The London Olympic Stadium by waheedarasool

Property Development Processes UP51005 Waheeda Hanaa Rasool 150024858

LONDON 2012

OLYMPIC STADIUM A CRITICAL EVALUATION

contents

Executive Summary

Acronyms Figures Development timeline

1. Introduction 1.1 Project Background 1.2 What is a Mega-project? 1.3 Project Description - London Olympic Stadium as a mega-project 1.4 Structure of the Report

2. Critical Evaluation 2.1 Developing a critical framework 2.2 Front- End Planning 2.3 The bid process & Feasibility 2.4 Legacy Goals 2.5 Stakeholder Roles & Engagement 2.6 Benefits & Needs 2.7 Project Governance 2.8 Site Appraisal - the need to regenerate 2.9 Land Acquisition - CPO 2.10 Project Funding 2.11 Budget

3. Risk

16 18 19 20 21 22 24 26 28 29 30 31

Appendix

12 13 14 15

4. Evaluation of Legacy

5.1 Conclusion

Residual Valuation (Hodge, 2012)

34 35 36 38

5. Conclusion

‘It must not become a white elephant’

3.1 Risk Considerations 3.2 Endogenous Risks 3.3 Exogenous Risks 3.4 Risk Management

4.1 Legacy through sustainable design 4.2 Impacts against Legacy goals 4.3 Evaluation against framework

Figure 01, Night time view of Olympic stadium ( Andrew Weber-USA TODAY Sports via US PRESSWIRE, nd)

Bibliography & References

44 46 48

50 52

56 56

Executive Summary The Olympic stadium, now known as the London Stadium, is London 2012’s flagship which plays a significant role in the regeneration of East London to ‘serve as the heart of the local community’ (3bit.co.uk, 2020). Pushing the boundary of traditional stadium materials, the projects vision of legacy is celebrated by its sustainable temporary design approach. After the white elephants of Webley stadium and the Dome, the stadium possesses global significance, continually hosting spectacular global events to exploit its legacy. Whilst it has been praised for early completion due to successful project management, it has gained a substantial amount of negative press post Games’ as the OPLC decision in 2011 caused seismic implications to the legacy of the stadium, questioning the sustainability of the temporary design. This report is a critical appraisal using the London 2012, Olympic stadium as a case study, evaluating different elements of the property development process to determine the projects efforts towards a legacy. An examination is undertaken through an appropriate critical framework developed from publications on mega projects, property development process and risk management from the reflections of Bent Flyvbjerg, Gillian Evans, Richard Reed & Sally Evans. After attempting to evaluate the stadiums development process it established that the front-end planning drove the stadium towards a successful delivery. It ensured that each stage of the development process considered the London legacy goals with feasibility studies undertaken before and after the bid process identifying potential costs and turbulences that may be encountered, such as land acquisition, land contamination and safety and security. Likewise, although minor issues were faced within the governance, the overall governance structure was robust permitting guidance to players, allowing efficient collaboration between stakeholders and instilled regular progress reports.

Figure 02, Olympic stadium near completion( Paul Robert Lloyd nd)

Building the Olympic Park on time and within budget has proved again that Britain can stand comparison with the very best when it comes to delivering major construction projects. (Hone, nd, p.33)

Upon evaluating several factors against the critical framework, the Stadium is concluded to be an overall success as it did not become another white elephant, an exemplary example to future stadiums and the property development process.

Acronyms

Figures

Figure 01, Night time view of Olympic stadium ( Andrew Weber-USA TODAY Sports via US PRESSWIRE, nd)

BOA

British Olympic Association

CLM

CH2M Hill, Laing O'Rourke and Mace (consortium)

CPO

Compulsory Purchase Order

DCMS

Department for Culture, Media and Sport

Figure 06, The Olympic stadium hosting an event (Skyscrapercity, Astroboint , nd)

FEP

Front-end Planning

Figure 07, Model of Olympic stadium design with designer architect Rod Sheard (Evening Standard, 2012)

GDP

Gross domestic product

GLA

Greater London Authority

Figure 10, Legacy themes, goals and promises which the Games’ were based upon (by author)

GOE

Government Olympic Executive

Figure 11, Olympic Stadium stakeholders, roles and responsibilities (by author)

IOC

International Olympic Committee

LDA

London Development Agency

LLDC

London Legacy Development Corporation

LOCOG

London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games

Figure 16, Funding for the Olympic Games’ (by author)

ODA

Olympic Delivery Authority

Figure 17, Budget for the ODA (by author)

OPLC

Olympic Park Legacy Company

OSSRA

Open Source Security and Risk Analysis

Figure 20, Armed Police at Olympic Games (AP Photo/Matt Dunham, nd)

PSFP

Public Sector Funding Package

Figure 21, ODA Risk Management policy - Three tier line of defense (by author)

QRA

Quantitative Risk Analysis

ROI

Return of investment

SDS

Sustainability Development Strategy

SPoC

Single points of contact

THS

Tottenham Hotspur

TfL

Transport for London environment Agency

WHU

West Ham United

Figure 02, Olympic stadium near completion( Paul Robert Lloyd nd) Figure 03, Location map of Olympic Park Plan 2012 stitched image by author (mla+& David Basulto ,nd) Figure 04, Satellite of Olympic stadium development in East London (GeoEye, nd) Figure 05, The Olympic Park with Canary Wharf financial district in background (Jeff J Mitchell, nd)

Figure 08, Front End Planning process diagram (by author) Figure 09, Lord Coe with IOC president Jacques Rogge after winning bid (home.bt.com, 2005)

Figure 12, Stakeholder benefits and needs from the development of the Stadium (by author) Figure 13, London Olympics Governance structure (by author) Figure 13a, ODA Governance framework drawn by author (Moore, Stephens,2007,pg 27) Figure 14, 2006 aerial image of East London site (dailymail, 2012) Figure 15, November 2008 base of stadium construction (AP, 2012)

Figure 18, steelwork construction on stadium (tcbolts, nd) Figure 19, Demolition and remediation works on Olympic site (DEME, nd)

Figure 23, Risk Management Process, from Mega-projects and Risk, Bent Flyvbjerg (by author) Figure 24, Authors adapted Risk Management Process for Olympic Stadium (by author) Figure 25, Olympic Stadium transformation (Populous, nd) Figure 26, Olympic Stadium axonometric showing its adaptable design (Populous, nd) Figure 27, Olympic Stadium environmental legacy (by author) Figure 28, Legacy evaluation matrix (by author) Figure 29, Framework evaluation matrix (by author) Figure 30, Post Games’ London Stadium with West Ham United as tenants (London Stadium, 2018) Figure 31, London Stadium and Olympic Park this year (Frank Da Silva, 2020) Figure 32, London Stadium with new roof structure to cover more people seated (2012imagelibrary, 2019)

Development Timeline February ODA confirm that no football will not be considered as anchor tenants ODA decide to proceed with initial design making it difficult to convert into a football stadium March ODA recieve Strategic Outline Case approval from the Olympic board

15 December BOA deliver report to DMCS, GLA, mayor or London & minister for Sport suggesting that London can present technically viable bid

1997

2000

BOA Initial feasibility study to asses viability for the Olympic Games’ in London

July 6th, 12.46pm London wins bid to host 2012 Olympic Games’

2004

2005

January Olympic Games’ Bid commenced November London candidate file submitted to IOC

2006

All land acquisition obtained with remaining through CPO

August Bidding process for post games’

August Approval of stadium construction

November THS and WHU shortlisted

7th November Stadium designs released by Populous (HOK Sport)

11th February WHU win the bid against THS to occupy stadium Post Games’. Decision by OPLC approved by Mayor of London

OPLC established

2007

June ODA decided to downsize stadium to multi-use arena Post Games’

LOCOG selects Sir Robert Mcalpine and Populous for the Design and Build contract for stadium

2008

2009

2010

1st May

Stadium construction begins

in Stratford, 3 months earlier than expected

2011

March

Stadium completed under budget and in time

for test events and official Games’

27th May 3 day visit form the IOC to assess progress

ODA established by the London Olympic Games & Paralympic Games Act

5th May

Stadium officially opened 27th July Olympics opening ceremony 12th August Olympics closing ceremony November LLDC reveal stadium will not meet reopening deadline of 2014

2012

2013

Conversion cost estimated to increase by £15m existing structure needed strengthening to support new roof

Held : 2017 IAAF World Championships 2017 World Para Athletics championships

October LLDC contribute £35.9m for completion

2014

2015

2016

Offical grant of a 99 year tenancy for WHU announced

June construction completed final cost £323m

August Conversion construction begins

October tender for new seating contractor

Balfour Beatty as contractor for changes such as roof, seating, corporate areas, concessions

2017

2018 2019 2020

2018 Held several concerts including JAY - Z & Beyonce 2019 £250,000 claret coloured pitch surround installed 2020 West Ham announce planned alterations new lower tier stands

£15m contribution from WHU £40m funded by Newham council

FRONT-END PLANNING PROCESS

DESIGN DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION PHASE OPEN FOR GAMES’ POST DEVELOPMENT

Figure 03, Location map of Olympic Park Plan 2012 stitched image by author (mla+& David Basulto ,nd)

Westfield Shopping Mall Westfield Station

London Olympic Stadium

1.0

introduction

West Ham Station

Victoria Park

1.1

project background

the olympics

Sport is essential to humanity, and ever since the second world war, the nature of sport has become a catalyst to facilitate civil renewal and social capitalism to solve delinquency and improve the quality of life. Thus, the role of sport has caused planners and politicians to believe that mega-projects like the Olympics act as tools which allow for urban regeneration (Azzali 2017; Malfas et al. 2004). It has become less about the city hosting the Olympics but rather how the mega-project can trigger urban regeneration in the city. The Olympic urbanism movement was first seen in Rome hosting the 1960 Olympics, but the 1992 Barcelona Olympics was seen to use the Games’ to regenerate the urban fabric. Thus, one can assume that London 2012 was built on Barcelona’s prophecy as central government, London council and former mayor Kevin Livingstone saw this as an opportunity to drive regeneration & tourism conversely, the BOA and LOCOG endeavoured to create a mega-project that celebrated sport and collectivity. London 2012 was a private/public initiative, led by four major public funding committees, with the largest investment from the UK Central government and the National Lottery comprising a £9.325 billion funding package. Officially completing in July of 2011, staying within budget, and only costing £8.77billion covering 246 hectares, the project was seen to fully exploit the economic opportunities during the recovery of the 2008 recession allowing the economy to emerge by 1% GDP.

Figure 04, Satellite of Olympic stadium development in East London (GeoEye, nd)

1.2

what is a mega-project?

According to the economic geographer Bent Flyvbjerg,’mega-projects are large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost $1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people’(Flyvbjerg, 2014). He further identifies that ‘every country, and pair of neighbouring countries, is in the business of promoting this new animal’ (Flyvbjerg, 2003, pg. 1). Endeavouring to gain global economic visibility whilst responding to the urban realm, the rise in the number of mega-projects has been exponential. It is estimated by Thomas Frey that it will make up 24% of global GDP within the next 10 years, ultimately changing the structure of our society. Successful projects such as the £18.6 billion London Heathrow expansion and the £15 billion Crossrail project have redefined cities within Britain, changing the relationship between the society and the built environment. Additionally, the outlined examples share qualities of high investment, vast scope, long durations, and a significant level of socio-political, economic, and environmental prosperity. However, due to the high level of uncertainty and complexity, many mega-projects are renowned to be unforgettable disasters as they become expensive ‘white elephants’ like the notorious London Millennium Dome and Wembley stadium; the humiliation of the mega-venture are ‘languishing at taxpayers expense’ (Evans,2016, pg. 33). Consequently, it becomes fundamental to understand the attributes of a successful mega-project and its consequences on the society.

1.3

project description

London Olympic Stadium as a mega-project

Sitting south within the diamond shaped mixed use ‘Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park’ in Stratford, East London, the £486 million Olympic stadium is the most symbolic sporting venue within the Park, conducting track and field events as well as the illustrious opening and closing ceremony for the Olympics. Embodied by two existing waterways, the stadium sits impressively on and ‘island’ which reflects the nature of its surrounding environment: megalithic objects including the Aquatic Centre and the Orbit sculpture. The clients (ODA) selected architectural firms by conducting a competition, Populous were the appointed architects for the design of the 108,500 m2 Olympic stadium led by chief architect Philip Johnson. With a vision of converting this into the ‘home for British athletics’ (Crockford, 2015, para. 1), the brief, carried out by the ODA comprised two parts:

1.4

structure of the report

The report will cover themes that will support the assessment of the Olympics stadiums success. Section two will cover the critical framework and a review of the front-end planning process. Followed by risk considerations and management discussed in section three. This will lead into the evaluation of legacy and impacts in chapter 4 which evaluates the subjects discussed from section two. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn to determine the legacy of the stadium within a mixed-use project.

Figure 05, The Olympic Park with Canary Wharf financial district in background (Jeff J Mitchell, nd)

1. A seating capacity of 80,000 for the Games’ 2. Flexibility to become a smaller venue with a capacity of 25,000 Hence, establishing the ethos of

‘embracing the temporary’

(Populous, n.d.)

to reflect the legacy dream allowed the transitory design of the stadium to suit the changing conditions of London. A demountable simple structure challenged the concept of building permanence and the common white elephants of sport-let mega-projects, it has created Archigrams vision of ephemeral urbanism. Within the park, the stadium alone has outlined characteristics of a behemothic megaproject, a field size of 105 by 68 meters, 80,000 seating capacity, a 400 seat-restaurant, several VIP lounges, changing rooms complimented by a pod village around the stadium. Its dominance not only within the Park but within the London skyline exemplifies its status, whilst the investment into landscaping has drowned the stadium, signifying that buildings stand only as good as the environment neighbouring them, a quality which mega projects recognise.

Figure 06, The Olympic stadium hosting an event (Skyscrapercity, Astroboint , nd)

2.0

critical evaluation

2.1

2.2

developing a critical framework

what is front-end planning?

FEASIBILITY

CONCEPT

• Front–End Planning • The Bid & Feasibility • Legacy Goals • Stakeholders, Roles & Engagement • Needs & Benefits • Governance • Sit Appraisal • Securing Land • Funding • Budget • Risk Management • Project Impacts

DETAILED SCOPE

DESIGN Figure 07, Model of Olympic stadium design with designer architect Rod Sheard (Evening Standard, 2012)

FRONT-END PLANNING PROCESS

Success is frequently intangible and subjective depending on each stakeholder’s perspective. However, success can also be quantified through traditional methods. As a result, both perspectives greatly influence the perception of project performance. Based upon readings from Association For Project Management and (Lessard & Miller, 2000) a critical framework is established to appraise the success or failure of the Olympic stadium, outlining the key elements that contributed towards a legacy, vital to the British economy:

front-end planning

The front-end planning process is the most critical stage of a project. To some extent, this is what determines the ‘long term’ success as the process addresses several factors such as the scope & justification of the project, stakeholders, finance, governance, risk factors & unforeseen circumstances. These factors provide context for the project and allows for a clear strategy to be outlined before procurement, construction, commission and handing over the completed project which also contribute to success. Mega projects repeatedly,

‘fail to satisfy their objectives in material respects – sometimes with very serious social and economic consequences’ (Hansford, 2020, para.15),

this is often due to weaknesses within the FEP process, hence an effective and robust strategy is pertinent to overcome challenges that may be faced. Although there are high up-front costs, it should be deemed as an investment as opposed to a cost (Hwang & Ho, 2012; Lucae et al., 2014). The framework identified in 2.1 will be used to evaluate the FEP process.

CONSTRUCTION

OPERATION

Figure 08, Front End Planning process diagram (by author)

2.3

2.4

the bid process & feasibility

legacy goals

The development of the London 2012 Olympics has been one of the greatest mega-projects in the UK. The bid to host the Olympics dates to 1997 when the BOA commissioned a feasibility study and later placed bids for Birmingham and Manchester to host the Games’. After failing, the ambition arose again in 2000, the BOA recognised that hosting the Games’ in the capital city could potentially result in a win. The IOC recognised that London was the only viable city to host the mega-event in Britain.

Olympic parks and sports facilities often become humiliating white elephants which London had already experienced. From the outset a comprehensive legacy plan was implemented a vital element in the bid, informing the development of the Games’. The government explained that the ‘legacy’ ‘refers to the imprint they will leave. It is therefore not just what happens after the Games, but what we do before and during them to inspire individuals and organizations to strive for their best’ (DMCS, 2008, pg. 8).

In 2003, the bidding process began with Keith Mills and Barbara Cassani appointed to produce the ‘Bid Book’ detailing the master plan and viability of the Olympic Games which was achieved through feasibility studies. This was crucial to instigate regeneration, tourism, social cohesion and increase economy. Consequently, on 6th July 2005 London was chosen to hold the sporting event for the third time in history to conduct the first ‘Green Games’. Thereafter, the LDA conducted a feasibility for the stadium & consultations with community groups, ultimately ensuring that the stadium was viable to all stakeholders.

Therefore, the following promises were central to the Olympic development. Identifying legacy goals within the initial planning allowed all stakeholders involved including the ODA to consider the goals at every stage of the stadium development monitored by annual Legacy Action Plan reporting to achieve aspirations of a legacy.

Figure 10, Legacy themes, goals and promises which the Games’ were based upon (by author)

Figure 09, Lord Coe with IOC president Jacques Rogge after winning bid (home.bt.com, 2005)

Regeneration Framework Provide homes for all

Theme

Place & Environment

Create a coherent and attractive city within a city region

Legacy promises To transform the heart of East London To make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living

Economy & Skills

To inspire a generation of young people

Reduce crime rates and anti-social behaviour

Social & Community

To demonstrate that the UK is a creative, inclusive, and welcoming place to live in, to visit and for business.

Maximise sport legacy and increase participation

Sport & Health

To make the UK a world-leading sporting nation

Improve educational attainment, skills and raise aspirations Reduce unemployment, benefit dependency and child poverty

Enhance health and well being

2.5

stakeholders, roles & engagement

Stakeholders are individuals or organisations that are invested and are affected by the project or can strongly influence the outcome. Within the Stadium the internal stakeholders were the investors like Exchequer & organisations such as the LOCOG and the GLA, who had a strong engagement within the project. External stakeholders were the visitors of the stadium, suppliers and local communities in the East End but often had short-term horizons. Consequently, level of engagement differs between stakeholders. Stakeholder engagement was fundamental to the success of the project. As there were numerous stakeholders involved with varied objectives and responsibilities relative to the development it requires careful consideration from the developer during the planning and management process (Zwikael et al., 2014) as

‘engagement of stakeholders is imperative to the success of any project’

(UNDP, 2009).

Clear organisational protocols and areas of convergence enabled the key players to work in a synergised environment at different levels of the stadium development to meet the legacy goals,ultimately, validating the success of the project. For example, the ODA and LOCOG worked collectively in the same office enabling them to increase efficiency while delivering the venues and infrastructure in time for the Games’. The table identifies the key stakeholders, outlining their roles within the London Stadium as mega projects are often

‘divided into subtasks that must be accomplished to achieve the project goals’

(Meridith & Mantel, 1989, pg.4),

in this case it is to meet London 2012 legacy goals. Due to its scale, additional stakeholders were involved such as Bioregional.

STAKEHOLDER DESCRIPTION NAME

ROLE WITHIN OLYMPIC STADIUM 2012

IOC

Project Sponsor, not-for-profit independent organisation, owns the right to the Olympic Games

Final approval of all decision

LOCOG

Established in 2005 as a private company for preparing, staging, and hosting the Games’ whilst achieving sustainability pledge.

Monitoring and reporting project progress to IOC as well as venue management ticket sales, operation of the opening and closing ceremony.

ODA

Established through the London Olympic Games and Paralympics Games Act 2006.

Responsible for the construction of stadium, ensuring that the stadium is completed on time aligned with new standards for sustainable development and equality are achieved.

BOA

National Olympic Committee for Great Britain recognised by IOC

Promote Olympic movement in the UK Select, prepare and manage the athletes ensuring their thoughts are considered during decision making

DMCS (GOE)

Responsible for government policy in culture, sport, art etc. in the UK.

Maximising social, economic and environmental benefits through delivering government led objectives for the stadium.

LDA

Delivering and extending the sustainable incentives from the games for social and economic prosperity of the city.

Leading the land acquisition action on the Olympic park site and grant public sector funding for employment and businesses in the host boroughs

LLDC

Created in 2012 and completely owned by the GLA. To plan, develop and manage Olympic Park after Games’

Delivering Olympic objectives, regeneration and national cohesion. Securing a viable future for the stadium

CLM

Organisation developed by the ODA responsible for management of the delivery of Olympic Park

Project manager of stadium

Populous

Architect

Architect chosen to design the legacy stadium

Sir Robert McAlpine

British construction and engineering Company

Main contractor of stadium

General Public

People living or working in surrounding areas of the Lower Lea river.

Attending weekly consultations and using the 24/7 hotline to voice opinions on development to be considered.

Hyland Edgar

Landscape Architect

Accountable for the design of the public realm surrounding the stadium

GLA

The regional political body of London, led by the former Mayor

Administrating the social, economic, environmental and health legacy from the stadium

TfL & environment Agency

Local government organization responsible for the transport system

Ensure a safe, efficient and effective delivery towards Olympic park in particular the express rail, park and ride, walking & cycling routes etc.

Arcaids and CLM

Global design and consultancy firm

Promote Olympic movement in the UK Select, prepare and manage the athletes ensuring their thoughts are considered during decision making

OPLC

Olympic/Paralympic Legacy set up in 2010 Responsibilities after the game to ensure legacy

East London Boroughs

The ‘Growth Boroughs’ that require The London boroughs ‘hosting’ the Olympic economic, social and environmental urban Games regeneration Figure 11, Olympic Stadium stakeholders, roles and responsibilities (by author)

2.6

benefits & needs

Within the Olympic development the stakeholders often have varying needs during different stages of the development process (bidding, planning, execution & post). Due to the multitude of stakeholders involved, to make the project viable, it must deliver incentives to those involved or affected. Thus, validating stakeholder needs allows stakeholders to justify the risky investment into mega-projects that carry great levels of complexities. Delivering a benefit (ROI) that can be tangible and intangible (Milena M. Parent, nd, pg.23) is the definition of project success for stakeholders. For the stadium, LOCOG coordinated and ensured all stakeholder needs and roles including the ODA were attained. Additionally, the GLA, LOCOG and the ODA saw a potential for the Olympic Games to drive regeneration in London and to provide a legacy for the development, meeting this criterion allowed their needs to be met. The following table identifies how stakeholders were benefitted, with an understanding that different stakeholders involved measured viability differently (intangible and tangible).

STAKEHOLDER

HOW THEY BENEFITTED

IOC

Delivered a legacy for Olympic stadiums while meeting Olympic charter criteria.

ODA

Successfully stimulated the goal of sustainable legacy vision to companies involved in stadium development. Changed the culture and behaviour of industry to think innovatively

LOCOG

Broke even at £2.41 billion from Olympic development and gained international recognition for holding a memorable Olympic opening and closing ceremony Handed over stadium to LLDC

DCMS

Able to lead commercial negotiations with two premier football clubs to take ownership of stadium legacy.

LLDC

Decided ownership of stadium post Games’ given to West Ham United and given an opportunity to partnership with LBN to develop a legacy for stadium post games’ securing community benefits

Populous

International acknowledgment as the ‘world’s most environmentally friendly Olympic stadium’(Rod Sheard) and the worlds longest cantilevered roof in the world

Sir Robert McAlpine

Recognition of engineering and sustainable excellence. Awarded gold Considerate constructors scheme awards in 2011 and 2012 and award for the first UK stadium to receive Secure by Design certification

General public

Creation of more job opportunities and improved the public realm

London Boroughs of Greenwich, Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets, and Waltham Forest, barking and Dagenham

Urban regeneration of the area to improve performance and prospects of communities. LBN obtained £40m of taxpayer’s money to further develop stadium to increase benefits and opportunity for communities

Figure 12, Stakeholder benefits and needs from the development of the Stadium (by author)

Project governance is often the set framework that secures the effective delivery of project goals, this is led by the project sponsor to overcome any challenges that may be faced (Miller & Floricel, 2000). Factors such as risk planning, life cycle management, strategic change, and value management are influenced by project governance, consequently impacting performance. It’s apparent that the governance of the Olympic Games is reflected by the vision of legacy following an institutional structure. The sponsor and founder for the games was the government, as the governance would be inherently complex, a consortium was imperative. Hence, the ODA held full responsibility to ensure and maintain strong governance. A highperformance governance structure a notable strength for ‘regeneration mega projects’ (Smith, 2012) identified how organizations would work interdependently whilst meeting the evaluation framework requirements steering towards legacy. The ODA implemented a SDS ensuring that sustainability is embedded within the management. The diagrams identify how sustainability and legacy was achieved across governance structure. Whilst the Olympic board had overall authority of the games the involvement of the LOCOG, OPLC and the ODA drove the project forward. Despite this, such complexities in the governance increased risk of conflict as well as jeopardising legacy and sustainability outcomes (Vassil Girginov, nd, pg.545). The ODA were also project sponsor, programme manager and client for the stadium whilst CLM were appointed project manager by the ODA (webarchive, 2012), who were responsible for design, procurement, and construction, ensuring that all stages of the stadium met sustainability goals. Despite this, distinct roles between decision making and delivery were unclear between the ODA and CLM (Raco,2013). However, there was a value management incentive as CLM comprising of CH2M Hill, Laing O’Rourke and Mace ‘had the breadth of experience key to delivering the best games and legacy’ (Livingstone, Manhagan, 2016), working on 5 previous Olympics, and possessing global experience, became valuable to the development process as the consortium secured success and enhanced reputation (Jacobson, 2011).

Delivery Bodies

IOC

LOCOG

BOA

OLYMPIC BOARD

2.7 project governance

Strategic coordination and monitoring

GLA

ODA

CLM

Annual reporting

DMCS/GOE LDA ToF

LOCOG

Figure 13, London Olympics Governance structure highlighted within Games Annual Report 2012-2013 (by author)

Approval of investment in projects above £20m

Corporate Plan, Business plan & project requirements approvals

External Reporting & Monitoring

Minister for the Olympics

Olympic Board

Olympic Board Steering Group

HM Treasury

GLA

Olympic Projects Review Group

Gvt Olympic Executive

External Stakeholder Consultation

Government Olympic Executive

ODA Board Figure 13a, ODA Governance framework drawn (Moore, Stephens, 20017, pg 27)

2.8

2.9

site appraisal

the need to regenerate

land aquisition

compusory purchase order

Figure 14, 2006 aerial image of East London site (dailymail, 2012)

From the outset the selection of the site was a key component outlined within the Legacy Plan of the games, considered by David Luckes in1997, the need to regenerate the most miserable slum in London initiated the bid for the Games’. The former mayor emphasizes that “I didn’t bid for the Olympics because I wanted three weeks of sport…I bid for the Olympics [as] the only way to get the billions of pounds out of the government to develop the East End” (Ken Livingston, Mayor of London 2000-2008). Although many factors were considered with varying opinions, it was important that urban regeneration was at the core. After the second half of the 19th century due to the closure of the ports, the East End was the most deprived & held amongst the worst health and unemployment statistics in the country. Hence, the desire for a legacy by building upon the areas ongoing regeneration, including the Thames Gateway, drove the decision to regenerate Stratford exploiting full opportunities for economic growth to diminish the economic discrepancy between the East and West in order to offer the highest quality of life for all locals.

A feasibility report taken by ARUP before the bidding evaluated the potential sites, significantly minimising the number of potential sites within the already dense capital city. Accordingly, Lower Lea Valley in East London offered a great potential with large amount of vacant land whilst also being a critical transport node within the city, it ‘was the tipping point that made the Games in east London viable.’(Hartman, 2012, pg. 50) In addition to this, the chosen site was considered in conjunction to London’s overall urban development policy and UK governments Urban Task Force 1999. This advocated the priority of utilizing deindustrialized brownfield sites hence, achieving the projects sustainable legacy goals. Although, additional responsibilities made the site questionable due to turbulence. LOCOG and ARUP concluded that ‘the Olympics will require a concentration of political focus and priority in favour of Olympic Sports, East London, and tourism’ (ARUP, 2002, pg.11). Consequently, the Olympic Games in London became a driving force for socio-economic and environmental incentives on a local, regional and national level.

The purchase of land is a crucial element of the FEP process. Land purchase within Stratford was a well-thought-out process as 80% of the land was under public control and acquired by the LDA before the win. However, the remaining 20% required a CPO, giving the government statutory authority to buy or take ownership of land (What is a Compulsory Purchase Order?, 2017, para.1) with the interest of the public benefiting from regeneration. Due to this approval in December 2006, the LDA supported those affected by allocating them to new industrial parks. “All tenants were offered the opportunity to relocate to an assured tenancy or equivalent and the vast majority of tenants relocated to properties that they themselves had selected as best matching their requirements.” (Jowell, 2008)

effective in that it enabled the construction to occur within the anticipated time frame allowing the project to come to fruition, the result of having to compensate the vast number of businesses led to the total budget for land to increase to £995 million, thus presenting major implications to the viability of the project. ‘Utter financial incompetence’ (Buff, £159 million hole uncovered in 2012 land purchase scheme, 2019, para 12) due to overspending has risen the debt towards the government. Figure 15, November 2008 base of stadium construction (AP, 2012)

This was crucial during a time when there was great distrust from the public and media (Evans, 2016, pg. 38), which made this the most complex but short land assembly process to occur in Britain. Although, the FEP process and CPO were

2.10

2.11

project funding

budget STADIUM

GLA & LDA

£486m

10% £0.875bn VENUE

£1.1bn 23% £2.175bn

Central Government

National Lottery £1.8bn

contingency fund

site preparation & infrastructure

67% £6.248bn

ODA

£935m

£6.2bn

olympic & paralympic village

Figure 16, Funding for the Olympic Games’ (by author)

£894m transport

It is fundamental to obtain project funding before the development to allow for an untroubled process. Obtaining funding was a difficult process due to great levels of skepticism of success from the public and government officials preparatory to bid. Though, former civil servant for the DMCS stated that ‘there would have been no support in Cabinet in the first place if it hadn’t been for Tessa Jowell (MP)’ (Institute For Government, 2013, pg.15). Jowell saw value for money in this development, thus, in 2003, Jowell’s determination successfully assured the government and mayor of the importance of providing public sector funding whilst also securing National Lottery and private sector funding of £738m. Subsequently, procuring initial funding was a prime contribution to the success of the FEP process. In the initial feasibility report an estimated budget (£4bn) was assumed, it was apparent that this would achieve an unfeasible budget. As a result, a ‘new’ PSFP, which was a total of £9.298bn, taking two years to secure. (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2015,

pg.13). Although, risky, the largest investment came from central government grants who embarked upon this to proceed regeneration, and to ‘be a catalyst for change….acknowledging the wider community benefits for the project to proceed (Reed, Sims & Cadman, nd, pg.130). A budgeting model representing baseline funding for each programme was published by the DMCS, including contingency, venue security and city operating funding packages. This was a crucial incentive towards ensuring viability & legacy benefits. The largest proportion of the funding (£6.250bn) was towards the ODA who were responsible for developing the Park. The stadium was assigned £496m to the previous £280m as it was also identified by the Mayoral briefing document in 2006 that a mixed-use stadium would ‘cost a minimum of an additional £70 million’ (Stephens, 2016, pg.32). Additionally, in 2010 it was announced that the ‘wrap’ around the stadium was to be privately funded by Dow Chemical Company, who believed that this would provide greater incentives than risks, taking upon the opportunity to advertise around the skin of the stadium.

international broadcast centre & main press centre

£896m

£725m programme deliver, tax & interest

other olympic park projects Figure 17, Budget for the ODA (by author)

Within property development, its crucial to stay within budget as this contributes to the success. As discussed previously, the new budget for the stadium was £496m, however, this final cost came to £486m. Being under budget was a fundamental incentive, achieved through lowcost design solutions that can be dismantled to reduce costs post games and quarterly reporting on the budget throughout the development also enabled costs to be lowered.

Figure 18, steelwork construction on stadium (tcbolts, nd)

3.0 risk

3.1

3.2

risk considerations

Within Megaprojects, ‘uncertainty and risk is a basic fact of large projects’ (Miller & Lessard, 2000), and the multitude of stakeholders and the characteristics of mega projects can amplify this. Hence, it is crucial to predict and mitigate multi-dimensional risk including force majeaure risks to ensure success. ‘Turbulance is the contextual variable that has the highest negative impact on performance: to be durable, project must survive the nearly inevitable burst of turbulence that they will encounter’ (Miller and Lessard, n.d, pg. 49). Consequently, the number of turbulences experienced present several challenges, hence, within mega-projects

one cannot eliminate risk but can diminish the impact of technical, organisational, institutional and financial complexities, through risk analysis and management, conducted within the feasibility study. Turbulences are often divided into two types, exogenous factors arising outside of the building project stemming from political, macro-economic and social forces whilst, endogenous occur within the project, which shall be investigated to highlight the different turbulence experienced within the stadium development.

Figure 19, Demolition and remediation works on Olympic site (DEME, nd)

endogenous risks

As there is little information published regarding the stadiums endogenous risks, endogenous London Olympic risks are evaluated with potential relevance to the stadium.

Land acquisition & contamination

Although institutional arrangements were put in place, some presented risk of failure causing institutional risks. As stated previously, land acquisition was purchased by CPO, with an understanding that the legislation in place may not have achieved land acquisition on its own. This presented a potential risk to the viability of the project thus requiring CPO. Additionally, although, it was known that the site was contaminated, it presented several risks which could not be ignored as the extent of the potential hazard was unknown. This introduced substantial upfront costs of more than £12.7m as remedial measures are often expensive especially with the complexity of dealing with 130 different land chemical criterions. However, knowing that the site was contaminated allowed for this to be budgeted before land acquisition (BBC, 2010). To add, institutional arrangements instilled in the FEP process from the ODA were able to professionally assess the situation for remediation, employ different methods of restoration and collaborate with Atkins’ geotechnical team to assess the excavated materials for potential re-use or recycle ensuring a sustainable project. Essentially the institution measures lead to successful risk

management of fully remediated land.

Sustaining network between decision makers

During the stages of development different degrees of pressures were faced by the stakeholders with differing responsibilities. To some extent, the risk of too many institutions involved caused organizational conflicts such as different opinions on delivery models which could have potentially prevented economies of scale (Edizel, 2014), it was believed by the GLA manager that the LOCOG and the ODA role should become one. Additionally, changing institutions and powers also caused changes in the regeneration policies, however, a strong organizational structure was developed enabling the DMCS to manage and sustain communication between stakeholders resulting in project efficiency.

Managing cash flow

Managing cash flow is one of the greatest risks faced in mega projects as many developments fail due to financial insufficiency. As predicted by Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012), the Games’ would become the most expensive Olympics project to date, this became a concern as it was predicted to exceed the Olympic budget, especially with the knowledge that the security costs doubled. Management of optimism bias through progress reports, cash flow analysis, as well as installing contingency provisions, an institutional arrangement suggested by the ODA prevented the project from going over budget.

3.3

exogenous risks

Figure 20, Armed Police at Olympic Games (AP Photo/Matt Dunham, nd)

Securing anchors ‘Without decisive action the stadium is in danger of becoming a white elephant’

(Wright and Wright, 2009, para.4)

To reduce the likelihood of ‘white elephants’, institutional arrangements to secure a legacy for the stadium was fundamental to achieve long term revenue whilst reducing uncertainty. Prior to the bid, the OPLC failed to anchor long-term tenants for the use of the stadium, and in 2006 the deal collapse was a result of the ODA changing the design specification to create legacy for a multi-use arena (Stephens, 2016), despite WHU and THS showing immense interest in occupancy. This presented a great risk in that the legitimacy of the legacy for a public sector multi-use arena was uncertain and could prove calamitous. Essentially ‘without a credible anchor tenant to bring regular footfall into the park there will be serious doubts as to the future financial viability of the venue’ (Wright and Wright, 2009, para. 3). Although, perhaps, securing a tenant such as West Ham Utd would result in funding complexities due to the requirement of significant design changes and likelihood of relegation (London Assembly Repot) which would prevent legacy. Reconsidering a football stadium had the potential to arise technical and financial complexities because redeveloping the stadium post games would not be cost effective (ODA, Stephens, 2016, pg.27). as well as this it presented legal uncertainty as legal action was taken by the

Spurs to the OPLC for corruption towards West Hams win for the bid, the potential risks could have hindered the development of the stadium and put legacy at risk.

Economy - Global recession In 2008 a financial crisis hit the world, one of the greatest risks in property development. Although, construction of the stadium was ongoing, one can suggest that this led to the significantly lower stadium budget as the Olympic funding was cut by £27m from the government (BBC News, 2010). It may seem that this significant cut may have hindered the quality and completion time of the project, however, this was risk was managed and met completion goals.

Geopolitical Risks – Terrorism ‘we are creating a sporting environment that has safety and security built in, leaving a groundbreaking legacy that will last beyond the Games’ (Shiplee, 2011, p.10) Due to its global recognition, the Olympic Games’ have become a famous attraction for diplomatic disputes. Historical experiences such as the Munich massacre and cyberattacks within the Beijing 2008 Games solidified the importance of risk management of such unprecedented attacks, resulting in an adverse effect on the success of Games’. After 24 hours of London winning the bid, a terrorist attack hit the London transport system during rush hour,

whilst it may be coincidental, such commotion increased greater levels of vulnerability and uncertainty within safety and security for the venue which was promised. This resulted in the Home Secretary undertaking a thorough Olympic threat assessment (OSTA) and ensuring that the games comply with the government counter terrorism strategy. Although, the security service believed that you cannot guarantee security (Evans, 2012), this appraisal allowed the Olympics to prepare for such attacks during the games. Hence, the introduction of security strategies such as biometric technology to allow authorised personnel on site, security screening, as well as UKBA, LOGOC and ODA working collaboratively to check and accredit all workers (COI, 2011). Furthermore, it also effected the design of the stadium as LOCP followed Secured by Design principals ensuring that each stage of the project met the standards, consequently, ‘using Secured by Design in the planning process significantly helped to enhance safety… and is much more cost effective than attempting to add on measures at a later stage’ (Chris Allison, National Olympic Security Coordinator and Metropolitan Police Lead for Safety and Security for London, 2012, p.5). Additionally, the number of staff significantly doubled than what was once required after the events of 9/11, requiring 3,800 staff for the Games’ for securitization.

Public disorder – Riots ‘Constant, inescapable criminality’ (Hill, 2011) ‘Scenes of rioting and looting a few miles from the

main Olympics site have raised concerns about security and policing for the event’ (London riots raise concerns about 2012 Olympics, 2011, para.1). The unforeseen civil unrest during August 2011 due to the death of Mark Duggan was the most destructive violence in 30 years. Occurring less than a year before the event, in an area encompassing the Park, presented a key reminder to the players involved about London’s reviving volatility (cbs news, 2011). Hence, this event amplified concerns of security and safety in and around the event. As a result, from both unprecedented events, concerns of security funding become a key issue as Hodge states ‘it is staggering that the original estimates were so wrong’ (London 2012: Olympic security cost raises concern among MPs, 2012, pg. 3). Such turbulences occurring throughout the development of the project suggest that these factors significantly rose the budget of security funding from £282m to £553m. The G4S contributed to this by failing to meet the number of militants required. Additionally, in December 2011 the government announced that LOCOG required twice the number of security guards, a total of 23,700 causing a financial complexity as LOCOG did not have any contingency left, contingency funding of the games’ was to be used for additional funding of security. Essentially, the result of geopolitical and public disorder resulted in the enforcement of 12,500 police officers with 7,500 providing venue security, 13,500 military personnel including RAF and Royal marines which ensured the safety and legacy of the Stadium and other venues.

3.4

risk management

Figure 21, ODA Risk Management policy - Three tier line of defense (by author)

DMCS

ODA BOARD

2ND LINE

3RD LINE

Audit Committee

CORPORATE

1ST LINE

External Stakeholders

(GLA, LDA, IOC)

ODA EMB

Risk & Audit

Programme Board

Programme Assurance

Audit Reviews

PROGRAMME

Using Flyvbjergs Risk Management process, applying this to the Olympic Stadium has allowed each risk to be assessed. Within the IOC it is a standard to carry out a risk assessment for candidate cities. As the stadium is within a multi-function complex, the risk assessment for this was considered by the BOA and GLA in 2002 within the practical feasibility report commissioned by ARUP and Insignia Richard Ellis. It was essential that the potential turbulences were considered within the QRA prior to the bid to inform bidding, mitigate risk and inform contingency. Essentially, the Olympics Games’ risk management was at the core of governance, the ODA placed strong institutional arrangements by setting out a ’three line of defence’, risk & opportunity management framework, safety and security strategic risk assessment (OSSSRA) with monthly reviews on the risk framework.

EXTERNAL HOLDERS

Delivery Partner

PROJECT

It is crucial to diminish the idealistic ‘Everything Goes to Plan’ outlook as property development process arises with inherent risks that hinder the development of a project. In this case, Flyvbjerg believes that a ‘full risk analysis based on the MLD principle (Most Likely Development)’ (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003, pg.84) as well as a Risk Management plan are fundamental procedures to manage and reduce the cost of risk. Subsequently, risk spreading by allocating complexities to stakeholders who ‘have an incentive to reduce the negative impacts of risk’ (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003, pg.83) will manage force majeaure risks, enhancing the legitimacy and viability of the project.

3rd Party Project Teams

ESTABLISH THE CONTEXT The development of the Olympic stadium within the Olympic Park to host 2012 Games’ ODA and CLM as project managers How to mitigate risk to allow legacy (success)?

ESTABLISH THE CONTEXT The strategic context The organisational context The risk management context

Develop criteria

Communication & consultation

Decide the structure

Health and Safety

Decide the structure

IDENTIFY RISKS

Legacy goals Cost Environmental/sustainability Reputation

What can happen? How it can happen

Functionality

ANALYSE RISKS Determine existing controls Determine likelihood

Determine consequences

Establish level of risk

MONITOR AND REVIEW

IDENTIFY RISKS

1. Securing all land 2. Contaminated land 3. Network with stakeholders 4. Securing Anchors 5. Terrorism/Riots 6. Economic Recession 7. Managing Cash flow

ANALYSE RISKS LIKELEHOOD CONSEQUENCES 1. Unlikely 1. Search for new site is required 2. Likely 2. Remediation required, unable to begin work 3. Potential 3. Inefficiency to complete project & to a high standard 4. Likely 4. Unprofitable white elephant, failure to meet legacy goals 5. Potential 5. Potential for another attack during construction and event 6. Likely 6. Cannot predict but may cause reduction in funding 7. Potential 7. Inadequacy to complete project

MONITOR AND REVIEW

Develop criteria

RISK LEVEL: 1. Low 2. High 3. Medium 4. High 5. High 6. High 7. High

ASSESS RISKS Compare against criteria Set risk priorities

ASSESS RISKS Compare against criteria Set risk priorities: High - Low HIGH PRIORITY: contaminated land, securing anchors, terrorism, economic recession & managing cash flow MEDIUM PRIORITY: network with stakeholders LOW PRIORITY: securing all the land

TREAT RISK Identify treatment options Evaluate treatment options Prepare treatment plans Implement plans

TREAT RISK RISK TREATMENT OPTIONS Avoid risk - zero action taken Accept risk - zero action taken Exploit risk - positive risk impact Mitigate risk - reduce impact Transfer risk - share responsibility Evaluate treatment options Prepare treatment plans Implement treatment plans

Figure 23, Risk Management Process, from Mega-projects and Risk, Bent Flyvbjerg (by author)

Risk 1: Accept Risk Risk 2: Mitigate Risk Risk 3: Share Risk Risk 4: Mitigate Risk Risk 5: Mitigate Risk Risk 6: / Risk 7: Transfer/Mitigate Risk

Figure 24, Authors adapted Risk Management Process for Olympic Stadium (by author)

Figure 25, Olympic Stadium transformation (Populous, nd)

evaluation of legacy

4.0 42

4.1

legacy through sustainable design

‘As a catalyst for new waste management infrastructure in east London’ (London 2012 Sustainability Policy 2006) The ODA outlined a Sustainable development strategy that correlated to the 2006 Olympics five sustainability themes to achieve legacy whilst carbon foot printing studies were used to inform decisions associated to design of the stadium (Degun, 2012). Additionally, implementing a sustainability team monitored by SPoC ensured that the stadium was an energy efficient, sustainable, and recyclable design to achieve BREEM excellence.

LEGACY

SHORT TERM

LONG TERM

ENVIRONMENTAL

Light weight design solution Utilizes CCHP - reduced the amount of material – provides heating, cooling, and required electricity - reduced GHG emissions as - fueled by sustainable wood ‘workers dredged the river lea pulp & natural gas from the waste to create a canal network that produced was used to transport CCHP served the stadium, other construction materials to the site’ venues and 11,000 homes (IOC,2013) No construction waste went to landfills - recycled, reused, or taken to waste energy centre ‘More than 98% of the demolition waste from decrepit buildings that were torn down was recycled”

roof

upper tier roof

spectators bridge

The wrap was recycled and repurposed after the games by Axion Recycling

stadium island running track

Granite blocks reclaimed from King George V docks reused on stadium landscape.

lower tier seats

Less than half the amount of steel usually required for stadiums was used – this makes it the most sustainable aspect of the design.

river pods

temporary structure

permanent structure

semi-permanent structure

Figure 26, Olympic Stadium axonometric showing its adaptable design (Populous, nd)

Utilizes a water harvesting system installed in the Thames water. - reduces water demand - reuse of harvested rainwater is for purpose of toilets, irrigating the field etc.

Solar panels installed around the stadia (International Olympic Committee – electricity obtained is used daily 2013). ‘sold back to the grid to help lower electricity costs to the surrounding Stadia wrap design was <0.5% of the neighbourhood’ total’s stadiums carbon footprint (Nawari, pg.5)

wrap

key of structures

(LLDC, 2012)

Occupied on a brownfield site - restored the natural habitat - decontaminated the River Lea - created a healthy and safer place for plants, animals, & people (LLDC,2012) Flexible design allowed the removal of the upper deck to reduce capacity - used for other events such as concerts

Olympic development generated 28% less CO2 that was anticipated for Games’ Figure 27, Olympic Stadium environmental legacy (by author)

4.2

Identified within the report, the main ambition for the Stadium was to achieve legacy goals outlined in the Olympics Legacy Action Plan. Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate legacy against the factors discussed throughout the report and its four legacy themes.

impacts against legacy goals

LEGACY THEMES

STRENGTHS

WEAKNESSES

SUCCESS/ FAILURE

Place and environment

Perception of East London changed due to major environmental improvements

Success

Greater green space for people to use

Sense of safety due to reduced crime rates

Economy and skills

Events - Several uses for the stadium post game such as hosting IAAF world Championships, Athletics World Cup and concerts has boosted the Uk’s capital. -

Athletics World Cup bought £100m to the wider economy (TheStadiumBusiness, 2019)

‘We congratulate London and UK Sport on continuing to deliver an impactful Games legacy that is adding value to the city and its citizens six years on from hosting the Games’ (IOC)

The regeneration has gentrified the area and did not solve real issues such as the shortage of affordable housing (NIHR, 2019)

Success

Local businesses - Displacement of local businesses (Raco & Tunney, 2010) -

Increased business rent costs due to regeneration and value the stadium bought to the area (McKay & Plumb, 2001; Kavetsos, 2012)

West Ham - Additional costs in due course as West Ham United were future tenants - agreed upon after the design.

Employment - Greater job opportunities ‘since London 2012, homes have been built, thousands of jobs have been created and millions of people have visited the venues’ (Lyn Garner LLDC, 2018), becoming the ‘hub’ of employment (DMCS)

Although the design was flexible, the redevelopment presented excessive additional costs of £190m

largest annual expense to change for football and athletics ‘mode’ (pg.150 Olympics Stadium Review)

Tourism - Additional 3.5 million tourists since

‘We have invested in transforming a temporary athletics venue into a permanent world-class multiuse arena that has a secure and long-term sustainable future.’ (para.15, The Guardian)

The total cost of the stadium is now £750m - LLDC is exposed to years of future challenges due to financial inefficiency and lack of planning

Land Value - Properties around the Olympic stadium sell 5% higher – boosting the property market (Georgios Kavetsos, 2009)

- ‘Although West Ham pay an annual rent of £2.5m as tenants’ (BBC,2019), according to the BBC, the stadium will lose £140m in the next 10 years

Social and community

Sport and health

Better community spirit and volunteering resulting in community cohesion

Driven social/ cultural equality

Community led sports days and cultural events

LDA announce one hundred years of community benefits for Newham residents due to partnership: - Tickets to West Ham and other sporting events held - Year-round access to the community track

100 community sport facilities refurbished by GLA benefiting 450,000 people

Increased education on sport and fitness in schools

Architectural - Design

Sustainable approach to design, materials, and construction methods

People having to move out

Success

Did not meet legacy goal of attracting the youth in sport, ‘actually children in school now are playing less sport than they were in 2009’ (Tessa Jowell, 2015)

Mostly successful

Inflexible due to radial formats and peppered with columns – opportunity for reuse is limited

Design was specifically for the stadium and did not consider other sports, hence design changes were required

Slightly successful, slight failure

Figure 28, Legacy evaluation matrix (by author)

4.3

impacts against framework

FRAMEWORK FACTOR

QUALITIES OF SUCCESS

SUCCESS/ FAILURE

STRENGTHS/WEAKNESSES

HOW CAN THIS BE IMPROVED

Governance

Effective governance structure

Mostly Successful

Strong stakeholder engagement and communication

Strengths - Strong governance structure allowed tasks to be delegated

Adapt governance framework when risks/circumstances change

Persistent project management to deal with risk

DMCS consistency in reporting progress

Clearly outline design priorities

Delegated responsibilities to different stakeholders involved

Weakness - Overlap between responsibilities between ODA and CLM (Alie, S. S, 2015)

FEP process

- Mostly successful

(Moore Stephens, 2017)

Governance was unclear at certain stages

Vigorous project brief

Effectively tackles foreseen and unforeseen circumstances

Strengths - Clear vision and legacy goals defined at early stage of planning prior to bid enabled the victory of hosting

Strategy that organises stakeholder to maximise success

Feasibility studies undertaken

Identifies & evaluates alternatives

Defined design brief

Provision of sufficient funding

Take into consideration varying levels of uncertainty into financial valuations.

Weakness - Consistently changing decisions on the future purpose of the stadium -

(Sarde, 2016)

Risk Management

Identifies potential risks and how they should be managed

Mitigate risks by allocating risk

Analysis and strategy should be robust to deal with turbulence experienced

Success

Failed to anchor tenant causing great financial implications

Strengths - Awareness of exogenous risks identified from the feasibility reports undertaken before and during development enabled the planning for prevention. -

none

Risk assessments were undertaken

(Flyvbjerg, 2003)

Project impact

Increases employment opportunity

Regenerates the urban environment

Improves community

Success

Strengths - Regeneration of East London by reducing urban inequalities

Ensure that design was aligned with future tenant requirements

More engagement with community

Movement towards sustainability employment, health, and community

Weakness - Increasing levels of construction cost due to several ongoing design changes to the stadium

Stakeholders & Roles

Experience on similar projects

Success

Strong communication increases trust within project community

Determination and efficiency to project

(APM, 2015)

Strengths - All players were adamant to meet legacy goals -

Delegate roles

Strengthened communication and engagement between stakeholders from outset (ODA and CLM worked efficiently together)

Weaknesses - ODA and CLM experienced some cases of blurred authority and responsibilities Figure 29, Framework evaluation matrix (by author)

Figure 30, Post Games’ London Stadium with West Ham United as tenants (London Stadium, 2018)

5.0 conclusion

5.1 conclusion

Figure 31, London Stadium and Olympic Park this year (Frank Da Silva, 2020)

The evaluation of legacy of the Olympic stadium has identified that this mega project was successful. Through the critical evaluation framework, the property development process has outlined key areas that contributed towards this. Referring to the evaluation matrix, it is evident that the project was anchored with an effective FEP process considering issues including brief, legacy goals, stakeholder engagement, governance, risk management, budgeting, land, and sustainable design. Firstly, feasibility studies before and after winning the bid was advantageous to the project’s progression allowing factors such as funding, land contamination, design brief & risk to be evaluated and considered. For example, considering land contamination allowed this to be considered within the budget and prevent a financial turbulence to occur during remediation. Additionally, the expediency of coherent institutional arrangements such as the CPO allowed land acquisition. Without the powers of the CPO, the risk of obtaining land in time for the Games’ was uncertain, considering that the land was contaminated, obtaining land quickly through CPO was a determinant of effective project performance. Risk management measures implemented by the ODA reduced the impacts of unforeseen turbulences creating clarity and awareness throughout the development. Furthermore, the effective governance of the project was reflected throughout the property development process and was the root of success. Alongside regular reports assessing the development of the projects, the ODA ensured efficiency of decision making resulting in faster

decisions for the project to progress allowing the stadium to be completed before the anticipated date. To add, by securing a governance structure allowed roles and responsibilities to be delegated spreading risk across the organisational structure. This structure allowed the ODA and LOCOG to work collectively and is an example of how engagement and communication was strengthened between different bodies. The devotion from stakeholders to achieve legacy goals outlined during the bid was reflected throughout all stages of the development particularly within the design of the stadium. The use of sustainable methods implemented in the stadium contributed to the delivery of green games, thus enhancing the viability of the project. Controversially, the inefficiency to secure an anchor tenant at an early stage proved to cause technical and financial complexities post games due to the significantly rising conversion costs. Post Games’ the stadium has secured legacy as it becomes the National competition centre for UK athletics with WHU as permanent tenants, securing its long-term viability as it becomes a world class venue. Overall, when comparing to other Olympic stadiums such as the abandoned Athens 2004 stadium and more recently the Beijing’s Birds Nest, who have failed to anchor tenants leaving the stadium with no permanent use, the London Stadium has proved itself to be one of the greatest examples of a successful stadium preventing itself from becoming another obvious white elephant amongst other stadiums whilst successfully contributing to the rejuvenation of East London.

Figure 32, London Stadium with new roof structure to cover more people seated (2012imagelibrary, 2019)

appendix

A) GDV (Gross Development Value) Residential accommodation 65,100 sqm site with planning permission for 723 houses each valued at £448,009 = £323,910,507

risidual valuation

Commercial space 21,700 sqm site with planning permission for 31 offices each valued at £3,360,000= £104,160,000

A return-on-investment calculation is a key performance indicator to understand whether the project is viable. It extremely valuable that the developer considers this before undertaking the project. As it is difficult to find the land cost for the Olympic stadium a residual valuation is appropriate. Using different sources of information, the following assumptions were required for the calculation.

Total = £428,070,507

Less selling costs (agents + legal fees) @ 3% = £12,842,115.21 (GDV) Net proceed of sale = £415,228,391.79

Assumptions: • • • • • • •

60% of the area will be residential housing 20% of the area will be assigned for commercial space Average commercial space is 700 sqm Average apartment size is 90 sqm Properties in Stratford average price = £448,009 (Right move, 2019) Average price for commercial office space is £4,800 per sqm Average Land Value in London Borough of Newham (E20) = £19,530,000 (UK government Land Value)

B) Cost of Development Cost of development (as documented) = £486,000,000 £486,000,000 x 0.8 (total area used 80%) = £388,800,000

Documented: • •

Total cost of development= £388,800,000

Total Area of development = 108 500 m2 Estimated Development Profit should be around 20%

Housing

C) Developers profit

108 500 x 0.6 = 65,100 sqm

Total area for housing = 65,100 sqm

65,100/90 = 723 houses

Developers profit (20% of GDV) = £83,045,678.358

Total cost and profit = £471,845,678.358

Number of houses in area = 723 houses

723 x £448,009 = £323,910,507

D) Residual amount for land

Commercial 108 500 x 0.2 = 21,700 sqm

Total area for offices = 21,700 sqm

GDV-(cost of development + profit) A-(B+C) £471,845,678.385 – £415,228,391.79 = £56,617,286.568 Land = £56,617,286.568

21,700/700 = 31 commercial buildings Number of commercial buildings in area = 31 commercial buildings 4,800 x 700 = £3,360,000

£56,617,286.568 x 0.03 = £1,698,518.59704 less costs of purchase (agent’s & legal costs) @3% = £1,698,518.59704 Price for commercial area = £3,360,000 £56,617,286.568 - £1,698,518.59704 = £54,918,767.97096

£3,360,000 x 31 = £104,160,000 housing + commercial = £428,070,507

Residual amount for Land: £54,918,767.97096

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Thank you to Dumiso Moyo

& UP51005 Property Development Process Lecture series that have assisted my learning

University Of Dundee