References

25. An accessible overview of the literature is provided by the BMZ and GIZ (2011) study, Curse or Blessing— Development or Misery. Useful overviews of the academic literature include Frankel (2010); Rosser (2006); Ross (1999); and van der Ploeg (2011). 26. Resource dependence has been shown to be one of the most important causes of civil wars. See the essays in Bannon and Collier (2003). Ross (2006, 267) noted, “The likelihood of civil wars in countries that produce oil, gas, and diamonds rose sharply from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. So did the number of conflicts in which insurgents raised funds by selling contraband resources.” 27. For a more recent critical view, see Smith (2015). 28. However, case studies revealed the importance of institutions in managing resource rents many years ago. The insight is not new, but a wide acceptance of its significance is. For an early example, see Gelb (1988, 223) on Indonesia: “A more accurate statement therefore is that Indonesia’s good performance during the oil booms reflected the institutions developed earlier to nurse the economy back to health, the approach to policy set in the Suharto Government’s formative years and the unusual degree of continuity.” Similar ground was covered but at a more abstract level by Auty and Gelb’s “Political Economy of Resource Abundant States” in Auty (2001). The primacy of institutions has been asserted and supported more recently by several leading economists, for example: Arezki, van der Ploeg, and Toscani (2016), “Shifting Frontiers in Global Resource Wealth: The Role of Policies and Institutions.” Cust and Harding (2014) have argued that institutions strongly influence where investors drill for oil and gas. 29. A systematic application of a political economy perspective is evident in the World Bank study Rents to Riches? The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development (Barma et al. 2012). It incorporates more than a dozen case studies and examines, in detail, how political economy can be applied to resource dependence. 30. See Hogan and Sturzenegger (2010), which considers the issue of seemingly perpetual contractual renegotiations driven by commodity price instability and how these pressures could be contained within a more stable commercial framework. 31. Much of the literature has focused on the information, finance, and capability asymmetries between developing state governments and transnational extractives companies. Remedies therefore focus on how to ensure that developing country governments use good practice solutions to secure a better deal. See Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007). 32. Collier (2010, 1113) notes that in failing states incumbents can win elections by means of technologies that are excluded in a conventional election because they are illegitimate: for example, vote-buying, voter intimidation, and ballot fraud. 33. See Barma et al. (2012, 69, figs. 2.6 and 2.7). Compare the Fraser Institute’s surveys of mining and petroleum, respectively, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/categories /mining and https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/global -petroleum-survey-2015. 34. See Barma et al. (2012, 39), noting in particular the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2010). 35. For example, Stevens, Lahn, and Kooroshy (2015, 3) note, “While it is not inevitable, the resource curse is alive and active.” 36. With respect to negotiations of mining contracts, two contributions are notable: BGR, CCSI, and Kienzler’s (2015) Natural Resource Contracts as a Tool for Managing the Mining Sector; and Nkot’s (2015), “Fifty Pieces of Advice to an Official Who Is Engaged in the Negotiation of Mining Contracts.”

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