14 minute read
Polexit and Other Not Fully Comprehensive Issues
POLEXIT AND OTHER NOT FULLY COMPREHENSIBLE ISSUES
Andrzej Olechowski, former Polish minister of foreign affairs (1993-1995) and in 2001 co-founder of the now opposition Civic Platform (PO), talks to Witold Żygulski.
In recent weeks, the Polish government has
been boasting of a great and effective diplomatic offensive, while the opposition claims that Poland has no coherent foreign policy at all today; what is your opinion?
Under normal circumstances the main goal of foreign policy is to create the best possible conditions for the country’s security and economic relations. But today we do not know what the goals are. Statements from the foreign minister are extremely rare, his deputies speak only about specific situations and events, not about strategic plans. If we were to judge this policy by its effects, we would have to say that it isolates Poland rather than improving security and good economic cooperation.
What is this isolation about?
If we look at the relations with our neighbors, which, as we know, are the most important in terms of security - a country is safe when it is surrounded by friends - we have bad or at best cool relations with everyone around us. Starting with the west: with Germany, as with other Western European countries, we are currently engaged in a legal and ideological dispute. It concerns fundamental questions of the rule of law and its principles, which today are the cause of an extremely sharp conflict both with the institutions of the entire European Union and with individual EU countries. Note that the European Parliament’s resolutions that are unfavorable to Poland are passed by a huge majority of votes. Contrary to what the Polish authorities claim, this is not a dispute with EU bureaucrats, but with the nations that make up the European community and with the democratic representatives of those nations.
Let us go further along the border. In the south we have an open conflict with the Czech Republic over the Turów mine, practically nonexistent cooperation in the Visegrad Group [Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary]. In the south-east there is Ukraine, with which we had very intensive relations under the previous government, but in recent years
they were clearly weakened by a very strong anti-Ukrainian lobby existing in Poland. In the east we have Belarus, with which we are in open conflict. We also have cool relations with Lithuania and other Baltic countries, which often criticize Warsaw’s policy. Of course, we cooperate on the migration crisis on our borders, but there have been significant differences here as well: incomprehensibly, Poland wanted to solve this problem on its own, while Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia worked closely with EU institutions from the beginning of the crisis.
In the end, albeit very late, the Polish government decided to internationalize the conflict on the Belarusian border. How would you comment on this situation?
I did not understand why the Polish government tried to create the impression that it would solve the crisis on its own. It was clear from the beginning that international negotiations, talks with Belarus and Russia, were necessary. Today, Poland is not capable of such negotiations: there is no politician in Poland who could establish a constructive dialogue with partners in Minsk or Moscow. I cannot remember any time since 1989 when relations with Russia were as bad as they are today. Therefore, it was obvious that the border conflict would not be solved without the participation of the EU and big EU countries. The Polish government’s attitude can only be explained by election-related reasons, an attempt to inflate the patriotic balloon, to consolidate citizens around the authorities in the face of an external threat. To me it was a completely sick idea. The problem of the migration crisis internationalized itself, as a result of the actions of Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron and European institutions. The Polish authorities simply had to come to terms with this. We still do not know whether the border conflict is not part of a larger operation, a more serious project to regain Russia’s influence in Ukraine. If so, nothing is moving in the right direction. If not, the crisis is likely to be contained soon.
You mentioned a significant deterioration of Polish-Ukrainian relations; what is the reason for this?
Nationalist tendencies dominate Polish foreign policy today. In such conditions it is impossible to maintain relations based on mutual trust with the Germans, Russians, Ukrainians or Belarusians. Polish nationalist circles are convinced that a German, a Russian, or a Ukrainian will always be an enemy of the Poles. This thinking is impossible to eradicate, it stems from the ideology of these movements. Poland has thus ceased to be an important ally of Ukraine. Of course, if there is a Russian military attack, we and the entire EU will stand in solidarity with Kiev.
How do you assess the current state of Polish-American relations?
Warsaw-Washington relations are best described by the words of Krzysztof Szczerski, former presidential minister and current Polish representative to the United Nations, who said that the Americans had elected their president, the Poles had elected their president, and they might not agree with each other. The Polish government seems to assume
that as long as the Americans believe that Russia and its actions are a threat to U.S. interests, military and security cooperation is unthreatened. In contrast, the Polish authorities do not care about the remaining political cooperation, believing that the United States under the current administration will be guided by different values and ideology from their own. As far as economic relations are concerned, the issue of the proposed new Polish media law, which, if enacted, would hit American interests, forcing Discovery to sell its majority stake in TVN, a TV station that is sympathetic to the opposition, has had a devastating effect. Poland’s conflict with the European Union over the rule of law and judicial independence is also of key importance to American investors. It is difficult to expect that an investor would want to operate in a country which proclaims that its internal laws are more important than international agreements. The possibility of unilateral changes in legal regulations effectively deters any company interested in the Polish market. The situation is similar with financing for investments: no self-respecting bank will grant a large loan for operations in Poland if it is considered a high-risk country in the legal field, and if it does, the interest rate will be much higher. There is also another, more long-term negative consequence of this government’s bad policies: after a period of increasing trust and friendliness toward Poland came the discovery that Poles have two faces. Today’s face of Poland is foreign to the current U.S. administration. It will be very difficult to change that effectively in the coming years. Of course, we too have seen two faces of the United States, and it remains to be seen whether the one personified by Donald Trump will not return in a few years.
Another minefield for Polish foreign policy is the relations with Israel, the worst in decades; can they ever be repaired in the face of gestures from Warsaw such as choosing Marek Magierowski, former ambassador to Tel Aviv, who is considered persona non grata by the Israeli government, as Poland’s new ambassador to the United States?
Joe Biden (in the middle) with Andrzej Duda (second from right), Photo PAP
The crisis in relations with Israel results from what I have already mentioned: Polish foreign policy being dominated by nationalist circles. Polish nationalism is strongly associated with an anti-Semitic subtext, the conviction that, to put it mildly, Jews are not friendly to Poles. We have witnessed many anti-Semitic statements in recent years, even by politicians from the front ranks of the current government. As long as the United Right is in power, an improvement in relations with Tel Aviv is, in my opinion, unthinkable.
Zbigniew Rau , Photo PAP
Is it even possible to speak of a single center pursuing foreign policy in today’s Poland? Many observers have the impression that there are at least several: the President’s Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the headquarters of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party…
Things are similar in almost all European countries today. The burden of EU policy has moved to prime ministers’ offices, if only due to the fact that meetings of the European Council, which used to be very rare in the past, are now held very often. Difficult issues are therefore decided personally by the heads of government. As for other key elements of foreign policy, in Poland issues of relations with the United States have been moved to the Presidential Palace, while relations with Russia now seem to be in the hands of the dominant figure in Polish politics, i.e. the president of PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński. As regards China, we have no policy at all. As a result of all this, the Foreign Ministry finds itself in a very difficult position. However, this does not preclude a scenario in which a strong, determined personality at the helm of the ministry could bring about the return of the foreign policy coordination center to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But, as I mentioned at the beginning of the conversation, I have not seen any significant statement from Minister Zbigniew Rau so far. The decline in the importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is dramatic. It cannot be explained by institutional factors alone; unfortunately the weakness of this ministry in terms of human resources has to be underlined.
Zbigniew Rau , Photo PAP
The picture you have presented is not optimistic. What do you think about the prospects for foreign policy in the coming months and years? Is it possible to strengthen it, to restore its proper importance?
It depends on what the present government’s real objective is. One might build a hypothesis that it is ultimately “Polexit,” Poland’s exit from European Union structures. In such a case, the periods of intensified propaganda against foreigners who are unfriendly to Poland and the mobilization of domestic public opinion in the patriotic spirit would become explainable. We can already see the effects of this, fortunately minor ones as yet; public opinion is softening its support for the European Union. When it comes to the standard question, “Do you want Poland to be a member of the EU?”, positive answers remain impressively high. But when the questions go deeper, we can see growing disillusionment with the EU, growing apprehension. And if Polexit is not the goal of those in power, we are dealing with a nightmarish ineptitude of foreign policy, today conducted in an often truly embarrassing way. I don’t see a way to quick improvement; unfortunately I am a pessimist. What particularly bothers me is that I still see no prospect of resolving this government’s dispute with the EU over the rule of law. My impression is that nobody sees one. This issue might be resolved in a way that will hurt Poland for years to come. The situation from the UK is repeating itself, where Brexit depended on solutions with-
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Photo PAP
In 2001 you founded the Civic Platform (PO), today the largest opposition party in Poland; do you think that there are people within the PO, or, more broadly, the whole opposition, who have a concept for foreign policy and/or who would be able to change this policy for the better?
There are probably many politicians out there who think, and rightly so because of their track record, that they could be very successful foreign ministers. So yes, I can easily imagine a well-composed ministry leadership. Such a leadership would also have good ideas on how to professionally strengthen Polish diplomatic staff, which has seen some very indecent changes in recent years. But the task that these politicians would face would be enormous. I and my colleagues, in those heroic times when we sought EU membership, convinced the world that all the Poles wanted to build a common Europe. Today, after six years of right-wing governments, this appears not to be the case. So there will be no question of growing trust in Poland as a partner.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Photo PAP
in the governing coalition. Similarly to that situation, the issue of the rule of law in Poland, which is the basis of the dispute with the EU, is a hostage to the crisis within the United Right.
In your opinion, is Polexit really feasible?
Did Brexit seem possible? I do not think that Poland’s possible exit from the EU can take place quickly; it is obviously out of the question in the time horizon of the current parliament and government... or at least we think so. But in the long run I can absolutely imagine it. If someone spent very big money on a well-constructed anti-EU campaign in Poland, wouldn’t we be really nervous before a possible referendum? Look at how the attitude of people in Hungary changed, how George Soros could be made into an enemy of the nation. Public opinion naturally, instinctively, pays more attention to the arguments of those in power than to those of the opposition. That is why the losses can be extremely severe and why we attach such great responsibility to what those in power say.
Are the Polish government’s attempts to create strange alliances, such as the so-called Warsaw-Budapest-Rome axis (the last element denoting Italian nationalists), more of a decoration or a real political plan?
No serious alternative axis can be built among European countries, especially since the financial crisis and later Brexit. On the contrary, there has been a strengthening of cooperation within the EU, not a weakening, as some, especially the Russians, expected. So these are rather exotic alliances and I don’t think that even those in power attach any particular importance to them. The current reason for such initiatives, I think, is a desire to have a stronger voice in the European Parliament by consolidating nationalists from different countries. But the reality shows that such groups do not gain more ground; on the contrary, they lose it, as we have seen in the elections in Germany and elsewhere. Therefore, I do not think that such a scenario of those in power is possible to realize.
It is obvious from what you say that a sine qua non condition for repairing Polish diplomacy and ensuring Poland’s security and partner relations in Europe and the world is a change of the ruling team after the next elections. However, are foreign policy issues considered at all by ordinary voters at the ballot box?
This is a difficult question, but a very important one. From my contacts with voters, even in the provinces, I can see that if we squabble with Russia, people treat this as normal. But when we simultaneously squabble with the United States, things change, anxiety appears. People say to me: “you city people don’t care much, but in the end it’ll be us being called up to the army [in case of a war].” When there is serious tension, the public starts to get nervous. This is evidenced by the current sense of relief after the European Union became involved in the conflict on the Polish-Belarusian border. The tension and interest in the problem decreased, which actually worried Law and Justice, a party that plays on social anxiety. So, in serious situations, Poles are interested in foreign policy. In other situations they are not, because these issues are distant from their everyday life, and besides, they are not fully comprehensible.
