1.1. Purpose of this threat assessment

and mounted rhino heads worth millions of Euros between 2010 to 2013.64,65

The seizure data analysis indicated some instances of crime convergence where rhino horns were confiscated alongside other illicit commodities on 68 occasions (approximately 10% of all seizures). The majority of these cases involved the seizure of firearms in conjunction with horns from poachers on the poaching grounds, nine cases involved the seizure of illicit drugs with horns, and several others involved counterfeit money and stolen vehicles. However, crime convergence is more likely to be detected through intelligence analysis techniques such as organised crime group mapping that focus on the criminal networks as a whole, rather than seizure data analysis which is focused on a specific commodity.

Intelligence from Wildlife Justice Commission investigations also points to further examples of crime convergence:

A rhino poaching boss in Mozambique is known to have a history in the stolen vehicle industry and outstanding arrest warrants against him in South Africa for murder charges.

A major wildlife trafficker based in Malaysia is also known to engage in drug trafficking.

In Vietnam, a broker with access to rhino horn and elephant ivory has had multiple previous convictions for robbery and extortion and is likely a career criminal who recently transitioned to wildlife crime due to the perceived high profits and lower risk involved.

In an Al Jazeera investigation, a Chinese businessman and rhino horn trafficker in South Africa was also allegedly paying regular bribes to immigration officials to employ illegal workers at his beauty and massage parlour and had previous convictions related to illegal gambling activities. 66

The data and case examples clearly show that crime convergence is occurring in relation to rhino horn trafficking, but further information and intelligence analysis are required to better understand the nature of this threat and infer trends.

Image 19: The horn from a black rhino was stolen from the Museum in Ritterhaus in Offenburg, Germany. Source: AFP/Getty Images.

64. https://www.sundayworld.com/crime/world-crime/from-africa-to-iceland-norway-to-new-zealand-rathkeale-rovers-travellers-havedealt-in-everything-from-tarmac-to-rhino-horn-40059841.html 65. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/08/eight-men-convicted-in-french-court-for-trafficking-rhino-horn-and-ivory 66. Al Jazeera Investigations (2016), The Poacher’s Pipeline, accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMguWY99q6s XIII Fake rhino horns are rarely detected by law enforcement authorities

The seizure analysis did not encounter many instances of fake rhino horns being smuggled or traded. Only three reports out of the total of 674 seizures indicated the potential involvement of fake horns. In these cases, authorities had questioned the authenticity of the seized horns and sought forensic tests to verify the products.

Table 11: Rhino horn seizure reports questioning the authenticity of the horns, 2012-2021.

Date Location Commodity seized

Nov 2015 West Bengal, India One rhino horn67

Apr 2016 Guangzhou, China Six rhino horns68

Oct 2018 Assam, India One rhino horn69

That is not to say that the trade in fake horns is not a matter of concern, but that it appears to be relatively rare that law enforcement authorities detect it compared to genuine rhino horn, and there is very little data to indicate the extent to which fake products circulate in the black market.

For example, in Vietnam, it is widely reported that modified water buffalo horn is opportunistically sold as rhino horn to unsuspecting buyers in the retail market,70 but it appears to be less commonly observed in wholesale trade. Fake horns made from cow horn have reportedly been discovered by police

Image 20: Counterfeit rhino horn seized in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, in February 2021. Source: Vietnam Environmental Police.

67. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/5-held-with-jumbo-tusks/articleshow/49742402.cms 68. Content currently unavailable but was previously accessed at: http://news.163.com/16/0408/06/BK41IAIN00014AED.html 69. https://nenow.in/north-east-news/two-held-jorhat-suspected-rhino-horn-seized.html 70. For example, Ammann, K. (2011), ‘The Vietnamese and Rhino Horn – a dealer speaks’, accessed at: http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files/132/1321179326.pdf

in South Africa.71 This could indicate that fake horn is more of a domestic trade issue among small-scale retail traders rather than a transnational issue, likely linked to the fact that criminal networks involved in trafficking horns typically work within an established circle of suppliers, transporters, and buyers.

In February 2021 the Wildlife Justice Commission encountered one case in Vietnam that was ultimately determined to be high-quality counterfeit horns. Intelligence on the sale of three rhino horns had been disseminated to law enforcement authorities in Ho Chi Minh City via a local NGO partner, but it wasn’t until several days after the seizure that the horns were identified as fake. It was the first time that the Wildlife Justice Commission had witnessed such high-quality counterfeit horns circulating on the wholesale black market in Vietnam.

71. Moneron, S., Okes, N., & Rademeyer, J. (2017), Pendants, Powder and Pathways, TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa.

3.

The criminal supply chain72

Since 2015, the Wildlife Justice Commission has collected extensive volumes of intelligence and evidence on the composition of criminal networks and the inner workings of the rhino horn supply chain from Africa to Asia. These investigations have focused on major source, transit, and destination locations of concern, primarily South Africa, Mozambique, Malaysia, Vietnam, and China. This chapter is largely based on a compilation of these findings over the past seven years, interspersed with additional information collected from open sources. While it does not provide a complete picture of the entire global supply chain, it does provide valuable insight into how a large proportion of rhino horns are moving via trafficking networks that operate as organised criminal businesses with clear roles and responsibilities of individuals facilitating the movement of goods from source to consumer.

72. Sanitised intelligence and findings from seven years’ worth of Wildlife Justice Commission investigations are interwoven throughout this threat assessment to provide context and insights into changes in the criminal dynamics of rhino horn trafficking. Where information is drawn from any other source, it is referenced with footnotes and acknowledged as such. Any non-referenced information, inferences or interpretation should be understood as being sourced from Wildlife Justice Commission intelligence analysis.