Extraterritorial state responsibility by VSF Justicia Alimentaria Global

Extraterritorial state responsibility The plundering of resources in sub-Saharan Africa

Extraterritorial state responsibility. The plundering of resources in sub-Saharan Africa. Authorship:

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Coordination of research and publication: Silvia Fernández and Ferrán García, Veterinarios Sin Fronteras. Technical Consultants: David Gallar, Isabel Vara Sánchez and Sara Martínez Frías, Instituto de Sociología y Estudios Campesinos (Institute for Sociology and Rural Studies) – ISEC –. Jessica Duncan, from the Centre for Food Policy, City University, London. Review and editing: Delphine OrtegaPhotography: Ana Belén Simón. Photography: Ana Belén Simón Design, illustration of the cover and layout: Laura Fernández Blanco Based in the original layout by Freepress S.Coop.Mad. Contents on this document are under a Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 3.0 Unported License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/deed.es

Index INTRODUCTION

PART I THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

The principles and main elements of Food Sovereignty

Human Rights and Food Sovereignty

Food Sovereignty and Gender

The situation of African farmers with regards to Food Sovereignty

THE WORLD GOVERNANCE OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

The Committee on World Food Security (CFS)

Principles and Directives for the Large-scale Acquisition and Leasing of Land

Food Sovereignty and the European Union

PART II INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

ALLIANCE FOR A GREEN REVOLUTION IN AFRICA: UNLEARNED LESSONS

COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The EPAs and African regional disintegration

The impact of EPAs upon Food Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa

PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS FOR THE CORPORATE IMPLANTATION OF THE SPANISH STATE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Spain’s Commerce and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior (Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade – ICEX)

Spanish international cooperation: investment as a tool for development policies

The Africa Plan

PART III THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The ﬁshing industry and ﬁsh-farming

Agricultural Production

Land accumulation

110

Genetic erosion and the loss of biodiversit

120

The extraterritorial responsibility of states and of transnational companies as a tranversal element of the threats to African food sovereignty

131 136

RECOMMENDATIONS For the world governance of food security

136

Concerning the Principles and Directives for the Large-scale Acquisition and Leasing of Land

137

Concerning Food Sovereignty and the European Union

138

Concerning ﬁshing

139

Concerning agricultural investment

140

BIBLIOGRAPHY

141

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Introduction Increasingly over the past few years, many African countries have seen their populations’ access to food come under threat and become restricted. Amongst other reasons, this is a consequence of the ever more aggressive implementation of agro-industrial policies promoted by African as well as foreign governments. The result of these policies is the growing presence of foreign multinationals on the African continent, many of which are European – including Spanish ones – and that hoard and exploit its natural resources in order to meet the demand in their countries of origin as well as in other countries; all of this being done at a rate that is dictated by the current global food industry, also known as “agribusiness”. As will be exposed in this report, the way in

This report analyses the main threats to Food Sovereignty in Africa and sets out three case studies researched by Veterinarios Sin Fronteras in three African countries: Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda. Finally, as a result of the joint identiﬁcation with several African farming and ﬁshing organisations, recommendations are proposed to the various key decision-makers enabling progress towards guaranteeing Food Rights and Sovereignty in Africa.

In the 2010 report “The state of food insecurity in the world”, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated that there were 925 million malnourished persons in the world. Food insecurity, deﬁned as the lack of access to suﬃcient, nutritious, harmless and

get worse due to the on-going international and national policies that promote the development of industrial agriculture and the new threats made by the international political context of the exploitation and privatising of African natural resources.

The problem of famine in the world is a fundamentally rural and more specifically feminine problem culturally adapted food, affects 1,300 million more people who suffer from nourishment deficiencies”, as well as a billion people who suffer from obesity (ibid). The figures for Sub-Saharan Africa are devastating: 30% of the population experiences famine and there are 239 million undernourished persons (FAO, 2010). The situation continues to

which this production outline (considering food as merchandise) and the manner in which it is implemented in the majority of African countries violates human rights – including the right to food – and threatens the Food Sovereignty of African people.

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The fact that the amount of undernourished people is incessantly rising in the world and particularly in Africa confirms the observation that this is not a technical and agronomical productivity issue, but that it is instead a political issue of access to natural resources and to food that depends upon the organisation of the world system, as well as the role of the food industry system protected by international trade institutions. At the same time, the proliferation of international institutions and instruments that have been created to fight poverty and to increase food security is inversely proportional to the efficiency that they have effectively demonstrated. It should be underlined that the problem of

famine in the world is a fundamentally rural and more specifically feminine problem: 70% of undernourished persons live in rural areas (FAO, 2008) and it is estimated that of these, seven out of ten persons who die of starvation are women and young girls, which leads to the need to reconsider agricultural, rural and development policies. The propositions for the resolution of these issues revolve around three concepts: the Right to Food (RF), Food Security (FS) and Food Sovereignty (FSov). At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we politically uphold the idea of Food Sovereignty as an integrated proposition that enables the fulfilment of the Right to Food, also including an alternative development context that addresses the social, economic, environmental and cultural consequences of the Western development model and its food industry system. The proposition of Food Sovereignty, originating in the Southern farmers’ movements and organised by the La Vía Campesina (LVC) organisation and complemented by various sectors of civil society, represents an alternative based upon the debunking of the “myths” of the current development model. It proposes the creation of a localised food industry system in which farmers, persons involved in small-scale fishing and herding can have access to natural resources and apply their traditional management systems, which have been proven to be able to durably meet their needs and those of their communities. All of this is included within a proposal that furthermore defends the environmental aspect by envisaging the effects of large-scale food industry on climate change and environmental pollution. In Sub-Saharan Africa the defence of Food Sovereignty and access to resources by the aforementioned sectors is in danger and is more and more worrying. In this report, Veterinarios Sin Fronteras aim to show how the threat to Food Sovereignty manifests itself, putting particular emphasis upon the way in which the presence of

European – including Spanish – companies constitutes one of the main factors that threatens Food Sovereignty.

Veterinarios Sin Fronteras delegates visited Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda twice; the first visit took place in November and December of 2010 and the second in April of 2011. On both occasions, the organisation met with farmers’, fishermen’s, fishwives’ representatives and leaders, non-government organisations, public authorities and with the representatives of various European companies involved in agricultural and fishery operations in the aforementioned countries. These visits gave rise to the three case studies that will be exposed in this report and that illustrate the negative effects entailed by the promotion, on the part of African and European governments, of agro-industrial policies that ignore the rights of local communities, stripping them of the access to resources and, as a result, of their Food Sovereignty. Exposing these will show the importance of disposing of the de-

CHIMOIO LOCAL MARKET, MOZAMBIQUE.

1 An organisation that brings together 149 farmers’ organisations from 69 countries around the world that in turn represent millions of rural families.

THE PLUNDERING OF RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

liberate recognition within international legal instruments of the so-called “extraterritorial responsibility” of states for what their citizens and companies do in other nations.

cal and commercial interests of the State and of Spanish companies. This way we will conduct a critical analysis based on the concept of “anticooperation”.

This report therefore consists of six chapters. The ﬁrst chapter addresses the development of the concept of Food Sovereignty, positioning the main thematic axes, their links with women’s issues and those of farmers’ movements and other agents for their practical construction.

In chapter 6, entitled “The main threats to Food Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa”, we present the case studies and the various threats are studied according to the following aspects: industrial ﬁshing, agricultural production, land-hoarding, and the genetic erosion and loss of biodiversity.

The second chapter analyses the existing governance spaces for Food Sovereignty on the international and regional stages, putting particular emphasis upon the recent reform of the FAO’s Committee on Food Security, which can potentially open up new intervention spaces for civil society. It also studies the principles and directives concerning large-scale land acquisition that have been deployed (or that are being established) by various international institutions and bodies, as well as the European Union’s main policies that aﬀect, or have the potential to aﬀect Food Sovereignty in Africa.

At the end of the report, Veterinarios Sin Fronteras formulates a set of recommendations that reflect and uphold the claims of several European and African non-government organisations, as well as those of African farmers’ ﬁshermens’ and ﬁshwives’ organisations.

Chapters 3 and 4 will address the situation of Sub-Saharan Africa in the context of the “instruments for the commercialisation of agriculture and food” that are being implemented on the continent, paying specific attention to the role of public policies that link African countries to the European Union. Therefore, we will present its role of its application on the African continent by means of the AGRA initiative (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa); we will analyse the potential effects that would be entailed by the signature of the EPAs or Economic Partnership Agreements, as well as situating the importance of commercial exchanges between both regions. Afterwards, chapter 5 will pay particular attention to the public policies that link Spain and Spanish companies to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the final part of this chapter we will comment on the role of cooperation policies, considering a critical position regarding the various Cooperation Plans as well as the successive Africa Plans that, beyond their good intentions, are used in practice depending upon the politi-

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TRADITIONAL FARM WORK TOOL, MOZAMBIQUE.

PART I

THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

CHIMOIO LOCAL MARKET, MOZAMBIQUE.

THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

Food Sovereignty The origins of the FSov concept stem from La Vía Campesina (LVC), an organisation that brings together 150 farmers’ organisations from 70 countries around the world that in turn represent millions of rural families 2. In 1996 LVC published a proposition shared with other social organisations as a tool with which to confront the use made by institutions of the FS terminology, corresponding to an industrial agriculture model speciﬁc to neoliberal globalisation.

WOMEN WORKING IN THE PROCESSING OF FISH, SANT LOUIS, SENEGAL

The various declarations of intent, some action programmes, political, theoretical and ideological discussions have revolved around three basic concepts with which we must try to treat the problem of famine and food insecurity and propose specific contexts of action that address its true causes: the Right to Food (RA), Food Security (FS) and Food Sovereignty (FSov). In this chapter we will develop the content necessary to acknowledge the signification of the Food Sovereignty (FSov) concept, offering an historic and conceptual explanation of its development. We will address the analysis and proposals made in the context of FSov regarding the integrated issue of the means of production, the handling of natural resources, relationships between the rural and urban worlds, North-South relationships, the exchange of knowledge and the condition of women.

This proposal arose from the perspective of small producing communities and on the basis of the acknowledgement that the issues of famine and poverty particularly affect the rural areas of developing countries. The consideration therefore stems from farmers’ movements in the South who suffer from the measures of restructuring Plans and the regulations imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) aimed at bringing an end to foreign debt. Nonetheless, this proposal integrates and situates farmers in the South and in the North in the same groups affected and excluded by international agrarian and commercial policies. The FSov concept has incorporated other agents and opinions so as to provide integrated answers to the global problems of present-day citizens (and of future generations). It has been adopted by various Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and Non-Government Organisations (NGO), resulting in the generation of a movement in favour of FSov in which farmers’, rural workers’, herders’ and fisherfolks’ organisations, NGOs groups from the academic world, organisations from the environmentalist social movement, feminists responsible consumption movements, etc. take part in the creation and application of the concept. At the present time, the World Forums on Food Sovereignty (WFFSov) and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty

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THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

(IPC) 3 are, along with LVC, the collective spaces of creation of FSov. Within the variety of specific definitions of FSov, one of the most complete ones is given by the WFFSov of Havana: “food sovereignty is the way towards the eradication of famine and malnutrition and the guaranteeing of lasting and durable food security for all peoples. By food sovereignty we mean the peoples’ right to define their own durable policies and strategies for the production, distribution and consumption of food that guarantees the right to food for all the popu-

lation, based upon small- and medium-scale production, respecting its own cultures and the diversity of farming, fishing and livestock techniques means of trade and rural management, in which women play a fundamental role” (WFFSov, 2001). In turn, the Nyeleni WFFSov of 2007 came up with a more concise definition: “Food sovereignty is the people’s right to adequate food from a health and cultural standpoint, obtained by means of durable and ecological methods, and their right to define their own food and agricultural systems”.

ASSOCIATION JUNE 16 FARMERS, MANICA PROVINCE, MOZAMBIQUE

3 http://www.foodsovereignty.org/public/index/indexeng2.php; http://foodsovereignty-org.web34.winsvr.net/

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THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

The principles and main elements of Food Sovereignty In the Rome declaration “Food Sovereignty: a future without famine”, LVC (1996) envisaged seven principles “as a fundamental context necessary for food security”: 1. Food, a Basic Human Right; 2. Agrarian Reform for FSov; 3. the Protection of Natural Resources; 4. the Reorganisation of the Food Trade; 5. the Global Elimination of Famine; and 6. Democratic Control. For its part, the WFFSov (2002) proposes an outline of four “pillars” of FSov, which are: 1. The Right to food; 2. Access to productive resources; 3. Dominant agro-ecological production; and 4. Trade and local markets, although at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we consider that they do not give suﬃcient visibility to aspects relating to the need for more democracy in the global handling of food and the development model (Windfuhr & Jonsen, 2005:16). In any case, the demand for the Right to Food (RF) is basic to the creation of FSov. This, as we shall see later, entails referring to a legal system of international and national regulations that protect persons’ rights to food that is adequate in quantity and in quality – harmless, nutritious and culturally acceptable – whether by means of physical access to markets or by means of access to productive resources – land, water, air, seeds and knowledge. On of the issues upon which a large part of this report will concentrate is the access to productive resources, which constitutes another of the essential elements within the concept of FSov, which in turn must correspond to a change in the agro-ecological productive model and a localised food industry system. The aim would therefore be to promote access to the durable use of their land, water, genetic resources and other natural resources by small-scale producers’ groups, groups involved in herding, small-scale ﬁshing and indigenous populations, and equitably shar-

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ing the benefits derived from its use (Windfuhr & Jonsen, 2005:16). Cultural diversity and the knowledge associated to each agrarian, rural and indigenous culture, along with the associated food cultures, are fundamental elements for achieving FSov, since they entail a security in the durable use of natural resources, integrating their handling as part of their culture and even giving them a sacred and existential dimension. The respect of cultural diversity and of the products of the management of natural and social resources are part of the adaptation to biophysical differences, providing appropriate solutions in the shape of local varieties and races, farming and indigenous knowledge, social systems for collective management, gastronomy and food cultures, etc. FSov can only be achieved by means of an agroecological productive model in which there is an ecological handling of natural resources in their technical and agronomic perspective, and a social and ideological transition towards a new paradigm that transforms the hegemonic model of production, transformation, distribution, consumption and waste management, modifying the legislation and the institutions that prevent their development and promote a globalised food industry system. This implies situating different scopes of action in an integrated manner, offering a fundamental perspective that calls for the participative and democratic control of the food industry system as a whole: on the part of farmers’ and rural social movements, urban consumers’ movements, environmentalist movements, scientists linked to the paradigm of ecology and complexity, etc. As many studies can confirm (Pretty, 2006; IAASTD, 2008; Uphoff & Altieri et al, 1999; Badgeley et al, 2007), traditional peasant agriculture has demonstrated its productive capacity with the appropriate technologies and knowledge for ecological handling, even in adverse conditions. As Altieri suggests (2009), traditional agricultural ecosystems in which complex and

THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

diversiﬁed crop systems reach high productive outputs, with the ability to respond to stressful environmental conditions, with a high degree of resistance, and handling great biodiversity – that furthermore entails a reduced in situ resistance to GMOs. The IAASTD’s (International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development) underlines that the traditional and local knowledge systems improve the quality of farmland and biodiversity, as well as the handling of nutrients, pests and water, and the ability to respond to changing environmental stresses associated to the climate (Altieri, 2009:33). Nonetheless, this rural knowledge necessary for handling biodiversity and agricultural ecosystems are permanently under threat in the same way as their material support and initiatives are required for participative agrarian extension and communication in order to maintain, develop and complete this knowledge in conjunction with the appropriate techniques and technologies that arise from participative agro-ecological research. The protection of the health of the ecosystems is a sine qua non condition for enabling the viability of durable rural agriculture in the same way as this type of rural agriculture is essential for the protection of the global environment: “agriculture and people to feed the world and cool the Planet” (LVC, 2009a:74; 2009b). Indeed, according to GRAIN (2009:25-33) the current food industry system represents approximately between 44% and 57% of global greenhouse gas emissions, whereas a model based upon local rural agriculture could reduce between one half and three quarters of the global emissions of these gases, given that rural agriculture 1) is able to recover the organic material in the soil, avoiding about 30% of the gases, 2) represents a reduction of the production of meat and the reintegration of livestock breeding and farming, which would avoid between 5% and 9% of gases, 3) is situated within a context of local markets with a high incidence of fresh foods, avoiding between 10% and 12% of the emission of gases, and 4) would stem the need to reclaim new land from forests for extensive farming devoted to food raw materials or agricultural fuels, avoiding

between 15% and 18% of greenhouse gases. The integration of livestock breeding and agriculture is another key element in any kind of durable agrarian management (IAASTD, 2008). And indeed, although this report will be referring particularly to the agricultural and ﬁsheries issue, all the questions envisaged can and must be transposed to the handling of livestock and forestry. In short, the focus here refers to the handling of natural resources from an agroecological viewpoint and must be applied to any domain. For Veterinarios Sin Fronteras the priority of the local markets is the corollary for the entire change to the food industry model that has been detailed until now and to achieve an integrated and integrating vision from the viewpoint of FSov. It means promoting the right to produc-

CORN DRYING IN THE SUN, MOZAMBIQUE.

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THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

tion and the access to productive resources by means of rural agro-ecological management, relocating the food industry system because of its ecological, economic, social and cultural consequences; in this context the right to food can be fulﬁlled and controlled by means of more horizontal community processes. In this sense, the revaluation of local food cultures is deemed to be of great importance to resist the “food imperialism that attacks the diversity of people’s food cultures, their national, cultural and ethnic identities” (WFFSov, 2001). Finally, as we have repeatedly maintained at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras and in several fora, agrarian reform must be complete, envisaged not only as access to land, but also as part of a transition towards agro-ecological models. In this sense, land is not a generic resource, but must instead be considered as the access to fertile, unpolluted soils that are accessible for production, with decent pastures, etc. Agrarian reform must guarantee security in the ownership and use of land - for those who already worked it and those who did not own it – and must go hand-in-hand with public policies that promote and invest in small-scale rural agro-ecological agriculture: loans, agrarian extension, research, valuation in local markets, ecologically adapted social and material infrastructures, etc. This right to land must be implemented in a context of equality and non-discrimination for reasons

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of gender, religion, race, social class or ideology: “the land belongs to those who work on it” (LVC, 1996). Particular attention must be given to access to land by women and the devolution of territories to their indigenous populations. Rural agriculture, herding, small-scale ﬁshing and indigenous communities can feed themselves and feed the world. The entire context of the FSov policies that replace the dominant model is what guarantees a truly durable FS.

FLOUR OF MANIOC, MUBENDE UGANDA.

THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

Human Rights and Food Sovereignty Half of the billion persons who suffer from famine are farmers. A further 22% are landless farmers who often get by with the incomes obtained in precarious work conditions as landless labourers; a further 8% are to be found in rural communities that devote themselves to fishing, hunting or gathering. In other words, 70% of people who suffer from famine live in rural areas (FAO, 2008). These rural areas are in fact marginalised areas: not because they are “far away”, but because they often “do not have access to secure property deeds, to loans, to agrarian technical assistance services, to local markets and to agricultural research. This lack of access to productive resources or to work means that families cannot produce or purchase adequate food” (FIAN-LVC, 2004:6). The hoarding of fertile land, the privatising of water, the oligopolistic at all levels of the food industry system (seeds, fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides, distribution, sales, food culture) does reach the remotest corners of all continents, displacing, substituting, or putting pressure on farmers, herders, small-scale fishing communities and indigenous peoples, who lose the control of productive resources to be able to feed themselves and feed their communities. From farmers’ point of view, FSov calls for the specific recognition of Farmers’ Rights as part of international legislation on Human Rights: the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The strategy of adhering to the language of Human Rights on the part of FSov in conjunction with the rhetoric of FR incorporates the concept of the interrelationship and interconnection between these Rights. Indeed, it is denounced that “the violation of the right to adequate food often goes hand-in-hand with the violation of other economic, social and cultural rights: the right to housing, to health or

to education. It is therefore the inattention towards the marginal rural areas that often leads to a multiple discrimination of this group” (FIANLVC, 2004:9). Complaints have been made concerning several cases in which the civil and political rights of farmers in rural areas are systematically violated by means of harassment, political persecution, the lack of access to justice, etc, as well as the violation of the right to protect themselves and to ﬁght for their livelihoods and to develop their political role via justice, trades unionism and associationism. At the same time, the influence of international agrarian and commercial policies – and their transferral to the national level – such as the WTO, the WB, the IMF and other regional

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THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

macro-policies, represents a clear attack on the functions of local markets in the form of dumping 4 and other structural perturbations. In view of this situation, LVC has created a “Declaration of Farmers’ Rights” (LVC, 2009c), considering farmers to be those persons who have “a direct and special relationship with the land and nature by means of the production of food and/or other agricultural products”, who engage in agriculture, livestock breeding, herding, crafts linked to agriculture or other similar

occupations, whether they are farmers with land or without land 5. Due to the speciﬁc shortcomings presented by the attention to the condition of farmers around the world, it suggests as basic and fundamental instruments the signature of an International Agreement on Farmers’ Rights and the holding of an International Convention on the issue. In this sense, the Declaration warns that there is legal precedent that can be used to defend the rights of farmers but that has not yet been put into practical use 6.

4 The practice of dumping consists in selling national products overseas at a price that is lower than that in the country of origin. It can have commercial goals (cornering markets via the elimination of rivals, or simply the defence of threatened markets), monetary goals (the acquisition of absolutely necessary foreign currencies) or political objectives (the economic and political servitude of importing countries). When the State has recourse to these practices, it uses more indirect means: subsidies and bonuses to exporting companies. But genereally speaking, dumping has harmful consequences for national consumption or for international trade, to which it introduces the idea of unfair competition. For this reason, all international agreements condemn this practice and foresee measues that eliminate the existing economic distortion (ant-dumping legislation, legal action). 5 “The term ‘farmer’ also applies to persons without land. According to the definition given by the UN Organjsation for Food and Agriculture (FAO 1984), the following categories of persons can be considered as being without land and it is probable that they are confronted to difficulties to ensure their livelihoods: 1) families of farmers who have little or no land; 2) non-farming families in rural areas, with little or no land and whose members devote themselves to various activities such as fishing, craftwork for local markets or the provision of services; 3) other herding, nomadic families, farmers who do crop rotation, hunters and gatherers, and persons with similar livelihoods” (Article I). 6 “The farmers’ fight is fully applicable to all international human rights instruments, including the special processes of the Human Rights Council, which deal with the right to food, to housing, to water access, the defenders of human rights, indigenous peoples , racism and racial discrimination as well as women’s rights. These international UN instruments do not completely address or prevent human rights violations, particularly regarding farmers’ rights. We have observed the limitations of ISESCR as a tool for the protection of farmers’ rights. Apart from this, the Farmers’ Charter created by the UN in 1979, was unable to protect farmersfrom international liberalisation policies. The other international agrgeements that are also concerned with farmers’ rights could not be applied either. These agreements include WTO Agreement 169, The Agreementt of Clause 8-J on Biodiversity, Point 14.60 Agenda 21 and the Cartagena Protocol. Even the UN conducted controversial policies that are adapted to the interests of transnational corporations instead of to the interests of farmers around the world” (section IV.

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THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

Food Sovereignty and Gender It is calculated that there are currently a billion people living in absolute poverty. According to the United Nation Organisation – UN Women, 70% of these are women. It is also estimated that seven out of ten people who die of starvation in the world are women and young girls 7. According to data from the FAO there are more than 1.6 billion rural women in the world, most of whom are farmers, who represent a quarter of the world’s population. These women would provide between 60% and 80% of the food production in the poorest countries and around 50% worldwide. Nevertheless, not only does this contribution go unnoticed, but it also contrasts with the fact that only 1% of land ownership and tenure is in the name of farming women. In this sense, since its beginnings La Vía Campesina has always paid particular attention in its FSov proposition to the condition of omen in the rural agricultural world and to the way in which they are aﬀected by the marginalisation suﬀered by rural and agricultural areas in general. For its part, the 2001 WFFSov stated, in paragraph 23: “We acknowledge and appreciate the fundamen-

tal role of women in the production, harvesting, sales and transformation of agriculture and fishing production and in the conservation and reproduction of peoples’ food cultures. We support women’s struggle to have access to productive resources, for their right to produce and consume local production”. In the acknowledgement of women’s essential labour for life it is pointed out that it is “women who feed the world” (Herrero & Vilella, 2009). In short, FSov, which originated in social movements, is part of a stream of criticism of Western Modernism and its system of hegemonic references, that have been turned into a dogma for development and progress in the shape of economic growth and the domination of differences. Horizontality, equality and diversity are essential in social relationships and women are a basic part when it comes to putting into practice FSov (both for the ends s well as for the means). Farming women would be the counterparts of the patriarchal model of market- and benefitsoriented industrial agriculture.

PEASANTS MOZAMBICAN.

7 UN Women (formerly the United Nations Development Fund for Women – UNIFEM), consulted on 10/11/2011 http://www.unwomen.org)

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THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

The situation of African farmers with regards to Food Sovereignty Some of the people devoted to farming on the African continent, and their organisations, have begun to agree with the diagnosis made by LVC regarding the agrarian and food issues, particularly in a continent that is fundamentally rural and in which food insecurity is a constant factor. This is nonetheless a new constant factor given that – as indicated by Holt-Giménez & Pajel (2010:73) – until 1970 the continent was self-suﬃcient with regards to food, and was also an exporter of food, exporting an average of 1.3 million tonnes of food per year between 1966 and 1970 (BBC, 2006).

At the present time, almost all African countries import food and the continent imports 25% of its food (Green Revolution, 2008).

In the meantime, most of the people who suffer from starvation are farming families in rural areas who farm less than two hectares of land in marginalised conditions with regard to access to land, to funding and public investment, to agrarian extension programmes and to local markets. Rural agriculture is besieged by the globalised food industry system that floods the local markets with imported products and by the agricultural export policies that offer currencies to governments in order to pay the debts with the WB and the IMF. As in the case of Ethiopia during the famine of the 1908s, this means that the best and most fertile land was devote to growing crops for exportation. In turn, the structural adjustment policies led to the implementation of this kind of policy that, if production was successful, led to an overproduction of specific products and, therefore, to the plunging of its price on international markets; for example, the success of the programme in Ghana to expand cocoa provoked a drop in the internatio-

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nal cocoa price of some 48% between 1986 and 1989, threatening to “increase the vulnerability of the whole economy according to the whims of the cocoa market” (Abugre, 1993). In 2002-2003, the collapse of the price of coffee contributed to another food emergency in Ethiopia (Oxfam, 2006:20). On the African continent there are many organisations and collectives that are involved in achieving Food Sovereignty by means of the defence of their rights in the rural environment, the launching of various local market initiatives, the incorporation of agro-ecological agronomic techniques and the transition to and maintenance of traditional organic agriculture, political training processes, etc. At the same time, one has to base oneself on the survival of a strong rural fabric and a rural agriculture that, albeit marginalised, possesses an immense social base and that preserves the knowledge and structures necessary to create a food sovereignty movement. Whether by means of organisation or community-level natural resource management mechanisms, Sub-Saharan Africa contains great human and natural potential. The traditional extensive agriculture systems, the informal seed systems, the herding systems, the integration of farming and livestock breeding, forestry management, small-scale fishing communities on the coasts or by lakes, fish-farming projects, etc. are ecological means of managing natural resources that sustain the viability of the change in the model in the context of FSov.

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World Governance of Food Security: Threats and Opportunities for Food Sovereignty * The “The Right to Food. Urgent” campaign puts forwards four groups of causes of famine and food insecurity: 1. the unchecked exploitation of natural resources due to harvesting, pollution, appropriation and privatising; 2. difficult access to natural resources (land, water, biodiversity and forests) and their unfair distribution; 3. economic and commercial policies that are applied to the agrarian sector and that are derived from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and other regional and international policies such as the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in the European Union (EU); 4. natural disasters and humanitarian catastrophes (Medina et al, 2004:37). Many of these factors are the result of international or global systems that in turn regulate them, establishing governance methods and policies with implications for states and their citizens. This is why it is fundamental to understand worldwide food security policies and their contexts, taking into account not only the threats for food sovereignty, but also the opportunities. To start off with, it is a good idea to explain what is meant by policies and governance. Policies can be defined quite simply as plans of action. In view of what is meant by government, “governance implies – on the part of the State – more indirect and gentle forms of leadership, and re-

flects cooperative results, often involving a wide variety of civil society agents as well as governmental bureaucracy and direct intervention by the State” 9. It is “an interactive process between public state legislation and policies with private interests and agents” 10. More specifically, food governance envisages regulatory mechanisms in the domain of agriculture, food and health that are organised and sanctioned by the political sector in the context of a social formation and that in turn generate policies rules and regulations that intervene beyond the local domain but whilst having important local implications. To the aforementioned definition, we can add the regulations and practices that establish limitations and incentivise governments. With regard to food sovereignty and world governance, it remains fundamental to understand international financial institutions. Financial institutions such as the G8, the United Nations Organisation for Food and Agriculture (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Food Programme (WFP), the WB and the WTO amongst others, tend to present policies that are contradictory and often promote the policies of the great powers. In this context, there is little or nothing left with which to promote the interests of the sustainable small-scale food producers and durable production approaches. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we believe that the current “global architecture” does not provide us with the food systems that we need and it is therefore important to unite

* Chapter written by Jessica Duncan, Centre for Food Policy, City University, London. 9 Ibíd., 15. 10 Ibíd., 81.

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strengths around the creation of alternative processes that uphold the ability, structures and supportive and encouragement structures for the systems that we are aiming for. In advance, during and after the 2007-2008 crisis, worldwide institutions involved in food and agriculture appeared or were reformed with new contexts and policies. This is partly due to the

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fact that there is renewed interest in agricultural investment and food security, brought about by the vulnerability that was exposed by the price rises. Above all, the interconnection between food security issues and the need for multilateral to reduce the situation of insecurity stands out. This way the worldwide policy spaces are reinforced in food and agriculture issues as well as by means of sectors and industries.

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The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) The Committee on World Food Security (CFS), created on the recommendation of the 1974 World Food Conference, is used in the United Nations system as a forum for the revision and assessment of worldwide food security policies, including the production of foods and the physical and economic access to it. The 35th Session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) took place between 14th and 17th October 2009. During the session, the CFS member states agreed upon a wide-ranging reform that offers opportunities for progressing towards a political context regarding food sovereignty. Firstly, it situates itself as a “platform for debating and coordination with a view to strengthening collaborative action amongst governments, regional organisations, national organisations and agencies, NGOs, SCOs, food organisations and other important parties” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 5.i), particularly those affected by food insecurity. This political convergence is primordial for the commitment of SCOs and also to resist against policies and practices that are in contradiction with food security. It also aims to establish ties between worldwide policies and national actions supporting the plans promoted by the countries themselves. Through greater centralisation of power and discussion, the opportunity to have a more specific orientation and to commit to the system in a more concerted, collective and cohesive way is envisaged.

CFS. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we participated actively in the discussions. The purpose of the civil society mechanism (CSM) is to facilitate the participation in the CFS of SCOs, enabling contribution to negotiations and decisions and also providing a space for dialogue between a wide variety of civil society agents. The CSM is made up of the Coordination Committee, consisting of forty focus points (members) from eleven constituencies (main interested parties) and sixteen sub-regions, elected in acknowledgement of the diversity of histories, realities and experiences of each region. Small-scale farmers represent the CC’s greatest constituency given that they represent the largest part of the undernourished world population and also produce the greatest proportion of food in the world. The geographic and gender balance amongst the focus points of the CFS’s Coordination Committee is guaranteed by means of the mechanism itself.

The CFS refers to the Right to Food as a primordial objective. Resting on a well-established legal mechanism that has been approved and ratiﬁed by the member states, it constitutes a strategic means of contextualising the debate. Before requesting that countries should develop food security policies, a right to food-based approach reminds the countries of their commitment to the goal of food security for all. Before the 36th Committee on World Food Security, the CFS invited civil society groups, NGOs and their networks to establish an autonomous mechanism that would facilitate participation in the

FLAGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COUNTRIES.

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Other fundamental aspects include translation, training and adequate funding. The 36th Session of the Committee on World Food Security took place at the FAO’s headquarters in Rom between 11th and 16th October 2010, with the participation of delegates from the 126 committee members; participants from 11 United Nations bodies and programmes; 47 international non-government organisations; and observers from 15 inter-government organisations. The main points on the Session’s agenda were three round tables on policies and the consensus on the development of a Worldwide Strategic Context. More specifically, during the round table on “land tenure and international investment in agriculture”, the committee supported the continuation of the participative process for the development of the Voluntary Directives for Responsible Governance of the Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources, based upon the existing regional processes in view of submitting the directives for appreciation during the 37th Session of the CFS. It was decided to create an open CFS work group to revise the first draft of the Voluntary Directives. The Committee took note of the development of the Principles of the World Bank for Responsible Investment in Agriculture that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources, and decided to launch a participative process to evaluate the principles within the CFS. The Committee also gave its encouragement to governments and interested parties to participate in the creation processes for the Voluntary Directives and Responsible Agricultural Investment and to ensure the coherency and complementarity between both processes. After the 36th Session, the High-Level Experts’ Group launched a consultation on two issues: the instability of land prices and tenure on the one hand and international investment in agriculture on the other. During the 37th Session of the Committee for World Food Safety that took place between 17th and 22nd October 2011 and was attended by 83 SCOs and NGOs, the CFS was invited to approve the final draft of the Voluntary Directives for the Responsible Governance of Land Tenure, Fishing

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and Forestry in the context of national food security. But despite the efforts made by all parties regarding the negotiation of the Directives, it was impossible to complete the process. It was thus decided that more time would be necessary for its continuation and completion and the recommendation was made to make the most of the already established and solid base, concentrating upon the remaining paragraphs and observing and maintaining the spirit of understanding that had been attained in previous negotiations. The new CFS provides the best opportunity for advancing food sovereignty in the governance of worldwide food security and can be seen as a model for coordination and participation around the world. Its revolutionary restructuring, which gives civil society its voice and access whilst at the same time guaranteeing that decision-making rests in the hands of the countries involved is an important step that covers the key principles of a political context of food sovereignty. Nonetheless, for the entire potential of the CFS to become effective, the countries will have to become involved in the process and funding will be required to support the work of the MESA, the Work Group, poor countries and civil society. Meanwhile, it is hoped that civil society organisations will progress hand-in-hand with the Civil Society Mechanism to guarantee their continued involvement in the process. What remains to be seen is whether or not the system of the UN and the FAO will be sufficiently powerful or influential to take a place at the forefront of food security governance. This depends upon the actions undertaken by the member countries.

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Principles and Directives for the Large-scale Acquisition and Renting of Land* The food crisis, in conjunction with the financial, environmental and energy crises, has further pronounced the shortcomings and vulnerability of the energy and food systems. Concern about an increase in food insecurity, profit-making issues, meteorological instability due to climate change, speculation on assets and the potential for investment opportunities are contributing towards a new worldwide rush for land control. This process, which has been given various names including investment, seizure and land acquisition, has fielded harsh criticism from civil society and represents a tangible threat for food sovereignty, particularly in Africa. A recent study by the World Bank 12 showed that during the first eleven months of 2009, a total of 110 million acres worldwide were subjected to exploitative trade; more than 70% of this figure was in Africa (particularly in Ethiopia, Mozambique and the Sudan). This section takes into account the main contexts and policies for the response to the phenomenon, as well as the repercussions upon food sovereignty. More specifically, there has been a comparative analysis of global principals and emerging directives by means of a political context for food Sovereignty. The aim of this chapter is not to review land seizures, since there is an ever-greater store of literature and research regarding this issue 13. As a starting-point, however, and in order to

provide an important context, we will summarise the main aspects of land seizure here. Land seizure, a phenomenon that is far from being novel, can be defined as the loss of land by rural populations in favour of the large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors (companies or states). Countries that are poor in resources but with a thriving economy are acquiring land in countries that are rich in resources but that have a poor economy, in order to meet their own food and energy needs 14. As reported by GRAIN, “the combination of the food and financial crises has turned arable land into a new strategic asset” 15. There are various means through which land can be lost: purchasing, renting and contractual agriculture, all for the purpose of industrial agriculture production. Land seizure also involves commercial transactions (national and international) and land speculation. In most cases these kinds of agreements are negotiated with national governments, and sometimes they themselves launch the negotiations. Those in favour of these investments claim that they are advantageous for all: the receiving communities experience economic growth and develop their rural environment, bringing in benefits for investors and consumers. The situation is therefore regarded as a means of increasing capital and providing valuable investment to agriculture. This

12 From the World Bank: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/0,,contentMDK:22694293~pagePK:641654 01~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469372,00.html 13 To obtain more information concerning the appropriation of land, refer to: Cotula, L. Land Deals in Africa: What is in the Contracts? London: IIED. 2011. http://pubs.iied.org/12568IIED.html; Cotula, L, Vermeulen, S, Leonard, R. and Keeley, J. Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural Investments and International Land Deals in Africa. London: IIED. 2008; Amigos de la Tierra Europa. Africa: Up for Grabs. 2010. http://www.foeeurope.org/agrofuels/FoEE_Africa_up_for_grabs_2010.pdf; GRAIN. Seized: The 2008 Land Grab for Food and Financial Security. Barcelona: GRAIN. 2008; Daniel, S.,and Mittal, A. The Great Land Grab: Rush for the World’s Farmland Threatens Food Security for the Poor. Berkeley, CA: Oakland Institute. 2009. The International Land Coalition has a website devoted to the commercial pressures upon land (http://www.landcoalition.org/ cpl). It also coordinates a dialogue initiative along with Oxfam Novib, Action Aid International, Roppa, the Asian Farmers’ Asssociation and COPROFAM. Go to: http://www.landcoalition.org/global-initiatives/commercial-pressures-land/dialogue-initiative; http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/pdfs/LandGrab_ﬁnal_web.pdf . 14 For example, go to: Intenational Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), www.ifpri.org/pubs/bp/bp013.asp.. 15 GRAIN. 2008. Page 2.

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provides opportunities for increased employment and social development, particularly in rural areas. Nonetheless, an analysis of the last 50 years, particularly in impoverished countries, makes it clear up to which point these large-scale investments exploit local resources and communities, above all those that depend on the land, including livestock breeders. At VSF we believe that such land investments have negative eﬀects on political stability, social cohesion, human rights, durable food production, the food security of households and the protection of the environment in the exploited countries. There is a concern that investments bring in very little with regard to the course of development, since the regulatory contexts of direct foreign land investment, particularly for agriculture, are inconsistent 16. These investments also threaten the rights to the ownership and usufruct of land and ignore or underrate land ownership systems that might not necessarily correspond to the Western private ownership model. Furthermore, investments go against the responsibility of the State as set out by international law.

there have been various initiatives from a variety of perspectives and approaches that, in one way or another, aim to mediate in the process. Of these, three contexts have assumed a dominant role in the international and worldwide debate (there is also a fourth context at regional level that will be addressed further on, EU Directives on land policy: Directives for the support of the design and processes for reform of land policies in developing countries) that we will address as follows.

Secure access to land and other natural resources is of the same degree of importance as the fulﬁlment of the right to food, despite the fact that that the right to food does not automatically translate into the right to land. Nevertheless, from the point of view of food sovereignty the right to land is fundamental. As has already been mentioned, food sovereignty is above all a means of producing food and, without access to land by means of a diversity of ways of using land, food sovereignty becomes impossible. Corporate and national land investment programmes represent a serious threat to food sovereignty. It is fundamental to exercise good governance in land tenure issues since the lack of governance in this domain “translates into a loss of lives and of livelihoods; it discourages investment and general economic growth and dissuades from the durable use of natural resources” 17. Despite international obligations, many states continue to invest in foreign land for single crop-based exports. This kind of investments has been a cause of concern and

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The Set of Minimum Principles for Arable Land Investment At the end of 2009 during the 13th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, the Special Reporter on the Right to Food, Olivier Schutter, presented “large-scale land acquisition and renting: a set of minimum measures and principles to deal

with the problem of human rights”. This report presents the 11 minimal principles regarding human rights that can be applied to the largescale acquisition or renting of land, which can be summed up as follows:

1. The negotiations must be undertaken in an entirely transparent manner.

7. Investors’ obligations will be clearly deﬁned and executed.

2. Agreement will be freely and previously communicated.

8. The investment agreements with importing countries must include a clause that guarantees that there will be a percentage of production that will be aimed at the local market.

3. Legislation will be adopted in order to protect the rights of local communities. 4. Local populations should beneﬁt from the incomes created by the investment agreements. 5. The states and the investments must be established and promote agricultural systems that contribute to the creation of employment in poor rural areas or wherever there is a lack of opportunities for employment. 6. Forms of agricultural production that are environmentally friendly and that do not speed up climate change, land depletion or the depletion of drinking water will be promoted.

The intention of these principles is to inform about current initiatives such as the adoption of directives concerning land policies and the management of international and regional organisations. Apart from that, they are also designed so as for the negotiations for land ac-

9. An impact evaluation must be carried out before closing negotiations. 10. Consulting and cooperating with indigenous populations with good will, respecting the speciﬁc mechanisms that protect their rights to land with regard to International Law. 11. Contractual agricultural employees must receive adequate protection and their fundamental labour and human rights must be legislated and respected.

quisition and renting fulﬁl the basic procedural requisites. In consequence, these principles create a context that can be used to analyse the new directives and principles from the perspective of human rights and the right to food.

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Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) At the beginning of 2009 the World Bank launched an in-depth study called “Large-scale acquisitions of rights over land for the purpose of agricultural exploitation or for its natural resources”. The study concentrated on the regulatory contexts and on the social, economic, and environmental repercussions derived from the case studies. The result of this research, along with contributions from the FAO, the IFAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and consultation with other international bodies were the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI). Some non-government organisations and civil society organisations also took part in the round tables. The RAI originates from a perspective of corporate social responsibility, with the intention of providing a referential context that can guide countries, corporations and other agents in the development of responsible investment from a social point of view. The ﬁnal report of the BM’s study also suggests future steps that offer better practices, directives and governance contexts. Generally speaking, RAI acknowledges that land rights must be respected, although no reference is made to the non-Western forms of land tenure or communal lands that often play a fundamental role in livelihoods. As a result RAI does not go far enough in guaranteeing that the receiving countries and the investors acknowledge the right of peoples to have access to land. At no moment does it satisfactorily address what happens to the victims of evictions once land transactions are completed. It does not even call for an even more necessary evaluation of whether or not these agreements really represent a good approach to guarantee the local populations’ long-term needs in terms of food security and rights. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we observe that such principles do not do a lot to resolve the problem: what moves the investors is monetary gain.

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Their beneﬁt margins or the ability to ensure food in their countries prevails over the needs, rights and wishes of local populations, because they have the means to pay for it. From the viewpoint of food sovereignty, this process threatens to impose neo-colonial development models in the countries whilst people are obliged to give up agriculture. Ironically, some of their investments are motivated by the fact that many people have given up agriculture in their own countries. In this sense, the principles are inadequate, particularly because the markets for basic products continue to fluctuate and because the demand for food is necessarily going to increase. In keeping with what several organisations have said, at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we believe that the aforementioned principles will not achieve the established goals. They are more of an attempt to justify land grabbing. Encouraging the corporate sector (both national and foreign) to carry out long-term acquisitions of the land of rural populations is totally unacceptable whatever the directives that are observed. The WB’s principles, which would be totally voluntary, are aimed at turning attention away from the fact that the worldwide food crisis characterised by the fact that each day there are a million more starving people in the world, will not be resolved with large-scale industrial agriculture, the objective according to which all of these land acquisitions are made 18. At the same time, another worrying aspect is that the RAI points to the need to consult with the parties aﬀected by large-scale land acquisitions and, despite this, do not present any guidelines or markers regarding what kind of consultation should take place. On the basis of food sovereignty and even from a democratic point of view, it is fundamental that the principles of free, previous and informed consent of all people who work the land should be defended in all of these negotiations.

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Since January 2010, the “Principles for a responsible agricultural investment that respects rights, livelihoods and resources” have been promoted by the World Bank (WB), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Organisation for Agriculture and Food (FAO). The governments of Japan and the United States have also adopted RAI during international round tables. According to RAI’s website, “there already exists

a wide-ranging consensus that some of the principles should constitute the starting-point for the designing of the international context. Nonetheless, most observers agree that the principles should not be legally binding, that they should have a flexible supervision mechanism and that they should take into account the country’s circumstances” 19. On the basis of a political context of food sovereignty, the principles of respect for people’s rights should eﬀectively be legally binding and be the object of rigorous supervision.

HANDS OF A FARMER, MOZAMBIQUE.

18 Go to http://www.focusweb.org/content/stop-land-grabbing-now 19 Go to http://www.focusweb.org/content/stop-land-grabbing-now

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Comparison of principles Given that the purpose of this report is to understand the consequences of the new governance contexts for food sovereignty, it is useful to compare these last two groups of principles on the basis of a political context of food sovereignty. For a start, the processes for large-scale land acquisition and renting generally contradict themselves in a political context of food sovereignty and represent a sizeable threat to it, particularly in Africa. Firstly, both sets of principles include the need for transparency in the negotiations. RAI also calls for the assessment and assumption of responsibility in land access processes and the associated investments. Both sets of principles also insist upon consultation. Whereas the RAI asks for participative consultation that leads to applicable agreements, the Special Reporter for the Right to Food introduces the principles of previously informed free consent and asks that the impact evaluations should be included as part of the negotiation process. Both sets of principles demand the respect of land rights but the principles of the SRORF (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food) go one step further by demanding the approval of laws that protect communities and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples. The economic issue is present in both sets of principles. The RAI concentrates on the economic viability of projects, aﬃrming that they should result in a durable shared value. The SRORF puts economic beneﬁt on the side of the community and demands that a proportion of the crops subject to such initiatives should be reserved for sale on the local market. The RAI suggests that investments should have a positive social impact without increasing vulnerability, whilst the SRORF’s principles concentrate upon the creation of agrarian exploitation systems that address rural poverty and unemployment. The SRORF also includes a principle of respect for the rights of rural workers. Both sets of principles insist on taking into account environmental considerations. The SRORF

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asks for the development of production methods that are environmentally friendly and that do not accelerate ecological problems. The RAI demands a positive impact on the part of investors and encourages the durable use of resources. Based on the perspective of food sovereignty, the language of this RAI principle appears vague and disappointing. As a principle, environmental durability should be a prerequisite for new projects that are undertaken on the acquired land, and not a mere suggestion. If this aspect cannot be strengthened, the result will be a set of principles that legitimise large-scale land acquisition projects without guaranteeing the protection of the rights of the population or that of the land upon which it depends. Finally, the RAI adopts food security as a principle and asks that all projects should contribute towards its consolidation. Food security is not directly included in the SRORF’s principles but all the elements of food security are included in the principles and measures for addressing human rights issues.

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The voluntary Directives The FAO has been working on the governance of land tenure since 2005 and has observed a generalised interest in the development and adoption of voluntary directives associated at international level with the execution at national level. The political process for these directives began in the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development of 2006, in whose final declaration 92 FAO member countries affirmed the importance of Objective 1.2(b) of the Plan of Action of the World Food Summit 20. On the basis of this, the FAO undertook a series of thematic studies and organised a meeting of the team of experts. As we have already seen, from 2009 until 2011 the carried out the preparation of the Voluntary Directives (VD) that include process for consultation with the various interested parties. The intention is to apply the Voluntary Directives in 2012 by means of the preparation of national and regional policies and plans of action. The VD on land tenure and natural resources are a response to the rising pressure on land and natural resources since new areas are being cultivated or are being taken over by urban expansion, their access and control is changing, or they are being abandoned. They are also linked to support for the progressive fulfilment of the right to adequate food in the context on National Food Security, taking it as a reference. This is not a reaction to land grabbing, nor is it a means of defence against this phenomenon. But according to which directives end up being established, they could provide a considerable motive (ethically, politically and ecologically) against this practice.

The VD are inspired by the belief that “responsible governance of tenure is a guarantee that the relevant policies and regulations are oriented towards durability and beneficial results and that the related services are provided efficiently, effectively and equitably” 21 . Here, responsible governance acknowledges not only statutory tenure (private and public property), but also customary tenure and common property. This is fundamental within the FSov context because many cultures do not share the Western customs and laws on property and are, as a result, very vulnerable when such approaches are used to analyse the use of, ownership of and access to land. The VD are intended to be used by persons in charge of formulating policies, by governments, by the private sector and by civil society organisations. The process for developing the VD is still being developed but there is general – albeit timid – general support for the process amongst CSOs. This backing is linked to the acceptance of an approach that is concentrated upon human rights highlighting the universal nature, interdependence, indivisibility and interrelation between them. The principles of participation, responsibility, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, gender equality, empowerment and the rule of law are part of the responsible governance-based approach 22. The VD will constitute a context of policies and programmes on the tenure of land and natural resources that are not legally binding. In any case, it is hoped that they will make reference to the current binding international human

20 “Establishing legal and other mechanisms, whenever relevant, that enable progress in agrarian reform, acknowledging and protecting property rights, water use and usufruct, to improve poor persons’ and women’s access to resources. Such mechanisms will also have to promote the preservation and durable use of natural resources (such as land, water and forests), reducing risks and stimulating investment” (The TRome Declaration on World Food Security, November 1996). 21 FAO. 2009. Page 1. 22 FAO. Governance of Tenure: Finding Common Ground. ND. Page 4. http://www.fao.org/ﬁleadmin/user_upload/nr/land_tenure/images/LandtenureENGpagebypage.pdf

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rights, given that these are linked to land and to natural resources. It is also hoped that they will include descriptions of how these obligations will be applied. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we are supporting this initiative since it is the only one that promotes a true participation of civil society in the process of drafting the voluntary Directives, including participation in the FSC.

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The Declaration on the land issue in Africa The African Union clearly understands the importance of land management and security, planning and livelihoods, and several member states have launched agrarian reform processes. Nonetheless, many of these reforms lack consistency and harmonisation between laws and sectorial policies. To this end, a pan-African process was launched in 2006 in order to develop a context and directives for land policies. The process was undertaken by the African Union, the UN, the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank

A. To oﬀer a basis for the commitment of the African member states’ commitment to the formulation and execution of well-designed land policies as a basis for sustainable human development that includes guarantees for social stability, maintaining economic growth and reducing poverty, protecting natural resources from degradation and pollution; B. to promote the consensus of the shared principles as the basis for secure access to land for all, increasing agricultural productivity and preserving livelihoods; C. underlining the need for popular participation in the formulation and execution of the land policy in view of providing better management of land resources; D. suggesting regulations for better practices for the reform of land policies and points of reference for the deployment of the land institutions that the member states can adopt in keeping with their respective contexts;

in consultation with regions and concerned parties, including civil society. The objective was to strengthen land rights, increase productivity and guarantee livelihoods. In 2009, the context was submitted to the Assembly of Heads of state and Governments of the African Union and in July of that same year a Declaration on the land issue in Africa was adopted 23. As it is outlined in the resulting report “Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (revised version)” 24, the goal of the Context is:

E. establish a political context to address the problems that arise and anticipate future usage with regard to land resources; F. providing a basis for a more coherent model of collaboration between states, citizens and associations for the development of the formulation of the land policy and its application on the continent; G. establishing general principles so that development associations can commit to mobilising resources to create capacities aimed at land policy reform processes; H. developing directives for regional convergence regarding the durable management and use of land and the associated resources shared by two or more member states in several parts of Africa.

23 http://www.gltn.net/images/stories/assembly_decision_-_land.pdf 24 The Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (revised version) is available on: http://www.gltn.net/en/home/landlaw-and-enforcement/framework-and-guidelines-on-land-policy-in-africa-revised-version-/details.html

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The context addresses the “land issue” in Africa, ascribing its origins to geopolitical, economic, social and demographic factors that have worsened due to worldwide imperatives such as diﬀering forms of colonisation as well as cultural and economic diversity. As a result, thousands of legal contexts have emerged regulating the use, tenure and management of land. The context emphasises the need to guarantee land rights for women but also to promote access to land for foreign commercial investors with interests in large-scale operations. This is justiﬁed by referring to the extensive irrigation networks but is situated at the same level as farmers, particu-

CROPS FIELD, UGANDA.

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larly farming women. This situation represents a tangible threat for food sovereignty, given that within a political context for food sovereignty, the priority is to hand it over to local farmers (with gender equality coming into play). In this sense, at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we wish to emphasise that the Context of the Directives is just that; a set of directives that are presented to states as recommended processes and better practices, but concentrating upon foreign investment and the extraction of resources at the expense of agricultural productivity and social security represents a tangible threat to food sovereignty.

THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

Food Sovereignty and the European Union* We shall now enumerate some of the main EU regulatory tools and contexts (apart from the EPAs, which will be dealt with in the next chapter)

that are relevant to the eﬀects of this study and that have, or may have, a potential impact upon Food Sovereignty in Africa.

Directives of the Common Agrarian Policy and Work Group In 2002 an EU work group on agrarian issues was created in order to develop the directives for the Common Agrarian Policy: Directives for the support of the agrarian policy and the reform processes for agrarian policies in developing countries. The idea behind the directives is that access to land and natural resources have caused growing concern for developing countries and their donors. The European Commission stressed that access is fundamental for fair and durable social and economic development as well as for good governance. When the directives were approved and adopted by the European Council and Parliament in December 2004, the work group was closed 26. After the recorded high for food prices in 20072008 and with growing concern regarding large-scale land acquisition, in January 2009 the European Commission proposed the reactivation of the EU Work Group on Agrarian Issues. The revived Work Group, made up of representatives from the European Commission and Member States, has two main objectives: 1) sharing information and exchanging experiences; 2) developing common positions for the EU and recommendations regarding land policies and reform initiatives in developing countries. The meetings of the work group are open to nonEuropean third-party countries, development bodies, international organisations and ﬁnancial

institutions that operate on interventions linked to land in developing countries. The work of this group could have important repercussions upon food sovereignty in Africa, particularly with regard to its analyses of largescale land acquisitions and of the principles and

BANANA TREE, UGANDA.

26 The Directives for the Common Agrarian Policy can be consulted on the European Commission’s website on development and cooperation, EuropeAid: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/intervention-areas/ruraldev/rural_landpolicy_en.htm

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directives that, as a result, are arising at various levels (see previous sections). It is important for this group to continue to be transparent and to continue the research into the experiences of people who have been affected by large-scale land negotiations. The Work Group should develop recommendations in view of the need to create a regional and binding legal context that acknowledges and regulates the Members states’ extra-territorial responsibility for what their citizens and companies do in third-party countries. As has already been widely acknowledged, the

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duty to protect and guarantee the human right to food and its economic, social and cultural aspects in Africa is the particular – but not exclusive – concern of the African states. The EU countries have complementary extra-territorial obligations towards starvation and malnutrition in Africa and other areas. The EU member states have a duty to protect the right to food in these countries by means of active measures (these include regulation, supervision, and due diligence in their sphere of influence) in order to avoid, amongst other things, land grabbing in these countries. We will speak of this in the next chapter.

THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

The EU context: “Encouraging agriculture in Africa” In July 2007 the European Commission presented a communiqué with the title “Advancing African Agriculture” (AAA), with the goal of providing strategic guidance for assigning European Development Funds and other EC resources and the general coordination of European aid to African agriculture by all the member states. This report was revised and approved by the European Council and Parliament in November 2007. The European civil society agents – in collaboration with African farmers from regional platforms – undertook periodical reviews (and drafted several thematic reports) with the aim of controlling up to what point the European policies had been in keeping with he criteria agreed to in the EC’s communiqué of 2007. 27 At the end of 2010, the European Commission published a communiqué with the title “A strategic context for the European Union to help developing countries to address problems derived from food security” (COM (2010) 127 ﬁnal)28. In keeping with the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security (2009), the regulatory context attempts to address food security problems in developing countries in rural and urban contexts: 1. Increasing the availability of food; 2. improving access to food; 3. improving the nutritional adaptation of the consumption of food; and 4. reinforcing the prevention and management of crises. The communiqué is centred on the progress of Millennium Development Objective Nº 1 (MDO1) (the eradication of poverty and famine in the world) and suggests that the progress in the achievement of this objective, and food security, have been geographically unequal. Quoting the 2009 report on the MDOs, the communiqué indicates that the proportion of malnourished

persons in Sub-Saharan Africa dropped to 29% in 2008 when it was at 32% in 1990-1992. As a result of all of this the EU context will concentrate upon improving the incomes of small-scale farmers and of their communities as well as supporting agriculture and food security in countries where this is one of the priorities. The context also indicates that by supporting smallscale agriculture, the EU should prioritise the intensification of approaches that are durable and efficient from an ecological point of view, respecting the functional diversity of agriculture. This approach, which pays particular attention to women and small-scale owners, is in keeping with the political context of food sovereignty. With regard to land tenure, the context indicates that secure access to land and its use are fundamental for increasing the productivity of small-scale farmers. The European Union and its member states are ready to support the development of principles that are agreed upon internationally for responsible investment in farmland (with no mention of the RAI) and should base themselves upon the current efforts including the directives for agrarian policies (EU Directives for supporting design and reform processes for agrarian policies in developing countries (2004) and the African Directives on agrarian policies (2009)). The context moves away from an alignment with a political context of food sovereignty in its analysis of trade, in which it mentions that international trade can make a substantial contribution to the availability of food by increasing this availability on the market. Whereas the context promotes the objective of a complete food industry chain with a diversity of markets and the harmonisation of regulations, a food sovereignty-based approach would encourage the promotion of local and regional markets before

27 The reports on AAA are available at http://www.europafrica.info/en/documenti/advancing-african-agriculture 28 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM_PDF_COM_2010_0127_EN.PDF

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getting involved with international commerce, particularly with the maintenance of community agricultural subsidies. The context presented three sets of conditions so that the EU member states might make the most of the efficiency of investments in food security, of which the report highlights the EU priorities in the promotion of food security in Africa. In the name of efficiency, the work Context requests that aid should be specified for each country and that the development of policies should be combined with the empow-

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erment of the most vulnerable populations of these countries. They prioritise four dimensions that are interrelated to small-scale agriculture: development, governance, regional integration and their mechanisms for assisting vulnerable populations. More specifically, the context asks the EU to improve the resistance of small farming estates and rural livelihoods; that it should support good governance, regional agriculture and food security policies; and that it should strengthen aid mechanisms for vulnerable sectors of the population.

PART II

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

JATROPHA PLANTATION, MOZAMBIQUE.

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

The industrialisation process of agriculture, carried out by means of policies by international bodies (FAO, IMF, WB, GATT – currently the WTO, amongst others), implies the concentration of decision-making cores that cover what we eat (product design), when we eat it (disappearance of “seasons”), how we eat it (level of processing), how it is produced (industrial agriculture and ﬁshing) and where it is bought (large retail chains) (COAG, 2007).

CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS, UGANDA.

At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we have on numerous occasions maintained that addressing the issue of famine and poverty only by means of modernising agriculture and increasing agricultural production, as was done in the case of the so-called Green Revolution, does not resolve the problem, since it ignores the concentration of economic power, particularly with regard to

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land access and purchasing power (Lappé et al, 1998). Any policy that is aimed at relieving the problem of famine will not only have to design strategies focused on food production, but will also have to take into account the established social relationships in the shape of economic, political and cultural regulations, which will determine the distribution of the benefits of agricultural production; benefits that will be aimed and the owners of the means of production and crops. Another commercialisation measure, and one that is more specific and tangible, is the regularisation of commercial relationships at international level, by means of the many bilateral and multilateral agreements. They are the result of the creation of a world based on the principle of free trade and that translates into import and export transactions between countries that have a high level of inequality. The rules of the game are not the same for all the players and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are playing with a disadvantage. Not all the commercialisation tools are as obvious as this. International development and cooperation policies that, of course, aim to be a benefit to the countries to which they are directed, can become a vector for neo-colonialism from various angles and a way into Sub-Saharan African countries for political and economic power, without taking into account the needs of the local population.

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

Alliance for a green revolution in Africa: unlearned lessons A new Green Revolution is spreading through Africa. The main agent of this expansion is the so-called Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA 29) made up of and promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation – that funded the first Green Revolution – and the Bill &Melinda Gates Foundation. The Rockefeller Foundation went public with its intention to promote a new Green Revolution in Africa justifying – amongst other reasons – that “one of the main reasons of the lack of efficiency [of agriculture in Africa] is that in the great majority of small-scale estates the crops are not high-output varieties commonly used in other continents” (Rockefeller Foundation, 2006). It was Africa’s turn (as expressed in the report “Africa’s turn. A New Green Revolution for the 21st Century” by the Rockefeller Foundation (2006)). The path chosen by AGRA, which prioritises genetic improvement and the use of chemical fertilisers, differs from the first Green Revolution because of considerable participation from the private sector (Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Yara Fertilizer, amongst others) (Holt-Giménez et al, 2009). One of the principal warnings of AGRA’s critics is that this orchestration of strategies in African agrarian policy might be a substitution of the rural economy by a market-oriented agricultural system. By pursuing this goal, AGRA may become a “Trojan Horse” that may allow the massive penetration of the continent by large international fertiliser and chemical pesticide companies and particularly, seed companies aimed at traditional improvement and genetic engineering (African Centre of Biosafety, 2010 30). Nevertheless, its associates such as the African

Agriculture Technology Foundation are promoting its legalisation and the Gates Foundation is funding their development. Recently, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation announced a new project to introduce the soy value chain to small producers’ groups in Africa in association with TechnoServe (an American non-profit organisation) and the Syngenta Corporation (Swanby, 2010). It has a budget of eight million US dollars over four years and its implementation will reach 37,000 small-scale farmers in Zambia and Mozambique with the intention to extend the model to other regions. This association of organisations favours an agricultural strategy of opening new markets for corporate interests. This is an open door for the Cargill Agribusiness to displace traditional African agricultural practices and crops. The worldwide demand for soya crops is growing because of pressure from the livestock sector and the development of biofuels, which makes it an incentive for investment. This model threatens to introduce African farmers to a high-risk global marketplace and to the dependence upon industrial raw materials. Moreover, it might be a means of entry for genetically modified organisms throughout SubSaharan Africa. In 2010 South Africa had already begun exporting GMO’s to the rest of Africa and the government of Mozambique accepted the import of 35,000 tons of genetically modified soya (ibid.). Below is a summary of the main reasons why a new Green Revolution would not resolve the problem of famine and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (Holt-Gimenez et al, 2006):

* Chapter written by Sara Martínez Frías, Isabel Vara Sánchez, David Gallar Hernández - Instituto de Sociología y Estudios Campesinos (Institutefor Sociology and Rural Studies) – ISEC –. 29 www.agra-alliance.org (Consulted on 18th October 2010) 30 http://www.biosafetyafrica.net (Consulted on 18th October 2010) THE PLUNDERING OF RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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A. Farmers and persons involved in smallscale agriculture cannot pay for the technology that is derived from the Green Revolution. In Sub-Saharan Africa, most of the people working the land do so on small estates and are exposed to debt. B. The technologies of the Green Revolution damage the ecosystem and expose farmers to greater environmental risks. C. The Green Revolution leads to the loss of agricultural biodiversity and endangers the reproduction of the agricultural ecosystems managed by persons involved in family agriculture. Biological reductionism creates a problem of ecological imbalance and makes populations more vulnerable to plagues and illnesses. D. The problems of famine and poverty are not only a result of the lack of food but also to the lack of resources for obtaining it. The link between food production and not suﬀering from the issue of famine becomes imbalanced when agrarian models are aimed at a global marketplace in which the population does not have equal access either to food or to the resources for its production. E. Technological considerations do not function if structural inequalities in the market systems and their policies are not dealt with. Worldwide distribution and the privatisation of food industry systems have pushed many people away from agriculture.

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F. The private sector cannot resolve food production, distribution and sales problems by itself. G. The introduction of genetic engineering will make farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa more environmentally vulnerable. Growing genetically modiﬁed organisms entails widely accepted environmental risks (Altieri, 2003) and it has in fact accelerated the evolution of “superweeds” and plagues of resistant insects, the unintentional transfer of “transgenes” to local varieties of crops with unforeseeable eﬀects, the accumulation of the Bt toxin in the soil, damaging the edaphic fauna and its negative impact on insects that regulate plagues and the substitution of local varieties, etc. H. The introduction of crops that are the result of genetic engineering to rural agriculture will lead to increased debt and to the bankruptcy of small-scale farmers. The substantial investments and high costs of new technologies that belong to large private sector companies cannot be supported by rural farmers. If the new technologies are distributed in a “philanthropic” manner for the inclusion of rural communities in marketoriented agrarian models, this will generate dependence upon the technological bundles of external inputs in the medium term.

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

I. The AGRA initiative is not the only option and does not take into account experience with an agro-ecological approach developed on the back of the failure of the Green Revolution. Durable agriculture can oﬀer great increases in the production of food in Africa and the agro-ecological approach with participative models for the development and distribution of technology can be a basis of social change in the domain of agriculture. In a study conducted by Pretty (1999) and that covered 45 durable agriculture projects and/or initiatives in 17 African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe), for a total of 730,000 households and some 900,000 hectares it was shown that models containing agro-ecological practices have substantially improved food production and food security in the households. In 95% of the projects, productive output has improved by between 50% and 100% (corn, sorghum, millet, rice, potatoes and plantains). Total agricultural food production has increased in all of them. This analysis demonstrates that durable agriculture can oﬀer great increases in food production in Africa.

J. The AGRA initiative does not allow farmers to be the main agents for the development of agriculture, livestock farming and ﬁshing. The creation of agrarian development policies that is being conducted by AGRA responds to decisions established from “above”, bringing together large corporations, philanthropic bodies, development agencies, international and national bodies as well as African governments. The participation of farmers’ movements is limited and the proposals for agrarian reform and Food Sovereignty are left oﬀ the agenda. True development at human scale (Max-Neef, 1993) requires the inclusion of proposals designed by the social base, taking into account basic human needs beyond the concept of monetary gain.

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Commercial agreements between the European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa The Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 for a 20-year period and first revised in 2005, constitutes the valid legal context in which the current commercial relationships between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries exist, and represents a new phase in the cooperation between both agents. The Cotonou Agreement attempted to establish a new panorama that would include concerns that go beyond mere commercial exchanges and even the concern for the economic development of ACP countries, which had already been expressed in the Lomé agreements, including another series of objectives amongst its priorities, such as the promotion of social and cultural development in ACP countries, the contribution to the creation of their peace and security and the encouragement of a stable and democratic political environment. The most refined product to come from the Cotonou Agreement is the launching of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), which the EU has been negotiating since 2002 with the 77 ACP countries (and as such with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa). The EPAs will be the agreements dealt with in this chapter, not because there are no other types of agreements established between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa regarding international trade (like the investment protection agreements, for example), but because they are currently the most relevant agreements for the definition of commercial relationships between both agents. If the negotiation period were successful, the EPAs would actually represent an

essential change in the economic and productive structure of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. EPAs represent the opening (by means of reduced duties) of African markets to European products. Far from maintaining the non-reciprocal trade system that favoured the ACP countries, the aim of the EPAs is totally diﬀerent: to impose upon ACP countries the gradual reduction of the duties that until now were levied on products from the EU, which was a means of protection for national production. The EU wants the ACP countries to liberalise at least 80 per cent of their European imports over the next 15 years. No sector is exempt from this (Oxfam International, 2008). In this sense, any steps that are taken towards establishing a system for commercial exchange “in equal conditions”, ignoring the fact that not all of the economies that participate in such a system have the same strength, influence and coercive capacity, can only go in favour of the strongest and most predatory economies. Via the EPAs, the EU is shamelessly defending its commercial interests and seeking the opening of new markets into which they can inject their surpluses (in many cases subsidised by the governments of the EU member states), regardless of the damage that this may cause to the economies and societies of third-party countries.

* Chapter written by Sara Martínez Frías, Isabel Vara Sánchez, David Gallar Hernández - Instituto de Sociología y Estudios Campesinos (Institutefor Sociology and Rural Studies) – ISEC –.

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

EPAs and African regional disintegration The negotiation process in Sub-Saharan Africa collapsed at the end of 2007, when eighteen African countries decided to retire from their regional negotiation groups. On 2nd October 2007, the

East African requested a two-year extension for the negotiation period in order to reach a regional agreement, but the EU refused, encouraging bilateral signatures with Ghana and the Ivory Coast.

From 2008 onwards, after the crisis of 2007, a second phase of negotiations began. During this phase, two radically differing lines of negotiation could be appreciated (Jovtis, 2008): • The one undertaken by the Least Developed Countries (LDC), favouring the preferential Everything But Arms (EBA) treatment system that, with a regime similar to that of Cotonou, enables free access to European markets for many products (apart from arms) with no requirement of reciprocity. • The one undertaken by 35 other ACP countries that have already signed interim agreements, which are temporary bilateral agreements established between each of these countries and the EU as a fundamental step towards defining the definitive contents of the EPAs. These agreements are WTOcompatible, eliminating the advantages offered by the Preferential Guarantee Systems.

At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we subscribe to the opinion that the EPAs prevent the reinforcement of African regional integration (GEA, 2009), since the majority of them are signed without respecting the regional groups. The fact that some ACP countries belonging to the same regional group are negotiating the EPAs in different “negotiation groups” would, for example, enable countries from the same integration project to agree upon different trade duties, origins regulations and liberalisation programmes with the EU, which in turn would damage their Customs unity, would go against trade within the group and, in short, would slow down regional integration (Jovtis, 2009). For example, it should be pointed out that the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) has signed several different agreements with the EU. Five COMESA countries have signed an “EAC text”, with the same tariff classification, and another five have signed individual “ESA texts”. Yet another six countries subscribed to the “Everything But Arms” programme. The Customs Union (SACU), the oldest union in the world, has been drawn into a crisis because of the EPA negotiation pro-

cess. South Africa, which represents more than 90% of the region’s incomes, has not reached an agreement in the EPA environment, whereas other countries have done so. Namibia initialled the agreement on the condition that the text would be modiﬁed (Le Roux, 2008). This amalgamation of agreements undermines the power that Sub-Saharan Africa could have as a negotiator if it acted as a cohesive negotiating group before the EU. In an attempt to preserve some common criteria, African heads of state are asking for bilateral agreements to be channelled through the African Union beforehand (Abeba, 2008), but the EU prefers to sign individually and does not concede enough time to favour the adoption of joint agreements on the part of African regions (Oxfam International, 2009).

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The impact of the EPAs upon Food Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa The opening and liberalisation of markets represents a serious threat for the FSov of African populations. Whereas by subscribing to an EPA Sub-Saharan African countries are obliged to remove their agrarian protections regarding tariffs and price control, the EU’s industrialised countries do not have to modify any of their agriculture subsidies, which is the basis for dumping. This causes a situation of extreme vulnerability for the economies of most Afri-

can countries: On the one hand they find that the product that they are selling hardly has any added value on the international marketplace and on the other, they find that their national productive systems are defenceless against the voracity of a market that does not understand farmers’ needs or take into account the fragility of local realities that can result from non-discriminatory tariff modifications.

Table 1: TARIFFS IN KENYA For persons involved in small-scale farming in Sub-Saharan Africa, unfair competition from European subsidised food products is a reality. Over the last 15 years, imports to Western Africa (that occur mainly in the agro-food industry) from Europe have increased by 84%, which has harmful eﬀects on African farmers, who stand by as national products are pushed aside by others that come from international trade that are cheaper. In Kenya during the Nineties, the local dairy industry collapsed when international prices dropped below national production costs, condemning 600,00 people whose jobs depended upon agriculture into poverty. In the face of this crisis situation, the Kenyan government increased tariﬀs from 25% to 35% and up to 60% in 2003, operating a tangible improvement to the situation that had engulfed the country31. Source: own data based on information obtained from Oxfam International, 2008 and Veterinarios Sin Fronteras, 2008.

Furthermore, the reduction of tariff barriers for the entry of EU products can represent a reduction of tax revenues for African governments. In the case of Uganda, for example, these repre-

sent around 50% of tax revenues (Veterinarios Sin Fronteras, 2008). This reduction in government revenue would have a particular impact upon social, health and education programmes.

31 The Commonwealth Secretariat on Gender and Trade. ‘EU Set to Milk East Africa with Subsidised Goods?’ 15th November 2007.

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

Table 2: THE CASE OF COTTON IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA Cotton farmers in Western and Central Africa appear to have the most efficient production system in the world in terms of production costs. According to figures available for 2001 onwards, production from a hectare of cotton plants costs $ 0.21 in Benin and Mali. In Burkina Faso, the cost is of $ 0.22, whilst this figure rises to 68 cents in the US. At the time, between 1990 and 1997, cotton gave a considerable boost to the economies of Burkina Faso and Mali. In Burkina Faso for example, cotton production increased by 175% between 1993 and 1998, which in turn led to a rise in revenues. As a result of this, the poverty figures dropped from 50% to 42% in cotton-growing areas, whilst the poverty levels rose in other areas. Cotton prices began to drop in the mid-Nineties. Between 1997 and 2002 the average global market price dropped by 40%. One of the most decisive factors in the price tumble was overproduction due to the liberalisation of the cotton sector in the US, the consequence of this being a drop in prices around the world. In 1996, instead of re-implanting demand-regulation programmes, the American government passed an Agriculture Bill that envisaged direct aid payments to compensate producing groups due to low global prices. These subsidies enabled the planters to continue overproducing so that the United States, despite the high cost of its cotton production, are the largest exporter and the second-largest producer of cotton in the world. Most of this aid went to no more than a dozen companies such as Cargill, which received more than 87 million dollars. The total amount of subsidies awarded to these twelve companies represented half of the total amount of aid, in other words 843.9 million dollars. The EU is not an important cotton producer since it only provides 2.5% of world production (EC production is mainly concentrated in Greece). Nonetheless, he subsidies that it gives to Spanish and Greek production groups are extremely high since they are respectively equivalent to 180% and 169% of global prices.

Table 3: UGANDA AND THE EPAs The Interim Agreement that Uganda signed as part of the EAC (East African Community) conditions its capacity for negotiation with other globally important agents such as China. In Article 16 (A more favourable treatment resulting from the economic integration agreements) it is established that with regard to the conditions of free movement for goods, the EAC will have to come to an agreement with the EU on all favourable treatments as a result of the EAC undertaking an economic integration process with any other economic power. Even though Article 16 establishes that this aspect will not be taken into account for inter-African agreements, in Caribbean or Paciﬁc countries it will aﬀect any economy with a percentage of international trade exceeding 1%, as occurs with China. This way, the EU maintains its dominant position in view of the threat represented by the entrance into Africa of the Asian market, ignoring the consequences that this kind of agreement may have upon the Ugandan population. Source: Veterinarios Sin Fronteras, 2008

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Public instruments for the corporate implantation of the spanish state in Sub-Saharan Africa With the goal of strengthening Spanish corporate fabric, encouraging its competitiveness and supporting its exports to Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as to incentivise trade relationships between both agents, the Spanish government has developed a series of commercial policy instruments. This chapter analyses several public policies

aimed at supporting the opening and internationalisation of Spanish economy. As well as providing a description of its most relevant aspects, it sets out the concerns expressed by civil society with regard to its eﬀects upon the target countries. Finally, it presents its application in Sub-Saharan countries, particularly within the context of the Africa Plan.

Organismos y mecanismos públicos para la internacionalización 32 The set of ﬁnancial instruments governed by various public, private or mixed bodies is called the Spanish System of Public Funding for Internationalisation. Integrated into the structure of the Spanish state, this system aims to promote and empower investments and exports by Spanish companies in geographically foreign markets.

Below, we will outline the map of bodies, instruments and objectives as well as the kind of support given by the Spanish state. As a ﬁrst general approach, the highest-ranking State bodies that are involved in corporate internationalisation are the following:

The State bodies and mechanisms that promote and support internationalisation are not limited to specific institutions or means of intervention, but instead there is a wide and diversified public structure that is at the service of private expansion. The growth of the national economy depends more and more upon the activities, benefits and capital that Spanish companies bring in from beyond their own borders.

32 The following information and tables are taken from the report “Public policies, private beneﬁts” (2010) by Rodrigo Fernández Miranda and Ridrigo Ruiz Rubio, published by the Foro de Turismo Responsable. 46

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

State bodies for internationalisation Organismo

Funciones

Características

Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade (MITT)

“…this is the department in charge of the proposal and execution of government policy regarding industrial development, trade policy, energy policy, of small- and medium-sized companies, of tourism, of telecommunications and of the information society”.

The MITT is built around the following organs: the Secretary of State for Tourism; the Secretary of State for Trade; the Secretary of State for Telecommunications and the Information Society.

Ministry of Economy and the Exchequer (MEE)

The Inland Revenue, the Oﬃcial Credit Institution (OCI), the National Statistics Institute (NSI), Lotteries and Gambling, the Treasury Department and the General Direction of the Land Registry depend upon the MEE.

Amongst its work sections one can single out: …treasury and ﬁnancial policy, funding of autonomies, local funding, European Union funds… General State Budgets… corporate accountancy and auditing… international.

Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Cooperation (MFAC)

General Administration of the State that (…) to execute the unity of the State’s foreign activity, is in charge of executing the following functions: planning, directing, executing and evaluating the state’s Foreign Policy; concentrating and boosting Spanish relationships with other states and with international organisations; encouraging Spain’s economic, cultural and scientiﬁc relationships; directing the International Development Cooperation Policy; ensuring the protection of Spanish citizens overseas and taking part in the proposal and application of the immigration policy.

This ministry dispose of a Secretary of State for Foreign Aﬀairs; a Secretary of State for the European Union; a Secretary of State for International Cooperation, a Secretary of State for Latin America; a Secretary of State for Consular and Immigration Issues.

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State bodies for internationalisation Organismo

Funciones

Características

Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade (ICEX)

A public body that depends upon the Secretary of State for Tourism and Trade and whose mission is to provide its services to Spanish companies to promote and/or facilitate their international projection, increase exports and improve the international appreciation of Spanish capital. The ICEX is one of the main centres that controls the promotion and internationalisation of Spanish companies.

The sectors of activity are the design and execution of programmes for the commercial promotion of Spanish companies on international markets; Training managers and employees of Spanish companies in Foreign Trade; Creation and publishing of reports and studies on Spanish products and companies, as well as on international markets; Promoting investment projects, the relocation of production activities and corporate cooperation on international markets.

Oﬃcial Credit Institution (OCI)

Part of the MEE, the OCI is a corporate public body “that is considered as a State Financial Agency (…) It supports the investment projects of Spanish companies so that they can be more competitive and contribute towards our country’s economic progress”.

The OCI has shares in various companies: Fund Fund-ico(100%); Euro-OCI Fund (100%); Axis Corporate Participations (100%); the Spanish Rebonding Company (CERSA – 23.81%); the Spanish Development Funding Company (COFIDES – 25.25%); the European Investment Fund (EIF – 0.28%); Carbon Fund for Spanish Companies (FC2E – 25%).

Spanish Company for Development Funding (COFIDES)

“A joint-stock company (…) whose goal is to provide ﬁnancial support to viable private projects that are undertaken in emerging or developing countries in which there is some kind of Spanish interest, to contribute towards the development of these countries as well as to the internationalisation of Spanish economy and companies with proﬁtability criteria”.

The following participate in its social capital: the Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade (ICEX); the Oﬃcial Credit Institution (OCI); the National Innovation Company (ENISA); BBVA; BSCH; Banco Sabadell. COFIDES, by means of Law 66/97 of Fidcal, Economic and Social Order Measures controls two funds for investment in capital and quasi-capital that were created to support the internationalisation of Spanish companies: FIEX and FONPYME, registered to the MITT and controlled by COFIDES.

These front-line ministries, institutions, public or mixed companies represent the first and second levels in the hierarchy of a pyramidal structure that is expanding in order to be able to accommodate a greater amount of projects, sectors, geographic areas and types of public intervention tools.

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

Public instruments for private internationalisation Generally speaking, there are three types of instruments for the public promotion of Spanish corporate internationalisation. This distinction is done depending upon the nature and the objectives that each one has: funding and aid mechanisms; institutional support instruments and, finally, tax incentives. It is difficult to present a static and long-lasting depiction of this network, since modifications

occur almost constantly. Beyond the two-party alternation in central government, as the internationalisation of ETNs has become more important in the Spanish GDP, new bodies, companies, tools and budgetary entries in public funds, al aimed at improving these processes, have been created. The dynamic international markets require public support elements that must also be dynamic.

BODIES AND INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONALISATION: DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES

Body

Instrument

Type

Objectives

MITYC-ICEX

Programme for Support to Foreign Investment Projects (PAPI)

Funding and Aid mechanism

Providing support for productive projects for corporate investment or cooperation conducted by Spanish companies overseas.

MITYC-ICEX

Programme for the prospection of Overseas Investments (PROSPINVER)

Institutional Support Tool

Facilitates or enables an initial contact between a Spanish company and an interesting market or an investment opportunity overseas.

MITYC-ICEX

Programme for the identiﬁcation, Diﬀusion and Support for New Investment Initiatives (PIDINVER)

Institutional Support Tool

Promoting the creation of corporate alliances (joint-ventures) between Spanish companies and companies from other “target” countries.

MITYC-ICEX

Programme for Access to Multilateral Markets (PAMU)

Institutional Support Tool

This Assistance Programme aims to facilitate Spanish corporate access for participation in contracts funded by Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFI).

MITYC-ICEX

Fund for Integrated Aid to Projects (FAIP)

Funding and Aid mechanism

Supporting “Spanish engineering, consultancy and contracting companies involved in civil and industrial projects” to encourage their participation in international tenders and bidding outside the European Union.

Institutional Support Tool

Informing interested Spanish companies about the various ﬁnancial instruments proposed by Public Administrations to provide support for corporate internationalisation.

MITYC-ICEX

Catalogue of ﬁnancial support instruments for foreign implantation and investment

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

BODIES AND INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONALISATION: DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES

Body

Type

Objectives

MITYC- General Direction of International Funding (DGFI)

Viability Studies Fund (FEV)

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Instrument funded via a charge to the DAF to favour the internationalisation of Spanish companies by means of the introduction of Spanish engineering, consultancy and technology ﬁrms, as well as Spanish know-how, into the preparation phases of projects… There are three types of FEV: public, private and multilateral.

MITYC- DGFI

Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion of Interests (APRI)

Institutional Support Tool

“Providing an environment that is stable and favourable to investment and that enables the reduction of political and legal uncertainty factors that sometimes aﬀect the development of investment projects with which companies are usually confronted overseas.

MITYC-DGFI

Agreement for the Conversion of Debt into Investment

Institutional Support Tool

The conversion of foreign debt into private and public investments for Spanish companies and NGDOs.

MITYC-CDTI International Direction

Technological Promotion Projects

Funding and Aid Mechanisms

“A Public and corporate body (…) that promotes the innovation and technological development of Spanish companies”. Funding for the foreign exploitation of technologies developed by Spanish companies.

MITYC- CDTI International Direction

Eureka Project

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Providing support for technological cooperation in Europe.

MITYC- CDTI International Direction

AL-INVEST Programme

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Providing support for technological cooperation in Latin America.

MITYC- European Community Programmes

ASIA-INVEST Programme

European Community Funding and Aid Mechanisms

European programmes aimed at strengthening economic cooperation between Europe and Latin America.

MITYC- European Community Programmes

PROINVEST Programme

European Community Funding and Aid Mechanisms

European programmes aimed at strengthening economic cooperation between Europe and Asia.

European Community Funding and Aid Mechanisms

European programmes aimed at strengthening economic cooperation between Europe and ACP countries.

MITYC- European Community programmes

Instrument

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Iberoeka Project

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

BODIES AND INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONALISATION: DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES

Body

Instrument

Type

Objectives

COFIDES

Country Expansion Line

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Joint funding of productive investments by Spanish companies in these countries, giving priority to projects in the infrastructures, public services and transport sectors amongst others.

COFIDES

Funding Line for Investments in the Tourism Sector (FINTUR)

Funding and Aid Mechanism

This is a public funding line aimed directly at the tourism sector and whose goal is to contribute towards the medium- and long-term financial needs of Spanish companies in this sector in “developing countries”.

COFIDES

Funding Line for Investments in the Services Sector (FINSER)

Funding and Aid Mechanism

The goal of this instrument is public contribution to the mediumand long-term ﬁnancial needs of investment projects by Spanish companies in the services sector overseas, more speciﬁcally in “developing countries”.

COFIDES

China Line

Funding and Aid Mechanism

The joint funding of productive investments by Spanish companies in China, giving priority to projects in the infrastructures, public services sectors.

MEH - ICO

Reciprocal Interests Convention (CARI)

Funding and Aid Mechanism

A financial body whose objective is to ensure that private financial bodies give long-term credits for export with a fixed interest rate that is lower than the market rate. CARI functions like an interest rate insurance, eliminating the risk of an eventual rise in interest rates.

MEH - ICO

SUPERCARI

Funding and Aid Mechanism

This is a credit for funding Spanish arms exports.

COFIDES

COFIDES-FOMIN Joint-funding line

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Provides support for the long-term funding requirements of productive investment projects by Spanish companies in Latin America.

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

BODIES AND INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONALISATION: DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES

Body

Instrument

Objectives

COFIDES

COFIDES for African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc (ACP) countries

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Providing support for projects by Spanish companies in ACP countries.

COFIDES

COFIDES-CII for investments in Latin American countries

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Providing support for the mediumand long-term funding requirements of productive investment projects by Spanish companies in Latin American countries.

COFIDES

Fund for Overseas Investments (FIEX)

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Providing support for the own resources requirements of investment projects by Spanish companies in overseas markets.

COFIDES

Fund for Overseas investments by SMEs (FONPYME)

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Providing support for the own resources requirements of projects by Spanish SMEs in overseas markets.

COFIDES

Country Expansion Line

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Joint-funding of productive investments by Spanish companies in these countries, giving priority to projects in the infrastructures, public services and transport sectors amongst others.

COFIDES

Line of Funding for Investments in the Tourism Sector (FINTUR)

Funding and Aid Mechanism

This is a public line of funding that is directly aimed at the tourism sector whose objective is to contribute towards the medium- and long-term funding requirements o Spanish companies in this sector in “developing countries”.

Funding and Aid Mechanism

The objective of this instrument is the public contribution to the medium- and long-term funding needs of investment projects by Spanish companies in the services sector overseas, mores speciﬁcally in “developing countries”.

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Joint funding of productive investments by Spanish companies in China, giving priority to projects in the infrastructures, public services sectors.

COFIDES Line of Funding for Investments in the Services Sector (FINSER)

COFIDES China Line

Type

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

BODIES AND INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONALISATION: DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES

Body

Instrument

Type

Objectives

COFIDES

FINBRAND – Line for internationalisation

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Medium- and long-term funding for the promotion of the internationalisation process of “relevant” Spanish brands. It envisages newly-implanted projects as well as the expansion of aﬃliates and the acquisition of foreign companies.

ICO - COFIDES

ICO line for internationalisation

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Joint funding of productive projects by Spanish companies overseas.

MEH-Inland Revenue

Deductions for Spanish Investments Overseas

Tax Incentive Instrument

The exemption of beneﬁts obtained in foreign territories, deductions for the implantation in other countries and for exports.

MEH-Inland Revenue

Conventions for the avoidance of Double Taxation

Tax Incentive Instruments

These are conventions signed by Spain and other states win order to avoid double taxation for companies that operate in both territories.

MEH-Oﬃce of the Secretary of State for Trade

Spanish Company for Export Credit Insurance (CESCE)

Funding and aid Mechanism – Institutional Support Tool

Covers the political and commercial risks derived from foreign trade operations.

COFI MEH – General Direction of Corporate Funding (DGFINT) DES

Debt Conversion

Funding and Aid Mechanism – Institutional Support Tool

These are bilateral agreements by means of which Spain cancels part of the foreign debt and the debtor state commits to the use of the liberated funds for the development of the country. Conversions can cover private or public investments.

MEH – MAEC – MITYC – ICO

Development Aid Fund (DAF)

Funding and Aid Mechanism

Credits awarded to “developing” countries for the funding of projects to be undertaken by Spanish companies that are equipped with Spanish assets and services. These funds have a double goal: the internationalisation of Spanish companies; promoting the development of the countries receiving this funding. The DAF is considered to be a development cooperation tool due to the fact that credits are awarded under conditions that are more advantageous than those of the market, and with the theoretical objective of promoting the development of the debtor state.

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

Support for internationalisation from regional governments There is also a series of bodies programme and instruments that are conducted in a decentralised way by some of the Autonomous Regions with the goal of promoting the internationalisation of the companies from various Spanish regions:

REGIONAL BODIES FOR CORPORATE INTERNATIONALISATION

Regional Government

Internationalisation Body

Functions and activities

ANDALUSIA

Andalusian Agency for Foreign Promotion (EXTENDA) – Reports to the Regional Ministry for Tourism, Trade and Sports of the Regional Government

Internationalisation body at regional level. Its goal is “to facilitate the internationalisation of SMEs from Andalucía that have the ability to compete by means of oﬀering a variety of services”

ARAGON

Aragón Exterior (AREX) – Public company registered to the Department of Economy, Inland Revenue and Employment of the Government of Aragon.

“It is the Aragon government’s tool for promoting foreign expansion of Aragon’s economy”72. Mission: consultancy and support for internationalisation projects for Aragon’s companies, with a network of bureaus in more than 20 countries.

ASTURIAS

Asturex: Sociedad de Promoción Exterior Principado de Asturias SA.

Date of creation: 2005. Asturex consists of the Government of the Principality, the Federation of Asturian Businessmen and the Chambers of Commerce of Avilés, Gijón and Oviedo.

CANARY ISLANDS

Sociedad Canaria de Fomento Económico SA (PROEXCA) –Registered to the Regional Ministry for Economy and Inland Revenue

Its goal: supporting the direct promotion of Asturian companies, the increase and geographic diversiﬁcation of Asturian exports and the increase of cooperation amongst companies.73.

CANTABRIA

Sociedad para el Desarrollo Regional de Cantabria (SODERCAN) – Made up of the Regional Government of Cantabria, the Caja Cantabria Bank and the Chamber of Commerce of Cantabria

Its goals are the promotion of the internationalisation of companies from the Canary Islands, strengthening the local corporate fabric and attracting foreign investment to the islands. 74 .

CASTILE LA MANCHA

Instituto de Promoción Exterior de Castilla la Mancha (IPEX) –_ Registered to the Vice-presidency and Regional Ministry of Economy and Inland Revenue

Its objectives are focused on promoting the internationalisation of companies from Cantabria, increasing and diversifying exports, amongst other functions. 75. Created in 2002, IPEX aims to increase the overseas corporate presence of Castilla-La Mancha primarily in countries outside the EU 76.

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

REGIONAL BODIES FOR CORPORATE INTERNATIONALISATION

Regional Government

Internationalisation Body

Functions and activities

Castile and León

ADE Internacional Excal SA

Its goal is to promote the internationalisation of the region’s companies. Excal oﬀers consultancy and promotion of foreign trade. It is a key instrument for the corporate internationalisation of Castilla y León.

Catalonia

Acció Centre d’Innovació i Desenvolupament Empresarial (CIDEM-COPCA)

Made up of the Regional Government of Catalonia, Catalan Chambers of Commerce and Industry and more than 100 private bodies that are registered with the Department for Innovation, Universities and Companies, it is the Regional Government’s tool for the promotion of the internationalisation of Catalan companies.

Ceuta

Sociedad de Fomento de Ceuta PROCESA: Sociedad Privada Municipal para el Fomento y la Promoción del Desarrollo Socioeconómico de Ceuta SA

PROCESA “has the mission of facilitating, stimulating, channelling and validating projects and initiatives of a corporate nature…”. Amongst other things, PROCESA manages the integrated operations programme between Spain and Morocco.

Valencia

Instituto Valenciano de la Exportación (IVEX)

“… it is the regional government’s tool for internationalising the corporate fabric of the Region of Valencia… The company was created under the joint initiative of the Regional Ministry for Industry, Trade and Innovation and the Chambers of Commerce of the Region of Valencia, facilitating the access to the global market for the region’s companies with the aim of making internationalisation the key to their progress and future success…”.

Galicia

Instituto Gallego de Promoción Económica (IGAPE)

It is Galicia’s Development Agency. Amongst its objectives is supporting Galician companies that wish to acquire an international dimension. The body oﬀers lines of funding, consultancy, corporate diagnoses, various forms of institutional support and market research, amongst other functions”.

Euskadi (the Basque Country)

Sociedad para la Promoción y Reconversión Industrial (SPRI)

Amongst other things, its goal is focused on contributing to the internationalisation of Basque companies and it disposes of a network of bureaus in 27 countries. “Mission: promoting the internationalisation of Basque companies, thus contributing to increasing their competitiveness and their potential for creating wealth and employment…”.

Extremadura

Sociedad de Fomento Industrial de Extremadura (SOFIEX)

It aims to attract investments to the region and to support local corporate projects in various sectors. SOFIEX and the Sociedad de Gestión Pública de Extremadura (GPEX) have signed a collaboration convention with COFIDES to promote the internationalisation of companies from Extremadura.

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

REGIONAL BODIES FOR CORPORATE INTERNATIONALISATION

Regional Government

Internationalisation Body

Functions and activities

LA RIOJA

ADER: Agencia de Desarrollo Económico de La Rioja – This is a public body of the Regional Government that is registered with the Regional Ministry for Industry, Innovation and Employment.

A public body whose mission focuses on improving the region’s corporate and industrial activity, developing an economic and industrial policy. As for the internationalisation of regional companies, ADER primarily concentrates on training and information.

MADRID

PromoMadrid – Reports to the Regional Ministry for Economy and Technological Innovation of the Regional Government of Madrid.

Amongst its functions is the support for companies from Madrid in view of their internationalisation, as well as attracting foreign investment to the region. It also carries out sectorial promotion activities. “Goals: Providing companies from Madrid with useful information for the development and execution of their internationalisation strategy (…) Training people in charge of the internationalisation processes within companies from Madrid so that they can carry out their activity in the most eﬃcient and successful way possible” .

MELILLA

Sociedad Pública Promoción Económica de Melilla (PROMESA).

A local development agency that has been involved in assisting and incentivising the Autonomous City’s corporate sector for the past 15 years.

MURCIA

Instituto de Fomento de la Región de Murcia (INFO)

“amongst a corporate audience (…) The Foreign Trade section of the Public Works Institute deploys its activities in the context of the Foreign Promotion Plan… whose objectives include the optimisation of the internationalisation of companies from Murcia by means of the incorporation of new companies, the diversiﬁcation of export products, penetration of new markets and the consolidation of existing markets” .

NAVARRE

Departamento de Innovación, Empresa y Empleo

By means of the Plan for the Internationalisation of Navarra’s Companies, this body aims for the penetration and creation of Navarre’s companies in foreign markets. For the development of the Plan for the Internationalisation of Navarra’s Companies, there are collaboration agreements with the Oﬃcial Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Navarra, and another with ICEX.

This analysis enables us to demonstrate an entire legal and political network at the service of Spanish companies. It exposes the divergences between the commitments of these policies and their effective fulfilment or the complaints from

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civil society, as well as the contradictions that exist between Spanish policies and institutions and development in Sub-Saharan Africa in the context of Spanish International Cooperation.

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

Table 4: MAIN INSTRUMENTS FOR SUPPORTING SPANISH TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA According to information obtained from the ICEX (Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade) website, some of the instruments for the promotion of Spanish exports to Sub-Saharan Africa are: • Support for Spain’s commercial oﬃces in Sub-Saharan Africa. • ICEX’s promotion and information activities (trade fairs, trade missions, campaigns, technical symposiums, etc.). • FAD (Development Aid Fund) loans awarded to African governments for the funding of projects to be undertaken by Spanish companies. • Public funding of viability studies (FEV) carried out by Spanish companies. • CESCE cover for corporate risks in African countries. And the main instruments for the promotion of Spanish investment in Sub-Saharan Africa are: • Funding by COFIDES for the creation/acquisition of companies in Africa by means of medium- and long-term loans. • Agreements with the Spanish government for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments in African countries (APPRI). • Multilateral instruments for supporting investment in Sub-Saharan Africa (European Financing Partners – EFP – and BEI). Source: table extracted as-is from Marin et al, 2009.

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

Spanish trade and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa Within the policy directives established by the EU, Spain maintains trade relationships for export and import with several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore Spanish exports have mainly been aimed at five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Senegal and Ghana, countries that concentrate more than half of all the exports made in the 1995-2007 period. South Africa, which represented 27.9%of all Spanish exports in 2007, had a growth of almost 500% in 2007 with regard to 1995 and is currently the main target for Spanish products (OPEX, 2009). It is followed by Nigeria and Angola with 11.2% and 6.7% respectively. Exports to Senegal and Ghana each represent around 5% of Spanish exports to Sub-Saharan Africa (OPEX, 2009). These five countries represent 56% of Spanish exports. The remaining 44% of exports is spread out over the other 43 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly in the Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Liberia, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya and the Seychelles. In the remaining countries, trade relationships are practically non-existent, since in all they do not represent more than 1% of exports. As for imports, albeit with a greater percentage than exports (56% and 38% respectively), Nigeria and South Africa continue to be Spain’s primary trade associates (OPEX, 2009). The level of specialisation of Spanish exports to the African continent is high: more than half of the export flows are concentrated upon equipment and semi-manufactured goods. As for goods and services imported from the African continent by Spain, 64% are aimed at the acquisition of energy products. In sectorial terms, the concentration is also very high: three sectors absorb around 66% of the funds. The main target sector for investments between 1993 and 1995 was the fishing and fish-farming sector, with 87% of investments. Wood, cork and basket making, with 27%, became the greatest targets in the 1996-2000 period. The

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fishing and fish-farming sector, which appears amongst the main targets of Spanish investments during the reference periods that are taken into account, was once again the favourite in 2006 and 2007 (OPEX, 2009). Amongst other sectors with some level of importance in quantitative terms, one finds food and drinks products, wood and cork, real estate operations, etc. Spanish investors also direct their resources towards other sectors, such as hotels, oil extraction transport or recreational activities, but without exceeding, jointly, 30% of total Spanish investment. In the two main target countries, the level of sectorial concentration is extremely high, particularly in the case of Namibia, where one could speak of single-sector investment: in this country the fishing and fish-farming sector concentrates 95% of Spanish investments. Forty-eight per cent of the investments made in South Africa were aimed ant the metallurgy sector (OPEX, 2009). The following table lists the commercial exchanges established between Spain and some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The information was obtained from the ICEX (Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade) website, updated in August 2010.

FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL SHIFT IN THE DISTANCE AND CRAFT BOAT, SANT LOUIS, SENEGAL.

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

Table 5: THE EXCHANGE OF TRADE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPAIN AND SOME COUNTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ANGOLA 33 Angola has never traditionally been a target country for substantial Spanish investment, although there is a noticeable presence in the energy, health and construction sectors. The main sector in which Spain imports from Angola is the environment and energy sector, with 268,838,000 Euros followed at a distance by that of fish and seafood, with 4,290,000 Euros. As for the main sectors in which Spain exports to Angola there is that of industrial technology, with 100,066,000 Euros, followed by the auxiliary mechanics and construction sectors, with 43,923,000 Euros. GHANA 34 The main sector that Spain imports from Ghana is the bakery and others sector, with a total of 47,510,000 Euros. The main sector that Spain exports to Ghana is that of auxiliary mechanics and construction, with a total of 45,198,000 Euros, followed by the chemical industry sector, with 19,819,000 Euros and by the industrial technology sector with 14,346,000 Euros. According to the ICEX, Spanish investment in Ghana does not represent a large amount, although from September 1994 until September 2005, 19 Spanish investment projects have been registered in Ghana, in the agriculture, construction, export, trade, manufacturing, services and tourism sectors. EQUATORIAL GUINEA 35 In 2007, Equatorial Guinea was ranked fifth for Spanish exports to Sub-Saharan Africa with 5.1% of its total exports. Spanish exports to Equatorial Guinea reached a record figure in 2008 with 144 million Euros. Amongst the products one can note machinery (19 M€), motor-cars and accessories (16 M€), drinks (15 M€) and electrical equipment (11 M€). For their part, imports reached record figures in 2008, with 1,882 million Euros, and are concentrated in the fuel sector (1,870 M€). Crude oil represents 98.35% of total imports. Other entries. The Isolux company is currently operating the Bata electrical power station for a sum of around 1 M€/year and the “Hermanos Martínez” and “Comercial Santy” corporate groups control a fair portion of the food wholesale and retail business in Equatorial Guinea (ICEX, 2009). MAURITANIA 36 In 2007 Spain was Mauritania’s third client after China and France, due to the import of fishing products. Spanish investment in Mauritania has traditionally been associated to mixed Hispano-Mauritanian companies. There are currently 20 companies operating in Mauritania, some of which are full affiliates of Spanish mother companies, most of which are based in the Canary Islands. Fishing has always been a traditional investment sector although there is only one fish processing plant operated with Spanish capital and there are very few active companies with Spanish capital. Transport is a key sector for Spanish investment, with the presence of two Spanish maritime transport companies, two air transport companies and two land passenger transport companies that regularly operate in Mauritania. 33 http://www.oficinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,,5280449_5282899_5283038_0_AO,00.html (Consulted on 2/10/2010) 34 http://www.oficinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,,5280449_5282899_5283038_0_GH,00.html (Consulted on 10/10/2010) 35 http://www.oficinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,,5280449_5282899_5283038_0_GQ,00.html (Consulted on 3rd November 2010)

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Table 5: THE EXCHANGE OF TRADE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPAIN AND SOME COUNTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MOZAMBIQUE 37 Spain is one of Mozambique’s main commercial associates (as a client as well as a supplier). Furthermore, the forthcoming signature by both nations of an Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments will create a legal context that will be favourable to the interests of Spanish companies in Mozambique. Spain intends to fund small projects in very diverse sectors of the Mozambiquan economy, which will introduce new companies into this country’s marketplace. In 2007, Spain’s exports to Mozambique amounted to 13.8 million Euros, 77% of which corresponded to raw materials, industrial products and equipment. In 2008 (from January to November), exports amounted to 21.9 million Euros, of which 52% were machinery and electrical and mechanical goods. According to data from ICEX, updated on 8/2010 , the fish and seafood sector is the first-ranking sector imported to Spain from Mozambique, with 97,722,000 Euros, followed by the raw materials, semi-manufactured and intermediate products sector, with 13,749,000 Euros. It is curious to note that, in the ranking of the main sectors exported from Spain to Mozambique, one finds fish and seafood in ninth place, with 185,000 Euros. NAMIBIA 39 Spain is Namibia’s third-ranked client, after the United Kingdom and South Africa. Nevertheless, if one does not take into account diamonds, Spain would be Namibia’s principal EC client, since it purchases about a third of all the products that this country exports to the European Union. It is followed in importance by France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. The strong Spanish presence in the fishing sector is undoubtedly the determining factor in the importance of exports of fish from Namibia to Spain. The main sector Spain imports from Namibia is fish and seafood, with 109,957,000 Euros, far ahead of horticultural products, with 191,000 Euros. The main sector exported to Namibia from Spain is that of raw materials, semi-manufactured goods and intermediate products, with 3,585,000, followed by industrial technology with 1,908,000 Euros. SOUTH AFRICA 40 The main sector imported by Spain from South Africa is that of environment and energy production, with 189,923,000 Euros, followed by the raw materials, semi-manufactured goods and intermediate products sector with 109,965,000 Euros. As for the main sectors exported to Namibia from Spain, in first place there is the industrial technology sector, with 293,474,000 Euros, followed by the chemical industry sector with 74,064,000 Euros. Fuente: elaboración propia a través de información extraída de www.icex.es 36 http://www.oficinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,5310,5280449_5304715_5296234_0_MR,00. html (Consulted on 3rd November 2010) 37 http://www.oficinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,5310,5280449_5304715_5296234_0_MZ,00.html (Consulted on 3rd November 2010) 38 http://www.oficinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,5310,5280449_5320986_5320988_0_MZ,00. html (Consultada el 10/11/ 2010) 39 http://www.oficinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,5310,5280449_5308104_5308301_0_NA,00. html (Consultada el 5/11/2010) 40 http://www.oficinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,5310,5280449_5320986_5320988_0_ZA,00. html (Consultada el 5 de Noviembre de 2010) 60

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

The Spanish Institute for Foreign Commerce (ICEX) According to the information on its website 41, the ICEX is “a Public Body with speciﬁc legal personality registered with the Secretary of State for Foreign Commerce reporting to the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, that provides its services to Spanish companies in order to promote and facilitate their international projection”. To this end “it designs and executes commercial promotion programmes in foreign markets, promotes investment, industrial implantation or corporate cooperation projects in foreign markets amongst other things” 42. For this purpose, the ICEX has developed various instruments with which to support the implanta-

tion of Spanish companies on foreign markets. These include commercial promotion activities (trade missions, promotion and publicity campaigns), information and communication (the ICEX website, call centres, market research, thematic seminars in Spain and overseas, investment and corporate cooperation for a) and training courses (foreign commerce grants programmes) (Ligero, 2007). The ICEX deploys its activities outside Spain by means of the reinforcement of the Network of Spanish Overseas Economic and Commercial Bureaus, which has seven oﬃces in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Angola and South Africa) (Marín et al, 2009).

Support Programme for Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (PAPAS) In 2008, on request from the CAPCAO (Assessment Committee for Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa), the ICEX created the Support Programme for Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (PAPAS) . The speciﬁc goal of this programme is to support and encourage sales of Spanish products as well as the commercial and productive implantation of Spanish companies in the countries of SubSaharan Africa (Angola, Zambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin, Burkina Faso the Cape Verde Islands, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo). This programme oﬀers aid for legal consultancy, rents and external services, expenses and travel

or promotional matter, and allows across-theboard projects in all sectors. Moreover, and in keeping with the philosophy of the Africa Plan (addressed later on in this report), the programme functions in such a way that projects that are submitted to the ICEX by companies are not only evaluated according to the usual parameters (the solidity and maturity of the project, for example), but are also evaluated according to the creation of employment in the target country, the transferral of technology and knowledge, the consolidation of the stable corporate fabric overseas and support for the development and export strategies of the target countries. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we are doubtful of the de facto beneﬁts of the immersion of foreign and Spanish companies in the economies and

41 http://www.icex.es 42 http://www.icex.es/icex/cda/controller/pageICEX/0,6558,5518394_5593051_5711547_0_0_-1,00.html (Consulted on 13/10/2010) 43 http://www.icex.es/icex/cda/controller/pageICEX/0,6558,5518394_6186001_5586834_4095211_0_-1,00.html (Consulted on 5/11/2010) THE PLUNDERING OF RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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societies of the ACP countries and, more speciﬁcally, in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa; countries in which, as can be seen throughout the document, the Spanish government has taken a particular interest in recent years. If there is real concern on the part of the Spanish government for development at all levels (social, cultural, economic, etc.) in poor countries, it would be logical to design and implement policies that would

contribute towards the economic and social reinforcement of these countries according to their endogenous abilities and not according to the interests of international private capital, in this case, Spanish capital. The more dependent a country is when consolidating the economic and social functions of its foreign interactions, the more it will be vulnerable to external interests.

The Agreements for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (APPRI) The APPRIs are bilateral treaties concerning direct foreign investment (DFI) and investment portfolios, as well as loans, property concessions and rights registered between two states on the basis of reciprocity. They constitute a basic tool of the institutional activity of the Secretariat of State for Trade and Tourism in the context of support plans for the internationalisation of Spanish companies, with the goal of creating conditions of political and legal security for the investments made by the investors from each state in the other state’s territory 44. In 2010, Spain signed APPRIs with Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Angola and Mauritania (Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, List of valid APPRIs, 2010). “As acknowledged by the Africa Plan, they take on a specific strategic interest in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, but nonetheless, the Spanish corporate world is still of the opinion that many African countries do not offer sufficient guarantees for their potential investments” (Marín et al, 2009).

YUCCA PLANT IN FAMILY OPERATION, UGANDA.

44 Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism. http://www.comercio.mityc.es (Consulted on 29/11/2011)

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Spanish international cooperation: investment as a tool for development policy Despite the apparent work of Development Cooperation over the past 60 years to alleviate the problem of starvation, instead of reducing, the number of people living in conditions of food instability continues to rise year after year. This lack of correlation between “concern” and “results” proves that something is not being done right. The Spanish International Development Cooperation Agency (AECID) is the body that controls the Spanish policy for international development cooperation. It is a public-law company registered

to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation via the office of the Secretary of State for International Cooperation (SECI) 45. The 3rd Directive Plan for Spanish Development Cooperation for the 2009-2012 period, identifies some of the causes of this lack of correlation, such as the lack of funding, the inefficiency of development aid and the need for better coordination amongst development agents and policies. Although these causes do have their part to play in this, continuing to consider them as central elements of this failure only distracts attention from the real problem.

The inefficiency of International Cooperation. An introduction to the concept of Anti-cooperation David Llistar coined the term “Anti-cooperation” (2009) in this sense. This concept attempts to show up the neo-colonial mechanisms that still exist today in a North-South direction, as well as the little importance carried by development policies compared to all the other foreign policies and lifestyles of wealthy countries, which directly or indirectly cause serious prejudices in Southern countries, as we shall see further on. If Development Cooperation is supposed to mean all activities in the North that are beneficial (at least in principle) to Southern countries, then “Anti-cooperation” means the exact opposite, in other words, activities conducted in and by the North and whose effects are directly or indirectly harmful to the South (Llistar, 2006). With such a consideration, it would appear to be difficult to achieve the objectives presented in the development policies of Northern countries, whatever the tools may be, if at the same time the anticooperation activities that are being carried out

are not reconsidered. Development cooperation enables wealthy countries to position themselves within the context of concern for inequality and poverty in the world without the need to address their real causes, whilst they actively develop means by which they can continue to wield political, economic and cultural control on a global scale. This gives rise to the paradox that cooperation and anti-cooperation tend to be conducted by the same agents. The following section illustrates the Anti-cooperation concept by means of a study of various mechanisms deployed by the Spanish government in order to support the internationalisation of Spanish companies in the context of Spanish international cooperation.

45 http://www.aecid.es/web/es/aecid/ (Consulted on 12/11/2010)

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Spanish cooperation and its paradoxes The Spanish government’s activities in the ﬁeld of cooperation, designed with a neoliberal approach, do not diﬀer from those of other wealthy countries. The proposal of this approach is “to alleviate the extreme poverty caused by the essential adjustment programmes whilst modernising and expanding the structures of global capitalism” (Llistar, 2009).

When the use of cooperation funds from the Spanish government is analysed, it is necessary to address the following issues: what is being financed and where it is being financed, in order to finally attempt to understand the directly and indirectly moves the Cooperation and development aid process, and the interdependence of the agents that characterises it.

WHAT IS BEING FINANCED Via the AECID, the Spanish government distributes and provides development aid by means of various sources: subsidies given to Spanish or foreign NGDOs and to Spanish companies whose fieldwork takes place in poor countries; International Cooperation contributions made directly to institutions or other bodies in the countries benefiting from aid, without the need for intermediaries; and finally by means of the Permanent Open Tender (CAP). The AECID devoted 238,769,776.07 € (which represents 24.80% of its total budget of 962,774,141.60 €) to NGDOs in 2010. More specifically, 53,166,161.58 Euros have been invested in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is 22.40% of the budget aimed at all the NGOs operating worldwide. The country that has benefited the most from this has been Mozambique, which has been awarded 8,604,059.45 Euros, which represents 3.63% of the total budget, followed by Equatorial Guinea with 7,952,922.00

Euros (3.36% of the total), Senegal with 6,263,998.97 Euros (2.64%) and Ethiopia, which received 4,198,170.00 Euros (1.77% of the total) (AECID, 2011). The International Cooperation subsidies represented a total of 49,631,354.66 Euros (AECID, 2009). These have a more institutional outlook and tend to be aimed at reinforcing the institutions of impoverished countries (such as Mozambique’s Ministry of Finance, the Development Agency in Senegal or the Namibian government) or at supporting the actions of multilateral bodies such as the FAO and UNICEF (with projects in Angola, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger). For its part, in the CAP 14 projects in SubSaharan Africa related to the agriculture and ﬁshing sector and local trade were funded for a total of 2,541,078.00 Euros 46.

46 Direction of Cooperation for Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe. Annex 1. Resolution of 1st October 2010 of the Presidency of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation on the partial adjudication of open and permanent tender aid for cooperation and development aid activities, corresponding to the ﬁrst procedure of 2010 (Published on the website on 20/10/2010).

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HOW IT IS FINANCED The analysis of the Directive Plan’s strategic priorities reveals that it is the productive sector (including agriculture and FS) that the AECID contributed the most in 2010, with a provision of 48,097,303.22 Euros, which represents 20.30% of its total budget. This figure is much higher than that of the following investment sector: health (including sexual & reproductive health), with a provision of 34,538,049.47 Euros (14.57% of the total amount), or education, with 41,063,085.98 Euros (17.33% of the total) (AECID, 2011). One can deduce from this that the Spanish government considers the agriculture and fishing sector to be a high-priority sector that could represent a force for development for impoverished countries whose economies and survival depend upon it. In view of this, one should ask oneself what type of projects (and from which perspective) is being supported since, depending upon how the intervention is conducted in the beneficiary country, the interferences that may arise can be of one or the other kind, and can occasionally cause effects on the population that are more harmful than

those that one is attempting to relieve. Supporting family agriculture by highlighting rural know-how, or strengthening local trade channels and the empowerment of the aﬀected community from the perspective of FSov, are not the same as providing support via the distribution of genetically modiﬁed seeds in the case of a food emergency. In cases of food emergencies, the Spanish government usually acts multilaterally, associating with international bodies such as the UN. The World Food Programme is the main United Nations agency that is in charge of providing food aid in an emergency situation. It receives 48% of the food from the United States (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 2005) and may only buy up to 30% of food aid locally, since it continues to receive the majority of contributions from governmental donors in the shape of food and not in monetary form (Oxfam International, 2005). The example illustrated in the table shows the activity of the international community in a food emergency situation in Mozambique.

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Table 6: FOOD AID IN THE 2005 FOOD CRISIS IN MOZAMBIQUE After four consecutive years of drought, the condition of Mozambiquan rural families was alarming, with an estimate of more than 800,000 persons aﬀected by the food crisis 47. Faced with this situation, on 13th September 2005, the government of Mozambique and the PMA launched an urgent call to the international community for it to support the drought victims in the country. The PMA’s partners in the distribution of food products were several national NGOs such as Ara, Bades, Cedes, Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique, Igreja Presbiteriana de Moçambique and O Concelho Cristão de Moçambique, and international ones such as World Vision, Jamo, LWF, Samaritano and IRD. Another important agent was the INGC (Instituto Nacional de Gestión de Calamidades) 48. Most of the products that were distributed did not come from national production: the millet was mainly purchased in South Africa; the beans came from China, the US and Kenya; the olyra, millet flour and soya flour came from the US; the rice came from Japan, Algeria and Pakistan; and the vegetable oil came from the EU. This way, via the PMA, the UN facilitated the imports of basic products fundamentally coming from wealthy and industrialised countries that view emergency situations as an opportunity to shift their surplus agricultural produce. Source: compiled internally according to Martínez, 2010

47 http://www.afrol.com/es/articles/16965 (consulted on 05/09/2010) 48 Institute that reports to the government of Mozambique. 66

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WHERE IT IS FINANCED The 3rd Directive Plan distributes the countries benefitting from Official Development Assistance (ODA) into three different categories (A, B and C) that define the government’s

geographic priority in the domain of cooperation. The intention is for the “A” and “B” group countries to concentrate 85% of aid by 2012 (AECID, 2009).

Table 7: GEOGRAPHIC PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN THE 3RD DIRECTIVE PLAN Categories

Description

Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa

GROUP A: EXTENSIVE ASSOCIATION

Least Developed Countries, Low Income Countries or Medium-Low Income Countries in which the programme of Spanish Cooperation has opportunities to establish an eﬃcient long-term association.

Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, the Cape Verde Islands and Niger

GROUP B: FOCALISED ASSOCIATION

Countries that, for various reasons, do not allow a Type A association. ODA is concentrated upon a single key sector or on more than one, but with a single approach, associated to a speciﬁc situation (such as cases of vulnerability to disasters caused by natural events, conflicts or post-conflict situations, etc.)

Equatorial Guinea, the Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guinea

GROUP C: FOCALISED ASSOCIATION WITH MEDIUM-INCOME COUNTRIES FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEVELOPMENT ACHIEVEMENTS

Countries in which the presence of Spanish Cooperation and the country’s potential as a development associate enables the deployment of speciﬁc association strategies, included as commitments on the international agenda for eﬃciency.

Namibia

Source: compiled internally from information obtained from the 3rd Directive Plan for Spanish Cooperation (2009-2012) At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras, we find that it is very telling that some of the countries the Directive Plan has prioritised, even in Group A, are countries in which Spain has the greatest corporate interests, such as Senegal and Mozambique with regard to fishing. In order to nurture good relationships with the governments of countries with which Spain has maintained commercial and fishing resource exploitation activities for decades, the Nuta Programme, promoted by the

AECID, has been specially created. The goal of this programme is to contribute towards the economic and social progress of African countries by means of the development of their fishing sector. It funds marine research programmes and fishing resources; projects linked to fishing resource policies and control; training projects; fishing development programmes and fish-farming projects 49.

49 http://www.aecid.es/web/es/publicaciones/Documentos/Otros/Africa/Prog_Nauta.html (Consulted on 05/11/2010)

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With regard to the development of fish-farming, the Nauta Programme organised a seminar in Accra (Ghana) on 23/03/07 with the aim of developing the implementation plan for the use and dissemination of genetically modified Nile Tilapia in the Volta Basin and adjoining areas, bringing together directing authorities from Benin, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali and Togo. This is an example of how, when concerned with the situation of food insecurity of African populations, Spanish cooperation is introducing highly technical exogenous farming methods, and furthermore ignoring the controversy that shadows the debate on genetically modified organisms and their individual, social and environmental consequences. The Spanish FAO Fund for Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe was created in 2008 as a multilateral means of addressing the problem of famine in these territories 50. In this context and by means of this Fund, in the agriculture sector the Spanish government has encouraged the promotion of intensive rice production as a response to the increased prices of food, fuel and fertilisers in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. It has not paused to consider the consequences that the implementation of intensive rice production methods may have in these countries where historically, rice has been grown using traditional methods that are specifically adapted to the crop context, and whose production was primarily aimed at feeding the families and at the local and/or regional market. Back in the domain of fish-farming, the FAOSpain Fund, in coordination with the activities undertaken by the Nauta Programme, has also developed a programme in the Volta Basin area called “Fish-farming Investments for the reduction of Poverty in the Volta Basin” 51. One of the project’s goals is – textually – the following: “Providing education to poor people for the fishfarming business and establishing national and Spanish SMEs” On the one hand, this highlights the assistive concept of the “enlightened rich” who have the moral duty to teach the “poor” in

order to help them to escape from poverty and, on the other hand, shows the direct link that exists between the cooperation sector and the corporate world. In fact, Spain has established alliances with the private corporate sector and private clusters as a key instrument in the development policy, for technical assistance reasons as well as for envisaging and executing development cooperation programmes, with Chambers of Commerce, the Spanish Confederation of Corporate Organisations (CEOE) or the ICEX as key contacts. All of this is set out in the “Public and Private Alliance for Development” (APPD). This alliance between sectors aims to address two antithetic goals at once: contributing towards developing the African population and favouring Spanish corporate access to Sub-Saharan Africa. In light of this fact it is important to underline two items: a) that the Spanish government considers investment as a development policy tool, in other words, as an activity through which the donor aims to get something in return (not altruistic) and that, therefore, will be undertaken in the sectors or territories in which there is a clear scope for returns; b) that, in turn, it promotes the exporting of the know-how and technology of private bodies before the endogenous and participative creation of technology and know-how that is locally appropriate in a geographic, biophysical and – above all – cultural way. Even more surprising is the inclusion, as a development policy, of credit-type contributions (these are not donation and must be returned according to certain conditions) to micro, small and medium enterprises in the associate countries. These credit-type contributions end up by generating debt in the countries receiving the “aid” and thus deepening the rifts that exists between wealthy countries and impoverished nations. In this sense, the debt that Spain possesses as a creditor before third-parties is o three diﬀerent categories that can be listed as

50 http://www.rlc.fao.org/fondo/ (Consulted on 30/10/2010) 51 http://www.rlc.fao.org/faoespana/proyecto/africa.html (Consulted on 15/10/2010) 68

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follows: the Development Aid Fund (FAD), trade debt and other kinds of debt (government-to-

government credits, lines of credit with speciﬁc nature and endorsements) 52.

The FAD credits and Sub-Saharan Africa The FAD credits, awarded to Southern countries by the Official Credit Institute (ICO) after approval by the Cabinet, have in the past represented a very significant part of Spanish ODA. These Development Aid Funds offer the beneficiary countries bilateral funding in terms of concession (according to the Spanish government these terms are more favourable than those of the market) with the goals of, on the one hand, contributing to the development of the beneficiary country – by means of the concession of soft funds – and, on the other, encouraging the internationalisation of Spanish companies (QDQ, 2007).

“The Spanish government is responsible for choosing the target countries for the credits, the criteria that will be applied to them, the operations that will be funded and the companies that will be contracted, since because of the linked nature of these credits, they are only conceded in order to acquire goods and services from Spanish companies” (Gómez et al, 2008). What id of great concern is that these loan will be accounted for as ODA in cases in which “they meet the principles of the cooperation policy, contained in the Directive Plan an in the other planning and strategy documents of Spanish development cooperation”. Therefore, the goal of a part of ODA is not to be a tool for oﬀering resources to the beneﬁciary countries, but instead to favour and promote the penetration of Southern economies by Spanish companies, thus increasing the exports of Spanish products (Muñoz, 2007).

Spanish civil society reproaches the FAD’s secrecy and lack of transparency, the lack of control over the final purpose of the funds awarded and over the execution of the funded projects, as well as over the evaluation of their social and environmental effects and their contribution to the extent of the countries’ debt (Gómez et al, 2008; Marín et al, 2009). In 2007 the external debt for which Spain was a creditor amounted to 8,495.60 million Euros, of which almost 50% (4,195 million Euros) was debt from FAD credits, whilst 43% (3,661 million Euros) corresponded to trade debt or that generated by the CESCE (Carrión et al, 2009). Furthermore, the illegal nature of some FAD credits has been criticised53, given that they were aimed at purchasing arms (usually for the purpose of quelling civil protests or maintaining a dictatorship); funding wars for the invasion and annexation of neighbouring territories; corrupting Southern economic ad political power (rerouting loans that never reached the country); purchasing luxury goods for the elites of the debtor country; financing infrastructures for the usage and benefit of translational companies; so-called development projects with serious economic, social and environmental effects; or loans imposed by the International Monetary Fund with harmful conditions for the population’s wellbeing (Gómez et al, 2008). In the case of Sub-Saharan countries, 200 million Euros were directed between 2001 and 2006 and, in 2007, FAD credit lines were approved for a sum of 239 million Euros (51% of the FAD total for internationalisation forecast for that year). In

52 For more information about this issue, consult the following website: www.quiendebeaquien.org 53 “An illegal debt is deemed to be that which originates from loans that hide, fund or whose results are behaviour, mechanisms or phenomena that, in the medium or long term, violate the dignity of the life of citizens of the world and/or endanger the paciﬁc coexistence of peoples” (Gómez et al, 2008).

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the Spanish Cooperation’s 2005-2008 Country Strategy Document for Senegal there is an explicit mention of the “success” of the FAD credits given to several Spanish companies for the development of photovoltaic projects in the Sine Salloum Basin, laboratory equipment for quality control for exports, storage and distribution facilities for agricultural and ﬁshing products and freezing facilities for artisan ﬁshing. In the case of Somalia, criticism has been aimed at the fact that the entire foreign debt that the country has towards Spain “corresponds to two FAD credits given to the dictatorial regime of Muhammad Ziyad Vallo for the sale of Spanish lorries and military vehicles. Somalia is currently embroiled in a military conflict that confronts various clans and ‘warlords’ and it is calculated that the foreign debt is equivalent to 300% of the country’s GDP” (Carrión et al, 2009). In 2003 Ethiopia, Uganda and Cameroon reimbursed a total of 23.5 million Euros to Spain in the devolution of Development Aid Fund (FAD) credits; this is six times more that what they received as donations (3.6 million Euros) (Intermón Oxfam, 2003).

ments” (Fresnillo, 2011). At the same time another commercial policy tool, the Fund for Corporate Internationalisation (FIEM), was created; it is totally separate, and is run by the Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Trade via the Oﬃce of the Secretary of State for Trade: it is aimed at the internationalisation of Spanish companies. The FIEM, which has a budgetary allocation of more than 316 million Euros for 2011, specialises in the concession of loans and credits to states, foreign regional, provincial and local public administrations, as well as foreign public and private companies in order to fund projects (despite the high levels of foreign debt held by many countries that are prioritised in the Spanish development policy).

The Fund for the Promotion of Development (FONPRODE), which is included in the Directive Plans of Spanish Cooperation and the Annual Plans for International Cooperation and which is not linked to commercial interests, was created in 2010 as a response to the historic claims of Spanish civil society and as a result of the reform of FAD funds. It includes a wide variety of instruments for direct and indirect funding (state-to-state donations) that can either be refundable or non-refundable (contributions to non-ﬁnancial multilateral development bodies). For 2011 it disposed of a budget 954 million Euros, which is 22% of the total envisaged ODA. It should be pointed out that this line continues to position private companies as key agents for international cooperation and that “the insufficient control and assessment mechanisms that are envisaged and, above all, the impossibility of controlling the funds lent out via go-betweens like IFIs or investment funds, are an open door to the creation of more illegal debt and to the promotion of irresponsible invest-

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COFFEE PLANTATION, NEUMANN KAFEE GRUPPE, UGANDA.

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The Fund for Viability Studies (FEV) The FEV line was created in 1995 under the responsibility of the FAD allocations and is directed by the Office of the Secretary of State for Trade. It is a binding and finalist instrument that is used to favour the internationalisation of Spanish companies by means of official financial of various kinds to consultancy and technical assistance overseas aimed at the creation of feasibility studies and project preparation, the development of sectorial or geographic contextual development plans, as well as the design of regulations or sectorial planning and, generally speaking, economic institutional strengthening. The goal is, on the one hand, to promote the participation of Spanish consultancy, engineering

and technology companies in the preparatory phases of trade and investment projects in foreign countries and, on the other hand, to facilitate the participation of Spanish companies in the subsequent execution of projects derived from the studies. The FEV can be requested by a Southern country, a non-consulting Spanish company or by multilateral institutions to which Spain contributes via funds, generally development banks (Marín et al, 2009). As far as Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, ﬁve studies were funded between 2001 and 2006 for a total value of some 460,000 Euros, concentrated in three countries (Mozambique, Nigeria and the Cape Verde Islands).

The CESCE and Sub-Saharan Africa For its part, the CESCE (Spanish Company for Export Credit Insurance) is an Export Credit Agency (ECA) founded in 1970; it is mixed in nature, made up of 50.25% of public capital and 49.75% private capital (with the participation of banks such as the Banco Santander Central Hispano and the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria) (Ortega, 2004; ODG, 2004) and reports to the Ministry of Economy via the Oﬃce of the Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism. The main objective of CESC is to facilitate the internationalisation of the private sector using public funding. In this way it controls in its own name and for the state the cover of risks in view of any loss 54 that a Spanish company might incur

overseas, particularly covering the risks of not being paid for the sales of products and services by Spanish companies in foreign marketplaces. It has insured projects that have reached 52% of the total foreign debt. Amongst the ten countries that have the greatest debt towards Spain, six of them 55 have ore than two-thirds of their debt in the hands of the CESCE (ODG, 2004). The following table presents a summary taken from the document La Agencia española de crédito a la exportación: CESCE (Vargas, 2009; ODG, 2009), which gives a synthesised summary of the standard process that follows the concession and payment of a CESCE credit.

54 The motives of loss in view of which the CESCE provides cover to Spanish companies overseas are: civil or international wars, revolutions, revolts, terrorism, considerable civil unrest or any similar circumstance that occurs overseas; catastrophic circumstances or occurences such as cyclones, floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions or tidal waves, as well as nuclear accidents and those occasioned by chemical, biochemical or similar substances that also occur overseas; particularly serious political or economic events that occur overseas, such as balance payment crises or signiﬁcant alterations to monetary equity that cause a general situation of insolvency; the expropriation, nationalisation, conﬁscation or seizure dictated by foreign authorities that fall back on the foreign purchaser or on the Spanish foreign investment (Ortega, 2004; ODG, 2004). 55 Russia, Peru, Egypt, Cuba, Algeria or Angola.

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Table 8: FUNCTIONING OF THE CESCE CREDITS 1. The Spanish company negotiates with a bank for the latter to give a loan to the purchaser of Spanish products from an impoverished country. 2. The bank concedes the loan and obtains insurance via the CESCE so that if the payment does not occur, the bank will be paid directly by the CESCE and the CESCE will then have to obtain the money from the debtor. 3. The CESCE and the bank impose sovereign guarantee clauses according to which the impoverished countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s government guarantees that if the contracting company cannot pay, it will be the State that will assume the debt and become the debtor (accepting these conditions to ensure that there is investment in the country). 4. If a non-payment occurs, the CESCE will demand the money directly from the poor state. At that moment, the debt will become a public debt between the poor country and Spain. In many cases, above all if it is a Peripheral State, it will be obliged to assume this debt given that part of the project has been undertaken by means of funding obtained from Development Aid Fund credits. Source: compiled internally according to information obtained from ODG, 2009

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As has been explained throughout this chapter, there is proof that the Spanish government is, in actual fact, aiming for the development of a new cooperation policy according to what is called “ﬁnancial cooperation”, based on the unchecked and unquestioned promotion of refundable ODA. Cooperation should not be considered as a means of economic interference but instead as a means of support to the way in which the aidreceiving countries understand and do things and should, in any case, not be linked to any corporate interest from the donor countries. The Spanish government should, in this sense, extensively review its cooperation policy as well as Law 11/2010: Law on the Reform of the System of Financial Support to the Internationalisation of Spanish Companies by following the

advice given by the state “Quién debe a Quién?” (“Who is in Debt to Whom?) (QDQ) campaign 56. This indicates that the FIEM will function according to the “sovereign guarantee”, implying the possibility of generating foreign debt in the case of non-payments, as well as pointing out that there are no signs of a reform of the CESCE. Below we specify the minimum changes that the government should implement if this debtgenerating mechanism were to be maintained; they are taken textually from the QDQ document Law 11/2010, of 28th June, on the Reform of the System for the Financial Support of the Internationalisation of Spanish Companies: Evaluation by the “Who is in debt to Whom?” campaign (2010). The present report subscribes to these proposals:

• Implementation of Integrated Public Audits, with participation from civil society, of the debt from all of Spain’s debtor countries in view of determining the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the demanded debt (including debt generated by means of CESCE). • Exclusion of all forms of support by means of CESCE insurance for projects that might potentially allow the violation of Human Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. • Exclusion of al kinds of support by means of a CESCE insurance for projects that entail serious environmental impacts, that generate greater climate change (extractive industries and dams) and/or those that include nuclear technology. • Explicit prohibition so that a CESCE cannot be used to support projects that ﬁnance military, police of double-use equipment. • Establishing mechanisms that ensure a real implication of the aﬀected populations in the decisions of environmental evaluations, compensation planning and relocations.

56 www.quiendebeaquien.org THE PLUNDERING OF RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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The Spanish Development Finance Company (COFIDES) COFIDES is a mixed-capital (public and private) company that has the participation of the ICEX, the Official Credit Institute (ICO), The National Company for Innovation (ENISA), the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), the Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH) and the Banco de Sabadell. Its objective is “to facilitate the medium- and long-term funding of viable private foreign investment projects which channel some form of Spanish interest in order to contribute, according to profitability criteria, to the development of the countries receiving the investments an well as to the internationalisation of Spanish economy and companies” 57. As for the FAD credits, these to objectives are difficult to fulfil simultaneously. As well as its own resources, COFIDES handles the FIEX (large companies) and FONPYME (Small and Medium Enterprises) funds, which are registered with the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, on behalf of the state. COFIDES also acts via the funds of the European Financing Partners (EFP), a corporation made up of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and most of the bilateral European Development Funding Institutions. More specifically in the context of the Africa Plan, COFIDES has the “Sub-Saharan Africa Line” to finance investment projects in the food industry, renewable energy, public infrastructures and services and transport and tourism sectors. For example, in 2000, a 30-year concession was adjudicated to the BAKWENA PLATINUM CORRIDOR consortium, led by the Spanish Grupo Dragados (now Grupo ACS), company, for the designing, building, funding, operation and maintenance of the Platinum Highway in South Africa, with an investment of 16.64 million Euros by the FIEX. For 2011, the figure of the line of finance rises to 35 million Euros.

COFIDES has made the commitment of not funding investment programmes that entail a harmful environmental or social effect upon the country receiving the investment. In 2005it joined the Platform for the UN Global Compact, which envisages ten rules of conduct and activity concerning human rights, work, the environment and the fight against corruption. It also implanted a Rating of Operational Impacts (RIO) to be able to conducts ex-post evaluations of the projects carried out with FIEX and FONPYME funds. Despite acknowledging that the measures taken by COFIDES in this respect are clearly greater than those assumed by other bodies that promote Spanish overseas investments such as, for example, the CESCE, civil society is critical of its shortcomings for the application of its principles and policies to the practical realities of the project evaluations. These shortcomings end up by translating into the funding of corporate projects that have important environmental and social effects 58 (ODG, 2006). One can also level criticism at the FINCARBONO initiative, which is aimed at funding Clean Development Mechanisms (CDL) and that is part of the Spanish plan in order to fulfil its commitments taken in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. The controversial CDLs enable governments and private companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by means of investments in developing countries aimed at projects that reduce carbon emissions worldwide. Various civil society organisations have expressed heir concern about the carbon business itself, claiming that, amongst other things, it diminishes the responsibility of polluting companies that continue to use fossil fuels, destroying forests and polluting communities, and that they are nothing more than false solutions that do not address the actual sources of climate change.

57 http://www.coﬁdes.es/ (Conslulted on 29/11/2011) 58 For example, refer to the case of Pescanova in Chile, http://www.odg.cat/documents/enprofunditat/Deute_ecologic/Pescachile_es.pdf (Consulted on 29/11/2011)

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

Cooperation envisaged from the perspective of Food Sovereignty Strategy lines of the Directive Plan such as access to decent food, or the ﬁght against child malnutrition, will be hard to achieve with the encouragement of productive diversiﬁcation if this is promoted via foreign technologies that generate dependence and that require external resources for their durability; nor will this be so if, on the contrary, means of handling natural resources via endogenous technologies are not encouraged, or if the internal food marketplaces are not protected from foreign invasion. Nor is the issue of famine just a question of local governance and of the active participation of the various sectors, as proposed in the Directive

Plan, given that without a productive and commercial structure controlled by local persons, it will be diﬃcult to guarantee access to food and to the resources for producing it. In order to turn Spanish cooperation into a strategic tool at the service of Food Sovereignty, ACSUR – Las Segovias have developed, in their document “Cooperation projects in the creation of Food Sovereignty. Strategic contributions” (Jiménez, 2007), a series of key elements that should be present in cooperation projects and that should be taken into account by the Spanish government when deﬁning support for a given cooperation or other project:

• The promotion and strengthening of community participation organised as a fundamental and essential element for the creation of FSov proposals.

of shared traditional know-how that incorporates appropriate, ecological and durable new technologies that must always respect the peoples’ cultural traditions.

• Free access to natural resources (land, water, forests, jungles, seeds) and productive resources (seeds and supplies for agricultural production, appropriate training and technology, funding…) for farming, ranching, indigenous and artisan ﬁshing populations.

• The promotion and defence of traditional, balanced and nourishing food systems that are based on the respect of peoples’ traditional customs.

• The recognition of women’s right to free access to and use of natural and productive resources, and to their participation in the productive, food distribution and consumption processes: this participation must be guaranteed. • The promotion of diversiﬁed production that is aimed at auto-consumption, that uses ecologically-friendly and durable agrarian techniques, and that are created on the basis

• The promotion and development of local markets with fair trade, based on local production and ethical consumption. • The creation and strengthening of local, national and international spaces and networks in the North and in the South, that can exert pressure on international institutions and on states to uphold producers’ and consumers’ rights and to inform the population and make it aware of the “under-developing” eﬀects of the practices and policies implemented by wealthy countries upon poorer nations.

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It is essential to promote the creation of solution that emanate from African populations in a collective and consensual manner and that provide an answer to their needs, based on their means of resolution. Indeed, on the part of the Spanish government, Cooperation should not be considered as a form of economic meddling, but instead as support for the ways in which the aidreceiving countries understand and do things

CHIMOIO LOCAL MARKET, MOZAMBIQUE.

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and it should not, in any case, be bound to any kind of corporate interest in the donor countries (in this case, Spain); this should be reflected in all the documents that deďŹ ne the strategy of Spanish Cooperation. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we therefore believe that the Spanish government should support projects that are founded on FSov and worldwide social equality.

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

The Africa Plan The Ministry of Foreign aﬀairs and Cooperation’s (MAEC) Plan of Action for Africa, or “Africa Plan” is a governmental initiative that responds to the fact that “the African continent has become a strategic and political priority for Spanish foreign activity” (MAEC, 2009).

The Ministry has already launched two Africa Plans since 2006. The ﬁrst Plan covered the 2006-2008 period. A second Africa Plan arose from the evaluation of the ﬁrst one, providing it with continuity, and was deployed for a four-year period from 2009-2012: it is currently on-going.

The Africa Plan as a market platform for the Spanish economy The Africa Plan (2009-2012) attempts to combine political strategies focused on national commercial interests with policies for the development of African local communities (GEA, 2009) and ﬁghts against poverty; this Plan includes across-the-board objectives such as Human Rights, Gender Equality, Environmental Durability and adaptation to Climate Change. Amongst its general objectives it includes Support for process of Consolidating Democracy and creating Peace and Security in Africa. In this Plan, the security perspective highlights the tendency to give greater protection to economic stabilisation activities rather than to the creation of social peace; it supports an institutional reinforcement that emanates from regional bodies such as the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) programme, which aims to mobilise resources by means of attracting direct foreign investment as a way of addressing the eradication of poverty 59. There is once again the interlinking of such important challenges as the ﬁght against poverty with economic growth without reconsidering the structural, political and economic causes of the problem and with the simplistic idea that by just creating companies one can provide a positive response to curtail-

ing poverty. It furthermore gives exaggerated importance to these organisations in detriment to other civil society organisations with projects and goals that denote an integrated focus on achieving the autonomy and integration of local populations. One of the causes of the lack of investment in Sub-Saharan African countries has been the political and social instability and the lack of guarantees for the stabilisation of investments. The vision of the African continent’s reality concentrates on endogenous causes, as much for poverty and migration as for armed conflicts, ignoring the structural causes (international economic policies, unbalanced international trade regulations, geopolitical and economic interests, etc.) and the intervention of external agents (governments, international bodies and multinational companies) (Alberdi and Bidaurratzaga, 2009; GEA, 2009). This means that the Plan’s goals appear to be disjointed and not to give a true solution to African problems. For the second objective, the ﬁght against poverty, the Plan includes the intention to promote access to decent and adequate food, to the encouragement of durable production systems and support for small-scale producers as well as favouring the agreements necessary to exercise

59 http://www.un.org/spanish/africa/osaa/nepad.html

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the right to food in an international environment. Nevertheless, it does not specify how the processes for achieving this objective will be developed, or how the aforementioned support will be provided, beyond the use of financial facilities. In fact, in the fourth line of action it points to economic growth as a means of fighting against poverty and links this line to the specific objectives of the third objective, which refers to the promotion of trade and investment relationships between Spain and Africa and to the economic development of Africa. The Africa Plan does not contain a prioritisation of the policy lines that it proposes and suffers from a lack of budgetary precision as well as of evaluation markers for the assessment of the interventions (Alberdi and Bidaurratzaga, 2009; GEA, 2009). Just the description of the actions and the lack of prioritisation of the policies can lead to the subordination of objectives and activities on the basis of principles of social and environmental durability in the face of the promotion of objectives and policies that are focused on Spanish economic expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa. This focusing of business opportunities on the African continent is in opposition with an integrated strategy of development, autonomy and wellbeing of the local population. As a matter of fact, in its fourth objective, the Plan highlights the promotion of trade and investment relationships between Spain and Africa and African economic development, ODA – multilateral and bilateral – and various economic tools that the Africa Plan considers to be tools that promote development (pro-development approach) (Marín et al, 2009). It is particularly focused upon two strategic sectors: the fishing industry and energy security. As has already been mentioned, the Spanish administration’s support will be materialised via various instruments and will in turn be contextualised within an environment of European trade policies and development, mainly by means of the EPAs, which do not contribute to the strengthening of African regional integration (GEA, 2009), given that most of them are not signed from a standpoint of respect for regional groups.

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In an analysis of trade relationships between Spain and Sub-Saharan Africa (Marín et al, 2009), it can be noticed that the most important instruments – in other words, those that have the greatest influence upon the application of other instruments of the Africa Plan – are: the public funding of viability studies (FEV) carried out by Spanish companies in Africa and the APPRIs with African countries. One of the instruments whose application depends on others is that of funding for Spanish companies for the creation/acquisition of companies in Africa, according to which the establishing of Spanish companies in SubSaharan Africa should be preceded by a series of promotion and facilitation measures. This task is the responsibility of the ICEX. The Plan specifies the promotion of Double Taxation Agreements and APPRIs that are particularly aimed at the protection of Spanish investments in overseas territories and whose conditions uphold the technological monopoly founded upon the protection of intellectual and industrial ownership and of the technical procedures, and the appropriation and exploitation of natural resources, with harmful consequences for traditional rural communities (Romero, 2006; APPRI Spain-Senegal, 2006). Financial instruments supporting trade and investment (FAD, FEV and COFIDEX, amongst others) are maintained with the supposition that the defence of Spanish commercial interests is not incompatible with African development and that it benefits the African economies (Alberdi and Bidaurratzaga, 2009). These instruments give rise to critical debates that the Africa Plan does not enter into (Marín et al, 2009); they have traditionally been considered as generators of foreign debt (Romero, 2006) and, in many cases of ecological debt: debts that given their very dynamics, could hinder the development of FSov processes. As far as energy security is concerned, the Plan places specific emphasis upon investment in renewable energies in Africa. Although this could be seen as an advantage in favour of African development, it could translate into the encouragement of crops aimed at agricultural fuels based on an industrial agriculture single-crop

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

model that would require vast tracts of fertile land and that would be aimed at exportation, for which reason it could hardly be considered as an endogenous process for the development of the local population. Despite the Africa Plan’s intentions regarding the facilitation of Spanish corporate penetration in Sub-Saharan Africa, the impact of the Africa

Plan’s (2006-2008) commercial and investment instruments, it can be noted that “the trend adopted by the flow of Spanish investments in Africa over the last 15 years seems to indicate that they have more in common with the economic and international juncture and obey punctual corporate decisions, than with the investment support measures envisaged in the Plan” (Marín et al, 2009: 52).

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INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COMMERCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

The Africa Plan and Spanish Cooperation According to the Plan “development cooperation is a priority for the 2009-2012 Africa Plan”. And the 2009-2012 Directive Plan for Spanish Cooperation, along with other Spanish annual planning instruments (Annual Plans for International Cooperation – PACI), sectorial planning instruments (Sectorial Strategies – DES) and geographic planning instruments (associative contexts for the country), will be the essential context that will guide the agents of Spanish cooperation in Africa throughout the validity period of the Africa Plan. Despite this attempt to align objectives, the Directive Plan does not explicitly mention the Africa Plan (GEA, 2009) although it does acknowledge the consolidation of SubSaharan Africa as a priority for Spanish foreign policy. The African Studies Group (GEA) already pointed out that “instead of aiming most of its eﬀorts towards countries with the least amount of human development, Spanish bilateral cooperation is going to continue to favour countries with which one can come to migratory, economic and commercial agreements” (GEA, 2009). Indeed, as shown by Alberdi and Bidaurratzaga, “geographic priority is based upon economic and commercial links (Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Nigeria), historic links (Equatorial Guinea) and links regulating migratory flows (Senegal, Mali and Mauritania). Ethiopia and Kenya are also prioritised because they are multilateral diplomatic centres” (Alberdi and Bidaurratzaga, 2009). This gives rise to an instrumentation of the development cooperation policy by other state policies in view of common interests (GEA, 2008) such as Human Rights, FR, the durable development of communities or FSov. With regard to food and agriculture, the Plan simply establishes the intention of promoting participation in producers’ organisations, regional bodies, women’s networks and African civil society organisations, as well as highlighting its commitment to the FS sectors (agricultural and livestock farming development). In some

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countries such as Niger, there exists a financial commitment aimed at food security via CEDEAO and/or NEPAD funds that promote an export-oriented agricultural model which aims for an Africa that would be a net exporter of agricultural products. This vision is in contrast with a strategy for the strengthening of productive capacities that gives priority to the self-sufficiency of the communities instead of free trade, with partners such as the EU (GEA, 2009). Therefore there is not even the slightest intention of promoting FSoriented policies as part of a series of measures for fighting against famine. Despite attempting to establish common principles and goals regarding education, health, culture, environmental durability democratic governance, gender, migration, water, rural development, the fight against famine, etc, the fundamental issue is the cooperation model that derives from the Africa Plan. This Plan aims to encourage the coherency of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and assumes the development policies defined by the Maastricht Treaty, the Cotonou Agreement and the European Development Council. In this sense, there is no criticism of neoliberal policies and unequal relationships continue between donor and receiving countries, wherein the result of the apparent dialogue continues to be ignorant of the needs of African communities that do not participate in the decision-making processes regarding their problems; this means that within the Africa Plan there is barely any room for anti-hegemonic and emancipating alternatives (Alberdi and Bidaurratzaga, 2009) that are proposed by social and farmers’ movements and civil society and which are situated within the Right to Food under equitable FS premises.

PART III

THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

DINA APOLOT, REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS. UGANDA.

THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Africa, the third-largest continent with a total surface area of 30,272,922 square kilometres, represents a vast territory made up of savannahs, deserts, large tracts of forest and tropical rainforests, coasts dotted with mangroves, lakes, lagoons and large rivers. This translates into a great abundance of natural resources and considerable biodiversity: it has a wide variety of forest species, its soils are particularly rich in minerals and are ideal for pastures and agricultural crops, it has large lakes and coastal areas that are rich in fishing resources as well as vast land surfaces that are home to a great quantity of animals that have traditionally been an important part of the African diet. It would be expected that, in view of such a wealth of natural resources and a great cultural diversity, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa should not experience any problems in meeting their basic needs. Nonetheless, and despite the inherent characteristics that give it a great potential to supply and consume its own resources, more than 50% of the African continent’s population lives below the poverty level as defined by the WB and its GDP only represents 2.6% of the world total, for which reason it is considered as the poorest continent in the world. For the most part, this is due to a long history of colonisation and leaching of its resources and is causing the substitution of its traditional productive model, based upon subsistence farming and herding, artisan fishing and mainly aimed at supplying families, by a new productive model that is defined by a great dependence on external raw materials in which the creation of benefits is the central element, that places African farmers in a position of vulnerability and dependency upon of the fluctuations of the international market and of the specific interests of the investors. In a continent in which 60% of the workforce is involved in rural activities (only 15% are employed in the industrial sector 60), the consequences of this change of paradigm could be devastating for African farmers.

sarily undertaken directly by the governments of wealthy countries, but instead by private capital from these countries, presented in the shape of multinational or transnational companies in the context of a political apparatus that favours it internationally. Therefore, the colonist-colony relationships that used to characterise interactions between Sub-Saharan Africa and the EU have now been transformed into unequal commercial relationships that allow the EU countries to continue reinforcing the dependency that they generated in the past, continuing to obtain low-cost raw materials or currencies from the exportation of their surplus products and that are therefore a clear reflection of their colonial origins. In this context, African society, which includes farming, herding, ﬁshing, trade, processing and woodworking communities, is coming together to speak out against the consequences of foreign corporate activities, within the current economic system, could represent for African society and nature and, more speciﬁcally, for its peoples’ Food Sovereignty. Throughout this chapter we will recap some of the main threats that are aimed at the African continent’s FSov and we shall therefore analyse those that affect such structural sectors as fishing and agriculture, the land-grabbing phenomenon and the genetic erosion process. This recap will pay particular attention to the role played by the Spanish government and companies in each of these threats, attempting to shed light their functions and actual intentions and to establish interrelationships, whenever possible, between the situation of poverty and vulnerability of the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the intervention of the Spanish corporate sector (mainly with private capital) in these countries.

The exploitation activities are no longer neces-

60 Egypt, the Republic of South Africa, Tunisia and Morocco posess almost all of this activity.

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THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The fishing industry and fish-farming Sub-Saharan Africa contains three large fishing areas indicated by the FAO 61: it therefore presents a large wealth of fishing resources that have historically been a source of food for the continent’s coastal populations, who have made the most of these resources on an artisan level

ensuring, on the one hand, the upkeep of the fishing grounds and, on the other, feeding their families as well as supplying local markets with fish. It is furthermore estimated that the subsistence of 7.5 million people on the continent depends upon fishing in inland waters 62.

The European context of the fishing industry and Association Agreements in the fishing sector For quite some time now, bilateral fishing agreements between the EU and third-party countries have constituted an essential element of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the European Union’s instrument for the control of fishing and fish-farming. The reform of the CFP in 2002 introduced the “association” concept to underline The EU’s intention to support the development of the national fishing sector in their associated countries with the aim of safeguarding their own economic interests. In fact, more than a quarter of the fish caught by European fishing vessels actually comes from waters that do not belong to the EU. About 8% of EU catches (2004-2006) correspond to fishing agreements with third-party countries and 20% is fished in oceanic waters, mainly in grounds supervised by the so-called regional fishing organisations 63. The EU has two types of fishing Agreements with other countries: on the one hand, the Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPA), in which the EU concedes financial and technical assistance in

FISHWORKERS SANT LOUIS, SENEGAL.

* Chapter written by Sara Martínez Frías, Isabel Vara Sánchez, David Gallar Hernández - Instituto de Sociología y Estudios Campesinos (Institutefor Sociology and Rural Studies) – ISEC –. 61 http://www.fao.org/fishery/es (Consulted on 15/10/2010) 62 http://www.iucn.org/knowledge/news/focus/water_2010/?5898/3/ (Consulted on 15/11/2010) 63 The Regional Fisheries Organisations are international organisations of countries that have fishery interests in a given area. Some control all the fish species that can be found in a given area whilst others focus on highly migratory species, particularly tuna, in much wider areas. These organisations are open to the countries of the region they control – “shore states” – as well as to those who have interests in their fishing grounds. Some RFOs are purely consultative, but most of them have the capacity for establishing fishing limitations, technical measures and control duties. The EU, represented by the Commission, palys an active role in six tuna fishery organisations and in eleven other organisations. THE PLUNDERING OF RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

exchange for fishing rights and, on the other, Northern Agreements for the joint control of shared populations. For the purposes of this study the focus will be put on the FPAs because they are established with countries that do not belong to the EU. They are agreements sign with countries that have no interest in fishing within EU waters but that could benefit from its financial and technical support for their attempts to develop their own national fisheries sector, in exchange for fishing rights for EU vessels. An FPA consists of two main components: regulated access by EU fleets to resources that the national industry of the associate country cannot fully exploit and a financial contribution by the EU, of which a large part (sometimes 100%) is aimed at supporting the associate country’s national fisheries policy, fighting against rogue fishing operations and reinforcing durable fishing methods within its EEZ (CFP, 2009). In this way the EU has signed more than 20 fishing agreements with third-party countries. Fifteen of them are still valid in “developing” countries. The EU pays some 150 million Euros per year to have access to foreign fishing grounds, particularly in West Africa 64. There are FPAs that are specifically for tuna, of

which eleven have actually been signed bilaterally. These agreements allow for the expansion of three tuna ﬁshing grounds from the North Atlantic and along the west coast of Africa and authorise EU ﬁshing boats to follow the migrating tuna in their journey through African waters (Mauritania and Senegal) and the Indian Ocean. Tuna is a highly migratory species and the tuna FPAs enable European ships to obtain a licence through each agreement in order to pursue the tuna population from jurisdiction to jurisdiction without having to cease their activity. In most cases, the quota is established by the pertinent Regional Fishery Organisation 65. There are also multi-species FPAs that have been signed with Greenland, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Morocco. The most important agreement is currently with Mauritania, for a value of 86 million Euros per year. This figure corresponds to one-third of the country’s public budget. The agreement with Guinea-Bissau is also approximately equivalent to one-third of the nation’s public budget. In most agreements, the EU pays 90% of the access quota and the private boat owners only pay the remaining 10%. More than 50% of these agreements are used by owners of Spanish vessels 66 .

EXPORTS OF SENEGALESE FISHING. ITALIAN COMPANY DESPAR.

64 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/index_es.htm (Consulted on 20/09/2010) 65 For example, the CICAA for the Atlantic and the CAOI for the Indian Ocean. 66 http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/in-english/marine-ecosystems-and-fisheries/eus-unsustainable-fisheries-in-westafrica/ (Consulted on 10/10/2010) 84

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Table 9: DATA REGARDING THE FPAS BETWEEN THE EU AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Country

Period

Fishing possibilities

Tonnage of reference (tuna, per year)

Total funding by the EU (per year)

Cape Verde Is.

2007-2010

Tuna: 25 purse seiners, 48 surface longliners, 11 rod ﬁshers

5.000 tonnes

385.000,00 €

Comores

2005-2011

Tuna: 40 purse seiners, 17 surface longliners

6.000 tonnes

390.000,00 €

Ivory Coast

2007-2013

Tuna: 25 purse seiners, 15 surface longliners

7.000 tonnes

595.000,00 €

Gabon

2005-2011

Tuna: 24 purse seiners, 16 surface longliners 2,500 trb/month of ﬁsh and cephalopods; 1,500 trb/month of shrimp.

11.000 tonnes

860.000,00 €

Guinea

2004-2008

Tuna: 34 purse seiners, 14 surface longliners and 9 rod ﬁshers

...

3,400,000 € Can rise gradually to 3,995,000 €according to ﬁshing possibilities

Guinea-Bissau

2007-2011

4,400 trb/month of shrimp and 4,400 trb/month of ﬁsh and squid. Tuna: 23 purse seiners and 14 rod ﬁshers

...

7.500 .000 €

Madagascar

2007-2012

Tuna: 43 purse seiners, 50 longliners (> 100 GT), 26 longliners (< 100 GT), 5 demersals

13.300 tonnes

1.197.000,00 €

Mauritania

2008-2012

Tuna: 22 purse seiners, 22 surface longliners and rod ﬁshers. Various shellﬁsh and demersal species

...

86,000,000 € (1st year) 76,000,000 € (2nd year) 73.000.000 € (3rd year) 70,000,000 € (4th year)

Mozambique

2007-2011

Tuna: 44 purse seiners, 45 longliners

10.000 tonnes

900.000,00 €

São Tomé and Príncipe

2006-2010

Tuna: 25 purse seiners, 18 longliners

8.500 tonnes

663.000,00 €

Seychelles

2005-2011

Tuna: 40 purse seiners, 12 longliners

63.000 tonnes

5.355.000,00 €

Source: Fisheries Partnership Agreements. Informational ﬁle. (EU, 2008) 67

67 http://ec.europa.eu/ﬁsheries/documentation/publications/pcp2008_factsheets_en.pdf (Consulted on 20/10/2010)

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The CFP policy’s economic instrument is the European Fisheries Fund (EFF), which has the intention of facilitating the application of measures aimed at guaranteeing durable fishing and the diversification of economic activities in fishing grounds. Its general budget is of 4,300 million Euros, of which Spain is the greatest beneficiary, with 26% of the total budget (EU, 2008). This European Community aid is complemented by national assistance originating from the funds of each member state. Until 2006, the economic tool of the structural policy in the fisheries sector was the Financial Instrument of Fisheries Orientation (IFOP) 68, predecessor of the European Fisheries Fund (EFF). Part of its budget was destined to creating mixed-capital companies that contribute to the over-exploitation of SubSaharan Africa’s fishing resources. During this period, Spain was the country that benefitted the most from the IFOP, obtaining 44% of the total budget. In Spain, the creation of, and public support for, mixed-capital companies that work in third-party countries has been promoted by the Cluster of Fishing Companies in Third Companies (CEPPT). Its activities have concentrated mainly upon obtaining public support for the creation of specific cooperation linked to fishing and mixed-capital companies. At a European level, Spain continues to lead the creation of mixed companies. During the 1990-1999 period, 152 corporate projects were concentrated throughout the European Union, 82 of which were promoted by Spanish companies (COFREPECHE, 2000). These benefited from a direct subsidy of 181,263,891 €, 61% of the total of European aid, thus positioning the Spanish fisheries sector as the top receiver of public aid. Since 204, no further aid has been offered for the creation of new mixed-capital companies; nonetheless this does not mean that they do not benefit from public support. A macro-credit is being negotiated with the EIB, the EU bank that is responsible for financing the EU’s overseas activities, for a total of 400 million Euros for the renovation of the fleet and installa-

tions overseas (SETEM, 2009). During the negotiation of the FPAs, Spain is part of the sector of European countries that cares the least about African demands and about the risks that have been announced regarding these agreements. As part of the cluster of countries that makes up the EU (like the rest of the EU), it insists that the conditions for privatisation have already been attained and ratified by the national parliaments of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, so that this way foreign investment can take place upon a solid financial base (Avendaño, 2006). In view of this hope of foreign investment, the IMF, the WB and more recently the WTO, are exerting pressure at all levels on the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, threatening the survival of small and medium fishing communities. The privatising of fishing resources brings about changes in fishing laws in the countries in which new legal bodies exist or are created that provide the prior conditions necessary for the transferral of property rights in the name of the nation or states to third parties (national or foreign companies); creating new fishing guidelines, usually by means of the Transferrable Individual Quotas (TIQ) system. With regard to the current state of the negotiations of free trade agreements for fishing, during 2004 the EU provided some new elements for the application of the CFP that was initiated in 2002. Since then, at bilateral level, fishing agreements have been reached or prolonged with several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such as South Africa, Cape Verde, the Comores, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Mauritius, whilst at the same time negotiation directives have been adopted for the signing of an agreement with Libya.

68 http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/EspanayUE/Politicascomunitarias/Paginas/Polticas%20Comunitarias%2016.aspx (Consulted on 27/09/1010)

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THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Comparison of ﬁshing and ﬁsh-farming models Concept

PESCA INDUSTRIAL

PESCA ARTESANAL More than 12 million

Number of ﬁsherfolk employed

Approximately 1/2 million

Approximately 30 million tonnes

Capital cost for each job generated on the ships

30.000 - 300.000

300 - 3.000

Catch used for oils or flours

20-30 million tonnes

Almost none

Annual fuel consumption

Approximately 37 million tonnes

Catch per ton of fuel

1 - 2 tonnes

4 - 8 tonnes

Fisherfolk for each million dollars invested in the ship

5 - 30

500 - 4.000

Catch discarded at sea

8-20 million tonnes

Very little

Annual catch for human consumption

Approximately 5 million tonnes

Source: Pauly, 2006. In the domain of maritime fishing and fishfarming in Sub-Saharan Africa, the main bone of contention lies between artisan fishing and fish-farming and the mechanised commercial foreign or mixed fleets that exploit the sea’s resource, and the large-scale fish farms. This conflict becomes even more complex since it general involves countries that do not dispose

of the resources necessary to establish their own commercial fishing fleets and that are pressured into selling their fishing rights to another country, often an industrialised one. For example, this is the case of the Spanish fishing industry (refer to the case studies), which operates in the waters of Mozambique, Senegal, Mauritania or South Africa.

THE PLUNDERING OF RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Artisan fishing and fish-farming Small-scale artisan fishing (maritime and continental) is the most commonly practiced fishing activity in Sub-Saharan Africa and has played a fundamental role in the local economy of the continent’s coastal countries. It is a form of fishing that generally uses traditional techniques with little technological development. It is usually done in small groups with small budgets, using small vessels, usually sail-powered and without an engine and that are between 10 and 26 feet in length. To fish, they use dragnets, gillnets and longlines. They use small boats in coastal waters going no further than 12 nautical miles, within territorial waters, and harvest various species of fish, shellfish, molluscs and crustaceans. The sector is also made up of fish harvesters and divers. This type of fishing can hardly compete with the industrial fishing that is carried out by large foreign – mainly European – companies. It subsists in regions that are not very industrially developed and is mainly used for auto-consumption: only a small part reaches local markets. This model of small-scale artisan fishing is not as dependent on external supplies and is more respectful of the renovation cycles of the fishing grounds. It is furthermore undertaken by means of the use of traditional know-how that has been

passed down from generation to generation and has, since ancestral times, characterised the economic activities of families living in coastal areas. It is a model that tends to include the most vulnerable sectors of society, which are pushed more and more towards the outskirts of the development model as a result of the policies controlling access to natural resources and fisheries management. Its main purpose is autoconsumption and the sale of surplus on local markets and it often constitutes one of the few forms of sustenance available to landless farmers, to the point of becoming the pre-established form of sustenance. In Senegal, for example, artisan fishing has become more important in recent decades due to the arrival of new inhabitants on the coast. In the FAO’s Fishing Technical Document Nº 481 (2007) 69, it is explicitly recognised that smallscale artisan fishing in continental and coastal areas contributes to the mitigation of poverty food security, and is also resistant to fluctuations and to international crises. In short, the artisan fishing model clearly offers a series of important comparative strengths compared to industrial fishing, some of which are listed below:

FISHERMEN FIXING THEIR NETS, SANT LOUIS, SENEGAL.

69 This document is a supplement to the Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fishing Nº 10, and it presents a wide range of practical examples and experiences from around the world that are linked to artisan ﬁshing.

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THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• It is the primary source of food animals for the African population. Fish remains in the home, representing the base diet of coastal populations instead of being exported to foreign countries such as Spain. • It is a dynamic and highly adaptable sector that presents greater economic eﬃciency than industrial ﬁshing (FAO, 2009).

geographic point of view (FAO, 2009) and by generating commercial flow at local level that is controlled by the ﬁsherfolk themselves. • Artisan ﬁshing is founded upon a tradition and a way of life that go back over several generations, thus representing an important contribution to the cultural heritage of African peoples.

• It represents the basis of the ﬁsheries sector in Sub-Saharan Africa as a creator of employment; in Senegal, for example, it represents close to 89% of the market and employs almost 600,000 persons (FAO, 2009).

• The importance of artisan ﬁshing is growing because it is being used more and more as a means of supplying the local processing industry.

• It is better equipped to widely exchange social and economic beneﬁts by decentralising them and extending them out from a

• It produces less negative eﬀects upon the environment due to the use of smaller boats with less capacity.

For its part, and according to FAO forecasts (2009), in 2015 fish farming will represent 41% of the world’s consumption of fish (compared to 27.4% in 2000). It has not been widely practiced by African populations. Nonetheless, its growth should not be underestimated since, as an artisan production model that is complementary to maritime and continental artisan fishing, it offers a series of advantages that are described as follows:

• It is considered as an alternative source to the sea’s ﬁshery resources that can partly alleviate their reduction and shortage. • It is a source of supplies for the local processing industries, above all during the biological pause.

Women play an important role in artisan fishing and fish farming as workers in the artisan fishing sector in Sub-Saharan Africa and as guarantors of household food security. They usually have a profound understanding and knowledge of the natural environment and of its resources. They take part in the process during and after the catch, in artisan as well as in commercial fishing. Their work usually consists in weaving and repairing nets, baskets and traps, and putting bait on the fishhooks. They rarely take part in commercial fishing out to sea or in oceanic waters,

• It creates employment and income possibilities at local level. • It represents the production of fish in inland areas, creating a diversification of farmers’ diets.

but instead take part in fishing activities on small vessels and canoes in coastal or continental waters, harvesting shellfish, molluscs and pearls, harvesting seaweed or placing nets and traps. Women also play an important role in fish farming, where they tend to take care of ponds, feeding and harvesting fish and collecting shrimp larvae and juvenile fish. Nonetheless, women’s most important function is artisan as well as industrial fishing takes place in the processing and sales stages (FAO, 2009).

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Industrial fishing and fish farming Officially, industrial fishing and artisan fishing have well-defined exploitation zones, but these are not respected by either party. This occurs in Senegal and Mauritania, for example. Artisan fishing has always taken place – and still does so – in the same areas where foreign companies operate, as in the case of the Spanish companies Pescamar, Pescanova and Krustamoz in the waters of Beira and Quelimane (Mozambique). This can currently be observed on the beaches of both towns, as well as in the main fishing areas in Senegal (by order of importance: Thies, Dakar, Saint Louis, Ziguinchor, Fatick, Louga and Kaolack) or in Mauritania (Nouakchott and Nouadhibou). At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we have often protested that the industrial fishing model represents a direct threat to access to fishing resources for African communities that carry out artisan fishing and that cannot compete with the means deployed by large fisheries corporations.

Industrial fishing requires much more investment capital, consumes more energy per tonne of catch and requires a lot less work per tonne of fish than artisan fishing. Despite this, because it is mainly aimed at exports to European markets and therefore constitutes an important source of currencies and is a basic part of the reduction of trade deficits, it has been privileged by many African governments (such as Senegal, for example) by means of its policies for the promotion of internationalisation and trade policies. Industrial fishing uses much more advanced technology and makes use of deep-sea trawling, a type of fishing that has very harmful effects upon the marine ecosystem. It also plays a very important part in the over-exploitation of the most economically profitable species.

relations with Sub-Saharan Africa that are centred on fishing resources, mainly based upon the exploitation of fishing grounds. The fish is then sold and processed, most of the time in Spain. In Mozambique, according to data from the ICEX (updated on 08/2010 70), the fish and seafood sector is the primary sector that is imported by Spain, with 97,772,000 Euros, followed by the raw materials, semi-manufactured goods and intermediate products sector with 13,749,000 Euros. It is strange to note that amongst the sectors that are exported from Spain to Mozambique, one also finds that of fish and seafood, for a sum of 185,000 Euros, which illustrates the illogical situations that arise from the outlook of the international markets and the import/export exuberance. In Mauritania, the fish and seafood sector is also the primary sector that is imported by Spain 71, for a sum of 38,361,000 Euros. It is also the second sector that is imported from Ghana to Spain, for a sum of 4,887,000 Euros. Between 1993 and 2004, direct Spanish investment in Namibia exceeded 60 million Euros. Investments in this country are mainly focused on the fisheries sector and consist of processing factories for the international sale of maritime products. Some of the companies that have been implanted in Namibia benefitted from support from the ICEX-CDI agreement 72 and from involvement by COFIDES (ICEX, 2010).

Within the FPAs, Spanish companies commercial

70 http://www.oﬁcinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,5310,5280449_5320986_5320988_0_MZ,00. html (Consulted on 10/11/ 2010) 71 http://www.oﬁcinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,5310,5280449_5320986_5320988_0_MR,00. html (Consulted on 10 /11/ 2010) 72 CDI is the EU’s aid programme for European SMEs for the creation of mixed-capital companies in developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Table 10: FISHERIES CASE STUDY: SENEGAL The fisheries sector plays a determining socio-economic role in Senegal because of its importance in the GDP, as the primary source of foreign currency, as well as for generating employment and the important place of fish in the population’s diet. Some 600,000 people are employed in fishing-related activities, which is 17% of the population, of which 100,000 are directly employed in the sector. Fishing acts as a means of subsistence, not only on an economic level as an income for families who work in the sector, but also as a source of food, estimated at an average of between 26 and 30 kilos per inhabitant per year, a figure that rises in coastal areas. The fishing activity in Senegal consists of the following components: • Artisan fishing: this is the country’s most important fishing activity, in value as well as in volume. It is carried out in canoes throughout the seven maritime regions of the country: Dakar, Thies, Saint-Louis, Fatick, Ziguinchor, Louga and Kaolack. • Industrial fishing: this is undertaken by Senegalese and foreign boats (some of which are Spanish) in the context of fisheries agreements with other countries, chartering by local companies and the creation of mixedcapital companies.

• Artisan and industrial fish farming: it is not yet very important, and is presented as an alternative source to maritime fishing resources. • The processing industry: the process of fish for export purposes is undergoing a reconversion process because of the excessive capacity of companies along with the lack of supplies of raw materials and the sector’s low level of competitiveness on foreign markets. There are also experiences of fish processing undertaken by women and that is aimed at local sales.

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Table 10: FISHERIES CASE STUDY: SENEGAL SPANISH COMPANIES REPRESENTING A THREAT Senegal’s fishing resources are mainly exploited by foreign companies. Spain was the first country to benefit from permitted catch quota of demersal fishing: in the case of coastal demersal trawlers with a quota of 47%, followed by Italy (37.5%) and Greece (15.5%) for a permitted total of 1,500 tonnes; for deep-sea demersal trawlers it obtained 100% (3,000 tonnes) of the accepted quota; for deep-sea demersal crustacean trawlers on which the catch is frozen, 91% (3,186 tonnes), with the remaining 9% going to Portugal. As for tuna fishing, Spain, France and Portugal shared the quota. In each case Spain obtained the largest amount of boats: 10 for stick fishing tuna boats (France 6), 21 for freezing net tuna boats (18 for France) and 20 for surface longliners (3 for Portugal). In May 2005 there were 36 Spanish boats with fishing licences in Senegal 73, out of a total of 152 foreign boats. For the purposes of this study various Spanish and mixed capital (Spanish-Senegalese) companies that fish in the country’s waters will be mentioned (emonet, 2006; ICEX, 2006): Fishing: • AGAC (ASOCIACIÓN DE GRANDES ATUNEROS CONGELADORES): An association of 22 tuna-fishing boats flying the Spanish flag, seven of which have licences to fish in Senegalese waters. • HISPANO SENEGALAISE DE PECHE, HISEPEC SA: Works exclusively with its Spanish clients.

• SISPA - STE IBERO-SENEGALAISE PECHE ATLANTIQUE: Social Capital: 200 million CFA Francs – Spanish capital: 49%. Seafood fishing with four boats of 200 TRB each, with a catch level of some 500 tonnes per year. One hundred per cent of the catch is aimed at export to Spain.

Owners of ﬁshing vessels: • SENEVISA: Fishing and a fish-processing facility, exporting frozen fish. The company is entirely Spanish.

73 A Spanish boat can ﬁsh in Senegalese waters under that country’s flag by complying with the following conditions: 51% of the social capital must be in Senegalese hands, the head oﬃce and the accounts must be domiciled in Senegal, the boats must be bought and registered in Senegal and the General Manager or Director must be Senegalese, amongst other things.

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THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Table 10: FISHERIES CASE STUDY: SENEGAL WHAT THE THREAT CONSISTS OF AND WHO IS AFFECTED BY IT For fishing communities around the world, the globalisation promoted by neoliberal policies has meant a drastic reduction in the rights to access to fishing resources, to traditional fishing grounds and to territorial waters in coastal regions. Senegal’s fishing resources are mainly being exploited by Spanish companies. This way, the benefits generated by the use of resources do not stay within the country of origin, but are instead exported to Spain to supply a growing amount of consumers, stripping the Senegalese population of their own fishing resources and exhausting the fishing grounds. Spanish influence on Senegalese fishing is not limited to the ownership of the vessels, whether they are controlled by Spanish companies or mixed-capital companies; Spanish agents also have a hand in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), one of the main hurdles for the correct management of fishing resources all over the world. IUU includes various types of illicit activities, such as fishing out of season without licences, using prohibited fishing methods, disregarding fishing quotas, not reporting or giving false information about the weight and the species caught (SETEM, 2009). EXPERIENCES OF ALTERNATIVE FOOD SOVEREIGNTY AND ASSOCIATED FARMERS’ MOVEMENTS Artisan fishing is currently of particular importance for Senegal, because of the amount of food that it supplies as well as because of the population to which it provides work. Artisan fishing represents a significant portion of global catch of proximity and surface species (between 70% and 80% depending on the region) (FAO, 2008). Artisan fishing in itself represents an alternative model to that of industrial fishing. In this sense, there is particular interest in the work done by fisherfolk in Dakar and Saint-Louis (which are two of the country’s most important industrial ports, with the presence of Spanish companies), for organising traditional fisherfolk into local and national networks, as well as the fish-processing experiences by organised groups of women linked to these networks. The agents involved in these experiences are the “Conseil National Interprofessionnel de la Pêche Artisanale au Sénégal” (National Inter-professional Council for Artisan Fishing in Senegal), the “Young Fishermen’s Association of Saint-Louis”, and organised women’s groups associated to both collectives, responsible for the processing and sales of fish in local markets in Dakar and Saint-Louis.

For its part, industrial fishing aims to provide an answer to growing food requirements, with the corresponding effects that this practice represents for the environment, since it undermines the mangroves of the African coast, replacing their original biodiversity with pools for the farming of prawns and other fish, and the abusive use

of chemicals that end up by polluting the water and the ground, as well as for African society (land occupation, integrated exports of production, etc.). Nigeria is the leading country in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa (FAO, 2009), with a registered production of 85,000 tonnes of catﬁsh,

THE PLUNDERING OF RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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tilapia and other freshwater fish. The Jumbo Prawn (Penaeus monodon) is being successful in Madagascar and he Eucheuma seaweed is successful in the United Republic of Tanzania, whilst the production of less widespread species such as the abalone (Haliotis) is on the rise in South Africa. Fish farming has been presented as a response to the over-exploitation of marine resources in SubSaharan Africa and the foreign fishing industry is using it more and more to increase worldwide fish production (as occurs with the panga in Mozambique). Nevertheless, the new industrial fish farming methods used in Sub-Saharan Africa are very technical and are based on intensive production and large concentrations of fish fed with artificial feeds, chemical additives and antibiotics in order to increase productive “efficiency”. Such methods require a large investment of capital that often excludes the poorest people. It is generally foreign companies that buy large expanses of coastal areas (or river- and lake shores), destroying mangroves, displacing the population and setting up shrimp farms (in Mozambique and Mauritania, for example), polluting the water, in order to obtain a product that will mainly be exported to, and consumed in, the EU so that, although these new methods are usually encouraged in order to reduce starvation, in practice this kind of farming is very rarely beneficial to the population, going against its FS and its FSov.

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As far as fishing is concerned, it is necessary to undertake a participative reorientation of the use of Sub-Saharan Africa’s marine resources and ecosystems. This calls for an integrated fisheries development policy that strategically protects the artisan fishing sector. Spain plays a fundamental role in the exploitation of Sub-Saharan Africa’s fisheries resources. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we consider that it is particularly serious that the Spanish government should bow to Spanish corporate interests instead of heeding principles of social justice and equality. The Spanish government should encourage participation in the creation of participative management plans, the application of the precautionary criterion, energy efficiency, the use of selective fishing equipment and methods as well as ensuring that respecting the social, cultural and labour rights is incorporated to the certification processes for national fisheries production. Over-investment in fishing should also be eliminated. The current situation of acute overinvestment in the fishing fleet and in industrial facilities is an attack on the stability of marine resources, the sources of employment and the coastal communities. The international community and also the Spanish government should progress towards the effective reduction of the fleet, avoiding exporting the industrial surplus to areas and fishing grounds with less control under the cover of flags of convenience.

THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Agricultural Production Within the context of the expansion of the agroindustrial production model and the free market economic system, Africa currently represents an attractive territory in which corporate interests have a large scope for development. Industrial agriculture is the form of agriculture that fits into a market economy that simplifies the power of the obtained product and reduces it to the rank of a mere “means”. The end product becomes a means for obtaining profit, regardless of whether it is represented by a packet of seeds, chemical fertilisers tomatoes or cosmetics. This detracts from the concept of agriculture as an art, thus turning the soil into a factory producing food that is harvested industrially and is in stark contrast with the concept of agriculture that predominates in most African countries, where productive activity is still interpreted in its original sense, in other words, as a process that is necessary to ensure the feeding of the family (Martínez, 2008). Considering the process of producing food as a means of obtaining profits and not as a basic right results in the commercialisation of the productive process, putting the peoples’ FS and FSov on the back burner or even marginalising it. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is mainly a form of extensive agriculture that is practiced, organised around the family farm. In this type of productive organisation, the mobilisation of the workforce made up of family members, as well as of all of the family’s assets, is essential, thus the name “family agriculture”. These operative systems

provide Africa with almost all of its agricultural production. In all of these cases it is a form of family agriculture that is not very dependent on external supplies (fuel for engines, pesticides, fertilisers), in which the workforce is distributed throughout the family unit, and that is not particularly linked to the fluctuations of prices on the international market. It also tends to be environmentally friendly, since it depends fundamentally upon nature in order to be productive. It is a kind of agriculture whose primary aim is to nourish the families and not to obtain economic benefits, and even less for export. Therefore, the products obtained in this way will always be used first to cover the needs of the family group and, subsequently, those of the local area. It is only once these needs have been met that they will enter the regional or national sales chain for agricultural products. In contrast, the industrial agriculture model, with its productive system founded on single-crop farming for exports, generates considerable dependency on external supplies and on the price fluctuations imposed by the international market and has a tendency to transform farmers into farm labourers, provoking rural migration towards cities. These people who used to be farmers stop growing their own food and start to become dependent on products offered on the market and on the fluctuation of their prices. With the constant rise and fall of prices and the search for profits, the production of private companies cannot in any way guarantee the FSov of Sub-Saharan Africa’s rural populations.

* Chapter written by Sara Martínez Frías, Isabel Vara Sánchez, David Gallar Hernández - Instituto de Sociología y Estudios Campesinos (Institutefor Sociology and Rural Studies) – ISEC –.

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Political context Sub-Saharan Africa is currently undergoing a re-colonisation of its territory, but this time the colonisation is not being carried out by states, but instead by the interests of private capital, backed up, in most cases, by their countries’ governments. The exploitation of the majority of its natural resources is being done by foreign companies for whom the wellbeing of the African populations is not the primary concern. This deviation in the use and beneﬁt of the resources themselves, that go from representing the survival of African peoples to representing a marketable element with which to trade and generate wealth, has a direct eﬀect on the FSov of African families by putting them in a position of dependency and vulnerability with regard to for-

eign private interests. In this sense, the policies undertaken by the various countries in the world are generally aimed at favouring the expansion of the current economic model. Therefore, the series of regulations that determine political, commercial and economic ties at international level do nothing more than perpetuate the roles of leadership, power, domination and subordination, once again placing each of the countries that take part in the process in its historical position of “rich” or “poor” in a practically fixed way (all of the regulation system blocks change). Under cover of an apparent concern for poverty, inequality and the need for development in Africa (a concern that appears in official documents, from the Africa Plan to those derived from the constitution of the WTO, for example), the political spectrum favours the expansion of this economic model and the entry and establishing of companies that for the most part come from wealthy countries. In Africa, the NEPAD, approved in 2001, represents the vision and the strategic concept adopted by African leaders to fight against poverty and “underdevelopment” throughout the continent. In theory, the strategy is aimed at resolving the major challenges with which the African continent is currently faced. Amongst its priorities is that of introducing political reforms and increasing investment in various sectors such as agriculture, the refinement of human resources, with particular attention being paid to health, education, science and technology, the construction and improvement of infrastructures, the diversification of production and exports, particularly for agribusiness, factories, mining and tourism, the intensification of trade between African countries and greater access to the markets of more advanced countries for its exports, etc. (Crush and Williams, 2004).

NEUMANN KAFEE GRUPPE COMPANY FACILITIES, UGANDA.

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It has come forth as a response to the need for cooperation and agreement amongst govern-

THE MAIN THREATS TO FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

ments, the private sector and other civil society institutions; and as a means of integration of all African nations into a global economy and policy. Within the context of NEPAD, the FS of African families has been identified as one of the first issues to resolve, for which reason it is deemed necessary to modify, textually, the “inadequate agricultural system” in order to have a sufficiently abundant agricultural production to be able to supply the population of the entire continent. It is not based upon traditional production, sales and consumption methods, but instead places the Western agrarian system as the example to be followed to progress along the path to development: “Developed countries will have to assist Africa in the development of its agricultural abilities” (NEPAD, 2001). It attempts to force a convergence between a vision of development based on innovation and openness towards the international market, and a tradition that is firmly rooted in African fields. This is apparent, for example, in the explicit intention to strengthen the biotechnology industry with the intention – according to textual claims – “of enriching biodiversity”, as well as “introducing innovative techniques and new technologies into the agricultural sector” with the objective of “developing indigenous know-how and increasing agricultural production”. It also paves the way for the entry of private capital, seen as being an essential component for the long-term maintenance of the African economic structure. As far as NEPAD is concerned, the objective fulfilled by agriculture in Africa (which is generally speaking a subsistence agriculture whose priority is feeding families) should be expanded to envisage a form of production that is market-oriented and that enables Africa to play a relevant role in the international commercial flow of highlevel raw materials and manufactured goods. In this sense, the function of private capital and of companies is fundamental and because of this, according to NEPAD, African governments should cut back as much as possible on restrictions to economic activity and investments and favour corporate activity in Africa. To ensure the fulfilment of these goals, specific

actions at internal level have been specified such as increasing security for the supplying of water for agriculture, promoting agrarian reform that is necessary to facilitate the development of agriculture and providing credits that fund agrarian activities. On an international level, there is a call for the creation of new partnerships that favour the development of agricultural products and access to the international market. NEPAD considers that it is fundamental for the continent’s economic development that financial institutions such as the WB, the FMI, the African Development Bank, UNSECO, the FAO and other multilateral donor agencies should participate in projects “that generate the economic structure”, thus being open to the vision and ways of doing things of these organisations. For their part, the international spectrum and the United Nations give firm backing to NEPAD as a context for confronting poverty and “underdevelopment” throughout the African continent. The various funds, programmes, bodies and departments of the United Nations system actively promote the priorities of NEPAD and the MDGs in their respective domains of experience 74. The WTO supports the main goals of NEPAD in the domain of trade, particularly by means of the activities of its technical assistance programmes linked to trade for African countries. This network of commercial, corporate and political relations that interconnects African countries, international bodies and wealthy countries is built upon a foundation of interests that are in many cases conflicting and that attempts to maintain an apparent equilibrium between the social concerns and the economic interests of each of the agents. A very telling example of this is the Plan REVA in Senegal (Retour vers l’Agriculture). Senegal is a country with a markedly agricultural economy. Although this sector provides les than 10% of the national GDP, it is the primary source of employment, covering 72% of the active population. Agricultural products represent about 8% of total exports and play a primordial role in

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feeding the population. According to the FAO’s estimations, Senegal’s arable surface exceeds 3,800,000 Ha, of which two-thirds are currently used for this purpose. The main farming areas are to be found in the deltas and valleys of the Senegal, Gambia and Casamance rivers, and the main crops are peanuts, millet, sorghum and rice (ICEX, 2006). In this context, the REVA Plan originally came about as an idea of president Wade as a strategy to maintain the Senegalese population by means of promoting the productive capacity of the rural environment. It aims for the implantation of integrated emerging poles 75 as the starting-point for their conversion into poles of development and the promotion of private initiative within the agribusiness sector in its widest sense (horticulture, forestry, ﬁsh farming, artisan crafts, etc.). The Senegalese government, which shares this concern, has often referred to the intention to achieve food security by means of strategies such as the Special Programme for the Development of Rice farming, a part of REVA with the goal of a production of 500,000 tonnes of rice for 2010 and self-suﬃciency for 2015. The means to achieve this would be the provision of 3,000 pumping units, the promotion of rice-growing centres (Valleys, Deltas, Fatik, South) and the rehabilitation of existing infrastructures. In this case the Spanish government, as one of the prime target countries for Senegalese migrants, decided to give its support to the REVA Plan in

2006 with a State Monetary Subsidy for the execution of “an emerging agricultural centre” that would act as a prototype for future farms that would beneﬁt from a reimbursable concession of funds for an amount of 10 million Euros charged to the Development Aid Fund. This support from Spain via DAF funds to Spanish companies such as the Basque company INKOA S.L. 77 or the public company TRAGSA is reflected in the text of the “Plan REVA puesta en marcha de los polos emergentes integrados en cooperation con el reino español”, drafted in July 2007. The exploitation of the “emerging agricultural centre of Djilakh” has become the guiding example to create a durable rural development policy in Senegal that would go beyond the encouragement of alternatives to migration and be able to position the agricultural sector as a decisive element for the creation of wealth and growth that is established Accelerated Growth Strategy (SCA) and the Strategy Document for the Reduction of Poverty (DSRP II), approved by the IMF and the WB for Senegal (Olivié, 2007). Empero, the powerful conglomerate that consists of the Senegalese government, the foreign company INKOA S.L. and the Spanish government, represents a serious threat for traditional rural agriculture in Senegal and in consequence to the population’s FSov as it suﬀers the displacement of its traditional production systems in favour of productive systems that do not do much for the food security of African families.

74 http://157.150.195.10/spanish/africa/osaa/systemsupport.html (Consulted on 03/11/2010)75 Grandes explotaciones diversificadas del sector primario en las que se conjuga las actividades tradicionales con las nuevas. Se dividen en polos emergentes integrados tipo “excelence” agrícolas y acuícolas, polos emergentes tipo “granja moderna”, polos de emergentes tipo mixto “agropiscícolas”, polos emergentes tipo “agro-pastoral”. (REVA 2006) 75 Large diversified farms in the primary sector that combine traditional activities with new ones. They are divided into integrated emerging agricultural and fish-farming centres of the “excellence” type, emerging centres of the “modern farm” type, emerging centers f the mixed “agriculture & fish-farming” type and emerging centres of the “agricultural herding” type. 76 The following centres are observed: the “large producers” type for innovation in non-traditional crops such as biofuels, small family farms implanted throughout the country via NGOs or other associates, micro-gardens and hydropnic crops in rural areas and the promotion of micro-gardens in schools (REVA, 206). 77 http://www.inkoa.es/ (Consulted on 01/09/2010)

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Agro-fuels The energy requirements of the wealthy countries’ consumer societies is increasing at the same time as the world’s oil reserves are falling. This is forcing the investment sector to move its capital towards other forms of energy production in order to meet the growing demand of consumer societies in the North. In view of this outlook the intensive production of agro-fuels appears as a plausible alternative. Since large expanses of land are required to meet

such a demand, the poor countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (such as the Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Mali, Madagascar or Mozambique) that have cheap land and labour represent an economically interesting option for the investing conglomerate, which is mainly made up of Northern companies. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the crops mainly used for the production of agro-fuels are:

• For the production of ethanol: sugar cane (grown in various parts of Africa as an export crop, with important industries in South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi); corn (one of the most important crops in Nigeria, where it covers 60% of farmlands, originally used as food for people and livestock); sorghum (a native grain of Africa, grown as a food source, although its high sugar content makes it ideal for the production of ethanol); and cassava (a root that is grown as a source of food; Shell and the Nigerian government are currently studying varieties that have been genetically modiﬁed in order to increase their productivity as an agro-fuel). • For the production of biodiesel: the oil-palm (native of West Africa, it produces seeds and fruit from which one can extract oil); castor (a plant that is native to East Africa; its oil is used for medicinal purposes around the world but it can be used to produce biodiesel when reﬁned) 78; and jatropha (a marginal crop that does not have any application as a food).

As can be seen, for the most part, agro-fuels are nothing more than a new purpose for crops that already exist. Indeed this is where the novelty lies: in changing the purpose for which the land

JATROPHA, MOZAMBIQUE.

is used: land that was once used to grow food is now used to meet the energy demands of industrialised societies. According to FAO data (2009) on land assignation in five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Sudan), there exists documentary evidence that confirms that the use of 2.4 million hectares of land has been modified in this respect since 2004, with considerable areas reserved for the production of agro-fuels in Ethiopia, Madagascar and Ghana. In its data, the International Food Policy Research Institute estimates that 20 million hectares of

78 http://www.castoroil.in/uses/fuel/castor_oil_fuel.html (Consulted on 05/10/2010) 79 http://www.ifpri.org/ (Consulted on 03/12/2010)

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land worldwide have been sold since 2006. Of these, some 9 million hectares have been purchased in Africa, of which almost ﬁve million hectares have been devoted to the production of agro-fuels, particularly jatropha, oil-palm and sorghum. Although it is true that it is mainly private companies, mostly from the EU 80, that are behind the business related to agro-fuel plantations in SubSaharan Africa, the land is also being acquired by national governments, often via state companies and private investment.

In general, foreign investment in agro-fuels is usually welcomed by the governments of host countries, on the premise that it will generate employment in rural areas and boost the region’s economic development. Fifteen African countries (Benin, Ghana, Senegal and Mali amongst others) signed a Treaty in July 2006 by means of which they established the Pan-African NonPetroleum Producers’ Association (PANPP) with the primary aim of promoting the production of agro-fuels on the African continent. This organisation has been called the “Green OPEC” (Friends of the Earth, 2010).

Table 11: AGRO-FUELS CASE STUDY: MOZAMBIQUE In the case of Mozambique, since mid-2007 the government has been attempting to convince farmers to convert their crops to jatropha crops as a first step towards a highly-publicised green revolution. That same year the government gave national and foreign companies the right to exploit this type of crop on five million hectares, almost one-seventh of the country’s land surface that is officially defined as “farmland”. In this way, the Mozambiquan government is actively promoting the intensive plantation of jatropha and oil plants, insisting upon the benefits and advantages that these crops can bring to the country. The National Policy and Strategy on biofuels, approved by the Cabinet on 24th March 2009, was published in the Bulletin of the Republic on 21st May 2009. The Strategy is a tool that concentrates specifically upon the promotion of the production of ethanol (sugar cane and sorghum) and biodiesel (jatropha and coconut) for the production of liquid fuels that are primarily used in transport, as well as for other energetic purposes whose main purpose is exportation. According to this document, the development of biofuels in Mozambique will be based on: • The production of biofuels is an essential activity for the private sector, a sector that can be developed via public/private associations. • The encouragement of international cooperation by means of the strengthening of the links that exist amongst institutions. • The strengthening of the Kyoto Protocol and of mechanisms and tools that encourage the rapid development of the production and use of biofuels, in order to contribute towards an effective reduction of greenhouse gases. Foreign governments favour the activity of their companies in Mozambique, since the raw materials obtained will be, for the most part, imported and used to cover the needs of their populations. For example, the Brazilian firm Petrobras signed a contract with Brazilian president Lula and with George W. Bush to facilitate and extend the production and sale of agro-fuels 81.

80 China is the exception to this rule, with state-owned companies that dispose of more than 2.8 million hectares of land for planting oil-palms in the Repulic of the Congo. Source: “Land grabbing” by foreign investors in developing countries, IFPRI, 2009, http://www.ifpri.org/publication/land-grabbing-foreign-investors-developing-countries 81 http://www.wrm.org.uy/temas/Agrocombustibles/Maniﬁesto_Quito.html (Consulted on 15/06/2010)

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Table 11: AGRO-FUELS CASE STUDY: MOZAMBIQUE SPANISH COMPANIES THAT REPRESENT A THREAT There are a great many companies that have agro-fuel plantations in Mozambique, ranging from the national company Pretromoc to oil companies that are beginning to specialise in the production of ethanol and biodiesel, like the aforementioned Petrobras. Other companies on this long list are: ESV Bio Africa Lda (based in <Ukraine/UK), Energem Biofuels Limited (Canada), Enerterra (Portugal), MocamGalp (Portugal), Sun Biofuels (UK) and AVIAM (Italy). Concerning Petrobras, the oil company created a subsidiary company in 2008 in order to take care of the biofuel production projects, called PETROBRAS COMBUSTIVEL. The company’s activities are focused on the production of biodiesel, ethanol sand second-generation biofuels. It currently operates in 21 countries, amongst which is Mozambique. There is an association between Petrobras and Petromoc to operate jointly on the biofuels market in Mozambique, in the Province of Manica. Then-president Guebuza visited Brazil in 2007 to meet his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the president of Petrobras, José Sergio Gabrielli de Azevedo, and both governments signed an agreement in the field of energy. Before signing this agreement, Petrobras was already present in the business in Mozambique with the Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), a national oil company, since 2006. An agreement memorandum was singed for the occasion regarding the exploration for oil and natural gas and also for research in and production of biofuels in Mozambiquan territory. The company is also associated to the Malaysian company Petronas to work on exploration in the estuary of the Zambezi River in Mozambique 82. Regarding the Brazilian company’s ties to Spain, the BBVA bank holds 3.7% of Petrobras shares, which makes it a direct participant in its activities in this sense. Within this context, the Spanish company Infinita Renovables 83, an affiliate of the Isolux Corsan group, has acquired 150,000 hectares of land in Mozambique 84 to grow oil-producing cereal crops that will be destined for its processing plants in Spain. As the group has announced, it will invest 170 million Euros and, with the raw materials, will be able to cover 30% of the needs of its plants in Ferrol and Castellón. In Mozambique, Infinita will be planting an experimental crop, jatropha, which is an oleaginous tropical plant that was mainly grown in Mexico until now. The company is aiming for production figures of up to 4,000 kilogrammes per year per hectare. In Mozambique, the investment will be of some 200 million dollars. Infinita Renovable shareholders include the Isolux Corsan group (70%), in charge of engineering, building and maintaining the production facilities, Santander Investment S.A. (5%) and Solar de Lukategi Sociedad Limitada (25%). Furthermore, the Spanish company Aurantia S.L. 85 is investing in the intensive production of oil palms in the Congo and already has experience in the biodiesel industry in Mozambique, Senegal and Guinea 86.

82 www.petrobras.com (Consulted on 10/07/2010) 83 http://www.inﬁnitarenovables.es/ (Consulted on 11/07/2010) 84 http://www.biodisol.com/biocombustibles/inﬁnita-renovables-compra-tierras-en-argentina-y-mozambique-para-cultivar oleaginosas/ Article published on 7th November 2007 (Consulted on 10/10/2010) 85 http://www.aurantia.es/ (Consulted on 11/07/2010) 86 http://news.mongabay.com/bioenergy/2007/03/spanish-company-aurantia-to-invest-in.html (Consulted on 23/08/2010)

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Table 11: AGRO-FUELS CASE STUDY: MOZAMBIQUE THE NATURE OF THE THREAT AND WHOM IT AFFECTS The green revolution announced by Guebusa does not represent a de facto support for smallscale agriculture but is, rather, yet another imposition demanded by the contingencies of the world marketplace and presented as a panacea for the people of Mozambique. “It is perhaps not the same Green Revolution that ruined India and Mexico in the Sixties since formally the government is against the invasion by agro-toxins. But we are very vigilant because, once again, we are being asked from overseas to implement this policy” 87, says Diamantino Nhampossa from the UNAC. The threat aﬀects farmers in Mozambique who watch as their land (in Mozambique land ownership is communal), which has traditionally been worked according to the family agriculture model aimed at the production of the food that is necessary to feed the family, is sold oﬀ by the government (in other words, privatised) to foreign companies – in many cases, Spanish – for the intensive production of agro-fuels that will be exported to Northern countries.

Spanish companies de not play a leading role in the production of agro-fuels in Sub-Saharan Africa when compared to the role of companies from other EU countries such as Germany or the United Kingdom. Their discreet presence is mainly due to the fact that historically speaking, Spain does not have such close ties to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (except for Equatorial Guinea) as do France or the United Kingdom with the countries that used to be their colonies. Nonetheless, at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we express our concern over the fact that actions that try to incentivise Spanish private investment in this respect are being developed. In Senegal, for example, within the context of the aforementioned REVA Plan and linked to the production of agro-fuels, there is a collaboration agreement with the Regional government of the Canary Islands. This focuses on scientiﬁc cooperation, which in Senegal is represented by the Institut Sénégalais de Recherche Agricole (ISRA – Senegalese Institute for Agricultural Research), for the selection of high-output vegetable matter, the optimisation of in-vitro and

traditional germination techniques, the execution of joint research projects and other training initiatives that may be necessary. Within eight years, the Regional Council has committed to sowing 321,000 hectares of jatropha in Senegal, with the intention of producing agro-fuels (Bermejo and Ribero, 2008). The Cultesa 88 company, with participation from the island government, has committed to this. The following table presents a summary of the agro-fuel plantations that have been identiﬁed in Sub-Saharan Africa and the companies involved, which are for the most part foreign. According to the information consulted when establishing this report, Spain is present in Senegal, Mozambique and the Congo.

87 http://viacampesinaafrica.blogspot.com/2008_12_01_archive.html (Consulted on 10/06/2010) 88 http://www.cultesa.com/ (Consulted on 05/07/2010)

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Table 12: COMPANIES INVESTING IN AGRO-FUELS BY COUNTRY Country

Companies with investments in agro-fuels in the country

ANGOLA

· The government assigned 500,000 hectares of land to the production of agro-fuels. · Biocom (an association of the Brazilian Odebrecht company, the Angolan Damer company and Sonangol, the state-run oil company in Angola) began sowing 30,000 hectares of sugar cane in 2009. · The Portuguese ﬁrm Quifel Recursos Naturales also has plans to sow sunflowers, soya and jatropha in the southern province of Cunene. · The Portuguese company, Gleinol, also began cultivating 700 hectares for the production of biodiesel; this ﬁgure would have risen to 13,000 hectares in 2009. Sonangol, Angola’s state-run oil company, and the Italian concern ENI, have plans to expand the oil palm plantations for the production of biofuels in the province of Kwanza in northern Angola.

CAMEROON

· SOCAPALM, which used to be state-run and is now partially owned by the French Bolloré group, announced plans to increase its production of palm oil. SOCAPALM has plantations on the coast, in the southern and central regions of Cameroon and signed a contract for a 60-year lease of 58,000 hectares in 2000. Bolloré owns the plantation in Safacam, which has 8,800 hectares.

D.R. OF THE CONGO

· The Democratic Republic of the Congo has undergone one of the most important evolutions as far as agro-fuel plantations are concerned. · In July of 2009, the chines company ZTE Company Ltd. announced plans to establish a million hectares of oil palms. · The Italian energy company ENI has also announced a 70,000 hectare plantation of oil palms.

CONGO BRAZZAVILLE ETIOPÍA

· Aurantia S.L. (Spain). The dimensions of the plantation are unspeciﬁed. African Palm*. Ethiopia has earmarked around 1.6 million hectares of land for investors who are ready to develop commercial exploitation and, in July 2009, 8,240 foreign and local investors received licences for the commercial production of agro-fuels. To date, the government has handed over more than 300,000 hectares for energy crops, but negotiations aimed at massively increasing this ﬁgure are under way. · National Biodiesel (an Ethiopian company with 80% of stock owned by Sun Biofuels, from the UK). Sun Biofuels (UK), with 5,000 hectares, of which 1,000 Ha are sown with jatropha. · Amabasel Jatropha project (Ethiopia), with 20,000 Ha of jatropha. · Jatropha Biofuels Agro Industry (Ethiopia), with 100,000 Ha of jatropha. · IDC Investment (Denmark/Ethiopia), with 15,000 Ha of jatropha. · Jemal Ibrahim (Ethiopia), with 7.8 ha of castor. · B DFC (Brazil) with 18,00 Ha (at least) of sugar cane and sweet beans. · Flora EcoPower (Denmark/UK), with 56,000 Ha sown and a further 200,000 Ha conceded for the sowing of castor and jatropha. · Petro Palm Corporation (USA/Austria), 50,000 Ha of castor and jatropha. · VATIC International Business (India/Ethiopia), with 20,000 Ha. · Global Energy (Israel), 2,700 Ha of castor.

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Tabla 12: EMPRESAS CON INVERSIONES EN AGROCOMBUSTIBLES POR PAÍSES País

Empresas con inversiones en agrocombustibles en el país

GHANA

· Agroils (Italy), 10,000 Ha of jatropha, with the concession of rights for a further 105,000 Ha. · Galten Global Alternative Energy (Israel), 1,000 Ha of jatropha out of a total of 100,000 Ha. · Gold Star Farms (Ghana), 14,000 Ha of jatropha. · Jatropha Africa (UK/Ghana), rights for exploiting 120,000 Ha of jatropha. · Biofuel Africa (Norway), 27,000 Ha, only 660 hectares producing jatropha and other crops. · ScanFuel (Norway), 400,000 Ha of jatropha (60% for agro-fuels. · Kimminic Corporation (Canada), 13,000 Ha of jatropha.

KENYA

· In 2007 the Japanese company Biwako Bio Laboratory announced plans to establish 30,000 hectares of jatropha that would increase to 100,000 Ha over the next ten years. · The Belgian company HG Consulting has obtained funding from the Ngima Project for exploiting sugar cane on 42,000 Ha of land. · The Canadian company Bedford Biofuels has obtained 160,000 Ha for growing jatropha, with the possibility of obtaining a further 200,000 Ha.

MADAGASCAR

MOZAMBIQUE

NIGERIA

· In Madagascar the British company GEM Biofuels has signed up for more than 490,000 hectares of land, of which only 55,700 Ha have been sown to date (January 2010), with jatropha. · D1 Oils (United Kingdom), 5,348 Ha of jatropha. · Energem Resources (Canada) has rights for 60,000 Ha, and is in negotiations for more than 60,000 Ha in other provinces; it has already sown 2,000 Ha of jatropha. · SGC Energia (Portugal), 20,000 Ha of jatropha. · Elaion Ag (Germany), 1,000 Ha of jatropha. · Galp Energia (Portugal), 5,000 Ha of jatropha. · Sun Biofuels (United Kingdom), 6,000 Ha of jatropha, with the intention of a further 15,000 Ha. · Avian (Italy), 10,000 Ha of jatropha. · Viridesco (United Kingdom), 10,000 Ha of jatropha. · Inﬁnita Renovables (Spain), 150,000 Ha of jatropha**. · Aurantia (Spain), no further information*. NNPC (Nigeria) have several plantations in the country. It has two sugar cane plantations, one of more than 200 square kilometres and another of 20,000 Ha. It has a further two yucca plantations, one of 10,000 Ha and the other of 30,000 Ha. Finally it has a sugar cane and yucca plantation of 20,000 Ha. · Kwara Casplex Limited (Nigeria), with 15,000 Ha of yucca. · Global Biofuels Limited (Nigeria). Two plantations of sweet sorghum, one of 11,000 Ha and the other of 30,000 Ha.

SIERRA LEONA

· Four plantations under the control of unidentiﬁed Chinese companies: one of sugar cane with 5,000 Ha; another one of corn, with 2,000 Ha; one with sweet potato, of 1,500 Ha; and one with ﬁgs and yucca, of 2,000 Ha. · Addax Bioenergy (Switzerland), 26,000 Ha of sugar cane.

SENEGAL

· Cultesa (Spain), with the participation of the Regional Council of the Canary Islands: 321,000 Ha of jatropha. · Aurantia (Spain), no further information*.

TANZANIA

There are almost 40 foreign-owned companies, including the British companies Sun Biofuels (that obtained 8,000 Ha of “degraded” woodlands in which to grow jatropha) and D1 Oils, which have invested in the expansion of agro-fuels in Tanzania.

Source: drafted internally according to data obtained from Friends of the Earth (2010). *http://news.mongabay.com/bioenergy/2007/03/spanish-company-aurantia-to-invest-in.html (Consulted on 23/08/2010) ** http://www.biodisol.com/biocombustibles/inﬁnita-renovables-compra-tierras-en-argentina-y-mozambique-para-cultivar oleaginosas/ 104

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The corporate activity undertaken in Africa in the domain of agro-fuels generates a series of social, economic and environmental consequences on the continent. These are described below:

• The loss of access to water and to land by small-scale farmers In Ghana, development agencies have pointed out that the propagation of jatropha is pushing small-scale farmers – particularly women farmers – away from their land. Valuable sources of food such as the karate tree have been felled to make way for the plantations 89. In Nigeria, the farming communities are being confronted with a resettlement programme after the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) requisitioned 200 square kilometres of land to grow sugar cane destined for the production of ethanol. Until then, the land had been used for small-scale agriculture to grow food (Friends of the Earth, 2010). In Tanzania, thousands of people involved in the production of rice and corn were obliged to abandon their lands in the Usangu plains in 2009, or have been threatened with eviction because of the implantation of sugar cane plantations in various parts of the country, giving rise to extensive conflicts. Similar situations have occurred throughout the country against jatropha and sunflower plantations. The farmers’ protests have led the Tanzanian government to reconsider its stance regarding agro-fuel plantations in the country 90. • Increased food prices The rivalry for land use that is represented by the agro-fuel plantations against the growing of basic foods such as yucca or sweet Sorghum is causing the land factor price to rise. Research by the WB (Mitchell, 2008) found that the use for agro-fuel production of crops that had been traditionally used as a food source is a factor that is closely linked to the rising food prices. • Employment of farmers The intensive farming of sugar cane, oil palms, jatropha, corn or any other crop for the production of ethanol or biodiesel is a new way of doing away with the control of local farmers and communities over their own productive activity, often stripping them of their traditional crops under cover of the promise of substantial proﬁts. This leaves them at the mercy of the programmed whims of the international market, turns the farmers into paid workers and covertly privatises the land, which in some countries such as Mozambique is communally owned, according to the Ley de florestas e fauna bravía (Flora and Wildlife Act, 2002). • The replacement of human labour by machinery It is not even possible to aﬃrm that the large agro-fuel plantations generate as many jobs as promised by the governments and companies involved. In fact, most of the agro-fuel crops require little labour. Various studies have demonstrated that one permanent job is created for every 100 hectares of agro-fuel crops. In most cases the work is highly mechanised and the employment levels are even lower. In the sugar cane industry, a harvesting machine can do the work of 100 persons (Ustulin and Severo, 2001). • Changing the use of the land and environmental degradation Seventy per cent of Mozambique is covered by forests and woodlands (DNTF, 2007), under the canopy of which foods that are the sustenance of Mozambiquan families have been grown using

89 http://www.biofuelwatch.org.uk/docs/ (Consulted on 23/08/2010) 90 http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/667648/-/qy9vngz/-/. (Consulted on 20/08/2010) THE PLUNDERING OF RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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traditional techniques. Most of the large-scale agricultural projects replace the natural vegetation in one way or another. The loss of this vegetation would have important consequences for climate change. In this way, the use of large stretches of land for the production of agro-fuels on the African continent represents a series of negative impacts upon nature, which could include deforestation and the elimination of natural habitats, soil degradation and water pollution as a result of the over-use of chemical products (pesticides, herbicides, chemical fertilisers) and the exhaustion of hydraulic resources due to the excessive use of water for the irrigation of the plantations. In Cameroon, the expansion of oil palm plantations is replacing native forests in the Congo basin, exaggerating the levels of deforestation in the country. The government of Cameroon has been supporting the production of palm oil since the Sixties via state-run companies such as SOCAPALM, which has been partially privatised since then (Friends of the Earth, 2010). The government of Benin has proposed the conversion of between 300 and 400 thousand hectares of wetlands to promote the production of oil palms in the southern part of the country, with the corresponding destruction that this would represent for the biodiversity of these wetlands (African Biodiversity Network, 2007). In Nigeria, plans for the large sugar cane plantations in Gombé State have awoken concerns about the use of pesticides (Salihu, 2008). • Farming them is detrimental to the families’ FS Continuing with the example of Mozambique, if one takes into account that about 87% of the Mozambiquan population is engaged in subsistence farming and that they produce 75% of the food that they consume (Martínez, 2008), the main concerns arise when one considers that the plan for encouraging the maintenance of small-scale farmers is to sow large amounts of jatropha on farmland once used for growing food. These concerns are made worse by the fact that these farmers usually have very poor connections to markets and have diﬃculties for storage, communication and information.

All of these elements mean that it is very diﬃcult for them to beneﬁt from these kinds of commercial crops (LVC, 2009). At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we consider that with regard to the production of agro-fuels, the Spanish government should withdraw its support to companies that establish agro-fuel plantations in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. It should above all reject the political goals that increase demand for agro-fuels.

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The production of food products for exporting In the context of NEPAD and of the current economic system (founded upon the opening of markets and the flexibility of trade relations), the traditional form of agriculture to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa as described in the previous paragraph is being replaced by a model of intensive agriculture based on single crops. The changing of the productive system and the impacts that this change entails for the Food Sovereignty of African populations occurs because the original meaning of agriculture, which was to supply the family group, is being changed. This will be under analysis throughout this section. Family and subsistence farming are characterised by the fact that they are highly diversified forms of agriculture that are integrated into natural cycles and based upon the sowing of traditional varieties that are specifically adapted to the conditions in the area. Dependent for the most part upon labour from the family group, it constitutes a very efficient productive model as long as the objective of production is that of guaranteeing sufficient and adequate food for the families in the immediate entourage. Nevertheless, if agriculture intends to respond to the growing needs of the international market and to the interests of investment capital, an intensive production system that is embedded in the logic of price-cutting and maximum benefits is required in order to provide products that are competitive on the international marketplace regardless of the quality of the end product and – more important still – of the social or environmental effects that their production may have entailed. The goal of this type of agriculture is production, mainly for exportation, and it is in this situation that foreign companies that enter Africa in search of cheap land and labour operate. It can also be undertaken by African national producers’ groups that have opted for an international market-oriented production model, convinced that this way they will rapidly increase their

wealth whilst contributing to the development of their countries. In any of these two cases, the products are generally directly exported to and manufactured in the home countries of the investing company, or simply in purchasing countries, without the local population having a share of the beneﬁts entailed by their production. The danger of this is that, whilst Sub-Saharan Africa stands out as one of the main producers of raw materials in the world, just a handful of companies are cornering this market at global level, maintaining control of the processes and prices throughout the production chain. Therefore, the farmers who used to be involved in diversiﬁed subsistence farming are now working on plantations run by foreign companies, in a dependent and vulnerable position against the fluctuations of the international market and the pressures from companies involved in the international trade game. Spanish companies, as in the case of the production of agro-fuels and for the same reasons, do not have a very great presence in Sub-Saharan Africa in comparison to those of other EU or overseas countries. In this sense it should be pointed out that Africa is currently a relatively “virgin”

BILLBOARD ON JATROPHA PLANTATION COMPANY SUN BIOFUELS. MOZAMBIQUE.

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territory, unlike other continents (such as, for example, Latin America and the cases of Brazil and Argentina with the production of geneticallymodiﬁed soya as animal fodder), in which large companies are starting to implant themselves. Nonetheless, the Spanish government and companies have begun a trend by favouring an industrial type of agriculture in all of their oﬃ cial

plans (suggesting that this will alleviate poverty in Africa). This is apparent in documents such as the Africa Plan, the ICEX’s support for investment projects for intensive agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, the involvement in cooperation projects that favour export-oriented agriculture as a means of economic encouragement, etc. All of this has been extensively developed throughout this document.

Table 13: SOME EXAMPLES OF COMPANIES THAT DOMINATE THE RAW MATERIALS MARKET AROUND THE WORLD. COCOA: Four companies (Barry Callebaut from Switzerland, Hosta from Germany and Cargill and Arthur Daniel Midland (ADM) from the US) control the worldwide cocoa market. Half of the world’s production of chocolate, which is mainly consumed in Europe, is in the hands of just six manufacturers that currently fight against the large retail chains for the slightest profit margins that can be obtained from cocoa products. African cocoa farmers and their governments have practically no influence over the establishing of prices, even when the ever-greater proportion of the milling is being done on their territory. COFFEE: Four companies (NK from Germany, Volcafe from Switzerland, the Swiss/Spanish company Ecom and the French company Dreyfus) control 40% of the worldwide coffee market. These companies supply a roasting industry that is even more concentrated: the Swiss company Nestlé, along with the three American companies Kraft, Procter & Gamble and Sara Lee, control 45% of the processing. BANANAS: Five companies (Dole, Chiquita and Del Monte from the United States, Eyffes from Ireland and Noboa from Ecuador) control 80% of the banana industry. FISHING: In the fishing industry, heavily subsidised European transnational companies such as Pescanova (Spain) pocket most of the benefits. FRUIT & VEGETABLES: Even Kenya’s export fruit and vegetables, which are an industry that is often presented as being a successful local enterprise, are in the hands of no more than five large companies (amongst which is Sunrise Ltd, which is controlled by the family of the Shah of Iran, and Homegrown Kenya, which now belongs to Flamingo Holdings from the UK). Source: bilterals.org, BIOTHAI and GRAIN, 2008. Adapted by Martínez Frías, 2010.

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Another example of this is, once again, the aforementioned REVA Plan from Senegal, which clearly shows the way in which the implantation of the agri-business model is taking place in the African countryside; in some cases by means of speciﬁc political programmes conducted in close collaboration with foreign governments and companies. Other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in which Spanish companies are present are, amongst

• Traditional cereal crops, which provide food for families, are tending to disappear in favour of imposed commercial crops such as melons, pumpkins or tomatoes. Traditional seeds and varieties are also being done away with in favour of commercial varieties and modified seeds (Mignane, 2010, personal communication). This is eliminating the diversity of crops that has traditionally characterised African subsistence farming, being replaced by single crops. This produces a gradual dilapidation of the soil, and increases farmers’ vulnerability, since they end up depending fundamentally upon the sales of a single product. It also leaves farmers more exposed to climate change, blights or illnesses. The diversification of crops was a means of ensuring a minimal production if a devastating event hit a specific variety or species. Specialisation in a single product puts the whole harvest at risk. • Rural young persons are turned into farm labourers instead of becoming farmers working with the rest of their family groups. This reduces farmers’ ability to intervene in decisions about what to grow, how to grow it and for whom to grow it.

others, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda. All of these cases are developed in the ﬁles that appear throughout this chapter. In the same way as the impacts produced by agro-fuel plantations have been indicated, some of the consequences on African life that are entailed by the industrial agriculture done by Spanish companies involved in the exportation of raw materials are listed below:

• The acquisition of land by these intensive production centres can, in the long run, cause instability and conflict in the FS of populations and families that take part in these systems. Land that could be used to grow crops for the inhabitants of the area is used for crops that will be directly exported. When they are placed at the mercy of international markets, of price fluctuations and of the tyranny of the export model, the vulnerability of farmers increases. • It increases rural migration and immigration, problems that activities such as those derived from the REVA Plan were initially designed to circumscribe. • Moreover, intensive production entails irreversible damage to the soil and water due to the excessive use of chemical products (fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides) and to the disregard for biological cycles that renew the nutrients in the ground.

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Land grabbing As mentioned in chapter 2, land-grabbing has once again put the issue of land and of the correct distribution of its tenure on the political, scientific and social agendas. Land, being a finite resource for agriculture, must be managed as a benefit to society. LVC defends the democratisation of its tenure and use; it defends true, integrated and participative agrarian reform that ensures the right for all people to work the land and that democratises its tenure, giving priority to family collective and cooperative types of agriculture (LVC, 2009). Land is a productive resource that is essential for the subsistence of the local population and without which it is impossible to ensure access

to food. Without any available land the people who work in the agricultural sector cannot produce food, build their homes or meet their needs based on social, cultural and religious values and practices; as the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Olivier de Schutter, puts it, “access to land and to the security of its tenure are essential to ensure not only the exercising of the right to food but also that of other human rights, including the right to employment (for farmers without land) and the right to housing” (UN, 2010). Because of this, access to land and to other natural resources, as well as the associated security of its tenure, have an important eﬀect for development (Palmer et al, 2009).

Interests and motivations for land grabbing During the 2007-2008 food crisis, in which food prices rose sharply and restrictions were increased for the exportation of basic crops by the exporting countries, there was a proliferation of the acquisition of farmland in developing countries by other countries that was partially motivated by the need to ensure their food security, by externalising their own productions. High oil prices over the same period increased the private sector’s interest in energy crops (and the land on which they are grown) and helped to promote interest in the reception of agricultural investments to reduce the cost of food imported to developing countries (Smaller and Mann, 209; Cotula et al, 2009). In conjunction with the ﬁnancial crisis, this surge in the investment in raw materials and basic products for food dramatically increased interest in agricultural land as a potential investment, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2010).

The target of these investments are countries that have abundant land with farming potential, as well as those whose land ownership regime is regulated by a less extensive legal context according to which the legitimate owners of farmland are more at threat of being the target of foreign investments that arise from the acquisition of extensive amounts of land. Speculation is another driving force for the search for new investment sources that are aimed at land acquisition, in which it is hoped that the value of the land and the price of food will increase, leading to beneﬁt margins. Moreover, the political reforms in some African countries has made investment a more attractive prospect, particularly by means of a growing number of investment treaties, the reform of land legislation, banks, tax and customs duties (Cotula et al, 2009). Some investment banks have created agricultural investment funds such as BlackRock (United States), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Goldman

* Chapter written by Sara Martínez Frías, Isabel Vara Sánchez, David Gallar Hernández - Instituto de Sociología y Estudios Campesinos (Institutefor Sociology and Rural Studies) – ISEC –. 110

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Sachs (United States) and Knight Frank (United Kingdom) (Smaller and Mann, 2009), that can draw benefit from the positive effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Other factors, which affect countries such as China, like high demographic growth, the degradation of ecosystems or climate change – droughts or a change in the rain cycle – can means that once fertile land is

now of no use for agriculture, for which reason governments decide to invest in land in other countries. For all of these factors, one can envisage ﬁerce competition for land resources to supply food, energy and ﬁbres, as well as it has been warned that international land investments can become an important factor in the change of the use of land in the globalised South (ibidem).

Land-grabbing in Sub-Saharan Africa According to information from the WB (World Bank, 2010), in less than a year they detected that 42 million hectares of land around the world had been under scrutiny from investors, of which more than 75% (32 million hectares) were to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, other research (Friis and Reenberg, 2010) puts into question between 51 and 63 million hectares (a surface area equivalent to France) on the African continent alone and, by the first quarter of 2010, the volume of land treaties accounted for was of 177 offers in 27 countries in Africa (ibidem). The main international investors are the Persian Gulf states, China and South Korea, but nevertheless the European Union is also implicated in the acquisition of land in Africa. Six European countries (in decreasing order: Italy, Norway, Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom and France) are amongst the most important investors in terms of FDI in agricultural deeds (Graham et al, 2010). Even though Spain is not amongst the most important investors, one should not underestimate its activity regarding land-grabbing in view of possible investment forecasts and their consequences for local populations and their environments. Amongst the main receivers of investments one finds Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Madagascar, Sudan, Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; one can highlight Uganda, with more than 14% of its surface area currently under negotiation, Mozambique, with more than21%, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo with more than 48% of its

farmland (ibidem). Almost two-and-a-half million hectares (not counting transactions for amounts of land of less than 1,000 Ha) in Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Sudan and Mali were assigned to foreign interests between 2004 and 2009, with a growing trend towards the increased size of the estates acquired (for example, more than 450,000 hectares for an agro-fuel project in Madagascar; 150,000 hectares for a livestock project in Ethiopia and an irrigation project of 100,000 hectares in Mali) (Cotula et al, 2009). As for Sub-Saharan Africa, according to cases recorded by the Global Land Project (Friis and Reenberg, 2010), amongst the land assignations there are cases such as that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in which the Canadian company MagIndustries invested in 68,000 hectares of eucalyptus plantations. In Mali, the Libyan company, Malibya, intends to acquire 100,000 Ha for food production, mainly rice and wheat; the South African and Chinese governments intend to acquire 55,000 Ha for the production of sugar cane. In Uganda, the Chines company Heibei Company intends to sign for 40,500 Ha of battery fowls, livestock and the production of corn, rice and wheat; In Ghana agreements have been signed with seven private investors (Norway, Brazil, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, China and the United Kingdom) for 55,000 Ha for the production of jatropha aimed at agro-fuels and, for the same purpose in this country, according to the NGO Friends of the Earth Europe (2010), the Ital-

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ian company Agroils has acquired the farming rights for 150,000 Ha and the Israeli company Galten Global Alternative energy is renting 100,000 Ha. In Mozambique, one can highlight the acquisition of land for the production of agro-fuels (see table 20). With regard to the production of food and exports, one can highlight the agreement for 10,000,000 Ha with the South African company Agri SA for corn, soya, poultry and dairy products (Friis and Reenberg, 2009). As far as Spanish companies are concerned, the most obvious cases are to be found in Ghana, where the García Carrión company has reached

an agreement with the Ghanaian government for the planting of 10,000 hectares of pineapple whose processed product would be aimed at EC markets 91 (Friends of the Earth Europe, 2010). In Mozambique, the Spanish company Inﬁnita Renovables, an aﬃliate of the Isolux Corsan group, has purchased 150,000 hectares of land on which to grow oleaginous cereals that will be destined for its production facilities in Spain (see the case study in the “Agro-fuels” section of this report) and in Senegal, the national government adjudicated 80,000 Ha to the businessman Raúl Barroso for the development of a tourism project consisting of the creation of a wildlife park and its associated tourist resort 92.

JATROPHA MONOCULTURE FOR EXPORTATION, MOZAMBIQUE.

91 Public information about this can be found in the article written by Vidal Maté, “Españoles que cultivan fuera”, published in the El País newspaper on 4th April 2009. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/global/Espanoles/cultivan/fuera/elpepuec oneg/20091004elpnegeco_4/Tes 92 Information obtained from th research for VSF’s campaign in Africa. Further information in “Agir pour les DESC”: http://www. agirpourlesdesc.org/francais/comment-faire-respecter-les-desc/agir-aupres-des-multinationales/article/accaparement-desterres-au-senegal (Consulted on 24/10/2010 and from the Jane Goodall Institute, 2008)

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Agricultural models and political contexts The goal of these land acquisition or long-term rent contracts is not to promote durable and fair development for the aﬀected populations, but is instead aimed directly towards agri-business. What is at stake is the production of commercial crops for the world market with a view to high economic turnover for investors (Graham et al, 2010). This vision diﬀers radically from the encouragement of rural agriculture that is environmentally and socially durable, in which the production of food is designed to sustain the community.

The design of public policies can tip the scales towards one or other of the agricultural development models. In fact, most of these policies discriminate against rural and indigenous agriculture, and agro-ecological systems (Graham et al, 2010), in favour of the public support obtained by forms of agriculture that have a high potential for destruction and pollution, with subsidies for technology, favouring the abandon of agriculture to small- and medium-scale farmers, concentrating production in a few hands (this is the case of the CAP).

In Africa, just like in other continents with developing countries, durable agriculture, with relatively few investments, with appropriate available technology that is adapted to the environmental and cultural conditions of the areas in which it is implemented, can achieve a suﬃciently high output to ensure a supply of food (Pretty, 1999; UNCTAD, 2008) to local markets.

Policies that lead to the freeing of agricultural trade worsen the abandon of family agriculture, with direct consequences upon the food supply of these communities. As explained in the report “Advancing African Agriculture (AAA): The Impact of Europe’s Policies and Practices on African Agriculture and Food Security” (Graham et al, 2010), certain policies are encouraging landgrabbing regardless of whether or not this is their direct objective. In some ways the EU’s energy policies can promote investment overseas in agro-fuels. An example of this is European Directive 2009/28EC (April 2009), which establishes minima for renewable energy sources to be achieved by 2020, in which agro-fuels must be the main fuel for transport, thus opening up a secure market for associated crops.

In order to develop this type of agriculture it is necessary to ensure the preservation of natural resources and equal access to them. Land, water and seeds are resources that must be accessible and protected for use and management by rural farmers and communities. The implementation of local markets in which farmers can sell their produce in a way that establishes a fair commercial relationship between consumers and farmers is also a condition of a local and equitable food system that is focused on the FSov of people. Large-scale investment in land denotes an agricultural development model that focuses on farms with a large investment in external technology, that are highly mechanised and that have an important density of capital. These farms are articulated around large-scale chains of supply and sales. This agricultural model rewards largescale producers (or owners), since their powerful position with regard to the market favours them and places their production within the domain of merchandise (for exports, for example) and not that of food (as occurs with rural agriculture).

These policies can be an encouragement for investment since they introduce support measures such as the reduction of fuel taxes, tax incentives, etc. (ibidem). At the same time, the food and financial crises are another means of justification for land-grabbing. This can be so as to ensure the production of food by externalising national production to land acquired in third countries or in order to generate incomes by acquiring land as an “investment fund” on the part of private financial institutions. Although 90% of land investment originates in the private sector (Cotula and Vermeulen, 2009), it is necessary to have a favourable political and regulatory context in order to carry them

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out. Land-related policies, investment protection regimes and trade policies are political contextual factors that can influence land-grabbing phenomena (Graham et al, 2010). Investment protection regimes are agreements amongst countries that are designed to facilitate investments, mainly within the financially weakest country, and which establish legal guarantees and ensure a certain stability for investments. Government diplomacy plays an important part in them, as well as the promotion of FDI that, in the case of Spain, is done by the ICEX. In 2007, the Spanish government signed an APPRI with the Republic of Senegal in which amongst other investments, the following were specifically included: “(…) d) industrial and intellectual property rights; technical procedures, technical knowledge (know-how) and trade funds; e) the rights to carry out certain economic and commercial activities given by law or in virtue of a contract or a concession, including concessions for prospecting, growing, extracting or exploiting natural resources” and protects them from being subjected to nationalisation or expropriation (Article 5 of the APPRI). This agreement paves the way for Spanish investment in Senegalese territory (land, agro-fuels, export products, etc.) although, even though it encourages reciprocal investment, according to the office of the Secretary of State for Trade 93 there are no records of the existence of Senegalese companies that have been implanted in Spain. In 2008 the Economic and Commercial Bureau of the Spanish embassy in Dakar published the document “El Mercado de la Agroquímica en Senegal” (Arranz, 2008), regarding the study of the agricultural raw materials market in Senegal (seeds, fertilisers and pesticides). This document promotes and guides the investments that Spanish companies would like to make, identifying that Senegalese programmes for production incentives such as the Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and Plenty 94 (known by its French acronym, GOANA) offer “fiscal exonerations to companies that wish to establish themselves

and whose activity will contribute towards agricultural development” (ibidem); this initiative is aimed at increasing the country’s agricultural production for the national and export markets, implementing an industrial production model (agro-fuels, cotton, fruit and vegetables, etc.). Spanish investment in Senegalese agriculture focuses on “contre-saison” (oﬀ-season) agriculture for export purposes, in which two companies spearhead Spanish investment: Promegal, dedicated to the production of melons on an estate in Mbour, and Versen, a company with joint Spanish and Senegalese stock with plantations in Kirène and Bayar that produce watermelons, melons, peppers and pumpkins, amongst other products (Arranz, 2008). Plantations of jatropha and other oleaginous plants used for the production of biodiesel constitute a sector that is of great interest to the Spanish corporate sector, according to the ICEX. These regulatory contexts can provide a favourable situation for large-scale land investment. Normally, these FDI promotion agreements do not take into account Human Rights when implementing investments and, of course, do not even mention Farmers’ Rights – expressed in the International Treaty on International Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) – or the Right to Food. Farmers that can be displaced from their land because of these foreign investment projects are in an extremely unequal balance of power and do not have any room for negotiation in these agreements in which national and international organisations impose their clauses and interests. Bilateral investment treaties extend the legal power of investors, reduce the political space of governments and undermine the power of local communities (Graham et al, 2010). With the intention of creating a more favourable environment for the development of agriculture in Africa, the EU launched the aforementioned “Advancing African Agriculture” (EU, 2007) communiqué in order to articulate national and international cooperation concerning Africa’s

93 http://www.oﬁcinascomerciales.es/icex/cda/controller/pageOfecomes/0,5310,5280449_5299371_5296234_0_SN,00.html (Consulted on 29/ 10/ 2010) 114

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agricultural development. As emphasised by the aforementioned report, even though the AAA acknowledges that agriculture plays a crucial role in poverty relief â&#x20AC;&#x201C; something that is essential for achieving the MDOs and that is a means of subsistence for the majority of poor popula-

tions in Africa â&#x20AC;&#x201C; it does not go any further into the role of family agriculture and small-scale farmers, nor does it address the protection of access to resources and to the means that are necessary to ensure that its agricultural models last over time.

94 http://goana-senegal.org/ (Consulted on 27/10/2010) 95 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/sectoral_development_policies/r13014_en.htm

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The eﬀects of land-grabbing There are a great many rural communities in Sub-Saharan Africa and most of the population are small-scale farmers with food production systems that address basic local needs. To ensure their supply of food, that of their families and that of entire communities, they depend upon access to natural resources and to means of production, whether for the production of their own food or for obtaining money with which to buy it. The land ownership regime in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa tends to be founded on state ownership and the people who make use of the land do not usually have the deeds to the land that they work. Given this legal uncertainty, farmers cannot present the necessary legal recourse if they are evicted from the land that they use and work on when, for example, investment capitalists acquire the land with the connivance of the governments (UN, 2009). Furthermore, much of

this land is considered by investors to be “underused”, “unused” or “unoccupied”, which means that the services that this land provides to the local population is disregarded when it becomes a mercantile object. Herding, forestry the harvesting of woodland fruit or medicinal plants, access to water sources or the extraction of resources such as timber are essential elements for the subsistence and reproduction of rural communities and the land that these activities take place on are not fallow but instead play a fundamental role in integrated agricultural, forestry and herding systems (Graham et al, 2010; UN, 2009); This takes on greater signiﬁcance if one takes into account that these types of arid lands make up almost half of the land surface of Sub-Saharan Africa and that some 60 million people living in Sub-Saharan Africa are involved in agriculture and herding, or just herding (UN, 2009). The large amounts of land that are acquired and that are ﬁnally used for the production of food, export products of for energy crops (agro-fuels) entail an industrial agriculture model based on single crops, the implementation of a technological package and mechanisation.

FAMILY DISPLACED BY AGRIBUSINESS, MUBENDE. UGANDA.

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As this report has shown, this industrial model implies the industrial appropriation of natural resources and the degradation of natural systems. Some of the consequences can be identiﬁed in the pollution of the soil and water through the use of agricultural chemicals (fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides), the exhaustion of water resources due to changing uses of irrigation water according to the type of crop (high water use for crops such as jatropha) and the degradation of the soil due to non-durable agricultural practices, amongst other things. The consequences of the loss of biodiversity and of local varieties due to the introduction of single crops – considered as being the greatest expression of the simpliﬁcation and homogenisation of biodiversity – and to the introduction of modern varieties, as well as the loss of traditional know-how linked

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to the management of this biodiversity, are analysed in a separate paragraph in this report since they are a further threat to Food Sovereignty: the loss of local varieties that are adapted to the regions, cultures and techniques endangers the populations’ FSov and RF.

companies or governments via their purchase or long-term renting are legitimate. The displacement of a population linked to agriculture and herding for its survival can entail the risk of a famine. This tension over land tenure can lead to the eruption of violent conflicts (ibidem).

Local social and economic systems are also influenced by land-grabbing. Although the states tend to have a positive view of the implementation of foreign investment as a source of development and creation of employment, mainly in rural areas in this case, one should not forget that this employment should translate into improved living conditions. A large part of these jobs are not stable, have bad work conditions and are underpaid. The transformation of traditional systems into technical systems entails a reduction of the demand for rural labour as well as endangering people’s health due to poisoning from agricultural chemicals (Graham et al, 2010).

Moreover, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have seen a growth in their dependence on food imports and food aid despite foreign investment in agricultural issues (ibidem). As pointed out in the report by the German NGO Welt Hunger Hilfe (von Oppeln and Schneider, 2009), agricultural investments do not usually focus upon offering the local population effective participation in the benefits; what is more, it warns that “states that depend upon food imports hand over more and more land to foreign investors whilst at the same time not guaranteeing improved incomes and food security to their own populations”. The handing over of this land represents a reduction of national productive capacity and the loss of control over resources and the production of food, putting this control in the hands of transnational companies, thus increasing the lack of autonomy and of FSov.

Foreign land investment represents yet another rival in the ﬁght for means of production and land access rights. Local populations that may be evicted from their territories might not consider that the land rights acquired by foreign

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Land-grabbing and the Right to Food Governments accepted the obligation to promote the execution of the RF in the PIDESC in 1966. The member states of the FAO also adopted the DV in support of the progressive execution of this right in the context of national FS (FAO, 2005), which describes the states’ obligations regarding access to resources and assets, including land: “States should undertake agrarian reforms well as the reform of policies in keeping with their obligations towards human rights and of conformity with the rule of law in order to ensure an efficient and equitable access to land and reinforce growth in favour of the poor. Particular attention should be paid to nomadic herders and indigenous peoples and their relationship with natural resources” (Directive 8.1.). “States should adopt measures so that the members of vulnerable groups can have access to economic opportunities and resources that enable them to take part in the economy fully and in equal conditions” (Directive 8.2.). The PIDESC and the PIDCP also acknowledge the right to free choice, defined as being the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural assets and resources, and disposes that under no circumstances may a people be deprived of its means of subsistence (Article 1), amongst which is the land upon which they live and grow crops, herd livestock or from which they extract basic resources. These are obligations and commitments for the international community and, as Olivier de Schutter explains (2010), “they are based on a diagnosis of famine that establishes its origins in the violation of human rights and not in the mere lack of technology or capital”. The peoples’ Right to Food is directly threatened by land-grabbing. The appropriation of land denies the communities who have little land access to land that they could make a better alternative use of. Once this land has been grabbed by foreigners, African national authorities will find it difficult to return the foreign investment by means of evictions, in favour of the local produc-

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tion of food by and for local communities. Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, as well as the various international trade regulations, can hinder the governments’ fulﬁlment of the right to food and their facilitating the population’s access to resources and avoid landgrabbing by foreign countries (Graham et al, 2010). Foreign land investments sharpen rivalry between persons who practice family agriculture and those who practice large-scale agriculture. This generates extreme inequality. The concentration of a large amount of land in the hands of a minority goes against the execution of the Right to Food because it limits access to the land that is necessary to obtain sustenance. It is very important for states to take steps to avoid this phenomenon. Olivier de Schutter (2010) observes hat “if necessary measures are not adopted to promote the viability of smallscale agriculture and communal land rights are not acknowledged and institutionalised, this process could turn into an unacceptable agrarian counter-reform, in other words, in the re-concentration of land ownership”. The measures should be in keeping with policies aimed at the populations’ FS, which not only take into account parameters such as production or means of production, but that also have an integrated vision of the fairest change to the agrarian model. The proposal by LVC and proFS social movements in this respect favours an integrated agrarian reform that is managed according to agro-ecological management criteria, conducting a transition that incorporates technical, agronomic, environmental, socioeconomic, cultural and political aspects. The states’ intervention in agreements with investors – whether public or private – that lead to large-scale land acquisition or renting violates the right to food by means of the deprival of resources, causing food insecurity and dependence on the markets, or by means of

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economic deprival due to the relocation of smallscale farmers away from their livelihoods. According to the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, the states are obliged to “avoid harming peoples’ ad communities’ ability to feed themselves when this ability exists (respect) and to avoid interference by others – particularly by private agents such as companies – with

this ability (protection)” (UN, 2009). Therefore, states that sell or rent out their land and, particularly because of their advantageous position in these transactions, the states of origin of the private investors, are obliged to regulate these investors’ behaviour and the nature of the investments themselves so that they do not interfere or threaten the local populations’ right to food.

BILLBOARD ON MILLET AND SUNFLOWER PLANTATION COMPANY SUN BIOFUELS. MOZAMBIQUE.

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Genetic erosion and the loss of biodiversity LVC considers that seeds are the fourth essential and basic resource for agriculture along with land, water and air; seeds are a prior requisite for durable production. The loss of agricultural biodiversity is one of the main environmental threats to the production of food. “Biodiversity must be a basis for guaranteeing food security as a fundamental, basic and non-negotiable right of people” (LVC, 2001). Biodiversity provides agriculture with a series of beneﬁts without which current environmental and social problems would be accentuated. It should be known that it plays a fundamental role in (i) productivity, because as it contains a wide rang of genes it results in a greater variety of food products for the world population and for other species; (ii) adaptability, since this variety of characteristics and genes contributes towards the resistance of agricultural biosystems and to the ability to recover from adverse environmental conditions: a high degree of adaptability ensures agricultural production and oﬀers evolutionary possibilities in view of the climate change issue; and in (iii) maintaining the functions of the agricultural ecosystems – and adjacent areas –

FRUITS IN LOCAL MARKET. MOZAMBIQUE.

by decomposing organic matter and regulating the nutrient cycle in order to maintain the fertility of the soil, interactions within and between species that give rise to a greater complexity of the system and to synergetic connections, the resistance of species to illnesses and pest control, pollenating for the fertilisation of crops and woodland species and the preservation of a dynamic agricultural biodiversity. By encouraging these functions, the result is an increased availability of nutrients, better use of water and energy, a reduction of the need for external supplies (chemical fertilisers, pesticides, herbicides, fossil fuels, etc.), an improvement of the soil structure and natural pest control. Traditional farming systems base their agricultural reproduction on the use and management of traditional, native or or local varieties. In order to incorporate genetic variability to the agricultural ecosystems that they manage, farmers dispose of their own technology for rural improvement and for the use and preservation of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA). This variability is a source of new crop options and of resistance to adverse factors, as well as a means of maintaining the ecosytemic balance and a legacy of security for the food supply and wellbeing of future generations. Farmers use local varieties mainly because these are very well adapted to local conditions and are, in such conditions, productive and stable. Moreover, using these varieties oﬀers some advantages as they are selected on the basis of food diversity and are better adapted to low-input farming. An important point is that they provide farmers with autonomy, since they regain control over part of their crops. They are the result of a co-evolutionary process that is made up of two selection processes: natural selection derived from environmental factors and cultural selection derived from the speciﬁc cultivation techniques, tastes and needs of rural communities.

* Chapter written by Sara Martínez Frías, Isabel Vara Sánchez, David Gallar Hernández - Instituto de Sociología y Estudios Campesinos (Institutefor Sociology and Rural Studies) – ISEC –.

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Loss of agricultural diversity There is scientific and social consensus regarding the serious loss of crop biodiversity aimed at food and agriculture. The industrialisation process of agriculture and, therefore, of food, is the main historic process of biological reductionism (ETC Group, 2009). Genetic erosion, defined as the loss of agricultural biodiversity or as the genetic simplification of crops (Soriano, 2004), is very worrying, since more than 75% of the genetic diversity of crops has been lost during the 20th century (Pretty, 1995). The causes of this loss of agricultural diversity is linked to the processes for the appropriation of natural resources and to the industrialisation of agriculture. The FAO points out that the primary cause of genetic erosion is the substitution of native varieties by others of an industrial origin due to the development of industrial and commercial agriculture. This evaluation by the FAO is present in the 1996 report on the Condition of Plant Genetic Resources in the World as well as in a second, more recent report (FAO, 2009), which indicates that the trend is continuing and that the “efforts” made to stem this erosion have not been sufficient. In the United States alone “95 per cent of cabbage varieties, 91 per cent of corn, 95 per cent of peas and 91 per cent of tomatoes have ceased to exist” (FAO, 1996). This substitution entails a prior process of transferring from seeds that have been selected and improved by the farming communities – with high productive levels according to environmental conditions – to the profit-oriented chemical agriculture industry. This phenomenon of the appropriation of resources, which has come to be known as bio-piracy, is based – with the complicity of international and governmental bodies – upon “intellectual property rights” without taking into account the farmers’ rights as set out in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). The countries have detected other, more or less influential causes that affect genetic erosion. On the one had there is a series of causes linked

to the industrial agriculture model, such as the changes of agricultural systems, levelling, excessive herding, the elimination of traditional agricultural practices like leaving land fallow, illnesses, pests and weeds, the over-exploitation of species and general environmental degradation. On the other hand they highlight political and social causes, such as demographic pressure, civil unrest and related legislation and policies. The latter has not been given the importance that it deserves in its links to genetic degradation, although in recent years more attention has been paid to it du to complaints for the appropriation of natural resources by means of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and other legal tools.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, ASSOCIATION JUNE 16TH, MANICA PROVINCE, MOZAMBIQUE.

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With regard to genetic erosion, the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa follows worldwide premises. Mali is a country in which the value of the PGRFAs is primarily linked to agricultural production for local consumption and the production of food for markets. The main crops are millet, rice and sorghum in native varieties that are characterised by a large interspeciﬁc diversity aimed at various uses. The role of Malian producers in the domestication of these species and in the evolution of native cereals explains this great interspeciﬁc diversity of crops. This diversity is invaluable for the future improvement of crops.

(Compaore and Kabore, 2008). In Senegal there are 14 important agricultural and woodland species that are of great importance for food and agriculture and that have been declared to be under threat of immediate extinction (Fall, 2008). In Uganda, it has been acknowledged that traditional agricultural systems tend to deliberately include genetic diversity in order to maintain systems in a low-risk situation as far as environmental stress is concerned, thus many underused crops such as yam are maintained by farmers in order to guarantee food security (PGRC and NARO, 2008).

In its National Report on the Condition of Plant Genetic Resources (Sidibe, 2008), it underlines the following factors that have a part in the loss of crop varieties: (i) the introduction and spreading of certain crops; it has been observed that 60% of local sorghum varieties have disappeared in the past 20 years as a result of the spreading of cotton farming, the development of the corn crop and the saturation of agricultural space, (ii) the introduction of new varieties; the introduction of a new and improved variety of sorghum has brought about the disappearance of three local varieties, (iii) drought, which affects long-cycle rice and sorghum varieties and (iv) migration; the hypothesis of the loss of local know-how concerning varieties due to rural migration is maintained.

Nevertheless, the Ugandan authorities have acknowledged the loss of habitat and the degradation of the soil, non-durable crops and over-exploitation, as well as a preference for exotic crops or introduced commercial varieties as the causes for the loss of local varieties.

In the case of Burkina Faso the main factors of genetic erosion are desertiﬁcation, extensive agriculture practices, the over-exploitation of non timber-yielding products, excessive tree-felling

Successive conflicts over a thirty-year period in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have had serious consequences on the agricultural sector: this has led to the increased imports of essential products and a drop in export crops, leaving the rural population in a very vulnerable position. The large-scale farms have been abandoned during the conflicts and it is the traditional family farms that have survived in rural as well as in suburban areas; rural women assume the majority of agricultural tasks and are considered to be the guarantors of FS. There has been a signiﬁcant loss of old varieties due to the war, to the lack of international technical cooperation, to the loss of gene pools, to the stoppage of development and research programmes and to the diﬃculties experienced by the state-run seed research, expansion and multiplication centres. In its analysis of the condition of plant genetic resources (DRC, 2009), the DRC emphasises the risk of the disappearance of adapted local varieties because of the introduction and cultivation of exotic seeds. Humanitarian aid programmes have often ignored local varieties, instead promoting the importing of foreign varieties due to emergency activities against famine.

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In southern Ghana, corn, yucca and plantain are

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the basic crops whilst in the north, sorghum, millet, yams and rice are the most important crops from a food security point of view. Ghana’s commercial crops are mainly cocoa, palm oil, pineapple, and cotton. Native varieties of Bambara peanuts, peanuts, malanga, cola and millet are under threat of extinction. As in most of the countries, there are no exact ﬁgures with which to quantify genetic erosion, but despite this it I acknowledged that this degradation is very widespread throughout the country. Amongst the stakeholders in PGRFAs in Ghana, there is a general consensus regarding the causes of this erosion: the substitution of local varieties, deforestation, pests, weeds and disease, demographic pressure and changes to agrarian systems, in this order (Bennet-Lartey and Oteng-Yeboah, 2008). Improved varieties of cowpea have substituted the Bambara peanut, or the Kersting peanut – originally from the African veldt – which means that there is not only a threat of losing varieties but also of losing crops. In Kenya, reports indicate that over the last decade a large amount of genetic erosion has taken place mainly because of the substitution of local varieties and other socioeconomic factors (Wambugu and Muthamia, 2009). The Kenyan seed system includes public sector agencies, private companies and multinationals. The seed sector was liberalised in 1996 and there are currently more than 40 registered seed companies. Corn ahs the greatest diversity of modern varieties, followed in decreasing order by tea, beans and chrysanthemums. Even though the diversity of modern varieties in most crops is on the rise, that of traditional varieties is declining. Accord-

ing to its report on the condition of PGRFAs, the diversity of plant genetic resources in Kenya has bee decreasing due to genetic erosion caused by biotic and abiotic factors. These factors include: droughts, desertification, demographic pressure on the land, changes in the use of soils, changes in feeding habits and over-exploitation. In these areas, migration in search of arable land is causing untold damage to existing diversity in places where genetic erosion is aggravated by desertification. In recent years, the country has suffered serious droughts that have had negative impacts on the survival of plant genetic resources. The increased dependence on food aid in these regions, due to factors such as drought and other natural disasters, has also given rise to a reduction of crop diversity. The rise of genetic erosion can also be attributed to policies that greatly advocate in favour of high-output crops, which has encouraged the displacement of traditional crop varieties. For example, githigu, a local variety of corn that used to be very popular in the centre of Kenya, has disappeared from the agricultural system in the last decade. The dismantling of traditional systems for the management of natural resources, with its corresponding loss of local plant varieties and of associated cultural knowledge, can also be a cause of erosion. Although in these countries the regression of agrodiversity is acknowledged by the populations and institutions, most of them suffer from the lack of resources with which to carry out precise inventories and monitoring that give clearer visibility to degrading processes.

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Implications of the loss of biodiversity and genetic erosion Genetic erosion goes hand-in-hand with genetic vulnerability and a uniformity of populations that depletes productivity and undermines the ability to resist diseases and pests, which translates into a relative increase in the use of external raw materials, mainly chemicals, that re potentially toxic for water, animals and plants. The problem of genetic vulnerability originates in a loss of combinations of alleles in a given time and geographic location, in other words there is a loss of genetic matter concentrated on native varieties of cultivated species. This erosion has dangerously restricted the genetic stock that is available for natural selection and for selection by farmers and plant improvers

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(Esquinas-Alcázar, 2007). The loss of genomic combinations in turn entails the loss of adaptability to environmental and evolutionary changes (co-evolution), which is an important quality in a climate change context. The consequences of the reduction of biodiversity, linked to the expansion of single crops are particularly visible in the domain of agricultural pest control, demonstrating the instability of agro-ecosystems in pest issues (Altieri, 1992), due to a breakdown in ecosystemic functions such as population regulation. The simplification of the genetic structure of crops increases the vulnerability of agricultural crops in the matter of the resistance to diseases. According to Toledo and Barrera-Bassols (2008), not only is it possible to measure industrial agriculture’s destruction of agroecosystems and their natural diversity, but it also goes hand-in-hand with the destruction of traditional memory and of cultural diversity. Biocultural memory is of particular interest with regard to the knowledge associated to local varieties; this traditional know-how is of great value in order to understand how and why local varieties are grown (Ibancos and Rodríguez, 2010), and is an element for the preservation of biodiversity and diversity in agricultural and livestock uses. The displacement of rural communities due to social and economic phenomena linked to the agri-business system in a globalised context can be another cause of genetic erosion. In turn, technological instability of modified seed systems has gone hand-in-hand with a change in knowledge systems. Therefore, local knowledge was substituted by technologies derived from the application of Mendelian genetics – and currently of genetic engineering – as a preface to the launching of rural modernising programmes (Soriano, 2007).

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Seed policies, multinationals and intellectual property Within the agro-food chain and industrialisation processes, seeds paly a central role due to their intrinsic ability for reproduction. Seeds have a dual character: it is a food product as well as a means of production (Kloppenburg, 1988). This double characteristics what makes it a biological hurdle for the accumulation of capital (Shiva, 1997) given that when it is being sown, not only is it ensuring a supply of food but also the reproduction of means of production: it is a connection between the biological and social dimensions. The seed’s natural characteristic of being able to reproduce can become a biological barrier for its trade; this is the challenge that industry by means of various technologies, must face in order to be able to maintain the production and distribution of the ﬁrst link of the agro-food chain. There are two ways to achieve this: a technical way and a social one (Kloppenburg, 1988). With hybridisation technology one can achieve the ﬁssion of the identity of the seed as a product and as a means of production.

tion by farmers (Shiva, 1997). The possibility of accumulating capital by means of seeds as merchandise is such that they have been acquired by transnational petrochemical and pharmaceutical companies that have important interests in agricultural chemicals and that are highly committed to biotechnology sales in the food industry sector (Kloppenburg, 1988). A corporate concentration process has been established that is doing away with hundreds of local companies and that has left seed production under the control of a handful of large transnational corporations (Mooney, 2002). According to the ETC Group (2008), the ten largest

The result of this technology is subject to commercial secrecy that means that hybrid seeds are a “proprietary” product. Farmers who use hybrid seeds must return to the market every year to obtain them; they only have value as a food (grain), not as a means of production (seed). The schism between grain and seed is an opportunity for accumulating capital and the seed, as a reproductive medium, becomes a merchandise. This will entail obtaining a legal context that institutionally protects the interests of seed companies with regard to the privileges over the obtaining and sales of the seeds. Furthermore, considering plants as objects that can be patented oﬀers seed companies opportunities for making greater proﬁts on the market. Genetic material is reassessed thanks to the technological investments (that translate into money and time), but this investment is not valued when it is done generation after genera-

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seed companies in the world represent 67% of the world market for patented seeds and the largest seed company in the world, Monsanto, alone represents 23% of this market; the three largest companies (Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta) represent 47% of the market, including 65%of the corn seed market and more than half of the patented soya seed market. It is this concentration, linked to the introduction of intellectual property rights, that can result in the excessively high prices of agricultural supplies (UN, 2009). The oligopolistic structure of the market supply means that people without economic resources who are involved in agriculture can be prevented from having access to productive resources such as seeds, making them less aﬀordable for the poorest populations (ibidem). The creation of a commercial seed production sector alongside farms and, more recently the creation of a biotechnology sector has meant that there has been a rise in the demand from geneticists and biotechnology inventors for the protection of their rights. The intellectual property systems are coercive legal tools that use governments to regulate the economic beneﬁts derived from the use of genetic resources (Soriano, 2007). The TRIPS Agreements have obliged all the WTO’s member countries to implement and reinforce intellectual property rights on plant varieties, and places the rights of plant improvers above the rights of people who work in the agricultural sector (ibidem); the TRIPS Agreement demands that all WTO members should patent vegetal achievements, thus giving the owner of the rights a 20-year monopoly over any kind of use of the patented invention. People who sow patented seeds do not have any rights over these seeds. They are considered to possess a licence for a patented product and are often obliged to sign agreements in which they commit to not preserving, re-sowing or exchanging the seeds that they have bought from the patent holders (UN, 2009). Apart from the patents, there exist other forms of protection by ownership for seeds aimed at recognising

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VEGETABLES AND LEGUMES SALES, CHIMOIO MARKET, MOZAMBIQUE.

the rights of plant improvers. The context for these protections is the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, established by the International Union for the Protection of New Kinds of Plants (UPOV). This Convention protects the rights of the developer as long as the plant variety that has been produced is new, diﬀerent, homogenous and stable. Due to the requisite of homogeneity and stability, the Convention of the UPOV does not allow the protection of farmers’ varieties, which are intrinsically unstable and are in a state of permanent evolution. In view of this legal outlook and out of concern for the risk entailed by the appropriation of genetic resources without the consent of the agricultural sector and of the communities that have produced them, the international community has drafted two documents in order to preserve

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biodiversity: the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the ITPGRFA. In the case of the CBD the application of some of its points generates conflicts with the TRIPS Agreement, mainly those concerning the guarantee of the origin of the basic genetic base for the new plant variety, in other words, where this material comes from and the facilitation of information about the source and about how the requisites for the access to and distribution of the beneﬁts imposed upon the country of origin have been fulﬁlled.

a) the protection of traditional knowledge that is of interest for plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; b) the right to participate equitably in the distribution of the beneﬁts derived from the use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; and c) the right to participate in the adoption of decisions at national level concerning issues relating to the preservation and durable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.

The ITPGRFA creates a multilateral system to facilitate access to plant genetic resources and establishes an international fund for the distribution of benefits, which is a depository for part of the benefits generated by the sales of patentprotected seeds that have been developed from genetic material obtained via the multilateral system created by the Treaty itself. This way, it aims to share out the benefits derived from obtaining, selling and use of the seeds in a fair and equitable manner amongst the countries. It is the first international document that jointly appreciates and sets out the preservation efforts and the Farmer’s Rights (Article 9): “The Contracting Parties acknowledge the great contribution that has been made, and that continues to be made, by local and indigenous communities and farmers from all the regions of the world, particularly those in the places of origin and diversity of cultivated plants, for the conservation and the development of plant genetic resources that constitute the basis for food and agricultural production all over the world”. The Treaty encourages the protection and promotion of the Farmer’s Right, more specifically, as expressed in the Treaty:

Spain is one of the countries that have ratified the Treaty and this commits it to its fulfilment. Out of all the African countries that interest us in this study, only Mozambique is not linked in any way with the Treaty; Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, the D.R. of the Congo and Mauritania adhere to it and Madagascar, Mali, Senegal and Burkina Faso have ratified the Treaty. Although it has a nationally committing nature, the acceptance by the states of the value of plant genetic resources must be seen from an international and global viewpoint, in the same way as a multilateral Treaty is upheld. It is therefore crucial that this important step in the acknowledgement of the Farmer’s Rights should not be subjected to the immobility of national regulations and that its legal bond should be made effective. Without this commitment and responsibility on the part of the states (Spain as well as the states of SubSaharan Africa that concern us) farmers’ rights can be totally or partially restricted, once again leaving them without protection and opening up the possibility of not having access to some of the plant genetic resources that they have preserved and improved throughout history. Public policies have supported the expansion of commercial seeds by means of subsidies for supplies and the diffusion of selected seeds. On many occasions the only way for farmers to have access to a credit is to accept the whole technological package. Since the local and traditional

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varieties used by farmers in their seed systems are not included in the registers of authorised varieties, they are not often included in government seed distribution programmes. The end result is a progressive marginalisation or disappearance of local varieties that are replaced by high-output varieties. In view of all of this, it can be stated that international policies, legislation regulations and agreements and intellectual property rights have a greater influence than is acknowledged in the genetic degradation process and its consequences on rural agriculture and in FSov, endangering peoples’ Right to Food. It is therefore important to demand that farmers’ rights should not be a commercial issue and that they should not be addressed from the context of the WTO and that governments have the duty to develop legal contexts that guarantee the preservation of biodiversity, farmers’ rights and durable livelihoods. A few initiatives have attempted to halt this tendency. In 1988, the African Union Organisation approved a model Law on the protection of the rights of local communities, farmers and developers for the regulation of access to biological resources. This model law recovered the urgency of the debate and public participation in the regulation of access to biodiversity in order to

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ensure the continuation of Africa’s wellbeing as well as the preservation of its means of production and its biological wealth. This urgency is due to the fact that various forces in world trade are attempting to ensure their monopoly and control over African biodiversity, local knowledge and markets by means of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, which are intrinsically unfair (Ekpere, 2000). This model law acknowledges the Farmer’s Rights and includes, amongst other things, the protection of traditional knowledge linked to the genetic resources of plants and animals and the right to the preservation, use, exchange and sale of seeds and traditional propagation matter. The actions of Spain in foreign policy, foreign trade and IDE promotion issues in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa can be very harmful for national and local initiatives for the preservation of diversity and the genetic resources for food and agriculture. In the bilateral accords, like the TRIPS, priority is given to policies for the protection of intellectual property and the concessions for prospection, growing, extraction or exploitation of natural resources, without the speciﬁcation of a vision of respect and protection for the preservation of biodiversity and the Farmer’s Rights.

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Informal Seed Systems and their importance in achieving Food Sovereignty Informal seed circuits and networks are important sources of seeds for small-scale farmers, particularly in Africa. In the northern part of Mali, the local market is the main source of peanut seeds for people working in agriculture and their own production provides most of the seeds – more than 80% - of the main crops (sorghum, millet, sesame, okra) (Sperling et al, 2010). In Uganda, more and more farmers are obtaining bean seeds via these networks (David and Sperling, 1999). In periods of political instability (civil conflicts, for example) or in conditions of environmental stress (large periods of drought, floods, etc.), the informal seed networks and markets can be a key element for upholding plant genetic security. The markets oﬀer flexibility to farmers enabling them to choose crops and varieties immediately, responding to changes in economic conditions and production (McGuire and Sperling, 2008). Specialised seed markets have also been identiﬁed; in the Douentza area in Mali, a group of villages produces a variety of medium-maturity millet that is adapted to the more arid parts of the region (Sperling et al, 2010). This specialisation ensures the security of the seeds, particularly during times of crisis. The maintenance of the local informal networks and markets is a basic premise for the conservation of native and traditional varieties. These informal systems for the circulation of seeds could be threatened by the disappearance of family and small-scale agriculture – a key source of seeds – due to the fact that it is displaced by the progression of industrial agriculture. Other threats are the marketing of industrially improved varieties and humanitarian aid. The mass distribution of commercial varieties by means of humanitarian aid systems and emergency seed assistance can be a motive for the collapse of these informal systems. The correct functioning of these seed systems can

become an encouragement for the introduction of genetically improved or manipulated varieties within the farming communities. Farmers’ movements are not ignorant of this problem and their rhetoric and practices includes the reassessment and recovery of local varieties. In 2003, Senegalese farmers came together and decided to create the Senegalese Association of Rural Seed Producers (ASPSP in its French acronym), in order to defend, valuate and distribute rural seeds of local varieties, being aware of the great value of these resources for rural agriculture and FSov (CNOP, 2007). The members of this network produce local varieties and transmit their technical know-how for preservation and production to other people who work in agriculture. The organisation of biodiversity fairs enables the promotion of the exchange of seeds and know-how. These local and regional exchanges enable rural communities to recover varieties that had been lost in their areas.

CORN, MOZAMBIQUE.

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Genetic Sovereignty as a primordial element for Food Sovereignty Crop varieties and livestock breeds are an important component of the biological diversity of the agricultural ecosystem. Their presence and relative abundance has not been established spontaneously but instead require their introduction and upkeep by rural communities (Soriano, 2007). To do this, farmers have a degree of control over genetic resources that is greater than upon any other aspect of the agrarian system. The preservation and reproduction of genetic resources on estates is entirely in their hands. This means that their control is even more conditioned by economic and social factors than the rest of the agricultural ecosystem’s biological diversity (ibidem). Genetic diversity plays a critical role in the increase of durable production and nutritional diversity. Food production and, by extension, FS and FSov depend upon the preservation access and good use of agricultural biodiversity and of genetic resources. We have already seen that, with the loss of biodiversity in natural and agricultural systems there is a parallel loss of

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services in the ecosystems; not only is there the threat of the loss of food and raw materials such as ﬁbres, but also the loss of resistance to natural risks and environmental change (Nellemann et al, 2009). The degradation of agrodiversity and the loss of traditional varieties endanger the right to food. In areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where farmers who practice family and subsistence agriculture have limited access to markets, agricultural chemical packages are expensive, there is a lack of infrastructures for irrigation, a low availability of credit and dependence on a few multinational suppliers, the informal seed systems and the preservation, exchange and sale of native seeds are a guarantee of FS and FSov. It is therefore necessary to restore control and social management of genetic resources, applying adequate policies that are within the context of the Right to Food and FSov. In view of this threatening outlook in SubSaharan Africa of the preservation of genetic resources for food and agriculture that are basic and fundamental to ensure stable FSov for African populations, Spain must heed the commitments assumed by the signing and ratiﬁcation of the ITPGRFA with an international outlook aimed at not endangering the rights of farmers in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. It must acknowledge the rights of these farmers and encourage this recognition in its foreign policies by incorporating the preservation and durable use of plant genetic resources that ensure food for the populations within its bilateral and multilateral agreements. In any case it must avoid speculative activities and must avoid that corporate activities, whether linked to the farming and livestock sector or to other sectors restrict Farmers’ Rights and undermine the genetic heritage of the countries and their populations.

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The extraterritorial responsibility of the states and transnational companies as a transversal element of the threats to African food sovereignty One of the main concerns regarding the threats studied in this chapter lies in the lack of efficient means of protection for food sovereignty. Therefore the current situation is recuperating a concept that is not very recent but that has not yet been sufficiently developed to be effective: we are referring to the extraterritorial obligation or duty of the states regarding their actions and those of their citizens (including transnational companies) in third states. Until now the study has been limited to the perspective of human rights. As we shall see, this is due to the fact that its conceptual development comes fundamentally from international human rights agencies. Nonetheless, at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we believe that an analysis of the extraterritorial responsibility of states limited to a perspective of human rights is insufficient. In the organisation, we maintain that the debate about this concept should be opened up. We think that, due to the complexity and diversity of the factors involved (investments, international cooperation and trade, etc.), the debate should be taken up to a “political” level in order to address the real causes that make it possible to violate peoples’ food sovereignty. Without the existence of a context of Food Sovereignty it is impossible for the Right to Food to be fully and effectively exercised. This regulatory concept would naturally include the transnational companies under its jurisdiction and with the considerations that we will explain below. Let us see. Why do we consider the phenomena studied (land-grabbing, water-grabbing, agricultural investment, etc.) as “threats”? Simply because they can harm – and indeed do harm – food sovereignty and the human right to food.

This leads us to transfer the focus of the analysis onto the agents that are involved in this dynamic and that therefore become potential subjects of the violation of human and other rights. What happens is that globalisation and so-called “open regionalism” have blurred – or at least have changed – the traditional geographic boundaries and concept of “subjects of law” of the classic human rights protection mechanisms. In other words, the attribution of the responsibility for violations of rights and food sovereignty is not only that of the state in whose jurisdiction this occurs but instead makes it more and more necessary to consider new dynamics and subjects that are responsible for these violations: northern governments, intergovernmental organisations and transnational companies. With regard to the latter, it is not at all sufficient for them to commit to interpreting international law and voluntarily applying it as they see fit, but instead they must compulsorily submit to it, there must be a clear responsibility of the state in which these companies have their head office (extraterritorial responsibility) and that the right to food is violated when the food sovereignty of a population, region or country is violated. We are not situating transnational companies but states at the heart of rights-based legal petitions. As for the role of transnational companies, the data provided by the UNDP almost ten years ago is very revealing. They already warned that transnational companies can have massive effects o human rights: with their employment practices, their environmental impact, the support that they give to corrupt regimes or the policy changes that they defend. “The 200 largest companies control a quarter of the worlds production assets. Many transnational companies have incomes that vastly exceed the incomes of

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the governments of the countries in which they operate. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 29 of the 100 largest economic bodies in the world are transnational companies. Concentration has created enormous transnational companies that monopolise the food chain, from production, trade and creation, to sales and retail, which reduces the options of farmers and consumers. Just ten companies (amongst which are Aventis, Monsanto, Pioneer and Syngenta) control a third of the world seed market, which is worth 23,000 million US dollars and 80% of the world pesticide market, which is worth 28,000 million US dollars. Monsanto alone controls 91% of the world market for genetically modified seeds. Another ten companies, amongst which is Cargill, control 57% of the total sales of the main retailers in the world and its incomes represent 37% of the incomes received by the 100 main companies in the food and drinks sector. In South Africa, Monsanto controls the entire national market for genetically modified seeds, 60% of the hybrid corn market and 90% of the wheat market” 96. In short, the role played by companies is not a small one and, as we have been able to analyse in this chapter, it is clearly growing. On the other hand, there is no adequate regulatory context aimed at states and that defines and stakes out their responsibilities. What have been developed are some declarations and directives (that are unsatisfactory, as we shall see) that have been approved by intra-governmental organs that regulate the activities of transnational companies. The most important instruments in this sense are possibly the OECD Directives for multinational companies and the Tripartite Declaration of Principles on Multinational Companies and the Social Policy of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of 1997, that are applied to States and multinational companies. According to the WTO’s Tripartite Declaration, multinational companies “should respect the sovereign rights of states, observe the national regulations, duly take into account local practices and respect ap-

plicable international regulations”. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we nonetheless consider that a legal context for this issue would only be eﬃcient if it acknowledged the “state” as a subject of law. It is the states that allow and even promote the overseas activities of transnational companies. As the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, says, in his report of 9th February 2004, it is the states who should supervise and regulate the activities of their transnational companies in order to guarantee that they do not violate the right to food. This leads us to analyse the geographic limit of this responsibility, given that it is clearer that the measures adopted by a government can have a negative influence on the food sovereignty of people who live in other countries 97. The delimitation or extent of the extraterritorial responsibility of states has been one of the most important aspects of the evolution of their characterisation from the viewpoint of human rights. In the international governance spaces there is an important consensus regarding the fact that the private investors’ home states must regulate the behaviour of these investors overseas. Nonetheless, in order for it to be complete, this regulation should include three pillars: respecting, protecting and making good the right to food and, above all, food sovereignty. As we have already mentioned, this is a prior requisite for the right, not the other way round. We therefore consider that the development made by the Special Rapporteur upon this tripartite typology of extraterritorial duty is entirely applicable to our food sovereignty-based approach 98. In this way, the duty of “respect” entails a negative obligation that means that the governments must abstain from undertaking certain activities that have negative eﬀects upon the right to food (and Food Sovereignty as a prior condition to this right), whether these activities take place in their own countries or in third states. It also includes the duty to abstain from making certain decisions within international or regional organisations that could give rise to violations of

96 UNPD Human Development Report, 2002. 97 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 24th January 2005, E/CN.4/2005/47, paragraphs 39 and 40.

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the right to food and food sovereignty in other countries. The extraterritorial obligation to “protect” means that the states guarantee that third parties subjected to their jurisdiction (such as their own citizens or transnational companies) do not violate the right to food, and we therefore consider that they should protect the food sovereignty of the population living in other countries as a prior requisite to the execution of this right. With the growing monopolistic control exercised by transnational companies over all the links of the food chain, from production trade and processing, to sales and retail, as well as over most of the concessions for supplying water at a global level, it is more and more diﬃcult for the least powerful national governments to regulate the activities of transnational companies operating on their territory. Finally, governments also have the duty to “promote” the execution of the right to food (and therefore of food sovereignty) in their territory and also in other countries 99. We can therefore appreciate the considerable evolution that has been undergone by the creation of the concept of the extraterritorial responsibility of states, although there is still more to be done than has been done.

pects of extraterritorial responsibility (respect, protection and promotion) should not only cover, but go beyond the analysis focused on the right to food, extending to other areas that may affect Food Sovereignty such as cooperation, investment, trade, economic and association agreements, amongst others. The issue’s complexity and the factors that constitute it make it essential to put the focus of the debate on the political sphere that, of course, includes legal or judiciary dimensions. In other words it is essential to dispose of internationally and regionally binding legal instruments that regulate aspects that may have an impact upon food sovereignty. In this sense, the analysis of the threats to African food sovereignty conducted in this chapter demonstrates that any legal instrument that aims to stake out and acknowledge the extraterritorial duty and responsibility of states must, as well as being obligatory (and not merely voluntary), at least include the following issues: direct foreign investment, intellectual property, agri-

The ﬁrst discussions on the extraterritorial responsibility of states dealt with civil and political rights, despite the fact that these rights contain explicit territorial and jurisdictional limitations. Later, the debate focused on economic, social and cultural rights, more speciﬁcally upon the right to food. In this sense, not only a few international agencies but also several non-government organisations (such as FIAN and Amnesty International, amongst others) made important and valuable contributions to the debate. As we have already explained, at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we believe that the debate concerning the regulation of obligations and the three as-

LAND PROPERTY TITLE. UGANDA.

98 The extraterritorial duties of the states extend to cases in which they act as part of an international organisation (such as the United Nations or the European Union) in which they act collectively. In this sense, the Maastricht Directives on the Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) insists upon the importance that “…States should use their influence to ensure that th programmes and policies in which they participate do not give rise to violations”. 99 See the Report of the Spacial Rapporteur on the right to food, 24th January 2005, E/CN.4/2005/47, paragraphs 47 to 59.

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culture, trade, services and Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA). In short, the Spanish government, in international (FAO) and regional (in this case, the EU) spaces it takes part in, should encourage and promote the creation of binding legal tools of this nature. These instruments must recognise

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the extraterritorial duties and responsibilities of states to ensure that the citizens and companies of the signatory states, as well as third parties that are subject to their jurisdiction – including transnational companies – do not violate the right to food or threaten the food sovereignty of populations.

Conclusions With this report, which is the foundation of the “Aquí vive gente” (“People live here”) campaign, at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we proposed to contribute towards clarifying the difference that exists between the three concepts (the right to food, food security and food sovereignty), which are closely interrelated but that also have very different contents. Moreover, in the organisation we have analysed and express our concern regarding the political and legal tools as well as the areas in which the threat to African food sovereignty is evident. We believe that the three cases that we have developed in these pages illustrate a widespread and transversal problem in Africa: European and Spanish companies are grabbing the natural resources from African farming and fishing communities, who use them to produce the food they eat. These practices do not occur “just so”; as we have seen and demonstrated, they are generally promoted by European governments – including Spain – that promote in Africa a productive model that they do not want – or cannot – deploy in their own countries: a model that is environmentally harmful, that feeds part of the population by

leaving another part without food. At Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we are worried to observe that the Spanish government, by promoting its companies’ investments in Africa, is part of the problem of poverty and not part of its solution. Therefore, on the basis of this research, we have established a series of recommendations aimed at the Minister of the Environment and Rural and Maritime environment and to the European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development that, if they were to be fulfilled, would help to reverse the current situation. In particular, at Veterinarios Sin Fronteras we insist upon recovering a little-used – albeit far from new – concept that is transversal to the four threats to African food sovereignty identified in this research (land-grabbing, water-grabbing, agro-industrial production and genetic erosion): that of the extraterritorial responsibility of states for their actions or for those that their companies carry out in third countries. At the organisation, we demand that states should assume their legal duty, which is recognised by international tools, of fighting against poverty and preventing their companies from generating famine.

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Recommendations Veterinarios Sin Fronteras recommends:

For the world governance of food security: Veterinarios Sin Fronteras urges the Minister for the Environment and the Rural and Maritime Environment:

• To ensure that the countries that receive public sector funds by means of the world agriculture and food security programme should maintain a significant consultation with those that are the most affected by food security. One way of achieving this is to continue working with representatives of non-government organisations for the WPAFS but also to follow the structure of the Civil Society mechanism for the Committee on World Food Security that identifies important points for regions and constituencies and that gives a voice to those that are the worst hit by food insecurity. • Supporting the new CFS to ensure that it extends its potential as a central political organisation to the making of decisions on issues of food security within the system of the United Nations. This translates into ministerial participation (Ministry of the Environment and of the Rural and Marine Environment) in CFS-related processes, including the annual sessions and activity periods, as a member country and also as part of the European Union. The funding for the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) will support this transparent and inclusive potential of the CFS and will guarantee that the voice of those that are worst hit by food insecurity is heard.

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• At national level, creating a mechanism for the participation of civil society that ensures stable and continued communications between the government and the civil society organisations during the period between sessions of the CFS. Given the nature of the issues to be addressed, this mechanism should be articulated within the Ministry for the Environment and the Rural and Marine Environment. To avoid past mistakes, it is important to pay close attention to the structural causes of food insecurity and to work on them. Political negotiations and the solutions proposed to achieve food security mainly emphasise the increased production of food, whereas evidence indicates that the problems that hinder the achievement of food security are not the lack of food, but instead the issues of the distribution, market access, security and infrastructure (particularly the control of residues after the harvest).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Concerning the Principles and Directives for the Large-Scale Acquisition and Renting of Land 100 Veterinarios Sin Fronteras urges the Minister for the Environment and the Rural and Marine Environments, and the European Commissioner for Agriculture and the Rural Development of the European Union to:

• Declare a large-scale moratorium on land acquisition (rent and purchase) by private companies and foreign states due to the threat to local food security, as well as the problems of conflicts, eviction and displacement derived from large-scale land investment. • Guaranteeing that the CFS undertakes an open and inclusive debate on the kinds of investment that will support the agro-ecological production of food. Everything should be done to include all food producers, paying particular attention to the needs of young persons and women. • Requesting that the states fulﬁl the commitments taken in the ﬁnal Declaration of the CIRADR regarding the secure access to, and control of, land and natural resources by small-scale producers and suppliers of food, authentic agrarian reform and durable rural development policies.

• Demanding that the CFS should not approve the IAR because these principles are not sufficient to regulate private investments. Instead, what are needed are laws that can be applied at national and international level and public order regulations in all land-related investments, including the extraterritorial dispositions of the duties of the states to regulate companies and ensure that they take their responsibility for their operations overseas. • Urge the governments and the CFS to support the development of the FAO Directives for the tenure of land and natural resources, as well as the Series of minimum principles for agrarian investments of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food.

100 It should be pointed out that these recommendations are in keeping with those that were developed in the consultation with SCOs before the 36th CFS Meeting, which included members of the CPI, La Vía Campesina, the International council on Indian Treaties, FIAN, the Coalition of Asian Rural Women and PROPAC. These recommendations were presented to the CFS round table on land issues. 101 The recommendation is in keeping with FoodSovCap (the European Movement for food Sovereignty). The following organisations developed the European Declaration on foods that was signed by: Fe Africa Europa and network of justice (AEFJN) Be; Afrika Europa Netwekr, the Netherlands; Friends of the Earth Spain; ASEED Europe, the Nethelands; Asocaizione Rurale Italana, Italy; Attac Austria; ATTAC SPAIN, Spain; ATTAC France; the Autrian Platform for Food Sovereignty, Austria; COAG, Spain; the Eco Ruralis Association, Romania; the European Coordination Via Campesina, Europe; Comida y Agua Europa; Friends of the Earth, Cyprus; Friends of the Earth, Europe; FUEGA/Orgnisation of Belgian farmers, Be; GIET, Groupe International d’Etudes Transdisciplinaires, France; Vredeseilanden, Belgium; MIJARC, Europe; Nederlandse Melkveehouders Vakbond, the Netherlands; the Norwgian union of farmers and small producers, Norway; NOUSUD Espala, Spain; Supermacht, the Netherlands; Wervel, Be; XminY Fondo de Solidaridad, the Netherlands.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Concerning Food Sovereignty and the European Union Veterinarios Sin Fronteras urges the European Commissioner for Agriculture and the Rural Development of the European Union to:

• Promote within the FAO’s Food Security Council and within the General Direction of Agriculture and Development of the European Commission the launching of a legally binding international regulation that is necessary for the acknowledgement of the extraterritorial duties of the member states of the FAO and of the European Union in order to guarantee that their own citizens and companies, as well as third parties that are subjected to their jurisdiction, including transnational companies, do not violate the right to food of other countries. This regulation should guarantee that all policies, including foreign investment, Public Aid for Development, agriculture and trade preserve and strengthen the ability of African rural communities to produce their own food. • Guaranteeing that the Communiqué “A strategic context for the European Union to assist developing countries to confront problems derived from food security” (COM (2010) 127 final) is fully applied throughout all European policies and practices. • Undertaking the regulation of agricultural markets with tools such as the control of public offer and the control of imports of agricultural products, in order to guarantee that farmers have expenses covered and stable prices directly from the market, at the same time guaranteeing that food prices are affordable for consumers 101. Nonetheless, there should be mechanisms to ensure the equitable distribution of the quota and to avoid transfers of quotas or means to acquire quotas that would concentrate these in the richest exploitations.

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• Reducing the direct payments to the payment of the diﬀerence of the average community production costs and the main production costs of agricultural exploitations in the least favoured areas, as well as of important public assets provided by the farmers. • Continuing to work upon the harmonisation of development and aid policies in all the member states whilst at the same time supporting development projects launched by the same countries that involve a large participation of social agents and that apply pressure to obtain durable results. The reform of the CAP should pay careful attention to the repercussions in African agriculture and food security. • Continuing to support the World Food Security Committee as the main forum for discussion and the formulation of worldwide policies concerning food security. They should ensure that development policies should be adapted to and support the principles of food sovereignty. • In the domains that in which she is competent, and in which she exercises or should exercise Spanish representation, the Minister for the Environment and the Rural and Marine Environment should promote and encourage the fulﬁlment of the aforementioned recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Concerning ﬁshing Veterinarios Sin Fronteras urges the Minister for the Environment and the Rural and Marine Environment to:

• Revise the fulfilment of the agreements signed in fishing issues, respecting the renovation cycles of the fishing grounds, the distances established from the coast, etc. • Comply with the international commitments. Particularly: > Ratify the United nations Agreement on Fishing on the High Seas of 1995, as well as the application of chapter 17 of the Agenda 21 of the United Nations of 1992, referring to the preservation of seas and oceans as well as the rights of coastal communities and artisan fishing and the preeminence of the FAO as an international debating organ instead of the World Trade Organisation, the WTO.

Concerning Agricultural Investment Veterinarios Sin Fronteras urges the Minister for the Environment and the Rural and Marine Environment to:

• Carrying out Durability Impact Studies (DIS) on the actions undertaken by Spanish companies in the agrarian sector and by the investment projects controlled by means of the ICEX. These DIS should be aimed at the potential economic, social and environmental impacts of these investments. As ﬁr the methodology of the DIS, the so-called Copenhagen Model used in the reports commissioned by the Trade Delegate of the European Union in the context of the “Dialogues with Civil Society” could be used.

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