guam and even New Delhi at risk.

Ending US dominance

Developed to counter US and allied multi-domain power projection platforms like carrier strike groups and

long-range bombers, China’s A2/AD capabilities aim to remove the advantage of uncontested air (and maritime) dominance that the US has enjoyed in recent campaigns, and to erode the freedom of action that such dominance has afforded. Put simply, the aim is to be able to impose cost on enemy forces operating within the area covered by an A2/AD ‘umbrella’, and to make the preferred US model of expeditionary warfare increasingly difficult, putting at risk the safe bases and sanctuaries upon which the previous approach depended.

China relies on fighter aircraft and an intricate network of air and missile defence platforms for area denial, and has made real efforts to improve its air defence capabilities, deploying Shaanxi Y-8J, KJ-200H, KJ-500 and KJ-2000 airborne early warning aircraft, and Y-8CB, Y-8DZ, Y-8JB, Y-8JZ and Y-9DZ electronic intelligence platforms, Y-8G

The test launch of a Chinese Dongfeng (DF-26) missile.

A Chinese PLA Air Force Shaanxi KJ-500 third-generation airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft - one of many dedicated to the air defence role.

and Y-9G jammers and the Y-8T Airborne Command Post, as well as a variety of tankers. Its fighter force now includes the notionally ‘fifth generation’ Chengdu J-20, while the J-35 (broadly equivalent to the F-35) is under development. Other PLA Air Force fighters will soon deploy the new PL-20 and PL-21 very long range air-to-air missiles – intended to take down high-value assets such as airborne early warning and tanker aircraft. These weapons would further enhance area denial capabilities by forcing US forcemultipliers like tankers and EW aircraft to operate further back, or risk being shot down. The effect is to turn a benign environment into a more contested one, and to force the US and its allies to return to having to face the real prospect of suffering losses in a peer-level conflict.

Playing Catch-up

Surprisingly, the US seems to have failed to do anything much to try to prevent the deployment of China’s A2/AD systems while they were being developed and initially deployed, or even to develop effective counters. Perhaps this was because it was felt that there was nothing that could be done – or perhaps because the US failed to fully comprehend early enough what was happening.

China advanced its A2/AD strategy while the US was fighting successful campaigns in the Balkans and the Middle East. These resulted in a degree of US complacency, and senior US politicians, officials and military commanders found it hard to conceive of another nation challenging US military power. Later, the Pentagon became distracted while fighting less successful counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And while the US has had to project power across the globe, Beijing has been laser-focused on regional hegemony and on Taiwan, and has bolstered its A2/AD capabilities in an effort to place US forces at risk over more and more of the region.

It has to be acknowledged that while A2/AD capabilities may give an opponent the ability to threaten or even shape a space, they do not allow that enemy to wholly control that space, and they may be insufficient to prevent or limit tactical and strategic offensive operations within it.

The use of Low Observable aircraft, well supported by SEAD and electronic attack may not be sufficient to allow the degree of air dominance that US pilots have been used to, and may not allow them to be able to operate entirely unmolested. But it may well be enough to allow some elements of US air power to operate without suffering prohibitive losses, and for those elements to achieve their operational goals – especially if they are able to use very long range

stand off weapons to stand well back from their targets.

But A2/AD does more than merely creating a contested space out of one that may previously have been uncontested or benign. Although tactical aircraft might be able to operate within China’s A2/AD ‘bubble’ without suffering an unsustainable loss rate, they might not be able to penetrate it far enough to be useful. Given that not all targets will be conveniently located close to the enemy coast (and in China they may be a long way inland), US aircraft may have to get close to the coast before launching their stand-off weapons. This will entail launching from bases or aircraft carriers that are well within the range of enemy missiles, or making a final refuelling from a tanker within about 500 miles (800km) of the missile launch box. This may make the mission effectively unflyable.

This is because larger and more vulnerable enablers and support aircraft, including airborne early warning and control (AEW&CS) platforms, EW aircraft, and most crucially of all, air-toair refuelling tankers, may not be able to operate so far forward, and could be pushed so far back that they are unable to support the fighters and attack aircraft.

In one US large scale wargame, US combat air platforms achieved their initial goals, only to find that all of their tankers had been shot down as they returned for post strike refuelling, and therefore ran out of fuel before they could return to base!

There has been some pushback even against using the term ‘A2/AD’ on the basis that it creates a disproportionate impression of vulnerability and thereby gives too much credit to potential adversaries.

A recent picture of one of PLA Air Force’s newest fighters, the J-35.

Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) transits the contested Taiwan Strait during a routine transit near PLA(N) ships on 28 August, 2022.

Less Effective

Certainly operational experience in Syria and the Ukraine has indicated that the effectiveness of even the latest doubledigit surface-to-air missile systems is lower than was once supposed. Logically it would follow that SAMs create smaller and less effective A2/AD bubbles than has sometimes been assumed. Whether or not this is the case, the use of LO technology on aircraft and air-launched platforms makes US air power hard to stop!

Nor can China rely on its ballistic missiles to knock out US air power on the ground. In 2013, the United States deployed a Lockheed Martin Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) battery to Guam to protect the base against ballistic missile and other threats, while Raytheon Patriot/PAC-3 batteries were deployed to protect its military bases on Okinawa. These land based missile defence systems are augmented by some 17 Aegis BMD-capable vessels deployed in the Pacific.

As well as protecting these main bases, the US is adopting an agile employment doctrine that will see US forces deploying to remote airfields across the Pacific region rather than to main operating bases. These airfields will have their runways lengthened where necessary, and will be provisioned with pre-positioned spares, repair equipment and fuel. More capable commandand-control systems will be fielded

to co-ordinate the operations of more widely dispersed forces. This promises to complicate Chinese targeting, and to reduce the risk of losing assets in a preemptive strike.

While China’s A2/AD capabilities may have no more effect on US air power operations than imposing a higher attrition rate, they may be more effective in the maritime domain.

Surface vessels represent big and vulnerable targets, whose loss would be harder to stomach than the loss of a fast jet or two. Moreover, considering the limited combat radius of carrier-borne aircraft without large-scale support from aerial refuelling tankers, the ability to keep an American carrier battle group at arm’s length may be all that China’s A2/AD capability needs to achieve if it is to ‘dissuade, deter, or, if required, defeat third-party intervention against a largescale, theatre-wide campaign” mounted by China’s People’s Liberation Army.’ Such as might be required in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan!

Flashpoint Taiwan

China’s growing military confidence has been reflected in an increasingly belligerent approach to its regional neighbours, and many believe that Taiwan is rapidly becoming the world’s most dangerous flashpoint. The head of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, warned the US Senate that China could try to annex Taiwan

“in this decade, in fact within the next six years.” LtGen. S. Clinton Hinote, US Air Force deputy chief of staff for strategy, integration and requirements has pointed out that: “Three of China’s standing war plans are built around a Taiwan scenario. They’re planning for this. Taiwan is what they think about all the time.”

China’s A2/AD capabilities will complicate any US response to such an operation, and may even prevent the US from intervening at all. While US Air Power might be able to operate in the face of China’s A2/AD, there are real concerns that in a modern multi-domain conflict in the Pacific, America could struggle to stop Chinese forces from invading Taiwan.

Bonnie Glaser, director of the China power project at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSII) in Washington, revealed that in: “Every simulation that has been conducted looking at the threat from China by 2030, and there have been various ones carried out, for example in the event of China invading Taiwan, have all ended up with the defeat of the US.”

LtGen. S. Clinton Hinote says that: “The trend in our war games was not just that we were losing, but we were losing faster.” Hinote concluded that: “If the US military doesn’t change course we’re going to lose fast. In that case, an American president would likely be presented with almost a fait accompli.”

On the other hand, more and more effective countermeasures may become available to protect warships and air bases against long range cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, and perhaps even to protect vulnerable US tankers and other enablers.

But that may not be the point, since some have suggested that China’s A2/ AD strategy may be a political rather than a military tool. The suggestion is that the strategy is intended to shape the peacetime environment in order to allow China to advance its strategic interests without recourse to military power, and not as an aid to actual war-fighting. The strategy has already disrupted freedom of navigation for US Navy and allied forces operating in the disputed and increasingly tense waters of the South China Sea, and may already have introduced doubt among the USA’s Pacific allies regarding the ability of US Pacific Command (USPACOM) to respond to Chinese pressure.

A soldier assigned the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, performs a system evaluation of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, 2019.