2. Achieving free movement

Is free movement a pipe dream?

Any argument for global free movement must recognise the enormous challenges of arguing for this goal in the current political context. The idea has few vocal supporters in the political mainstream, being largely confined to circles of sympathetic activists and intellectuals. Moreover, the rise in right-wing nationalist political parties and movements, deeply imbued with anti-migrant politics, make the task more difficult still. Far-right parties won around 25% of the vote in the 2019 European elections, and in South America a ‘conservative wave’ has brought to power Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Mauricio Macri in Argentina and Sebastian Piñera in Chile in recent years, all of whom have described refugees as disease-ridden or criminals.55 The anti-immigrant attitudes of Trump in the US are well-documented, and Australia recently voted in Scott Morrison, a man who promised to drastically cut migration56 and used unlawful measures to prevent asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat.57 In the UK, the party which introduced the ‘hostile environment’ for migrants was last year re-elected with 44% of the popular vote.

In this context, it may seem that free movement is simply not a viable political project. However, this conclusion is too hasty. Without downplaying the above challenges, the current political attitudes regarding migration are by no means uniformly negative. In the 2019 European elections, the rise of the far right was accompanied by a ‘green wave’ of broadly pro-migration parties, winning around 20% of the total vote coming second in Germany and third in France.58 In the US, despite Trump’s repeated attacks on migrants in recent years, polling data shows that almost a quarter of people want to see immigration increased and 40% would like it to stay the same. The centre ground has moved significantly on this issue with 34% of Democrats wanting an increase compared to around 20% in 2014.59 Most strikingly of all, almost a quarter of people in the US believe that we should have ‘basically

open borders’.60 During the ‘migrant crisis’ of 2015-17 in Europe, huge mobilisations in support of admitting more refugees took place in London (attended by around 100,000)61 and in Barcelona (attended by around 150,000),62 with hundreds of thousands of people marching against the far-right in Berlin.63 Furthermore, demographic shifts are likely to lead to increasing support for free movement, with young people holding more progressive views on migration.64

It is also important to recognise how dramatically political attitudes and social structures can shift in the space of a few years or decades. At the turn of the millennium, for example, there was not a single country on earth where same sex marriage was authorised by law. At the time of writing, there are 27 countries that have legalised the practice,65 including the vast majority of western European countries. In Europe, these changes happened partly due to a European wide network of determined LGBT activists, academics and policy makers working in tandem.66 Similarly, at the start of the 20th century women’s suffrage was extremely limited – now women have voting rights in every country in the world aside from Vatican City.67 To achieve suffrage, women in the UK used tactics of hunger strikes, vandalism and civil disobedience.68 In Iran, women went on strike and organised counter-protests in 1963 in order to maintain their suffrage and right to stand for political office.69 While these legal developments do not represent panaceas for the emancipation of LGBT+ people or women, they attest to the possibility of major progressive change in unpredictable ways.

For free movement to be achieved, it will require a powerful, coordinated global movement. And of course, many elements of such a movement are already in place and being led by migrants themselves. In recent years we have seen hunger strikes from migrants detained in UK and South African detention centres; protests from migrant workers on the streets of Beirut; in France, the Gilet Noirs movement of undocumented people campaigning for better living conditions;70 anti-deportation protests in Israel, led by Sudanese and Eritrean women; in Hong Kong, campaigns by domestic workers from Indonesia and the Philippines for better wages and working conditions. A particularly striking example was the ‘caravan’ of thousands of migrants that left Honduras in October 2018, heading for the US-Mexico border. En route they were joined by migrants from

other Central American countries, such as El Salvador and Guatemala. The caravan transformed the often isolating process of trying to migrate to the US into a collective one, with positive political consequences. Observing the caravan, Martha Balaguera and Alfonso Gonzalez described the consciousness-raising process that took place, as those involved came to see their experiences through a political, structural lens. In the words of Boris, one member of the group:

Before coming in the [caravan], I thought of myself as an individual. But through the journey, I learned that any of us could have to migrate one day and that we are living a collective problem. When I get out of here, I will struggle for my detained compañeros, and I urge people to struggle in solidarity with us as well.71

Around the world, then, there exist significant currents of support for migration and greater migrant rights, and a powerful migrant-led movement already exists. That is not to deny the range of obstacles and objections to free movement – which we return to in the final section of this pamphlet. But first, we must consider in more detail what kind of political and structural changes could bring us towards a world of free movement, and what demands the movement for open borders should make.

Short-term measures to strengthen migrant rights

The path to free movement requires short-term measures which strengthen the rights and well-being of migrants. Given the wide variety of national policies regarding migration around the world, the demands which bring this about will naturally be varied. However, one vital step in most countries would be to make it easier for people to immigrate by liberalising the rules governing entry. For instance, in the UK there has been a push to remove the minimum income threshold for migrant workers to bring over family members;72 this law was only introduced a few years ago and could easily be reversed. Reducing the exorbitant visa fees and improving accessibility to visa fee waivers would also make a huge difference. Over 70% of those who claim they are facing destitution, and a similar proportion of child applicants, are turned down for financial help with visa fees by the Home Office.73 Encouraging the proliferation and institutionalisation of humanitarian visas, which can allow people to apply for asylum without having to take hazardous journeys across borders, would also be an important step in this regard. Humanitarian visa policies already

exist in countries such as Brazil, where they have been issued in response to crises in neighbouring countries.74

A full defence of the right to freely move must go beyond removing barriers to entry by also strengthening the rights of migrants living in host countries. This could be achieved by granting undocumented migrants an amnesty or regularisation, allowing them to acquire legal status, a demand currently being made in the UK by groups including Migrants Organise.75 Similarly, migrant communities in the US have also been demanding an amnesty for several decades, ever since the last amnesty in 1986.76 Evidence suggests that the 1986 US regularisation programme increased wages and job opportunities as well as helping with social integration.77 In 2005, a Spanish amnesty regularised around 600,000 migrants, with each person adding on average €4,400 to the Spanish tax coffers.78

However, amnesties can come in many different forms; in order to bring us closer to free movement they need to be part of a consistent set of policies, with broad eligibility criteria and accompanied by measures to enforce workers’ rights. In 2014, Morocco regularised almost 18,000 undocumented migrants, in what was seen as an assertion of independence against EU demands for a crackdown on irregular migrants attempting to travel into Europe from the country. Unfortunately, Moroccan policy has since become increasingly draconian at the behest of the EU, with thousands of violent removals of sub-Saharan Africans.79 Thus, though the amnesty may have provided momentum towards free movement, it was ultimately not sustained. Moreover, many NGOs complained that the eligibility criteria of the Moroccan amnesty were too strict. Applicants required a valid employment contract and proof of at least 5 years continuous residence, both very difficult to prove for people on the margins of society working illegally.80

Regional free movement zones

Over the longer term, one route to universal free movement could be built through regional free movement zones. Existing free movement zones could be expanded and new ones created, leading eventually to their being merged into a single global system operating without border controls. Many such zones already exist: the European Union, the Caribbean Community, the MERCOSUR agreement in South America, and the Trans-Tasman

Travel Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand. Other moves are underway elsewhere. For example, in 2018 the African Union agreed a protocol aiming to facilitate “the progressive implementation of free movement of persons, right of residence and the right of establishment in Africa”.81 For some, the idea of an African free movement zone is a core anti-colonial demand – in the words of Cameroonian political theorist Achille Mbembe: “If we want to conclude the work of decolonisation, we have to bring down colonial boundaries in our continent and turn Africa into a vast space of circulation for itself, for its descendants and for everyone who wants to tie his or her fate with our continent”.82

Free movement zones could grow gradually, allowing countries to adapt to the changes brought about by population changes, as governments do within existing borders today. Although we should be sceptical of the assumption that global free movement would necessarily create unsustainable population flows (see part 3), increases in migration to some countries could lead to short-term challenges. It is important, however, to emphasise that with good planning, even such short-term challenges can be overcome. For example, the Turkish city of Gazaintep is today hosting around half a million refugees from Syria, which has caused its population to grow by 30%. After an initial period of pressure on housing stock, wages and drinking water, the local government embarked on a series of infrastructural reforms benefiting both refugees and the local population, with the city now considered a model for migrant integration.83

Working towards a world of free movement through gradually expanding regional free movement zones carries huge challenges. Firstly, free movement zones often overlap with areas of economic cooperation between states that are skewed towards the interests of big business. The European single market, for example, guarantees the free movement of goods, capital and services, alongside freedom of movement for workers. Since the 1980s, when some European countries began to embrace neoliberal economic policies, the EU has contributed to weakened unions, reduced wages and lower rates of employment by pursuing a “labor market flexibility agenda… having a monetary policy focus on inflation instead of full employment and imposing fiscal austerity and central bank independence”.84 This trend has continued in recent times with the EU imposing austerity on countries such as Greece, Italy,

and Portugal; the case of Greece occurred in spite of a national referendum rejecting austerity.85 To be truly emancipatory, free movement needs to go hand in hand with a levelling up of workers’ rights and a fairer distribution of wealth.

Secondly, free movement zones in the rich parts of the world can undermine the rights of those coming from beyond the zone’s borders. For example, the development of free movement in Europe has been used as a justification for the development of ‘Fortress Europe’ and repressive policing of the EU border. Furthermore, those coming from outside of the free movement zone are vulnerable to exploitation. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for instance, has free movement between member states. However, this free movement coexists with a regime of extreme exploitation and abuse of migrant labourers from outside the GCC, many of whom are tied to their employers (see part 1). We need to ensure that free movement is intimately linked to a push for workers’ rights.

Anti-racist groups in high-income countries must also be strengthened if regional free movement zones are to expand effectively. In the free movement zone in West Africa, ECOWAS, many people have been murdered in xenophobic attacks, having gone to work or start businesses in other countries.86 Similarly, some of the public opposition in the EU to Turkey’s accession is due to the fact that it is a predominantly Muslim country.87 The UK’s vote to leave the EU, and reduce a free movement zone, was partly linked to a backlash against immigration and was starkly divided across racial lines. A 2016 poll found that 67% of Asian voters voted to remain, as did 73% of black voters, compared to 47% of white voters.88 The referendum result was followed by a rise in hate crime against black and brown people, as well as Eastern Europeans.89

Free movement: past and present

There have been numerous examples of free movement between states in the post-war era. None is perfect, but together they point to the possibility of one day dismantling border controls altogether.

Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies

Dates: 1948–1962 Member states: United Kingdom and all its colonial territories

The 1948 British Nationality Act granted 600 million Commonwealth citizens not only the right to migrate to the UK, but equal legal rights with

all British-born citizens including access to work and social and political rights. Whether a person was born in Colchester, Colombo or Kingston, they had the same citizenship and the same rights. Despite the theoretical equality of Commonwealth citizens, when they came to the UK discrimination in employment and housing was widely and openly practised. This was not prohibited until 1965, when the UK introduced its first Race Relations Act. However, this act was introduced in tandem with harsh immigration legislation, with Labour MP Roy Hattersley infamously claiming that “integration without limitation is impossible”. In 1967, Indians living in Kenya were forced to leave the country and came to the UK on account of their British citizenship. However, the UK government quickly introduced emergency legislation, the 1968 Commonwealth Act, to stop them arriving based on the colour of their skin.90 This discrimination against British citizens from the colonies has continued to the present day, most recently through the Windrush scandal in which the British government actively illegalised, excluded, and in some cases detained and deported those who moved from Caribbean former colonies before 1973, and were therefore entitled to effective rights of citizenship.91

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Dates: Treaty agreed 1979–present Member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Following the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, the 1979 Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment envisioned the creation of a region of free mobility to be implemented in three phases. The first phase, removing visa requirements for travel for up to 90 days between ECOWAS states for citizens, has been fully implemented. The second and third phases, providing for the right of residence and establishment, including equal treatment with local citizens regarding economic and social rights, are in the process of implementation. There is a common ECOWAS travel document, issued by the governments of all member states and recognised across the region.

A notable feature of the ECOWAS model is the provision for the integration of refugees displaced across the region by the war in Liberia and Sierra Leone. As ECOWAS citizens, as well as refugees, these populations should theoretically have

the right to residence and labour market access on a non-discriminatory basis. Although significant hurdles remain, the UNHCR has developed a framework for the integration of refugees in ECOWAS host countries.

The Nordic Passport Union

Dates: 1952–present Member States: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Faroe Islands, Iceland (joined 1966)

In a series of treaties and agreements concluded between 1952 and 1958, restrictions on mobility between citizens of the Nordic countries, including requirements for visas, work-permits or passports in order to travel, settle and work, were removed. This was accompanied with the Nordic Convention on Social Security of 1955 which ensured equality of treatment for all Nordic citizens in receipt of all social welfare including pensions, sick-pay and unemployment benefits among others.

The Passport Union was motivated by a widely shared desire for closer political and economic ties across the Scandinavian bloc. However, its implementation nonetheless generated opposition motivated by racism and protectionism. In particular, concerns over the possible free movement of Finnish Roma communities into Sweden were an initial stumbling block. This group had been previously explicitly excluded from entry to Sweden under a Roma immigration ban. Throughout the 1960s and ‘70s, under the new mobility rights of the Union, proportionately significant numbers of Finnish Roma did move to Sweden, drawn not only by the booming labour market and higher quality of life, but also fleeing the intense social exclusion and discrimination they faced in Finland.

The Passport Union created the circumstances whereby Swedish and Finnish Roma populations came into regular contact and thus were able to begin to mobilise and radicalise, demanding equal treatment and an end to assimilationist policies in both countries.92 Riding the wave of this political momentum, the international Nordic Roma community that had taken shape thanks to the Passport Union and relaxation of mobility rights was able to emerge as a new form of transnational minority politics, forming pressure groups and forcing through a more rights-based approach in education and integration policy among others. Although unintended, this is a striking example of the benefits of free movement for enabling subordinate groups to defend and extend their rights.