A.11 Lessons learned from the Metrobús-Q System in Quito, Ecuador A.12 Lessons learned from the Avanza Zaragoza concession in Zaragoza,

TABLE A.11 Lessons learned from the Metrobús-Q System in Quito, Ecuador

BEST PRACTICES

• Decentralizing a transportation authority from the national government to the Metropolitan

District of Quito was key to developing the project. [political and social risk] [planning risk] • The commitment of the mayors of Quito during planning and project implementation was key to completing the project. [political and social risk] • The initial success of the Trolebús corridor helped to develop the other corridors. [planning risk] [design risk] [operation risk]

Source: World Bank. AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

• A different project structure that transfers more risk to the private partners could have benefited the project. Two attempts to negotiate operation contracts failed. However, these two attempts negotiate directly with incumbent operators rather than employing competitive procurement. [operation risk] [planning risk] [design risk] • The Metropolitan Public Passenger Transport Company could have benefited from competitive procurement to contract operators for the corridors, instead of direct negotiation with incumbent operators. [operation risk] [planning risk] [design risk] • The implementation team lacked the capacity to structure the project adequately, which could have been solved with technical assistance. [operation risk] [planning risk] [design risk] • Bus rapid transit corridors are not integrated, which affects demand and service efficiency. [operation risk] [planning risk] [design risk] • Cost-reflective tariffs that remain outside political influence should be considered whenever possible. [political and social risk] [operation risk] [financing risk] • Tariffs should be integrated across the service. Metrobús-Q tariffs change depending on the corridor and type of service, and the only payment method is cash. [operation risk] [financing risk] [design risk] • The corridors could have been designed to have larger distances between stops, better priority signaling, passing lanes in stations, and real-time information systems. [operation risk] [planning risk] [design risk] • The Northern central corridor began operations without having completed its facilities, resulting in operational issues. [operation risk] [planning risk] [design risk]

AVANZA ZARAGOZA (ZARAGOZA, SPAIN)

The Municipality of Zaragoza has provided high-quality public transportation services to its citizens since the beginning of the 20th century (Municipality of Zaragoza 2017, 2018). This case describes the operations and upgrade of an existing public transit system through a concession for operations and maintenance (O&M) of the system. It demonstrates the importance of integrating public transportation planning with larger urban development plans.

In 1982 Zaragoza awarded its first bus concession to the firm Zaragoza Urban Transport (TUZSA). TUZSA operated the streetcar system that was in place until 1976. Since 1982, the bus system has reported positive results. In 2006 the municipality developed the Sustainable Mobility Plan for Zaragoza (SMPZ). As part of the new plan, the municipality restructured the public transportation system and awarded the new concession to the same operator, now called Avanza Zaragoza. It renewed the concession in 2013. The bus system now consists of 641 kilometers of routes, 315 buses (85 articulated buses, 205 standard buses, and 10 microbuses), 11 buses for people with limited mobility, and 3 double-decker buses for tourism. The SMPZ had the following aims:

• Offer a high-quality, efficient, and sustainable service • Improve constantly the supply of public transportation • Connect citizens with the parts of the city where economic activity is concentrated • Increase access to information for all public transportation modes • ensure that public transportation, pedestrians, and bicycles account for most trips in Zaragoza.