RUCHIR AGARWAL http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ragarwal ragarwal@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, NBER Cambridge, MA 02138 Cell: 617-230-0507
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 244 Chestnut Street Cambridge, MA 02138
Undergraduate Studies: B.A., Economics, Mathematics, University of Michigan, with high distinction and high honors, 2006
Graduate Studies: Ph.D., Economics, Harvard University, 2006 to present Thesis Title: Essays in Corporate Finance and Macroeconomics Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor N. Gregory Mankiw Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-495-4301, ngmankiw@harvard.edu
Professor Jeremy Stein Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-496-6455, jeremy_stein@harvard.edu
Professor Emmanuel Farhi Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-496-1835, efarhi@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Lawrence Katz Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-495-5148, lkatz@harvard.edu
Professor Alp Simsek Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-496-3374, asimsek@fas.harvard.edu
Research and Teaching Fields: Financial Economics, Macroeconomics
Teaching Experience: 2008-2011 Spring 2010 Summer 2007
Econ 10: Principles of Economics (undergraduate, full year), Teaching Fellow for Prof. N. Gregory Mankiw Econ 1759: Financial Crisis (undergraduate), Teaching Fellow for Prof. Jeremy Stein Econ S-1316: Economic Development in India and East Asia (undergraduate), Teaching Fellow for Prof. Subramanian Swamy
Research Experience and Other Employment: 2011-present 2011 2006-2011 2005 2003-2005
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Visiting Researcher International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Division, Intern National Bureau of Economic Research, Research Assistant Penn World Tables, University of Pennsylvania, Research Intern University of Michigan, Research Assistant for Jan Svejnar and Miles Kimball
Professional Activities Presentations: Asian Meeting of Econometric Society, TADC at London Business School Referee for: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2010-2011 2010 2009, 2010 2009 2008,2009,2010
Graduate Society Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University Real Estate Academic Initiative Grant, Harvard University Levenson Teaching Prize nominee for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching Allyn A. Young Teaching Prize for Excellence in Teaching, Harvard University Derek Bok Center Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard University
Research Papers: “Strategic Corporate Layoffs” with Julian Kolev, November 2011 (Job Market Paper) Firms in the S&P 500 often announce layoffs within days of one another, despite the fact that the average S&P 500 constituent announces layoffs once every 5 years. By contrast, similar-sized privatelyheld firms do not behave in this way. This paper provides evidence that such clustering behavior is largely due to managers managing their reputation in financial markets. We interpret the results within a theoretical framework in which managers delay layoffs during good economic states to avoid damaging the market's perception of their ability. The model predicts clustering in the timing of layoff announcements, and illustrates a mechanism through which the cyclicality of firms' layoff policies is amplified. We test the model's predictions using two novel datasets of layoff announcements and actual mass layoffs. Consistent with our model we find that the firms that cluster layoff announcements at high frequencies are also the ones that are more likely to engage in mass layoffs in recessions. We also compare layoff behavior of publicly-listed firms and privately-held firms to estimate the impact of strategic-layoff policies on cyclicality of layoffs. Compared to observably similar matched private firms, public firms are 3.5-4.5 percentage points more likely to conduct mass layoffs in a recession month. These effects do not appear to be driven by unobserved differences between public and private firms, leverage, lifecycle differences, or our matching criteria. Our findings suggest that reputation management is an important driver of layoff policies both at higher frequencies and over the business cycle, and can have severe macroeconomic consequences.
Research Papers in Progress: “Theory of Dynamic Disclosures” “Delay between Corporate Disclosures and Real Actions: Evidence from Layoff Decisions”
“Supply of Safe Assets” Money and other safe assets ensure transfer of resources between periods without being subject to large risks. This paper presents a theory of the safe assets market and makes three central points. First, the quantity of safe assets has a strong influence on equilibrium risk premium and households' willingness to hold risky assets. Second, the banking system and its regulation largely determine the quantity of safe assets (money-like claims) available to households. Lastly, by regulating banks' safe asset creation, central bank policy influences the risk premium and therefore has real effects even in a flexible-price world. I show that the optimal central banking policy involves managing risk in the economy, which sometimes calls for asset-market interventions.
Non-academic Publication: “Long-Term Investors and their Asset Allocation” in Global Financial Stability Report, IMF 2011 with S. Erik Oppers and GFSR team-members.
ARTURO ALBERTO AGUILAR ESTEVA http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~aaguilar/ aaguilar@fas.harvard.edu HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antràs Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Department of Economics, Harvard University Littauer Center, 1805 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 909-0278
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 700 Huron Avenue, 11-M Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 395-8210
Personal Information Gender: Male Date of birth: August 26th, 1980 Place of birth: Mexico City Languages: Spanish (native), English (fluent), French (fair). Education B.A. Economics, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Honors, Sept 1999 to Jun 2005 M.A. Economics, Harvard University, Sept 2006 to Jun 2009 Ph.D. Economics, Harvard University, Sept 2006 to present (expected completion: May 2012) References: Professor Lawrence Katz Department of Economics, Harvard University (617) 495-5148, lkatz@harvard.edu
Professor Rohini Pande Harvard Kennedy School of Government (617) 384-5267, Rohini_Pande@ksg.harvard.edu
Professor Gary Chamberlain Department of Economics, Harvard University (617) 495-1869, gary_chamberlain@harvard.edu
Professor Rema Hanna Harvard Kennedy School of Government (617) 496-1140, Rema_Hanna@ksg.harvard.edu
Research and Teaching Fields Main interests: Development Economics, Labor Economics, and Applied Econometrics Teaching: Econometrics, Microeconomics Professional Activities 2011 Seminar Huatusco IX: “Inequality in the Returns to Education in Mexico;” Mexico 2009 Research Fellow, Mexican Migration Field Research Program (MMFRP), Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (UC San Diego) 2008 Harvard-Manchester Summer Workshop on Immigration and Social Change Teaching Experience 2009-2010 Quantitative Methods in Economics (undergraduate), Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Prof. Gary Chamberlain and Prof. Geert Ridder
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2008-2009 Fall 2005 Employment 2003-2006
Introduction to Econometrics (undergraduate), Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Prof. Eric Chaney and Prof. Raffaella Giacomini Principles of Microeconomics (undergraduate), ITAM, Instructor
Financial Analyst (full-time), Protego Asesores, Mexico Investment Banking: Real Estate Sector
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships 2010-2011 Dissertation Completion Fellowship (Harvard University) 2009 Derek Bok Award for Excellence in Teaching (Harvard University) 2006-2010 Harvard University, CONACYT, Fundación México en Harvard Fellowship 2006 Tlacaelel National Prize. First place, undergraduate thesis (Mexico) 2005 Banamex Economics National Prize, First place, undergraduate thesis (Mexico) Research Papers “El Niño and Mexican Children: Medium-Term Effects of Early-Life Weather Shocks on Cognitive and Health Outcomes,” Job Market Paper. (Joint with Marta Vicarelli) Abstract: El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a recurrent climatic event that causes severe weather events. This paper employs ENSO-related floods at the end of the agricultural season to identify mediumterm effects of negative income shocks and stressful conditions in early child development. The analysis shows that, four to five years after the shock, children exposed to it during their early stages have test scores in language development, working-memory, and visual-spatial thinking abilities 11 to 21 percent lower than same aged children not affected by the shock. Negative effects are also found on anthropometric characteristics: children exposed to floods early in life exhibited lower height (0.42 to 0.71 inches), higher likelihood of stunting (11 to 14 percentage points), and lower weight (0.84 pounds) than same aged children not affected by the shock. Negative effects of weather shocks on income, food consumption, and diet composition during early childhood appear to be key mechanisms behind the impacts on children's outcomes. Finally, no mitigation effects were found from the provision of the Mexican conditional cash transfer program Progresa on poor households with children affected by ENSO-related shocks. “Educational Self-Selection Among U.S. Immigrants and Returning Migrants” Abstract: This paper empirically examines the educational selectivity of recently arrived immigrants to the United States and of those returning to their source country. Ten countries are selected for the study based on their historical and contemporaneous importance on U.S. migration. To determine the type of selection of incoming immigrants, the schooling distribution of recently arrived immigrants is compared to that of same-aged individuals at the source country. The selectivity of returning migrants is estimated using repeated cross-section data to examine changes with time in the distribution of schooling of synthetic immigrant entry cohorts. The synthetic cohorts are defined by age, source country, and first year of arrival to the United States. The results generally indicate positive selection on educational attainment of recently-arrived immigrants, being China, India, Philippines, and the United Kingdom the most prominent examples. Moreover, the estimated educational selectivity of returning migrants accentuates, in most cases, the positive selection of those migrants that stay in the United States for a longer term. Educational positive selection of immigrants to United States is apparent irrespective of the source country's level of inequality and estimates of returns to education.
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Research Papers in Progress “Census versus Self-Selection: Efficiency in Targeting the Poor for Social Programs” “Electoral Characteristics and Targeting Errors in a Social Program Context” Research Projects in Progress “Aurora Project: A Randomized Control Trial to Improve Educational Outcomes of Telesecundaria's Students in Rural Mexico” (Pilot study projected for 2012-2013 school year)
Publications “Coping with La Crisis.” (with Georgia Hartman, David Keyes, Lisa Markman, and Max Matus) In Wayne Cornelius, et al, (eds) Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic Crisis. A transnational perspective, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, UCSD, San Diego (2009) “Desigualdad de la educación y de los ingresos laborales en México: la importancia de la calidad educativa.” (with María Elena Ortega) In La Gaceta de Economía 23, ITAM, Mexico City (2008)
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EDUARDO AZEVEDO http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~azevedo/ azevedo@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Department of Economics 1805 Cambridge Street Littauer Center, Room G20 Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 617-913-9456 Personal Information: Born: 1982 Sex: Male, Citizenship: Brazilian. Undergraduate Studies: BA, Mathematics, PUC-Rio, Brazil 2004. Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Market Design and Microeconomics� Expected Completion Date: June 2012 M.A. Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation Graduate School of Economics, 2007 M.A. Mathematics, IMPA, 2004 References: Professor Alvin Roth Harvard Business School Baker Library 441 Soldier's Field Road Boston, MA 02163 Assistant: Mary Louise Corradino asgecon@fas.harvard.edu al_roth@harvard.edu Professor Oliver Hart Department of Economics 1805 Cambridge Street Littauer Center, Room 220 Harvard University Assistant: Ann Richards ann_richards@harvard.edu ohart@harvard.edu
Professor Susan Athey Department of Economics 1805 Cambridge Street Littauer Center, M-25 Harvard University Assistant: Ann Richards ann_richards@harvard.edu athey@fas.harvard.edu
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Applied Microeconomic Theory and Market Design Secondary fields: Psychology and Economics, Game Theory, Finance, Industrial Organization. Teaching Experience: 2008-2011 Principles of Economics Section Leader, Harvard, Professor N. Gregory Mankiw. Research Experience and Other Employment: 2011 Capula Investment Management LLP, Summer Intern. 2008
Microsoft Research New England, Summer Intern.
2006-2007
Brazilian Central Bank, Analyst.
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011 Yahoo! Key Scientific Challenges Award, winner. 2007-2012 Roger L. Martin Cornerstone Fellowship, and C. Douglas Dillon fellowship, Harvard University. Publications: “Risk-Neutral Firms Can Extract Unbounded Profits from Consumers with Prospect Theory Preferences”, with Daniel Gottlieb. Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming. “The college admissions problem with a continuum of students”, with Jacob Leshno. Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC11). “Hierarchical Cheap Talk”, with Attila Ambrus and Yuichiro Kamada. Theoretical Economics, Conditionally Accepted. “Imperfect Competition in Two-Sided Matching Markets”. Games and Economic Behavior, Conditionally Accepted. Research Papers: Available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~azevedo/ “A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets”, with Jacob Leshno (Job Market Paper #1) We propose a new model of two-sided matching markets, which allows for complex heterogeneous preferences, but is more tractable than the standard model, yielding rich comparative statics and new results on large matching markets. The model simplifies the standard Gale and Shapley (1962) college admissions model in two ways. First, following Aumann (1962) we consider a setting where a finite number of agents on one side are matched to a continuum mass on the other side. This represents a situation where each agent on one side of the market (colleges or firms) is matched to many agents on the other side (students or workers). Second, we show that, in both the discrete and continuum model, stable matchings have a very simple structure, with colleges accepting students ranked above a threshold, and students demanding their favorite college that will accept them. Moreover, stable matchings may be found by solving for thresholds that equate the demand and supply of
colleges. We give general conditions under which the continuum model admits a unique stable matching, in contrast to the standard discrete model. This stable matching varies continuously with the parameters of the model, and comparative statics may be derived as in standard equilibrium theory, through the market clearing equations. Moreover, given a sequence of large discrete economies converging to a limit economy, the set of stable matchings of the discrete economies converges to the stable matching of the limit economy. We give bounds on the rate of convergence of the set of stable matchings of large discrete economies to the continuum approximation, show that comparative statics regarding the unique stable matching of the continuum model extend to strong set ordering of the sets of stable matchings of approximating discrete economies. We model the transferrable utility case, as in Becker (1972). We characterize the limit of school choice mechanisms used in practice, generalizing previous results of Che and Kojima (2010). Finally, we illustrate the applicability model by deriving how much incentives school choice clearinghouses give schools to invest in quality, and show that schools have muted and possibly even negative incentives to invest in quality dimensions that benefit lower ranked students. “Strategyproofness in the Large as a Desideratum for Market Design”, with Eric Budish. (Job Market Paper #2) We distinguish between two ways a mechanism can fail to be strategyproof (SP). A mechanism may have profitable manipulations that persist with market size; and, a mechanism may have profitable manipulations that vanish with market size. We say that a non-SP mechanism is strategyproof in the large (SP-L) if all of its profitable manipulations vanish with market size. Our main result is as follows. Suppose we are given some mechanism that has Bayes-Nash equilibria but is not SP-L; then, under some commonly satisfied conditions (semi-anonymity, private values, quasi-continuity) we show by construction that there exists another mechanism that is SP-L, and that implements approximately the same outcomes as the original mechanism, with the approximation error vanishing in the large-market limit. Thus, while SP often severely limits what kinds of mechanisms are possible, SP-L is approximately costless, and hence may be a useful second-best. We illustrate with examples from assignment, matching and auctions. “Evolutionary Origins of the Endowment Effect – Evidence from Hunter-Gatherers”, with Coren Apicella, Nicholas Christakis, and James Fowler (Available upon request). The endowment effect, the tendency of people to value an item they possess over an item they do not, is one of the most well known departures from rational choice, surviving replication in a number of settings. Previous research has suggested that the endowment effect is a basic feature of human decision making, with deep evolutionary roots. We provide new evidence that sheds light on this hypothesis. We report a field experiment with a unique population of hunter-gatherers, the Hadza Bushmen of Tanzania. They live in a collectivist society, and are an evolutionarily relevant population, in that their technology and environment resembles that of early humans. Moreover, due to geographic reasons, the Hadza are segregated in two groups that have very different levels of interaction with modern society. While we find that Hadza living in isolated regions do not display the endowment effect, Hadza living in a geographic region frequently visited by ethno-tourists, and who have increased market integration, do display the endowment effect. This suggests that the bias is not a human universal. Moreover, insofar as the Hadza represent early human behavior, it suggests that our
ancestors did not display the bias, and that it arises from exposure to cultural or environmental factors. “Walrasian Equilibrium without Gross Substitutes”, with Glen Weyl and Alex White. In an economy with indivisible goods, a continuum of agents and quasilinear utility, we show that equilibrium exists regardless of the nature of agents preferences over bundles. This contrasts with results for economies with a finite number of agents, which require restrictions on preference (such as substitutability) to guarantee existence. When the distribution of preferences has full support, equilibrium prices are unique. “Can we make school choice more efficient?”, with Jacob Leshno. The deferred acceptance mechanism, currently used in the New York City and in the Boston public school systems, can produce Pareto-dominated assignments. When students are nonstrategic an efficient mechanism that Pareto dominates deferred acceptance can be achieved by allowing some students to trade schools (Erdil and Ergin (2008) and Kesten (2010); Abdulkadiroglu (2010)). However, when students are strategic these mechanisms can make all students worse off and the equilibrium assignment can be unstable. “Lesgislative committees as information intermediaries”, with Attila Ambrus, Yuichiro Kamada, and Yuki Takagi. This paper contributes to understanding the role of interest groups in legislative decisionmaking, and offers an explanation to two widely discussed puzzles concerning the legislative process: why legislative bodies sometimes tie their own hands by delegating power to specialized committees, and why committees consist of preference outliers. In our model, the legislature has to collect information from a strategic lobbyist. Depending on the lobbyist’s bias, the legislature either wants to delegate power to a committee aligned with the lobbyist, or retain power but communicate with the lobbyist through an adversely biased committee.
KATHERINE BALDIGA http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~kbaldiga/ kbaldiga@fas.harvard.edu 508-259-1896
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Office Contact Information Department of Economics Harvard University, Littauer Center Cambridge, MA 02138 Undergraduate Studies: B.A., Mathematics and Economics, Williams College, Summa Cum Laude, June 2007 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Microeconomics” Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Jerry R. Green Baker Library 469, Harvard Business School jgreen@hbs.edu 617-495-3950
Professor Alvin E. Roth Baker Library 441, Harvard Business School aroth@hbs.edu 617-495-5447
Professor Drew Fudenberg Littauer Center 310, Harvard University dfudenberg@harvard.edu 617-496-5895
Professor Iris Bohnet Taubman 110A, Harvard Kennedy School iris_bohnet@harvard.edu 617-495-5605
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Social Choice Theory, Political Economy Secondary Fields: Experimental Economics, Gender and Economics Teaching Experience: Spring 2010 Decision Theory, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Tomasz Strazlecki Fall 2010 Normative Economics, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Jerry Green AY 2010 – 2011 Behavioral and Experimental Economics Senior Thesis Seminar, Harvard University, section leader AY 2009 - 2010 Behavioral and Experimental Economics Senior Thesis Seminar, Harvard University, section leader Fall 2009 Psychology and Economics, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Sendhil Mullainathan Spring 2008 Normative Economics, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Jerry Green
Research Experience and Other Employment: Summer 2008 – Harvard University, research assistant for Jerry R. Green Summer 2011 Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: AY 2011 - 2012 Roger L. Martin Cornerstone Graduate Student Fellowship Fund January 2011 Harvard Program on Negotiation Grant for Research May 2011 Harvard Economics Department Summer Travel Grant November 2010 Harvard Lab for Economic Applications and Policy Grant May 2010 Harvard Kennedy School Women and Public Policy Program Grant AY 2010 - 2011 Harvard University Derek C. Bok Award Winner for Excellence in Graduate Student Teaching of Undergraduates. Also nominated for 2009 - 2010. AY 2010 – 2011, Harvard University Certificate for Distinction in Teaching AY 2009 - 2010 Publications: Baldiga, K.A. and J.R. Green. Forthcoming. Assent-maximizing social welfare functions. Social Choice and Welfare. Research Papers: “A Failure of Representative Democracy” (Job Market Paper 1) Abstract: In this paper, we study representative democracy, one of the most popular classes of collective decision-making mechanisms, and contrast it with direct democracy. In a direct democracy, individuals have the opportunity to vote over the alternatives in every choice problem the population faces. In a representative democracy, the population commits to a candidate ex ante who will then make choices on its behalf. While direct democracy is normatively appealing, representative democracy is the far more common institution because of its practical advantages. The key question, then, is whether representative democracy succeeds in implementing the choices that the group would make under direct democracy. We find that, in general, it does not. We analyze the theoretical setting in which the two methods are most likely to lead to the same choices, minimizing potential sources of distortion. We model a population as a distribution of voters with strict preferences over a finite set of alternatives and a candidate as an ordering of those alternatives that serves as a binding, contingent plan of action. We focus on the case where the direct democracy choices of the population are consistent with an ordering of the alternatives. We show that even in this case, where the normative recommendation of direct democracy is clear, representative democracy may not elect the candidate with this ordering. “Gender Differences in Willingness to Guess and the Implications for Test Scores” (Job Market Paper 2) Abstract: Multiple-choice tests play a large role in determining academic and professional outcomes. Performance on these tests hinges not only on a test-taker's knowledge of the material but also on his willingness to guess when unsure about the answer. In this paper, we present the results of an experiment that explores whether women skip more questions than men. The experimental test consists of actual practice questions from the World History and U.S. History SAT II subject tests; we vary the size of the penalty imposed for a wrong answer and the salience of the evaluative nature of the task. We find that when no penalty is assessed for a wrong answer, all test-takers answer every question. But, when there is a small penalty for wrong answers and the task is explicitly framed as an SAT, women answer significantly fewer questions than men. We see no differences in knowledge of the material or confidence in these test-takers, and differences in risk preferences fail to explain all of the observed gap. Because the gender gap exists only when the task is framed as an SAT, we argue that differences in competitive attitudes may drive the gender differences we observe. Finally, we show that, conditional on their knowledge of the material, test-takers who skip questions do significantly worse on our experimental test, putting women and more risk averse test-takers at a disadvantage.
SHAI BERNSTEIN http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~bernst2/ sbernstein@hbs.edu HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
pantras@fas.harvard.edu 617-495-1236 mmelitz@harvard.edu 617-495-8297 bpiquet@fas.harvard.edu 617-495-8927
Office Contact Information Baker Library 220L, Harvard Business School Boston, MA 02163 Cell phone: 857-756-5640 Education Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Financial Economics� Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References Professor Jeremy Stein Dept. of Economics, Harvard University 617-495-455, jeremy_stein@harvard.edu
Professor Andrei Shleifer Dept. of Economics, Harvard University 617-495-5046, ashleifer@harvard.edu
Professor Josh Lerner Harvard Business School 617-495-3817, jlerner@hbs.edu
Professor Fritz Foley Harvard Business School 617-495-6375, ffoley@hbs.edu
MA, Financial Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Summa cum Laude, 2007 BA, Mathematics and Economics, Ben Gurion University, Summa cum Laude, 2005 Teaching and Research Fields Primary field: Corporate Finance Secondary fields: Entrepreneurial Finance and Contract Theory Teaching Experience Teaching Fellow, Harvard University: Fall 2009, 2010 Contract Theory (Graduate), for Professor Philippe Aghion Spring 2009 Contracts and Organizations (Undergraduate), for Professor Oliver Hart Teaching Fellow, Hebrew University: Fall 2006 Asset Pricing (Graduate), for Professor Shlomo Yitzhaki Spring 2006, 2007 Dynamic Models and Optimization (Graduate), for Dr. Jonathan Stup Fall 2005 Advanced Algebra and Calculus (Graduate), for Dr. Jonathan Stup Teaching Fellow, Ben-Gurion University: 2005 Calculus for Economists (Undergraduate), for Professor Leonid Berezansky 2004, 2005 Statistics for Economists (Undergraduate), for Mr. Liad Grinfeld
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships 2011 2010 2008 2007 - Present 2005 – 2006 2006 2005 – 2006 2006
Best paper award, Coller Institute of Private Equity, London Business School (“Does Going Public Affect Innovation?”) Ewing Marion Kauffman Dissertation Fellowship Participant, NBER Entrepreneurship Research Boot Camp Doctoral Fellowship, Harvard Business School Luxemburg Scholarship, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Rector's Prize, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Rector's Fellowship, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Dean's list, School of Business Administration, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Research Papers “Does Going Public Affect Innovation?” (Job Market Paper) Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of going public on firm-level innovation. Using a novel data set consisting of innovative firms that filed for an initial public offering (IPO), I compare the long-run innovation of firms that completed their filing and went public with firms that withdrew their filing and remained private. To address concerns about the endogeneity of IPO completion, I use NASDAQ fluctuations during the initial part of the book-building period as a source of exogenous variation that affects IPO completion but is unlikely to affect long-run innovation. Using this instrumental variable and standard patent-based metrics, I find that going public leads to a 50% decline in innovation novelty relative to firms that remained private. The decline in innovation is driven by both an exodus of skilled inventors and a decline in productivity among remaining inventors. However, access to public equity markets allows firms to partially offset the decline in internally generated innovation by attracting new human capital and purchasing externally generated innovations through mergers and acquisitions. I find suggestive evidence that changes in firm governance and managerial incentives play an important role in explaining the results.
“The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (with Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar), October 2011, submitted. Abstract: Sovereign wealth funds have complex objective functions and governance structures where return maximization and strategic political considerations may conflict. SWFs with greater involvement of political leaders in fund management are more likely to support domestic firms and invest in segments and markets with higher P/E levels, especially in their domestic investments. But these investments see a subsequent reversal in P/E levels suggesting that the funds engage in poor market timing. The opposite patterns hold for funds that rely on external managers. Funds that have stated domestic development goals are more likely to invest at home, especially if politicians are involved.
“Private Equity and Industry Performance” (with Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen and Per Stromberg), October 2011, submitted. Abstract: The growth of the private equity industry has spurred concerns about its impact on the economy. This analysis looks across nations and industries to assess the impact of private equity on industry performance. We find that industries where private equity funds invest grow more quickly in terms of total production and employment, and appear less exposed to aggregate shocks. Robustness tests suggest that these results are not driven by reverse causality, nor are they driven solely by common law nations such as the United Kingdom or the United States.
Published Papers Bernstein, Shai, and Eyal Winter, 2011, “Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities”, forthcoming American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Abstract: We model situations in which a principal offers a set of contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project (such as a social event or a commercial activity). Agents’ benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume multilateral externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts’ payoff relies on a ranking of the agents, which can be described as arising from a tournament among the agents (similar to ones carried out by sports associations). Rather than simply ranking agents according to a measure of popularity, the optimal contracting scheme makes use of a more refined two-way comparison between the agents. Using the structure of the optimal contracts we derive results on the principal’s revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities’ asymmetry. Work in Progress “What do Firms do with Cash Windfalls? Evidence from Unexpectedly Successful IPOs” (with Rick Townsend)
Kjell Ke-Li Carlsson 48 Easton St., Apt. 2 Boston, MA 02134
(617) 943 7299 kcarlsson@hbs.edu
EDUCATION Harvard University (Cambridge, MA) PhD in Business Economics, 2012 (expected) MA in Economics, November 2008 Fields: International Business, Strategy, Organizational Economics Committee: Juan Alcacer (Chair), Jordan Seigel, Oliver Hart Dissertation Title: “Multinational Suppliers, Institutions, and Performance in Global Supply Chains” Fudan University (Shanghai, PRC) Visiting Scholar, 2009-2010 Columbia College of Columbia University (New York, NY) BA, magna cum laude, 2001 Economics (major), Computer Science (concentration) RESEARCH & TEACHING INTERESTS International Business, Strategy, Multinational Firms, Emerging Markets, Institutions, Relational Contracting, Intellectual Property, Property Rights View of the Firm, FDI WORKING PAPERS “The Hidden Costs of Private Enforcement: The Effect of Contracting Institutions, Relational Contracting, and Multinational Suppliers on Supply Chain Flexibility during the Financial Crisis” (September 2011) “Sourcing from Multinational Suppliers to Overcome Weak Contracting Institutions and Gain Supply Chain Capabilities” (August 2011) “Multinational Suppliers, Local Suppliers, and Institutions: Lead Times in Global Footwear and Apparel Supply Chains” (February 2011) “A Simple Model of Outsourcing and Intellectual Property Infringement in Weak IP Enforcement Locations” (September 2010) CASES “Ghana: National Economic Strategy” with Michael Porter, HBS Case no. 706497, April, 2006
“Rwanda: National Economic Transformation” with Michael Porter, HBS Case no. 706491, March, 2006 “Portfolio Investment in Emerging Markets” with Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, HBS Note no. 706438, October, 2005 “Why Study Emerging Markets” with Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, HBS Note no. 706422, August, 2005 TEACHING EXPERIENCE Section Leader for Macroeonomic Theory, Economics Department, Harvard College (Spring 2011) Resident Tutor in Economics, Pforzheimer House, Harvard University (2006-2009) Head Teaching Assistant for Discrete Mathematics, Department of Computer Science, Columbia University (Spring 2000) Teaching Assistant for Discrete Mathematics, Department of Computer Science, Columbia University (Spring 1999) PRESENTATIONS “Who Should We Keep? The Effect of Contracting Institutions, Multinationals, and Relational Contracting on International Contract Manufacturing Relationships during the Financial Crisis”, Academy of Management PDW (August 2011) “Local Protectionism, Court Sophistication, and Strategic Court Selection in Chinese Intellectual Property Court Cases”, Association for Asian Studies/ICAS Joint Conference (April 2011) “An Acceptable Rate of IP Loss: Investigating the Impact of Organizational Form, Industry, and Location on Intellectual Property Protection in China”, International Management Doctoral Consortium, Academy of Management (August 2010) “A Simple Model of Outsourcing and IP Misappropriation in Emerging Markets”, Strategy Unit Doctoral Seminar (August 2010) “Sustaining Agreements Without Courts: When Can Private Enforcement Substitute for Formal Contract Enforcement”, Strategy Unit Doctoral Seminar (April 2009) AWARDS AND HONORS Harvard University • Graduate Society Dissertation Completion Fellowship (2011-2012) • Harvard-China Fellowship (2009-2010)
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Doctoral Student Fellowship (2005-2009)
Columbia University • Phi Beta Kappa (2001) • Golden Key Honour Society (2001) • Teaching Assistant Excellence Award (2000) • Lawrence A. Gussman Endowed Scholarship (1999-2000) • Class of 1927 Scholarship Fund Scholar (1997-1998) • Global Scholar (1997-2001) • Dean’s List (1997-2001) RESEARCH EXPERIENCE Research Assistant to Professor Tarun Khanna, Harvard Business School (2005) Research Associate for Professor Michael E. Porter, Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard Business School (2002-2005) Research Analyst, LECG (Law & Economics Consulting Group) LLC, Cambridge, MA (2001 – 2002) MISCELLANEOUS Languages: Swedish (fluent), Mandarin (intermediate), French (intermediate) REFERENCES Juan Alcacer Associate Professor Harvard Business School Morgan Hall 227 Soldiers Field Road Boston, MA 02163 (617) 495-6338 jalcacer@hbs.edu Jordan Siegel Associate Professor Harvard Business School Morgan Hall 231 Soldiers Field Road Boston, MA 02163 (617) 495-6303 jsiegel@hbs.edu
Oliver Hart Andrew E. Furer Professor of Economics Department of Economics Harvard University Littauer 220 1805 Cambridge St Cambridge MA 02138 (617) 496-3960 ohart@harvard.edu
Ian Dew-Becker www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~idew idew@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Office Contact Information Department of Economics Littauer Center Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 412-480-2673 Undergraduate Studies: B.A., Economics and Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Northwestern University, with honors from both departments, 2006 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays on Time-Varying Discount Rates” Expected Completion Date: June, 2012 References: John Y. Campbell Harvard University 617-496-6448 john_campbell@harvard.edu
Emmanuel Farhi Harvard University 617-496-1835 efarhi@fas.harvard.edu
Effi Benmelech Harvard University 617-496-4787 Effi_benmelech@harvard.edu
David Laibson Harvard University 617-496-3402 dlaibson@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Asset pricing, Macroeconomics Teaching Experience: Spring 2010 Econ 1011b: Intermediate Macroeconomics (undergraduate), Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Prof. Philippe Aghion and Prof. David Laibson Fall 2009 Econ 1723: Financial Markets (undergraduate), Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Owen Lamont Research Experience and Other Employment: Summer 2011 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Ph.D. internship 2006–2007 Research Assistant to Prof. David Laibson Harvard Economics Department 2003–2005 Research Assistant to Prof. Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University Economics Department
Summer 2005 Summer 2004
Research Assistant to John Williams and John Fernald Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Research Assistant to Tara Rice Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Professional Activities: Referee Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Oxford Economic Papers, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Journal of Productivity Analysis, American Political Science Review, Social Problems Invited Presentations Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2011; Cornell University, 2011; CESifo Summer Institute, Venice (keynote speaker), 2008; NBER Productivity program 2007; Economic Policy Panel, Lisbon, 2007; Central Bank of Ireland, 2006; NBER Summer Institute, 2006; Northeast Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 2006 Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2007–2012 National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship 2007–2012 Harvard Economics Graduate Research Fellowship Publications: “How Much Sunlight Does it Take to Disinfect a Boardroom? A Short History of Executive Compensation Regulation in America,” CESifo Economic Studies, 2009, 55(3–4). “Unresolved Issues in the Rise of American Inequality,” with R.J. Gordon, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2007 no. 2. “Where did the Productivity Growth Go? Inflation Dynamics and the Distribution of Income,” with R.J. Gordon, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2005 no. 2. Research Papers: “A Model of Time-Varying Risk Premia with Habits and Production” (Job Market Paper) This paper develops a new utility specification that incorporates Campbell–Cochrane–type habits into the Epstein–Zin class of preferences. In a simple calibration of a neoclassical growth model with the EZ-habit preferences, the model generates a strongly countercyclical equity premium, substantial equity return predictability, and a stable riskless interest rate, as in the data. Moreover, time-variation in risk aversion increases the volatility and mean return of equities, conditional on the average level of risk aversion. On the real side, the model matches the short and long-term variances of output, consumption, and investment growth. As an additional empirical test, I measure implied risk aversion and find that it has an R² of over 50 percent for 5-year stock returns in post-war data. Variables that predict stock returns in the data also predict returns in the model with a similar degree of explanatory power. “Investment and the Cost of Capital in the Cross-Section: The Term Spread Predicts the Duration of Investment” I study the determinants of investment in assets with different depreciation rates. When physical capital is discounted like a bond with a similar duration, a high term spread should be associated with low average duration for investment. I document a strong negative correlation between the term spread and the average duration of aggregate investment, implying an important role for the cost of capital in determining the composition of aggregate investment. The results are robust to including a variety of controls. Consumer durable goods purchases display similar behavior.
“Bond Pricing with a Time-Varying Price of Risk in an Estimated Medium-Scale Bayesian DSGE Model” A New-Keynesian model in which households have Epstein–Zin preferences with time-varying risk aversion and the central bank has a time-varying inflation target can match the dynamics of nominal bond prices in the US economy. The model generates a steady-state term spread of 152 basis points, compared to the sample average of 207 basis points. The fitting errors for individual bond yields are roughly as large as those obtained from a non-structural three-factor model (8 basis points), and two thirds smaller than in restricted models with constant risk aversion or a constant inflation target. The term premium is estimated to have a standard deviation half as large as that of the term spread. The model delivers rich variance decompositions for the pricing kernel and the real side of the economy. Shocks to risk aversion account for less than 5 percent of the variation in output, consumption, and investment growth at business-cycle frequencies, but 32 percent of the variation in the term spread. There is little connection between priced risk factors and output, consumption, investment, or hours worked in the short run. “Essentially Affine Approximations for Economic Models” This paper proposes a novel first-order approximation technique for standard economic models with stochastic volatility, risk aversion, or disaster risk. It is identical up to the first order to perturbation, but it includes terms that perturbation would treat as "higher-order" that follow from the use of an essentially affine stochastic discount factor in the Euler equations. I calculate Euler equation errors for the RBC model with time-varying risk aversion, volatility, and disaster risk and find that the essentially affine approximation has accuracy between that of second and third-order perturbations. The equilibrium dynamics take a fully linear state-space form, so models can be estimated with the Kalman filter, rather than a more computationally intensive nonlinear filter. The approximation encompasses a variety of well-known methods specialized for use in particular settings, including general equilibrium models, models of time-varying risk aversion, portfolio choice, and endowment-economy asset pricing. Research in Progress: Commodity Inventories and Returns: Stockouts or Time-Varying Discount Rates? With Deepa B. Dhume We study the relationship between commodity inventories and expected returns in the context of Deaton and Laroque's (1992) extension of the classic Hotelling (1931) model, and Bils and Kahn's (2000) analysis of convenience yields in industrial inventories. In both models, inventory levels forecast returns on commodity futures. The models are differentiated along a number of dimensions that we examine: they have different implications for the conditional volatility of returns, the relationship between inventories and the price of risk, and non-linearities in the forecasting relationship between inventories and returns. Rather than attempting to accept or reject each of the models, we argue that they can be useful for characterizing different commodities at different times. When inventories are especially low, Deaton and Laroque's model of stockouts applies and commodity returns and volatility are high. When inventories are higher, Bils and Kahn's theory is applicable and inventories are linked to futures returns through variation in market discount rates.
MELISSA ECCLESTON http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~mecclest mecclest@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Office Contact Information Littauer Center Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 480-8616 Undergraduate Studies: A.B., Economics, Harvard University, Magna Cum Laude, 2004 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Human Capital and Development” Expected Completion Date: June 2012 References: Professor Lawrence Katz Department of Economics, Harvard University (617) 495-5148, lkatz@harvard.edu
Professor Claudia Goldin Department of Economics, Harvard University (617) 613-1200, cgoldin@harvard.edu
Professor Sendhil Mullainathan Department of Economics, Harvard University (617) 496-2720, mullain@fas.harvard.edu Teaching and Research Fields: Labor Economics Development Economics Teaching Experience: Fall 2009 The Historical Origins of Middle Eastern Development, Harvard University, Head Teaching Fellow for Asst. Professor Eric Chaney Research Experience and Other Employment: 2011 U.S. Agency for International Development, Haiti, Project Consultant Summer 2011 U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington D.C., Innovation Fellow 2009–2010 Research Assistant for Asst. Professor Richard Hornbeck Summer 2008 Research Assistant for Asst. Professor Erica Field Summer 2008 GHESKIO Center, Port au Prince Haiti, Visiting Researcher 2007 Bain & Company, Delhi India, Team Leader 2004 – 2006 Bain & Company, Los Angeles, Senior Associate Consultant
Professional Activities Referee: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Development Economics Discussant: Migration and Development Conference 2011, Harvard Kennedy School
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011–2012 Graduate Society Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2010–2011 Harvard Graduate Prize Fellowship 2010 Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics Research Grant 2010 Lab for Economic Applications and Policy (LEAP) Research Grant 2007–2010 National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship 2004 Thomas T. Hoopes Prize for outstanding undergraduate research 2003 Phi Beta Kappa
Job Market Paper: “In Utero Exposure to Maternal Stress: Effects of 9/11 on Birth and Early Schooling Outcomes in New York City” Exposure to maternal psychological stress in utero may have substantial negative effects on physical and mental health and cognitive ability. This paper estimates the causal effect of exposure to the stress of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the cohort in utero that day using birth data from the National Vital Statistics System and New York City public school records. The analysis finds that cohorts exposed during the first or second trimester in New York City weighed 12-14 grams less and had gestation lengths 1-1.5 days shorter on average. Male and female newborns were affected similarly. Births in the suburban counties surrounding the City and in the rest of the United States were not affected. Initial educational attainment in New York City also suffered: at the age of six, boys were 7-9% more likely to be in special education and 15-18% more likely to be in kindergarten rather than first grade, with no effect on girls. The analysis accounts for alternative causal channels, namely air pollution and economic recession. Effects estimated outside the area of air pollution are similar to estimates within it. Outcomes for a cohort exposed in utero to a period of high unemployment following 9/11, but not to the terrorist attacks themselves, are not adversely impacted. The results suggest that psychological stress is an important channel through which adverse conditions experienced by pregnant women negatively impact the early life outcomes of in utero cohorts.
Research Papers in Progress: “Gender Differences in the Value of Job Training: An Online Labor Market Experiment” (with Katherine Baldiga) Studies of higher education and job training programs often find that women are more likely than men to take advantage of training opportunities and realize higher relative income gains from training. We use the controlled setting of an experiment to identify factors that may help explain this gender difference in the value of training. We conduct an experiment in an online labor market in which subjects are paid for performance in an unfamiliar task, and a subset of subjects is offered training at a cost. We find that men realize higher average performance gains from the training but are no more willing to pay for it than women. Although we find no ex-ante gender differences in task performance, women are less confident than men in their forecasts of own performance relative to others. Women also perceive the training to be more valuable than men
do, both before and after completing the task. We plan to conduct an additional treatment to determine if training provides value to women by increasing their confidence.
“The Effect of Formal Female Employment on Fertility: Evidence from Caribbean Special Economic Zones�
MICHAL FABINGER http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~fabinger fabinger@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antràs Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Department of Economics Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 Mobile: 617-230-5274
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 22 ½ Fairmont Ave Cambridge, MA 02139
Personal Information: Date of Birth: February 26, 1977, Czech Citizen Undergraduate and Graduate Studies of Physics: M.Sc., Charles University, Prague, summa cum laude, June 2000 Ph.D., Stanford University, January 2004 Thesis Title: “Aspects of Time-Dependent Solutions of String Theory” Graduate Studies of Economics: Harvard University, 2008 to present Thesis Title: “Essays on Trade and Imperfectly Competitive Markets” Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Gita Gopinath (primary advisor) Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-495-8161, gopinath@harvard.edu
Professor Pol Antràs Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-495-1236, pantras@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Marc Melitz Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-495-8297, mmelitz@harvard.edu
Professor Glen Weyl Department of Economics, University of Chicago 773-702-4862, weyl@uchicago.edu
Fields: Primary fields: International Trade, International Finance Secondary fields: Price Theory, Finance Previous Employment: 2005-2008 Society of Fellows, Harvard University, Junior Fellow 2004-2005 Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, Member Teaching Experience: Summer 2001 Mechanics, Heat, and Electricity Stanford University, Teaching Assistant to Professor Gerald Fisher Spring 2001 Relativity, Quantum Mechanics, and Elementary Particle Physics Stanford University, Teaching Assistant to Professor Leonard Susskind
Teaching Experience (continued): Winter 2001 Electromagnetism Stanford University, Teaching Assistant to Professor Savas Dimopoulos Fall 2000 Optics and Thermodynamics Stanford University, Teaching Assistant to Professor Douglas Osheroff Other Research Experience and Employment: 2008-2011 Harvard University, Research Assistant to Professor Gita Gopinath 2001-2004 Stanford University, Research Assistant to Professor Eva Silverstein 1998-2000 Institute of Physics, Academy of Sciences, Prague, Researcher 1998-1999 Citi, Prague, Technology Officer Professional Activities: Referee: Journal of Economic Theory Research Papers: “Trade and Interdependence in a Spatially Complex World” (Job Market Paper) This paper presents an analytic solution framework applicable to a wide variety of general equilibrium international trade models, including those of Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and Melitz (2003), in multi-location cases. For asymptotically power-law trade costs and in the large-space limit, it is shown that there are parameter thresholds where the qualitative behavior of the model economy changes. In the case of the Krugman (1980) model, the relevant parameter is closely related to the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of goods. The geographic reach of economic shocks changes fundamentally when the elasticity crosses a critical threshold: below this point shocks are felt even at long distances, while above it they remain local. The value of the threshold depends on the approximate dimensionality of the spatial configuration. This paper bridges the gap between empirical work on international and intranational trade, which frequently uses data sets involving large numbers of locations, and the theoretical literature, which has analytically examined solutions to the relevant models with realistic trade costs only for the case of very few locations. “A Restatement of the Theory of Monopoly,” with Glen Weyl We show the equivalence of several parameters of monopoly theory typically considered distinct. In a general (residual) monopoly model we show that the pass-through rate at which cost increases translate into price rises, which is a function of the curvature of demand and cost, in turn determines the division of surplus, the pass-through rate of demand shifts and strategic effects from Bertrand and Cournot competition. These connections generalize and simplify the analysis of industrial organization models, as we illustrate with the example of the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model of monopoly in two-sided markets. Research Papers in Progress: “Price Dynamics for Durable Goods,” with Gita Gopinath and Oleg Itskhoki “A Multidimensional Envelope Theorem with Endogenous Choice Sets,” with Glen Weyl “Demand Forms and the Theory of Monopoly,” with Glen Weyl
JOSHUA D. GOTTLIEB http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jdgottl/ jdgottl@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
pantras@fas.harvard.edu mmelitz@harvard.edu bpiquet@fas.harvard.edu
Contact Information National Bureau of Economic Research 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Third Floor Cambridge, MA 02138
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Cell phone: 410-929-3158 Office phone: 617-682-9084
Undergraduate Studies: A.B., Economics, Harvard University, 2007 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Applied Economics” Expected Completion Date: May 2012 Thesis Committee and References: Professor Edward Glaeser Professor Amitabh Chandra Harvard University Harvard Kennedy School eglaeser@harvard.edu amitabh_chandra@harvard.edu Professor Lawrence Katz Harvard University lkatz@harvard.edu
Professor David Cutler Harvard University dcutler@harvard.edu
Professor Andrei Shleifer Harvard University ashleifer@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Public Economics, Health Economics Secondary fields: Urban and Real Estate Economics Teaching Experience: 2009-2010 “Research in Microeconomics,” undergraduate research seminar Spring 2010 “Behavioral Finance”, graduate course, teaching fellow for Jeremy Stein Spring 2009 “Behavioral Finance”, graduate course, teaching fellow for Owen Lamont Awarded “Certificate of Distinction in Teaching” Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2010-2012 NBER Pre-Doctoral Fellowship in Aging and Health Economics 2011-2012 Taubman Center Urban Dissertation Fellowship, Harvard Kennedy School 2008-2012 Humane Studies Fellowship 2009 Harvard Real Estate Academic Initiative Research Grant 2008 Price Theory Scholar, Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Joshua D. Gottlieb, page 2 Research Papers: “Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Treatment Patterns and Patient Health?” (Job Market Paper), with Jeffrey Clemens
Do physicians' financial incentives influence health care supply, technology diffusion, and resulting patient outcomes? In 1997, Medicare consolidated the geographic regions across which it adjusts payments for physician services, leading to area-specific price shocks that are plausibly exogenous with respect to health care demand. Areas with higher payment shocks experienced significant increases in health care supply. On average, a 2 percent increase in payment rates leads to a 5 percent increase in care provision per patient. Elective procedures such as cataract surgery respond twice as strongly as less discretionary services like dialysis. Higher reimbursements increase the pace of technological diffusion, as non-radiologists acquire magnetic resonance imaging scanners sooner when prices increase. The incremental care has no significant impacts on mortality, hospitalizations, or heart attacks. “Can Cheap Credit Explain the Housing Boom?” with Edward L. Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 16230, July 2010. Between 1996 and 2006, real housing prices rose by 53 percent according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency price index. One explanation of this boom is that it was caused by easy credit in the form of low real interest rates, high loan-to-value levels and permissive mortgage approvals. We revisit the standard user cost model of housing prices and conclude that the predicted impact of interest rates on prices is much lower once the model is generalized to include mean-reverting interest rates, mobility, prepayment, elastic housing supply, and credit-constrained home buyers. The modest predicted impact of interest rates on prices is in line with empirical estimates, and it suggests that lower real rates can explain only one-fifth of the rise in prices from 1996 to 2006. We also find no convincing evidence that changes in approval rates or loan-tovalue levels can explain the bulk of the changes in house prices, but definitive judgments on those mechanisms cannot be made without better corrections for the endogeneity of borrowers’ decisions to apply for mortgages. Publications: Glaeser, Edward L. and Joshua D. Gottlieb, “The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the United States.” Journal of Economic Literature 47(4):983-1028, December 2009. Gottlieb, J.D. et al. “Hypoxia, Not the Frequency of Sleep Apnea, Induces Acute Hemodynamic Stress in Patients with Chronic Heart Failure.” Journal of the American College of Cardiology 54:1706-1712, October 27, 2009. Glaeser, Edward L. and Joshua D. Gottlieb, “The Economics of Place-Making Policies.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2008(1):155-239, Spring 2008. Glaeser, Edward L. and Joshua D. Gottlieb, “Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City.” Urban Studies 48(3):1275-1299, July 2006. Referee Service: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Journal of Urban Economics, The Economics of Transition, Journal of Economic Geography, Management Science Other Experience: 2005 Internship, Mexican Ministry of Health, Office of Performance Evaluation
DAVID HÉMOUS http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hemous/
hemous@fas.harvard.edu HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet Office Contact Information Department of Economics Harvard University Littauer Center 1805 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Cell phone number: 857-928-8078
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 581 Franklin Street Cambridge, MA 02139
Personal Information: Date of birth: 24th September 1983 Sex: Male Citizenship: French Pre-doctoral Studies: Master of Sciences, Engineer Diploma, Economics and Physics, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France, 2005 - 2007 Bachelor of Sciences, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France, 2003 - 2005 Preparatory classes, Mathematics and Physics, Lycée Fermat, Toulouse, France, 2001 - 2003 Doctoral Studies: Harvard University, 2006 to present, PhD in Economics Thesis Title: “Essays on International Trade, Economic Growth and the Environment” Expected Completion Date: June 2012 References: Professor Philippe Aghion Harvard University, Department of Economics Phone: 617-495-6675 e-mail: paghion@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Daron Acemoglu MIT, Department of Economics Phone: 617-253-1927 e-mail: daron@mit.edu
Professor Pol Antras Harvard University, Department of Economics Phone: 617-495-1236 e-mail: pantras@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Elhanan Helpman Harvard University, Department of Economics Phone: 617-495-4690 e-mail: ehelpman@fas.harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary Fields: International Trade, Macroeconomics (Economic Growth), Environmental Economics Secondary field: Contract Theory
Teaching Experience: Spring 2010 Econ 1540 (Undergraduate Topics in International Trade), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Pol Antras Fall 2009 Econ 2010a (Graduate Microeconomics), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professors Edward Glaeser and Drew Fudenberg Spring 2009 Econ 1410 (Undergraduate Public Sector Economics), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professors Martin Feldstein, Alexander Gelber, Mihir Desai and Raj Chetty Fall 2008 Econ 2010a (Graduate Microeconomics), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professors Edward Glaeser and Drew Fudenberg Fall 2007 Econ 2010a (Graduate Microeconomics), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professors Edward Glaeser and Jerry Green Professional Activities and Affiliations: Referee: Econometrica, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Journal of Political Economy, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Development Economics, The Economics of Transition, The European Economic Review, Swiss National Bank Working Papers series, Environmental and Resource Economics. Affiliation: Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Pre-doctoral Fellow Dissertation Fellow, Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics, Weatherhead Center Fellowships: 2011-2012 2010-2011
The Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics Fellowship , Weatherhead Center, Harvard University GSAS Dissertation Completion Fellowship
Publications: Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hémous (2011), “The Environment and Directed Technical Change,” The American Economic Review, forthcoming. This paper introduces endogenous and directed technical change in a growth model with environmental constraints. The final good is produced from "dirty" and "clean" inputs. We show that: (i) when inputs are sufficiently substitutable, sustainable growth can be achieved with temporary taxes/subsidies that redirect innovation towards clean inputs; (ii) optimal policy involves both "carbon taxes" and research subsidies, avoiding excessive use of carbon taxes; (iii) delay in intervention is costly as it later necessitates a longer transition phase with slow growth; (iv) use of an exhaustible resource in dirty input production helps the switch to clean innovation under laissezfaire. Philippe Aghion, David Hémous and Enisse Kharroubi (2011), “Cyclical Fiscal Policy, Credit Constraints, and Industry Growth,” The Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming. This paper analyzes the impact of cyclical scal policy on industry growth. Using Rajan and Zingales (1998) s diff-and-diff methodology on a panel data sample of manufacturing industries across 15 OECD countries over the period 1980-2005, we show that industries with relatively heavier reliance on external finance or lower asset tangibility tend to grow faster -both in terms of value added and of labor productivity growth- in countries which implement more counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Research Papers: “Environmental Policy and Directed Technical Change in a Global Economy: Is There a Case for Carbon Tariffs?” (Job Market Paper) In an open economy, can unilateral environmental policies undertaken by a group of committed
countries ensure sustainable growth? This paper addresses this question in a dynamic model with directed technical change. There are two countries and two tradeable goods. One of the two goods is produced with a clean input and a dirty input, which causes a global externality. Innovation can be targeted at both sectors and, within the polluting sector, at clean or dirty technologies. For most of the analysis, innovation is local. I show that carbon taxes in a single country are generally unable to ensure sustainable growth, that is, to prevent environmental quality from falling below some critical threshold. A temporary combination of clean research subsidies and a tariff in a single country can ensure sustainable growth - in some cases, clean research subsidies alone may not do so. I characterize the first best policy, the world optimal policy under the constraint that one country must be in laissez-faire, and the optimal policy from the point of view of a single country. Calibrated numerical simulations show that, relative to autarky, trade accelerates environmental degradation, but that when one country undertakes policy, trade makes it easier to avoid environmental degradation. Finally, I introduce knowledge spillovers and show that even with strong knowledge spillovers a carbon taxes in a single country are still generally unable to ensure sustainable growth. “Long-term Relationships, Static Gains and Dynamic Inefficiencies,” joint with Morten Olsen Do contractual frictions matter when firms are engaged in repeated interactions? This paper formalizes the idea that long-term relationships allow firms to (partly) overcome the static costs associated with low contractibility, but this comes at the cost of dynamic inefficiencies. We consider the interaction between final good producers and intermediate input suppliers, where the provision of the intermediate input is noncontractible, but where the repetition of the interaction can (partly) overcome the associated inefficiencies. A producer/supplier pair can be a good match or a bad match, with bad matches featuring lower productivity. This allows us to build a cooperative equilibrium where producers can switch suppliers and start cooperating right away with new suppliers. Every period one supplier has the opportunity to innovate. We then show (i) that innovations need to be larger to break up existing relationships in the cooperative equilibrium than in either a set-up where the input is contractible or when we preclude cooperation in long-term relationships, (ii) that the rate of innovation is lower than in the contractible case, and may also be lower than when we preclude cooperation in the noncontractible setting, (iii) that cooperation may therefore reduce welfare, (iv) that cooperation in long-term relationships becomes a better substitute for good institutions for less developed countries and when patents are well enforced. “Testing for Path Dependence in Clean versus Dirty Innovation: Evidence from the Automotive Industry,” joint with Philippe Aghion, Antoine Dechezlepretre, Ralf Martin and John Van Reenen. We exploit new firm-level panel data on "dirty" (internal combustion engine) and "clean" (e.g. electric and hybrid) patents in the automobile industry across 80 countries. We show that firms tend to innovate relatively more in clean when they face higher tax-inclusive fuel prices and higher R&D subsidies to clean innovation. Furthermore, there is path dependence in the type of innovation both from countrywide spillovers and from the firm's own history of innovation. Research Paper in Progress “Sector Specific Human Capital and Transitional Dynamics,” joint with Adam Guren and Morten Olsen Non-academic publication Philippe Aghion, David Hémous and Reinhilde Veugelers (2009). “No Green Growth without Innovation”. Bruegel Policy brief 2009/07.
YUICHIRO KAMADA http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ykamada/index.html ykamada@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Office Contact Information Depatment of Economics, Harvard University Littauer Center 310 Cambridge, MA 02138 Personal Information: Born: January 31, 1985 Sex: Male Material Status: Married, one child Citizenship: Japanese Undergraduate Studies: M.A., Economics, Harvard University, June 2010 B.Agr., Agriculture, The University of Tokyo, March 2007 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Revision Games� Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Drew Fudenberg Littauer Center 310, Harvard University dfudenberg@harvard.edu
Professor Attila Ambrus 213 Social Science Building, Duke University aa231@duke.edu
Professor Tomasz Strzalecki Littauer Center 322, Harvard University tomasz_strzalecki@harvard.edu
Professor Alvin Roth Littauer Center 308, Harvard University al_roth@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy, Market Design Secondary fields: Decision Theory Teaching Experience: Spring, 2010 Game Theory I: Equilibrium Theory (Graduate), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Drew Fudenberg Spring, 2010 Advanced Game Theory (Undergraduate), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Markus Mobius Fall, 2008 Theories of Decisionmaking in Economics (Undergraduate), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Barton Lipman
Research Experience and Other Employment: 2009-2011 Harvard University, research assistant for Drew Fudenberg 2009
Harvard University, research assistant for Markus Mobius
Professional Activities Referee Services: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Theory, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Theory and Decision Seminar/Conference Presentations: Invited talks: 1. MOVE-Urrutia Elejalde Workshop on Information, Dynamics and Political Decisions Making (at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona), 2010 2. 6th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory (at Tokyo Institute of Technology), 2011 3. Concentration on Conflict (at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona), 2011 4. Brown University, Citibank Workshop in Economic Theory, 2011 Other talks (this list does not include Harvard talks): 1. Hitotsubashi University, Economic Theory Workshop, 2009 2. University of Tokyo, CIRJE Microeconomics Workshop, 2009 3. The 15th DC Conference (at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies), 2009 4. The 2009 Far East and South Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (at University of Tokyo), 2009 5. The 21st Summer Festival on Game Theory, International Conference on Game Theory (at Stony Brook University), 2010 6. Economic Society World Congress 2010 (at Shanghai Jiao Tong University), 2010 7. Chinese Game Theory and Experimental Economics Association, the first conference (at University of International Business and Economics in Beijing), 2010 8. The 22nd Summer Festival on Game Theory, International Conference on Game Theory (at Stony Brook University), 2011 9. Hitotsubashi University, Economic Theory and CTWE Workshop, 2011 10. University of Tokyo, CIRJE Microeconomics Workshop, 2011 Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2007-present Harvard Grant 2007-2011 Kiyo Sakaguchi Scholarship Publications/Accepted Papers: 1. “Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium” (2009), Econometrica 78(2): 823-832. 2. “Information Can Wreck Cooperation: A Counterpoint to Kandori (1992)” (2009), (joint with Scott D. Kominers), Economics Letters 107 (2): 112- 114. 3. “Matching Theory and Its Applications: “Regional Imbalance of Medical Residents” and Its Solutions” (2010) (in Japanese) (joint with Fuhito Kojima and Jun Wako), Iryo-Keizai Kenkyu (Research in Health Economics). 4. “Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Matching and Its Solution” (joint with Fuhito Kojima), Forthcoming, American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings. 5. “Hierarchical cheap talk”(joint with Attila Ambrus and Eduardo Azevedo), accepted subject to revision, Theoretical Economics.
Research Papers: Job Market Paper: “Multi-Agent Search with Deadline” (joing with Nozomu Muto) Abstract: We study a multi-agent search problem with a deadline: for instance, the situation that arises when a husband and a wife need to find an apartment by September 1. We provide an understanding of the factors that determine the positive search duration in reality. Specifically, we show that the expected search duration does not shrink to zero even in the limit as the search friction vanishes. Additionally, we find that the limit duration increases as more agents are involved, for two reasons: the option value effect and the preference heterogeneity effect. The convergence speed is high, suggesting that the mere existence of some search friction is the main driving force of the positive duration in reality. Welfare implications and a number of discussions are provided. Revise/Resubmit Papers: 1. “Improving Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program” (joint with Fuhito Kojima), December 2010, Revise and Resubmit, American Economic Review. 2. “Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games” (joint with Takuo Sugaya), June 2010, Revise and Resubmit, Theoretical Economics. (To be merged with “Preopening and Equilibrium Selection” by Riccardo Calcagno and Stefano Lovo.) Submitted Papers: 1. “The Equivalence Between Costly and Probabilistic Voting Models” (joint with Fuhito Kojima), September 2011, submitted. 2. “Naive and Sophisticated Pair-Dominant Choices,” May 2011, submitted. 3. “Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium” (joint with Drew Fudenberg), August 2011, submitted. 4. “Social Distance and Network Structures” (joint with Ryota Iijima), December 2010, submitted. 5. “Legislative committees as information intermediaries: a unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules” (joint with Attila Ambrus, Eduardo Azevedo, and Yuki Takagi), July 2011, submitted. 6. “Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies” (joint with Fuhito Kojima), July 2011, submitted. Working Papers: 1. “The Effect of Correlated Inertia on Coordination” (joint with Yuhta Ishii), April 2011. 2. “Learning Contingent Plans” (joint with Alex Peysakhovich), November 2010. 3. “Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies” (joint with Takuo Sugaya), January 2010. 4. “Hierarchical Model of Election with Campaign Contribution” (joint with Daisuke Hirata), January 2010. 5. “Sequential Implementation of Unenforceable Contracts with Stochastic Transaction Costs” (joint with Neel Rao), July 2009. 6. “Revision Games” (joint with Michihiro Kandori), July 2009 9. “Bounded Behavior,” March 2007
SUPREET KAUR www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~kaur kaur@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Department of Economics Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 475-0710 (cell)
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 10 Appian Way Apartment 2 Cambridge, MA 02138
Personal Information: Gender: Female; Citizenship: United States Pre-doctoral Studies: B.S., Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, 2004 M.P.A. in International Development (MPA/ID), Harvard University, 2007 Doctoral Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays on Labor Markets in Developing Countries� Expected Completion Date: June 2012 References: Professor Sendhil Mullainathan (primary advisor) Department of Economics, Harvard University (617) 233-3233, mullain@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Lawrence Katz Department of Economics, Harvard University (617) 495-5148, lkatz@harvard.edu
Professor Michael Kremer Department of Economics, Harvard University (617) 905-9099, mkremer@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Rohini Pande Harvard Kennedy School (917) 421-2627, rohini_pande@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary Field: Development Economics Secondary Fields: Labor Economics, Behavioral Economics Teaching Experience: Spring 2007 Advanced Microeconomic Analysis II (API 110), Harvard Kennedy School, Professor Asim Khwaja Fall 2006 Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Evidence (PED 101), Harvard Kennedy School, Professors Rohini Pande and Dani Rodrik Research Experience and Other Employment: Fall 2006 Harvard University, Research Assistant to Professor Asim Khwaja (Cambridge) 2005 Public Policy Institute of California, Research Associate (San Francisco) 2004 The Sikh Coalition, Community Organizer (New York)
Professional Activities: Refereeing: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics Fellowships and Research Awards: 2010-2011 2009-2010 2009 2009 2009 2009 2005-2007
Giorgio Ruffolo Doctoral Fellow in Sustainability Science, Harvard University Dissertation Fellow, Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics, Harvard University National Science Foundation research grant 0961857 (co-Principal Investigator) Warburg Funds research grant, Department of Economics, Harvard University Research grant, Consortium on Energy Policy Research, Harvard University Research grant, Centre for Development Finance, IFMR, India Public Policy and International Affairs Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School
Publications: “Self-Control and the Development of Work Arrangements.” 2010. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. 100(2): pp. 624-628 (with Michael Kremer and Sendhil Mullainathan). Research Papers: “Nominal Wage Rigidity in Village Labor Markets: Evidence from Demand Shocks” (Job Market Paper) This paper tests for downward nominal wage rigidity in markets for daily agricultural labor in developing countries. Wage and employment responses to rainfall shocks in 500 Indian districts from 1956-2008 point to distortions from rigidities. First, wages rise in response to positive labor demand shocks but do not fall during droughts. Second, after transitory positive shocks have dissipated, wages do not return to their previous levels—they remain high in future years. Third, inflation moderates these effects: when inflation is higher, wages are more likely to be lower during droughts and after transitory positive shocks. Fourth, wage distortions generate employment distortions: employment is lower in the year after a transitory positive shock than if the positive shock had not occurred. Those with less land—who must sell their labor to other farms—are considerably more likely to face rationing. Landless laborers experience a 7% reduction in employment—twice as large as the employment decrease during a drought. Fifth, there is some evidence that wages are less rigid in areas where rigidity is likely to cause larger profit losses due to crop characteristics. Finally, data from a new survey I conducted in two Indian states suggests that agricultural workers and employers: view nominal wage cuts as unfair; are considerably less likely to regard real wage cuts as unfair if they are achieved through inflation rather than nominal cuts; and believe that nominal wage cuts cause effort reductions. “Self-Control at Work: Evidence from a Field Experiment” (with Michael Kremer and Sendhil Mullainathan), 2011 Self-control problems change the logic of agency theory: workers not only fail to work as hard as employers would like, they fail to work as hard as they themselves would like. In response, firms can use incentive pay to affect the self-control problem, not just moral hazard. We describe the results of a yearlong field experiment on data entry workers designed to test the empirical importance of these ideas. First, we find that workers will choose dominated contracts—ones that pay less for every output level but with a steeper slope—in order to motivate themselves. Second, their effort increases significantly as the (randomly assigned) payday gets closer. Third, these two effects are linked: the demand for dominated contracts (and their benefits) is concentrated amongst those with the highest payday effects. Finally, as workers gain experience, they appear to learn about their self control problems: the correlation between the payday effect
and the demand for the dominated contract grows with worker experience. Both payday and contract effects are quantitatively large in magnitude when benchmarked against impact of a change in the slope of incentives or of a year of education. These results together suggest that self-control, in this context at least, meaningfully alters the firm’s contracting problem. Research in Progress: “Quality Deterioration by Firms in Poor Countries: The Impact of Search Frictions on Gasoline Adulteration” “Works Well with Others: Peer Effects and Self-Control” (with Michael Kremer and Sendhil Mullainathan) “Contracting Failures in Village Irrigation Markets” (with Ryan Bubb and Sendhil Mullainathan)
JACOB D. LESHNO www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jleshno jleshno@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
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Office Contact Information Baker Library 433, Harvard Business School Boston, MA 02163 Cell: 857-253-1313
Previous Degrees: M.Sc., Mathematics, Tel Aviv University, Summa Cum Laude, 2007 B.Sc., Mathematics, Tel Aviv University, Summa Cum Laude, 2005
Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays on Matching Markets� Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Alvin Roth Baker Library 441, HBS 617-495-5447, al_roth@harvard.edu
Professor Susan Athey Littauer Center M-25, Harvard University 617-496-1939, athey@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Ariel Pakes Littauer Center 117, Harvard University 617-495-5320, apakes@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Drew Fudenberg Littauer Center 310, Harvard University 617-496-5895, dfudenberg@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary: Microeconomic Theory, Market Design Secondary: Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics
Teaching Experience: Spring 2009, 2011 Graduate Microeconomics, Harvard University Teaching Fellow for Professor Oliver Hart and Professor Jerry Green Fall 2009 Graduate Market Design, Harvard University Teaching Fellow for Professor Alvin Roth
Research Experience, Fellowships and Awards: 2010 Roger Martin Award for Excellence in Doctoral Research, HBS Summer 2010 The Russell Sage Foundation Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics Summer 2009 Summer Intern, Yahoo! Research 2007 - present Doctoral Fellowship, Harvard Business School 2006 School of Economics Excellence Scholarship, Tel Aviv University 2005 - 2007 Researcher, IBM Research Labs
Conferences and Invited Talks: Invited session at the American Economic Association Meeting, Chicago, January 2012 (scheduled) EconCon, New York, August 2011 Stony Brook Game Theory Festival, July 2011 SED Conference on Economic Design, Montreal, June 2011 ACM conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), San Jose, June 2011 MFI conference on matching and price theory, University of Chicago, May 2011 International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston, April 2011 Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, December 2010 Tel Aviv University, December 2010 Brown University, November 2010 Brazilian Workshop of the Game Theory Society, Sao Paulo, August 2010 Risk, Uncertainty, and Decision, Tel Aviv, June 2007
Research Papers: “Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems” (Job Market Paper) In many assignment problems items arrive stochastically over time. When items are scarce agents form an overloaded waiting list and items are dynamically allocated as they arrive; two examples are public housing and organs for transplant. Even when all the scarce items are allocated, there is the efficiency question of how to assign the right items to the right agents. I develop a model in which impatient agents with heterogeneous preferences wait to be assigned scarce heterogeneous items that arrive stochastically over time. Social welfare is maximized by appropriately matching agents to items, but an individual impatient agent may misreport her preferences to receive an earlier mismatched item. To incentivize an agent to avoid mismatch, the policy needs to provide the agent with a (stochastic) guarantee of future assignment, which I model as putting the agents in a priority buffer-queue. I first consider a standard queue-based allocation policy and derive its welfare properties. To determine the optimal policy, I formulate the dynamic assignment problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. The resulting optimal incentive compatible policy uses a buffer-queue of a new queueing policy, the uniform wait queue, to minimize the probability of mismatching agents. Finally, I derive a robustly optimal policy which uses a simple rule: giving equal priority to every agent who declines a mismatched item (a SIRO buffer-queue). This robustly optimal policy has several good properties that make it a compelling market design policy recommendation.
“The College Admission Problem With a Continuum of Students”, with Eduardo Azevedo In many two-sided matching markets, including college admissions, agents on one side are matched to a large number of agents on the other side. Yet little is known about the structure of stable matchings when there are many agents on one side. To approach this question, we propose a
variation of the Gale and Shapley (1962) college admissions model, in which a finite number of colleges are matched to a continuum of students. We show that, generically (though not always) (i) there is a unique stable matching, (ii) this stable matching varies continuously with the underlying economy, and (iii) it is the limit of the set of stable matchings of approximating large discrete economies. “Can We Make School Choice More Efficient?”, with Eduardo Azevedo The deferred acceptance mechanism, currently used in the New York City and in the Boston public school systems, can produce Pareto-dominated assignments. When students are non-strategic, an efficient mechanism that Pareto dominates deferred acceptance can be achieved by allowing some students to trade schools (Erdil and Ergin (2008) and Kesten (2010); Abdulkadiroglu (2010)). However, when students are strategic, these mechanisms may make all students worse off and the equilibrium assignment may be unstable. We show this by using a model with a continuum of students that allows for tractable equilibrium analysis. Our results hold for arbitrarily large markets. “Will a Decrease In The Minimal Wage Improve Training?”, with Michael Schwarz Why do firms provide general skill training? The previous literature showed that firms will provide training in imperfect markets to gain informational rents. We show that even when labor markets are perfectly competitive, a firm with a cost advantage can provide training by means of a self-enforcing contract. The firm recovers the cost of training by gradually training the worker over time, paying a wage below the worker’s marginal product and providing the remaining compensation in the form of training. The speed of training is limited by minimum wage laws that limit the worker’s ability to pay for training. When the minimum wage is close to the worker’s product, the impatient firm will find it efficient to front-load a gift of training to the worker. While the firm does not receive direct payments for the front-loaded training, this early training makes the worker more productive faster, allowing the worker to pay faster for the rest of the training. A reduction in the minimum wage increases the worker’s ability to pay and substitutes away front-loaded training. We conclude that a reduction in the minimum wage always makes firms better off, but may reduce the overall efficiency of training provision. “Probabilities as Similarity-Weighted Frequencies in Presence of Irrelevant Observations” I characterize how a decision maker forms his beliefs from a database of past observations, extending the axiomatization of Billot, Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2005) by endogenizing the selection of relevant observations. The decision maker forms his belief by similarity-weighted average of the beliefs induced by each relevant past case, giving irrelevant observations an infinitesimal (zero) weight. We find that this process of belief formation generates the lexicographic probabilities of Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel (1991). In my model, a doctor considering treatments for a patient suffering from laryngeal cancer will consider relevant only past observations of laryngeal cancer, unless those do not allow him to come to a decision, in which case he would consider past observations of leukemia.
Research Papers in Progress “Matching with Aggregate Peer Preferences” I examine a college admission model where students’ preferences over colleges depend on the composition of their peers. When preferences depend on the assignment of individual peers, a stable match need not exist; a particular case is matching with couples. In a model where there are a continuum of students (extending Azevedo and Leshno 2010) and preferences depend only on aggregate composition statistics, a stable matching always exists. The proof relies on the characterization of stable matchings as outcomes of a decentralized market where colleges post
admission thresholds and students hold correct expectations. The equilibrium ranking of a college results from the intrinsic preferences for the college and from the coordination game between students.
“Large Market Asymptotics as Proxies For Cognitive Difficulty: Experimental Evidence from Multiunit Assignment” , with Clayton Featherstone Several recent papers have shown that non-strategy-proof mechanisms that work well in practice are only non strategy-proof because of manipulations whose profitability disappears in the large market limit. We suggest that these asymptotic results can help predict agent’s behavior even in small markets, letting the asymptotic profitability of a manipulation serve as a proxy for the cognitive difficulty of manipulating. If the profitability of a manipulation asymptotically vanishes, we say it is "hard"; otherwise, it is "easy". We predict that, holding profitability equal, agents would employ “easy” manipulations but would miss “hard” manipulations. We test our hypothesis in the lab in the context of multi-unit assignment by using a random serial dictatorship that goes through the dictatorship ordering multiple times. Such mechanisms are susceptible to both “easy” and “hard” manipulations. When truth-telling is a dominant strategy, we see truth-telling, and when the equilibrium manipulation is "easy", we see that manipulation. However, when the equilibrium manipulation is "hard" agents manipulate in an erratic way that is difficult to explain with standard theory. Hence in our context, agents are less likely to manipulate if the gains vanish asymptotically, but they do not necessarily revert to truth telling. “Markets for Commitment” Economists argue that commitment products can increase welfare when agents are time inconsistent. Despite the potential gains, firms often fail to offer contracts with commitment, leading economists to step in and offer commitment products. I set up a model where firms in a competitive market choose whether to provide contracts with different levels of flexibility and find that firms may choose not to offer commitment contracts in equilibrium. Flexible contracts that exploit naïve agents allow sophisticated agents to free ride. Firms do not offer commitment because the sophisticated agents prefer to pool with the naïve agents rather than take a commitment contract at a price that makes the firm break even.
HONGYI LI http://www.hongyi.li hongyili@mit.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
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Contact Information MIT Sloan School of Management 100 Main Street, E62-513 Cambridge, MA 02142 Cell: 626-636-6008 Personal Information Gender: Male Date of Birth: 11/5/1980 Citizenship: Singapore Current Position Postdoctoral Associate, August 2011 – present MIT Sloan School of Management, Applied Economics Group Undergraduate Studies B.S., Mathematics, California Institute of Technology, with honors, June 2004 Graduate Studies Ph.D., Harvard University, June 2011 Thesis Title: “Essays in Microeconomic Theory” Committee: Oliver Hart (Chair), Robert Gibbons, Eric Van den Steen References Professor Robert Gibbons MIT Sloan School of Management 617-253-0283 rgibbons@mit.edu
Professor Oliver Hart Harvard Economics Department 617-496-3461 ohart@harvard.edu
Professor Philippe Aghion Harvard Economics Department 617-495-6675 paghion@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Eric Van den Steen HBS Strategy Unit 617-495-8019 evandensteen@hbs.edu
Teaching and Research Fields Primary field: Organizational Economics Secondary fields: Contract Theory, Applied Microeconomic Theory Teaching Experience Fall, 2007 “Cultural Economics”, undergraduate course, teaching fellow for Paola Guiliano Fall, 2003 “Algorithms”, undergraduate course, teaching assistant
Research Experience 2004 - 2005 Research Assistant for David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian and James Choi Research Papers “Developing Shared Knowledge” (Job Market Paper) I develop a model of knowledge sharing in organizations where coordinated activity requires shared knowledge, and the propagation of knowledge is local and self-interested. Because propagation is local, shared knowledge takes time to spread across an organization. As a result, knowledge may be fragmented: multiple cliques may form that are unable to coordinate with each other. Because knowledge sharing is selfinterested, two forms of inefficiencies may arise. First, fragmentation may persist over the long run, even when it is socially inefficient. Second, knowledge that is unsuitable for the organization may be developed and propagated. The model has implications for organizational strategy. Persistent fragmentation develops when an organization grows too rapidly; consequently, managers of highly productive firms may deliberately constrain firm growth and eschew acquisition-based growth strategies in favor of organic growth. Also, shared knowledge is persistent, and organizations that undertake new activities may be unable to adjust their shared knowledge to adapt. Finally, organizations may implement job rotation policies to develop shared knowledge.
“Functional Centralization and the Division of Labor in Management” (joint with Maria Guadalupe and Julie Wulf) In contrast to the widely held view that flatter hierarchies are associated with the delegation of decisions, this paper shows that the trend towards flattening in large U.S. firms since the mid-80’s has been accompanied by increased centralization of activities at the top of the organization. In particular, the number of functional managers (e.g., Chief Financial Officer or Chief Marketing Officer) reporting directly to the CEO has increased relative to the number of general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions in large U.S. firms (1986-1999) and exploiting variation within firms over time and across position types, we document how the centralization of functional activities relates to the firm’s IT investments and business diversification. Centralization increases with IT intensity for “administrative” functions (e.g., finance, law, HR); yet, the same relationship only holds for “product” functions (e.g., marketing, R&D) in firms with related businesses. Firms in related businesses are more likely to centralize product functions, but we find no relationship with administrative functions. We also document how pay changes with firm organizational structure for the different types of managers. These findings suggest that the nature of the information associated with the different functions is an important force driving the centralization decision.
“Competition and Prices: Insights from Extreme Value Theory” (joint with Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson, Deyuan Li, Sidney Resnick, and Casper de Vries) We use extreme value theory (EVT) to derive a tractable, general formula relating markups to the level of competition in a variety of random-utility models. When the number of firms is large, markups are proportional to 1 / (nF '[F −1 (1−1 / n)]) , where F is the distribution function for the noise in random utility, and n is the number of firms. This formula implies that competition with large n leads to the same (uniformly scaled) markup in all the classes of random-utility models that we study. This implies that the crucial element for their predictions about prices is the assumed distribution of the noise, rather than the details of the market specification. This confers upon those models a useful property of “detail-independence.” The elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms is shown to be the EVT tail exponent of the distribution for random utility. Consequently, for many widely used distributions of noise, the markup is insensitive to the number of firms in large markets. For example, for the Gaussian case, asymptotic markups are proportional to 1 / ln n , implying a zero asymptotic elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms. In those often-used cases, competition only produces weak pressure on prices.
“Sequential Learning and the Structure of Knowledge” Learning is often sequential; for example, it is easier to learn calculus when you already know algebra. I analyze a single-player model of sequential knowledge acquisition. A key assumption of the model is that the set of knowledge has a directed tree structure, in the graph-theoretic sense: sequential knowledge acquisition corresponds to traversal of the knowledge tree. When knowledge is noncomplementary, the player specializes over the long run by acquiring knowledge on only one branch of the tree. However, when knowledge is complementary, the player pursues a balanced learning strategy across multiple branches. In such environments, unbalanced acquisition fails to exploit complementarities between skills, so the player pursues multiple branches of knowledge simultaneously. Interestingly, long-run learning outcomes may be pathdependent; shocks to learning opportunities at the start of the learning process may determine whether an individual becomes a jack of many trades or a master of one.
“Why Isn’t Conspicuous Consumption more Conspicuous?” (joint with Jonathan Hall) A puzzling feature of conspicuous consumption is that it is not more conspicuous. Many goods that are consumed for the purpose of signaling the consumer's wealth are not maximally conspicuous; for example, consumers often prefer an expensive but subtly labeled handbag to a functionally equivalent, equally costly version that is prominently labeled. Why do consumers seem to deliberately obfuscate their conspicuous consumption? Our explanation is that by being imperfectly visible, subtly conspicuous consumption signals social status in addition to wealth. We analyze a model where agents care about their reputation for both wealth and social status. Wealthy but low-status agents, who have few social connections, consume conspicuously because subtle consumption is too costly in foregone wealth signaling. Agents who are wealthy and high-status consume discreetly to distinguish themselves from those with low social status. The model also predicts that groups and cultures with high levels of social capital are associated with more subtle consumption, while maximally conspicuous consumption prevails in groups and cultures with low levels of social capital.
Research Papers in Progress “Communication, Ambiguity, and Shared Understanding” I develop a model of non-strategic communication where there is a tradeoff between communicating clearly (but narrowly) and communicating richly (but ambiguously). In one-shot interactions where communication of a multifaceted issue is important, communication is dominated by rich language, which has an advantage in high-dimensional communication. An increase in environmental uncertainty favors rich communication because of the need to communicate regarding each potential contingency. Improvements in Information Technology (IT) may, by improving the efficiency of clear communication, reduce the use of rich communication (to the extent that clear communication and rich communication are substitutes). The ambiguity inherent in rich communication reflects a lack of shared understanding between sender and receiver. Shared understanding between sender and receiver in a transaction may be developed through repeated interaction. Repeated interaction thus increases the efficiency of rich communication, and consequently is particularly valuable in high-uncertainty environments. Interestingly, even when IT augments clear communication but not rich communication, the value of repeated interaction may be enhanced by improvements in IT: improvements in clear communication accelerate learning about the meaning of rich language, and thus the development of shared understanding.
Honors and Fellowships 2010 - 2011 Harvard Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2005 - 2010 HBS Doctoral Fellowship
DAVID MERICLE http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~mericle/ mericle@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet Office Contact Information M30 Littauer Center, 1805 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138 cell: 617-869-9080
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Home Contact Information 28 Fernald Drive, #32 Cambridge, MA 02138
Personal Information: Date of birth: June 25, 1983. Citizenship: USA, Canada. Languages: English, some Spanish and Chinese. Undergraduate Studies: AB in Economics and History, AM in Statistics, language citation in Chinese. Harvard College, magna cum laude with highest honors, 2001-2005. Graduate Studies: PhD, Economics. Harvard University. Thesis Title: “Income risk and aggregate demand over the business cycle� Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: N. Gregory Mankiw Littauer Center 223 ngmankiw@harvard.edu, 617-495-4301
Emmanuel Farhi Littauer Center 318 efarhi@fas.harvard.edu, 617-496-1835
David Laibson Littauer Center M-12 dlaibson@harvard.edu, 617-496-3402 Teaching and Research Fields: Research field: macroeconomics Teaching field: computational economics. Teaching Experience: Spring, 2006 Instructor for self-designed Sophomore Tutorial course, History of Economic and 2007 Thought. Research Experience and Other Employment: 2006-2007 Harvard University, research assistant to Dani Rodrik. 2003-2006 Harvard University, research assistant to Amartya Sen. 2001-2006 Harvard University, research assistant to Michael Kremer.
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011-2012 Post-doctoral fellowship, Harvard College Fellows Program. 2009-2010 Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University. 2006-present Doctoral Fellow, Harvard University Multidisciplinary Program in Inequality & Social Policy, a National Science Foundation IGERT Program. Conferences China Summer Institute, organized by UC-Berkeley and Tsinghua University, June-July 2008. Research Papers: “Uncertainty, the liquidity trap, and social insurance” (Job market paper) This paper offers two contributions to the study of the zero lower bound. First, I show that a liquidity trap can result from excess demand for precautionary savings in times of high uncertainty. The model introduces heterogeneous agents subject to idiosyncratic productivity risk into a new Keynesian setting featuring two frictions, sticky prices and the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. As in Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009), the economy alternates between states of low and high uncertainty, so that the conditional variance of the productivity process is time-varying. When a high uncertainty shock hits, households’ demand for precautionary savings increases enough that the interest rate hits the zero bound, inducing a collapse in output. I calibrate a regime-switching model that alternates between the low- and high-uncertainty states and solve for the transition dynamics following a high-uncertainty shock. In the baseline calibration, the liquidity trap occurs only in the aftermath of the shock and exit from the liquidity trap occurs endogenously. Second, I show that two forms of social insurance, unemployment insurance and progressive taxation, can reduce precautionary savings demand enough to partially restore output when uncertainty is high. Social insurance is particularly effective when the adjustment in output occurs through increased unemployment risk, when unemployment duration is high, and when more unemployed households are credit constrained.
Research papers in progress: “Consumer credit over the business cycle” An emerging literature studies the effect of a sudden external tightening of credit availability on aggregate demand and output. I show that the tightening of consumer credit in recessions can be endogenized as a response to the cyclical increase in household income risk. Building on the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) framework used in work on unsecured consumer credit with default risk, I study the response of credit availability to an increase in the conditional variances of the transitory and persistent components of income when lenders can only see total income. The model produces three main results. First, credit availability tightens during recessions in response to increased persistent income risk. This provides an endogenous financial amplification through the household borrowing channel of the cyclical fluctuation in demand resulting from precautionary motives. Second, the availability of consumer credit over the business cycle is determined by the ratio of the conditional variances of the transitory and persistent components. Credit availability can expand in response to increased income risk if the variance of the transitory component increases proportionally more than that of the persistent component because households are less likely to default on loans used to smooth non-persistent shocks. Third, lender profits in a competitive consumer credit market generally fall with the onset of a recession.
“The Credit Market Effects of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction” (joint with Danny Shoag) The mortgage interest deduction is one of the largest federal tax expenditures, and its cost is projected to rise above $131 billion in 2012. It is also one of the most criticized deductions in the U.S. tax code, as evidenced by the repeated calls for its repeal in the wake of the housing bubble. In particular, critics point out that the deduction is highly regressive and encourages households to make leveraged bets on the housing market. This paper introduces a novel justification for the mortgage interest deduction. In an economy with both housing assets and consumer credit, the mortgage interest deduction is modeled as a subsidy for the accumulation of collateralizable assets by households who have maintained good credit. As such, the subsidy loosens participation constraints and facilitates risk-sharing. A calibration exercise reveals that the subsidy has a sizable impact on the availability of credit. Empirical evidence also provides support for the subsidy’s impact on credit availability. A second exercise shows that a negative shock to the value of housing assets calibrated to match the large decline of recent years significantly reduces households’ ability to borrow in credit markets.
10/31/2011
CAROLIN E. PFLUEGER http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~pflueger/ cpflueger@hbs.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information
Office Contact Information Harvard Business School Baker Library 344B Soldiers Field Boston, MA, 02163 Cell: 617-682-9082
175 Beacon Street Apt 210 Somerville, MA, 02143
Undergraduate Studies: MMath, Mathematics, University of Cambridge, Distinction, 2007 BA, Mathematics, University of Cambridge, First Class, 2006 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Inflation and Asset Prices” Expected Completion Date: June 2012 References: Professor Luis M. Viceira Harvard Business School 617-495-6331, lviceira@hbs.edu
Professor John Y. Campbell Harvard University 617-496-6448, john_campbell@harvard.edu
Professor Erik Stafford Harvard Business School 617-495-8064, estafford@hbs.edu
Professor James Stock Harvard University 617-496-0502, james_stock@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Asset Pricing, Macroeconomics Secondary fields: Corporate Finance, Econometrics Teaching Experience: Fall, 2008: Asset Pricing, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Prof. Christopher Polk Research Papers: “Inflation Risk in Corporate Bonds” , with H. J. Kang (Job Market Paper) Do corporate bond spreads reflect fear of debt deflation? Most corporate bonds have fixed nominal face values, so unexpectedly low inflation raises firms’ real debt burden and increases default risk. In a real business cycle model with time-varying inflation risk and optimal but infrequent capital structure choice, more volatile and more procyclical inflation lead to large credit spread increases, even with inflation volatility as moderate as in the United States since 1970. We find strong qualitative and quantitative
10/31/2011 empirical support for our model predictions in a panel of six developed economies. Credit spreads increase by 15 basis points as either inflation volatility or the inflation-stock return correlation increase by one standard deviation. Inflation risk explains as much variation in credit spreads as do equity volatility and the dividend-price ratio. Firms counteract higher debt financing costs by decreasing leverage and increasing the share of floating-rate debt in times of higher inflation uncertainty. “An Empirical Decomposition of Risk and Liquidity in Nominal and Inflation-Indexed Government Bonds”, with Luis M. Viceira This paper decomposes excess return predictability in inflation-indexed and nominal government bonds into liquidity, market segmentation, real interest rate risk and inflation risk. We estimate a liquidity premium, which appears systematic in nature. It is around 40 to 70 bps during normal times but much larger during the early years of TIPS and during the financial crisis in 2008-2009. We find evidence for large time-varying liquidity premia and real rate risk premia in TIPS and a time-varying inflation risk premium in nominal bonds. We find no evidence for segmentation between nominal and inflation-indexed bond markets in the US or UK. “A Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Robust Pre-Test for Weak Instruments”, with Jose Montiel Olea, Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics This paper develops a pre-test for weak instruments in linear instrumental variable regression that is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Our test statistic is a scaled version of the regular first-stage F statistic. The critical values depend on the long-run variance-covariance matrix of the first stage and can be conveniently evaluated numerically. The test controls the bias of the Two-Stage Least Squares estimator relative to a worst-case bias. We apply our pre-test to the instrumental variable estimation of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution and find that instruments previously considered not to be weak do not exceed our threshold. Publications: Pflueger, Carolin E., and Luis M. Viceira, 2011, “Inflation-Indexed Bonds and the Expectations Hypothesis”, forthcoming Annual Review of Financial Economics This review empirically analyzes the expectations hypothesis (EH) in inflation-indexed (or real) bonds and in nominal bonds in the United States and in the United Kingdom. We strongly reject the EH in inflationindexed bonds, and also confirm and update the existing evidence rejecting the EH in nominal bonds. This rejection implies that the risk premium on both real and nominal bonds varies predictably over time. We also find strong evidence that the spread between the nominal and the real bond risk premium, or the breakeven inflation risk premium, also varies over time. We argue that the time variation in real bond risk premia most likely reflects both a changing real interest rate risk premium and a changing liquidity risk premium, and that the variability in the nominal bond risk premia reflects a changing inflation risk premium. We estimate significant time series variability in the magnitude and sign of bond risk premia. Czado, Claudia, and Carolin E. Pflueger, 2008, “Modeling Dependencies between rating categories and their effects on prediction in a credit risk portfolio”, Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry 24(3):237-259 Work in Progress: “Macroeconomic Origins of Bond Risks”, with John Y. Campbell and Luis M. Viceira The covariance between US Treasury bond returns and stock returns has moved considerably over time. While it was slightly positive on average in the period 1953-2009, it was unusually high in the early 1980’s
10/31/2011 and negative in the 2000’s. This paper explores the macroeconomic determinants of nominal bond risks in a simple new Keynesian model. Professional Activities 2011: Presentations at NBER Summer Institute Asset Pricing Workshop, NBER Summer Institute Capital Markets and the Economy Workshop, North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, SCOR/Toulouse School of Economics Inflation Conference Referee: Econometrica, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Applied Econometrics Research Experience and Other Employment: Fall, 2010: Harvard University, Research Assistant for James Stock 2008-2009: Harvard University, Research Assistant for John Y. Campbell and Luis M. Viceira 2007-2008: Harvard University, Research Assistant for Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln
NEEL RAO www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~rao rao@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Littauer Center, Room G-26 Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 Cell: 631-525-2579
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 343 Harvard St., Apt. 2R Cambridge, MA 02138
Personal Information: Date of Birth: 2/20/1985. Citizenship: United States. Undergraduate Studies: A.B., Economics, Harvard College, magna cum laude, 2006 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Labor Economics� Expected Completion Date: June 2012 References: Professor Lawrence Katz Economics Department, Harvard University 617-495-5148, lkatz@harvard.edu
Professor Raj Chetty Economics Department, Harvard University 617-744-9492, chetty@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Oliver Hart Economics Department, Harvard University 617-496-3461, ohart@harvard.edu Teaching and Research Fields: Primary: Labor Economics Secondary: Organizational Economics Teaching Experience: Fall, 2008-2009 Macroeconomic Theory (Graduate), Harvard University Teaching Fellow for Prof. David Laibson Spring, 2008-2009 Microeconomic Theory (Graduate), Harvard University Teaching Fellow for Prof. Oliver Hart and Prof. Jerry Green Research Experience: 2006-2007 National Bureau of Economic Research Research Assistant for James Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte Madrian Professional Activities: Referee: Quarterly Journal of Economics (7x)
Scholarships and Fellowships: 2011-2012 Harvard University Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2007-2011 Harvard University Graduate Fellowship Research Papers “Social Learning in the Labor Market” (Job Market Paper) Abstract: This paper examines whether a worker's wage is based in part on information about the performance of her personal contacts. Embedding a sibling model into an employer learning framework, I develop a theory of labor markets with symmetric but imperfect information among employers in which workers are organized into disjoint social groups and workers in the same reference group have correlated abilities. I study wage determination under two alternative belief formation processes: individual learning, under which employers observe only a worker's own schooling and performance, and social learning, under which employers also observe those of her personal contacts. Using data on the AFQT scores of siblings in the NLSY79, I test for a form of statistical nepotism in which a sibling's performance is priced into a worker's wage. If learning is social, then an older sibling's test score should typically have a larger adjusted impact on a younger sibling's log wage than vice versa. By contrast, if learning is individual, then no such asymmetry should be present. The empirical findings provide strong support for the central prediction of the social learning model. Furthermore, I perform several exercises to identify social learning as the leading explanation for the main results, largely ruling out other potential factors, such as asymmetric skill formation, human capital transfers, and role model effects. “Social Networks and Vaccination Decisions” (with Markus Mobius and Tanya Rosenblat) Abstract: We combine information on social networks with medical records and survey data in order to examine how friends affect one’s decision to get vaccinated against the flu. The random assignment of undergraduates to residential halls at a large private university allows us to estimate how peer effects influence health beliefs and vaccination choices. Our results indicate that social exposure to medical information raises people’s perceptions of the benefits of immunization. The average student’s belief about the vaccine’s health value increases by $5.00 when an additional 10 percent of her friends are assigned to residences that host inoculation clinics. Among students with no recent flu experience, a 10 percent rise in the number of friends living in residences with clinics raises cumulative valuations of the vaccine by $10.92, with 85 percent of this increase attributable to heightened perceptions about the medical benefits of immunization. We also find evidence of positive peer effects on individuals’ vaccination decisions. A student becomes up to 8.3 percentage points more likely to get immunized if an additional 10 percent of her friends receive flu shots. Furthermore, the excess clustering of friends at inoculation clinics suggests that students coordinate their vaccination decisions with their peers. Research Papers in Progress “The Impact of Macroeconomic Conditions in Childhood on Adult Outcomes” Abstract: The process of skill formation in childhood is an important area of research. Information about the effect of business cycles on child development can be useful to policymakers when designing and targeting economic stimulus plans or health care programs. This paper investigates how macroeconomic conditions during one’s formative years affect one’s labor market outcomes in adulthood. Based on Census data, I document the relationship of state and national unemployment rates during childhood to schooling, employment, and income as an adult. In addition, I construct a matched sample of parents and children from the PSID in order to assess whether the observed impact of the macroeconomy is due to selection in the attributes of parents giving birth or to changes in parental investments in offspring. Finally, data from the
NLSY79-CHYA are used to examine how parental caregiving and home environments vary over the business cycle. The analysis controls for state fixed effects, national cohort effects, linear state trends, and current conditions. Family fixed-effect estimates are also presented. “Sequential Exchange with Stochastic Transaction Costs� (with Yuichiro Kamada) Abstract: We analyze the bilateral trade of divisible goods in the presence of stochastic transaction costs. The first-best solution requires each agent to transfer all of her good to the other agent when the transaction cost reaches a certain threshold value. However, in the absence of court-enforceable contracts, such a policy is not incentive compatible. We solve for the unique maximal symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium in which agents can realize some gains from trade by transferring their goods sequentially. Several comparative statics are derived. In some cases, the first-best outcome can be approximated as the agents become infinitely patient. Moreover, even when the transaction cost is constant, positive transfers can be sustained by variable supplies of goods.
DANA ROTZ http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~drotz drotz@fas.harvard.edu HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 36 Quint Ave. #7 Allston, MA 02135 Mobile: 617-283-4914
Office Contact Information Department of Economics Harvard University Littauer Center, G20 1805 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138
Undergraduate Studies: B.A., Economics & Mathematics, Boston University, summa cum laude, 2007 Graduate Studies: M.A., Economics, Boston University, 2007 Ph.D., Harvard University, 2008 to present Thesis Title: “Essays on the Economics of the Family� Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Claudia Goldin Dept. of Economics, Harvard University cgoldin@fas.harvard.edu 617-613-1200
Professor Lawrence Katz Dept. of Economics, Harvard University lkatz@harvard.edu 617- 495-5148
Professor Roland Fryer Dept. of Economics, Harvard University rfryer@fas.harvard.edu 617-495-9592 Teaching and Research Fields: Primary field: Labor Economics Secondary fields: Economic Demography, Applied Econometrics Teaching Experience: Fall 2011 The Economics of Work and Family, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Claudia Goldin Spring 2011 American Economic Policy, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professors Martin Feldstein, Jeffrey Liebman, and Lawrence Summers Spring 2010 Introduction to Microeconomics, Wellesley College, Visiting Lecturer
Research Experience: 2007-2008 Research Assistant for Marianne Baxter 2006-2007 Research Assistant for Lawrence Kotlikoff Professional Activities: Organizer Harvard University Social Economics Working Group Referee
The Economic Journal, Journal of Monetary Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics
Seminars
2011 Schreyer Seminar on Marriage, Family, and the Social Sciences, Witherspoon Institute, Princeton, NJ 2010 Price Theory Summer Camp, Becker Center, University of Chicago
Honors and Fellowships: 2011-2012 NSF-IGERT Doctoral Fellowship, Multidisciplinary Program in Inequality & Social Policy, Harvard University 2008-2010 Doctoral Fellowship, Harvard University 2007-2008 Doctoral Fellowship, Boston University Research Papers: “Why Have Divorce Rates Fallen? The Role of Women's Age at Marriage” (Job Market Paper) American divorce rates rose from the 1950s to the 1970s, peaked around 1980, and have fallen ever since. The mean age at marriage also substantially increased after 1970. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I explore the extent to which the rise in age at marriage can explain the rapid decrease in divorce rates for cohorts marrying from 1980 to 2004. Three different empirical approaches all demonstrate that the increase in women's age at marriage can explain at least 60 percent of the decline in the hazard of divorce since 1980. Other (plausibly exogenous) factors, such as improvements in women's labor market opportunities and increased access to birth control, largely impacted divorce rates over this period by changing age at marriage. I further develop an integrated model of the marriage market to demonstrate that monotone decreases in the gains to marriage (due to the aforementioned exogenous changes) can produce both the increase in age at marriage and the rise and fall of divorce rates observed in the U.S. since 1950. Finally, I show that the recent changes in age at marriage and divorce are associated with more egalitarian marriages and decreased marital conflict. But the new patterns of family formation also imply a polarization in the lives of children born to more and less educated women. “Do Outside Options Matter Inside Marriage? Evidence from State Welfare Reform” I analyze the impact of the early 1990s state waivers from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) guidelines to understand how changes in options outside of marriage affect household expenditures. AFDC waivers decreased the public assistance available to impoverished divorced women and thereby reduced a woman's bargaining threat point in marriage. Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and an empirical synthetic control approach, I find that decreases in potential welfare benefits altered the expenditure patterns of two-parent families. Waivers were associated with increased expenditure on food at home relative to restaurant meals and decreased expenditure on child care and women's clothing, suggesting greater home production and decreased consumption by women. Such changes are evident only for households containing a woman with a reasonable probability of receiving welfare benefits if her marriage ended. The changes in expenditure patterns suggest that reductions in a wife's outside options cause her utility within marriage to decline.
Research in Progress: "The Impact of Abortion on the Wage Distribution: Evidence from before Roe v. Wade" Three years before the Supreme Court ruled on the case of Roe v. Wade, New York became the first state to allow all women legal access to abortion on demand. This study analyzes the impact of the selection effects of this early reform on the wages of native New Yorkers 35 years after the legislation. Comparing people in the same cohort but whose mothers had differential access to abortion due to small differences in dates of conception, I find large effects of abortion on children's long-run economic outcomes. Access to abortion greatly increased the wages of the low-ability and black workers whose mothers carried their pregnancies to term. Such gains are not found for whites or high-skilled workers. Despite the large gains, comparing the wages of those in different cohorts suggests that these selection effects were very short-term in nature.
DOROTHÉE ROUZET http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~drouzet drouzet@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Littauer Center G9 1805 Cambridge street Cambridge, MA 02138 Cell: 857-928-7563
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 6 Hingham street Cambridge, MA 02138
Personal Information: Date of birth: June 7, 1984 Citizenship: France Undergraduate Studies: Ecole Normale Supérieure Ulm, Paris, 2002-2006 M.A. in Economics, Paris School of Economics, 2005 M.A. in Statistics, Ecole Nationale de Statistique et d’Administration Economique, 2005 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: Essays in International Economics and Political Economy Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Philippe Aghion Littauer Center 222 617-495-6675, paghion@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Marc Melitz Littauer Center 215 617-495-8297, mmelitz@harvard.edu
Professor Elhanan Helpman Littauer Center 217 617-495-7730, ehelpman@harvard.edu Teaching and Research Fields: Research fields: International Trade, Political Economy Teaching fields: Financial markets, Macroeconomics Teaching Experience: Fall 2009, 2010 Capital Markets, Harvard, head teaching fellow for Professor Owen Lamont Spring 2010 Macroeconomic Theory, Harvard, teaching fellow for Professors Philippe Aghion and David Laibson Spring 2009, 2011 Macroeconomics, Harvard, teaching fellow for Professor Christopher Foote Fall 2008 Capital Markets, Harvard, teaching fellow for Professor Christopher Polk
Research Experience and Other Employment: 2008 Harvard University, Research assistant to Professor Philippe Aghion 2006-2007 Economic Mission of the French Embassy in Bulgaria, Economic Analyst for the Danube-Balkans region 2004 French Agency for Development, Research assistant to the Chief Economist Pierre Jacquet Professional Activities: 26th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Oslo, August 2011 Kiel Institute on Economic Policy, on “The New Global Division of Labor”, July 2008 Referee for Economics of Transition Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011-2012 Harvard Graduate Society Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2009 and 2010 Derek Bok Center Certificate of Distinction in Teaching 2007-2009 Douglas Dillon fellowship 2007-2009 Harvard Economics Graduate fellowship 2005-2006 ENS-Harvard exchange fellowship Research Papers: “Improving ‘National Brands’: Quality Reputation and Export Promotion Strategies” (Job Market Paper), with Julia Cagé We study the effect of firm and country reputation on exports when buyers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. Firm-level demand is determined by expected quality, which depends on both past experience with the good and the country of origin's reputation for quality. In this framework, asymmetric information acts as a barrier to entry for high-quality firms, but facilitates sales by "fly-bynight" low-quality firms. We derive two types of steady-state equilibria with endogenous national reputation. In a high-quality, high-reputation equilibrium, imperfect information does not hinder entry into export markets, but there is a distortion in profits and the quality composition of exports. In a lowquality equilibrium, a range of relatively high-quality firms are permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction, so that countries with bad quality reputation can be locked into exporting lowquality, low-cost goods. Export subsidies then have a positive welfare effect on the exporting country, by enabling it to improve the average quality of its exports, its reputation for quality and exporter profits. However, a subsidy has the opposite long-run effects in a country that initially exports relatively highquality products. Empirically, we measure national reputations by analyzing the content of US newspaper articles about foreign countries over 1988-2006. Consistent with our model, we find that more positive news coverage of foreign countries and companies is associated with higher unit values of their exports to the US, particularly in sectors with a larger scope for vertical differentiation. Research Papers in Progress “Education and Military Rivalry”, with Philippe Aghion and Torsten Persson “Inequality and the Political Economy of Public Spending in Education”, with Philippe Aghion, Filipe Campante and Aminur Rahman
MICHAEL SINKINSON http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~msinkins/ MSinkinson@hbs.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Department of Economics, Harvard University Littauer Center, Room G20 Cambridge, MA 02138 Mobile phone: 617-301-2432
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 351 Harvard St Apt 2C Cambridge, MA 02138
Undergraduate Studies: B.Com with Honours, Commerce, Minor in Mathematics, Queen’s University (Kingston, Canada), Beta Gamma Sigma, 2004 Graduate Studies: Ph.D. Business Economics, Harvard University and Harvard Business School, 2007 to present Thesis Title: The Industrial Organization of Mobile Telecommunications Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Ariel Pakes Harvard University Department of Economics 617-495-5320, ariel_pakes@harvard.edu Professor Matthew Gentzkow University of Chicago Booth School of Business 773-834-2177, gentzkow@chicagobooth.edu
Professor Guido Imbens Harvard University Department of Economics 617-384-7485, imbens@fas.harvard.edu Professor Bharat Anand Harvard Business School 617-495-5082, banand@hbs.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary field: Industrial Organization Secondary fields: Applied Microeconomics, Econometrics Teaching Experience: Fall 2009 Econ 2610 (Graduate Industrial Organization), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Ariel Pakes Fall 2010 Econ 1642 (Undergraduate Advanced Industrial Organization), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Gregory Lewis Fall 2010 Econ 2610 (Graduate Industrial Organization), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Ariel Pakes Research Experience and Other Employment: 2006-2007 Chicago Booth, RA to Professors Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro 2005-2006 Cornerstone Research (Los Angeles, CA), Analyst 2004-2005 McKinsey & Company (Toronto, Canada), Business Analyst
Professional Activities Conference Presentations: Western Economic Association (2011), Midwestern Economic Association (2010). Referee Experience: Journal of Media Economics, Journal of the European Economic Association, Econometrica, International Journal of Industrial Organization. Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2007-2011 Harvard Graduate Student Fellowship 2008-2011 Doctoral Fellowship, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 2011-2012 Doctoral Associate in Research/Teaching Fellowship, Harvard Business School 2009 Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Derek Bok Center for Teaching and Learning, Harvard University 2010 Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Derek Bok Center for Teaching and Learning, Harvard University (x2) Publications: “The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics” (with Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro). American Economic Review, Vol 101, No. 6 (2011). Research Papers: “Pricing and Entry Incentives with Exclusive Contracts: Evidence from Smartphones” (Job Market Paper) I study the motivations for and implications of exclusive contracts, with an application to smartphones. Why would Apple choose to distribute its smartphone through only one carrier, and why would AT&T bid the most for exclusivity? I develop a model which shows that if upstream handset manufacturers face a relatively low price elasticity for their good compared to downstream wireless carriers, exclusive contracts can maximize their joint profits. An exclusive contract can soften price competition in the final good market but also increases returns to innovation for parties outside the contract, such as Google's Android. Different price elasticities among downstream firms due to network quality differences can lead to different valuations of the exclusive contract. I estimate the relative elasticities of smartphone and carrier demand using simulation and MCMC methods on a detailed dataset of consumer purchase decisions over 2008-2010. Counterfactual simulations show that Apple's exclusivity increased entry incentives for Android handset makers by approximately $1B. Accounting for pricing effects, AT&T had the highest value of exclusivity with Apple, and was willing to compensate Apple $147 per unit sale foregone due to exclusivity. Research Papers in Progress: “Competition and Ideological Diversity: Historical Evidence from U.S. Newspapers”, (with Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro)
ANDREA STELLA http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~astella astella@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-8570 617-496-4798 617-495-8927
Contact Information 32 Irving Street Apt.21 Cambridge, MA 02138 Phone: 857-445-8467 (Phone from 12/23 to 12/30 only: +393403815359) Personal Information: Male, Italian Citizen. Undergraduate Studies: B.A., Economics, Università Commerciale “Luigi Bocconi”, summa cum laude, 2005 Graduate Studies: Ph.D., Economics, Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Empirical Macroeconomics” Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Alberto Alesina aalesina@harvard.edu 617-495-8388
N. Gregory Mankiw ngmankiw@harvard.edu 617-495-4301
James Stock james_stock@harvard.edu 617-496-0502
M.A., Economics, Harvard University, 2009 M.A., Economics, Università Commerciale “Luigi Bocconi”, summa cum laude, 2007 Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Macroeconomics Secondary fields: Monetary Economics, Political Economy, Applied Time Series Teaching Experience: 2009-2011 Senior Thesis Tutorial in Macroeconomics (undergraduate), Harvard University, Instructor Fall 2009, 2010 Cultural Economics (undergraduate), Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Professor Alesina Research Experience and Other Employment: 2008 Harvard University, Research Assistant for Professor Alesina Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2007-2012 Harvard University Graduate Fellowship 2008 Dillon Fellowship Fund
Publications: “The Politics of Monetary Policy”, with A. Alesina, Handbook of Monetary Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam, 2011, Ch 18, 1000-1054 Research Papers: “The Magnitude of Menu Costs: A Structural Estimation” (Job Market Paper) Abstract: The leading theories on monetary policy non-neutrality require some degree of price rigidity, which is often introduced by assuming fixed costs of price adjustment, also known as menu costs. Empirical evidence on the existence of such menu costs is very scarce. Using weekly data on prices, costs and units sold by a supermarket chain, I estimate a discrete-choice dynamic model of a multiproduct firm facing menu costs with a moment inequalities approach. This empirical methodology allows me to estimate two types of fixed costs of price adjustment: costs that are independent of the number of items that change prices and costs that are incurred at each item's price change. I find that both types of menu costs exist and are substantial. The total costs from changing prices is estimated to be bounded between 0.13% and 0.76% of revenues and between 6.63% and 38.18% of net margins. The first type of fixed cost accounts for approximately half of this expense, pointing at substantial economies of scope in price setting. “State-Dependent Models for Inflation Forecasting” with J. Stock Abstract: Stock and Watson (2007) show that a simple unobserved component model with stochastic volatility performs better in forecasting inflation than most univariate models. The performance of Phillips curve model depends on the sample period considered: in some periods the information contained in real activity measures is useful to forecast inflation and in some other periods is not. The motivation for this paper is to design a model that can capture the time-varying relationship between inflation and unemployment in a parsimonious and flexible way. We filter both inflation and unemployment to find some common cyclical element and we find that exploiting this relationship helps in forecasting inflation. Previous Research: “Social Capital and Political Accountability” with T. Nannicini, G. Tabellini and U. Troiano, revise and resubmit at American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
SETH ISAAC STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~sstephen sstephen@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
MMELITZ@ FAS.HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-496-8297 617-495-8927
Office Contact Information 1805 Cambridge St. Littauer Center Cambridge, MA 02138 Phone: 201-566-6411
Undergraduate Studies: BA, Philosophy, Stanford University, distinction, Phi Beta Kappa, 2004 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Political Economy� Expected Completion Date: June 2012 References: Professor Alberto Alesina Harvard University, 617-495-8388 aalesina@harvard.edu
Professor Edward Glaeser Harvard University, 617-496-2150 eglaeser@harvard.edu
Professor David Cutler Harvard University, 617-496-5216 dcutler@harvard.edu
Professor Lawrence Katz Harvard University, 617-495-5148 lkatz@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Political economy, labor economics Secondary fields: Public economics, macroeconomics Teaching Experience: Fall, 2008 Fall, 2009
Graduate macroeconomics, teaching fellow for Prof. Emmanuel Farhi Undergraduate econometrics, teaching fellow for Prof. Eric Chaney
Research Experience and Other Employment: 8/04-8/05 Yale Law School, Research Assistant for Prof. John Donohue 8/05-8/06 Brookings Institution, Research Assistant for Peter Orszag and William Gale
Research Papers: “The Effects of Racial Attitudes on Voting: Evidence Using Google Search Data” (Job Market Paper) Traditional surveys struggle to capture socially unacceptable attitudes, such as racial animus. This paper uses a source that may better elicit such attitudes, Google searches, to develop a new proxy for a local area’s racial animus: searches including racially charged language. I use the Google-search proxy, available for roughly 200 media markets in the United States, to reassess the impact of racial attitudes on voting for black candidates in U.S. elections. I compare an area’s racially charged search volume to its votes for Barack Obama, the 2008 black Democratic presidential candidate, controlling for its votes for John Kerry, the 2004 white Democratic presidential candidate. Previous studies, using a similar empirical specification and standard state-level survey measures of racial attitudes, yield little evidence of a major impact of racial animus in recent U.S. elections. Using the Google-search proxy, I find highly significant, large, and robust effects in the 2008 Presidential election. The estimates imply that racial animus in the United States cost Obama about four percentage points in the national popular vote in the 2008 election. “If Education Leads to Democracy, Must Democracy Better Promote Education?” This paper models investment in education with the government in power aware that greater human capital makes democracy more likely in the future. When overall human capital is low, democracy is unlikely in the future. This gives a greater incentive to invest in education for an autocratic government but a lower incentive to invest in education for a democratic government. When overall human capital is high, democracy is likely in the future, and the incentives are reversed. Education should be increasing in human capital in democracies but decreasing in human capital in autocracies. This is consistent with the data. Implications of the model include: If human capital is low enough, democracy can be an inefficient form of government; and small positive shocks to human capital can dramatically increase a country’s welfare. Research Papers in Progress: “Anxiety and GDP” Estimating the economic consequences of anxiety has proven difficult for two reasons: First, anxiety, like many health conditions, may be inaccurately reported to surveys. Second, plausibly exogenous shocks to anxiety have not been found, limiting causal interpretations. This paper develops a monthly measure of an area’s anxiety from search data as well as an instrument for anxiety: conditions in foreign wars interacted with percent of the population at risk. Controlling for soldiers stationed abroad, danger abroad (casualties) increases anxiety relatively more in areas with more soldiers at risk but should not otherwise differentially affect an area’s economic performance. A one standard deviation increase in anxiety lowers GDP growth by one percentage point. Publications: “Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code,” Tax Notes, June 18, 2007, 1-19 (with William Gale and Jon Gruber) Personal Information: D.O.B: 9/15/82, Englewood, NJ; Citizenship: USA.
STAN VEUGER www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~veuger veuger@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Office Contact Information Littauer Center G-7 Cambridge, MA 02138 Phone number: 617-335-0831 Undergraduate Studies: Doctorandus, Spanish Language and Literature, Universiteit Utrecht, cum laude, 2004 Doctorandus, Business Administration, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2004 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2006 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Political Economy” Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Martin S. Feldstein National Bureau of Economic Research 617-868-3900, msfeldst@nber.org
Professor Alberto Alesina Department of Economics, Harvard University 617-495-8388, aalesina@harvard.edu
Professor Jeffry A. Frieden Department of Government, Harvard University 617-496-2386, jfrieden@harvard.edu M.Sc., Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Honors, 2005 Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Political Economy, Public Finance Secondary fields: Applied Microeconomics, International Finance Teaching Experience: Spring, 2011 History and Evaluation of the Policy Response to the Great Recession, Harvard Kennedy School, teaching fellow for Professor Lawrence Summers Spring 2009-11 Public Economics, Harvard College, teaching fellow for Professors Raj Chetty, David Cutler, Mihir Desai, Alex Gelber and Martin Feldstein Fall, 2008-11 Markets and Market Failures, Harvard Kennedy School, teaching fellow for Professors Erzo Luttmer and David Yanagizawa-Drott 2008-11 Research in Public Economics, Harvard College, Senior Thesis Seminar Spring, 2006 Advanced Game Theory, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, teaching assistant for Professor Andreu Mas-Colell Spring, 2006 International Finance, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, teaching assistant for Professors Fernando Broner and Romain Rancière
Fall, 2005
Industrial Organization, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, teaching assistant for Professor Ana Cusolito
Leadership, Research Experience and Other Employment: 2011-Present Vice-President for Finance, Harvard European Student Society 2010-Present Board Member, Netherlands-America Foundation, Boston Chapter 2007-Present President, Harvard Dutch Cultural Society 2007 Harvard University, Research Assistant for Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln 2006-7 Representative for the Social Sciences, Harvard GSAS Graduate Student Council 2006 Governing Council Member, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 2005-2006 University Council Member, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 2002 Banc Sabadell, AIESEC Internship Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011-2012 Harvard GSAS Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2011 Academy of Management Best Conference Paper by a Doctoral Student, Public and Non-Profit Division Spring 2011 Harvard University Certificate of Distinction in Teaching 2006-2010 Harvard University Graduate Student Fellowship Fall 2010 Harvard University Certificate of Distinction in Teaching 2008 Pforzheimer Fellowship 2005-2006 Universitat Pompeu Fabra Graduate Student Fellowship 2004-2005 Nuffic Huygens Scholarship 2004-2005 VSBfonds Scholarship Languages: Fluent: Conversant: Reading:
Dutch, English, Spanish Catalan, French, German Galician, Latin, Portuguese
Research Papers: “The Performance Effects of Regulatory Oversight” (with Kristin Wilson) This paper explores the heterogeneity in firm performance that can arise from exogenously varying levels of oversight in regulated industries. We show that banks located closer to their examination field offices face lower supervision costs: a two-hour difference in examiner travel time corresponds to an increase in expense levels of 1 to 2 percent of capital that are not explained by leverage. In addition, supervisor distance is not associated with increased returns derived through higher interest margins, but is associated with deteriorating portfolio performance. “Do Political Protests Work? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement” (with Andreas Madestam, Daniel Shoag and David Yanagizawa-Drott) This paper examines the impact of political protests on citizens' political behavior and policy. In particular, we study the effect of Tea Party movement rallies in the United States on the movement's strength, citizen voting behavior, and voting on legislation by elected officials. To identify the causal effect of rallies, we use an instrumental variables approach that exploits variation in weather on the rally day. We find a statistically significant and substantially important effect of the protests. Our results show that the rallies strengthen the political movement by increasing membership and campaign contributions. We show that rallies also affect voting behavior as they increase the republican vote share in congressional elections. Policy is also affected as a larger Tea Party rally in the district causes the representative to vote more conservatively in the U.S. Congress.
“Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation� (with Tim Ganser) Voter behavior in proportional representation systems is a poorly understood topic in political economy. We propose a model of voter decision-making in which some voters are partisan, while others care about policy and vote 'strategically'. These strategic voters construct expectations of coalitions and policy outcomes based on expected seat distributions, and vote to maximize their expected utility from the implemented policy. We test the predictions of our model using survey data from the Netherlands and successfully predict the voting behavior of significant numbers of voters who deviate from voting for the party that is, or the parties that are, ideologically closest to them.
Avinash Kishore http://scholar.harvard.edu/avinashkishore avinash.kishore@gmail.com
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information 124 Mt. Auburn Street Cambridge, MA 02138 703-795-4671
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information Apt. 1C, 1 Raymond Street Allston, MA 02134 703-795-4671
Undergraduate Studies: BSc, Chemistry, IGNOU, India, 1999 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: “Three Essays in Environmental Economics� Expected Completion Date: June 2012 Princeton University, 2005 to 2007 Masters in Public and International Affairs and Certificate Program in Science, Technology and Environmental Policy Institute of Rural Management Anand (IRMA), 1999 to 2001 Post-graduate Diploma in Rural Management (equivalent to MBA) References: Prof. Dale Jorgenson Department of Economics, Harvard University djorgenson@harvard.edu 617-495-4661
Prof. Robert Stavins Harvard Kennedy School robert_stavins@harvard.edu 617-495-182
Prof. James Hammitt Harvard School of Public Health jkh@Harvard.edu 617-432-4343 Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Environment Economics, Development Economics, Health Economics Teaching Experience: Spring, 2009, Environmental & Resource Economics and Policy, Harvard College and Harvard 2010 & 2011 Kennedy School, teaching fellow for Professor Robert Stavins Fall, 2008 Public Policy for Environmental Science, Harvard College, teaching fellow for Professor William Clark
Research Experience and Other Employment: Summer 2010 International School of Management (ISM), India Visiting Faculty 2006-07 RA to Prof. Alan Krueger. Princeton University. Worked on his book: What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism Summer 2006 Ecologic Institute (Germany), Transatlantic Intern 2001 to 2005 International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Research Fellow
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011 Harvard University Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2010 Sustainability Science Travel Grant, Harvard Kennedy School 2009 Joseph Crump Fellowship, Harvard Kennedy School 2008 Vicki Norberg-Bohm Fellowship, Harvard Kennedy School 2008 Pre-doctoral Fellow, Sustainability Science Center, Harvard Kennedy School 2007-09 Harvard Kennedy School Graduate Student Fellowship 2005-07 Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Student Fellowship 2005 Robert S McNamara Fellowship, Woodrow Wilson School and The World Bank (Declined) Research Papers: “Clean Cooking Fuel, Women’s Intra-household Status, and Son Preference in Rural India ” (Job Market Paper) Despite profoundly negative health consequences of indoor air pollution, most rural Indian households cook using traditional biomass fuel, rather than cleaner cooking fuel. Although many factors contribute to households’ continued use of solid fuels, this paper focuses on one: women’s intra-household status. We use two nationally representative datasets, and implement two complementary empirical strategies. The first strategy demonstrates that observable indicators of women’s low status are associated with lower use of clean fuel, despite a broad range of controls. No similar association is found between status and electrification. The second strategy exploits Indian son preference: having a girl first child lowers women’s status relative to having a boy first child, and is therefore associated with a threefourths of a percentage point reduction in the likelihood of using clean fuel. This effect is found throughout the wealth distribution, and is not concentrated among households in states with a high child sex ratio or households where women have some education. Using several other assets as dependent variables – including electrification – no similar effect of having a girl first child was found. To our knowledge this is the first paper demonstrating a causal effect of women’s status on clean fuel use. “Value of Statistical Life in India (VSL): An Estimate ” We present the first VSL estimates from India using hedonic wage method with worker and job characteristics data from Employment and Unemployment Survey of India (EUS)—a large nationally representative survey that has not been used in this literature before. We use data from 61st and 66th rounds of EUS, corresponding to years 2004-05 and 2009-10, and estimate VSL separately for both years. VSL of an average low-skilled urban Indian worker was about $85,000 in 2004-05 (65 times the annual wage) and it increased to about $200,000 in 2009-10 (105 times the annual wage) at 2010 constant prices. Our estimates of VSL and VSL-to-income ratio are much lower than all previous estimates from India. We estimate VSL to be 35-135 times workers’ annual income while previous estimates of VSL-to-income ratio range anywhere from 250 to 5000, with more on the higher side of the range. Comparisons with estimates from other developing countries like China and Taiwan suggest that
our estimates are more reasonable. Interestingly, our VSL estimate is also less than the value one would obtain by extrapolating VSL from the US using income elasticity of VSL< 1. Within our own study, workers’ annual income increased by 1.3 to 1.4 times between 2004-05 and 2009-10 while the VSL estimate increased by 1.6 to 2.3 times, which suggests that income elasticity of VSL is greater than 1. Our VSL estimate, if reliable, sets a lower threshold for investment in environment and public safety projects that can be justified using cost-benefit criteria. The threat to reliability comes mainly from the relatively poor quality of the occupational risk data in India. Research in Progress
“Impact of Trade Liberalization on Outdoor Air Pollution in India” Economic liberalization in 1991dismantled the License Raj in India and liberalized international trade. We use the fact that Indian liberalization of 1991 was externally imposed and comprehensive as a natural experiment. The extent of tariff reductions varied significantly across commodities and the extent of reduction in different commodities were not influenced by any measurable industry characteristics, at least in the first few years of reforms. Now, the 450 districts in India varied in their industrial composition when trade was liberalized. Districts that had greater concentration of industries whose tariffs were reduced more sharply experienced greater liberalization shock. Following Topalova (2007) and Keskin (2011), I construct a measure of district trade exposure as the average of industry-level tariffs weighted by the workers employed in that industry in 1991 as a share of all registered workers. The variation in industrial composition will generate differential response of the district-level trade exposure to the exogenous changes in tariffs. We regress city level pollution data against the district level trade exposure measure mentioned above to estimate the impact of trade liberalization on outdoor air pollution. “Weather Shocks and Household Consumption” (with Ram Mukul Fishman) There is a large body of literature in economics that shows that households in poor areas are not able to insure themselves against correlated income shocks like droughts and floods. Weather shocks reduce income, and consumption with it. But what are the margins on which households make adjustments in consumption when faced with an income shock? And what are the short-term and long-term impacts of such adjustments? We try to answer these questions using data on a) daily precipitation, b) crop production and yield by district, and c) consumption expenditure from NSS. We also find an indirect way to assess if a negative income shock increases discrimination against the girl child in the family. “Correlates of the Gradient—The Child Malnutrition Problem in India” (with Dean Spears and Diane Coffey) The National Family Health Survey (NFHS) data show that Indian babies are short in height even at birth, with height-for-age (hfa) Z-score of about -0.5. The situation gets worse as they grow older with hfa Z-score falling down to more than -2.0 by the time kids are 20months old. This research tries to understand factors related to this sharp decline in the nutritional status of young children in India. Among other factors, we look into the effect of the household fuel choice on kids’ height-for-age. Preliminary results show that kids in families using biomass fuels for cooking do much worse than families that use cleaner fuels (kerosene and LPG) even after we control for household asset ownership.
Other Publications: Tushaar Shah, Avinash Kishore and Hemant P. 2009. “Drought Impact on Indian Agriculture: Will
2009 be Different from 2002?” Economic and Political Weekly, September 12. Vol 44(37), pp. 11-14 Kishore, Avinash. 2004. “Understanding Agrarian Impasse in Bihar.” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 39 (31) Page No. 3484-3491 Mukherji, Aditi and Avinash Kishore. 2003. “Tubewell Transfer in Gujarat: A Study of the GWRDC Approach.” Research Report 69. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute Shah, Tushaar, Christopher Scott, Avinash Kishore and Abhishek Sharma. 2003. “Energy Irrigation Nexus in South Asia: Improving Groundwater Conservation and Power Sector Viability.” Research Report 70. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute
ROBYN C. MEEKS http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~rmeeks/ Robyn_Meeks@hksphd.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Rohini Pande Graduate Administrator: Nicole Tateosian
ROHINI_PANDE@HARVARD.EDU NICOLE_TATEOSIAN@HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Center for International Development 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138
617-384-5267 617-495-1190
Home Contact Information 4 Cambridge Terrace, Unit 2 Cambridge, MA 02140 Phone number: 774-217-3049
Personal Information: Citizenship: Canada and United States Undergraduate Studies: Brown University, Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, 2000 Graduate Studies: Yale University, Masters in Environmental Management, 2005 Thesis Title: “International Development and Integrated Water Resources Management” Harvard University, PhD in Public Policy, 2006 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Development Economics and Environmental Economics” Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References Professor Rohini Pande (Primary advisor) Harvard Kennedy School of Government 617-384-5267, rohini_pande@harvard.edu
Professor Michael Kremer Economics Department, Harvard University 617-495-9145, mkremer@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Rema Hanna Harvard Kennedy School of Government 617-496-1140, Rema_Hanna@hks.harvard.edu
Professor Robert Stavins (Teaching reference) Harvard Kennedy School of Government 617-495-1820, robert_stavins@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Development Economics, Environmental Economics Secondary fields: Health and Behavioral Economics Teaching Experience: Spring 2011 Econ 1661, Environmental and Resource Economics and Policy, Economics Department, Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Professor Robert Stavins Research Experience and Other Employment: 2009 Harvard University, Research Assistant for Professor Rema Hanna 2007-2009
Innovations for Poverty Action and Harvard University, Research Assistant for Professor Michael Kremer
2006
Fulbright Program, U.S. Student Fellow in Kyrgyz Republic
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2005-2006
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Energy and Environment Group, Consultant
2005
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Consultant
2004
Resources for the Future (RFF), Research Intern
2003-2005
UNDP Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment, Editor/RA
2000-2002
Peace Corps Kazakhstan, Volunteer
Professional Activities: Review of Economics and Statistics Referee: Member:
American Economic Association (AEA), Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (AERE), American Water Resources Association (AWRA)
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011 - 2012 National Science Foundation (NSF) Social, Behavioral, and Economics Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant 2011 - 2012 Harvard University Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2011 David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies Research Grant 2010 Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies Graduate Research Grant 2009 - 2010 Taubman Center for State and Local Government Dissertation Fellowship 2009 Center for International Development Research Grant 2009 - present Sustainability Science Program, Doctoral Fellow 2008 - 2009 Harvard Sustainability Science Program Giorgio Ruffolo Fellowship 2007 - 2008 Crump Fellowship for Environment and Natural Resource Management 2007 Norberg-Bohm Fellowship for Science, Technology and Public Policy 2006 - present Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Doctoral Fellow 2006 - 2008 Harvard Kennedy School Pre-doctoral Fellowship 2005 - 2006 Fulbright U.S. Student Fellowship, Kyrgyz Republic 2004 - 2005 Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Scholarship, Russian language 2005 Hixon Center Research Fellowship 2004 Carpenter-Sperry Mellon Award Research Paper: “Water Works: The Economic Impact of Water Infrastructure” (Job Market Paper) Billions of hours are spent each year on water collection in developing countries. This paper explores whether improvements in water technology enable changes in household time allocation patterns and, thereby, productivity gains. To do so, it exploits differences in the timing of shared public water tap construction across Kyrgyz villages to provide evidence on the extent to which such changes in time allocation are aided by access to better water infrastructure and less labor-intensive home production technologies. Access to shared public taps decreased the difficulty of water collection and increased the average household’s probability of being within 200 meter of its water source by 15%. This, in turn, reduced the time spent on home production activities that are greatly impacted by water access, such as bathing, going to the doctor, and caring for children. It increased time spent on leisure activities and work on the household farm. Average production of cash crops (specifically, cereals such as wheat and barley) increased by 645 kilograms per household per year. Village-level incidence of acute intestinal infections amongst children fell by 30%. Although adults 2
themselves show no signs of improved health, they benefit from the reductions in time spent caring for sick children. The labor supply and productivity estimates imply a rate of return to labor valuing approximately $0.43/hour, which mirrors the hourly wage for farm labor. Taken together, these results suggest that the main channel of influence through which productivity gains were realized was increased labor supply in an environment where the classic separation of household production and consumption activities appears to hold. Research Papers in Progress: “Economics of a Lightbulb: Experimental Evidence on CFLs and End-User Behavior” joint with E. Carranza In the developing world, where lighting is a major component of residential electricity consumption, energy efficient technologies such as compact fluorescent lightbulbs (CFLs) can save electricity and alleviate household financial constraints. Still, where CFLs have been introduced in developing countries through mass replacement programs at a zero or subsidized price, their use is often discontinued once the consumer is required to pay the full price. This represents a major constraint to realizing the potential impacts of energy efficient lighting. To better understand the adoption, continued use, and diffusion process of the CFL technology, this study uses randomized experiments to inspect two major mechanisms: (1) the role of “peer” networks in spreading information on a new technology, and (2) the “rebound” effect, which is the result of behavioral responses that boost consumption and offset CFLs’ technologically feasible electricity savings. Although the initial adoption of CFLs may be limited because the willingness to pay (WTP) is lower than the market price, their diffusion may be restricted if information is too noisy or if a greater importance is put on negative rather than positive information. The study furthers knowledge on the behavioral barriers that arise from end-user interactions with energy-efficient technologies and provides information on the optimal combination of innovation and price policies and the trade-off between welfare and electricity conservation. “Gender of Water Collectors and Time Shocks: Tests of Intra-Household Time Allocation” “Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Contributions: Payments for Water Infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan” “Property Rights and Access to Water Sources: Evidence from a Land Titling Program in Rural Peru” Publication: “Hydroclimatic risk to economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa” (with C. Brown, K. Hunu, and W. Yu). Climatic Change, 2011, 106(4): 621-647. Select Reports: “Willingness to Pay for Cleaner Water in Less Developed Countries: Rigorous Evidence and Directions for Future Research” (with M. Kremer, E. Miguel, C. Null, and A. Zwane). 2009. 3ie Synthetic Review. “An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Climate Variables on National Level Economic Growth” (with C. Brown, Y. Ghile, and K. Hunu). 2009. Background paper for the World Bank World Development Report. “Overview Report on the Experience of International Financial Institutions and International Funds in Investing in Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries” (with B. Gentry, G. Walker, S. Wallander). November 2005. Background paper for the report of the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), FCCC/SBI/2005/INF.7.
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MATTHEW RANSON http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ranson matthew_ranson@hksphd.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Economics Department Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Harvard Kennedy School ROHINI_PANDE@HARVARD.EDU Placement Director: Rohini Pande MATTHEW_BAUM@HARVARD.EDU Placement Director: Matthew Baum NICOLE_TATEOSIAN@HARVARD.EDU Graduate Administrator: Nicole Tateosian
617-384-5267 617-495-1291 617-495-1190
Office Contact Information John F. Kennedy School of Government, Box 27 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 617-359-1428
MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU
Home Contact Information 195 Mount Auburn Street, Apt 1 Cambridge, MA 02138 617-359-1428
Personal Information: U.S. citizen Undergraduate Studies: B.A., Env. Science and Public Policy and Economics, Harvard University, magna cum laude, 2002 Graduate Studies: Harvard University, PhD in Public Policy, 2006 to present Thesis Title: “Measuring the Costs of Climate Change: Hedonic and Other Economic Approaches” Expected Completion Date: June 2012 References: Professor Richard Zeckhauser 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 617-495-1174, richard_zeckhauser@harvard.edu
Professor Robert Stavins 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 617-495-1820, robert_stavins@harvard.edu
Professor Martin Weitzman 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 617-495-5133, mweitzman@harvard.edu Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Environmental and natural resource economics, Applied microeconomics Secondary field: Behavioral economics Teaching Experience: Fall 2010 Spring 2010 Spring 2010 and 2009 Fall 2008 Spring 2008
Quantitative Analysis and Empirical Methods, TF for Chris Barr Environmental and Resource Economics and Policy, TF for Robert Stavins The Economics of Climate Change, TF for Martin Weitzman Intermediate Microeconomic Theory, Head TF for Laurence Ball Theory of Capital and Income, TF for Martin Weitzman
Research Experience and Other Employment: 2008-2009 Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements: RA 2007-2009 Harvard University: RA for Robert Stavins 2002-2006 Abt Associates, Environment, Trade, and Agriculture Division: Analyst 2001 Hennepin County Env. Services: Hazardous Waste Inspector Intern Professional Activities and Affiliations: Activities: Harvard Env. Economics Research Lunch Seminar: Coordinator, 2008-2011 Affiliations: Association of Environmental and Resource Economists American Economic Association Harvard Institute for Quantitative Social Science Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Pre-doctoral Fellow Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011-2012 Harvard Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2011 Harvard Mind/Brain/Behavior Initiative research grant (with S. Bhanot and J. Lee) 2011 Enel Prize for Best Paper in Env. Econ. by a Harvard PhD Student, co-recipient 2010-2011 Joseph Crump Fellowship 2010-2011 Julius B. Richmond Fellowship 2009 Summer Research Stipend, Harvard Kennedy School 2006-2008 Harvard Kennedy School Fellowship Job Market Paper: “What Are the Welfare Costs of Shoreline Loss? Housing Market Evidence from a Discontinuity Matching Design” This paper estimates the welfare costs of shoreline loss along coastal beaches, using a unique panel dataset on housing sales, beach width survey measurements, and the timing of 210 beach nourishment projects along 300 miles of Florida's coastline. To measure the relationship between housing prices and beach width, I use three research designs: (1) a repeat-sales panel approach, (2) a differences-in-differences approach based on sharp changes in beach width caused by beach nourishment projects, and (3) a new “discontinuity matching” approach that exploits predictable discontinuities in the Markov transition function for beach width. I develop a forward-looking hedonic model that provides exact welfare interpretations for the coefficients from each of these regressions. In contrast to previous work, I find that changes in beach width have no impact on housing prices. The results imply that the welfare costs of near-term sea level rise may be modest.
Research Papers in Progress: “The Impacts of Sea Level Rise on Coastal Economies and Tourism” “Bayesian Updating with Potentially-Biased Evidence: A Model of Climate Skepticism” “A Field Methodology for Studying Emotions and Economic Decisions” (with S. Bhanot & J. Lee) We develop a novel method of field testing behavioral hypotheses, using data collected in a context in which a quasi-random shock determines individuals’ emotional states. We test two hypotheses: (1) sadness increases pro-social behavior; and (2) sadness increases willingness to pay for hedonic goods. We evaluate these hypotheses using emotional variation caused by the receipt of a midterm exam grade by students in an large undergraduate course at Harvard. This natural experiment allows us to collect panel data on students experiencing transient sadness (from a poor grade) or happiness/relief (from a good grade). [Results expected in Dec 2011.]
Publications: Jaffe, Judson, Matthew Ranson, and Robert N. Stavins. 2009. “Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture.” Ecology Law Quarterly 36: 789-808. Johnston, Robert J., Elena Besedin, and Matthew Ranson. 2006. “Characterizing the Effects of Valuation Methodology in Function-Based Benefits Transfer.” Ecological Economics 60(2): 407419. Johnston, Robert J., Matthew Ranson, Elena Besedin, and Erik Helm. 2006. “What Determines Willingness to Pay per Fish? A Meta-Analysis of Recreational Fishing Values.” Marine Resource Economics 21(1): 1-32. Johnston, Robert J., Elena Besedin, Rich Iovanna, Chris Miller, Ryan Wardwell, and Matthew Ranson. 2005. “Systematic Variation in Willingness to Pay for Aquatic Resource Improvements and Implications for Benefit Transfer: A Meta-Analysis.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 53(2-3): 221-248.
MAOLIANG YE http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~mye mye@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Office Contact Information Room K351, IQSS 1737 Cambridge St. Cambridge, MA 02138 857-998-2803 Undergraduate Studies: BE, Communication Engineering, Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) University, Outstanding Graduate, 2002 Graduate Studies: ME, Information and Communication Engineering, Tsinghua University, 2005 MPhil, Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007 Ph.D., Public Policy, Harvard University, 2007 to present Thesis Title: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Gradualism in Coordination and Trust Buildingâ&#x20AC;? Expected Completion Date: May 2012 References: Professor Alberto Alesina Harvard Economics Department 617-495-8388, alesina@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Iris Bohnet Harvard Kennedy School 617-495-5605, iris_bohnet@harvard.edu
Professor Raj Chetty (Co-Chair) Harvard Economics Department 617-744-9492, chetty@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Brigitte Madrian (Co-Chair) Harvard Kennedy School 617-495-8917, Brigitte_Madrian@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Public Economics, Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Political Economy Organizational Economics, Development Economics, Labor Economics Teaching Experience: Fall 2010 International Monetary Economics (undergraduate), Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Professor Richard Cooper Spring 2010 Macroeconomic Theory (undergraduate), Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Lecturer Christopher Foote Fall 2009 Culture Economics (undergraduate), Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Professor Alberto Alesina Spring 2009 Senior Thesis Advisor (undergraduate), Harvard University Fall 2008 Senior Thesis Advisor (undergraduate), Harvard University Spring 2008 Program Evaluation: Estimating Program Effectiveness with Empirical Analysis (graduate), Harvard University, Course Assistant for Professor Alberto Abadie
Spring 2007 Fall 2006 Spring 2006 Fall 2005
Money and Banking (undergraduate), Chinese University of Hong Kong, Teaching Assistant Perspective in Economics (undergraduate), Chinese University of Hong Kong, Teaching Assistant Understanding Banking and Finance (undergraduate), Chinese University of Hong Kong, Teaching Assistant Basic Microeconomics (undergraduate), Chinese University of Hong Kong, Teaching Assistant
Research Experience and Other Employment: 2008-2009 MIT Political Science Department, Research Assistant for Professor Lily L.Tsai Summer 2008 World Bank Group, Washington D.C., Consultant Summer 2006 Chinese University of Hong Kong, Research Assistant for Professor Hongbin Li 2002-2005 Tsinghua University, Research Assistant for Professor Xiaoqing Ding Spring 2002 Sun Yat-sen University, Research Assistant for Professor Jiwu Huang Summer 2001 Sun Yat-sen University, Research Assistant for Institute of Software Professional Activities: Membership: American Economic Association, Royal Economic Society, Economic Science Association, Western Economic Association International, Southern Economic Association, Chinese Economist Society, American Political Science Association, Public Choice Society, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Society for Judgment and Decision Making Referee: Social Choice and Welfare, Journal of Comparative Economics, Regional Science and Urban Economics, China Economic Review Presentations: 2011 Southern Economic Association Annual Conference, Washington D.C. Economic Science Association North-American Conference, Tucson, AZ Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Fall Conference, Washington D.C.; Workshop on Social Networks and Social Capital, Harvard Sociology Department MIT Political Economy Breakfast American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Seattle, Washington International Economic Association Congress, Beijing, China Conference on Public Finance Issues in China, Beijing, China Chinese Economists Society Annual Conference, Beijing, China Public Finance Seminar, School of Finance, Renmin University of China Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, Texas Harvard Public Finance/Labor Lunch Seminar Behavioral Ethics Camp in Negotiation and Decision Making, Harvard Business School 2010 IQSS Student Conference on Data and Social Policy, Harvard University Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy (February and October) Harvard Public Finance/Labor Lunch Seminar 2009 Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy Harvard Development Lunch Seminar Harvard Kennedy School Doctoral Seminar Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2011-2012 Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University 2011-2012 Graduate Student Research Grant, IQSS, Harvard University 2011 Conference Grant, Graduate Student Council, Harvard University
2011 2011 2010-2011 Summer 2009 2007-2009 2005-2007 2002-2005
Graduate Conference Grant, American Political Science Association Graduate Travel Grant, IQSS, Harvard University Graduate Student Research Grant, IQSS, Harvard University Ezra F. Vogel and Fairbank Center Graduate Research Fund, Harvard University Pre-doctoral Fellowship, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Studentship, Chinese University of Hong Kong Scholarship, Tsinghua University
Research Papers: “Does Gradualism Build Coordination? Evidence from Laboratory Experiments” (Job Market Paper) Abstract: This paper studies how gradualism -- increasing required levels (“stakes”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -- affects group coordination on high-stake projects. I explore the effect of gradualism in two laboratory binary-choice weakest-link coordination games (games in which each player’ payoff depends on her own contribution and the lowest contribution of all group members) under two different information structures: a limited information structure when participants are only informed whether all group members contribute, and a richer information structure when they are informed exactly how many group members contribute. In each case, I randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, and starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stake over time (the “gradualism” treatment). I find that with limited information, groups coordinate most successfully at the high stake in the gradualism treatment; with a richer information structure, the advantage of gradualism shrinks because a richer information structure facilitates later coordination for the other two treatments when a group is close to success. These results show that gradualism works in weakest-link games via guaranteeing a high success rate at the beginning and providing the information about how far a group is from success in a higher-stake coordination project. I propose a behavioral game theory model based on belief updating to explain why and when gradualism works in weakest-link games. However, in a third experiment I find that allowing free riding worsens the coordination in all treatments, and gradualism alone does not perform better. “One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?” (with Sam Asher, Lorenzo Casaburi and Plamen Nikolov) (First author; under review) Abstract: Using a multiple-period binary-choice minimum-effort coordination experiment, we study how gradualism -- increasing required levels (“stakes”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -- affects group coordination on a high-stake project. We randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, and starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stake over time (the “gradualism” treatment). We find that groups coordinate most successfully at the high stake in the gradualism treatment relative to the other two treatments. We propose a belief-based learning framework to explain the results, and discuss other theoretical explanations. Our findings point to a simple, voluntary mechanism to promote successful coordination when the capacity to impose sanctions is limited. “Does Gradualism Build Trust? Evidence from A Multi-round Trust Experiment” Abstract: This paper examines the effect of gradualism -- increasing the stake of investment slowly over time rather than requiring a high stake of investment immediately -- in trust building using a multiround trust (investment) experiment. I randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake (the “High Start” treatment), starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few rounds (the “Big Jump” treatment), and starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stake over time (the “Gradualism” treatment). In each round, two players of each group make their decisions sequentially. The first (“trustor”) makes a binary decision whether to pass the stake to the second one (“trustee”), which measures her trust. If she passes, the stake triples and the trustee then makes a binary decision: to return a low unfair amount or a high fair amount to the trustor, which
measures her trustworthiness. I find that at the beginning the degree of trust is the same for all treatments, but trustworthiness is lower for the “High Start” treatment; as a result, the “High Start” treatment has a lower level of subsequent trust and a lower rate of successful cooperation (here cooperation is defined as “successful” if and only if both of the following conditions hold: the trustor is trusting and the trustee is trustworthy.). However, trustworthiness and trust for all treatments sharply decrease in the end (“end-of-game” effect). “Does Money Buy Happiness? Evidence from Twins in Urban China” (with Hongbin Li, Pak-wai Liu and Junsen Zhang) (under review) Abstract: This paper estimates the effect of income on self-reported happiness using unique Chinese twins data. We address three key challenges: omitted variable bias, measurement error bias, and reverse causality. To control for omitted genetic factors and family background, we use a within-monozygotictwin-pair fixed-effects model. The instrumental variable fixed-effects method is used to correct measurement error bias. Finally we employ industry average income as an instrumental variable and suggest that the causality runs from income to happiness. The results are robust after we address concerns about potential biases of within-monozygotic-twin-pair estimates, use various measures of income and wealth, and consider the potential cross effect of the twin sibling’s income. This paper adds to the literature on the causal effect of income on happiness, and to the best of our knowledge, it is the first such study which draws on twins data to correct both omitted variable bias and measurement error bias. “Communism, Homo Economicus, or Fairness? Preferences for Redistribution in China” Abstract: Rigid political control by the Communist Party, vigorous economic performance and increasing income inequality following thirty years of market-oriented reforms make China an excellent case to enrich the literature on preference for redistribution to the poor. Using the World Value Survey, I find that on average the Chinese prefer less redistribution than the rest of the world, which suggests that egalitarianism is no longer popular in China. Using the 2006 Chinese General Social Survey, I find that Communist Party members do not favor more progressive taxation; they even prefer lower expenditures on redistributive programs such as poverty relief, unemployment relief and pensions. Moreover, those with higher incomes and those expecting their incomes to increase in subsequent years favor less redistribution. On the other hand, the perception of fairness matters. These results suggest a combination of self-interest and fairness, rather than communism, is the key ideological factor associated with preferences for redistribution in China. This study adds to the social and political science studies on perceptions of inequality in China, and to the best of my knowledge, it is the first economics study systematically examining the determinants of preferences for redistribution in China, which has implications for China’s next decades of social policy and a more balanced development strategy. Research Papers in Progress “Information, Perceptions of Policy Justice, and Preferences for Redistribution ------ An experiment in China under an Authoritarian Context” “More Education, More Happiness? Evidence from Twins in Urban China” (with Junjian Yi and Junsen Zhang) “Institutional Environment and the Performance of Family Firms: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms” (with Ling Chen, Hongbin Li and Yanyan Xiong) “What Really Explains the Interregional Fiscal Disparity after the 1994 Tax Reform in China?” (with Shaojie Zhou)
TRISTAN ZAJONC http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~tzajonc/ tzajonc@fas.harvard.edu
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PANTRAS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Placement Director: Pol Antras Placement Director: Marc Melitz Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet
MMELITZ@HARVARD.EDU BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU
Office Contact Information Institute for Quantitative Social Science (K320) Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 (415) 358-1855
617-495-1236 617-495-8297 617-495-8927
Home Contact Information 23 Oak St. Apt 3 Cambridge, MA 02139 (617) 953-2204
Undergraduate Studies: BA, Economics, Pomona College, with honors, 2003 Graduate Studies: MPA in International Development, Harvard University, 2006 Harvard University, PhD Candidate in Public Policy, 2006 to present Thesis Title: “Essays on Causal Inference for Public Policy” Expected Completion Date: June 2012 References: Professor Guido Imbens Department of Economics Harvard University (617) 384-7485, imbens@fas.harvard.edu
Professor Alberto Abadie John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University (617) 496-4547, alberto_abadie@harvard.edu
Professor Asim Khwaja John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University (617) 384-7790, akhwaja@hks.harvard.edu
Professor Dale Jorgenson Department of Economics Harvard University (617) 495-4661, djorgenson@harvard.edu
Teaching and Research Fields: Econometrics, Labor Economics, Development Economics, Economics of Education Publications: (Job Market Paper) “Bayesian Inference for Dynamic Treatment Regimes: Mobility, Equity, and Efficiency in Student Tracking”, Forthcoming, Journal of the American Statistical Association. Policies in health, education, and economics often unfold sequentially and adapt to changing conditions. Such timevarying treatments pose problems for standard program evaluation methods because intermediate outcomes are simultaneously pre-treatment confounders and post-treatment outcomes. This paper extends the Bayesian perspective on causal inference and optimal treatment to these types of dynamic treatment regimes. A unifying idea remains ignorable treatment assignment, which now sequentially includes selection on intermediate outcomes. I present methods to estimate the causal effect of arbitrary regimes, recover the optimal regime, and characterize the set of feasible outcomes under different regimes. I demonstrate these methods through an application to optimal student tracking in ninth and tenth grade mathematics. For the sample considered, student mobility under the statusquo regime is significantly below the optimal rate and existing policies reinforce between student inequality. An
easy to implement optimal dynamic tracking regime, which promotes more students to honors in tenth grade, increases average final achievement 0.07 standard deviations above the status quo while lowering inequality; there is no binding equity-efficiency tradeoff. The proposed methods provide a flexible and principled approach to causal inference for time-varying treatments and optimal treatment choice under uncertainty.
“Do Value-Added Estimates Add Value? Accounting for Learning Dynamics” (with Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, and Asim Khwaja), July 2011, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. “India Shining and Bharat Drowning: Comparing Two Indian States to the Worldwide Distribution in Mathematics Achievement” (with Jishnu Das), 2010, Journal of Development Economics. “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data” (with Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das and Asim Khwaja), 2006, Comparative Education Review. Winner of the George Bereday Award for outstanding article published in the CER for the year 2006. Learning and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools (LEAPS): Insights to inform the education policy debate (with Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Khwaja, and Tara Vishwanath), 2009. “Madrassa Metrics: The Statistics and Rhetoric of Religious Enrollment in Pakistan” (with Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das and Asim Khwaja). 2010. In Beyond Crisis: Re-Evaluating Pakistan, Naveeda Khan (ed.) Routledge: India Research Papers: “Regression Discontinuity Design with Multiple Forcing Variables” (with Guido Imbens), September 2011. Regression discontinuity designs identify causal effects by exploiting treatment assignment rules that are discontinuous functions of underlying covariates. In the standard regression discontinuity design setup, the probability of treatment changes discontinuously if a scalar covariate exceeds a cutoff. We consider more complex treatment assignment rules that generate a treatment boundary. Leading examples include education policies where treatment depends on multiple test scores and spatial treatment discontinuities arising from geographic borders. We give local linear estimators for both the conditional effect along the boundary and the average effect over the boundary, and a consistent estimate for the variance of the average effect based on the nonparametric delta method. For two-dimensional RD designs, we derive an optimal, data-dependent, bandwidth selection rule for the conditional effect. We demonstrate these methods using a summer school and grade retention example.
“Learning Levels and Gaps in Pakistan” (with Jishnu Das and Priyanka Pandey), 2006, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #4067. “Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation” (with Doug Johnson), 2006. Research In Progress Cumulative Returns to Teacher Quality: A Dynamic Treatment Model of Skill Formation
Automatic Bayesian Inference for Complex Economic Models Teaching Experience Fall 2010 Introduction to Applied Econometrics (PhD), teaching fellow for Professor Dale Spring 2009 Jorgenson Fall 2007 Spring 2008 Program Evaluation: Estimating Program Effectiveness with Empirical Analysis Spring 2011 (Masters/PhD), teaching fellow for Professor Alberto Abadie
Spring 2008
Economics of Education (Sophomore Tutorial in Economics)
Research Experience and Other Employment: 2003-2011 World Bank, Short Term Consultant (multiple dates) 2011 Entrepreneurial Finance Lab, External Consultant Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2009-2010 Harvard University Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2007 Graduate Instruction Committee Award for Excellence in Teaching Economics to Graduate Students (Awarded for overall ranking of 4.5 or higher, Economics 2120) 2007 George Bereday Award for outstanding article published in Comparative Education Review 2006-2007 John F. Kennedy School of Government Doctoral Fellowship 2004-2006 Kennedy Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School Referee Service: Review of Economics and Statistics, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Comparative Education Review, Economic Development and Cultural Change
JEREMY T. BAROFSKY DOCTORAL CANDIDATE, HEALTH ECONOMICS Harvard University, School of Public Health Institute for Quantitative Social Science Department of Global Health and Population
44 Columbia St., # 2R Cambridge, MA 02139 (617) 780-9634 jbarofsk@hsph.harvard.edu
EDUCATION HARVARD UNIVERSITY Doctor of Science, Health Economics, School of Public Health, Anticipated May 2012. Minor Fields: Development Economics and Public Economics. BOSTON UNIVERSITY Master of Arts, Economics, Comprehensive Exam Grade: A, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, May 2005. Bachelor of Arts, Economics and Public Policy, Magna Cum Laude, University Professors' Program, May 2003. RESEARCH Estimating the impact of health insurance in developing nations: Evidence from Mexicoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Seguro Popular (job market) Estimates the impact of social health insurance program in Mexico using cluster-randomized data and compare to programâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s costs. Procrastination in Health Insurance Enrollment using Mexico's Seguro Popular Explores reasons for low health-insurance uptake in Mexico and uses calibration of a hyperbolic discounting model to explain observed affiliation rates. Field Experiment on Health Insurance Uptake in Mexico Implement a randomized field experiment on health insurance affiliation with each treatment arm elucidating a theoretical mechanism for low uptake of insurance in Cuernavaca, Mexico. Economic Effects of Malaria Eradication: Evidence from Uganda Evaluates the impact of malaria eradication campaign in 1959 using regression discontinuity and finds that it produced 3%-9% higher schooling levels per year compared to control areas. RELEVANT EXPERIENCE RESEARCH Research Assistant, 2010-2011, Professor William Hsiao, Worked on the report The
Vermont Option: Achieving Affordable Universal Health Care. Research Assistant for Julian Jamison, 2010-present, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Center for Behavioral Economics and Decisionmaking. TEACHING EXPERIENCE: TF Fall 2011 for Professor Marc Melitz, ECON 1010a – Microeconomic Theory, Department of Economics, Harvard University. TF Spring 2009, 2010 for Professor Richard Freeman, ECON 1818 – Economics of Discontinuous Change. Department of Economics, Harvard University. TF Fall, 2009 for Professor David Cutler, QR 24 – The Business and Politics of Health, Department of Economics, Harvard University. WORK EXPERIENCE: Master's Fellow, Harvard Initiative for Global Health, 2005-2007 -Evaluated effectiveness of Mexican government to affiliate poor and rural families to health insurance program and measured equity in Mexico’s health financing system. -Assessed U.S hospital quality by producing patient-severity-adjusted measures of overall hospital performance with discharge data. PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS Presentation to International Health Economics Association, Eighth World Congress, July 2011. Selection and Nervous Nellies: Determinants of Uptake in Mexico’s Seguro Popular. Presentation to American Society of Health Economists, June 2010. Seriously, I’ll do it tomorrow: Procrastination in Health Insurance Enrollment using Mexico’s Seguro Popular. Presentation to Minnesota Population Center, February, 2009. The Economic Effects of Malaria Eradication: Evidence from an Intervention in Uganda, Presentation to International Health Economics Association, Sixth World Congress, July 2007, Measuring Institutional Strength: Seguro Popular Affiliation in Mexico from 2002 to 2006. Assessing the effect of the 2001-2006 Mexican health reform: an interim report card, Gakidou, E., et al. Lancet, 2006; Vol. 368, Issue 9550, pp. 1920-1935. Evidence is good for your health system: policy reform to remedy catastrophic an impoverishing health spending in Mexico, Knaul, F, et al. Lancet, 2006; Vol. 368, Issue 9549, 1828-1841.
Estimating population cause-specific mortality fractions from in-hospital mortality: validation of a new method. Murray, CJL., et al. PLoS Medicine, November 2007, Vol. 4, Issue 11. AWARDS AND HONORS Harvard School of Public Health Doctoral Fellowship, 2007-2012 Glickenhaus Fellowship 2011-2012 IPUMS-International Research Award 2008 for Best Paper David Rockefeller Center and Institute for Quantitative Social Science Research Grants, 2010. RELEVANT SKILLS Fluency in Spoken and Written Spanish Introductory Spoken and Written Swahili STATA and R programming REFERENCES David Canning, PhD (primary advisor) Richard Saltonstall Professor of Economics and International Health School of Public Health, Harvard University 665 Huntington Avenue, HSPH I 1211, 12th Floor, Boston, MA 02115 Phone: 617-432-6336 dcanning@hsph.harvard.edu David Cutler, PhD Professor of Applied Economics Department of Economics, Harvard University Littauer Center, 1875 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 Phone: 617-496-5216 dcutler@harvard.edu Amitabh Chandra, PhD Professor of Public Policy John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Mailbox 26, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 Phone: 617-496-7356 amitabh_chandra@harvard.edu David Laibson, PhD Robert I. Goldman Professor of Economics Department of Economics, Harvard University Littauer M-12, Cambridge, MA 02138 Phone: 617-496-3402 dlaibson@harvard.edu
Samuel Starr Richardson Harvard University PhD Program in Health Policy ▪ 14 Story St., Cambridge, MA 02138 ▪ (617) 285-8758 ▪ richard5@fas.harvard.edu http://scholar.harvard.edu/samr
EDUCATION Harvard University. Cambridge, MA PhD, Health Policy, Economics Concentration Dissertation: “Quality-based payment in health care: Theory and practice” Stanford University. Stanford, CA BA with Honors, ΦΒΚ, Human Biology, Health Policy Concentration, Economics Minor
Expected May 2012
June 2002
HONORS AND AWARDS National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Eight-time awardee, Derek Bok Center Certificate of Distinction in Teaching Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Predoctoral Training Grant Harvard University Dissertation Completion Fellowship
2008-2011 2007-2011 2006-2008 2011-2012
RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS Primary field: Health Economics Secondary fields: Industrial Organization, Public Finance Additional teaching fields: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Econometrics PUBLICATIONS Papers in progress: Richardson SS. “Integrating pay-for-performance into health care payment systems.” Job market paper. Richardson SS, Gosden TB, Batata, A. “Effect of pay-for-performance on rewarded and unrewarded health outcomes in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service.” Richardson SS, Gosden TB, Batata, A. “Unintended consequences of pay-for-performance in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service.” Peer-reviewed publications: Richardson SS, Sullivan G, Hill A, Yu W. 2007. “Use of aggressive medical treatments near the end of life: Differences between patients with and without dementia.” Health Serv Res. 42(1p1): 183-200. Wagner TH, Richardson SS, Vogel WB, Wing K, Smith MW. 2006. “The cost of inpatient rehabilitation care in the Department of Veterans Affairs.” J Rehabil Res Dev. 43(7): 929-937. Richardson SS, Yu W. 2005. “Controlling for patient case mix at the end of life: Issues in identifying cause of death.” JAMA 294(7):793-4. Other publications: Smith MW, Richardson SS. HERC Technical Report #17: Dialysis Treatment Use and Costs Reported in VA Administrative Databases. Menlo Park: VA HSR&D Health Economics Resource Center, 2005. RESEARCH EXPERIENCE Harvard Kennedy School and National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, MA Research Assistant to Amitabh Chandra
2006-2009
VA Health Economics Resource Center. Menlo Park, CA Research Assistant to Wei Yu, Mark W. Smith, and Todd H. Wagner
2003-2006
Richardson, 2 TEACHING EXPERIENCE (Teaching portfolio available upon request) Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Cambridge, MA Head Teaching Fellow, American Health Care Policy Managed 6 TFs and logistics in large undergraduate general education lecture course Student evaluations: 4.80/5 (department average = 4.04) Teaching Fellow, Microeconomic Theory I and II Graduate-level courses for a broad range of doctoral students across the university Student evaluations: 4.81/5 (department average = 3.78) Ca’ Foscari-Harvard Summer School. Venice, Italy Teaching Fellow, Topics in Health Economics Seminar course for Ca’ Foscari and Harvard undergraduates Harvard University Kennedy School of Government. Cambridge, MA Instructor, Doctoral Student Research Methods Workshop Instructor, Doctoral Student Mathematics Review Course Cesar Chavez Academy. East Palo Alto, CA 7th Grade Teacher, Math and Science
Fall 2010
2007-2011 (7 semesters)
Summer 2008
Summers 2007-2011 Summers 2009-2011 2002-2003
PEDAGOGIC TRAINING Derek Bok Center Special Seminar: “Designing the Course of the Future” Selected through a competitive application process to participate in this course for experienced teaching fellows, funded by the Teagle Foundation Harvard Writing Project Workshop: “Responding to Student Writing” Harvard University Fall Teaching Conference Derek Bok Center Videotaping and Teaching Consultation
Spring 2011
October 2010 2007, 2008, 2010 2007, 2008
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS Richardson SS. “Gaming, multitasking, and pay-for-performance in the United Kingdom.” Oral presentation. American Society for Health Economists Conference, Durham, NC, June 2008. Richardson SS, Sullivan G, Hill A, Yu W. “Use of aggressive medical treatments near the end of life: differences between patients with and without dementia.” Poster. Society for Medical Decision Making Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, October 2005. Richardson SS, Yu W. “Controlling for patient case mix at the end of life: issues in identifying cause of death.” Poster. Academy Health Annual Research Meeting, Boston, MA, June 2005. Yu W, Hill A, Richardson SS. “Regional variations of aggressive medical treatments in VA and Medicare hospitals.” Poster. Academy Health Annual Research Meeting, Boston, MA, June 2005. Hill A, Richardson SS, Yu W. “Causes of death for patients with HIV: Impacts of HAART on end-of-life care.” Poster. VA HSR&D National Meeting, Baltimore, MD, February 2005. ACADEMIC SERVICE Reviewer, The Harvard Undergraduate Research Journal Health Policy and Economics Tutor, John Winthrop House, Harvard University Student Representative, Academy Health Economics Interest Group Advisory Committee Discussant, Academy Health Economics Interest Group Meeting, Chicago, IL
2011 2008-2011 2010-2011 June 2009
Richardson, 3 REFERENCES Thomas G. McGuire, PhD (primary advisor) Professor of Health Economics Harvard Medical School Department of Health Care Policy 180 Longwood Avenue Boston, MA 02115 mcguire@hcp.med.harvard.edu 617-432-3536 (phone) 617-432-0173 (fax) Amitabh Chandra, PhD Professor of Public Policy John F. Kennedy School of Government Mailbox 26, 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 amitabh_chandra@harvard.edu 617-496-7356 (phone) 617-496-1722 (fax) Meredith B. Rosenthal, PhD Professor of Health Economics and Policy Harvard School of Public Health Department of Health Policy and Management 677 Huntington Avenue Kresge Building Room 405 Boston, MA 02115 mrosenth@hsph.harvard.edu 617-432-3418 (phone) 617-432-4494 (fax) Christopher N. Avery, PhD (teaching reference) Roy E. Larsen Professor of Public Policy and Management John F. Kennedy School of Government Mailbox 47, 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 christopher_avery@hks.harvard.edu 617-496-4063 (phone) 617-496-5960 (fax) Michael E. Chernew, PhD (teaching reference) Professor of Health Care Policy Harvard Medical School 180 Longwood Avenue Boston, MA 02115 chernew@hcp.med.harvard.edu 617-432-0174 (phone) 617-432-2648 (fax)