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QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER ISSUE 2 > 2016
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT A PERSPECTIVE FROM INTERNATIONAL GENEVA
PLUS
UNITED NATIONS INVOCATIONS OF THE ‘RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT,’ STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE ACTIONS
Qualifying U.S. armed counter-terrorism measures under the UN’s Right of Self-Defense
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FEATURE ONE
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A Perspective from International Geneva | 3 Michael Møller | Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva
SPECIAL FEATURE
UNITED NATIONS INVOCATIONS OF THE ‘RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT,’ State Sovereignity and State Actions | 5 Francesco Manca | Deputy Director (Ret.) for the Political and Civil Affairs Office of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) Max Stephenson | Professor of Public and International Affairs and the Director of the Institute for Policy and Governance at Virginia Tech Laura Zanotti | Associate Professor, Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech
FEATURE TWO
QUALIFYING U.S. ARMED COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES UNDER THE UN’S RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE A Strategic Mandate for Civilized Violence | 7 Michael O. Opondo | Law student, Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya
SAVE THE DATE 2017 ACUNS ANNUAL MEETING
THURSDAY – SATURDAY > JUNE 15-17, 2017
Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Korea Hosted by Korean Academic Council on the United Nations System (KAKUNS)
WELCOME TO ACUNS
STARTING POINT
SECRETARIAT STAFF Alistair Edgar Executive Director, ACUNS Associate Professor, Wilfrid Laurier University T > 226.772.3167 E > aedgar@wlu.ca
Brenda Burns, Co-ordinator T > 226.772.3142 F > 226.772.0016 E > bburns@wlu.ca
Gwenith Cross, Administrative Assistant T > 226.772.3121 E > gcross@acuns.org
BOARD MEMBERS 2015-2016
ACUNS is governed by an international Board of Directors:
Chair: Lorraine Elliott, Australian National University
Past Chair: Abiodun Williams, The Hague Institute for Global Justice
Vice Chair: Roger Coate, Georgia College and State University Vice Chair: Margaret Karns, University of Dayton
MEMBERS Thomas Biersteker, Graduate Institute, Geneva Stephen Browne, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, Graduate Center Eunsook Chung, Sejong Institute Cristián Gimenez Corte, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Mary Farrell, University of Plymouth Francesco Mancini, International Peace Institute Nanette Svenson, Tulane University
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up2date news & opinions
Compelling reading to complement theory and knowledge in action AM16 provides an opportunity to share ideas, become well-informed on the most pressing global issues and insights, and to experience the power of theory and knowledge put into action. ACUNS/ASIL Summer Workshop follows, and we offer you some compelling articles to consider while taking part, or that will pique your interest to consider attending in the future. Dr. Alistair Edgar, ACUNS
We have a very interesting, and informed, set of articles around which to build Issue 2 of our 2016 Newsletter series. Michael Møller, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, considers the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and explains why International Geneva today is “one of the most relevant multilateral operational platforms in the world”; Laura Zanotti and Max Stephenson of Virginia Tech and Francesco Manca, Deputy-Director (Ret.) for Political and Civil Affairs of UNIFIL, together offer a quite critical look at UN and member states’ invocations (or not) of R2P in conflict and crisis situations; and Michael Opondo, student at Kenyatta University in Nairobi and President of International Youth Action Against Terrorism, provides a cautionary look at the United States’ counter-terrorism strategy in Africa. Thanks to all of the authors for their time and intellectual energy. This issue will be in print just prior to the 2016 Annual Meeting in mid-June, at Fordham University. If you are new to ACUNS, you may even be reading this while attending the Annual Meeting for the first time. Whether new or a seasoned veteran of ACUNS and our Annual Meetings, I hope that you find engaging the tremendous line-up of Keynote, Plenary, Workshop, and other special guest speakers that all are contributing to our discussions on “Meeting the Challenges of Development and Dignity.” None of this would have been possible without the vision, determination, and engagement, of Melissa Labonte and Brendan Cahill, the generosity of the senior leadership of Fordham University, and of course the direct support of all of the administrative staff. I owe them all thanks, on my own and on behalf of ACUNS. Looking towards next year, I am pleased to give an especial welcome to our colleagues from the Chinese, Korean and Japanese UN studies associations—CANUNS, KACUNS and JAUNS—who have made a special effort to join us, and who will be making a number of contributions to our AM16 proceedings. By the time we meet at Fordham, Brenda and I will have visited Seoul, Korea, where KACUNS will be the host organization for the 2017 Annual Meeting. I look forward to being able to circulate more details, soon. Readers of this section will know that the 2016 ACUNS-ASIL Workshop will be hosted in early October at O.P. Jindal Global University in Sonipat, India. I am looking forward to co-directing the Workshop with my good friend and colleague, Professor Vesselin Popovski, on the theme “Supporting States’ Implementation of International Law.” There is always too much to highlight, and I apologize in advance for everything and everyone I may have missed here. However, I must at least mention the steadily growing success of the ACUNS Global Governance seminar series, held in New York and Geneva with the core support of OEF Foundation, and especially Roberta Spivak who you may know as the Managing Editor of the journal, and Volker Lehmann of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung New York office. However, as I write this piece in mid-April, I want to round out my column by noting that ACUNS is acting as a ‘Digital Advocate’ for the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, and your Executive Director is pleased to have the opportunity to attend and participate as a registered NGO delegate to the Summit. I look forward to the learning experience, and to working with other NGOs and Summit participants.
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COLLECTIVE ROADMAP FOR HUMANITY
FEATURE ONE
FEATURE STORY > MICHAEL MØLLER DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE A PERSPECTIVE FROM DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL GENEVA 2015 WAS A MILESTONE YEAR for the United Nations and for the global development
agenda as an unprecedented convergence of interests, and concerns, led to the creation of a collective roadmap for humanity: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa Agenda for Financing Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Paris Climate Agreement. Combined, these new policy frameworks put us on the path towards a sustainable world for future generations.
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his is exciting and we already see the world mobilizing around these new global goals. Now, the true test is in their implementation. There is a clear sense of urgency for transformative change to achieve them: this is not merely an option anymore, it is a necessity for the well-being of humankind, and we have 15 years to do it. Thus, we must ask ourselves how best we are going to transform these instruments into real action and which roles we can all play, as individuals, businesses, civil society, academia, media, and governments, together within our global society.
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The scale and the ambition of the new agenda requires not only the mobilization of financial resources, the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, and adequate capacity building, but also a truly “revitalized Global Partnership.” This is particularly important in an era of complex and interconnected challenges, where local problems increasingly have global dimensions and global solutions impact at the local level. We must rethink our current models for international cooperation: traditional state actors may lead the way, but they cannot succeed without adopting a different, much more collaborative approach. Governments will be better placed to deliver on promises if they break down the silos between different ministries and begin operating in a more integrated way. Parliamentarians, mayors, and local authorities, for instance, will play a crucial role by serving as conduits between local interests and central institutions.
For a larger version of the graphic, please visit www.acuns.org.
THE NEED TO FOSTER MORE INTEGRATED APPROACHES applies to all sectors of society, including international organizations, private sector, academia, and civil society. The United Nations system has understood that “business as usual” is not an option anymore: the organization has opened up to multi-stakeholder partnerships, which have brought new synergies and resources, including human capital, innovation, technology, and research. All of these factors contribute to the modernization of the UN by introducing new ideas and methods of practice. When it comes to leveraging a global pool of synergies to foster worldwide development, International Geneva holds a unique position and with the implementation of the SDGs, this role becomes even more crucial. International Geneva is by definition “more than the sum of its parts.” It is a network of over 50 United Nations organizations, funds, programmes and agencies, 110 international entities, over 400 NGOs, and over 250 Permanent Missions and other delegations. International Geneva works for global “peace, rights and well-being,” but behind this simple motto lies a highly specialized network of organizations, agencies and other entities that collectively contribute to the common goals. Among these bodies are several that pursue an often overlooked normative function. Others focus on more specific areas, such as field operations, capacity development, legal frameworks, policy formulation, data analysis, advocacy and outreach, research and data collection. Although on the surface these entities appear to be pursuing different objectives, they are actually approaching the same overarching goals from their different areas of expertise. This collaboration is creating a veritable hub of constructive synergies.
AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH SYNERGY IS SDG GOAL 17: PARTNERSHIPS BUILDING – part of the DNA of International Geneva. And this is exactly why the Perception Change Project (PCP) was launched in 2014 by the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG): to reinforce synergies and to increase public understanding of the work done by International Geneva. To achieve this, the PCP seamlessly collaborates with the UN Information Service in rolling out creative communication strategies around major issues on the UN agenda. In two years, the project has grown into a network of 85 partners from international organizations, NGOs, academia, and government entities, as well as supporters spanning from think tanks to the private sector. It has become a true platform that collects information, examples of impact, and best practices from across organizations and communicates it in innovative formats. It is now a natural vehicle for the collection and dissemination of content, particularly around the SDGs. One of the PCP’s ground-breaking projects in 2015 was the mapping of Geneva’s expertise in the SDGs. This effort has sparked discussions, created new links between organizations, and brought even more entities together for a second and more comprehensive mapping exercise in 2016. It is now an indispensable tool for Member States as it provides an overview of expertise on each of the 17 SDGs. Partnerships with the private sector are also continuously promoted. In this context, a privileged cooperation is growing with the World Economic Forum (WEF) based in Geneva. Recently, at the annual WEF forum in Davos, the Global Sustainability Index was launched. This Index is a tool to measure the social responsibility of enterprises, and will help businesses conduct their activities in an economically, socially, and environmentally Continued on page 9 >
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A C U N S . O R G 4
R2P
The UN’s adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2005 expanded its role to include protection of people and not simply states. This shift recast sovereignty as contingent on a state’s behaviour and performance.
UNITED NATIONS INVOCATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ‘RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT,’ FEATURE State Sovereignty and State Actions
Recent developments following the so-called Arab Spring have raised questions concerning why the United Nations has been unable to perform a more meaningful stabilizing role in such scenarios. Indeed, many analysts have argued there are now signs of a renewed Cold War, particularly in Syria. Suspending for a moment a focus on these contentions, what is certain is that actors and alliances have employed force in the present Syrian conflict on a broad scale—apparently without the United Nations’ will or capacity to prevent or stop it—and following often conflicting agendas. During 2015, France and the United States led a coalition that included Bahrain, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and began to bomb targets in Syria controlled by the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Meanwhile, Iranian troops and Hezbollah fighters have reportedly engaged in a ground offensive against anti-Assad forces, with Russian air support. Russia’s aid to the Syrian government has often worked at cross-purposes with the France-USA coalition, a fact that threatens to broaden the conflict in that nation. In addition, according to the newspaper Ha’aretz, Israel has launched at least a dozen airstrikes in Syria and Lebanon since 2011 targeting what it considers to be terrorist weapons caches and arms-transport convoys (principally associated with Hezbollah).
THE UNITED NATIONS has remained largely vague or silent regarding the legitimacy of these operations affecting the territorial sovereignty of one of its members, reflecting its members’ incapacity or unwillingness to invoke the UN Charter to address the issue. Nations have neither effectively worked to assist the Syrian government to reassert its sovereignty, nor intervened to address meaningfully a situation that presently threatens international stability. This brief article examines the evolving UN understanding of state sovereignty in light of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine as revealed by the current crisis in Syria. We contend that states have continued to act in ways that erode the principle of sovereignty in that conflict, but without evidencing sustained political will to address the circumstances their interventions have created. The Syrian situation points increasingly to an international system whose architectonic structural principle is no longer sacrosanct, but one without clear criteria for how to proceed when overriding that premise is appropriate. The UN Charter named the United Nations Security Council as the only body that could authorize military actions against governments that committed acts that broke the peace. The UN’s adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2005 expanded its role to include protection of people and not simply states. This shift recast sovereignty as contingent on a state’s behavior and performance. However, the standards for assessing alleged state
(mis)behavior remain contested. Since R2P’s adoption as the organizing principle for the UN role as an international security organization, a number of states have complained that it fosters an interventionist agenda, and that those governments labeled as “rogue” (i.e., unable or unwilling to protect their citizens from an array of issues, ranging from political oppression, to violence, to extreme poverty) have therefore become potential targets for international action. Unfortunately, the Western choice to support those opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad because of that government’s poor human rights record, without inquiring deeply from the outset into the exact character of the forces on the ground arrayed against his rule, has created a favorable terrain for such previously unknown groups as ISIS and al Nusra to capitalize on the governance instability in the region. The United Nations Charter binds states to subsume their national interests to compelling international needs when the two conflict. However, as Goulding (2003) and Thakur (2006) have observed, the tensions between the UN as the institutional embodiment of the normative aims of the international system and the interests of individual states have only increased. In fact, the body has increasingly been used as a legitimizing tool for bilateral political choices. In his 2007 end of mission report Alvaro de Soto, Under-Secretary General and United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary
General to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority and Envoy to the Quartet (USA, Russia, the European Union, and the UN), argued that the United Nations was included among the stakeholders addressing the Israeli– Palestinian conflict without being allowed to play its traditional role as an impartial actor. As Special Coordinator for the Peace Process, De Soto was not allowed to engage in conversations with Syria even though Israel occupied a share of that nation’s territory. De Soto argued that the United Nations’ presence in this group served principally to legitimize choices favored by the Quartet’s other members. Regrettably, the R2P is increasingly used by like-minded states in a manner analogous to the Dictatus Papae (i.e., as a right to excommunicate regimes not considered “good” players in the international arena). But today’s states take such actions without assuming full responsibility for rebuilding what they may destroy by their interventions or, often, even considering carefully the forces at play or the consequences that could arise from de-stabilizing the political status quo. Such “acts of excommunication” may be led by a single state and its allies (as obtained with the USA under the George W. Bush Administration in 2003 in Iraq), or via UN resolutions (as happened with Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2013). Leaders in all of these cases used protection of civilians to justify ostracism of the targeted regimes. In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized a no fly zone and “all necessary Continued on next page >
5 A C U N S . O R G S i g n u p f o r o u r E > U P D AT E b y b e c o m i n g a m e m b e r !
MEMBER PUBLICATIONS > F R A N C E S CO M A N C A
> MAX STEPHENSON
> L A U R A Z A N OT T I
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RET.) POLITICAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF UNIFIL (UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON)
PROFESSOR, PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, VIRGINIA TECH
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA TECH
Advocating the Responsibility to Protect while exercising it imprudently may create humanitarian catastrophes and encourage the destabilization of entire regions, as the current situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria demonstrate. measures” (i.e., military action) to protect civilians in Libya. In 2013, the General Assembly approved a resolution, drafted by Saudi Arabia, condemning human rights violations in Syria. It urged the Security Council to take measures to end such abuses in Syria (UN General Assembly, 2013b). On 17 May 2013, prior to United Nations passage of the Saudi-sponsored resolution in December, the General Assembly had, “strongly condemned the Syrian government’s indiscriminate violence against civilian populations and welcomed the establishment of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as interlocutors needed for a political transition” (UN General Assembly, 2013a). This measure challenged the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states established by Article 2.7 of the UN Charter in the name of an international responsibility to protect citizens from government-sanctioned violence. Given the humanitarian and refugee crisis in Syria that has ensued as a result of the continuing conflict, the question arises whether member states should not exercise more prudence before withdrawing legitimacy through UN bodies from governments that fail to match internationally recognized standards concerning how they treat some groups within their territories. In fact, the “Responsibility to Protect” should be
exercised responsibly, (i.e., after careful consideration of the interests and agendas of the various players involved in complex conflicts), and after study of the means adopted to undertake action and of the potential exacerbation of conflict that may result. Advocating the Responsibility to Protect while exercising it imprudently may create humanitarian catastrophes and encourage the destabilization of entire regions, as the current situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria demonstrate. In addition, the ongoing massive refugee flow from these nations has sharpened the polarization of political debate in Europe and the United States. Despite the limitations of peacekeeping operations undertaken in the 1990s, at least in that decade the United Nations sought to establish Transitional Administrations in failing states or territories. In contrast, UN member states today do not appear willing to accept that degree of responsibility in the unfolding crises in many Arab countries, especially Syria. Oddly, nations have become more willing to weaken or set aside the principle of state sovereignty in favor of a nominal Responsibility to Protect, but less inclined to do so with care, prudence and accountability to the interests of the populations affected by such choices.
REFERENCES DeSoto, Alvaro (2007). End of Mission Report. Available at https://www.google.com/search? q=alvaro+de+soto+end+of+mission+report&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8 Accessed February 14, 2016. Gregory VII (1075). Dictatus Papae. Available at https://highandlatemiddleages.wordpress. com/2013/02/08/because-i-can-exploring-pope-gregory-vii-dictatus-papae/#_ftn1 Accessed February 10, 2016. Goulding, Marrack (2003). Peacemonger. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Thakur, Ramesh (2006). The United Nations, Peace and Security. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
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MPub
Future of African Peace Operations Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, John Karlsrud (editors) | Zed Books | 2016 Increasingly, African leaders have been making greater efforts to safeguard the peace and stability of their nations. With threats ranging from Islamist insurgencies to an Ebola pandemic, the realities of protecting their citizens within these complex conflict zones have revealed a widening divide between the theory and practice of peacekeeping in Africa. The Future of African Peace Operations provides the first—and long overdue—comprehensive overview and analysis of peacekeeping efforts in Africa. With the African Union’s newly created African Standby Force becoming fully operational in 2016, this timely study argues that governmental response to these challenges will require a unique and distinctively African model of peacekeeping, as well as a radical revision of the current security framework. Analyzing high-profile case studies, such as the operations against Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, this book contains practical insights from both academics and practitioners and will be a vital resource for policy makers, researchers, and anyone seeking insights into the immense security challenges that Africa faces today.
Targeted Sanctions Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, Marcos Tourinho (editors) Cambridge University Press | 2016 International sanctions have become the instrument of choice for policymakers dealing with a variety of different challenges to international peace and security. This is the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of all the targeted sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations since the end of the Cold War. Drawing on the collaboration of more than fifty scholars and policy practitioners from across the globe (the Targeted Sanctions Consortium), the book analyzes two new databases, one qualitative and one quantitative, to assess the different purposes of UN targeted sanctions, the Security Council dynamics behind their design, the relationship of sanctions with other policy instruments, implementation challenges, diverse impacts, unintended consequences, policy effectiveness, and institutional learning within the UN. The book is organized around comparisons across cases, rather than country case studies, and introduces two analytical innovations: case episodes within country sanctions regimes and systematic differentiation among different purposes of sanctions.
* Francesco Manca is Deputy Director (ret.) for the Political and Civil Affairs office of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). In a span of more than a quarter of a century at the UN, Francesco Manca has taken part in many projects and assignments at both UN Headquarters and in the field in areas such as economic development, electoral assistance, human rights, peacemaking and peacekeeping. He has held political and managerial responsibilities in a number of UN peacekeeping missions in Central America, the Balkans, Tajikistan, East Timor, Sierra Leone and in the Middle East. During his long career he has often been invited to deliver lectures and speeches to numerous academic and professional forums in Europe, North and Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. * Max Stephenson is Professor of Public and International Affairs and the Director of the Institute for Policy and Governance at Virginia Tech. Stephenon’s current research interests include international politics, NGOs and international development, peacebuilding and humanitarian relief. * Laura Zanotti is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical international relations theory, as well as international organization, security, peacekeeping and democratization. Prior to joining VT, Zanotti worked for ten years at the United Nations, where she served both in administration and as a political advisor for Peacekeeping Operations.
A C U N S . O R G 6
A STRATEGIC MANDATE FOR CIVILIZED VIOLENCE
> M I C H A E L O. O P O N D O LAW STUDENT, KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, NAIROBI, KENYA
FEATURE STORY
QUALIFYING U.S. ARMED COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES UNDER THE UN’s RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE The September 11, 2001 attacks led to the ‘war on terror,’ which marked a significant change in the international approach to terrorism. One of the immediate repercussions was ‘Civilized Violence’, leading to increasing numbers of civilian victims who were not part of the targeted group. I am attempting to understand the justifications, limits, and effectiveness of ‘Civilized Violence’ as a counter-terrorism approach whose doctrinaire pursuance has turned to an obsessive religion out to prove might.
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FEATURE TWO
WHAT I AM OPPOSED TO IS A DUMB WAR. WHAT I AM OPPOSED TO IS A RASH WAR... A WAR BASED NOT ON REASON BUT ON PASSION, NOT ON PRINCIPLE BUT ON POLITICS.
–B ARRACK O B AM A, O CTO B ER 2002
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error groups are turning their strategy to the occupation and control of territories, and are increasingly joining Western powers in the politics of presence as a means to stamp authority and involvement in ‘all’ international affairs. They believe that ‘might makes right,’ and endeavor to enforce their idea of what is ‘right’ without acknowledging that the definition is based on subjective standards. At some point in all this, we have to agree to the possibility that the war on terror is a perpetual war. Do we seek to put an end to violence in the world by the invention of ‘smarter weapons’, or do we seek to keep this war a perpetual misadventure—The Blank Cheque? I would call the war on terrorism “an African Democratic Regime”— that is, one doesn’t know when it might end.
THE ATTACKS ON 11 SEPTEMBER, 2001 demonstrated that a state can suffer a large-scale attack from groups with no nation-state identity, and that the victim state can lawfully respond in self-defense. Significantly, the attacks were committed by a nefarious combination of a state actor, the Taliban regime which was the de facto government of Afghanistan at the time, and a non-state actor, the international terrorist organization Al Qaeda. It is, therefore, important to qualify armed counter-terrorism measures taken by states as an inherent right of self-defense, given by the UN Charter to its members, in cases of armed conflict (i.e., a state can only exercise its right to use of force in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter if an armed attack occurs against it). As that particular article notes: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. The definition of armed conflict, however, has not been clearly defined in International Humanitarian Law, although the general view holds that the existence of armed conflict is determined on the basis of particular facts and circumstances. With this loop, we cannot at any point treat armed counter-terrorism measures as outside international law; the use of self-defense is a matter of philosophy and politics because the definition of armed conflict itself is subjective and deeply political.
The right to self-defense, however, also prohibits excessive measures by the defending state; force shall be proportionate to the threat with no room for extreme actions. To identify the boundaries of acceptable measures, it is crucial to understand the nature of the conflict in question, and to determine whether the situation of violence amounts to a situation of armed conflict; only then can we justify ‘civilized violence’ in the ambit of self-defense. How do we qualify terrorism as armed conflict? Every definition of terrorism has limitations. It is more practical to find an intersection between terrorism and armed conflicts—whether certain acts of terrorism are likely to give rise to, or form part of, an armed conflict. We can place terrorism under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which applies only in relation to armed conflict. Sometimes states attempt to argue that their counter-terrorism efforts are not within the context of armed conflict; an approach intended to avoid the application of IHL that would limit their range of choice of activities. Any nexus between a counter-terrorism measure and armed conflict creates obligations to be strictly observed to avoid the violation of IHL. There are two different regimes governing armed conflicts in IHL: International Armed Conflicts (IACs) and Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIACs). IACs are all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more high contracting parties, even if one party does not recognize the declaration of war.1 In contrast, in NIACs the application of IHL is dependent on a high level of violence. NIACs take place in the territory of a high contracting party between its armed forces or other organized groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. The conflict must be protracted and armed groups must be organized.2 All law, but especially Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), necessarily involves subjectivity implicit in human reasoning that may be troubling to those of a technical mind-set, accustomed to the precision that their academic discipline so often grants. On the other hand, terrorism has become part of our daily vocabulary—even though there is not a concrete definition of terrorism and a multitude of possible definitions. For instance, it is possible that the violation of a population’s or a groups’ human rights by governmental institutions may be equated with state-sponsored terrorism. To expand on this example, it helps to look at torture and the kind of action or inaction that is embedded with political motivations. If torture is effected against individuals in order to achieve political measures then it is evident that it is a form of terrorism. This sort of identification helps in the definition of terror, and terrorism. Political motivations are inclusive of the Government’s Continued on page 10 >
1 Geneva 2 Geneva
Convention I-IV, Art. 2(1) Convention I-IV, Art. 2(2) ACUNS.ORG
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A PERSPECTIVE FROM INTERNATIONAL GENEVA Continued from page 4 > responsible way, while carefully managing social and environmental risks. That approach will help them succeed in the long term by contributing to a more sustainable world. As we are increasingly getting better at collaboration and aiming to be more original, creative, and resourceful, innovation is an important theme that cuts across the work done in International Geneva. The science research at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) leads also to transformative findings in medicine. The International Organization for Standardization mobilizes over 100,000 experts involved in the development of standards for innovation. The World Intellectual Property Organization has over 300 technology and innovation centres in more than 50 countries. Fostering the pursuit of science in Geneva, however, extends beyond the laboratory, as the forging of laws and policies play a critical role too. The most inspiring examples are the ones that push the boundaries of conventional knowledge and bring different worlds together, like drones designed not for warfare, but to carry life-saving medical supplies and blood to remote areas at low costs. A SECOND EXAMPLE IS SDG GOAL 16: PEACEFUL AND INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE are essential elements for development and their fulfilment contributes to conflict prevention. International Geneva is a well-established and recognized hub for the promotion of good governance, respect for human rights, and peace. While good governance and prevention of conflict are our collective primary objectives, the system nevertheless often fails to prevent conflict and address, in good time, the root causes. The United Nations and its partners in International Geneva have an important role to play in resolving violent conflicts through peaceful means, in particular through mediation. In 2015 alone, UNOG hosted four mediation processes and multiple rounds of negotiations on Syria, Libya, Yemen, Georgia, and the Great Lakes; Geneva remains an important hub for international diplomacy. This is based on Geneva’s brand, supported by its infrastructure, the neutrality of the host country, and the multiplicity of actors working for peace, all of which provide valuable assets and support to mediators who chose Geneva as a venue for their peace efforts.
Its 2015 edition focused on the theme “Building Peace 2030 – Getting ready to face future conflict trends” and concluded with several key messages, including the need to see the search for peace as part of a broader agenda that includes our work on human rights and development. The evident need to strengthen cross-pollination between operational actors and academic researchers, as well as between governments, civil society, and the private sector, is essential to support peace efforts and Geneva is a great place to have these exchanges. THE THIRD EXAMPLE IS SDG GOAL 5: THE PURSUIT OF GENDER EQUALITY AND THE NEED TO EMPOWER ALL WOMEN AND GIRLS— which is also high on our list of priorities in International Geneva, as it is instrumental in achieving peace, defending rights, fostering economic growth, and promoting the well-being of us all. The “Geneva Gender Champions Initiative” was launched in 2015, by myself and the US Ambassador. Each Gender Champion chooses two concrete, measurable commitments for gender equality in his/her own organization and takes an additional pledge— common to all—to pursue gender parity in discussion panels. With nearly one hundred Gender Champions so far, including heads of international organizations, representatives of Member States and civil society actors, we are changing the way we do business. Together, committed leaders generate momentum at the highest level to usher in meaningful change and facilitate strong cross-cutting links for the greatest possible impact. The example we set in International Geneva is already having a global impact on organizational cultures and will hopefully help reduce gender inequalities.
Impact Infographic by the Perception Change Project (PCP). The piece was a crowdsourced product produced for Geneva Peace Week 2015. For a larger version of the graphic, please visit www.acuns.org.
These are three examples out of the seventeen global goals, but the list is much longer with health, trade, humanitarian action, human rights, disarmament, disaster risk reduction, etc. As the SDGs mapping shows, Geneva has expertise in basically all the areas of sustainable development. The nature of the SDGs is universal and integrated and it is becoming increasingly clear that all actions should be cost effective, impactful, collaborative, and with multiple effects. With over 750 actors working for peace, rights, and well-being we can safely say that there is an unparalleled critical mass of work, expertise and knowledge in International Geneva, which serves as one of the most relevant multilateral operational platforms in the world.
A recent initiative in Geneva is the creation of a SDGs network of specialists working for peace and security to provide States and interested parties access to the knowledge and resources of organizations working on the secure implementation of the SDGs. To further promote peace, a “Geneva Peace Week” was created. * Version from September 2015, prepared in advance to the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit in New York. A 2016 revision is underway. For a larger version of the graphic, please visit www.acuns.org.
9 A C U N S . O R G S i g n u p f o r o u r E > U P D AT E b y b e c o m i n g a m e m b e r !
QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER Issue 2 > 2016 Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) Quarterly Newsletter is published four times a year with the support of the Department of Communications, Public Affairs & Marketing (CPAM) at Wilfrid Laurier University.
We welcome and encourage your feedback. Opinions expressed in ACUNS Quarterly Newsletter do not necessarily reflect those of the editor, ACUNS or the host institution. © ACUNS 2016. All rights reserved.
Publisher: Alistair Edgar, Executive Director, ACUNS Editor: Brenda Burns, Co-ordinator, ACUNS Contributing Writers: Michchael Opondo, Michael Møller, Laura Zanotti, Max Stephenson, Francesco Manca, Alistair Edgar and Brenda Burns Design: Dawn Wharnsby, CPAM Imagery: Thinkstock.com Send address changes and feedback to: Gwenith Cross, Administrative Assistant, ACUNS E > gcross@acuns.org T > 226.772.3121
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QUALIFYING U.S. ARMED COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES UNDER THE UN’S RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE Continued from page 7 > purposes, for instance, an autocratic State will find its activities to be legitimate irrespective of how unreasonable, unethical or contrary to Jus Cogens the said Municipal Lex Specialis are drafted. Therefore, political aims will not suffice as violent activities that are only meant to force the Government to act in a certain way; rather, it will suffice as violent activities that are aimed to coerce individual persons into acting in a certain way.
Under this definition, terrorists’ actions are meant to physically or psychologically injure a person or a small group of people with the hope of inciting fear in a large portion of the population. Therefore, terrorism is the act or omission by an individual or a group of people, organized or disorganized, with the intention of effecting physical or psychological violence towards a person or group with the hope instilling large-scale terror. This aspect of attempting to subdue the other using arms is the only relative nexus between terrorism and armed conflicts, although other aspects such as the legal standing of the person conducting the terrorist act may also be invoked.
At this juncture, these definitions of terrorism will not touch on what the various laws provide, as the same will be tackled autonomously since each state has its own practice. The definition of terrorism will not be uniform from one state to another. However, this does not suggest that academics have one consistent definition or understanding of terrorism. The basic concepts surrounding terrorism have to be addressed with the hope of simplifying this discussion.
The above standard or understanding of international law serves to positively qualify the United States’ actions in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries harboring terror groups.
In the study of terrorism, it is wise to avoid focusing on behavior; actors should be the focus. The arguments from sociologist Omar Lizardo are worth considering as they analyze the actor.3 To some extent, a Government’s actions can be scrutinized to reveal if their activities are meant to invoke terror. There are, however, issues with a definition that focuses exclusively on actors as it is best suited for studies of state practices. Furthermore, this definition invokes the ideology of state practice, which Lizardo does not address. Conversely, Tore Bjørgo, author of Strategies for Preventing Terrorism,4 argues that terrorism invites the concept of fear, such as La Terreur—the Reign of Terror—during The French Revolution.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: * Michael Møller is Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva. With over 35 years of experience as an international civil servant in the United Nations. He began his career in 1979 with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and worked with UNHCR in different capacities in New York, Iran, Mexico, Haiti and Geneva. Between 1997 and 2001 he was the Head of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs at United Nations headquarters; between 2001 and 2006 he was the Director for Political, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary General, while serving concurrently as Deputy Chief of Staff for the last two years of that period. Mr. Møller also served as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Cyprus from 2006 to 2008 and was the Executive Director of the Kofi Annan Foundation from 2008 to 2011. Born in 1952 in Copenhagen, Mr. Møller completed a Master’s course in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the University of Sussex, United Kingdom.
A C U N S Q UA R T E R LY N E W S L E T T E R > I S S U E 2 > 2 0 1 6
* Michael O. Opondo is an undergraduate Law student at Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya. He is the president of International Youth Action Against Terrorism, and has long been involved in helping youth understand and support the principles and work of the United Nations through engagement with Model UN Conferences and through the UN Volunteers Program, working closely with the UNON (United Nations Office at Nairobi) public information office. He can be contacted at www.michaelopondo.com 3 Omar
LIzardo, “Defining and Theorizing Terrorism: A Global Actor-Centred Approach,” Journal of World Systems Research 14, 2 (2008).
4 Tore
Bjørgo, Strategies for Preventing Terrorism (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).
2016 DISSERTATION AWARD ANNOUNCEMENT ACADEMIC COUNCIL ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
is pleased to announce the winner of the 2016 Dissertation Award
GABRIELA BUENO PhD Candidate, University of Massachusetts, Boston Global Governance and Human Security
for her dissertation entitled, The Institutional Landscape of International Forest Protection: Understanding Institutional Complexity in International Forest Governance
VIEW THE 2017 DISSERTATION AWARD CALL FOR APPLICATIONS ONLINE
> visit acuns.org/2017da/
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