Chapter X
Peripherialization and History of Psychology: an example from Turkey Sertan Batur PhD Candidate, University of Vienna, Austria
SUMMARY In the peripheralized countries like Turkey modernity was not a bottom-up process developed by own internal dynamics, but a process understood as “westernization” and led by a political elite aiming to integrate country with the world-system. Psychology in such countries overtakes the task of construction of a westernized subject rather than defining the subject under given conditions and contradictions of transition from “traditional” to “modern” society. There are two main consequences of this process: First, psychology is constitutionalized in such countries as a result of a top-down process. Second, in order to construct the westernized subject, mainstream psychology orients itself after the western psychology. Instead of feeding itself from the indigenous roots, it merely confines itself to western knowledge. In this paper, it is argued that history of psychology in peripherialized countries should begin with an analysis of periferializations of both country and scientific discipline as dialectical interdependent processes. These processes determine social function of psychology, its institutionalization and professionalization, as well as its particular characteristics.
PSYCHOLOGY, MODERNITY AND MODERNIZATION In recent years, thoughts around the multiple origins of psychology and its internationalization have been increasingly expressed within the historiography of psychology (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010; Pickren, 2010). While presentist and progressive interpretations of history writing which make psychology start with Wilhelm Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig and bring it to the other side of Atlantic via Functionalism and Gestalt theories and finally to the present times, “new history” of psychology argues that history of social sciences cannot be constructed on a simple line. Historians of psychology agree more and more that psychology has plural origins and celebratory interpretations of history have some ideological functions. This dialectical view of history coincides with postcolonial situation: Understanding indigeneity of psychology, elucidating of indigenization of American psychology as well as understanding dialectics of Americanization of psychology after World War II provide us with some clues about the plural origins of psychology in ex-colonies (Danziger, 2006). We know that modern European psychology was indigenized in North America and “American psychology” peripherialized especially after Second World War and maybe colonized other psychologies (see Bhatia, 2002). But we must remember that psychology gained currency in old oriental empires too, synchronously with indigenization of American psychology. In the period between two World Wars, psychology was broadening in modernizing oriental countries. We can assess that psychology was institutionalized in Turkey, Iran and China in this period. Main question of this paper is why the same indigenization process placing American
psychology to centre and peripherializing almost the whole mainstream psychology in world was not possible in the old oriental empires despite contemporaneity. I think Turkey can be a good example to answer this question, mainly for two reasons. The first one of these reasons is associated with relations between psychology, modernity and modernization. Steinar Kvale (1992) assessed that “psychology is child of modernity”. Be it Foucaultian which relates psychology with emergence of individual in the 18th century and with micro-power technologies which helps getting individual action under control or be it Marxist which relates psychology with new forms of capitalist productive relations, almost in every approach in critical historiography, a relation between psychology and modernity is assumed (Jandl, 1999). But we should pay attention to Jürgen Habermas’ (1983) distinction between cultural modernity and capitalist technological modernization. This distinction gives some clues in order to understand histories of late modernized countries. We can assess that in a world dominated by imperialism, technological modernization doesn’t presuppose cultural modernity. Moreover, technological modernization in certain societies doesn’t immediately mean modernization of all sectors of society. This process is manifested usually through supporting of modernization project by an elite segment in society while the other segments continue to live under traditional social structures and with traditional ways of thinking, despite developing capitalist relations. This very modernization process differentiates the old empires like Turkey, Iran and China from both western European countries and traditional colonies. Second reason which makes Turkey “a good example” is related with the first one. European expansion from 15th century brought a new world order which is named by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) as “world system”. Monetary fluctuation which was caused by European Expansion dragged old empires like Ottoman Empire into financial crisis and even into bankruptcy in the long term (see Pamuk, 2000). As a consequence of absolutism after the fall of feudalism, military modernization in Europe changed the power balance between European monarchies and traditional oriental empires. Politics of reformation which aimed to bring armies of these empires to the modern technological level of West Europe started in the 18th century. But these reformation projects deteriorated financial situation of the empires, made them depended on European capital and therefore, these politics were accompanied by peripherialization process. While expanding Europe colonized the rest of world, traditional empires, – except Russia, a traditional empire that was incorporated into capitalist world economy due to its historical features as semi periphery (Wallerstein 1974, pp.300) – became half-colonies. Typically, reform politics were projects of an elite group in state bureaucracy and they triggered negative reactions from traditional segments of society. Differences in modernization histories of traditional empires are mostly caused by powerful traditional and local feudal forces. At the beginning of 19th century, local forces in Ottoman Empire were mostly overwhelmed by central power. Thus, reform politics could be realized despite some interruptions.
PROJECT OF MODERNIZATION Project of modernization forced the pace of peripherialization and made traditional empires both politically and financially more depended upon central countries of world
system. Project of modernization in periphery and project of modernity in the centre have a few historical differences: The first one is the nature of the intelligentsia. As contrasted with project of modernity, project of modernization doesn’t represent the worldview of a new social class. Bourgeoisie in traditional empires was not yet formed as a social power when modernist ideas were introduced. The bourgeoisie was mainly merchant bourgeoisie that was dependent on western capital and was very weak against traditional forces in society. Forerunners of modernization were not an intelligentsia as was in European countries, but they were bureaucrats at different levels of state. The second difference is the nature of social dynamics in oriental empires. Modernization in oriental empires was a top-down project without actual social dynamics. Typically, modernizing elite was out of touch with larger segments of society. For example, modernizing elite in Ottoman Empire and modernist republican elite in Turkey have been regarding people as uneducated, back-warded, and thus they needed for this elite the help of modernizers. Traditional forces have been depicted as ignorant by modernizing elite. Therefore, the modernizing elite proclaimed itself as the avant-garde force with the motto of “for the people, despite the people”. Actually, this elite has often been reacted negatively by larger segments of society living under traditional structures. But, reformation politics were realized despite the people – if necessary with violence. The third is the differences in the purpose of modernization. The European Enlightenment imagined an ideal world in which liberté, egalité et fraternité are actualized. In contrast, the main goal of modernizing elite was to save the state. Motive of modernization projects in Turkey has been to save the state and to prevent a possible collapse of the bureaucratic power. Thus, dream of Ottoman modernizers was not necessarily an equal, free world, but a powerful central state which could run against central countries. Although they demanded freedom and equality, they did it because of the belief that it could save the state. It is not surprising that modernizers who try to explain negative reactions of people with ignorance or even betrayal, regarded equality and freedom as only conditional rights. The fourth difference can be seen in the relationship between culture and technology. Main tension caused by modernization project is actually the relationship of cultural modernity and technological modernization. Although technological modernization was always accepted by modernizing elite, cultural modernity was received with certain resistance. In modernizing elite in Turkey, there were not only groups like Kemalists who defined central countries of world system as “contemporary civilization” to which Turkey belongs, but also other ones who despised western civilization and resisted against it within the framework of other “modern” projects like pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism. The main line of the Kemalist group was radical westernization politics, while second group defended politics of “getting technology from west and protecting one's own culture against foreign influences”. They were particularly interested in modernization in Japan. The fifth is the contradictions of the project of westernization. Politics of westernization has strongly dominated some periods of Turkish history. Particularly, westernization politics in the latest period of Ottoman Empire between 1913 and 1918 and early period of the Republic of Turkey between 1923 and 1950 determined present situation in Turkey. Even institutionalization of psychology in Turkey occurred in this period. This was not just a coincidence. Main contradiction of westernization politics
was the attempt to realize the project of modernization from top to down without the support of the larger segments of society. Life style of people was changed by top-down politics and violence, and thus these politics have sometimes faced with public resistance. Westernization politics were reduced to formalities such as dressing up like modern people or listening western classical music from state radios. This situation caused on the one hand hybrid ways of life and on the other hand, it opened an increasing gap between modernizing elite and lay people. Through top-down politics of industrialization and etatism, modernizers tried to create a national industrial bourgeoisie. But this bourgeoisie that was encouraged by state credits, subventions, economic speculations and even corruptions didn’t become really modern except for a few cases. Despite the formal modernization, a wide cultural modernization in Turkey following European example could not be really successful. Psychology as instrument of westernization Even psychology was a part of the process of westernization. Institutionalization of psychology in Turkey started by the suggestions of western advisors who were invited to Turkey by the government to assess the needs of a modern education (e.g. Dewey, 1960). Particularly in early years of Turkish republic, modern education of people had an important role in Kemalist social politics. Kemalists reformed educational system radically. Turkish students were sent to Europe in order to study pedagogy. Egon Brunswik was invited to Turkey. First psychological laboratory in republican period was established by him in the Gazi Institute of Pedagogy in Ankara. After university reform in 1933, Kemalist Turkey invited scholars who were dismissed from German universities because of their Jewish origins and their relationships with Jews and also for political reasons. Institute of Pedagogy and Psychology at Istanbul University was established in 1937 (see Widmann, 1973). First director of the institute was Wilhelm Peters who left Germany where he founded psychological department in Jena. First studies of the institute in Istanbul were on measuring IQ scores of Turkish children. By doing this, standardization of educational system was targeted. Another aim of these studies was to compare Turkish children with European ones. Results were not surprising that Turkish children did not have significant differences from French children and thus it was scientifically proven that there were no biological obstacles against westernization and westernization politics were feasible (Batur, 2002). An interesting point here is that psychology remained until 1980s a pure academic discipline. For example efficiency of labor power which was one of main concerns of mainstream psychology in industrialized countries was not a subject of Turkish psychology for a long time. Clinical psychology could develop until 80s neither. Social psychological studies were mostly related with social change and reformation politics. Psychology was regarded by governments just as a part of educational reform. Therefore, it could be assessed that psychology, the child of modernity, was in Turkey child of politics of modernizing elites. It was directly dependent on these politics and could survive as long as it was in service of them. There are some typical consequences of this dependence. These consequences are the characteristics of Turkish psychology and they differentiate history of psychology in Turkey from that of Western Europe or North America. With a superficial reading, we
can argue that these characteristics are not unique to Turkey. Histories of psychology in some other traditional empires have some similarities. Top-down institutionalization and peripherialization First of these consequences is, contrary to West European and North American psychology, the top-down institutionalization. In the modern societies, institutionalization follows the attempts of a certain group of scholars. What happened in Turkey was quite the contrary. First, foreign advisors were invited and then, according their suggestions, government decided to create an institute of psychology. After a political resolution of council of ministers about establishing an institute for psychology and pedagogy, minister of education together with foreign advisors began to seek for suitable persons who can work at institute. For example Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil, one of first assistant professors of institute had no psychological education. He was just appointed because he could read French very well and translate psychological classics from this language. He translated for the first time important books of Jean Piaget into Turkish. A typical result of top-down institutionalization is that psychology in Turkey became a peripherialized psychology dependent on psychology in center. Lack of qualified academics required that students are sent to European countries and scholars from modernized countries are invited. Hence, as a consequence, only western psychology was regarded as scientific. Moreover, the ideal place for an important study to be published was a western psychology journal. This situation became chronic with rush Americanization in 1950s. Even today, publishing in Turkish journals is not regarded as equal with publishing in English ones. This situation harmed development of scientific language. Even basic psychological terms were translated into Turkish by different translators in different ways. Moreover, translations from western languages are unavoidably selective. This selectiveness facilitated an illusion of continuity in history of psychology. Discussions on “crisis of psychology” which are as old as history of discipline were hardly reflected in Turkey. Thus, western psychology, progressing on a line without ruptures and contradictions, gained a scientific authority. New paradigms were regarded as scientific developments in same progressive science. Impossibility of indigenous psychologies and critical attempts This dependence on western psychology had of course some parallelisms with admiration of modernizing elite to the western way of life. But there was no “the” western way of life. European countries were in a plurality, just like the discipline of psychology. That caused eclecticism in modernization process. Kemalism contained not only positivistic, but also romantic aspects. What should be imported from modernized countries, what was obsolete and what was unscientific was determined by the needs of modernization politics. Thus, psychological projects attempting to overstep the borders of educational reform and trying to use western psychology in order to understand subjects of new social order in Turkey, took a back seat during the first period of history of Turkish psychology. In 1930s and 1940s, two of the three chairs of Institute for Pedagogy and Psychology in Istanbul, chairs for Experimental Psychology and Pedagogy conducted studies that could be meaningful for social politics, like studies on
IQ scores or characterology. Third chair, General Psychology, was giving place to “human scientific” paradigms. Scholars of this chair tried to develop psychological theories which have nationalistic emphasizes and they claim to elucidate social reality as a whole. These theories were derived from French positivist sociologists like Gabriel Tarde and Émile Durkheim and philosophers like Henri Bergson. They tried to interpret French theories according to reality of Turkey and in this sense they tried to develop an “indigenous” psychology. But these attempts could not impress scientific society as well as politicians. With Americanization in 1950s, studies of this chair were openly condemned by younger scholars as old-fashioned and unscientific. It can be argued, that dependency of psychology on modernizing/westernizing elite and its peripherialization prevented that Turkish psychology become indigenous. It gained rather a cosmopolitical character and stayed outside of social problems excepted politics of modernizing elite. For example, racism was for Turkish psychologists for a long time not a Turkish problem related with situation of minorities in Turkey, but rather a western problem related with Afro-Americans. Frankly, it can be asked if a psychology dealing with fundamental social problems was practically possible or not. The claim of modernizing/westernizing elite of being a “society without classes” and its corporatist character made the political system a closed one to criticism (Batur & Aslıtürk, 2006). In a system in which state directed capitalism had priorities against individual rights and freedoms, it is not surprising that opposite voices faced with political oppression. A good example is Muzafer Sherif’s story. In a period in which racist forces were openly supported by government under the influence of Nazi Germany, Muzafer Sherif took a political position. He wrote in anti-fascist journals and published a book titled as “Race Psychology” (Başoğlu, 1943) which was condemning Pan-Turkism explicitly. He was arrested, and then he left Turkey with support of his friends and an American scholarship. Because he married a non-Turkish woman in US, he was dismissed from Ankara University and he did never turn back to Turkey (Asliturk & Cherry, 2003). Delay in professionalization Dependence of psychology on modernization politics meant its dependence on state. One of the characteristics of Turkish psychology was to remain for a long time merely an academic discipline supporting the educational reform and teachers training, as modernizing elite conceived psychology. Psychological knowledge had not any effects on everyday life, industry or family, but remained as pure academic discipline. Psychology could become a profession first after bureaucratic elite lost its absolute power to new born bourgeoisie in 1970s, years of rush capitalization. It became possible in the second half of 1970’s that a private-sector or some public-sector organizations began supporting psycho-technical studies in order to raise working power efficiency. Psychological counseling did not become popular until emergence of a new, rich and educated middle class in 1990s by liberal politics. Emergence of this new social class facilitated with its needs formed by mass media psychotherapy and counseling centers. Psychologists were now hired at human resources departments of companies or at kinder-gardens, for the first time in 1990s which is after the introduction of neoliberal politics in 1980s. Even today, psychology is not yet a legally recognized and protected profession. Professionalization process of psychology is today an actual subject of psychological
societies in Turkey. Dependence of psychology on politics of modernizing elite caused practically delay in process of professionalization.
CONCLUSION Since 1970s, critically minded psychologists have criticized hybrid nature of Turkish psychology, its alienation to society and validity problems of universalistic assumptions (e.g. Vassaf, 1982). Today, modernizing/westernizing elite have mostly lost their ideological and political pillars. Emancipatory critical psychologies now attract more attention in scientific community than ever. As long as critical psychologists can stand up against the neoliberal ideologies and disciplinary regimes, they will have a better chance to understand and change social reality than what peripheral mainstream psychology can offer to people. It is possible to have some clues about historiography of psychology from countries like Turkey, Iran and China which joined to the world system from the periphery, within the formal structures of old empires. In researching of psychology’s history in Europe, we understand that modernity has a leading role. Similarly, history of psychology in old empires should be thought with a particular reference to their modernization politics. This critical relation of psychology with modernization in these countries is the most important factor in psychology’s history in the peripheral countries. Process of indigenization in these countries can only be understood within this context.
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