USA - Poland: Not So New Deal

Prof. Bohdan Szklarski, a specialist in American studies, lecturer at the University of Warsaw and the Collegium Civitas private university, spoke to Witold Żygulski.

Anew tenant will move into the White House in January. How will this affect Polish-U.S. relations, especially given that Donald Trump is openly supported by politicians from the rul-

ing right wing as well as government media?

Indeed, the people who govern Poland have put all their proverbial eggs in one basket. However, I am convinced that there will be no drastic deterioration of relations, because we are simply not important enough as a country. There is nothing to be afraid of, but there is an unpleasant aftertaste. Much has been said in Warsaw in recent years about our special relations with the United States; I think we will be given a reality check. We have been pumping this balloon ourselves for years, boasting about the friendship of U.S. presidents, military cooperation, and so on. Meanwhile, we should realize that Poland is not and cannot be a strategic partner for Washington; simply put, we play in a much lower league. Maybe Joe Biden’s victory will be a sobering experience. On the other hand, today it is hard to tell where and by whom the foundations of Poland’s policy toward the United States are being built. Until now, it seemed that it was the presidential center, but after the embarrassment of supporting Trump and not congratulating Biden (Andrzej Duda only congratulated him on a “successful election campaign”), the Polish president’s position has been significantly undermined. This has been compounded by internal friction within the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party around the presidenProf. Bohdan Szklarski tial draft law on abortion. It

MUCH HAS BEEN SAID IN WARSAW IN RECENT YEARS ABOUT OUR SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES; I THINK WE WILL BE GIVEN A REALITY CHECK

is really difficult to say where the policy toward Washington is being developed right now.

During Trump’s term of office, however, we heard many declarations from both sides that Polish-U.S. relations had never been better. What remains of that today?

It is easy to see that Polish-U.S. relations were “special” mostly on a declarative level. As soon as Poland put itself on a collision course with the United States, the other side voiced its dissatisfaction without hesitation. When the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) law was passed in Poland, the State Department did not hesitate to immediately criticize it. The same happened with the so-called re-Polonization of media: When it concerned the TVN television station, which is controlled by U.S. capital, Ambassador Georgette Mosbacher reacted with outrage. Looking at the Americans’ response, it was hard to find the restraint that should characterize countries with “special relations.” They did not bother waiting for diplomatic channels, nothing was nuanced, no one showed sensitivity. The style in which they told off the Polish people was completely unimportant to the Americans.

Joe Biden talks a lot about the need for a community of values in foreign policy. He is referring to the declarations that Jimmy Carter once made. In this area, the new U.S. leader is clearly trying to distinguish himself from Donald Trump. But wherever specific American interests emerge, these values are pushed into the background; I don’t think that will change. And it needs saying that we are a valuable ally for Washington, for example due to buying increasingly advanced weapons made in the United States or considering a partnership in the nuclear power program.

To sum up, I don’t think that our relations will deteriorate, but I don’t foresee any changes for the better either. We can hardly count on an increased U.S. military contingent in Poland; the Pentagon is divided on this. Some of the military do not think that it will have a positive impact on European security. The Americans do not even want to make symbolic gestures. It has been no secret for a long time that the “Fort Trump” idea, which Polish politicians were so enthusiastic about, is fiction. But it is worth noting that processes of building European security with U.S. involvement are continuing, for example through joint command structures, and Biden will have no reason to halt them.

Poland makes regular purchases of U.S. military equipment, paying more than it would have paid potential competitors. The reason is not some kind of rip-off by the Americans, but the fact that Warsaw wants to purchase the most advanced technologies, sometimes even those not yet decently tested. We cannot have the Patriot missile batteries that the Romanians are buying, we must have better ones. The same can be expected with the planned purchase of nuclear power technology from the United States.

Polish-U.S. relations proceed on many levels. We will certainly have to redefine the concept of transatlantic cooperation in the near future; there are many indications that such a signal will come from Biden’s administration. I hope that it will be appropriately received by European countries.

What do you think will be the likely impact of Biden’s policy toward China on Poland’s interests?

Joe Biden will probably inherit the anti-Chinese policy from Trump, which might be a problem for Poland. On one hand, President Duda has announced his friendship with China, while on the other the Americans are putting on pressure, saying that the New Silk Road will be a Chinese fifth column and that Huawei’s participation in the Polish 5G network project will enable the Chinese to carry out electronic surveillance and espionage. And we wanted those Chinese 5G technologies really badly. However, we will probably pursue a cautious policy so as not to fall into disfavor with Washington. If we were a bigger player, we could test how far we can go, but we even have too little money for effective diplomacy in the United States. Our room for maneuver is limited, as Ambassador Mosbacher has already shown several times.

However, Poland is sending out signals about its need for greater independence; examples of this include refraining from recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Nor do we seem to have abandoned the Palestinian issue altogether; here, too, we are distancing ourselves a little from U.S. politics.

Photo PAP

Today Poland must, above all, place itself better in the European Union. The new U.S. administration will now renew friendly relations with Germany and France, while we have positioned ourselves on the fringes, on the sidelines of the EU. Trump pursued a policy of weakening the EU, establishing relations with individual Central European countries, hosting Viktor Orban, Andrzej Duda and the Croatian president in the Oval Office. He also supported projects such as the Three Seas Initiative. Biden is more likely to stake his bets on stronger European allies.

In your opinion, what will the relations between the new U.S. president and Russia be like?

We have always assumed that the worse things are along the Washington-Moscow line, the better for us. This assumption of Polish foreign policy should change. We need to mature to normal relations with Russia, but Russia needs to mature to them too. Russian-U.S. relations are frozen today. They are not very bad, but there is not much good in them, either. Both sides have walked out on disarmament agreements, there are no negotiations, treaties were suspended during the Bush era, not even under Trump. Obama announced a reset, but Putin decided not to play along and invaded Crimea and Ukraine. There was hope for joint responsibility, but nothing came of it. Neither the Americans had anything to offer the Russians, nor the other way around. Their relations are drifting today. Guided by its own economic interests, Washington has been opposing the Nord Stream project, but this is not just about fighting Russian domination, but about competition on the gas supply market. Besides, there are no serious areas of conflict today; Ukraine is no longer front-page news, and the Americans are also withdrawing from Syria.