22 minute read
War in Ukraine: A Test for the Free World
WAR
IN UKRAINE: A TEST FOR THE FREE WORLD
General Mieczysław Bieniek talks to Witold Żygulski.
The eighth month of the war unleashed by
Russia in Ukraine has passed; what are your thoughts on the course of hostilities so far?
Let’s recall what was happening before Feb. 24, the day the Russian invasion began. Putin talked about the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, thus justifying the start of his aggression. Everyone wondered what he meant. Today we can all see that his original strategic plan was to seize all of Ukraine, establish a Moscow-dependent government there and appoint his governor. Initially, it seemed that Putin only wanted to seize the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk regions as well as the southern corridor connecting Crimea to the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. He intended to rule the rest of the country with the help of his puppet team installed in Kiev. Former President Viktor Yanukovych or billionaire Viktor Medvedchuk, recently exchanged for Ukrainian prisoners of war, including defenders of the Azovstal fortress, were mentioned as its leaders. And then suddenly it turned out that the incompetent army of the Russian Federation attacked Ukraine from six operational directions, contradicting all the principles of operational art (the ratio of attacking to defending forces, no main direction of attack, the system of reconnaissance, command, logistics, a lack of cooperation, communications, poor training, failure to overpower Ukraine’s air defense system, low morale – one could go on for ever). And another important factor working in favor of Ukraine: pervasive corruption in the Russian Federation and its armed forces.
The result was failure: The Russian army suffered a severe defeat near Kiev, the most painful proof for Moscow being the loss of hundreds of tanks, transporters, artillery systems, communications and command equipment, helicopters and other aircraft, and the defeat of an elite unit of landing and assault troops, who were supposed to take control of the Hostomel airport in the first hours of the invasion. Had this attack been successful, it would undoubtedly have been a game changer: The Russian-controlled airfield would have been able to land transport aircraft like the Il-76, which are capable of carrying heavy equipment such as tanks. An effective attack on the Ukrainian capital would then have been possible.
After the defeat at Kiev, Putin proceeded with Plan B, which involved striking from the east and northeast in order to cut Ukraine along the Dnieper River line. This, too, failed, although the Russian army managed to take some Ukrainian territory, after heavy fighting. Putin then focused on seizing as much of the two separatist republics as possible, throwing nearly 85 battle groups into battle there, backed by heavy artillery and air forces that bombed civilian targets that had nothing to do with the military operation. The primary goal was to expand the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as much as possible, seizing Mariupol and the entire coast of the Sea of Azov, at the same time attacking the territory of Ukraine with a huge number of precision and non-precision missiles, which, falling on civilian targets, inflicted damage on civilians and destroyed infrastructure. Unfortunately, the Russians succeeded in this, though at the cost of heavy losses. At this point I must highlight the intrepid, almost heroic defense of the port city of Mariupol, where the defenders of this city defending themselves in the Azovstal complex tied up significant Russian forces for almost three months, inflicting heavy losses on them. The Russians also succeeded in seizing Kherson and declaring another “people’s republic” there.
Nor can we fail to mention the heroism of the defenders of Snake Island and the subsequent sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, the cruiser Moskva, by the Ukrainians. This was not only a military blow to Russia, but also an image and propaganda blow.
Soon, however, the situation got out of hand for the Russians; heavy fighting continued in the Donbass, an attempt to cross the Donets River ended in another defeat for the Russian troops, who lost almost their entire battle group along with their equipment. Other heavy battles were fought in Severodonetsk, where the Ukrainian army put up serious resistance, inflicting very heavy losses on the Russians, themselves suffering losses as well. But in this way Ukraine gained some time, during which it received successive new armaments and ammunition from the West as well as mobilizing and training new forces. The front came to a halt. The Russians proceeded to defend the occupied area. Since March, Ukraine has managed to mobilize and train 700,000 troops; additional brigades were created and successively trained and equipped. Ukraine then received a large amount of modern military equipment from the West, including HIMARS artillery rocket batteries with large numbers of rockets fired accurately to a distance of up to 70 kilometers. Soldiers very quickly learned how to operate them. In addition, a lot of older armaments were acquired from the Russians.
A few weeks ago, the Ukrainian army launched a counteroffensive that ended in tremendous success. Russian troops were pushed back near Kharkov, suffering huge losses in the process. An effective strike was carried out at one of the most vulnerable points, between two regiments formed from conscripts of the separatist republics on the border of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with Ukrainian forces attacking the poorly trained and demoralized Russians. Taking advantage of this success, the Ukrainians intensified their attack, regaining nearly 40 percent of the territory lost in that direction, while capturing a huge amount of abandoned equipment, ammunition and fuel depots. At the same time, in the southern direction, near Kherson, using HIMARS launchers and air forces in the attack, the Ukrainians hit not only the invading army’s groupings, but also command posts, artillery batteries, weaponry depots and logistics centers, isolating the battlefield and cutting off
the Russian troops in Kherson from sources of supply.
A little earlier, the Ukrainians managed to hit the Russians painfully in the Crimean Peninsula: More than a dozen SU-24 and SU-25 planes as well as helicopters were destroyed in an attack on the Russian airfield in Novofedorovka. The attack had a tactical dimension, practically depriving the Black Sea Fleet of air support capabilities, but also a psychological and image-related aspect: Russians no longer felt safe even in the territory of Crimea that they had annexed illegally in 2014. We later saw a panicked flight of Russian tourists and departing residents of the peninsula, terrified by the possibility of hostilities around their places of residence. Despite the ubiquitous state propaganda about a “special operation,” it slowly began to dawn on ordinary Russians that this was simply a war in which the “invincible” Russian army was suffering heavy defeats along particular sections of the front. Shipments of “Cargo 200” (Gruz 200), i.e., coffins with killed soldiers, have begun arriving in Russia. The Russians have so far probably lost about 40,000 dead plus 60,000-100,000 wounded and missing in action. This means that of the army of 180,000 that moved into battle on Feb. 24, almost two-thirds have been excluded from combat.
In addition to its tremendous brutalization, non-compliance with any conventions, expressed in the murder of civilians, rape, torture, demolition of cities and infrastructure and looting of property, in this war we are also seeing such elements as destruction and theft of grain, and its export from Odessa being blocked. There are also the attacks on the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, which could end in a tragedy similar to that of Chernobyl in 1986. But on the other hand, we also see the heroism and high morale of the Ukrainian people, soldiers, and the steadfast leadership of President Volodymyr Zelensky, his entourage as well as the excellent work of the Ukrainian General Staff and the various commands down to the lowest level. All this is happening with continued support from the West.
What do you think of the “partial mobilization” now underway in Russia, which is expected to involve 300,000 people? On the Komsomolskaya Pravda daily’s website, I recently read an interview with former Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov, who said that “the future of Russia today depends on these people.”
Vladimir Putin’s decision on a “partial mobilization” is nothing more than a desperate attempt to fill the army’s manpower shortage resulting from the colossal losses I mentioned earlier. We have already seen such attempts. After the first losses on the front line, they sent in Putin’s “private army,” the so-called Wagner Group, and the combat units of the Russian president’s Chechen vassal Ramzan Kadyrov, as well as mobilizing local forces in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (two regiments were created there, with no practical combat value), conscripting prisoners, who were guaranteed amnesty in exchange for participation in combat, and even pulling contingents of Russian troops from Syria and Abkhazia to replenish losses.
The same mess that we see every day during the war can also be seen in the process of this strange mobilization (there is no such thing as a “partial mobilization” in Russian legislation). A country that has enormous mobilization capabilities today has problems with calling just 300,000 people to arms. All over the world, trained reserves are called up in such cases, but in Russia today, they are conscripting anyone they can catch; candidates for soldiers are fleeing abroad in droves or hiding wherever they can, there are shootings at conscription points and so on.
Of course, the number of 300,000 new soldiers is very serious, but transforming quantity into quality is another matter. According to the rules of the art of war, which, by the way, have probably all been violated in Russia, people who are to be mobilized are notified first, then they are mobilized and sent to training centers, where they are equipped and trained, then the units they are to go to are identified or new units are formed, and these undergo further stages of training. In basic terms, this takes two to four months. In Russia today, it looks like people who have ever undergone any military training at all will be sent to the front after a week or two to replenish units whose losses sometimes reach 30-40 percent of their personnel. The combat efficiency of such a recruit will be close to zero.
Another issue is equipping the new troops. To do this, it is necessary to take equipment out of storage, remove any protection, refurbish the equipment, bring it into working order. There is a shortage of communications systems, optoelectronics, targeting systems, systems necessary on the battlefield. Of course, the way things are in Russia, half the equipment has been stolen and half exchanged for liquor. New equipment cannot be manufactured quickly because Russia already has a shortage (caused by international sanctions) of components such as microprocessors, semiconductors, and optoelectronics. Without them, any tank, plane, or missile is a pile of scrap metal.
Of course, the mobilization of 300,000 recruits should not be downplayed. Even in the role of untrained recruits, representing zero combat value, combined with what is already operating on the front lines, this number poses a threat.
But Ukraine has the capacity to respond. No time has been wasted; the Ukrainians have not only fought the invaders, but also pursued a parallel process of mobilization and training, equipping units with modern weapons. Human resources are also not insignificant in Ukraine, the morale of the army stands very high, Ukrainian troops are gradually moving from defensive positions to attack, in a drive to regain the territories lost after Feb. 24.
Of course, the support of the West is extremely important. Without it, Ukraine would have very little chance of defending itself against the Russian onslaught. The determination of the free world is great; its leaders, headed by the American president, express it time and again in speeches at international forums. It was also confirmed at the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Moscow’s threats, repeated daily, are of no use.
How do you think the Russian government intends to act in the coming months?
Putin’s political intention is to absorb the territories of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, i.e., all the regions of Ukraine where Russian troops are stationed today, into the Russian Federation, through referendums that are illegal under international law and obviously rigged. Then, according to Moscow’s plan, these territories would become an integral part of the Russian state, just like the equally illegally occupied Crimea. According to Russian doctrine, it will therefore become permissible to use all possible military means to defend them, which will become another “Patriotic War.”
This is what happened when Putin announced the annexation of these regions by the Russian Federation on Sept. 30. This is territorial rape on an unprecedented scale in the history of the 21st century. With this act, he also justifies the already widespread mobilization to his own people. This brings us to another point, which was recently raised by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in his typically brazen speech in the UN. He said in New York that if anyone attacks the lands of the Russian Federation, all possible means will be used, including weapons of mass destruction. The question is: where, against whom and what for? It is primarily meant to intimidate the Ukrainian and Western societies. The charm of nuclear weapons lies in deterrence and intimidation by threatening to use them.
Should the possibility of Russian nuclear strikes be taken seriously today?
I believe that the probability of such an escalation of the war exists but is very small. This is evidenced, for example, by the attitude of China, which made it clear at the recent summit in Samarkand that Moscow cannot go as far as such measures. The international community will never accept
it. I also believe that there are still people in Putin’s entourage who have common sense and know that the use of such weapons will cause a global cataclysm. In response, NATO could, for example, launch a massive conventional strike against, say, the Black Sea Fleet, sinking it completely, including its submarines, or any other sensitive object valuable from Russia’s point of view. Moscow is well aware that the Americans have such capabilities.
Admittedly, the Russian president is enormously determined, emotionally unstable and finds it difficult to back down, but not only external but also internal pressures are already emerging. Decentralist processes are noticeable in Russia, especially in the regions where most of the soldiers currently fighting in Ukraine come from: Ingushetia, Dagestan, Buryatia or even Chechnya, ruled by Kadyrov with an iron fist.
From a purely military point of view, the use of nuclear weapons in the current conflict is absurd. Where would such charges, even small tactical ones, be fired? Over Kharkov, Kherson, Zaporizhia? Over a cluster of fighting troops? The fact is the directions of winds in this part of the world (they blow from the south to the northeast) will send the radioactive air over Russian territory. Moreover, the United States and NATO have put all possible monitoring measures in place: space, cyber and personnel, that can detect any signs of intent to use such weapons, with a view to preventing this.
However, we must remember that Putin’s war, in addition to many other horrific and tragic consequences, has also provoked a food crisis in African countries due to the partial blockade of grain exports from Ukraine, an energy crisis, and now, with this latest nuclear scare, has caused fear and terror in Ukraine and Western societies.
So, what further course of the war do you foresee?
The Ukrainian army has just liberated Kupiansk and Lyman. It is conducting harassment operations in the southern direction, and is slowly bringing air power into action, reducing the slight advantage the Russians had for several months in this aspect of the war effort. At the same time, Zelensky is soliciting political and military support, and receiving more supplies of anti-aircraft and missile weapons.
Putin’s criminal decision to plunder the lands of the aforementioned regions has complicated the situation for the Ukrainian leadership, as Putin is well aware. That is why President Zelensky has asked for an accelerated procedure for Ukraine’s admission to NATO. This is very difficult at the moment, as it requires the consent of all the NATO countries, and Ukraine is in a defensive war with Russia. Its possible inclusion in NATO structures would now automatically bring the Alliance into the war against the Russian Federation, which would then automatically escalate into a global conflict.
Time, forces, and geography are working in Ukraine’s favor. Of course, winter will be difficult for the Ukrainians, but not as difficult as it will be for the Russians. Russian units are severely cut off from sources of supply, so far away from home bases that it becomes impossible to maintain the supply chain. They are stationed in ruined areas that they themselves have ruined, with no repair facilities for equipment, let alone medical facilities for the wounded.
It is expected that the war could continue for quite some time yet.
But seeing the perversity and insolence of the authorities in Moscow, it cannot be ruled out that Putin will put forward proposals for a peace treaty in which the lands he has
illegally occupied must be recognized as Russian territory. The Ukrainian authorities will certainly not agree to such a proposal.
For many decades, the world believed in the power of the Russian army, treating it as one of the undisputed world powers; has the war in Ukraine changed this opinion?
We were all victims of Russian propaganda, which is still repeated today, except that it is probably only for internal use; for the rest of the world, the picture drawn by the war is rather clear. We watched films of Russian maneuvers, we watched military parades on Red Square (although even there, a state-of-the-art Armata tank suddenly broke down during a parade a few years ago). Only now do we know that truly homeopathic amounts of new equipment were put on display, and that Russian generals habitually lied to Putin, informing him of the flourishing state of the army, of the constant modernization of the armed forces. Of course, Russia’s army was being transformed into a modern one, in a process that accelerated especially after the campaign in Georgia, but it was all largely false. Apart from the special airborne units (which, however, failed to break the resistance of the Ukrainians at the Hostomel airfield) and a few elite units such as the Taman and Kantemirov tank divisions, everything was poorly organized and equipped, as well as poorly commanded. The whole concept of massed strikes by tank troops, dating back to World War II, was largely anachronistic. There was a lack of communication systems, long-range target detection and indication, interoperability, logistics, training and, above all, morale. The air force is a case in point: In the first phase of the war in Ukraine, it was successful; Russian propaganda cried out in delight at the supposed complete control of the Ukrainian airspace, but it soon turned out that the underestimated Ukrainian anti-aircraft defense was able to down dozens of Russian planes and helicopters with its own BUK-21 systems. The Russians also failed to overpower the Ukrainian radar or command systems.
The Russian army also lacks the ability to use precision munitions effectively at long ranges. A large number of “precision” missiles are landing in Ukraine in the middle of nowhere.
To sum up, apart from nuclear missile strategic forces and submarines armed with ballistic missiles, the Russian land forces do not present much danger, and are largely overrated. Another thing is that we also don’t know what state Russia’s nuclear arsenal is in; it is not at all out of the question that a sizable portion of it may not be combat-ready, and the procedures for its use are imperfect and unreliable, although they have reportedly been improved during military exercises.
When the world’s second army cannot cope with the world’s twenty-second, the picture is rather clear. No wonder, then, that Putin keeps repeating that he is not fighting with the Ukrainian army at all, but with the entire West or the whole of NATO.
The current war has changed the picture of the European and global security system; what will it be like now and what role should Poland play in it?
We had the first signs that the world was changing, for the worse, back in 2014 after the seizure of Crimea. Back then, however, the West, especially European countries, was still convinced that things would end there. But it was easy to conclude from Putin’s and Lavrov’s words that Russia want-
ed to change the global security architecture, push NATO away from its borders, demilitarize the countries that joined the Alliance after 1999, and force the withdrawal of NATO military units and installations from their territories. We can imagine how that would have ended. Today, the Kremlin has achieved the opposite; two countries traditionally shying away from military alliances – Sweden and Finland – are joining the Alliance. The security architecture is changing in favor of NATO countries, in favor of the free world.
The Russian aggression has also made many other countries realize that they must be prepared to defend themselves effectively against an invader before any help arrives. Taiwan, for example, is a case in point. China, a major world player, has led to Russia slowly becoming its vassalized client rather than an equal partner. However, Beijing has also noticed that Europe has united in the face of the Russian invasion, and the role of the United States has increased, including in the Far East. Countries such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore see the need to strengthen security in the face of the neighboring presence of China, which, while not planning a military attack, has an active policy of strengthening its army, navy and air force.
As an active and loyal NATO member, Poland is consistently strengthening its defense potential. Every member state of the Alliance, in accordance with Article 3 of the NATO Treaty, is obliged to continuously strengthen its armed forces at a level that ensures the reliability of the defense system. As part of this obligation, Poland is increasing its military potential and defense budget. The lessons that emerge from the conflict in Ukraine are absolutely clear. We must be prepared to hold our own territory in the event of a possible attack until the arrival of NATO forces, to cooperate with them and, perhaps most importantly, to be permanently present in the common defense system.
The recently adopted Homeland Defense Act envisions the size of the Polish armed forces at 300,000 soldiers. However, this process must take time. In parallel, we need to saturate our army with state-of-the-art means of combat, including air defense, target identification, the ability to strike targets, network-centricity, communications, mobile logistics, improvement of the command system, resistance to cyber and radio-electronic strikes, maneuver capabilities, operational preparation of the terrain on which we are likely to conduct operations, continuous learning and training, preparation of personnel reserves, etc. We must also be able to interact with other NATO armies, updating and exercising elements of contingency plans within the framework of the NATO defense strategy. It is also necessary to improve and develop the Territorial Defense Forces by including them in the plan of use together with operational troops and civil defense. In other words, we have to improve our entire defense system. So, we can see that this is a continuous and complicated process requiring the alignment of many factors and related issues.
We don’t want to attack anyone, but we must be prepared to attack an attacker heading toward our borders while they are still on their territory, so as not to allow situations like we see today in Bucha, Izium and many other Ukrainian cities where civilians are murdered and infrastructure destroyed, or situations in which we would give up some parts of our own territory to take them back laboriously later. It is necessary to defend ourselves in such a way as to prevent the loss of any piece of Polish territory.
Analyzing the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war, one can also conclude that as a result of the hostilities in Ukraine so far and the losses suffered there, as well as the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation, the Russian armed forces, and especially ground troops, will need about 15 years to rebuild potential capable of carrying out effective offensive operations. But at the present stage, especially after the implementation of the mobilization system and the replenishment of frontline units, they still present a huge threat to Ukraine.
General Mieczysław Bieniek is a former NATO Deputy Strategic Commander for Transformation. He was the first Polish officer to assume such a high command position in NATO. Bieniek commanded elite units of the Polish Army - the 6th Airborne Brigade and the 25th Air Cavalry Division. He was commander of the Polish UN Military Contingent in Syria in 1989-90. He was also head of observers in the UN Peace Mission in Western Sahara. From July 1998 to January 1999, he commanded the Nordic-Polish SFOR Brigade in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the first Polish general to undertake NATO service. In the fall of 1999, he was appointed head of the Training and Exercise Division of the NATO Allied Forces in Europe (SHAPE) Headquarters in Mons, Belgium. He was also in charge of NATO Rapid Reaction Force exercises of formations such as ARRC (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) and AMF(L) - Allied Mobile Forces (Land).
In 2002, he took on another international challenge by assuming the position of first deputy commander of the 3rd NATO International Rapid Reaction Force Corps with a command in Turkey - Istanbul.
From January to July 2004, he commanded the Multinational Stabilization Force Division in Iraq.
In 2010, he becomes the only Pole to date in NATO’s military structures (a four-star general) and takes up the position of NATO Deputy Commander for Transformation, which he held until September 2013.
