PNCR-Coalition was ‘most incompetent, corrupt’ in Guyana’s history – Jagdeo

Guyanese are clear on the sheer incompetence of the former APNU+AFC Coalition government, which, now, in Opposition, is attempting to pull the wool over their eyes with talk of grand plans for change.

“Every single person in this country… now say with certainty that the last government was the most incompetent in our history, the most corrupt in our history and the government, in such a short period, they managed to devastate, in racial terms, some of the communities that Indo-Guyanese and Amerindians lived in,” he said.

According to him, the PNCR-led Coalition came into office in 2015 with goodwill after selling a story to Guyanese voters that they were competent, had a clear governance plan, was committed to the fight against corruption, and could bring economic development.

“Three fallacies that were proven to be fallacies in their tenure in office,” he said.

Jagdeo added too that details being disclosed daily continue to add to the 50-plus scandals, which took place between 2015 to 2020.

At a prior forum, Jagdeo had noted that the Coalition’s position on fighting corruption is in question, given the many scandals, a few of which include:

1. The debacle over the US$18m signing bonus.

2. The transfer of over $20M of taxpayers’ monies to the children of Minister Simona Broomes. Details on the matter indicate that in 2018, two transfers of US$25,000 each to the daughter of Minister Broomes, the Department of Public Service within the Ministry of the Presidency.

In 2019, there was another transfer to Broomes’ daughter worth US$36,450 by the Department of Public Service within the Ministry of the Presidency. Minister Broomes’ son, in 2019, benefited from a fourth transfer of GYD$2.51M from the same Department. The disclosure from your Director General, Joseph Harmon, that the monies represented sums for scholarships raises more questions that remain unanswered.

3. The failure to account for the use of taxpayers’ monies on the multi-million dollar D’Urban Park Project. After months of delay, it is only recently that information has been finally handed to the Audit Office by the Ministry of Public Infrastructure. The 2017 Audit report pointed out that millions spent on the project could not be account- ed for.

4. The continued breaches of Guyana’s procurement laws, relative to the feasibility study on a new Demerara River crossing. The Public Procurement Commission has pronounced on the illegal nature of this undertaking. The report said:

“The PPC noted that the Minster of Public Infrastructure, by memorandum dated November 18 2016, made a request to the Cabinet for Government seeking consideration and approval to use funds from the Demerara Harbor Bridge Corporation to fund the feasibility study and to commence a contractual engagement with LievenseCSO as of the 1 Jan 2017.” The PPC noted that this request to Cabinet was not forwarded through the NPTA but submitted directly by the Minister of Public Infrastructure. The PPC also noted that Cabinet considered the memorandum submitted by the Minister of Public Infrastructure and in November 2016 approved a total sum of $161,514,420 to be used from the Demerara Harbor Bridge Corporation to cover cost for the feasibility study for a new bridge across the Demerara river.” To date, new information indicates that more than $$161,514,420 was spent – instead it is close to $300 million that was spent.

5. The use of public office by Minister Cathy Hughes to bolster her financial standing and that of her company, Videomega Productions.

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Nationally defined plans by developing countries the attractive model for the 21st Century

The commitment to a balanced developmental approach was reiterated ad nauseum by the PPP/C Government, underscoring the recognition of Guyana’s situational nuance as both an oil and gas producer and a leader on the climate change front.

This recognition is encapsulated in the Low Carbon Development Strategy 2030 (LCDS 2030). The LCDS 2030 sets how – in line with the 2009 vision - Guyana will advance its payment for forest climate services model and invest new revenues in the low carbon economy, while also expanding the vision to include Guyana’s other globally significant ecosystem services. It summarises how the country aims to achieve the right balance between (i) low impact mining and forestry to enhance employment and income generation opportunities – today these sectors employ 40,000 people and contribute over a billion dollars to export earnings – while preparing for new opportunities as the world seeks more advance minerals for the global transition to renewable energy and electric mobility; (ii) continuing to provide forest climate services, maintaining Guyana’s 18 million hectare forest, and sustaining one of the world’s lowest rates of deforestation; (iii) advancing Guyana’s next generation of ecosystem services such as water management and biodiversity protection. It also outlines how Guyana’s Protected Areas System will be expanded (page 30), how partners will be sought for the International Centre for Biodiversity Research (page 32) and a sustainable Ocean Economy will be nurtured (page 33). The document addresses too how Guyana has evolving from the 2009 vision for forest climate services. It provides more detail (Page 36) on the three phases first identified in 2009, and how Phase I – the Guyana-Norway Agreement – saw Guyana receive US$220 million payments for the period 2009-2015. The specific investments from the payments from Norway are summarised in Appendix III (page 134). Further, it sets out how Guyana is preparing to move to Phase 2 (pages 37-42), when payments from Norway can be replaced or augmented by payments from the voluntary carbon markets. A revenue sharing mechanism, which resulted from the national consultation, and which was endorsed by the National Toshaos’ Council as the final step in the national consultation was also detailed in the document. This revenue sharing mechanism focuses on how indigenous peoples and local communities can receive revenues through: National programmes as outlined in the LCDS 2030 (e.g. renewable energy as described in Chapter 3, land titling as described in Chapter 4, protecting against climate change as described in Chapter 5); and Community/Village-led programmes for indigenous peoples and local communities as set out tin Village Sustainability Plans (VSPs) or equivalent, put together by communities themselves in accordance with the principles of Free Prior and Informed Consent (more detail is set out on Page 43 and 44). The LCDS 2030 also draws attention to how Guyana had developed a comprehensive strategy for addressing the huge losses the country suffers from droughts, floods and other climate-related events. The strategy – the Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategy (CRSAP) was developed with revenues from the Guyana-Norway Agreement, but it was not progressed after 2015.

Importantly, the LCDS 2030, addresses the oil and gas sector and Guyana’s plans to achieve one of the world’s most ambitious energy transitions – where energy use can increase five-fold while costs can be dramatically decreased, and greenhouse gas emissions can stay approximately flat is also addressed. It sets out plans for Transformative Investment (page 48), including in Isolated Grids (page 56), a new section on Policies and Incentives to Encourage Consumer Choice (page 60) and more information about Energy Efficiency Measures (page 61).

Further, Guyana’s Vice President, Bharrat Jagdeo has affirmed that Guyana will develop its oil and gas sector in a manner that is environmentally safe and not remain locked into a cycle of “low emission and low income” – a cycle that ignores the fact that Guyana is a net carbon sink, among other facts.