An Environment of Eviction: Investigating the Policy, Past, and Perspectives Behind Evictions in New Delhi

Authors

Nitya Prabhakar, College of Health and Human Sciences

Brendan Duffy, School Mechanical Engineering

New Delhi’s housing market has been dealing with a very serious issue: evictions of those residing in informal housing settlements. These evictions are carried out under the guise of being better of the community. This begs the question: Does the greater good of the community not include equitable access to residential land? How can the removal of a family from their home be framed as an act of public interest? [1] Evictions occur in New Delhi for a multitude of reasons including policies, acts, and upper-versus-lower-class attitudes regarding housing for the poor.

Number of JJs in Each Cluster in 2014

DUSIB. http://mitdisplacement.org/delhi-1.

Looking at the current issues with eviction in India requires stepping back and understanding the recent state of the world. India and the rest of the world have been dealing with the aftermath of a global pandemic, and India’s housing crisis was hit hard by COVID-19. Many low-income families were forced out of their homes and had their settlements demolished with a lack of resettlement options. But eviction issues have predated the pandemic; forced evictions have occurred between 2000 and 2010 in many of the city’s low-income areas.

This was the primary explanation for the 25% decrease in the population of New Delhi’s two central districts. [2] Legal cases have also shaped the current political situation regarding housing; in the Industries Case of 1996, relocated hazardous industries to the outskirts of the city became legally synonymous with moving the poor out of the city center.​[3] In the 2002 case of Almitra Patel vs the Union of India, the court remarked that New Delhi should be the showpiece of India, essentially saying that aesthetics are valued over people. [4] There was also the case of Hemraj vs the Commissioner of Police and Others​in 2006, where the Delhi High Court ordered the demolition of Nangla Maachi, which housed 15,000 people, but was deemed illegal encroachment (unauthorized occupation)​. [5] Lastly, in Okhla Factory Owners Vs. Government of the NCT of Delhi,​ the court refused to hold the executive responsible for its failure to provide low-income housing starting in the 2000s, thus eroding the right to settlement​. [6]

In addition to this, New Delhi’s population has grown at the fastest rate among cities in India. A study published in 2003 estimated the population of New Delhi was projected to be around 27 million by 2021. [7] In actuality, New Delhi’s population in 2021 was 31,181,000 people. [8] In the 2003 study, 27 million seemed daunting from an urban viewpoint. The combination of a rapid population increases and socio-economic changes have created a shortage in housing, especially for the poor and low-income households. Almost half of New Delhi’s population lives in conditions of poverty. [9] In terms of housing, this means that they are crammed into overcrowded slums and hutments. These slums are forms of informal housing, the other types of housing are traditional and formal housing. The formal housing delivery systems used in New Delhi can be split into four stages. The first of these stages is planning; this includes plan preparation by the Delhi Development Authority, a subset of the Ministry of Housing serving as the preeminent authority on matters of urban development. [10] The land assembly stage follows this and consists of land acquisition, payment to landowners, and finance to agencies. Under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the New Delhi government is required to acquire the land before passing it over to the Delhi Development Authority. [11] The role of this agency is to create availability for development. Implementation is the third stage, which is composed of land development and housing construction. The responsibility of land development and housing construction falls upon the government and various sectors: public, private, and cooperative. In this stage, off-site development is done by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, whereas on-site development is handled by the Delhi Development Authority. [13] The final stage in formal housing is disposal. Housing disposal is also handled by the government; this is the least developed part of the formal housing system. The only agencies which provide individual loans are the Housing Development Finance Corporation, and the National Housing Bank. The rate of interest on these loans has been extremely high (16% in 1998); however, the situation is looking up, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. [13]

Predating the pandemic, there were three other back-to-back disruptions: demonetization, RERA, and GST. [14] The RERA stands for the Real Estate Regulatory Authority which functions under the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act of 2016. [15] While there has been a hike in interest rates recently, the increase is relatively short-term and matches the demand for housing at the times of increase. The informal housing system is in stark contrast to the rigid, governmental nature of formal housing. Informal housing can be defined as squatter settlements, quasi-legal settlements, and unauthorized colonies or community-based subdivisions​. These have evolved out of the traditional developments of the old city and rural settlements (known as urban villages in Delhi). [16] The majority of the economically underprivileged population lives in informal housing that is unprotected by law. The strict expenses correlated with formal housing make it hard to access, and the unprotected nature of informal housing in the face of governmental policy creates high levels of situational insecurity.

To understand this “situational insecurity” of informal settlements is to understand the city’s history of housing and eviction policy. This begins with the Master Plan of 1962, a proposal instituted by the Delhi Development Authority for the “large-scale acquisition and development of land” that “focused on thinning the densities within the old city” to maximize land use while conserving the beauty and sanitation of New Delhi’s center. As a result of this edict, the denizens of New Delhi’s central districts were distributed throughout six “ring towns” along the city’s peripheries. [17] However, such relocations only applied to “authorized colonies”; communities that did not meet the DDA’s economic and environmental approvals were not recognized as components of the city. Ergo, unauthorized persons were evicted from their homes and forcibly relocated out of the newly-sorted New Delhi. Further from the business districts than ring-town citizens and without formal recognition from their government, these individuals were forced further into poverty and their informal housing situations became slums. Consequently, the number of slums grew from approximately 110 to 1,797 in the six decades following the Master Plan. [18] In essence, the Master Plan “created illegality where it did not exist” and only stimulated the development of slums. [19]

The DDA’s failure to accommodate those evicted through the Master Plan reflects an anti-slum bias that exists to this day. Following a boom in the real estate sector at the turn of the century, a “Master Plan 2001” was formulated to mitigate slum expansion as populations exploded. [20] Yet the DDA’s ambitions could not compete with the city’s growth; “by the late 90s, the city’s population increased by 3.4 million people, well beyond MPD (Master Plan Delhi) demographic projections”. [21] Yet rather than adjusting Master Plan policy, the DDA refused to acknowledge certain low-income groups as legitimate citizens, forcing them beyond MPD-defined areas. As such, the quantity of slums grew exponentially. Exacerbating the problem was the DDA’s subsequent refusal to admit these individuals as construction workers due to their illicit residences. Such a failure to recognize that urban improvement “could only be realized by the labor of large numbers of the working poor, for whom no provision has been made” significantly hindered the DDA’s efforts. [22] Ignorance of the poor persisted in the Master Plan 2021, with politicians such as the administrator statesmen Jagmohan claiming that “no document was bad but they were all marred in their implementation”. [23] Indeed, New Delhi’s Master Plans promised equal housing rights; however, authorities’ refusal to collaborate with the evicted stalled this effort and prompted the spread of slums. Worse, it has reinforced an ideological barrier between what New Delhi’s rich and poor envision of an improved national capital.

As aforementioned, the upper-class-driven reformation that was the Master Plans only factored in what politicians wanted, not what citizens needed. The resulting disparities between the ideals of electors and their electorates create contrasting “Upper” and “Lower” perspectives, respectively, of urban housing and development. “Upper” perspectives are those held by politicians, governing bodies, and individuals with the adequate resources to constitute an upper socioeconomic class. Conversely, “Lower” perspectives include the opinions and ambitions of slum-dwellers and other lower-class individuals who may not receive adequate political representation. When these perspectives clash, the development of slums and worsening of conditions therein are only propagated. Evictions and their related impacts due to these “Upper” versus “Lower” outlooks can be explored along three avenues: the beatification of public areas, mitigation of pollution, and centralization of governmental districts.

A major tenet of the Master Plans is that the “beautiful city and its pleasing architecture . . . should pervade the design of all public buildings”. [24] This “Upper” notion is not unfounded, as clean, sanitary, and aesthetically pleasing urban areas encourage the higher quality of life and sophistication expected of a national capital. However, when viewed from a “Lower” perspective, these endeavors are merely efforts to evict encroachers from public places. For instance, on January 30th, 1995, enraged house owners and police beat and killed an 18-year-old slum-dweller named Dilip for defecating in an Ashok Vihar colony public park. Open defecation is strictly prohibited in New Delhi, yet Dilip’s slum of 10,000 evicted households only shared 24 public toilets, one per 417 people. [25] Dilip’s actions were thus out of a necessity entirely disregarded by the DDA. Rather than constructing more latrines, the Authority leveraged funding from high-class neighborhoods near the park to build a wall barricading Dilip’s slum. [26] While this reflects the “Upper” outlook of cleaning the park by barricading the poor out, the “Lower” are left without fundamental access to defecation. The DDA’s efforts in Ashok Vihar parallel broader efforts by politicians to clean up public areas by ostracizing the poor. Thus, the “Upper” solution of building a barricade violates the “Lower” need for adequate latrines, dirtying slums and public areas alike.

Another means by which the DDA has ventured to “clean” New Delhi is by replacing slums with high-income housing along the city’s natural resources, especially rivers. The “Upper” mentality behind such actions is that slums are contaminated and propagate the pollution of major rivers like the Beas Sutlej, Ganges, and Yamuna. In fact, the opposing “Lower” mentality is true; “the poor don’t pollute to the degree claimed simply because they cannot”. [27] A study conducted by Jawaharlal Nehru University researchers Sreoshi Gupta and Sourabh Ghosh evidenced that most slum dwellers only consume 16-18 liters of water per person whilst the middle and rich class use as much as 450 liters per person. [28] As access to resources increases, so does the capacity to pollute. Thus, instead of the poor contaminating the rich, it is actually the rich who are contaminating the poor. Evicting slum-dwellers only intensifies safety hazards, as many are relocated downstream where the effects of pollution are compounded. On March 3rd, 2003, the Delhi High Court mandated the eviction of many unauthorized structures on the Yamuna yet permitted “recognized” residences to remain. [29]Over 200,000 people were evicted downstream without any means of equitable resettlement. [30] By 2010, pollution from highincome housing on the Yamuna generated floods in 50% of the khadir, land immediately adjacent to the river. [31] The thousands of slum-dwellers who illegally relocated downstream were thus exposed to floods of highly-polluted water. Again, the discrepancies between “Upper” and “Lower” perspectives have caused widespread pollution and a loss of living quality, highlighting a cause for change.

Thirdly, the Master Plan’s prioritization of government infrastructure in the central district has had disastrous impacts on the urban poor. This is also due to “Upper” perspectives that lower-class individuals can simply be relocated without regard for their future circumstances. This is evident in the forcible eviction of 40 women and 60 children from the Palika Hostel on October 16th, 2004. Under the pretense that the hostel premises were needed to build living quarters for its employees, the New Delhi Municipal Council “violently assaulted several women occupants and . . . threw all the food, utensils, blankets, and other belongings of the homeless women on to the street”. [32] When questioned about where the evicted would be relocated, the NDMC responded that “‘social work’ is not its responsibility” and suggested that the women move to the Nirmal Chaya shelter. [33] Not only is Nirmal Chaya distant from the women’s areas of employment around the Palika Hostel, but the distant shelter does not cater to children.

NDMC’s eviction and lack of applicable housing for the evicted women and children underline the lack of consideration that New Delhi’s authorities give to their lower class. While an “Upper” perspective sees the Palika eviction as a necessary move towards better reorganizing government structures, a “Lower” perspective sees a loss of living space and livelihood. New Delhi’s poor cannot simply be relocated to produce more space in central, governmental districts. If individuals are to be evicted, ensuring an appropriate rehabilitation location and guaranteeing jobs in the region will fulfill housing goals more sufficiently than disregarding the poor.

Despite the DDA’s intentions to improve housing by beautifying public areas, mitigating river pollution, and prioritizing central districts for government purposes, they have consistently undermined and ignored the voice of the lower class. As a result, the poor are forced further into poverty and slums become evermore horrid. While the hundreds of thousands of evictions into “unauthorized” communities remain a colossal ethics concern, contemporary measures are being made to safeguard housing rights. Following the Palika Hostel evictions, the Housing and Land Rights Network (HIC-HLRN) issued an Urgent Action Appeal on the basis that the NDMC violated the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. [34] This caught the attention of UN Special Rapporteur Miloon Kothari, who stated that the evictions had indeed violated the women and children’s international right "to adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living”. [35] Involving the UN into what was a municipal matter hitherto helped sway “Upper” perspectives to meet “Lower” necessities; on March 20th, the Delhi High Court ruled that “forced and unannounced evictions of slum dwellers without consultations on resettlement plans are illegal”. [36] Thus, the political climate on New Delhi evictions can be altered through the involvement of national and global governing bodies. Changing municipal authorities’ stance on lower-class citizens is the first stepping stone on the path to reformed urban development. Subsequent Master Plans, notably the Master Plan of 2041, are currently under debate; the time is now to shift political perceptions on New Delhi residents and ensure everyone has the fundamental right to housing. Time and again it is made obvious that forced eviction never truly serves any moral purpose.

The overwhelming number of evictions in New Delhi express that the city’s governmental and social landscape must be altered to accommodate all citizens rather than remove them for not fitting a narrative. Reducing evictions and providing for those affected by them is not just an issue of administration but of attitude. When “Upper” level intentions coincide with “Lower” level needs and circumstances, direct, proactive steps can be taken to provide adequate housing for all citizens alike. Doing so not only compensates for population growth, but promotes urban beauty, pollution reduction, and appropriate living situations. As a global city, it is paramount for New Delhi to transform its environment of eviction and set a worldwide precedent for equitable housing.

REFERENCES

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