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Lemo
Martin
The need to extend the reach of unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance which still allowing operation from ships or small land sites with minimal support has the Marines and Navy considering the Martin V-Bat UAS (shown). These would be introduced in the increase of Marine VMU squadrons.
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between 60-122m (200-400ft); approximately 4,000 tons displacement; accommodate 75 Marines and a crew of no more than 40; provide 744 square metres (8,000 square feet) of deck space for equipment; and have an unrefuelled range of 3,500 nautical miles (6,480km) at a transit speed of 14 knots (26km/h). Its ability to move personnel and equipment ashore across a beach demands a stern or bow ramp while dictating a maximum draft of 3.6m (12ft). The LAW would have a limited self-defence capability and Tier 2-plus survivability surviving a hit long enough to evacuate personnel. The aggressive schedule anticipates the first vessel being procured in fiscal year 2023 with 28 to 30 envisioned.
MARINE AIR
Beyond the medium and heavy helicopter reductions and additional of VMUs, and aerial refuelling the roles and structure of Marine aviation are per FD2030 “continuing to be analysed”. In particular, the fixed wing Lockheed Martin F-35B VTOL and F-35C carrier version mix remains an ongoing study. The shift to dispersed light forces, moving from larger aviation capable amphibious ships and the stated desire to reinvest could present a number of questions regarding the Air Wing’s future. These could include how fixed wing aircraft (Boeing FA-18 and F-35C) requiring a carrier or fixed airfield fit these expeditionary scenarios.
Given the historically critical role expeditionary based Marine aviation has played in achieving sea control, especially in the Pacific in World War II, this previously decisive capability would be expected to have an integral role. The associated draft Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)
The G/ATOR long-range air surveillance and counter-artillery radar from Northrop Grumman will provide a key role in providing early warning and air direction against expected attacks against dispersed Marine forces.
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Textron
Although the April 2021 Force Design Update ‘Invalidated the requirement’ for an LAV replacement by a similar vehicle, the Marines issued development contacts to Textron Defense and General Dynamics for prototype Amphibious Reconnaissance Vehicles (ARV). These could provide a modular mobile platform for various sensors, as well as, combat, EW, and support roles. Shown is Textron’s Cottonmouth initial configuration.
references the contribution of Offensive Air Support, yet details on its application, and changes considered to address the FD2030 objectives remain largely unaddressed. Since the closely integrated air-ground team has been a key hallmark of the Corps and something that has set it apart from the other services, this is surprising.
LOGISTICS SUPPORT
Logistics support is a major challenge for any military force in the Indo-Pacific as evidenced by the experiences of both the Allies and Japanese in World War II. The difficulties encountered by dispersed small and potentially isolated expeditionary ground units can be expected to be compounded. The FD2030 March 2020 highlighted this stating a lack of confidence that “we have identified the additional structure required” and affirming that “logistics must be a priority for Phase III”. However, neither the FD Updates nor the EABO offer insights into how these critical tasks will be practically addressed. The topic is also fourteenth of 15: “Priority Investments - Expeditionary logistics systems to sustain standIn forces in a contested environment”.
Considering the expanse of the Indo-Pacific and its extended distances, sustaining scattered sites as envisioned in EABO would be a sizeable undertaking. This would be compounded at an outbreak of hostilities, especially for sites positioned “inside the opponents Weapons Engagement Zones (WEZ)” as promoted by FD2030. To grasp the levels to be dealt with consider that the MV-22 flying at 275kts maximum speed would require over three hours to complete, for example, the 380nm resupply turn-around from Manila, Philippines, to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The LAW at its 14knt cruise would require nearly 28 hours to reach the same.
The reality is that as the US Joint Warfare Publication 1 states: “Logistics sets the campaign’s operational limits.” Or, most appropriate for a Pacific war, US Navy Adm Raymond Spruance’s observation still holds true, that “a sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail…”.
FD2030 AND WIDER MISSIONS
FD2030’s objective is to essentially establish distributed A2AD zones “inside an adversaries weapons engagement zone (WEZ)” requiring a focus on extreme longrange fires and the elimination of many traditional combined arms assets. Some analysts have suggested that the resulting structure could jeopardise the Corps’ ability to execute other designated missions such as small war conflicts and littoral interventions as “a force in readiness”. This is viewed by some with concern since such operations have historically been more prevalent. In addition, its emphasis on light forces and elimination or sizeable down-scaling of armoured formations removes the possibility of offensive ground manoeuvre. A force optimised strictly for small islands would have insufficient mobility, tactical speed, and flexibility to respond and operate to contingencies on larger littoral land masses. These could include providing support, including sea control, to Pacific rim and maritime choke-point countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Here ground manoeuvrability will be an essential requisite.
FD2030 is stated as a ten-year effort. Yet considering its wide scope and number of new equipment initiatives required to implement the design it could reasonably extend beyond this. It will most certainly still be a work in progress into the term on the next Commandant of the Marine Corps in two years. The question is, considering the finality of some of the actions already taken, how much flexibility will remain for him to potentially adjust the Corps’ direction.
