The Wellesley Globalist: Volume IV, Issue 1"Lingua Franca"

the Wellesley Globalist Volume VI, Issue 1

Lingua Franca

D

Letter from the Editors

ear Globalist Readers,

Welcome to our fall issue of the Globalist, Wellesley’s student-run magazine on international affairs.

This fall’s theme is “Lingua Franca,” which means a common language and was first used to describe a shared vocabulary of Italian, French, Spanish, Greek, and Arabic amongst trading partners in the Mediterranean during the Middle Ages. This theme symbolizes the commonalities between our wide array of article topics as well as bringing together communities, no matter how seemingly disparate, to begin mutually beneficial conversations. We begin in China, assessing President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and learning about a small Jewish community facing cultural erasure. We then journey to the Middle East and Africa where we examine two ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and South Sudan and their respective leaders’ responses. Next we jump to Europe, where our writers focus on the the rise of nationalist movements, and end in the Americas dancing to the beat of Latin pop in Miami and shooting for the moon (and beyond).

On behalf of the Wellesley Globalist Staff, we would like to thank our writers and contributors, including our lecture speakers Professors Abeberese and Rosenwald, for their time and dedication. We encourage you to reach us at thewellesleyglobalist_wcso@wellesley.edu if you wish to contribute articles or photographs to our next issue. You can also follow us on Facebook to keep up with our upcoming events, including our spring open meeting, lecture, and publication party.

B

est, Your Editors-in-Chief Zarina Patwa ‘18 and Katherine Schauer ‘18

Editorial Staff: Editors-in-Chief: Zarina Patwa Katherine Schauer Managing Editor: Sarah Shireen Moinuddeen Secretary/Treasurers: Lindsey Bennett Devyani Kalra Event Coordinator: Tiffany Zhou Photographer: Aya Kaino Web Content Managers: Hajira Fuad Claudia Lamprecht Mika Thakkar

1

Associate Editors: Denisse Becerra Shreya Parjan Christine Roberts Mallika Sarupria Yashna Shivdasani Anna Wan Copy Editors: Stephanie Makredes Anastacia Markoe Laurel Stickney Layout Staff: Claudia Lamprecht Stephanie Makredes Hajira Fuad

Cover Photo by Katherine Schauer

Mercado de la Boqueria in Barcelona, Spain Photo by Katherine Schauer

Table of Contents: 3 9 13 16

Asia

Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign by Mallika Sarupria Memory and Erasure of the Jewish Past by Laurel Stickney

Middle East and Africa

South Sudan by Emma Schaechter-Santander The Afghanistan War by Makiko Miyazaki

Europe

Understanding the Re-emergence of Nationalist Movements in the European Union by Arela Haluci 25 Nigel Farage and Donald Trump by Sarah White 20

28 31 33

The Americas

Mr. 305 and Miami Sound by Vita Solorio-Fielder To the Moon and Back Again by Mehak Sarang An Exploration of Lingua Franca: Trade and Translation 2

Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign

By Mallika Sarupria

After coming to power, the centerpiece of Xi Jinping’s political agenda has been the eradication of corruption by targeting tigers (high-level officials) and flies (low-level officials). The economic changes brought about by the reform era intensified the already existing corruption in China, creating fertile ground for Xi to execute a policy that targeted corruption. This campaign was not only politically motivated, as it was initiated at a time when Xi needed to consolidate his power, but it was also implemented to improve the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the eyes of the people. While this policy intended to target tigers and flies alike, its initial focus on tigers has caused it to face criticism for being a political purge disguised as an anticorruption policy. In addition to this, Xi has used

this campaign to solidify and expand the power of the CCP through the centralization of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) as well as through reliance on the party apparatus to enforce discipline. Thus, this campaign has helped Xi improve the legitimacy of the party; however, it only provides a short term solution because it tackles the symptom rather than the root cause of corruption. Moreover, this policy also has implications for China’s growth due to its impact on the luxury market, the efficiency of officials, and level of investments. Thus, Xi’s anticorruption policy represents his intentions of advancing China towards stricter authoritarianism.

It is important to understand the nature of corruption prevalent in the Mao era to understand how corruption was intensified and transformed

Photo by APEC 2013 3

during the reform era. Mao believed that corruption was the “filth and poison of the past,” and therefore saw his anti-corruption campaigns as tools that would contribute to attainment of a socialist state. Moreover, Mao was devoted to diminishing the importance of Confucianism, as he saw it as an impediment to the socialist transformation he envisioned for China. In his article, “Corruption or Guanxi? Differentiating Between the Legitimate, Unethical, and Corrupt Activities of Chinese Government Officials,” Jacob Harding explains that this was an important step in Mao’s advance against corruption because it included diminishing the power of guanxi, a Confucian concept based on creating relationships and maintaining them through social activities and reciprocal gifting. An integral part of society and Chinese culture, guanxi was prone to corruption because it blurred the distinction between public responsibility and private benefits and allowed for nepotism and partiality to spread within the political and economic sphere. Furthermore, the centralized economy and lack of private ownership led to profit-seeking goals being seen as a by-product of “capitalism’s sugar coated bullets” and was therefore labeled as corrupt.

The opening up of the economy in the reform era led to the intensification and transformation of corruption. Economic reform reshaped China’s legal, regulatory, and business environment, which created more room for large-scale corruption.

Decentralization was an important aspect of the economic reform implemented in China. One of the main reforms introduced to decentralize China’s economy was the transfer of control from government assets to private firms. This transfer was facilitated by local government officials who acted as liaisons between the government and the market and consequently developed relationships with the private-firm owners. This responsibility engendered competition amongst the local officials who wanted to ensure that they were more successful than the rest, which subsequently led them to resort to corruption. Another way this facilitated large-scale corruption was by providing opportunities for government officials to earn huge profits by charging the assets at prices higher than those designated by the government.

As a consequence of this, private-firm owners interested in obtaining the government assets were

obligated to develop relationships or guanxi with these government officials. Thus the formation of these relationships enabled them to easily engage in practices like bribery in the future.

Moreover, the transfer of assets also gave the owners of these private firms the ability to manage their activities without any external supervision which incentivized reliance on corrupt methods to incur large profits. Under Mao, the centrally planned economy ensured that there was an insignificant income gap in society; however, the economic reform after 1978 increased income inequality and especially affected the incomes of public officials. This was further aggravated by the increase in inflation during the 1980s and 1990s which pressured officials to use their power and access to various resources to obtain other sources of income and indulge in corruption.

Thus, it was in this context that Xi promised to annihilate corruption when he came to power in November 2012. Xi’s emphasis on anti-corruption was triggered by a political scandal that came to light a few months before he came to power. This scandal involved Wang Lijun, the vice-mayor of Chongqing.

It revealed information regarding the cover-up of a British businessman’s murder by Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai’s wife, to the American consulate.

This information not only revealed Bo’s corrupt activities but also exposed his plans with Zhou Yongkang of orchestrating a coup against Xi. The Bo Xilai political scandal allowed Xi to make his hardline anti-corruption campaign a centerpiece of his political agenda that would not only tackle the corruption prevalent in China, but also allowed him to consolidate and establish his power. Moreover, the scandal was an example of how corruption was eating into the legitimacy of the party. Therefore, to improve the image of the party in the eyes of the Chinese public, Xi was further motivated to implement his anti-corruption campaign. Thus, in 2013 Xi stated that the “party would hunt down tigers (corrupt senior officials) and swat flies (corrupt rank and file officials),” and this idea became the central focus of his anti-corruption campaign.

In the initial stages of this campaign, Xi introduced an eight-point code which provided instructions on conduct and imposed limitations on official behavior. As asserted in the journal China Perspectives, these regulations expected 4

officials to “reconnect with the masses, banned the use of luxury cars, eliminated lavish gifts and reduced pomp, banquets, ceremony, bureaucratic visits and meetings.” Xi’s attack on the tigers can be characterized as a strategy to eliminate political rivals and consolidate his power as leader. An important characteristic of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which distinguishes it from previous anti-corruption policies implemented during the reform era, is that many of the tigers who were examined have direct or indirect relations with retired party leaders. The basis for such attacks comes from the idea that if officials and their relatives have become increasingly wealthy over the years, then they have done so through corrupt means.

However, it can be argued that Xi’s actions were not politically motivated because Zhou, after his involvement with Bo in the political scandal, had lost any political capital or power he possessed which made it difficult for him to pose a threat to Xi’s legitimacy. Even then, by diminishing the power as well as political network of high-ranking officials such as Zhou, Xi was able to weaken any potential political rivals who could undermine his power. Additionally, it can be argued that Xi’s tiger hunt has political roots because it has failed to target any of Xi’s political allies or relatives and has 5

only been focused on his political rivals and the networks. Not only that, but it has also allowed Xi to replace the expelled officials with his allies who are likely to back his reforms. Thus, this has given him more power to implement policies of his choice.

The second aspect of the anti-corruption policy focuses on eliminating the flies or the lower-level government officials. This is not only harder than targeting tigers because of the sheer number of local officials in China, but it is also more important in the fight against endemic corruption. This is because even though lowlevel officials only control smaller regions, they are more connected to the Chinese people and have a lot of influence and power in their regions.

Furthermore, these local officials have been able to accumulate a lot of wealth through different nefarious activities. For example, a former official from the Beidaihe District in the Hebei Province was found to possess 120 million yuan in cash and 37 kilograms of gold. Additionally, by taking control over basic resources like water and land and dominating Hebei’s electricity, gas, and healthcare industries, Hebei’s local officials have managed to secure undue authority and influence.

Therefore, these examples reflect the importance of curbing the corrupt activities of local officials

Photo by Xiquinho Silva as it would improve the party’s image and help establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

Despite this, Gao Bo, a researcher at the Political Academy of Social Science, stated that flies “had not been given enough attention and were being underestimated.” This is because in the initial time frame of the campaign, Xi had been more focused on eliminating the tigers who were his potential political rivals. Even then, recent efforts at restricting flies have gained momentum, and, in 2016, China Daily reported that “415,000 officials were punished for violating the party’s code of conduct and 11,000 others in suspicion of crimes were transferred to judicial organs.” This represents how Xi refocused efforts against the local officials only after taking down his primary political rivals which exemplifies the political roots and priorities of the campaign.

Apart from striking against his political rivals to consolidate his power, Xi has also centralized the party’s apparatus to enforce discipline to prevent party officials from indulging in corrupt activities.

The enforcement of discipline stems from the need to eradicate the four undesirable work styles, namely formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance, to ensure that government officials do not use corrupt means to work and serve the

people. Thus, to do so, Xi introduced a mass-line policy that bears resemblance to Mao’s rectification campaigns in Yanan. This mass-line policy required party members to self-criticize as well as voice their opinions about the other members of the party to establish transparency and eradicate corruption within the party. Furthermore, instead of solely relying on the legal system, suspected officials are only put under legal trial after they are taken into custody under the shuanggui (double designations) procedure. Shuanggui is an innerparty process of questioning that has often been condemned by scholars for being brutal. Moreover, after being convicted, most officials are then subject to party disciplinary punishment rather than the legal process. Lack of public knowledge about the exact details of the party’s punishment process has created fear amongst officials. Also, by making the party apparatus responsible for disciplining convicted officials, Xi has centralized his power and strengthened the authority of the CCP. Another way in which Xi has increased the CCP’s dominance is by centralizing the power of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and making it the most powerful disciplinary body that presides over local agencies to combat corruption. While this 6

has been effective in disciplining the party officials, it has also allowed the CCDI’s power to grow without any checks and balances, giving Xi the ability to target tigers and flies without any limits.

One of Xi’s goals behind introducing the anti-corruption campaign was also to improve the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of the public.

Corruption had eroded the party’s legitimacy because public officials were seen using their power for private gains. Thus, the anti-corruption campaign was seen favorably by the public who saw the attack on the tigers as the party’s willingness to remove corruption from every level of the party, including the higher levels. In the journal Modern China Studies, it is stated that around 74.75 percent of people viewed the anticorruption campaign as “fairly effective” or “very effective”. Although, people who were more aware of the corruption in their local regions were less satisfied with the campaign’s effectiveness. This is due to the tangibility of the local corruption for the public because, unlike the activities of high level officials, the actions of flies would directly affect their lives. Furthermore, since most Chinese people believe that the three main causes of corruption are “insufficient rule of law, insufficient anti-corruption efforts and a lack of transparency,” the current anti-corruption campaign does not completely address these causes. To address this, the campaign would have to prioritize combatting structural causes of corruption that are embedded in Chinese institutions.

Therefore, since Xi has been using the anticorruption campaign to maintain his power, his battle against corruption is ineffective for the future and only provides a short-term solution.

This is because the current anti-corruption campaign is focused on targeting individuals who are guilty of indulging in corruption. For long

term success, instead of focusing on the symptoms of corruption, the campaign needs to focus on the structural causes of corruption like the one-party framework. The one-party structure of government facilitates corruption because the hierarchical structure incentivizes greed and power-grabbing tendencies.

Moreover, concentration and centralization of power accompanied by the lack of checks and balances and lack of transparency in decision-making in the party creates avenues for corruption. Xi’s ongoing campaign has been successful in eradicating corrupt government officials that can be replaced with his allies who will support him in implementing his policies and not pose a threat to his power. However, even then, this does not eliminate the possibility of these new government officials using their new posts to extend their power and subsequently engage in corrupt activities.

Therefore, to tackle the root causes of corruption, in conjunction with the anti-corruption campaign, it is essential that Xi also introduces policies that reduce power-grabbing opportunities or incentives.

Despite the implementation of the anticorruption campaign, the economic consequences of corruption have continued to exist in China. It is important to consider the campaign’s impact on the Chinese luxury market. This is because a major aspect of guanxi is dependent on exchange of gifts (usually luxury goods) to establish and maintain relationships that eventually help businesses acquire access to different government services and ask for future favors. Since Xi’s anti-corruption campaign requires officials to reduce displays of wealth and the consumption of luxury goods to combat corruption, the luxury good market in China has been adversely affected. This has led to Chinese consumers relying on buying luxury goods globally, which led to decline in consumption by

“Since Xi has been using the anticorruption campaign to maintain his power, his battle against corruption is ineffective for the future and only provides a short-term solution.”

7

two percent in 2015. However, recent government efforts to decrease import duties and increase duty-free zones to refocus consumption from the global market to the local luxury market has alleviated the consequences of the campaign on the local market. Furthermore, the fear created by the anti-corruption campaign has paralyzed officials who are afraid of being identified as flies. Thus, to prevent attracting any attention to their activities, many officials are nervous to implement economic reforms or start new projects. In addition to this, ongoing projects are hindered if the officials in charge of them are suddenly called in for questioning or charged with corruption. This has prevented the launch and effective implementation of various projects. Not only that, but the campaign has also affected investment as many foreign investors are perturbed by the disappearance of Chinese officials and business owners that they had developed relationships with. Therefore, this uncertain climate has discouraged many foreign investors from investing in the Chinese economy. Consequently, all these factors have dampened the growth of the Chinese economy.

Overall, the initial stages of the anti-corruption

campaign were aimed at consolidating Xi’s power because it included eliminating potential political rivals like Zhou and the centralization of power within the party apparatus to reduce corruption. Furthermore, after comparing Mao’s anti-corruption policies with Xi’s, it is evident that the current anti-corruption campaign is the most politically-motivated campaign implemented by any leader after Mao. Thus, it can be argued that Xi is advancing towards stricter authoritarianism.

By centralizing his power within the CCP as well as eliminating potential rivals, Xi is moving China away from the collective leadership established after Deng Xiaoping. Furthermore, to successfully improve the party’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people who are affected by local corruption, it is important that Xi adopts policies that target the structural causes rather than the symptoms of corruption. Lastly, the adverse effects of the campaign on the Chinese economy are reflected in the low growth rates.

However, in the long run, this campaign will improve the economy because it will eliminate the corrupt officials whose inefficient and fraudulent activities were already slowing down the economy.

Photo by Philip Jagenstadt

8

Memory and Erasure of the Jewish Past

By Laurel Stickney

Temple of Baalshamin in Palmyra, Syria, Demolished in 2015 by ISIL Photo by Bernard Gagnon

Commemorating site of Kaifeng Synagogue Photo by Alex Shaland As violent conflict continues to plague many parts of the Middle East and North Africa, leaving countless numbers killed or displaced, cultural sites and antiquities are also under attack. During the Islamic State’s occupation of Syria’s ancient city of Palmyra, for instance, the group destroyed numerous buildings and artifacts in the former Roman colony and beheaded the city’s foremost archaeologist. In the midst of warfare and tragedy, some have turned to technology to preserve digitally what may soon be lost physically. One such group is the Diarna Geo-Museum, whose preservation efforts across the globe have produced a treasure trove of Jewish historical and cultural materials.

In 2010, Diarna began as a project of Digital Heritage Mapping, a non-profit organization co-founded by Wellesley College professor Fran Malino. Diarna’s mission is to digitally preserve the Jewish history of the Middle East and North Africa region and beyond through dedicated research, extensive documentation through photographs and fieldwork, and the collection of oral histories. Diarna’s work is achieved through the efforts of a global team of researchers, archivists, and photographers representing numerous religious and ethnic backgrounds.

11

A major component of Diarna’s work is to not only document historical sites, but to present them in an engaging way that is accessible to the public. The centerpiece of its website is a powerful, interactive map which allows individuals to explore the organization’s vast archive by location.

Currently the Diarna site features eight curated exhibits, including the D’fina Jewish Morocco exhibit, which explores the heritage of Moroccan Jews and features several French-Vichy labor camps, largely forgotten remnants of the Holocaust’s reach into North Africa. Though many of the sites Diarna is working to preserve, such as schools and synagogues, have been out of use since the mass exodus of the Middle Eastern and North African Jews during and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the sites that still remain are at risk of destruction.

The bulk of Diarna’s work has been the identification, to date, of over 2,500 Jewish heritage sites across the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. Over the course of the summer, I researched a number of cultural and religious sites located across North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. I was particularly struck by my findings regarding a small Jewish community in the heart of China, far-removed from any coreligionists. While

researching the Kaifeng Synagogue, I uncovered from the time of the Song Dynasty until the mida story representative of the forces that have 19th century, the Kaifeng Jews had faced little been active against Jewish histories of all types. discrimination and persecution. Their amicable Kaifeng, a city on the Yellow River in China’s relations with the outside community made for Henan province, was a bustling commercial center easy integration into Chinese society and were on the Silk Road. The first Jews of Kaifeng are thought in fact central to the assimilation and decline of to have arrived sometime between 960 and 1127 the community. Relatively miniscule in relation to AD, and the small community existed relatively the staggering figures of the Chinese population unhindered until the 1860s when assimilation as a whole, the few hundred individuals in and the destruction of the synagogue resulted in Kaifeng who identify with a Jewish heritage pose the demise of the community. little threat to the national In the last decade of the government and, as their “Diarna’s work is 20th century, more than forebears, seek only to continue one hundred years after the honoring their cultural imperative because the synagogue’s demise, a revival identities while respecting of Jewish heritage in Kaifeng and living in harmony extreme decline in the occurred as a result of renewed with those around them. interest in the community The experiences of the population of Jews in the from foreign Jewish scholars, Kaifeng Jewish community tourists, and businesspeople. compelled me to consider Arab world, combined Descendants of the earlier the erasure of history, the Jews began to reconnect with very thing that Diarna is with the active erasure their Jewish heritage through working to combat. Diarna’s of their histories, greatly work is imperative because a variety of outlets, including classes, services, and historical the extreme decline in the increases the possibility exhibits. For years the revival population of Jews in the Arab continued unhindered. world, combined with the that these Some of the Kaifeng Jews active erasure of their histories, were even relocated to Israel greatly increases the possibility communities and lives with the assistance of the that these communities and organization Shivei Israel. lives will be forgotten. The will be forgotten.”

In 2016, however, Jews of Syria, for example, Chinese president Xi Jin have left the country in its Ping’s crackdown on unapproved religions and entirety. In 2015, an Israeli-American businessman foreign influences reached the small community smuggled Aleppo’s last few Jews to Israel. in Kaifeng. The one or two hundred Jews who Similarly, almost one-quarter of the 85 remaining have been active in Jewish cultural and religious Yemeni Jews were brought to Israel by the Jewish activities have been barred from celebrating Agency for Israel in 2016. Across the world, Passover and other holidays and from promoting this trend has only accelerated in recent years.

Jewish heritage. The community has seen signs My work with Diarna has allowed me to and relics of its Jewish past removed at the hands appreciate the importance of preserving these of the government, including the commemorative histories and has empowered me with the marker at the site of the former synagogue. knowledge that with the aid of technology and Though specific reasons for the crackdown are dedicated research, we can combat the forces unknown, religious groups outside of China’s five of historical erasure. In an era when fascism state-licensed religions (Buddhism, Catholicism, and anti-semitism have dishearteningly found Islam, Protestantism and Taoism) have historically a foothold, and misinformation and disregard been viewed by the Communist Party as for the truth abound, the work of organizations suspect and have faced intense discrimination. like Diarna is more important than ever.

Throughout their earliest history, however,

12

South Sudan:

Conflict and Chaos in the World’s Youngest Country

By Emma Schaechter-Santander Population science states that across the globe, no matter our race, country of origin or ethnicity, our genetic make-up varies by less than 0.5 percent. The differences between ethnic groups of South Sudan are minute, and yet those same differences are vast enough to determine life and death consequences, seemingly without remedy.

As an intern for the Panamanian Mission to the UN this past summer, I was able to attend the United Nations Security Council’s 8008th meeting, which was focused on “The Situation in South Sudan.” The facts detailed at the meeting were startling. After several regional officials provided general updates, the floor was given to the Security Council’s 15 member states. The U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Michele Sison, spoke first. The statistics she presented interrupted my notetaking—more than 6 million South Sudanese out of a total population of 12.2 million are food insecure and 1.7 million are on the brink of starvation. The widespread famine is just one, albeit large, calamity occurring in the nation. The predicament is, as the United Kingdom’s UN Ambassador Matthew Rycroft states, “a crisis of human creation.”

Civil conflict, arising from a hunger for power over principle, human rights and societal betterment, is commonly found throughout the annals of world history. Within South Sudan, civil conflict is a singular facet in a complex struggle for titles, territories, resources and military control. The First and Second Sudanese wars, long periods of bitter conflict, took place prior to South Sudan’s independence from Sudan. The instigating factors for these wars were manifold and many arose from decisions made by the British when abandoning the former colony. For upwards of 50 13

years, the two factions of Sudan—the Muslim north and the Christian and traditional African south—were in an ongoing brutal conflict with one another, resulting in roughly two million casualties. Previously persecuted, marginalized and targeted, the fight for independence was an extremely personal one; the relentlessness of the South Sudanese people demonstrated their hope that one day they would attain freedom and have autonomy in their own country.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the Second Sudanese War in 2005.

Signed by both the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), it bestowed South Sudan with greater autonomy and prepared it for an independence referendum. The referendum, with upwards of 98 percent approval, was South Sudan’s first

Independence Day 2011 Photo by Daniel X. O’Neil

step in becoming the country its constituents had vice president. Unlike Kiir, Machar is a part of the aspired to create—an independent and democratic Nuer ethnic group, which, at approximately 15 nation in control of its own percent, is the second most resources and future direction.

“Although South Sudanese populous ethnic group in On July 9, 2011, after the country. President Kiir voting to separate, South independence was expected hoped this appointment Sudan achieved independence would be perceived as a to bring peace to the region, concession to the dozens and became the youngest nation in world. On July 14, of other ethnic groups military habits die hard, 2011, the United Nations residing in the nation. admitted South Sudan as

Yet, by December self-governing takes time 2013, South Sudan’s short their 193rd member. This entry indicated that other UN of relative peace came and cohesion across insulted era member states acknowledged to an abrupt end when Kiir their sovereignty as a claimed that forces loyal fractions requires nation, an essential step to Machar had attempted in global acceptance. a coup d’état against the great effort.”

But after six years of government.

Machar independence, the fledgling nation has again denounced this as a falsehood and called for the devolved into a new civil war. Although South military to follow him and depose Kiir. In a radio Sudanese independence was expected to bring interview Machar accused Kiir of inciting “interpeace to the region, military habits die hard, selfethnic fighting” and killing his citizens “like flies.” governing takes time and cohesion across insulated Fighting immediately broke out between fractions requires great effort. In July 2011, when Dinka forces loyal to the Kiir and Nuer forces South Sudan became independent, liberation loyal to the Machar, with smaller ethnic groups leader Salva Kiir became president of the newly aligning between them. Political disputes became independent country. An SPLM party leader, increasingly complicated by previously unsettled he is also a member of the Dinka, South Sudan’s conflicts. On Dec. 26, ten days after President largest ethnic group. Aware that exclusive Dinka Kiir’s inflammatory announcement, the UN Office dominance could spark resentment and unrest, for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Kiir appointed SPLM leader Riek Machar to be estimated that approximately “63,000 people had sought protection at UN bases across the country among the more than 121,000 displaced in fighting that had spread to five of South Sudan’s 10 states.”

Regional groups, such as the African Union and the International Authority on Development quickly implemented mediation efforts and began investigations into the escalating conflict.

Additionally, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), established under Security Council Resolution 1966 to aid the nascent democratic government, was updated in July 2011 to aid in reducing warfare in the country. The resolution update (Resolution 2132) specifically stated that, “given the urgent circumstances of the situation, UNMISS will consist of a military component of up to 12,500 troops of all ranks and of a police component.”

However, within months, deliberate mass civilian killings along ethnic lines, large-scale 14

President Kiir Photo by Utenriksdepartment/Astrid Sehl population displacement, sexual violence, and other forms of destruction were committed by both sides as detailed in reports. Efforts, including the August 2015 Peace Agreement signed by both the president and vice president, were made to renew peace and stabilize the young country, yet fighting consistently erupts anew, testing hope in civilians and aid workers.

For six years now, Salva Kiir has been president and commander-in-chief of South Sudan. His military dictatorship has limited aidworkers’ access to devastated areas, effectively leaving people in these regions to flee as they near starvation. Over two million such refugees have fled to neighboring countries, including Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya; to be exact, within the first 44 days of 2017, over 100,000 refugees fled to Uganda alone. All together, more than 500,000 South Sudanese have fled to Uganda, over 300,000 to Ethiopia, nearly 300,000 to Sudan and approximately 100,000 to Kenya.

Thousands continue to leave South Sudan daily.

United Nations refugee camps also offer relative safety to refugees, but are currently facing overflow and hygiene complications. Roughly 200,000 people, or only ten percent of those who have been displaced, are in the care of UN Peacekeepers and sheltered in UN sites. Alarmed by these numbers and reports from within South Sudan, the UN Security Council has renewed and adjusted UNMISS’s mandate eight times since its initial creation; it has also imposed and renewed various 15

government sanctions, pressuring South Sudanese power-holders to de-escalate the military situation.

More recently, the term “genocide” has been employed to describe the continually growing destruction, indicating the increasing fear surrounding this refugee and humanitarian crisis—one of the largest in the world today. UK Ambassador Rycroft has even pleaded that it is imperative we “use every available tool to pull South Sudan back from the abyss.” Conversely, in an interview with German media company Deutsche Welle, South Sudanese President Kiir, when asked about the humanitarian crisis, said it will “be improved once there is silence of the guns.

The humanitarian organizations will come back and will serve the people, and everybody will go back to his or her place. So it is not a big deal.”

Current UN Security Council meetings stress the urgency of the situation, placing sanctions on South Sudan and attempting to address the humanitarian crisis, all without infringing upon South Sudan’s sovereignty. However, conflict continues to erupt and people continue to flee the region. Ex-Vice President Riek Machar—currently in exile in South Africa—has cautiously agreed to a renewal of and adherence to the peace agreement initially signed in 2015, Sudan’s ultimate goal.

Yet, due to President Kiir’s continual downplay of the crisis, it is unlikely that any significant change will take place in the near future and that violence and hunger will continue to driving the South Sudanese from their residences in droves.

The War in Afghanistan: Worldviews and Policies of Bush, Obama, and Trump

By Makiko Miyazaki In October 2001, then President George W. Bush launched the Afghanistan War that became the longest war in American history. While he intended the war to be a short-term policy decision to destroy the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, alQaeda and the Taliban, the war became a foreign policy nightmare that neither he nor President Obama succeeded in concluding during their presidential terms. In a déjà vu moment in August 2017, President Trump pledged to further increase U.S. commitment, signaling a dramatic reversal of his anti-Afghanistan War campaign rhetoric.

In this article, I will argue that Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have articulated a similar worldview and pursued a similar foreign policy towards the Afghanistan War. Their similarities, both in theory and practice, suggest a fundamental difficulty for presidents to diverge from their

predecessors’ legacies. I will start by examining the specificities of the presidents’ worldviews. Then, I will explore how they navigated the Afghanistan War and conclude by speculating the reasons behind the similarity in the three presidents’ policies.

Worldviews Bush, Obama, and Trump have had comparable worldviews in terms of the Middle East. According to Bush and Obama’s respective National Security Strategy Reports (which outline each president’s foreign policy objectives), Trump’s speeches (the administration has not yet issued his report) and works by scholars, there are three notable similarities.

First, they have characterized terrorism and “failing states” that endorse terrorism as significant

Photo by Kenny Holston 16

Photograph by Hillbraith/Flickr threats to the U.S. Second, they have at least in rhetoric advocated cooperation with allies in reducing global terrorism, although they have not been averse to unilateral action should they deem it necessary to satisfy American interests. Third, they have shared—to decreasing extents from Bush to Trump—the pattern of advocating for the spread of liberal, Western values abroad while refraining from nation-building efforts that would help countries implement these values.

Specifically, Bush asserted in his 2002 National Security Strategy Report that the U.S. will spread values and “translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty… to help make the world not just safer but better.”

Yet according to CNN national security analyst Peter Bergen, “nation-building [was] not our key strategic goal” in the Afghanistan War, and the U.S. decision not to help Afghanistan reconstruct itself helped the Taliban regain strength after the U.S. had overthrown them in 2001. This discrepancy between words and action undermined Bush’s promise to spread peace, prosperity and liberty to Afghanistan.

Obama still suggested in his 2015 National Security Strategy Report that the U.S. should 17

lead the world through its values. Instead of aggressively pushing countries to implement these values, Obama recommended that the U.S. “draw on the power of our example” and not “dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events around the world.”

Trump has not advocated for the spread of democracy and Western values as much as he has advocated the pursuit of attainable interests. As he stated in his speech in August 2017, “[W]e will no longer use American military might to construct democracies in far away lands, or try to rebuild our countries in our own image… Instead, we will work with allies and partners to protect our shared interests.” While Trump’s advocacy for the U.S. victory over the Taliban revealed his implicit belief in American righteousness and in Western values, such as liberty and individual rights, his prioritization of interests over the spread of values suggests that he may be the least ideological of the three presidents.

The reasons why the three presidents have become less ideological chronologically would include the U.S. struggle to win the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars but are up for debate. The key takeaway from the discussion on their worldviews, however,

is that when faced with two conflicting desires— that of spreading Western values and of refraining from nation-building—presidents have tended to go the middle route: interfering in Afghanistan enough to ensure the victory of the U.S. and its values, but not enough to engage in nationbuilding. In part because of the insufficiency of nation-building, Afghanistan has not yet achieved peace, and the Taliban has continued to grow in strength. As the three presidents attempted to address this over the years, they have ultimately increased U.S. involvement in the Afghanistan War. Policies The ways Bush, Obama, and Trump have handled the Afghanistan War are similar both strategically and tactically. I will first explore the similarities between Bush and Obama, then with that as the basis for comparison, analyze the similarities between them and Trump.

I note that for Bush I am specifically examining his second term. In his first term, Bush launched the war in Afghanistan and, after the initial U.S. victory in 2001, withdrew many of the troops. It was in his second term that the Taliban regained their strength and Bush had to revisit the Afghanistan War. Because both Obama and Trump inherited the Afghanistan War with a large Taliban insurgency, juxtaposing Bush’s second term with Obama and Trump allows for a more equal comparison.

Bush and Obama Both Bush and Obama recognized the strategic need for the U.S. to increase its involvement in Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaeda. According to Peter Bergen, towards the end of Bush’s term the Taliban controlled about 40 percent of Afghanistan both geographically and politically. Afghanistan, as well as its neighbor Pakistan, remained a safe haven for the Taliban and for al-Qaeda, with whom the Taliban continued to cooperate. To help the Afghan government regain territorial and political control, Bush sent in 12,000 additional troops towards the end of his term. Obama intervened in Afghanistan in 2009 with a “surge,” sending 30,000 additional troops. These troops deployed under Bush and Obama would not only fight the Taliban but also train the Afghan national army—so that they could eventually fight the Taliban without reliance on the U.S. In deploying them, Bush and Obama established a withdrawal date to avoid making the

Afghanistan War an open commitment.

Obama’s surge was based not only on Bush’s deployment of 12,000 troops but also on Bush’s 2007 Iraq surge. When an insurgency by alQaeda in Iraq emerged after the U.S. withdrew from the Iraq War, Bush sent in 21,500 troops who ultimately decimated the insurgents. While Obama had disagreed with the Iraq surge during Bush’s presidency, in Bergen’s words, he “now used its success as an important way of informing his way forward in Afghanistan.” In addition to Afghanistan, Bush and Obama focused on Pakistan, upon which success in Afghanistan depended. Pakistan harbored most of the alQaeda leadership and the Afghan Taliban and also possessed nuclear weapons that were not properly secured and which therefore had the potential to be seized by terrorist. While the U.S. and Pakistan were technically allies in counterterrorism efforts, Pakistan’s harboring of terrorists, its nuclear capabilities, and its fraught relationship with another U.S. ally, India, complicated U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Bush and Obama pursued U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan through both diplomacy and uninvited drone attacks. While Bush introduced drones as instruments of foreign policy, Obama expanded the drone program by tenfold during his presidency. While some may claim that this was a difference in Bush and Obama’s foreign policies, the shared context and the purpose of drone strikes—a unilateral approach to counterterrorism in Pakistan—make their foreign policies comparable.

Bush/Obama and Trump While it is too early in his term to fully assess his foreign policy, Trump so far seems to be following Bush and Obama’s policy. In the speech on August 2017, Trump suggested that he would send more U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Although he did not mention a definite number in the speech, experts believe that as of now he has sent 3,900 troops.

One difference from Bush and Obama is that Trump did not specify a date of withdrawal. Trump instead stated that he wants the conditions on the ground to determine the timing of the withdrawal, causing some politicians to worry that this may be an open-ended commitment of at least four years.

Yet, like Bush and Obama, Trump wants U.S. troops to fight alongside Afghan troops. Although fighting alongside Afghan troops was not a 18

priority under Bush and Obama, who focused The second, and more significant, reason is more on training the Afghan troops, it is definitely domestic politics; presidents need to garner voter the main objective under Trump. Indeed, Trump support to ensure reelection. While American has sought to loosen restrictions on U.S. soldiers voters want the Afghanistan War to end, they also made under Obama to pursue this more lethal use want the war to end in victory—both to maintain of U.S. troops. pride and to minimize the risks of future terrorist Like Bush and Obama, Trump recognizes attacks on U.S. soil.

Pakistan’s role in the Afghan But the Afghan conflict is a conflict. He was rhetorically “Their similarities, both lose-lose situation. If the U.S. stays harsher in demanding Pakistani in the war, it will lose countless help on U.S. counterterrorism but in theory and practice, American lives. If the U.S. leaves, has resorted to the previouslyAfghanistan will fall to the Taliban tried methods of ensuring such suggest a fundamental and voters will feel an increased compliance, such as withdrawal fear of terrorism in the U.S. difficulty for presidents of military and security aid.

The only way to satisfy the Like Obama, Trump has voters, therefore, is to stay in the war to diverge from their but win as soon as possible. This is also sought to expand the drone program. Trump has kept because Afghanistan does predecessors’ legacies.” difficult Obama’s policy of distinguishing not have a strong local opposition between war zones and areas that group with which the U.S. can require higher protection for civilians. But he has partner to defeat the Taliban. Such a group can be also expanded the possible targets of drone attacks crucial for U.S. success, like the Sunni insurgent from solely jihadist leaders to less important group that helped the U.S. destroy al-Qaeda in ‘foot soldier’ jihadists. Trump even demanded Iraq in 2007. that proposed drone attacks and raids would no longer undergo the high level vetting process Therefore, in Afghanistan, the U.S. must as under Obama. Given his expansion of targets bear most of the burden. Because there are only and loosening of restrictions, we may expect that a limited number of strategies that have worked drones may become an even more significant before—such as a surge of troops, use of drones, and cooperation with Pakistan—our presidents instrument of U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan. have tended to maintain the status quo in pursuing Why such similarity between the presidents? a difficult foreign policy.

Given that both Obama and Trump vehemently Overall, Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump opposed the Afghanistan War on the campaign have had similar worldviews and policies towards trail, one wonders why they ultimately pursued a the Afghanistan War. These presidents have realized foreign policy similar to that of their respective that their lack of experience and the constraint of predecessors. The similarity that Trump displays is domestic politics prevents them from pursuing especially significant. Because he has so far based their often-simplified campaign promises. These many of his policies on fulfilling his campaign universal constraints are especially salient today promises and satisfying his core constituents, because they suggest that despite Trump’s generally he took a high political risk in departing from unconventional presidency, his future policies on his campaign rhetoric. Such behavior leads us to Afghanistan might not diverge outrageously from ask why presidents’ foreign policies often do not those of Bush and Obama. diverge from those of their predecessors.

Whether such similarity is for better or for One possible reason is the presidents’ lack of worse, we cannot yet to tell. The similarity could experience, especially at the beginning of their certainly grant relative stability to the U.S. strategy term. As new presidents realize the complexity on Afghanistan. Once policymakers and analysts of the issues they inherit, they may emulate the have some assurance on the stability of U.S. predecessor’s policies that have succeeded (or at policies, they could improve key weaknesses and least not failed) to avoid failure so early in their work to end the longest war in American history. presidential careers.

19

Artwork by Banksy

Understanding the Re-emergence of Nationalist Movements in the European Union

By Arela Haluci

Despite a fragile political and economic framework, the European Union (EU) has successfully created values that guide its member states and create the closest possible thing to a European identity. The debt crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit and the rise of nationalist movements threaten the adherence to these common values and reveal the dormant underlying tensions of the European project. Right-wing supporters across the continent have re-emerged in the political landscape with a xenophobic, antiimmigrant platform directed primarily against refugees and immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

In today’s world, many are trying to understand the intersection of global inequalities that the far right supporters are situated in and their intentions with regard to these inequalities. This group’s resentment of current EU governance systems and their reluctance to continue to abide by shared norms rests on a perceived threat imposed by multiculturalism and internationalism on their national identity, economic status, electoral power, and social standing. Even though the negative sentiments against emigrants have only recently re-emerged in the European political discourse, their existence is far from new.

In 2010, Amnesty International reported that the EU has an unrivaled human rights architecture consisting of a robust legal framework that ensures protection and a political rhetoric that guards the Union’s reputation as a beacon of human rights. Since the economic crisis of 2011, however, there has been a fundamental shift in the EU public and political discourse due to the re-emergence of nationalist movements across the continent. These right-wing movements, through a series of anti-emigration platforms, have revealed the ongoing racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination against minorities from the MENA region that reside in the EU. In the context of the EU political discourse, it is very important to make the distinction between immigrants and emigrants. The former are EU citizens that move from one member state to the other, whereas the latter are non-EU citizens that move into the EU. The trend in the EU is to view emigrants as racial minorities and racial minorities as emigrants regardless of their citizenship status.

As a result, emigrants and minorities are treated 21

in the same way by right-wing supporters.

The recent, racially-charged political discourse against emigrants and refugees, which targets primarily black and Muslim emigrants and citizens, is reported to have increased the discrimination against them in all areas of life.

Statistics show that in the UK, white British citizens have a 100 percent higher chance of getting a job interview than applicants with an African sounding surname. Vernellia R. Randall, a professor of law at the University of Dayton, reports that racism is manifested in job postings, “in phrases such as ‘BBR’ (Bleu- Blanc-Rouge) a code for ‘French only.’” Published announcements have statements such as “White woman wanted to care for elderly lady,” “No persons of color,” and “Position for intern of French cultural origin.”

In addition, people of African origin have a much higher unemployment rate than the national average. Citizens originating from the MENA region are exposed to police violence as well as racism-motivated abuse from the public. Black students experience higher rates of bullying in school and receive differentiated teaching material, practice, and treatment. Discrimination also occurs in healthcare where prejudice leads the health-care staff to often refuse to treat or to neglect black or Muslim citizens. In countries like France, recording people’s race, ethnicity, and religion is prohibited by law in an attempt to avoid the categorization of the French population into labels and minorities. In reality, however, all it does is prevent the collection

of data that can show the path of progress.

Populist movements are not a new phenomenon in Europe. In fact, the EU itself is a political experiment that attempted to rectify the atrocities committed by such movements during World War II. The EU of the 1990s and early 2000s lived up to its mission of creating a free common market that would benefit European citizens by increasing capital, labor, and educational mobility in the region. However, the cultural integration and the creation of a common European identity have yet to be achieved.

The economic downturn and the surge of emigrants and refugees from the war-torn Middle East brought to the forefront of EU politics the underlying tensions that have prevented the creation of a shared European identity. In 2015 alone, 1.4 million emigrants and refugees arrived in the EU. Currently, foreign-born citizens comprise 10.2 percent of the total EU population.

Germany, the UK and France were the top three destinations for the incoming emigrant who sought in the EU the possibility of a more sustainable life. These numbers of the overly-populated sites of refugee camps became an integral concern for European citizens, thus creating a new wave of hostility against non-European residents.

In the UK, the Independence Party conducted a successful Leave Campaign that resulted in a Brexit vote to leave the EU. In France, the National Front’s leader Marine Le Pen came very close to winning the presidency. The Swedish Democrats

and the Alternative for Germany, although only recently-established political parties, have been able to garner sufficient support in the recent elections. The platforms of these right-wing parties rest on an ideology that combines exclusionary populism and nationalism. Political issues are simplified in populist discourse to a ‘black and white’ form of understanding and problem-solving.

The current European populist movement targets the established political parties, media, and intellectuals for promoting the liberal values of multiculturalism, internationalism and individualism. These values are perceived to work against the interests of the masses and their access to power. Nationalism in European politics centers on the idea of the state as a form of human organization to which individuals may only gain membership if they share a common ethnicity and set of cultural values. However, this definition has turned exclusionary of the non-native population.

Research shows that this ideology of xenophobic populism is strongest among older, non-university-educated, working-class, white male citizens of the EU. They are motivated by a reluctance to accept EU membership and are worried by the recent tax increases, benefit cuts, and rise in unemployment. These people combine cultural conservatism, anti-immigration rhetoric, and left-wing economic policies that support the welfare state and accept their xenophobic views. However, this group is not the supplier of the ideology but rather the consumer of the rhetoric. Upon close consideration of the political parties that promote the populist agenda, we find that white people in the high political and economic ranks of the European society not only share, but also partake in the formation and support of the nationalist movements.

Today, the shared ideology is promoted on grounds of extreme anti-immigration views that supporters of right-wing European parties are 52 percent more likely to support than people on the other side of the political spectrum, as Pew research data revealed. The same 2016 Pew poll showed that more than half of the citizens in eight European nations (Hungary, Poland, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Greece, the UK) believe that incoming refugees increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks.

More than half of Hungarians, Poles, Greeks, 22

Italians and French also think that refugees are an economic burden because they increase native unemployment and utilize social benefits.

In addition, citizens of Italy and Sweden link the increasing number of refugees with criminal activity.

Over 70 percent of Europeans have a shared belief that diverse multicultural societies either make no difference in the quality of life or worsen it. Among right-wing supporters, the percentages exceed 90 percent. These negative views are justified based on a belief that the minorities do not wish to fully integrate and participate in the broader society by adopting the nation’s customs and values.

European citizens are strongly attached to their conception of national identity. In the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II, Europeans pursued a rhetoric of political amnesia and identity denial to overcome the bitter legacy of genocide and colonization. They distinguished between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Europeans as a means to justify the wrongdoings of the colonial powers.

The trauma of guilt resulting from the colonial legacy of Europe had the most enduring impact on the discourse on identity which became increasingly driven by a sense of shame and guilt.

As a result, the political rhetoric refused to deal with the immigration questions, considering those as beyond the politically-acceptable discourse.

Instead, they chose to deal with postcolonial multiculturalism by legal recognition of the different groups each entitled to their own educational system, traditions, and geographical position.

The third-world emigrants were considered authentic in their own ways and fundamentally different from the host European societies. These differences, combined with the sense of guilt for actions taken in the past, led the political circles of Europe to stray away from integration practices and lean towards multicultural societies where the different groups rarely interact and follow separate development paths.

The second phase took place in the 1960s following massive immigration from North Africa, the Levant and the Indian subcontinent, and the discourse on immigration changed. The political elites downplayed the size of emigrant inflows by arguing that these emigrants would either adopt the European traditions or that they would remain temporary guests expected to return to their place of origin. The 1960s political class hoped to make 23

emigrants the “invisible people” whose unappealing practices could comfortably be ignored on grounds of cultural relativism.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York City and the attacks on London’s and Madrid’s transit systems, the multiculturalism rhetoric in Europe collapsed. The policy began to be perceived as a danger to Europe’s culture and values.

The failure of the policy created the deep political divide between Europe’s right and left. In this third phase, the right moved towards a complete denial of multiculturalism whereas the left attempted to revise multiculturalism by creating a concept of national values that stresses the importance of ‘European-ness’ and wants the minorities to adopt these national values while still allowing them to protect their culture.

It is important to understand how this notion of identity is created in the context of anti-emigration movements in Europe. The understanding of our relationship with others is based on the identification and assimilation of differences and similarities. However, people have a tendency to idealize one’s own characteristics and beliefs thus creating a perception that these need to be protected from characteristics and beliefs that are external to one’s point of view. Nationalism is one widespread form of this idealization, strengthened by the sense of belonging to a group that secures this identity. Different nationalities often find themselves on opposite sides and tend to project the negative traits onto one another. In this context, for many Europeans, emigrants, particularly those from the MENA region who have a different skin color and do not share the same beliefs, are ‘othered’ and all the unwanted traits are projected onto them thus making them a ‘sanctioned people.’ These ‘others’ then are blamed for the negative circumstances that the group experiences.

A major motivating factor for the discriminatory behavior of right-wing supporters is the recent economic grievances the EU has experienced. The official party line is that emigrants increase unemployment and deplete the social safety funds. While research on the topic tends to disprove such claims, the economic concerns of right-wing supporters are not unfounded. Immigration skeptics believe that emigrants threaten to dilute this premium which is particularly large in the EU due to the size of social

programs. In the absence of an immediate solution to people’s economic grievances, populist rhetoric of right-swing parties will aim for simplified solutions that create a rift between groups of the society by deeming their interests as incompatible.

A growing number of emigrants have the potential to gain electoral power to the point where political parties will have to direct their attention toward the needs of emigrants and use the scarce economic resources on them. The aging demographic of Europe reveals that emigrants may outnumber Europeans in the future. The fear of losing the material benefits associated with electoral power creates the negative views among right-wing supporters. Lenka Bustikova, a scholar who conducts research on public opinions, asserts that the right-wing parties gain supporters when minorities achieve electoral success. She also provides evidence that the segregation of minority and emigrant communities in certain areas like the suburbs in France or the neighbourhoods of south London is done to prevent emigrants from taking electoral power.

The anti-immigration movements in Europe target everyone who is not European. They seek to maintain and possibly strengthen the existing inequalities between people of European origin and minorities. Many tend to dismiss the threat of populist movements in Europe by arguing that they are a result of an economic downturn and as such will be resolved by economic recovery.

Dominique Moisi of the French Institute for

International Relations in Paris notes that, “What we are witnessing is not a new trend, but a deepening and acceleration of something that was in place … These politicians are playing with fire, because feelings on this issue run very deep and may not disappear when the economy recovers.”

Indeed, as Heather Grabbe, director of the Open Society Institute in Brussels notes, “People in Europe have grown comfortable in the decades since World War Two and now they see that level of comfort threatened…The result is that tolerance is no longer held dear as a European value, even in countries that used to be proud of being open and liberal.” It is therefore crucial to extend the discussion beyond a political discourse to one that studies the fundamental aspects of societies within the EU. It is certainly confusing why racism has flourished in such a developed part of the world with a rich history of humanism and an overall well-educated population. The existence of laws against discrimination has proved to be insufficient in preventing this phenomenon, thus calling for more interdisciplinary research on the matter.

The analysis shows that racism and xenophobia are rooted in a person’s insecurity about the future due to unemployment and poverty. The solutions to these problems are a task for the EU leadership.

However, the involvement of the citizens themselves is crucial to creating the normative conditions for racism to become an issue of the past.

Syrian refugees strike in front of Budapest Keleti railway station Photo by Mstyslav Chernov 24

Nigel Farage and Donald Trump

By Sarah White The one-two punch of Brexit and the 2016 elections shocked mainstream political observers from all parties. Comparisons between the two votes were inevitable. Both events were fueled by either economic insecurity or white nationalism, depending on who you ask. Both shocked a political mainstream that believed these events were too unprecedented to occur. Furthermore, both were spearheaded by deeply polarizing figureheads whose respective policies, backgrounds, and personalities became central to the campaigns.

President Trump needs no introduction to American readers. His brash, blunt, politically incorrect style of electoral campaigning made him charismatic to some and repugnant to others. He went from political novice to the most powerful man in the world in a dizzying ascension to power that stunned almost everyone watching—including himself.

Nigel Farage, head of the United Kingdom’s Independence Party (UKIP) that spearheaded the campaign to depart the European Union, may be a less familiar figure, but American audiences will recognize certain qualities immediately. His audacious, unapologetic willingness to express and endorse racial resentment and xenophobic fears gave him the populist backing that ended the United Kingdom’s membership in the EU. The barely-a-dog-whistle xenophobia that underpinned both men’s campaigns is the most

obvious point of comparison. The string of wildly offensive comments made by then-candidate Trump were widely publicized to relatively little effect. The “Mexicans are rapists” line, the “grab her by the pussy” comment and “we need a complete and total shutdown of Muslims entering the country” claim all failed to horrify the majority of voters in the way that mainstream political observers anticipated. Farage left a similar trail of comments across the UK. Over the course of his pro-Brexit advocacy, he said in his documentary “Things We Won’t Say About Race That Are True” that he supported allowing employers to favor “British-born” workers, complained about hearing non-English languages spoken in public, and once attributed his tardiness to too many immigrants clogging up the highways.

It is tempting, particularly for those who oppose them, to declare that these two men are essentially identical. Their ugly rhetoric and brash styles mirror each other and the xenophobic urges of their followers are distinguishable only by their targets. Anyone attempting to counter the politicians’ efforts, though, must examine not just their actions but the causes. While the content of their campaigns may have been similar, the men’s motivations reflect their different backgrounds. While Trump had flirted with political runs for over a decade, he was not a politician before campaigning for the

“Trump and Farage were dismissed by critics as too radical and too controversial to succeed in their respective campaigns.”

25

presidency and is quite proud of this.

Trump’s trademark improvisational, impulsive, and unfiltered style has created scandal after scandal, and there was no apparent political strategy behind the incendiary remarks that so inflamed voters. While some have called Trump impervious to outrage and argued that his penchant for stirring up chaos is a clever ploy, polls suggest that at least some of the endless strings of shocking gaffes have negatively affected the public’s view of the president. Trump himself has frequently attempted to backpedal or deny having made the offensive remarks. Baiting Trump into controversial remarks is an easy and periodically effective way of undermining him, or at least of keeping him off-balance and focused on damage control instead of policy.

Farage, for all his disparagement of the “establishment,” is a career politician who had been leading UKIP for over a decade by the time the Brexit referendum occurred. While his inflammatory comments may have offended a large percentage of British voters, it would be reductive to call them gaffes. Farage’s principles may be repugnant to many, but he nevertheless possesses and holds true to them. Unlike Trump, whose comments often contradicted traditional Republican policy, Farage’s remarks were usually consistent with his party’s policies, and he rarely backtracked. Trump unintentionally dovetailed his impetuous remarks with a surge of nationalistic fervor that he rode to an unexpected victory.

Farage calculatingly tapped into the resentment and racial tensions that he knew voters possessed.

Some were surprised when Farage offered only a limited endorsement of Trump, the man who seemed to be his policy doppelganger, but Trump’s style of creating political and personal chaos put off the comparatively cautious Farage. Indeed, Farage expressed disapproval of some of Trump’s more overtly racist remarks and private scandals in an interview with journalist Jeremy Paxman.

Farage is far less likely than Trump to become mired in chaos by his own runaway rhetoric. He is more vulnerable to attacks on his policies, which

are less ephemeral than Trump’s but no less reliant on faulty assumptions.

Trump and Farage were dismissed by critics as too radical and too controversial to succeed in their respective campaigns. The undercurrent of these arguments was usually this: these men are just too different to win. Trump and Farage’s successes were unimaginable to those who had grown up watching politicians meticulously mind the norms through which the two men were gleefully smashing. Like the proverbial dog who caught the mailman, both politicians were also seemingly caught off guard by their ultimate successes. President Trump reportedly entered the race with the intention to come in a respectable third place in the primary and parlay his boost in fame into reality-show ratings. Farage revelled in his role as a rabble-rousing, rock-throwing outsider.

Their successes were bombshells to all who were involved, and Farage and Trump were forced to deal with the shrapnel along with everyone else.

Though the hard work of disentangling the United Kingdom from the European Union had not yet begun, Farage promptly declared he had “done [his] bit” in his interview on ITV’s Good Morning Britain following the Brexit referendum, and resigned as the head of UKIP. If the party’s raison d’être was to accomplish Brexit, he claimed, then the party was now effectively redundant.

For the first time, he began rapidly backtracking on the often-challenged promises of his proBrexit campaign, at times directly contradicting his earlier statements. In the same post-Brexit interview, he also denied ever saying that the United Kingdom could reroute 350 million pounds a week from the EU to their healthcare system.

The unimpressed interviewer pointed out that this claim was emblazoned on the side of his campaign bus. Farage and other “Brexiteers” have gone on to backpedal on claims that leaving the EU would be

“For those who disagree with their policies, comparing their strengths and weaknesses can provide an effective blueprint for opposition.”

quick, easy and affordable.

This strategy—declare premature victory, claim credit, ignore any complicated follow-through, 26

duck promises—is ironically far more Trumpian than the course Trump himself took. Trump may have entered the race with no intention of winning, but he lost the ensuing game of chicken: policies can be backed out of, presidencies cannot. Almost every promise made on the campaign trail can be broken, save one—that the candidate, if elected, will become president. Whether he or the majority of Americans wish it or not, President Trump is now tasked with enacting the promises of his campaign while Farage has contentedly returned to criticizing the government.

Farage and Trump may have led similar movements with similar goals, but they did so with very different styles and outcomes. Farage’s background as a politician may have allowed him to execute his campaign with greater political savvy and consistency, but it did not shield him from the consequences of unforeseen success. His over-promising has now created a vulnerability

Photo by Michael Vardon/Wikimedia Commons 27

that anti-Brexit activists can exploit. As Brexit fails to unfold in the straightforward, advantageous manner he promised, support for both Brexit and Farage should erode. President Trump’s lack of experience or interest in traditional politics led to a disorderly and impulsive campaigning style.

While this suited the improvisational environment of a campaign reasonably well, his inability to adapt to a statesman’s role has rapidly revealed his unpreparedness to serve or execute the policies he invented on the campaign trail. The temperament that leads to both his offensive declarations and his inability to follow through on them is his greatest weakness. The two brash, incendiary politicians on both sides of the pond rocked their respective countries in 2016, and for those who disagree with their policies, comparing their strengths and weaknesses can provide an effective blueprint for opposition.

Mr. 305 and Miami Sound

By Vita Solorio-Fielder First-generation Cuban American artist according to James R. Curtis in the Journal of Armando Christian Peréz, professionally known Cultural Geography. Because these artists knew as Pitbull, oozes Cuban-Miami pride from all their audiences, they were able to produce content aspects of himself — through his lyrics, his videos, that would sell in this hub of Latino culture. In and his tattoos. With the “Made in Dade” ink on fact, Miami serves as such a central location for his wrist to the trademark cry of “305” (which he Latin Music that Dr. Daniel Party, a popular music features in one out of every five of his singles), fans scholar, credited in his book chapter entitled can never question Pitbull’s roots. When the music “The Miamization of Latin-American Pop Music” video for his 2015 Top 40 with being “responsible “To picture Miami or hit “Fun” ft. Chris Brown for the formatting of centered around iconic artist’s promotion and other sterotypical tropical Miami themes, no one distribution” by way of environments simply as could be surprised. The appealing to both the combination of provocative American and carefree, fun, sexy areas feeds Latin lyrics and the video’s overAmerican pop music into the commercialization... styles. Pitbull completely the-top Miami Vice spinoff theme sets the stage for exemplifies Miami sound This phenomenon of a generic twenty first by combining both types tropicalization at worst century pop song; what of music, creating, as sets this club anthem apart Party describes, “fast dehumanizes Miami residents, from the rest lies within songs halfway between who are predominately the rhythm and the music American dance pop and itself. Sampling Miami Latin American dance Latino... and at best portrays Sound Machine’s 1985 hit rhythms.” Through his use them as party animals.”

“Conga,” “Fun” remasters of “Conga” in “Fun,” he the quintessential gets the best of both worlds sound of 1980s and 90s Miami music, and with of Latin and American pop music to appeal to a influences from fellow Miami artist Desi Arnaz, broader audience and two unique generations. brings “Conga” into the limelight once again.

The Miami Vice visuals of “Fun” portrays the Pitbull, Desi Arnaz and Miami Sound Machine commercial and glamorous front of Miami: a all found success by presenting their Miami-based tropical environment featuring blue oceans, tall Latinidad to a mainstream American audience, palm trees, neon lights, luxurious cars, scantily initially doing so by first marketing Miami to its clad women and traces of crime and mischief. own Latino population. This was not hard for The opening scene showcases a double line of Pitbull and Miami Sound Machine, considering palm trees under a brilliant blue sky, followed by their roots in Dade County where nearly “six out Chris Brown and Pitbull, clad in suits (like Desi of every ten [U.S.] Cubans” lived during the 90s, Arnaz) designed with a singular bright color, 28

exiting two high-end cars. Although Brown informs Pitbull in the video that his girlfriend— Nuestra Belleza Latina 2013 Winner, Marisela De Montecristo—runs the “import/export trade from Colombia to Miami” and Pitbull must “bring her in,” he prioritizes having fun first.

The journey features De Montecristo’s neon pink mansion filled to the brim with scantily clad women, Pitbull’s “305 FUN” license plate, and Pitbull and Chris Brown dancing with one another. From the graphics alone, the video shows a tropicalization of Miami; yet, there also exists the exotification of the video’s characters. Pitbull reinforced the tropical theme through all his actions, no matter how subtle. The colorful suit jacket and pants combos, the sunglasses worn constantly in the video, distinctly looking up towards the sky as Desi Arnaz did while performing “Bablú”, dancing under palm trees and neon lights, clubbing, and riding a boat collectively consist of what a trip to tropical Miami would entail.

While Pitbull’s music video easily doubles as a plug for Miami tourism, his representation of Cuban-Americans in Miami lies underneath the surface of the showy setting. Pitbull takes a page from Desi Arnaz’s book on how he presents his

Photo by simplethrill 29

Cuban-Americanism to a large international audience. Through Arnaz’s clear Cuban identity in both his music and I Love Lucy, televised 19511957, and Pitbull’s similar Cuban-Miami pride, the two men exhibit love for their Latin identities through references to their ethnicity in their works. Similarly, both seem to utilize their Cuban and Latin identities to draw in their audiences through exoticization and tropicalization.

Desi Arnaz faced one of the first waves of the exoticization of Latinos in the industry, “with his management team,” as “Rhythms of Race” author Christina Abreu describes “urging him to act like a “playboy and ladies’ man,” to emphasize the concept of him being a “Latin Lover” as he was portrayed in an episode of I Love Lucy.

Pitbull exudes the ladies’ man persona both on and off stage, given his six children despite never being married or in a public relationship and constantly showing a large following of women in his music videos. Tropicalization, additionally, adds to the environment of both men’s performances, especially in “Fun.” Desi Arnaz used the concept of tropicalization to cater to his audience of “mostly white North Americans.”

The palm trees and puffy sleeves allowed for the

white audience to see the fun (pun intended) side of Latinness that they wanted to see, one that Abreu asserts, “emphasized [...] tropical escape.”

To picture Miami or other stereotypical tropical environments simply as carefree, fun, sexy areas feeds into the commercialization. Instead of people viewing Miami as a city that is home to almost half a million people, it’s seen as a party city that tourists should go to if they want to party on a beach. This phenomenon of tropicalization at worst dehumanizes Miami residents, who are predominantly Latino, in the sense that they become objects, and at best portrays them as party animals. While Miami does have a rampant party scene with numerous nightclubs, beaches, and resorts, the city should also be valued for what it does in relation to education, the economy, and technology. The “mostly white North Americans” who consume the tropical, exocitsized image of Miami as party central, neglect to think of the city in all of its other important contexts. Miamians have more dimensions to them besides their bodies, their parties, and their fun, upbeat party music.

Pitbull and Miami Sound Machine both serve as more modern examples of Latino artists who took the Latin pop scene by storm. Both artists incorporate traits of the typical Miami sound, detailed by James R. Curtis and Richard F. Rose in their case study of Miami Sound in “A Contemporary Latin Form of Place-Specific Music”; specifically, the study entails the use of “Spanglish,” the chorus being sung by a higherpitched individual, and how the “bass alternates between a syncopated, off beat Latin bass line and a symmetrical pop bass part.” “Conga” epitomizes the most recognized qualities of what comprised the 80s and 90s music of Miami through the use of the latter two traits. Pitbull and Brown maintain all the same characteristics in “Fun,” but actually add Spanglish lines that “Conga” omits, such as “Often Casa Campo, who would’ve thought de que.”

Pitbull incorporates Spanglish into most of his music, even noted in his newer popular hits such as “Por Favor” with Fifth Harmony, and the 2013 throwback “Timber” with Kesha. “Por Favor,” which came out in late Oct. 2017, touts the Spanglish lyrics by including a Spanish title and chorus, as well as a verse or two, even though it is mainly in English. The choice to incorporate these can be seen in most of Pitbull’s other songs

Photo by Andrey Krivashov as well, including those like “Taxi” and “Don’t Stop the Party.” Here, Pitbull shows his intention to appeal to a broader American audience who wants both the influences of American and Latin pop, while not trying to completely Americanize his newer take on Latin pop.

Overall, Pitbull’s “Fun” opens up a dialogue about Miami’s musical history, the influence of its heavily Latino population, and the way it serves as a hub for both Latin and American pop music.

Although the video portrays the tropicalization and exotification of Miami’s environment and characters, Pitbull claims Miami as his home and takes utmost pride in his hometown, his people, his music, and his ability to have a little fun.

30

To the Moon and Back Again: The Future of Space Exploration in the Modern Era

By Mehak Sarang

Photo by NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center 31

Space exploration in the modern era has unique potential. Stakeholders around the globe range from governments bolstering space programs, to private companies capitalizing on a burgeoning space economy, to scientists studying the atmosphere on Mars. As access to low-Earth orbit and other advanced technologies becomes more affordable and reliable, anticipating the trajectory of our journey into the solar system is becoming increasingly difficult.

The Trump administration provided a bit of insight into their own interests in space exploration this July when President Trump reinstated the National Space Council. Flanked by Vice President Pence and astronaut Buzz Aldrin, President Trump announced, “Our journey into space will unite us behind grand ambitions and bring us all closer together.” While publicly the Trump administration may claim that the development of America’s space program will somehow act as a bipartisan unifier, it seems more likely that capitalistic motivations—following a “Make America Great Again” narrative—are determining the decision to pursue space exploration.

And when was America “great” in terms of space exploration? Arguably, America’s finest hour was at the height of the Space Race. The success of Sputnik 1 in 1957, when the Soviet Union became the first country to successfully place a man-made object into orbit, spurred America’s initial foray into space. The technological feat struck a blow to the narrative of American exceptionalism, a sentiment captured by Gabriel Heatter, an American radio commentator, in his eulogy to the orbiter titled “Thank You, Mr. Sputnik:”

“You will never know how big a noise you made...You hit our pride a frightful blow. You reminded us of an old-fashioned American word, humility. You woke us up out of a long sleep. You made us realize a nation can talk too much, too long, too hard about money. A nation, like a man, can grow soft and complacent. It can fall behind when it thinks it is Number One in everything.”

In today’s context, this reads rather eerily like a prophecy, but at the time it expressed a widelyshared belief: Sputnik was a wakeup call. The Space Race became a proxy for political ideologies, and America was determined to demonstrate that it, as the leader of the free world, was the beacon of innovation. This spirit gave rise to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), an organization that would later develop the internet and eventually establish the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The investment paid off when NASA’s Apollo 11 landed on the moon in 1969, allowing Neil Armstrong to take those fateful steps and become the first man on the moon. He planted the US flag in the lunar dust and claimed victory for America in the Space Race.

Conquering the moon seemed like an obvious choice at the time, and it was also a largely government-funded initiative. The 21st century Space Race, however, looks very different. The last time the US left low-earth orbit (2,000 km) was in 1972, and now, with a myriad of private companies and international space programs, access to space is opening up drastically. The question now is: where to next, and who will get us there? And particularly, what role does government still have in missions to space, and what do they stand to gain from developing space programs?

With the Mars Orbiter Mission, India became the first Asian nation to reach Mars and the first nation to succeed in its initial attempt. Prime Minister Modi strategically highlighted the low cost of the mission—it famously cost less than the production of the film “The Martian”—and the manufacturing process of the spacecraft, boasting, “We built it indigenously, in a pan-Indian effort, stretching from Bangalore to Bhubaneswar, and Faridabad to Rajkot." Prime Minister Modi has been working to build the manufacturing backbone of the country with initiatives like “Make in India”, and the development of a robust

Fading rover tracks by Mars’ Victoria Crater Photo by NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center space program clearly matches these policies.

For the Trump Administration, the focus has shifted towards encouraging the commercial space economy, with the goal of being competitive in the international Space Race. Vice President Pence criticized the Obama administration at the last meeting of the National Space Council, saying that “rather than competing with other nations to create the best space technology, the previous administration chose capitulation.” His solution is to direct efforts to return to the moon with the intention of building enough infrastructure to eventually support a mission to Mars. This is a notable departure from the Obama administration’s goal of landing on asteroids. After all, as Obama said of the moon at the John F. Kennedy Space Center in Florida, “We’ve been there before.”

With every new advancement, a new opportunity for a show of strength arises. Much like the Space Race of the 1960s, conquering our final frontier has, once again, become an arms race.

But why do we go to space? Is it to demonstrate our technological prowess, to establish control in a previously unfettered environment, to bolster nationalism or simply because, as JFK once suggested,“it is there?” Is it possible to land on Mars by engaging in a space race similar to that of the 1960s within today’s new landscape?

32

An Exploration of Lingua Franca: Trade and Translation With Professors Abeberese and Rosenwald In the spirit of lingua franca’s roots as a common trade language, the Wellesley Globalist invited Assistant Professor of Economics Ama Baafra Abeberese and Anne Pierce Rogers Professor of American Literature Lawrence Rosenwald to speak at our biannual lecture. Abeberese chose to center her talk on discourse surrounding sweatshops, while Rosenwald spoke about translation theory and his thoughts on the changing nature of translation in a multilingual world. Although these topics were very different on the surface, they connected to each other in their scrutiny of the concept of universality.

Professor Abeberese opened the lecture with the 2013 factory collapse in Dhaka, Bangladesh — a factory that made clothes for multinational corporations including H&M, Mango, and Joe Fresh. This disaster forced Western consumers to confront the low wages and hazardous working conditions that lead to their ability to purchase cheap clothing.

Cases such as the one in Bangladesh, and factories in which Nike products are made, have caused an uproar in the international community without a full understanding of what it is protesting, and what goal it is ultimately attempting to achieve through boycotts and petitions.

Although Professor Abeberese offered potential solutions to the issues of low wages and the lack of sufficient regulation in clothing factories, she explained that all of these solutions

could have unintended consequences for factory workers. One example of this phenomenon is the concept of a universal living wage. Introducing an economic perspective to her lecture, Professor Abeberese explained that a standard living wage will likely divert manufacturing into more developed countries. Due to technological advancements, developed countries have a higher productivity relative to developing countries. As low-skilled wages increase, the benefits of using low-skilled labor declines, and companies will shift their manufacturing towards more productive, high-skilled labor.

While unable to present the perfect solution to issues surrounding sweatshops, Professor Abeberese left the audience with a key point to keep in mind. She explained that while protesters may understand that sweatshops are exploitative, they must also understand the role of these factories in the context of the lives of the workers. The factories are taking advantage of workers who need a social safety net or a way to supplement income. When consumers stop purchasing clothes from these factories, workers may lose this income and be exposed to even greater poverty. This is a further detriment to their health, wealth, and livelihood, the opposite effect of these actions’ intent. Perhaps the issue is not whether we should buy these goods, but why we aren’t willing to pay more.

When Professor Aberese finished her portion of the lecture, Professor Rosenwald shifted the

“The misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all.”

- Joan Robinson

33

focus to the changing dynamics in the field of translation. He had three key points in mind: machine translation, the market of translation, and untranslatables. The rise of machine translations, according to Professor Rosenwald, is not something that should be looked down upon. Machines are performing the bulk of translations in the modern world, opening up new ways for people who speak different native languages to communicate more efficiently. There are still issues to be worked on— machine translations do not necessarily understand the cultural nuances of language yet. However, translation software such as Google Translate is constantly improving at a surprising rate.

Professor Rosenwald also touched upon the market of translations, a problem of both supply and demand that fit nicely with Professor Abeberese’s field of study. He advocated for increased recognition of translators and higher pay in order to stimulate the production of more works of translation. With a greater pool of translations comes a more critical study of them and more competition in the field.

Translations can drastically change the meaning of the original text, making it necessary to bring the market of translations under scrutiny.

Lastly, Professor Rosenwald spoke about untranslatables — words and phrases that, when translated outside of the original language, cannot hold the same meaning. He challenged the idea of a universal definition and understanding, stating that even common words such as the English language word “freedom” can represent something entirely different in a new country or context.

While both professors addressed different aspects of the concept of “lingua franca” from different academic viewpoints, their lectures fit with each other and interacted in a way that helped the audience to question “universality.” The ways in which we address issues must be contextspecific, whether we are promoting human rights and development or translating a text from one language and culture into another. While we were left with no simple solutions, the lecture raised important questions and discussions that continue to inform our work as students and as editors.

Photo by Aya Kaino 34