Language & Communicarion, Printed in Great Britain.
Vol.
7. No.
I, pp. ‘7-90.
LANGUAGE,
1937.
027l-li309i87 93.00 - .OO Peryamon Journals Ltd.
FEMINISM AKD
LINGUISTICS
Deborah Cameron, Feminism and Linguistic Theory, >Iacmillan, London, 1985, 195 pages A review by Margaret Deuchar and a comment by Anthony Holiday FEMINISM AND LINGUISTIC MARGARET
THEORY
DEUCHAR
The title of this book suggests that it might just be the one that feminists have been waiting for. As far as I know there is nothing similar on the market, and I think that feminists will not be disappointed. In fact the book should appeal to a wide range of people, including feminists who want to know about language, linguists who want to know about feminism, as well as to that small band of feminist linguists already in existence. Until now these groups of people have had to rely either on books about feminism which are not so well informed about linguistic theory, or on books which report theories and empirical findings about the relation between language and gender, but which are barely informed by feminist theory. Here, at last, is a book by an author who is both a linguist and a feminist, and who is able to draw on two very different approaches to language in dealing with issues of current relevance to feminists. In addition to its uniqueness of scope, this book has a particular virtue which is shared by all too few academic books in any area. It is clearly written, in an accessible styie which aims to include rather than exclude readers who are unfamiliar with the topics and issues discussed. In addition to technical terms being mostly explained as they are introduced in the text, there is also a useful glossary of terms at the end of the book. As Cameron makes clear in the preface, the clarity of style is deliberate, and represents an attempt to avoid mystification. This is particularly helpfui, as well as unusual, in a book which deals with literature from a wide variety of sources, inchiding that usually considered ‘difficult’, such as work by Lacan. The book consists of nine chapters, of which the eighth outlines Cameron’s own view of the relation between feminism and linguistic theory. The chapters which come before this provide the necessary background for this central chapter, both in terms of material covered and critical argument. The first chapter is an introduction and sets out Cameron’s aims, which include an assessment of the state of the art in feminism and linguistic theory. She points out that although there is a great deal of pubiished material on the subject, there is a great diversity of approaches, so that it is not clear to what extent the same questions are being addressed, or the same conclusions reached. Her aim is what we might call a ‘critical synthesis’, which will include criticism of both feminist views of language and academic linguistics. Correspondence relating to this review should be addressed to Dr. kl. Deuchar, School of European Studies, University of Sussex, Arts Building, Falmer. Brighton BNI 9QS. U.K. 77
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Chapter 2 is an introduction to the relevant aspects of linguistic theory, and deals both with Anglo-American linguistics and with Continental semiology: this is particularly useful since British scholars are rarely competent in both areas. Cameron traces both linguistics and semiology back to a common origin in Saussurean structuralism, and though she recognises that they have diverged since, she shows that what they have in common is their structural approach to language. Cameron also outlines other approaches to language, including the sociolinguistic, which she identifies, along with semiology, as having been the most fruitful for feminist language study. Chapter 3 considers sociolinguistic approaches to sex differences in language and criticises studies conducted within this framework for their focus on women’s speech as deviant, for ‘folklinguistic bias’, and for dubious interpretation and explanation. Sociolinguists working on sex differences would probably contest these criticisms, with at least partial justification: I cannot give detailed consideration to the matter here, as I intend to focus on Cameron’s positive contribution to feminism and linguistic theory which culminates in chapter 8, rather than on defending those she criticises. Thus I shall simply recommend at this point that the reader of Cameron’s book should also read the sociolinguistic studies referred to in chapter 3, in order to determine to what extent Cameron’s criticisms are justified. In chapter 4 Cameron turns to the narrower concerns of ‘mainstream’ or structural linguists, and picks on two areas which she suggests are hostile to a feminist conception of language: that of componential analysis and of grammatical gender. The discussion of gender is particularly interesting and convincing, showing how linguists are wrong to claim that there is no connection between grammatical gender and sex, and how sexism is found not only in the language, but in linguists’ analyses of it. Componential analysis, on the other hand, appears rather more as a straw person, since many semanticists would agree with Cameron in rejecting it as a satisfactory account of meaning. Chapter 5 considers the possibility of feminist linguistic reform, drawing an interesting distinction among opponents of sexist language according to whether they consider language to be ‘symptomatic’ (or the effect of social processes) or ‘causal’ (or the cause of social processes). Cameron does not at this stage make clear which side she would place herself on theoretically, but she does make her practical stance clear. She sees non-sexist language as a myth, showing how apparently non-sexist language can still be used to reflect a sexist reality. She advocates instead what she calls ‘positive language’, or what has elsewhere been called the visibility strategy, that is, using language which draws attention to the existence of women. An example of this is the generic ‘she’, which Cameron uses throughout the book. Chapters 6 and 7 together deal with three feminist approaches to language: the ‘dominant and muted’ model of Shirley and Edwin Ardener, the ‘man made language’ theory of Dale Spender, and the psychoanalytic model of Lacan. The account of Lacan in chapter 7 is particularly valuable, introducing his notion of the ‘symbolic order’ and his claim which is of particular relevance to feminists, that ‘male and female children enter the symbolic order differently’ (p. 119). Cameron argues that the three feminist approaches to language share three basic axioms: linguistic determinism, the idea that men control language, and the assumption that women are at a disadvantage, or alienated, as users of language. Cameron’s critique of these axioms will be further considered below. In chapter 8 Cameron puts forward her own response to the feminist axioms discussed in chapters 6 and 7. She puts forward and defends three propositions: (1) that linguistic
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determination is a myth, (2) that men do not control meaning, and (3) that women’s alienation from language does not exist in the form that some feminists have suggested. Cameron’s justification for these claim, which are central to her book, will be further considered below. In chapter 9 Cameron gives a final summary of what she considers a feminist linguistic theory to be, and examines the questions which all theories of this kind will have to resolve: what is meant by language, and how this relates to gender, to reality, and to disadvantage. In the remainder of this review I intend to deal with Cameron’s central propositions, outlined above, and to determine how well they are supported in her argumentation throughout the book. Cameron’s treatment of the notion of linguistic determinism is one of the most interesting aspects of her book. For those familiar with linguistics it may come as a surprise that this unfashionable notion should be so prevalent in feminist approaches to language, while those familiar with the latter may be forced to confront the assumption of determinism for the first time. Cameron not only produces the standard arguments against determinism, but also a new one which is particularly relevant in the context of feminist theory. Determinism is defined in the glossary (p. 187) as ‘the belief that linguistic structures are ultimately responsible for their users’ conceptualisation of the physical and intellectual universe’. In chapter 6 Cameron traces the way in which the notion originated in two areas: the work of the anthropological linguistics Sapir and Whorf, and in that of Lacan, interpreting Saussure. The account of Sapir-Whorfian determinism is similar to that which can be found in many an introductory linguistics textbook, while that found in Lacan’s work would be new to most Anglo-American linguists. According to Cameron Lacan’s determinism is derived from Saussure’s doctrine ‘that the sign is arbitrary, functioning only in a system of signification’ (p. 95). This statement of Saussure’s position actually contains two propositions about signs: (1) that they are arbitrary; and (2) that they function in a system. While these points are both made by Saussure, it is not clear that he intended the conclusion apparently drawn by Lacan, that ‘the whole continuum of experience is segmented in an arbitrary way by the signifiers of the language’ (p. 95). Cameron does not in fact critically examine Lacan’s interpretation of Saussure. Instead she quotes (p. 95) what the reader might take to be a representative passage from Saussure’s work, in order to show that while he rejected the idea of language as a servant of thought, his position on whether language ‘acts like a straitjacket’ (p. 94) was open to question. Unfortunately the quotation from Saussure skips a whole paragraph which makes clear that Saussure was not a determinist. The missing paragraph includes the following sentence from the same page (112) as the translation of Saussure’s work cited by Cameron: ‘Phonic substance is neither more fixed nor more rigid than thought; it is not a mold into which thought must of necessity fit but a plastic substance divided in turn into distinct parts to furnish the signifiers needed by thought’. This, together with the rest of the quotation, makes it clear that Saussure considers neither language nor thought to determine one another. Leaving aside the question of how Lacan arrived at his assumption of determinism, it is clear that it influenced feminists working on the Continent, particularly in France. SapirWhorf determinism, on the other hand, has had more influence on those working within the Anglo-American tradition, such as Dale Spender. As Cameron shows in chapter 6, Spender espouses Sapir-Whorf determinism unashamedly and uncritically. This is a clear indication of the extent to which people outside the field of Anglo-American linguistics have hitherto been untouched by its ideas and assumptions, which include the dubiousness of determinism.
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In the remaining feminist approach which Cameron considers, the ‘dominant and muted’ model, Cameron finds more equivocation in relation to determinism. Women are represented in this model as a muted group who have their own conception of reality, though this cannot be expressed in the language of the dominant group. But as Cameron points out, if we are to assume determinism then how could women arrive at their own conception of reality in the first place; and if not, then why could women not find the language to express their reality? The arguments which Cameron puts forward against determinism are a combination of the standard arguments found in linguistics textbooks and some of her own. The standard arguments include the possibility of translation and second language learning, the fact that Ianguage changes, and the possibility that Ianguage may be an effect rather than a cause of the way people look at the world. The last is the classic ‘chicken or egg’ problem which Cameron puts aside towards the very end of the book, where she suggests (p. 169) that even if language is causal, there is no reason to accord it such a privileged status in the construction of reality. Instead she prefers to see it as simply one of the possible determinants, along with socio-familial relations, the physical environment, and individual genetic make-up. A more interesting and novel argument against determinism, however, is summed up in the statement (p. 143) that ‘Where there is no determinacy, there can be no determinism’. Following Roy Harris, determinacy is explained as the assumption that language is a code with a fixed set of correspondences between form and meaning. Cameron argues that this assumption is incorrect, since the meaning of some forms varies according to the context, and speakers can be creative and innovative in their production and interpretation of meaning. However, the assumption of determinacy has been dominant in linguistics and leads, according to Cameron, to determinism, If this is correct one might immediately wonder why determinism is then not also dominant in linguistics, and why linguistics textbooks are at pains to argue against it. The solution to this probIem appears to be that determinacy is in fact a necessary condition of determinism but not a sufficient one, or, in other words, that determinism entails determinacy but not the reverse. It does seem reasonable to argue that you can only hold that language determines thought if your notion of language is one of fixed correspondences between form and meaning. On the other hand, you can hold that language consists of fixed form-meaning correspondences without subscribing to determinism. In the Iatter case you simply need to take on board the argument about translation and second language learning in order to avoid determinism. Thus the correct argument is not that determinacy leads to determinism, but that determinacy is a necessary condition of determinism, a point actually made by Cameron in the statement quoted at the beginning of this paragraph: ‘Where there is not determinacy, there can be no determinism’. If we agree that determinacy is a myth, then Cameron seems right in concluding that determinism is one also. The second feminist axiom which Cameron seeks to refute is the idea that men control Ianguage. The third axiom, that women are alienated from language, appears to follow from the second, so both wilf be dealt with under the heading of control. The notion of male control seems to permeate feminist approaches to language as much as that of determinism. In fact, as Cameron tells us (p. 102) ‘Determinism and control are the twin foundation stones on which feminist theories of women’s oppression, alienation and silence are built’. What Cameron does not explain, however, is why these two are twins. Perhaps it is because in order to assume that men control language, we have to assume that women
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are subject to linguistic determinism, and unable to escape from the ‘straitjacket’ of language designed by men. But why should men escape determinism? If language controls the thought of human beings, then how can a particular group of people seize control of language at the expense of another? The concept of power might help to explain why men have more control of the resources of society than do women, but language is not subject to their control, according to Cameron, because of its indeterminacy. What determinism and control then seem to have in common is that they both assume determinacy; but they both otherwise appear to be quite independent of one another, even contradictory. This contradiction is not explored by Cameron, but she does make clear that rejecting determinacy leads to the rejection of all three feminist axioms. Determinism, male control and female alienation are not only based on shaky intellectual foundations, as Cameron shows, but as she indicates, they can allow little optimism for feminists. Cameron’s message, however, is an optimistic one: if instead of viewing language as an abstract object, we look at how it can be used to oppress women, that very metalinguistic practice can lead to emancipation. The antidote to determinism thus appears to be metalinguistics.
LANGUAGE
AND LIBERATION
ANTHONY
HOLIDAY
All revolutionaries have grappled with language and the problems engenderd by the urge to theorise about it. Thus Luther translated the Bible into German, giving practical expression to his doctrine that salvation depended on the pure-hearted hearing the Word. From similar motives, the Puritans purged the Liturgy. Rousseau contrived a theory of the origins of language which would accord with his contractarian political vision, and Stalin debated with the disciples of the Soviet linguist, N. Y. Marr, about the relation in which language might be held to stand to Marx’s base super-structure model of the workings of history. More especially has it been the case that those revolutionaries engaged in the liberation struggles which have taken place in our half of this century have had to deal with the experience of language as a constraining force. For them it has been an oppressor’s weapon which they needed to deflect, destroy or transform into a weapon of the oppressed. This holds true not only of the American civil rights struggles against the survivals of slaveculture, embodied in the language of racial insult and in legalese. It is true also of colonial situations, where colonisers exported their language and the culture it supported along with the technology used to exploit the natural resources of subject peoples. More especially, and, (for the purposes of the ensuing discussion), most significantly, it is true of conditions of ‘internal’ or ‘special’ colonialism, such as presently obtained in South Africa, where the meaning of the very word ‘apartheid’ is at stake, along with the rights of the colonised peoples to be described as they describe themselves, rather than as ‘kaffirs’ or ‘coolies’. The parallels which suggest themselves between the struggle against special colonialism and the Women’s Movement’s current engagement with the problems of linguistic theory Correspondence
relating to this paper should be addressed to A. Holiday, Linacre College, Oxford. U.K.