Singapore Airshow

CARRIER GROUP DISAGGREGATION

Dr Lee Willett

here is much theoretical discussion of disaggregated – or dispersed – operations in contemporary Western military activities. The UK Royal Navy’s (RN’s) HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group (CSG) has been actively applying such disaggregation in practice during its inaugural deployment, the CSG21 mission.

Disaggregated operations might be defined as a concept where force elements from a centralised construct like a CSG can disperse, in both geographical and task terms, to operate independently at the tactical level while remaining under operational-level control of the central element.

Speaking at the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) exhibition in London in September, Rear Admiral Martin Connell, the RN’s director Force Generation and assistant chief of Naval Staff for Aviation and Carrier Strike, said that “the force-multiplying, dispersed nature of [the CSG’s operations] is significant.”

Providing this active demonstration of disaggregated operations are: (from the RN fleet) HMS Queen Elizabeth, the Type 45 Daring-class destroyers HMS Defender and HMS Diamond, the Type 23 Duke-class frigates HMS Kent and HMS Richmond, an Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), and two support ships; and (from NATO partners) the US Navy’s (USN’s) DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS The Sullivans and the Royal Netherlands Navy’s (RNLN’s) De Zeven Provincien-class air-defence and command frigate HNLMS Evertsen. Across the CSG21 deployment - from the North Atlantic, through the Mediterranean, and into the Indo-Pacific – carriers, surface ships, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft from allies and partners have worked with the CSG, with several platforms even integrating into the CSG.

The CSG’s disaggregation has been demonstrated in both platform and task terms. In platform terms, right across the deployment ships have detached from the CSG to conduct different operations in different regions – sometimes even in different seas to the CSG. For example, early in the deployment, Defender and Evertsen sailed into the Black Sea to provide presence there while the CSG remained in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea conducting strike operations ashore. In their absence, the Italian Navy Orrizonte-class destroyer ITS Andrea Doria, which had already ‘chopped’ into the CSG, could help provide the carrier’s local area air-defence coverage.

As the CSG sailed in the Western Pacific, Richmond detached to conduct goodwill visits to Vietnam and Indonesia. As well as port visits in Cam Ranh Bay and Jakarta respectively, the frigate conducted Passage/ Passing Exercises (PASSEXs) with the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) Navy Gepard-class frigate Dinh Tien Hoang and the Indonesian Navy first-in-class frigate KRI Bung Tomo. More significantly, while sailing south towards Vietnam, Richmond transited the Taiwan Strait in what could be seen as freedom of navigation deployment. The CSG, meanwhile, continued operations outside the South China Sea’s first island chain.

In task terms, the CSG has operated across the full spectrum of naval, joint, and combined operations. Broadly, the CSG made its presence felt, most prominently during air strikes conducted in combat operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and during exercises in the South China Sea. At the low end of the spectrum, it has contributed regularly to maritime security operations (MSO).

Critics of carrier capability argue that conducting MSO activities is an inefficient use of a carrier’s effects. However, the CSG21 deployment has demonstrated the added effect and value a CSG can bring at the lower end of the operational spectrum. For example, and demonstrating the disaggregation concept, Kent detached from the CSG in the Mediterranean to integrate into NATO’s ‘Sea Guardian’ MSO construct, with the carrier also making a key contribution. As the CSG sailed through the Gulf of Aden as it headed east, it worked both with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Asagiri-class destroyer JS Setogiri to support the JMSDF’s counter-piracy mission and with the USN-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) multinational coalition to support its various maritime security task forces. Of particular value here was the increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability the carrier could bring, for example through the range and quality of sensors fitted across the CSG’s platforms and embarked helicopters.

The disaggregation was enabled by the level of integration across the CSG. This is demonstrated not only by the presence of USN and RNLN surface ships, the ease with which others have ‘chopped’ in and out, and the presence of a combined UK/ US airwing onboard Queen Elizabeth, but also by the ease with which CSG assets have integrated with others. During exercises in the Indo-Pacific region with the USS America amphibious ready group (ARG), Lockheed Martin F-35B aircraft from Queen Elizabeth ‘lily-padded’ onboard America before heading on to strike targets further afield. Such was the success of the CSG’s engagement with the ARG that it opened up further discussion of opportunities for US/ UK integrated engagement.