Abu Ghraib Remembrance

By George Aldridge

unleashed a maelstrom of fanaticism, internecine sectarian violence, mayhem and looting and anti-American hatred; it helped spawn ISIS, a virulent, violent Salafist Caliphate that threatened to take over Iraq. It also did damage that will take generations to get over. Under postwar U.S. mismanagement, Iraq went from being a “republic of fear” to a “caldron of chaos.”

The First Gulf War erupted shortly after I entered the U.S. Foreign Service—an otherwise optimistic period highlighted by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War. Years later, the 2003 German film “Good Bye, Lenin!” captured the near disbelief that the Warsaw Pact was no more and that the Cold War was over.

IRAQ WARS CRUSH POST-COLD WAR CALM

Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Kuwait abruptly sidelined the euphoria of the times.

Tension and turmoil thereafter seemed to reign even as the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton sought to facilitate a just and lasting Arab-Israeli peace settlement, albeit without Palestinian representation. Appalling horrors in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Darfur spoke of ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, even genocide. Heartless brutality took place in Srebrenica, making a mockery of “U.N. safe-havens”—the oxymoron of the 1990s.

THIS MARCH 20 will mark 20 years since the Second Gulf War, more commonly known as the Iraq War. Launched under dubious, many would maintain fabricated, justifications, the U.S.-led invasion

A U.S. diplomat for more than 27 years, George Aldridge was consul for labor and economic affairs in Casablanca from August 2002 to July 2005. Before entering the U.S. Foreign Service in July 1990, he taught American and Texas government at three North Texas junior colleges and was executive director of the southwest office of the National Association of Arab Americans.

By the early 2000s my family and I were based in Casablanca, where I was consul for labor and economic affairs, involved in the George W. Bush administration’s negotiations for a free trade agreement with Morocco. As the specter of a second Gulf War seemed inevitable, our lives grew more cautious. My wife—like other expatriates—was anxious about public reactions once our bombing raids over Baghdad occurred. “Don’t speak English to me when we’re out shopping,” she stressed. “Mumble in French or Arabic, but don’t speak English.” We concealed our identity as Americans and even exchanged our diplomatic license plates for regular Moroccan ones.

My business, labor and civil society Moroccan contacts and friends were equally alarmed. To a person, they hoped that the war would be swiftly over, with few civilian casualties. The Iraqi people, they emphasized, should not be punished for the crimes of Saddam Hussain and the Ba’ath Party. Liberate them from tyranny, but do not subject them to reprisal, they urged. I sensed they generally supported our March 2003 campaign to remove Hussain and eliminate the Iraqi military’s wherewithal to threaten its neighbors.

The Abu Ghraib Revulsion

But with the subsequent occupation came the revolting news in July 2003 of sadomasochist torture: U.S. soldiers and intelligence officers were shown to have brutalized Iraqi detainees in macabre and grotesque ways. The February 2004 Taguba Report acknowledged that U.S. personnel at Abu Ghraib committed “numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses” of detainees. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt described the vile treatment of the Iraqi prisoners as “reprehensible.” In an appearance alongside King Abdullah II of Jordan, President Bush apologized for what he said was “abhorrent abuse” and a “stain on our country’s honor and reputation.”

I was disgusted, but I was also worried. Islamists known as integristes (hardcore Islamic fundamentalists) in Morocco and others would surely use Abu Ghraib to vilify us. Various American leaders such as Generals David Petraeus and Stanley A. McChrystal warned that Islamists would use Abu Ghraib as a recruitment tool, pointing out that we Americans are indeed hideous infidels. General McChrystal commented: “In my experience, we found that every first-time jihadist claimed Abu Ghraib had first jolted him into action.”

Retribution for our crimes would be forthcoming. Our soldiers, expatriates, missionaries, diplomats, aid workers, embassy and consulate employees from the host country known as “foreign service nationals,” Peace Corps volunteers, overseas teachers and students and tourists would likely be targeted in revenge attacks.

But not only Americans and other Westerners would be threatened and victimized, Moroccans told me. As several stressed, Moroccans close to the embassy in Rabat and consulate in Casablanca or connected to the international schools and other U.S.affiliated institutions would be attacked as traitors. Moroccan women, specifically those who exhibited Western mores and lifestyles, would be especially vulnerable. As one long-time female consular contact warned me, “The integristes will now go after anyone seen as pro-Western. You’ve enraged them against us.”

Perhaps even more alarming was a bitter comment made repeatedly by several Moroccans: “Before Abu Ghraib we thought you Americans were better than us. Now we know this is not true. You are no better than the worst of our so-called leaders. Our image of Americans has been shaken.”

Lost Faith In American Exceptionalism

Hearing Moroccans say that they had lost faith in American exceptionalism was jarring. After all, they routinely took pride in reminding one and all that in December 1777 their country was the first to recognize the United States of America. Since Operation Torch during World War II when U.S. forces liberated Morocco from French Vichy control in November 1942, Moroccans have regarded us as “the good guys.” This image was further strengthened in subsequent years when the U.S. objected to French efforts to reimpose colonial control of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Somehow, even our steadfast support for Zionism had not dissuaded Moroccans that we were their friends and worthy of emulation. Abu Ghraib changed their views. Moreover, Moroccans were openly offended by our nonimmigrant visa policy that assumed that all young North African and Middle Eastern males were an inherent threat. At large gatherings of Moroccan high school students—many of them fluent English speakers—there were frequent expressions of anxiety about going to college in the United States. These talented young scholars worried that they would be shunned and mistreated for being Moroccan Muslims.

Their parents were already alarmed by the horrors that took place ten years earlier in Bosnia. On numerous occasions they asked me if the West truly cared about Muslims. As they often remarked, “if the West won’t accept and safeguard the most Westernized and Europeanized Muslims among us, the Bosniaks, as coequals, what Muslims would be acceptable? Will you ever like us and welcome us to your homes?” They were truly disturbed by what they considered the West’s inaction and pretty much suggested that no matter how secular and Western-oriented Muslims became, they would never be fully welcomed and accorded equal status.

Hopefully, those parents, as well as the students—now adults nearing 40 years of age—have rediscovered that Americans are indeed their friends. And we need their friendship. ■