196 of evidence and submissions and to the joinder of Mr. Schrems as a notice party to the proceedings. Had it been necessary for me to decide the issue as to whether FBI’s proceedings were an abuse of process or brought for an improper purpose, I would certainly have decided that they were not. 429.
I would go so far as to say that the allegation (which was not a mere tactical plea in
the statement of opposition but was verified on affidavit, addressed in the written submissions and maintained up to and until the end of the third day of the hearing) ought not to have been made and, having been made, ought to have been withdrawn much sooner than it was. I am, of course, not blind to the pressures of complex litigation such as this and to the greatly abbreviated timeframe within which pleadings, affidavits and submissions had to be exchanged. I am prepared to accept that this may well have been a contributory factor to the late withdrawal of the allegation. I will hear further from counsel as to what, if any, consequences should follow from the making and withdrawal of this allegation and from the findings and conclusions set out in this section of my judgment. 25. Summary of Conclusions 430.
In summary, I have reached the following conclusions in this judgment:(1)
I have concluded that the decisions of the DPC on 28th August, 2020 to commence the own volition inquiry under s. 110 of the Data Protection Act, 2018 in respect of FBI’s EU-US data transfers, to issue the Preliminary Draft Decision and to adopt the procedures set out in that document and in the surrounding correspondence are all amenable to judicial review.
(2)
Having reached that conclusion, I have then considered each of the grounds of challenge advanced by FBI in respect of the DPC’s decision and in respect of the procedures adopted by it. FBI did not maintain two of the grounds of challenge. Of the remaining grounds of challenge, I have concluded that those
