Moving the Needle: A Strategy for U.S. Policy in Yemen

Moving the Needle: A Strategy for U.S. Policy in Yemen Princeton School of Public and International Affairs Policy Workshop Report Fall 2021

Houthi rebel inspects the damage after an air strike in Sanaa.

Cover photo courtesy of AFP - Getty Images.

Moving the Needle: A Strategy for U.S. Policy in Yemen Princeton School of Public and International Affairs Policy Workshop Report Fall 2021

Faculty Advisor Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies Authors Jacqueline Baumgartner • Merlin Boone • Garin Bulger • Dina Chotrani • Raisa Chowdhury • Alex Gephart • Baher Iskander • Jack McCaslin

(right) With Special Envoy Timothy Lenderking and Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Benaim at State Department, Washington, DC (left) With Special Envoy Timothy Lenderking at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

(below) With Ambassador Moosa Hamdan Al Tai at Omani Embassy, Washington, DC

Table of Contents 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| 6| 7| 8| 9|

Executive Summary Background to the Conflict Key Actors Shortcomings of Past Approaches to Resolving the Yemen Crisis Moving the Needle: Proposed Strategy Conclusion List of Interviews Workshop Participants Endnotes

1 3 5 14 22 31 32 34 36

Policy Insights • Beating a dead horse: Should the United States continue supporting the Hadi-led ROYG? • “The more they eat, the hungrier they get”: Houthi strategy after the fall of Marib • “A pariah state”: Should the United States break with Saudi Arabia?

• Is the U.S. Congress a barrier to the peace process in Yemen?

• The “bloody nose” approach: Putting U.S. military options on the table

6 8 10 16 30

Page i

Preface This report is the final product of a policy workshop sponsored by the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs as part of the Master in Public Affairs degree program. It results from the work of eight graduate students advised by Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer. The report’s content was briefed to the U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arabian Peninsula Affairs, and the NSC Director for Political-Military Affairs (MENA) on December 7, 2021.

The report’s information and recommendations stem from months of research and interviews with current and former government officials from the United States, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, researchers, members of civil society, and UN officials. A list of those we interviewed can be found at the end of the report. The group conducted virtual and in-person interviews in Princeton, Washington, DC, and New York City.

Throughout the report, we make reference to some of those we interviewed by name, indirectly by title, or merely as a workshop interview. This was done at the requests of those we interviewed to allow them to speak freely and for us to use the information they gave us. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of any individual author, facilitator, Princeton University, the U.S. State Department, humanitarian professionals, or any person or their affiliated organizations interviewed as part of this workshop.

Acknowledgements We are deeply grateful to the many people who supported us during our workshop. We thank the government officials, researchers, and others who generously lent their time and expertise to us.

Their contribution to our understanding of the Yemen conflict was invaluable.

We would like to thank Ambassador Kurtzer for his mentorship and Bernadette Yeager for her support during our workshop. We are also thankful for Dean Amaney Jamal, Associate Dean Karen McGuinness, Associate Director of Finance and Administration Ryan Linhart, and everyone else at SPIA who helped make this workshop possible.

Page 1

1 | Executive Summary The war in Yemen is in its seventh year. Hundreds of thousands of Yemeni people have been killed by hunger, disease, and fighting, while millions more have been internally displaced. Though often overshadowed among policymakers and in the media by regions perceived as more important to U.S. interests, Yemen remains a priority for the Biden administration. Biden came into office committed to ending the conflict, and in February 2021 he appointed Ambassador Timothy Lenderking as a Special Envoy for Yemen.

A complex web of actors, shifting interests, and fraught alliances characterize the conflict. The situation contains three layered conflicts in one: between the UNrecognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the Houthis; the Houthis and Saudi Arabia; and Saudi Arabia and Iran. U.S. involvement in the conflict began with the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) intervention in March 2015, shortly after the Houthis unseated the UNrecognized government at the end of 2014.

country also supports the anti-Houthi coalition and hosts the ROYG in Riyadh. It therefore has enormous influence over the outcome of the conflict. So too, do the Houthis, whose unexpected and largely unchecked military victories have given them control over roughly 70-percent of Yemen’s population.

Map of the Yemen conflict as of June 2019 European Council on Foreign Relations

Houthi controlled territory ROYG & controlled territory (nominally)

Our strategy focuses on the Houthi-Saudi relationship, and our goal is de-escalation In this report, we chose to limit U.S. objectives between the two. We recommend a series of to mending the U.S.-Saudi relationship and small, interim agreements between these two achieving a Saudi-Houthi détente. We assess main actors. This approach departs from past that Saudi Arabia is indispensable to the Biden efforts, such as the Stockholm Agreement administration’s goal of ending the war. Not only and the Joint Declaration, which had pursued does Saudi Arabia’s historical intervention in comprehensive settlements that sought to Yemen form the basis of Houthi grievances, the address a wide range of issues and involved

Page 2

a wide range of actors. We assess that smaller agreements with limited scope can lay the necessary groundwork for a future comprehensive Yemeni political agreement.

Our strategy has two parts.

with the Houthis and Saudis to help address each side’s grievances, win concessions, and build trust. Two discrete near-term goals are an end to Houthi cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and a ceasefire in Marib. Longer term, our strategy aims to reach a ceasefire First, we call on the U.S. government to across all frontlines in order to lay a path toward rehabilitate its relationship with Saudi Arabia. normalization of relations between the Saudis If the United States wants to help bring the and the Houthis so that each feels secure from conflict closer to an end, it must rebuild a close foreign intervention and attacks. partnership based on trust with Saudi Arabia, given the latter’s central role in the conflict. Our strategy assumes the United States and Saudi Arabia is the party in the Yemen conflict Saudi Arabia would commit the necessary that the United States has the greatest potential resources, including limited U.S. military to influence. strikes, to prevent the fall of Marib to the Houthis. We do not assume an inevitable Houthi Second, we call on the U.S. Special Envoy to victory in Marib. To focus on the strategy, our intensify his parallel diplomatic negotiations report does not engage in depth with related issues like counterterrorism, the humanitarian crisis, or internal Yemeni political dynamics or tribal politics. We discuss some spoilers (or disruptors) that could undermine our strategy, including the role of President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, the U.S. Congress, and the potential fall of Marib, though this list is not exhaustive.

The front lines of Marib,

December 2021 Islamic World News ROYG controlled territory Contested territory Houthi controlled territory

Page 3

2 | Background to the Conflict The Imamate, Unification, and Civil War

Saada Wars

In Yemen, conflict and division are nothing new.

Beginning in 897 CE, an Imamate administered political and religious rule over different parts of modern-day Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman.1 After it gained independence from the Ottoman Empire following World War I, the Imamate ruled in northern Yemen until a revolution in 1962 ushered in republican rule.2 South Yemen gained independence from British colonial rule in 1967 and soon became a Marxist state with close

Saleh’s government waged a series of wars from 2004 to 2010 in the Saada governorate against the Houthi family and its followers. The conflict was triggered by public demonstrations against Saleh that escalated into a series of battles in which the main opposition leader was killed under contested circumstances at the hands of the Yemeni military. These wars allowed the Houthi movement to demonstrate its resilience and expand across northern Yemen.5

Arab Spring

The Yemeni Zaidi State in 1597 under Al-Mansur al-Qasim Wikimedia ties to the Soviet Union.3 The North and South merged to create a unified Yemen in 1990. The South had joined to achieve economic stability but grievances mounted due to economic marginalization and political violence. Civil war broke out in 1994, but within two months, northern forces led by Ali Abdullah Saleh triumphed, leading secessionist leadership in the South to go into exile and take its movement underground.4

In 2011, the wave of protests gripping the Arab world, later dubbed the Arab Spring, spread to Yemen. Protests broke out against Saleh’s three-decade autocratic rule. By the end of the year, Saleh agreed to step down and was replaced by his vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s term as President was originally supposed to be for two years as part of a transition arrangement partially brokered by the GCC.6

National Dialogue Conference In March 2013, the 565-member National Dialogue Conference (NDC) commenced. The goal of the NDC was to determine the political reforms necessary to create a structurally sound and united Yemen. Comprising eleven working groups and a nine-member presidency, the NDC included most significant interest groups in Yemen, including the General People’s Congress (GPC), the Islah party, the Houthis, southern socialists, tribal leaders, and civil society

Page 4

Protestors calling for the ouster of President Saleh during the Arab Spring

alliance with the Houthis against Hadi’s government. In September 2014, the Houthis Suhaib Salem/Reuters pressured President Hadi to sign an agreement organizations. The NDC decided to transition that granted both Houthis and southerners a Yemen into a six-district federated system, place in his government. This agreement lasted with Sana’a and Aden becoming special zones five months before Hadi fled to Aden. outside the districts. However, the Houthis felt GCC Coalition Intervention in Yemen their political power had been severely diluted As the Houthis continued their push to take through the district creation process, and they the southern governorates in 2015, Saudi withdrew their support for the new constitution. Arabia led a GCC military intervention in March Additionally, many southern Yemeni leaders 2015 to restore the internationally recognized boycotted the entire conference.7 government to Sana’a. Initial successes later settled into the stalemate of the last few years.8 Houthi-Saleh Alliance Takes Sana’a The damage from military hostilities has led to In 2014, the Houthis expanded their control in a humanitarian catastrophe across all of Yemen. the north by signing non-aggression pacts with The economic situation remains dire. The several northern tribes. They moved into the Houthis have only been emboldened with their capital of Sana’a with little resistance with help military victories—and they seem intent to take from forces loyal to Saleh, who had formed an over Marib, the strategic oil rich city in the north.

Page 5

3 | Key Actors Republic of Yemen Government

aftermath of the Houthi takeover of Sana’a.

The ROYG is the UN-recognized government The Hadi-Islah alliance is driven primarily by of Yemen. It is led by President Abd Rabbuh self-preservation, resisting threats to each of Mansour Hadi, the former vice president to their positions from the Houthis, the STC, and President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The government an array of other Yemenis and outsiders. This has been based in Riyadh since 2015 when Hadi comes at the expense of strengthening the antifled Aden following the Houthi advance on the Houthi coalition and bringing an end to the war. city.9 President Hadi formally requested outside support, providing the primary justification Houthis (Ansar Allah) under international law for the Saudi-led The Houthis now control territory that includes coalition’s intervention in Yemen.10 Hadi’s about 70 percent of the Yemeni population.15 primary partner in the government is the Islah The Houthis are a Zaidi revivalist group within party, an Islamist political party with links to the Shia Islam. The contemporary movement began Muslim Brotherhood.11 Saudi Arabia brokered in the 1990s in response to the spread of Salafi the Riyadh Agreement in 2019, which sought institutes in their homeland and marginalization to ease tensions between the ROYG and the by the Sana’a government. After their leader, Southern Transition Council (STC), providing Abdulmalik al-Houthi, was killed by Saleh’s the latter a formal role in the internationally security forces, the Houthis fought the Saada recognized Yemeni government. The agreement wars against Saleh between 2004 and 2010, is yet to be fully implemented.12 with Saleh’s militias receiving support from Saudi Arabia.16 The Houthis later took part in protests that led to Saleh’s resignation during the Arab Spring and participated in a GCCsupported National Dialogue Conference in 2014. The Houthis later teamed up with Saleh after his resignation, and took Sana’a, unseating the internationally recognized government led

by President Hadi. Without a strong military or national base of support, the Houthis benefited from Saleh’s control of military forces and were eventually able to use Saleh’s GPC patronage networks to infiltrate the government, even after the Houthis killed him in 2017.17

The ROYG today is characterized by infighting and conflicting agendas. It is held together by its dependency on Saudi Arabia and antipathy toward the Houthis.13 Hadi is both reliant on and distrustful of his Saudi partners. He sacked the popular Khaled Bahah in 2016, fearing that the Saudis preferred Bahah to lead the ROYG, and in 2018 he fired his prime minister, Ahmed Bin Daghr, for bringing together expatriate GPC leaders. Bahah was replaced with General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, who was closely affiliated with the Islah party.14 The relationship between Hadi and Islah is a marriage of convenience since both were politically vulnerable in the Iran’s support to the Houthis has strengthened

Page 6

Beating a dead horse: Should the United States continue supporting the Hadi-led ROYG? The denouement of Afghanistan’s former government serves as a warning for U.S. policymakers. Supporting a corrupt government that has little to no support from its people is a recipe for failure. The official government of Yemen maintains our support even though it bears the same warning signs that characterized Ghani’s government before it fell.

ROYG President President Abd Rabbuh

U.S. policymakers must ask: What Mansour Hadi in 2019 Hamad l Mohammed/Reuters value does Hadi’s leadership offer and what are the downsides to supporting his government? It is true that Hadi remains the official representative of the internationally-recognized government of Yemen. He has also been supportive of U.S. counterterrorism operations inside Yemen. But Hadi carries no domestic legitimacy with his people. Interviewed Yemenis emphasize this point—the man is extremely unpopular. His government has been in exile for years, which is both a cause and a symptom of his country’s lack of trust in his leadership. Further, Hadi has made peace more difficult to attain. “Incentives for Hadi to negotiate a deal are close to zero,” relayed one analyst, “once he negotiates a deal, he is negotiating himself out of power.”43 After assessing the benefits and risks of supporting Hadi, U.S. policymakers should ask their Saudi and Yemeni partners the following questions: Is there a suitable replacement for Hadi?

What is the roadmap that could lead to the ROYG returning to Yemen? Should there be a different model considered for governing Yemen—such as a weak figurehead, with stronger, more autonomous governors in charge of the various parts of Yemen? Unless a strong case has been made to support Hadi’s government, the United States should remove Hadi from its plans for a post-war Yemen.

Page 7

Houthis (continued)

Southern Transitional Council

over the past few years. Iran was one of five countries with diplomatic missions in Sana’a in 2015 after other embassies pulled out. The group also received Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hizballah members for security and military training. Houthis regularly receive weapons shipments from Iran and some Houthi leaders have been hosted in Tehran for training and indoctrination. Many of our interviews emphasized that the solution to Yemen “lies in Tehran,” not Riyadh.18

The STC is a southern political entity founded in 2017 by Hani bin Breik and Aidroos al-Zubaydi.

It grew out of the Southern Movement, or Hirak, a protest movement against President Saleh that began in 2007. The protests had roots in the outcome of the 1994 Yemeni civil war, when southern secessionists sought to divide the just-unified Yemeni state, only to lose to forces led by then-President Saleh.22

The Houthis have sought to secure their border with Saudi Arabia, undercut and marginalize the Hadi-led government, and end foreign intervention in Yemen.19 These three goals have not fundamentally changed, but specific Houthi demands have evolved. In April 2020, the Houthis laid out a set of demands for peace.

It called for a ceasefire overseen by the UN, “brotherly relations” with Saudi Arabia, and the end to foreign interference in Yemen. It called for the end of land, air, and sea blockades by the coalition and the demilitarization of border crossings, all of which would presumably make it easier to smuggle in weapons. It also demanded the coalition provide compensation to all those affected by the war, taking virtually no responsibility for rebuilding or governing Yemen.20 In December 2021, the Houthis called on the Saudi-led coalition to arrange a ceasefire and negotiate an end to the war under the auspices of the UN.21

When the Houthi-Saleh alliance invaded parts of the south in March 2015, the movement quickly transformed into the Southern Resistance and was supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in its campaigns against al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Houthis.23 Though it does not represent the entire southern region, the STC is currently in control of Aden, the de facto seat of the ROYG in Yemen, and it has support in Dhale, Lahij, and the western Abyan governorates.24 Given present and historical animosities, the STC has a complicated relationship with the Hadi-led ROYG. While it advocates for southern independence, it has also publicly supported Hadi as the legitimate president in the context of the anti-Houthi coalition. In January 2018, the STC seized control of the Aden government from Hadi-aligned officials. Clashes between government forces and STC forces continued throughout 2018 and into 2019. The fighting

Page 8

“The more they eat, the hungrier they get”: Houthi strategy after the fall of Marib Our recommendation assumes Marib remains under the control of ROYG forces for the short term. Should the city fall to the Houthis, two questions ensue. First, will the Houthis stop their military campaign, or will they continue onto Shabwa and the south? Second, will the ROYG collapse?

We assess that the Houthis, emboldened by their victory and empowered by access to new oil revenues, will continue their military campaign beyond Marib. Some analysts we spoke with emphasized the Houthis’ predilection for fighting over governing. Houthi history demonstrates a tendency toward fighting rather than consolidating gains, especially since they have no experience with governance. Houthi ideology is also laden with visions for conquering all of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Iran will likely support their campaign eastward and capitalize on their new victory. For these reasons, we assess that Houthi fighting will continue. To be sure, some voices within Houthi ranks will prefer to parlay victory in Marib into a maximalist negotiating position. Those are the moderate, pragmatic voices that the United States and Saudi Arabia should empower and elevate.

A defeat in Marib will likely spell the end of the Hadi-led ROYG. President Hadi is on the record claiming that he will not let the city fall.44 If it does, his scant legitimacy in Yemen would be gone.

A scramble for new leadership, driven by the Saudis or other partners, would likely ensue. The ROYG’s collapse may also prompt Saudi Arabia to abandon their ineffectual partner altogether and to seek accommodation with the Houthis, exchanging a reduction of Saudi support to the ROYG for an end to Houthi rocket attacks. In tandem, the STC may feel liberated to abandon the ROYG to deal directly with the Houthis; according to our interviews, this is a prospect that has been considered.

Page 9

STC (continued)

Yemeni disputes in its favor. Saudi Arabia’s intensified in August 2019, when advancing overall goal has been to maintain stability in government-backed forces were turned back by Yemen to prevent its problems from spilling UAE airstrikes that killed hundreds of soldiers.25 over the border, while ensuring the country In November 2019, Saudi Arabia brokered the remains dependent, weak, and friendly to Saudi Riyadh Agreement which aimed to stop the leadership.29 intra-coalition fighting by establishing a new unity government that included representatives Saudi involvement in the current crisis began during the Arab Spring, when the GCC helped from the STC.26 facilitate a transition plan to end President The STC’s main interest is independence for the Saleh’s 33-year rule.30 After what appeared to south of Yemen. According to one STC official, be a successful transition, Saudi Arabia—which the “crux of our struggle against the Houthis was instrumental in negotiating Saleh’s exit and in the south has been to achieve independence Hadi’s appointment—was not deeply involved as and reestablish the state of southern Yemen.”27 the GCC transition plan played out through the In the short term, the STC wants international NDC.31 The plan fell apart when Houthi forces recognition and legitimacy. It would prefer and forces still loyal to Saleh in the Yemeni that international actors drop their insistence military joined together and took Sana’a in 2014. on supporting Hadi and on a unified Yemen government. Our interviews affirmed that the STC continues to resist the Houthis and terrorist groups, including AQAP and the Islamic State (IS).

On March 22, 2015, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced Operation Decisive Storm, initiating the now seven-year-long Saudi intervention. The Crown Prince’s exact motives for intervening were not certain, but some argue that “it had more to do with Iran than with Yemen Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia has a long history of intervention itself,” specifically concerns of Iran’s influence 32 in Yemen. In 1933, just one year after the over the Houthis. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has establishment of the modern state of Saudi received U.S. military equipment and assistance Arabia, a border dispute drew Saudi forces into with targeting and aircraft maintenance, open conflict with their southern neighbor. The although its primary partner on the ground in war resulted in the expansion of Saudi territory, Yemen has been the UAE. When the war began, which remains a source of grievance for the the Saudis focused on the north and the Emiratis 33 Houthis today.28 Historically, Saudi intervention on the south and the coasts. has been characterized by financial and military support to various sides to skew internal Today, Saudi Arabia is increasingly pushing for

Page 10

“A pariah state”: Should the United States break with Saudi Arabia?

When it comes to U.S.-Saudi relations, the options available to the administration range from complete decoupling to rehabilitating and returning to a strong relationship marked by mutual trust. Our research leads us to advocate for the latter approach. A stronger relationship with Saudi Arabia serves current U.S. interests in Yemen, and it will reap dividends in the future.

If the United States wants to prepare for global

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) (Saudi Royal Court/ Reuters) and US President Joe Biden

competition with China, it must maintain alliances at strategic chokehold points beyond the Indo-Pacific, such as the Arabian Peninsula, over which Saudi Arabia enjoys regional leadership. Saudi Arabia will continue to exercise influence within the Muslim world given its custody of Islam’s holiest sites as well as being a regional leader. Barring an extreme event, Mohammed bin Salman is slated to rule the country for the next several decades, and he is seeking to expand his country’s influence, transforming it into an economic and cultural hub for the Arab world. Given the Crown Prince’s young age, it would be prudent for the United States to maintain and strengthen the bilateral relationship in order to hold some sway over his country’s behavior for the foreseeable future. If we do not repair our relationship with Saudi Arabia, we lose influence over the Arabian Peninsula and cede its strategic value to competitors.

History suggests the U.S.-Saudi relationship is extremely resilient. It has managed challenges across successive administrations, surviving tensions over Israel; the oil embargo of 1973; the discovery of Chinese ballistic missiles in 1985; the 9/11 terrorist attacks; the boycott (and potential invasion) of Qatar; and the brazen murder of a U.S. permanent resident and journalist. The U.S. would do well to look beyond Saudi Arabia’s failed policies in Yemen to see their value as a strategic partner and potential friend for the future’s largely unknown contingencies.

(Michael Stravato/The Texas Tribune)

Page 11

Saudi Arabia (continued) a negotiated resolution to the conflict, spurred

by U.S. and UN support. It is searching for ways to exit gracefully in the face of surprising Houthi victories. In March 2021, the Saudis released a peace plan and ceasefire arrangement, which was rejected by the Houthis.34 Saudi Arabia remains concerned about its security in the face of a near daily barrage of drone and rocket attacks from Houthi territory and the possibility of greater Iranian presence on the Arabian Peninsula.

anti-Iran movements across the Middle East, an accusation punctuated by the Saudi execution of a Shia dissident cleric in January 2016. Following the death of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who had sought to reduce tensions between Riyadh and Tehran, and the rise of King Salman, Iran increased its involvement in Yemen.35

The Houthi-Iran relationship is fraught, and it would be incorrect to describe the Houthis simply as an Iranian proxy in the likes of Lebanon’s Hizballah. Unlike Hizballah, the Houthis have their own history and ideology that stand apart from Iranian doctrine. They maintain Iran Iran’s involvement in the Yemen conflict is a deep sense of sovereignty over their territory. characterized by strategic opportunism. Iran Indeed, the Houthis have publicly criticized Iran, provides security assistance and training to the like when the latter announced plans to build 36 Houthis. Specifically, our interviews affirmed a naval base in Yemen. Iran’s role in Yemen is that Iran’s IRGC has provided weapons and further complicated by internal Iranian division. assistance in setting up security directorates Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and establishing a police state in the northern territories. To be sure, Iranian support to the Houthis was not inevitable.

President Rouhani of Iran had sought détente with Saudi Arabia, but he faced internal opposition. Iranian hardliners who opposed normalization with Saudi Arabia found the Houthis a suitable partner in Yemen to achieve their interests. Supporting the Houthis with weapons and training was a cheap and convenient way to drain Saudi coffers. Hardliners accused Saudi Arabia of funding

Reuters

Page 12

For example, the Iranian embassy in Yemen did not support the Houthi takeover of Sana’a, but the IRGC did.37

is complicated by two contradictions, one emanating from the UAE and the other from its proxy forces. First, the UAE strongly dislikes both the Islah party, based on the party’s For its part, Iran’s influence in Yemen is limited. affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Their support for the Houthis comes in the Hadi-led government, which lacks legitimacy context of entanglements in other conflicts— and competence. Second, as Emirati proxies Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria—and achieved success on the battlefield, southern punishing U.S. sanctions. That said, the future secessionist sentiment was reignited and of Iran’s role in Yemen, particularly following empowered, undermining the UAE-ROYG a potential Houthi victory in Marib, remains relationship. These two fissures in the antiunclear. Some analysts have suggested Houthi coalition have not yet been resolved. that Iran may seek to dramatically increase its partnership with the group, leading to a To project power and influence in its “Hizballah 2.0” inside Yemen.38 neighborhood, the UAE has acquired ports and licenses for its firms to operate, developed closer ties with Ethiopia, and established United Arab Emirates 40 The UAE had been Saudi Arabia’s primary military bases in Somaliland and Eritrea. For and most effective foreign military partner example, the Assab base in Eritrea has been in Yemen from 2015 to the downsizing of its used by Emirati special forces to train Yemeni military footprint in 2019. Emirati operations fighters and to send Sudanese soldiers to fight occurred principally in southern Yemen and in Yemen. The UAE ultimately seeks to achieve were characterized by the cultivation of local the ability and the legitimacy to protect vital fighting forces that achieved early successes maritime trade routes, making itself valuable to against Houthi forces and later AQAP forces. regional and international actors.

The UAE has two immediate goals in Yemen: (1) degrade and defeat AQAP and IS, and (2) prevent Houthi-domination of Yemen that would provide a foothold for Iran on the Arabian Peninsula.

For the UAE, Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping routes and oil exports while waging asymmetric warfare through proxies all drive its regional “risk reduction strategy.39 The UAE’s significant role in the GCC coalition

In 2019, the UAE conducted a “downsizing” that has been mischaracterized as a withdrawal.

According to the UN’s Yemen Panel of Experts, the Emiratis maintain operational control over roughly 90,000 fighters throughout Yemen.41 Ultimately, the impact of UAE’s intervention in Yemen lies in its fracturing of the anti-Houthi coalition and its empowering of the southern secessionist movement.

Page 13

Oman Oman has ensured its security through a strategy of peaceful coexistence and careful balancing, eschewing military intervention. It cherishes its status as a “neutral” player that can engage all parties. When Saudi Arabia began its military intervention in Yemen in March 2015, Oman was the only GCC member that did not join. Our interviews made clear to us that Oman does not consider the Houthis a direct threat to its security.

Oman has three broad interests in Yemen. First, it wants to ensure a stable border region. Second, it wants the Mahra governorate in Yemen, which borders the Omani province of Dhofar, to be free of extremism and Saudi or Emirati influence.

(Given historical, cultural, and economic ties, Mahra is the one foreign region where Oman is willing to exercise significant influence.)42 Third, Oman wants good relations with its neighbors: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has come to lean more heavily on Omani diplomacy to end the war peacefully, evidenced by frequent visits between Saudi and Omani officials. According to our interviews, Oman holds no preference on a united or bifurcated Yemen.

Oman has cultivated close ties with parties on all sides of the conflict in Yemen, including the Houthis, Iranians, and Saudis. These relationships have enabled Oman to host Houthi leaders for extended periods, facilitating their communication with other parties to the

conflict, and to mediate hostage releases and prisoner exchanges.

Page 14

4 | Shortcomings of Past Approaches to Resolving the Yemen Crisis The U.S. Approach The broader U.S. approach to Yemen should be viewed in the context of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Despite rhetorical flourishes and some recalibration in the wake of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and indiscriminate Saudi airstrikes inside Yemen, the United States has remained committed to the relationship.

More recently, the United States has staunchly supported Saudi Arabia’s right to defend itself from Houthi rocket attacks. According to our interviews with people within the U.S. government and others, the United States has no stand-alone Yemen policy apart from Saudi Arabia.

and September 11, the United States wanted a Yemeni government that would greenlight vast counterterrorism operations inside the country.

It secured this capacity during President Saleh’s reign, and later under President Hadi.47

Support to the Saudi-led Coalition and Military Operations in Yemen

The United States, to varying degrees, has advised, supported, and armed the Saudiled coalition’s operations in Yemen against the Houthis. Over three administrations, this support has included arms sales, intelligence sharing, refueling and maintenance for Saudi jets, technical support to minimize civilian casualties in airstrikes, and the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia after the 2019 Aramco The United States has an interest in preventing attack. The United States has also been explicit Iran from obtaining a foothold on the Arabian in its support of Saudi Arabia’s border security.

Peninsula, which would destabilize the region After the Houthis attacked a civilian airport in and undermine the security of Saudi Arabia and Abha, the State Department recognized the other Gulf countries.45 In terms of resolving the coalition’s military campaign as an act of selfconflict and ending the humanitarian crisis, the defense and asserted that Saudi Arabia “does United States continues to support a UN-led face a threat from Yemen. We are standing with negotiated political settlement to the conflict. our partner.”48 Together, the Obama and Trump It has also sought to mitigate the humanitarian administrations were responsible for approving crisis through aid and economic relief.46 several billions of dollars in major weapons sales to Saudi Arabia.49 The United States also has an enduring interest in securing key oil and commercial maritime U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition began routes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. After in March 2015 under the Obama administration, the al-Qaida attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 which maintained logistical support for Saudi

Page 15

operations in Yemen, but in 2016, decided to reduce U.S. personnel support and limit certain U.S. arms transfers. The Trump administration followed by emphatically backing the Saudiled coalition and using the Houthi threat to the coalition as a justification to double down on countering Iranian influence in the region, including support to the Houthis.50 The administration decided to proceed with planned arms sales that the Obama administration had halted. President Trump thrice vetoed congressional bills that would have prevented U.S. military involvement in noncounterterrorism Saudi missions in Yemen.51

territorial defense, including against missiles and drones launched by Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen.”55

The U.S. role in Yemen is nevertheless limited.

State Department officials that work on Yemen emphasized to us that the United States does not direct the war and is not a party to the conflict.56 A U.S. government employee with access to classified briefings underscored the surprisingly small role for the United States in Saudi Arabia’s Yemen operations. Regardless, Congress has been a source of significant pressure on the Biden administration to cut off all ties to Saudi Arabia over their policies in It is unclear whether U.S. support for the Yemen. Support (or antipathy) for Saudi Arabia coalition has actually decreased under the Biden has become entwined with American politics administration, which announced in February and its Iran policy. A U.S. government official 2021 that it would end U.S. support for offensive relayed how polarizing the issue has become, operations in the war, including relevant arms “If Republicans are anti-Iran, then progressives sales.52 The administration initially paused the need to be pro-Iran.”57 implementation of some arms sales approved

by President Trump and initiated a process to U.S. Policy at the United Nations review allegations of human rights abuses or Security Council violations of international humanitarian law that U.S. support for a UN-mediated resolution to involved American air-to-ground munitions.53 the conflict has been unwavering. The United But by November 2021, the Biden administration States has used its seat in the UN Security signed off on new military contracts Council to publicly support the UN Special collectively worth $600 million to allow Saudi Envoy’s work and call out Houthi obstruction to Arabia to maintain its fleet of Apache attack the peace process during the Council’s monthly helicopters and to provide it with missiles briefing and consultations on Yemen.58 It has and interceptors following increased cross- also emphasized the importance of dialogue border attacks from the Houthis.54 According as the only way to achieve a stable and unified to the State Department, “the United States is Yemen.59 fully committed to supporting Saudi Arabia’s

Page 16

Is the U.S. Congress a barrier to the peace process in Yemen?

Saudi Arabia is unpopular among members of Congress and the U.S. public.

Members of both parties, but particularly progressives in the Democratic Party, have repeatedly pushed the Trump and Biden administrations to weaken the U.S.Saudi relationship. Legislative efforts to censure Saudi Arabia for its policies or to ban weapons sales are likely to continue.

Members must ultimately decide if they are more interested in punishing Saudi Arabia than they are in ending the war Senator Bernie Sanders discussing the U.S. role in the war in Yemen Mandel Ngan/Getty Images in Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the war could come to an end—a critical step toward lasting peace in Yemen—if it can find a graceful way out. But the Saudis first need to feel secure from Houthi attacks and Iranian incursion before this can happen. Congress cannot continue to undercut Saudi security while the administration is asking Saudi Arabia to end the fighting. As such, we think senior officials from the administration should be more proactive in explaining to congressional leaders, especially those members who are most vocal against Saudi Arabia, what is at stake in the relationship, and how a strategy based on a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship can be implemented to end hostilities in Yemen.

Further, the administration should more forcefully relay to Congress and the public the threat facing Saudi Arabia, making clear that Houthi rocket and drone attacks into Saudi Arabia—which have doubled in the first nine months of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020—impact American interests.81 U.S. interests include stability of oil prices, the safety of tens of thousands of U.S. citizens in-country, safe passage for goods, and global energy supplies. These interests should be well publicized and acknowledged by the administration.

Bringing senators and congressmen into the administration’s thinking might temper criticism and limit it only to the most insistent anti-Saudi voices. Indeed, Congress seems willing to listen to the administration—it bodes well that last month 67 senators voted against the recent Senate resolution of disapproval for foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia.

Page 17

Successive U.S. administrations have also used the Security Council as a venue to pursue other U.S. interests as they relate to Yemen. In April 2015, the United States supported the passage of UN Security Council resolution 2216, which endorsed President Hadi and the ROYG as the legitimate government in Yemen and called on the Houthis to disarm and withdraw from Sana’a.60 In December 2017, then USUN Ambassador Nikki Haley used the Security Council to accuse Iran of providing weapons to the Houthis.61 Most recently, in October 2021, USUN Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield used the forum to condemn the Houthis’ October 3 missile attack on Marib, the Houthi siege of Abdiya, and Houthi cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia at King Abdullah and Abha airports.62 According to a U.S. government official, the UN should have the lead role in internal Yemeni peace, but it needs the “buttressing of strong, powerful countries,” like the United States.

Terrorist Designations and Sanctions The United States has used sanctions and terrorist designations to punish the Houthis’ destabilizing activity and pressure the group to change its behavior and come to the UN’s negotiating table. At the UN, the United States supported the passage of Security Council resolution 2140 in 2014, which established “financial and travel ban sanctions against individuals and entities threatening

the peace, security or stability of Yemen” and imposed targeted sanctions on Yemen’s former President Saleh and two senior Houthi rebel leaders. Also, Resolution 2216 included an expansion of the criteria for designating individuals as terrorists.63 The clearest use of these coercive measures against Houthi obstructionism was the Trump administration’s designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2021. This last minute action was intended to confront Houthi terrorist activity and advance efforts to achieve a peaceful Yemen free from Iranian interference.64 Although the Biden administration reversed the designation on humanitarian grounds, it maintained the designation of three Houthi leaders—Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim—as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs),

Former Secretary of State Pompeo, who designated the Houthis a FTO Wikimedia

Page 18

and it has added two other Houthi commanders to the list.65 The Biden administration also extended a maximum pressure campaign against Iranian financial support to the Yemen conflict. In June 2021, it sanctioned the head of an IRGC-linked financial network led by Houthi financial supporter Sa’id AlJamal, who is based in Iran.66

Appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen

Special Envoy Lenderking with Prince Khalid bin Salman Prince Khalid bin Salman/Twitter

Mohammed Abdulsalam in Oman, and the two have maintained contact.69 In September 2021, On February 4, 2021, President Biden appointed Lenderking accompanied National Security Ambassador Timothy Lenderking as U.S. Adviser Jake Sullivan to a meeting with Saudi Special Envoy for Yemen. The decision to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, where they appoint Lenderking, a diplomat with extensive discussed the need for an immediate ceasefire experience in the Gulf region, demonstrated and intensified diplomatic engagement.70 U.S. resolve to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict.67

The UN Approach

Lenderking’s shuttle diplomacy in the region, with trips to Saudi Arabia, the United UN Security Council Resolution 2216 Arab Emirates, Oman, and many others, has (2015) reinforced the role of regional actors and UN Security Council Resolution 2216 codified backchannel negotiations in mediating an end an overly-simplified vision of the Yemen to the conflict. The public-facing details of his conflict by enshrining a power dynamic that travels suggest American urgency and resolve does not reflect the realities of the conflict.71 to seek de-escalation of the continued Houthi It demands that the Houthis withdraw from offensive in Marib, the return of the ROYG to all seized territory and fully disarm but offers Aden, and an immediate nationwide ceasefire.68 no incentives for them to do so.72 Since 2015, In February 2021, soon after taking office, the UN’s binary characterization has slightly Lenderking met with Houthi chief negotiator

Page 19

broadened to accommodate the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis’ relationship with Iran. It was further broadened by the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which integrated the STC into the ROYG. However, it still fails to account for numerous independently-aligned non-state armed brigades and civil society organizations that have a stake in any future power-sharing agreement. According to one UN official, the predominant interpretation of the resolution deeply constrains the UN in its approach by only allowing it to consult, but not negotiate, with these other conflict parties.

Kuwait Talks (2016) Between March and June 2016, the Kuwaiti government—with UN support and under the direction of the UN Special Envoy at the time, Ismaïl Ould Cheikh Ahmed—hosted rounds of dialogue between the ROYG and Houthi representatives. In the lead up to the talks, the international community hoped the two parties would agree on a longer-term roadmap toward peace and more immediate-term steps to start implementing resolution 2216.73 However, after three months of draft agreements, the ROYG and the Houthis were not able to reach consensus on the sequencing of the new government’s formation and the Houthis’ withdrawal and disarmament. Each party conditioned their commitment on the other party’s willingness to move first.74 Despite its breakdown, the format of the Kuwait talks—two-party negotiations on a ceasefire and interim political and security arrangements, with interspersed confidence-

building measures (CBMs)—have determined the framework of successive UN-led mediation efforts.75 One UN staff member we spoke with criticized the approach taken in Kuwait, explaining that the UN wasted its political capital in gathering both parties in one place without “preparing the ground” for talks. Questions surrounding which actors to include in the room, as well as the right level of Houthi representation, distracted from the substance of the terms requiring negotiation. According to that official, at one point, the Houthis were so surprised by the UN’s proposed roadmap that they nearly walked out in the middle of talks.

Stockholm Agreement (2018) In December 2018, UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths brokered a local ceasefire in the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah.

Analysts refer to Stockholm as a mixed success.76 Some point to Stockholm as hopeful evidence that the UN can broker a ROYG-Houthi deal. However, others point to the enormous amount of pressure by international actors, such as the United States, that was required to secure the agreement. Though it was signed, international pressure has not been sufficient to force the parties to implement the deal.77 The agreement was problematic in other ways.

The entire process was accelerated, lasting just a week, and many issues were left ambiguous or unresolved in an effort to reach a deal quickly.78

Page 20

Several of those we interviewed emphasized that Stockholm, by formalizing the joint ROYGHouthi administration of Hudaydah, emboldened the Houthis, allowing them to effectively freeze their control over the city and mobilize on other consequential conflict frontlines, including Marib. Emirati-backed forces were on the verge of taking the port city from the Houthis, and the agreement effectively saved the Houthis from defeat.

negotiate, quick impact CBMs—and require complicated political calculus to arrange.

Combining multiple challenging and disparate issues—none of which has seen progress when negotiated separately—into one proposal entrenches their complexity and pushes the UN further away from an end-state that sees these issues resolved. This partially explains the lack of progress on the proposal.80

The four point plan additionally fails to provide a clear path to political talks, and its success Joint Declaration (2020) The Joint Declaration was a four-point plan depends too heavily on changing party demands proposed to the ROYG in June 2020 by then UN and conditionalities. Within the framework, Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. It has involved the Houthis, who are winning militarily, are not shuttle diplomacy between the Houthis and offered incentives to engage diplomatically the ROYG to get them to agree to a set of CBMs in a meaningful way. As a result, the proposal that would pave the way for a resumption of has been co-opted by the parties as a stalling peace negotiations. A UN staff member noted tactic to, in the words of a UN staff member the pressure for Griffiths “to do something,” we interviewed, “buy more time to create facts especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic’s on the ground.” The big hurdle facing Griffiths’ impact on Yemen’s dire humanitarian and successor, Hans Grunberg, is reducing mistrust economic situation. However, what Griffiths between the parties. This issue should not proposed—a nationwide ceasefire that freezes be overlooked because it has the potential to the frontlines, the opening of ports and Sana’a undermine any future deal. airport, agreement on an oil revenue-sharing mechanism, and a return to peace talks—was nothing new. Instead, it further perpetuated the status quo by providing several concessions to the Houthis in advance of peace talks, and it did not include a ceasefire enforcement mechanism.79 Of the four points, the first two are strategic military objectives—not symbolic, easy-to-

'

"' ' "%' %' ' ' $ '

!

!

! ! !

! ! ! !

' "%' ' "%' ' ' ' $

! ! ! ' ' ' ' ' %' ' ' %'! ' ' $

!

"' ' # & '

"' ' ' "' ' ' $

! ! ! ' ' ' ' ' ' %' ' ' ' ' ' $

! !

!

' ' ' ' ' "' $

! !

' %' ' %' ' ' $

' ! !

Page 22

5 | Moving the Needle: Proposed Strategy We believe that pursuing a series of small, bilateral interim agreements, rather than a comprehensive agreement that includes all parties, can bring the conflict closer to resolution. Focusing on the Saudi-Houthi relationship is a crucial first step toward a nationwide ceasefire to allow internal and international actors to focus on improving the humanitarian situation and prepare the ground for the UN to restart a political process.

will provide sufficient space for Yemenis to decide their political future. Our strategy is best implemented as soon as possible. It is predicated on exploiting the political space that now exists, prior to a potential Houthi takeover of the oil-rich city of Marib.

Step 1 — Rebuild Saudi Relationship

Our strategy has two parts. First, the U.S. The fulcrum of our Yemen strategy rests on a government should rehabilitate its relationship strong U.S.-Saudi relationship characterized by with Saudi Arabia. If the United States wants mutual trust. Before we can ask the government to help bring the conflict closer to an end, we of Saudi Arabia for any concessions in Yemen— believe that it requires a close partnership which we believe will be necessary to end the based on trust with Saudi Arabia, given the conflict—the United States must rapidly seek latter’s central role in the conflict. Second, the to rehabilitate the partnership. We believe U.S. Special Envoy should intensify his parallel A Patriot missile battery at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/Associated Press diplomatic negotiations with the Houthis and Saudis to help address each side’s concerns and secure concessions.

Our goal is to end Houthi attacks into Saudi Arabia and reach a ceasefire on all fronts in the conflict to lay a path toward normalization of relations between the Saudis and the Houthis. Achieving this

Page 23

taking any number of the following steps will strengthen the bilateral relationship, encourage mutual trust, and allow the Special Envoy to push the Saudis to take uncomfortable steps needed to end the conflict.

Publicly support Saudi Arabia’s role in ending the Yemen conflict. Top U.S. officials should use statements and speeches to reaffirm their support and commitment to the Saudi government, beyond their right to self-defense from Houthi aggression. We believe a trip to Riyadh by Secretary of State Blinken would communicate resolute U.S. commitment to the Saudi regime.

officials, like the Secretary of State, should be far more proactive in relaying to the public the threat facing Saudi Arabia and its impact on U.S interests. Private overtures by Secretary Blinken to members of Congress might also be necessary to secure their cooperation.

Step 2 — Parallel Diplomatic Tracks

After strengthening the bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. government should turn its attention to two parallel streams of diplomatic negotiations—one with Saudi Arabia, and the other with the Houthis. These tracks Provide additional offensive and defensive are meant to be implemented in tandem, rather military support. Beyond public messaging, a than sequentially. Inasmuch as the Saudis are significant increase in military and intelligence offering concessions, the United States would cooperation would go great lengths to improve ask more from the Houthis, and vice versa. the relationship. This could take several forms, Mutually reinforcing CBMs will allow the including sending back Patriot batteries; United States to offer calibrated assurances restarting air refueling operations; sharing and guarantees in response to concessions intelligence regarding battlefield developments from both parties. and the targets of Houthi missile and rocket launch pads; or signaling our intent to share future c-UAS technology.

Engage Congress to limit criticism. We recognize that Congress will likely seek to limit some of these actions, but we think a frank conversation with key Congressional leaders that seeks to bring them into the administration’s thinking might temper criticism and limit it only to the most outspoken anti-Saudi voices. Senior

Page 24

Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia’s interests in the Yemen conflict are shaped by their strategic competition with Iran and the security threat posed by Houthi drone and rocket attacks against Saudi infrastructure.

Saudi Arabia does not want Iranian influence anywhere on the Arabian Peninsula, much less on their southern border. The Saudis also want to ensure that their oil supplies and pipelines remain secure, including through the construction and development of a pipeline through the Mahra governorate in eastern Yemen.82 With respect to a political outcome, Saudi Arabia wants a Yemeni state that is stable but weak, decentralized, and dependent on its support and largesse. Saudi Arabia has historically bought off various tribal leaders and cultivated politically pliable leadership in Yemen. We assess that Saudi Arabia will seek similar outcomes in a post-war Yemen.

array of Yemeni political actors. Alternatively, the Saudis could encourage Hadi to replace Vice President Muhsin al-Ahmar, which might get the attention of the Houthis and be viewed as a CBM. Relatedly, Saudi Arabia should begin to cultivate alternatives for future Yemeni leadership. This includes continuing to engage with the UAE to settle differences regarding the future role of the STC. Expand engagement with Houthi officials. The government of Saudi Arabia should maintain its private engagement with the Houthis, and expand it beyond intelligence backchannels.

This should include more senior officials and prominent royals. Building these relationships will be necessary if Saudi Arabia is expected to deal with a Houthi-controlled northern Yemen.

Increase humanitarian access to Houthicontrolled areas. In order to alleviate Potential concessions to seek from humanitarian suffering, the United States should Saudi Arabia Loosen Hadi’s grip on the ROYG. The United encourage Saudi Arabia to loosen restrictions States should encourage Saudi Arabia to take a at Hudaydah port and allow commercial and number of steps to compel the Hadi-led ROYG to humanitarian-related flights through Sana’a greenlight a political process that includes the airport. The Houthis have consistently stated Houthis. President Hadi’s resistance to power- that lifting these restrictions was a precondition sharing has limited the ROYG’s ability to engage for their agreement to a ceasefire. These initial in political discussions that include the Houthis. steps would not only facilitate humanitarian Saudi Arabia maintains leverage over President relief efforts, but could also curry favor with the Hadi; since 2015, it has hosted him and other Houthis. This may also allow the UN to further exiled ROYG ministers in Riyadh. Removing this pursue discussions on a port revenue-sharing support to President Hadi may pave the way for mechanism to pay public-sector wages in other political structures to emerge, such as Yemen. (Saudi strategy continues on the left pages of the a presidential council that includes a broader spread.)

Page 25

Houthis In tandem with U.S.-Saudi discussions, the United States should simultaneously engage the Houthis, making demands and offering them incentives in an effort to begin winding down the conflict. This will be a process of give and take between the United States, the Houthis, and Saudi Arabia. If the Houthis remain resistant to moving toward peace, the United States should consider limited military options.

The Houthis’ Interests The Houthis’ interests are shaped by their marginalization by the Yemeni government for many decades, their opposition to Saudi intervention in Yemeni affairs, and their significant (and unexpected) military successes against the GCC coalition. In public statements and documents, the Houthis have made clear that they want an end to foreign interference in Yemen, an end to outside interference in the north specifically, and a larger role in Yemeni politics.83 Many of our interviews affirmed that the Houthis crave recognition and legitimacy, especially from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Nations. They also need massive financial and technical support to rebuild war-torn territories after the fighting stops and actually start governing.84 The Houthis have successfully pursued their interests through war and with Iranian support. Their battlefield successes have weakened their opposition and increased their strength, giving them significant leverage in future negotiations. They do not have many

incentives to change course. If they take Marib, we believe the Houthis will continue pursuing more military victories.

Potential concessions to seek from Houthis Before the United States offers anything to the Houthis, it should seek commitments from them. We propose that the Special Envoy seek the following concessions from the Houthis, which could be met with more Saudi concessions, thereby improving prospects for a ceasefire.

Vacate the U.S. embassy and release prisoners immediately. In November 2021, the Houthis occupied the U.S. embassy in Sana’a and took prisoner employees, some of whom remain captive.85 The Houthis should vacate the embassy complex before the United States can commit to greater political engagement or offer any substantial concessions. Yemeni embassy workers and others who are still held captive should be released.

Halt strikes into Saudi Arabia. Houthis should temporarily halt their cross-border rocket and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia as a CBM. The Saudis might offer concessions in return, such as a pause to their airstrike campaign around Marib.

Pause inflammatory rhetoric. The Houthis should tone down their hostile rhetoric (Houthi strategy continues on the right pages of the spread.)

Page 26

Saudi Arabia Pause the deportation of Yemeni workers. The United States should encourage Saudi Arabia to address Yemen’s dire economic situation.

As a short-term measure, it should pause any deportation of Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia.

The reduced flow of remittances back into Yemen, a cornerstone for the Yemeni economy, would affect millions of Yemenis and worsen the economic crisis.

in northern Yemen, an enduring grievance of the Houthis. During the war, the rise of Saudisupported Salafi militias has contributed to the overall destabilization of cities in northern Yemen.

How the United States can pressure Saudi Arabia

As previously noted, great effort should be taken to rehabilitate the U.S.-Saudi relationship Commit to rebuilding Yemen with GCC for more effective cooperation on the Yemen partners. Saudi Arabia should commit long- conflict and other strategic issues. If Saudi term reconstruction funds for rebuilding critical Arabia refuses to cooperate, however, the infrastructure in a post-war Yemen. It should also United States should threaten to roll back some consider the integration of Yemen into the GCC. of the positive steps it had taken. The United Access to the GCC would facilitate economic States needs to carefully balance its threats recovery by providing increased opportunities over Yemen with the overall U.S.-Saudi bilateral for Yemeni goods and labor. A more economically relationship. Our strategy’s original intent is integrated Yemen would likely reduce Houthi to restore trust by strengthening the bilateral dependence on Iran. relationship to cultivate a more cooperative partnership. Nevertheless, should they remain Commit more resources to the defense of intransigent, the following actions may compel Marib. Since a Houthi victory in Marib is not greater cooperation. inevitable, the United States should pressure Saudi Arabia to channel more manpower Reduce public support for Saudi Arabia. A shift and resources to secure Marib and provide a in tone in U.S. statements regarding Saudi Arabia decisive blow to Houthi ambitions. Although the would communicate U.S. frustration. The United bombing has intensified since November, some States could choose to make less supportive of our interviews have conveyed that Saudi statements regarding Saudi defense, or it could leadership does not view the battle over Marib make more outright condemnatory statements. as “existential”.

There is substantial domestic frustration with Wind-down support to Salafi institutes and militias in northern Yemen. Saudi Arabia should stop its support and funding of Salafist causes

Saudi Arabia and the administration could strategically channel this energy.

Page 27

Houthis aimed at the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the international community. The group should also accept a meeting with UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg in Sana’a as a sign of their commitment to a UN peace process, which they have publicly supported.86 Address governance problems. The Houthis should pay the salaries of their civil servants.

This could be done through an escrow account with Hudaydah port revenues. Additionally, the Houthis need to allow the UN to safely dispose of the Safer. If it deteriorates further and its 1.1 million barrels of oil spill into the sea, it would be a major disaster for the region.87 Doing something about the Safer would demonstrate Houthi willingness to be a responsible actor in Yemen’s future. The Houthis should also allow greater humanitarian access to the territories they control.

Halt advance on Marib. A pause to the Houthi assault on Marib would send the clearest signal of Houthi commitment to a political process.

Even a temporary ceasefire would allow greater humanitarian access to the more than one million people who have sought refuge from the war in Marib. Such a move could be rewarded with the loosening of restrictions on Hudaydah port and may also make Saudi Arabia willing to pause airstrikes.

Reframe relationship with Iran. In December, the Houthis sent home the Iranian ambassador to Sana’a. Though he was allegedly sent

home for health reasons (he died of COVID shortly thereafter), the Saudis have publicly interpreted this as a sign of decoupling.88 A new Iranian ambassador will replace him, but the Houthis could choose to reject him.

Taking this or any number of steps that reduce Iranian influence or weaken the Houthi-Iranian relationship would be met with U.S. approbation and more Saudi concessions. The Special Envoy could also push for the expulsion of key IRGC officers currently in Yemen, as well as Syrian Hizballah fighters.

How the United States can influence the Houthis The United States should help the Houthis secure some of their objectives in exchange for concessions that bring the conflict closer to an end. Some steps can be taken unilaterally by the United States while others will require Saudi cooperation.

Empower and engage with moderate Houthi leaders. Given internal divisions, it is difficult to understand the scale and scope of Houthi strategy. Their vision changes and expands as more time goes by. Nevertheless, those we interviewed have discussed the presence of moderate voices among its leadership. It is up to the United States, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and others who engage with the Houthis to legitimize those voices.

Support Houthi governance. If the United States promised political support to Houthi

Page 28

Saudi Arabia Pausing foreign military sales. The United States has been Saudi’s largest arms supplier for decades. Despite the more recent weapons sales, the Saudis are requesting additional weapons to defend against Houthi aggression.

The United States could leverage Saudi Arabia’s reliance on U.S. weapons to extract Saudi concessions.

Remove the U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen. The appointment of the Special Envoy to Yemen was widely perceived as a positive development toward ending of the Yemen conflict. It sent the message that U.S. political leadership desires to see the conflict end. But it was also the messenger selected that gave the appointment weight.

Ambassador Lenderking had spent three years as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Riyadh, and the Do not oppose anti-Saudi legislation. Gulf Saudis prize personal relationships. If President leaders listen closely to Congressional debates Biden were to remove the Special Envoy, or and legislation that pertains to them—and threaten to do so, there would be substantially how the administration chooses to engage. If less attention given to the Saudi side of the the administration does not signal opposition conflict. Perhaps more importantly, it would to anti-Saudi legislative initiatives, which are signal U.S. frustration with their troublesome bound to continue over the coming years, it may partner who remains uncooperative and well compel the Saudis to alter their behavior, responsible for allowing the conflict to drag on. particularly if these legislative efforts deal with The Saudis would prefer to avoid this perception weapon sales. and could make concessions to prevent such a dramatic outcome.

U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking (left) Carolyn Kaster/Getty Images

Page 29

Houthis governance and offered it political legitimacy, this might lessen their dependence on Iran.

Examples of these incentives include the promise of limited reconstruction funds, the restarting of some USAID development funding, toning down rhetoric critical of Houthi leaders and actions, as well as taking some Houthis off of the SDGT list.

the Houthis will be a part of a future Yemeni political settlement; U.S. officials could meet publicly with Houthi leadership in Muscat or Riyadh, if not Sana’a. If Houthis respond positively, the U.S. could conduct a phased reopening of the embassy in Sana’a. Finally, the United States could push for a renegotiated UNSC Resolution 2216 that acknowledges Houthi control in the north.

Progressively legitimize the Houthis. The United States could progressively legitimize the Houthis as they take positive steps. If the Houthis can demonstrate that they can be a responsible actor, moving from a heraka (movement) to a hezb (political party), then the United States should be prepared to reward them with legitimacy. Some recommended steps to progressively legitimize the Houthis could include public statements indicating

Houthi supporters attending a rally in Sanaa in 2019 Mohammed Huwais/AFP

Page 30

The “Bloody Nose” approach: Putting U.S. military options on the table A strategy for the Houthis that does not clearly demonstrate U.S. resolve is likely to fail. Our proposed diplomatic initiatives require U.S. willingness to use military force and coercive pressure if necessary. If the Houthis do not cooperate, the United States must be prepared to consider a wider range of punitive policy options. Otherwise, the Houthis have little incentive to believe the United States is serious about bringing the conflict to an end. There are some military and diplomatic policy options that would apply greater pressure on the Houthis.

Militarily, the United States should be prepared to engage in limited airstrikes against Houthi targets around Marib. This targeted use of force would effectively demonstrate U.S. resolve and represent a significant change in U.S. policy. To address mission creep concerns, this policy should not be sustained if it does not ultimately compel the Houthis to alter their behavior.

Diplomatically, there are several options to apply pressure on the Houthis in the face of intransigence.

These actions can be taken in sequence or individually. First, the United States could continue escalating official rhetoric and public censure of Houthi actions. Second, the United States could add more Houthi leaders and personnel to the SDGT list. Third, it could redesignate the Houthis as a FTO. Fourth, it could freeze humanitarian aid. (Although extreme, freezing aid has “gotten the attention” of the Houthis in the past, and it was restarted in exchange for concessions.)89 As a final measure, the United States could begin formal notification procedures and preparations to temporarily relocate its diplomatic mission in Yemen to Aden.

Taken together, these military and diplomatic policies would provide escalatory policy options to U.S. leaders. These actions should only be taken in a calculated way to demonstrate U.S. resolve in hastening peace negotiations. If U.S. resolve is questioned, it is unlikely that the Houthis will believe American policy positions or potential “red-lines,” and the conflict will drag on.

Page 31

6 | Conclusion The United States has a clear national interest in the cessation of hostilities and a stable Yemen.

The conflict threatens the stability of our close partner Saudi Arabia. It also has the potential to disrupt global oil supplies and international shipping. The conflict is poised to dramatically increase Iranian influence in the region and provide Iran with a permanent foothold on Saudi Arabia’s border. The instability can also be exploited by terrorist groups who could reconstitute and threaten regional stability.

And finally, the conflict has produced one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

This report provides a roadmap for U.S. policy that focuses on two primary actors—Saudi Arabia and the Houthi coalition—in the Yemen conflict. We did not focus on state-level politics, reflecting America’s limited ability to influence internal Yemeni dynamics. Nevertheless, the United States has an important role to play by virtue of its long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia.

First, this report recommends strengthening the U.S.-Saudi relationship, which we believe is critical to winding down the fighting and to future negotiations in the Yemen conflict. Second, this report recommends the United States pursue parallel diplomatic tracks with the Houthis and with Saudi Arabia to offer calibrated assurances and guarantees in response to coordinated concessions. Together, these two policy recommendations directly serve U.S. interests in the Gulf region and support progress toward

a peaceful resolution of the Yemen conflict.

It is critical to note this report’s assumptions and scope. This report assumed that Marib had not fallen and that the United States and Saudi Arabia would commit the necessary resources, military or otherwise, to prevent such an outcome. If Marib were to fall, our strategy would need to be revisited and adjusted.

Page 32

7 | List of Interviews We are grateful to the diplomats, scholars, analysts, and other professionals who took the time to speak with our policy workshop. They were invaluable and helped inform the perspectives presented in this report. The content of the report does not necessarily reflect their views or the views of their affiliated organizations. Some of those we interviewed from the United Nations, U.S. government, and some foreign governments requested that their names not be included.

They are listed below in alphabetical order.

Amb. John Abizaid former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and U.S. CENTCOM Commander

Marieke Brandt Senior Researcher at Institute for Social Anthropology, Austrian Academy of Sciences

Summer Ahmed Southern Transitional Council’s U.S.-based Foreign Relations Representative

Sana Brosnan Humanitarian Advisor, U.S. Mission to the UN

Nadwa Al-Dawsari Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute

Casey Coombs Researcher, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and Independent Journalist

Mohammed Abdullah Al-Hadrami former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen

Elana DeLozier Rubin Family Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Amb. Prince Turki Al-Faisal Al-Saud former Saudi Ambassador to the United States

Amb. Gerald Feierstein former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen and Senior Vice President, Middle East Institute

Waleed Alhariri U.S. Office Director, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies

Lise Grande President and CEO, United States Institute of Peace

Ahmed Atef Counselor, Southern Transitional Council Foreign Affairs Department

Bernard Haykel Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University

Daniel Benaim Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Kelsey Hampton Senior Officer, Search for Common Ground Gregory Johnsen Non-Resident Fellow, Brookings Institute

Page 33

Trevor Keck Deputy Head of Policy and Humanitarian Affairs Advisor, International Committee of the Red Cross

Miles Price Senior Disaster Operations Specialist, United States Agency for International Development

Jacob Kurtzer Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Peter Salisbury Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group.

Amb. Tim Lenderking U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen

Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service

Marc Linning Senior Advisor, Center for Civilians in Conflict

Rachel Smith-Levy Political Advisor, U.S. Mission to the UN

Daphne McCurdy Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Jeff Merkley

Amb. Moosa Hamdan Al Tai, Omani Ambassador to the United States

Rob McCutcheon Chief of Staff to the U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen

Eric Trager Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee

Daniel Mouton Director for Political-Military Affairs (MENA) at National Security Council

Amb. Matthew Tueller U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen

Summer Nasser CEO, Yemen Aid

Katherine Zimmerman Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Asher Orkaby Associate research scholar at Princeton University’s Transregional Institute.

Scott Paul Senior Manager for Humanitarian Policy, Oxfam John Phillips Program Officer for Asia, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State

Professional Staff Member U.S. House of Representatives Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates

Page 34

8 | Workshop Participants Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer is the S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA). During his twenty-nine-year career in the Foreign Service, he served as the U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel.

Jacqueline Baumgartner is a master’s student studying domestic politics at SPIA. Prior to coming to Princeton, she worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for five years in Geneva, Paris, Athens, and Washington, DC, where she was responsible for monitoring the humanitarian consequences of migration. Prior to the ICRC, Jacqueline worked for the American Red Cross National Headquarters and for the International Rescue Committee assisting with refugee resettlement in the United States.

Merlin Boone is a PhD student at SPIA and an active-duty officer in the U.S. Army. Professionally, his experience includes special operations in Syria and throughout the Asia Pacific. Merlin’s research interests include great power competition, economic statecraft, and East Asian security relations. Merlin holds a MA in international affairs from The University of Hong Kong and BS in economics (Honors) and Chinese from West Point.

Garin Bulger is a master’s student studying public policy and international relations as a visiting scholar from Rutgers University. He spent last summer as a research associate at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington DC. Prior to his Master of Public Policy, Garin spent a decade in the private technology sector running multidisciplinary teams at several companies, most recently serving as a senior consultant for an internationally based technology firm.

Dina Chotrani is a master’s student studying international development at SPIA as a Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative (SINSI) graduate fellow. She previously worked at the U.S. Department of State covering conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance in the Middle East, and at the U.S. Institute of Peace, working on security sector reform and governance.

Raisa Chowdhury is a master’s student studying international development at SPIA. She has over six years of experience in a variety of areas including peacebuilding, rights and inclusion of vulnerable populations, and digital development.

Alex Gephart is a master’s student studying international relations at SPIA. He is an infantry officer in the U.S. Army with multiple combat and operational deployments. After SPIA, he will continue serving in infantry formations.

Page 35

Baher Iskander is a master’s student studying international relations and national security at SPIA. He previously worked as a Senate staffer on the Armed Services Committee, a China analyst for a senior senator, and a Christian minister at Yale. Baher is interested in Middle East foreign policy issues, and he has served refugee communities as a volunteer Arabic translator in Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, and Greece.

Jack McCaslin is a master’s student studying international relations and climate change at SPIA. This summer, he interned with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, focusing on stabilization, humanitarian affairs, and environmental security. Prior to SPIA, Jack worked for the Africa Program at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC.

Page 36

9 | Endnotes 1

Brown, William R. “The Yemeni Dilemma.” Middle East Journal, vol. 17, no. 4, Middle East Institute, 1963, pp. 349–67, http://www.

jstor.org/stable/4323636.

2

Orkaby, Asher Aviad. The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University,

2014.

3

Howe, Marvine. “Southern Yemen Blends Marxism with Islam and Arab Nationalism.” The New York Times, The New York Times,

May 25, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/05/25/archives/southern- yemen-blends-marxism-with-islam-and-arab-nationalism.html.

4

“Yemen Claims Victory in Civil War after Seizing Rebel City.” The New York Times, July 8, 1994, https://www.nytimes.

com/1994/07/08/world/yemen-claims-victory-in-civil-war-after-seizing-rebel-city.html.

5

Boucek, Christopher. “Yemen: On the Brink.” A Carnegie Paper Series, no. 110, April 2010.

6

Alley, April. “Tracking the ‘Arab Spring’: Yemen Changes Everything… And Nothing”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 24, no. 4, Oct.

2013, pp. 74-85.

7

Schmitz, Charles. “Yemen’s National Dialogue.” Middle East Institute, October 14, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/ye-

mens-national-dialogue.

8

Delozier, Elana. Yemen Matrix: Allies & Adversaries. Washington, DC, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October

2020. p. 39.

9

Delozier, Yemen Matrix: Allies & Adversaries, p. 18.

10

Staff, “Arab League to discuss Yemen intervention plea on Thursday.” Reuters, March 25, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/

us-yemen-security-arabs-idUSKBN0ML1B420150325.

11

Al-Dawsari, Nadwa and Summer Nasser. “The Role of “Legitimacy,” Hadi, and the Islah Party.” Global, Regional, and Local Dy-

namics in the Yemen Crisis edited by Stephen Day and Noel Brehony, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 212.

12

Delozier, Yemen Matrix: Allies & Adversaries, p. 18.

13

Al-Dawsari, Nadwa and Summer Nasser. “The Role of “Legitimacy,” Hadi, and the Islah Party.” p. 212.

14

Al-Dawsari, Nadwa and Summer Nasser, p. 223.

15

Al-Shamahi, Abubakr. “Yemen: NGOs fear the worst after Houthi ‘terrorist’ designation,” Al Jazeera, January 12, 2021, https://

www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/12/yemen-ngos-fear-the-worst-after-houthi-terrorist-designation 16

Delozier, Yemen Matrix: Allies & Adversaries, p. 20.

Page 37

17

Nevola, Luca and Baraa Shibanr, “The Role of “Coup Forces,” Saleh, and the Houthis.” Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in

the Yemen Crisis edited by Stephen Day and Noel Brehony, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 234 18

Bernard Haykel, Workshop Interview, October 7, 2021.

19

Nevola, Luca and Baraa Shibanr, “The Role of “Coup Forces,” Saleh, and the Houthis.” p. 247.

20

Delozier, Elana, “Houthis Release Their Wish List for Ending the Yemen War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April

9, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthis-release-their-wish-list-ending-yemen-war.

21

The New Arab Staff, “Yemen’s Houthi rebels call for dialogue to end war,” The New Arab, December 18, 2021, https://english.

alaraby.co.uk/news/yemens-houthi-rebels-call-dialogue-end-war.

22

Delozier, Yemen Matrix: Allies & Adversaries, p. 1.

23

Day, Stephen. “The Role of Hirak and the Southern Transition Council.” Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis

edited by Stephen Day and Noel Brehony, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 254.

24

Delozier, Yemen Matrix: Allies & Adversaries, p. 34.

25

Mukhashaf, Mohammed. “UAE carries out air strikes against Yemen government forces to support separatists ,” Reuters, August

29, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN1VJ17F. 26

“New Yemen gov’t sworn in after Saudi-brokered power-sharing deal,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.

com/news/2020/12/26/yemens-new-government-sworn-in-after-power-sharing-agreement.

27

Mused, Abdulsalem, “Independence in Southern Yemen: An STC Perspective,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

September 8, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/independence-southern-yemen-stc-perspective 28

Orkaby, Asher. “Saudi Arabia’s War with the Houthis: Old Borders, New Lines.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy. April 9,

2015, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saudi-arabias-war-houthis-old-borders-new-lines.

29

Brehony, Noel. “The UAE’s Role in the Yemen Crisis.” Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis edited by Stephen

Day and Noel Brehony, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 131.

30

Delozier, Yemen Matrix: Allies & Adversaries, p. 32.

31

This was partly the result of leadership changes in Saudi Arabia rather than a calculated decision. See Riedel, Brucel. “Saudi

Arabia’s Role in the Yemen Crisis.” Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis edited by Stephen Day and Noel Brehony, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 119.

32

Riedel, Bruce. “Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Yemen Crisis,” p. 115.

Page 38

33

Knights, Michael. “Lessons From the UAE War in Yemen,” Lawfare Blog. August 18, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-

uae-war-yemen.

34

Nereim, Vivian. “Saudi Arabia Proposes Yemen Peace Plan Amid Oil Attacks,” Bloomberg, March 22, 2021, https://www.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-22/saudi-arabia-proposes-yemen-ceasefire-after-oil-attacks.

35

Vatanka, Alex. “Iran’s Role in the Yemen Crisis.” Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis edited by Stephen Day

and Noel Brehony, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 159.

36

“Iran may seek naval bases in Yemen or Syria: chief of staff.” Reuters, November 27, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/

us-iran-navy-yemen-syria-idUSKBN13M08M. 37

Nevola, Luca and Baraa Shibanr, “The Role of “Coup Forces,” Saleh, and the Houthis.” p. 239

38

Johnston, Trevor, at al. Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2020. p. 86.

39

Brehony, Noel. “The UAE’s Role in the Yemen Crisis.” p. 133.

40

Brehony, Noel. pp. 131-134.

41

Jalal, Ibrahim. “The UAE may have withdrawn from Yemen, but its influence remains strong,” Middle East Institute, February 25,

2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong.

42

Delozier, Yemen Matrix: Allies & Adversaries, p. 28.

43

Katherine Zimmerman, Workshop Interview, September 23, 2021.

44

Al-Batati, Saeed. “Yemen’s Marib will not fall to Houthis, says Hadi,” Arab News, November 30, 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/

node/1978476/middle-east.

45

Robert McCutcheon, Workshop Interview, October 20, 2021.

46

“USAID Yemen Programming Approach 2020-2022”. U.S. Agency For International Development, 2020, https://www.usaid.gov/

yemen/documents/usaid-yemen-programming-approach-2020-2022.

47

Sharp, Jeremy et al. Congress And The War In Yemen: Oversight And Legislation 2015-2021. Washington, DC, Congressional

Research Service, October 19, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45046/29.

48

“Department Press Briefing - September 2, 2021”. U.S. Department Of State, 2021, https://www.state.gov/briefings/depart-

ment-press-briefing-september-2-2021/#post-273768-SAUDIARABIAYEMEN. 49

Sharp, Jeremy. Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, September 17,

2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43960/35.

Page 39

50

Riedel, Bruce. “A Brief History of America’s Troubled Relationship With Yemen”. Brookings Institution, October 22, 2018, https://

www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/201T8/10/22/a-brief-history-of-americas-troubled-relationship-with-yemen/.

51

Blanchard, Christopher. Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, October

5, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33533/86.

52

“Remarks By President Biden On America’s Place In The World”. The White House, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief-

ing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.

53

Blanchard, Christopher. Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations.

54

Kirchgaessner, Stephanie, and Bethan McKernan. “Biden’S $500M Saudi Deal Contradicts Policy On ‘Offensive’ Weapons, Critics

Say”. The Guardian, October 27, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/oct/27/joe-biden-saudi-arabia-arms-weapons-deal; “US Congress allows Saudi Arabia weapons sale to proceed.” Al Jazeera. December 8, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/8/ us-congress-allows-weapons-saudi-arabia-weapons-sale-to-proceed.

55

Gordon Lubold, “Saudi Arabia Pleads for Missile-Defense Resupply as Its Arsenal Runs Low,” The Wall Street Journal, December

7, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-pleads-for-missile-defense-resupply-as-its-arsenal-runs-low-11638878400.

56

Robert McCutcheon, Workshop Interview, October 20, 2021.

57

Senior Democratic policy aide, Workshop Interview.

58

“Remarks By Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield At A UN Security Council Briefing On Yemen.” United States Mission To The

United Nations, 2021, https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfield%e2%80%afat-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-yemen/.

59

Sharp, Jeremy. Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.

60

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2216 (14 April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2216, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_

doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2216(2015) 61

Lynch, Colum, and Robbie Gramer. “Haley’s ‘Smoking Gun’ On Iran Met With Skepticism At U.N.” Foreign Policy, December 14,

2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/14/nikki-haley-yemen-houthi-rebels-iran-missiles-press-conference-pentagon-skepticism-united-nations-trump-nuclear-deal-diplomacy/.

62

Lynch, Colum, and Robbie Gramer. “Haley’s ‘Smoking Gun’ On Iran Met With Skepticism At U.N.”

63

“Fact Sheet on the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee (2014).” Security Council Report, August 17, 2020, https://www.security-

councilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/yemen-sanctions-fact-sheet.pdf.

Page 40

64

“Terrorist Designation Of Ansarallah In Yemen”. United States Department Of State, 2021, https://2017-2021.state.gov/terror-

ist-designation-of-ansarallah-in-yemen/index.html.

65

“Revocation Of The Terrorist Designations Of Ansarallah”. United States Department Of State, 2021, https://www.state.gov/

revocation-of-the-terrorist-designations-of-ansarallah/; “Issuance Of Cyber-Related General License And Related FAQs; Cyber-Related Designations Updates; Yemen-Related Designations; Ukraine-/Russia-Related Designations; Non-Proliferation Designations And Designations Updates”. U.S. Department Of The Treasury, March 2, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210302.

66

“Treasury Sanctions Network Financing Houthi Aggression And Instability In Yemen”. U.S. Department Of The Treasury, 2021,

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0221.

67

Alyemany, Khaled. “Optimism Mixed With Realism About The Biden Administration’s Promises On Yemen”. Atlantic Council, Feb-

ruary 23, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/optimism-mixed-with-realism-about-the-biden-promises-on-yemen/.

68

“U.S. Special Envoy For Yemen Lenderking Returns From Travel To Saudi Arabia”. United States Department Of State, 2021,

https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-yemen-lenderking-returns-from-travel-to-saudi-arabia/.; “U.S. Special Envoy Lenderking Returns From Travel To Saudi Arabia, Oman, And Jordan”. United States Department Of State, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-lenderking-returns-from-travel-to-saudi-arabia-oman-and-jordan/.

69

El Yaakoubi, Aziz, “U.S officials have met Yemen’s Houthis as Washington seeks end to war—sources,” Reuters. March 3, 2021,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-idUSKBN2AV1VH. 70

Holland, Steve. “White House Aide Discusses Yemen With Saudi Crown Prince.” Reuters, September 28, 2021, https://www.reu-

ters.com/world/white-house-aide-discusses-yemen-with-saudi-crown-prince-2021-09-28/.

71

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2216 (14 April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2216, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_

doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2216(2015).

72

Villanti, Benjamin. “In Search Of A Peacemaker Who Can Deliver - Sana’a Center For Strategic Studies”. Sana’a Center For Strate-

gic Studies, June 24, 2021, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/14510.

73

Cafiero, Giorgio. “Kuwait’s Yemen Foreign Policy”. Middle East Institute, August 12, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/ku-

waits-yemen-foreign-policy.

74

Asseburg, Muriel et al. “Mission Impossible?”. Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (SWP), October 15, 2018, https://www.swp-ber-

lin.org/en/publication/mission-impossible-un-mediation-in-libya-syria-and-yemen.

75

Salisbury, Peter. “The International Approach To The Yemen War: Time For A Change?”. Crisis Group, October 23, 2020, https://

www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/international-approach-yemen-war-time-change.

76

Salisbury, Peter. “The International Approach To The Yemen War: Time For A Change?”

Page 41

77

Salisbury, Peter.

78

Jalal, Ibrahim. “From Stockholm To Riyadh: Breaking The Yemen Peace Process Deadlock”. Middle East Institute, February 13,

2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/stockholm-riyadh-breaking-yemen-peace-process-deadlock.

79

Jalal, Ibrahim. “Yemen’s Joint Declaration: A Bigger Repeat Of The Stalled Hodeida Agreement?”. Middle East Institute, March 4,

2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/yemens-joint-declaration-bigger-repeat-stalled-hodeida-agreement.

80

Jalal, Ibrahim. “Yemen’s Joint Declaration: A Bigger Repeat Of The Stalled Hodeida Agreement?”

81

Jones, Seth G., et al. “The Iranian and Houthi War against Saudi Arabia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Decem-

ber 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia

82

Ardemagni, Eleonora.. “Caught in the Gulf Rivalry: Yemen’s Al Mahra Avoids the War Despite ‘Collateral Militarisation’. London

School of Economics and Political Science. December 11, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/12/11/caught-in-the-gulf-rivalry-yemens-al-mahra-avoids-the-war-despite-collateral-militarisation/.

83

Nevola, Luca and Baraa Shibanr. “The Role of “Coup Forces,” Saleh, and the Houthis.” p. 247; The New Arab Staff. “Yemen’s

Houthi rebels call for dialogue to end war.” The New Arab, December 18, 2021, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/yemens-houthi-rebelscall-dialogue-end-war.

84

Delozier, Elana. “Houthis Release Their Wish List for Ending the Yemen War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April

9, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthis-release-their-wish-list-ending-yemen-war.

85

Schorr, Isaac. “Houthi Rebels Storm U.S. Embassy in Yemen, Take Hostages.” National Review, November 11, 2021, https://www.

nationalreview.com/news/houthi-rebels-storm-u-s-embassy-in-yemen-take-hostages/.

86

The New Arab Staff. “Yemen’s Houthi rebels call for dialogue to end war.”

87

Aldroubi, Mina. “Leak from Yemen’s Safer tanker could mean disaster.” The National News. December 27, 2021, https://www.

thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/2021/12/27/leakage-in-yemens-safer-tanker-could-mean-disaster-says-deputy-governor/.

88

Eqbali, Aresu. “Iran’s Top Diplomat to Houthi-Controlled Yemen Dies of Covid-19.” The Wall Street Journal. December 21, 2021,

https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-top-diplomat-to-houthi-controlled-yemen-dies-of-covid-19-11640102821.

89

“UN food aid to Yemen will fully resume after two-month break, as Houthis ‘guarantee’ delivery,” UN News. August 9, 2019,

https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/08/1044011.