10.Resolution of Mr. Schrems Proceedings

if not all, of the information sought in the MHC letter of 29th October, 2020 was at least

potentially relevant and ought to have been provided by the DPC. That does not, however,

mean that the DPC was in breach of its duty of candour and that is an issue which I consider

later in the judgment.

10. Resolution of Mr. Schrems’ Proceedings

104. FBI’s proceedings were listed for hearing to commence on 15th December, 2020. Mr.

Schrems’ proceedings were listed to commence on 13th January, 2021. Mr. Schrems

participated fully as a notice party at the hearing of FBI’s proceedings. Submissions were

made on his behalf both in support of and against some of the grounds advanced by FBI.

Shortly before the hearing of Mr. Schrems’ proceedings were to start on 13th January, 2021, I

was informed that those proceedings had settled, subject to an outstanding issue between the

parties on the question of costs.

105. The terms of settlement were set out in a letter from Philip Lee to ARQ dated 12th

January, 2021. Although not directly relevant to the issues which I have to decide in FBI’s proceedings, the terms on which Mr. Schrems’ proceedings were settled are peripherally

relevant and set out how the DPC intends to proceed, depending on the outcome of FBI’s proceedings. In brief summary, the Philip Lee letter of 12th January, 2021 noted that Mr.

Schrems’ proceedings were resolved, save as to costs, on the following basis:-

(1) In the event that the Court decides in FBI’s proceedings that the DPC can proceed with its own-volition inquiry and, subject to the terms of such orders

as may be made in FBI’s proceedings, the DPC will “advance its handling of

[Mr. Schrems’] complaint and the own-volition inquiry from the point at

which the Court delivers judgment”. It was agreed that each process would be

progressed thereafter “as expeditiously as possible in accordance with [the

DPC’s] obligations under relevant provisions of the GDPR and the 2018 Act”.

(2) If the Court rules that the DPC’s own-volition inquiry may not proceed, or if

the Court rules that it can proceed but an appeal is brought and the Court’s order is stayed pending such appeal, the DPC will nonetheless advance its

handling of Mr. Schrems’ complaint under and by reference to ss. 109 and 113 of the 2018 Act.

(3) If the Court rules that the DPC’s own-volition inquiry may proceed (and the

stay on that inquiry is lifted), the DPC will “hear from” Mr. Schrems in that

inquiry on the terms set out in a letter from Philip Lee to ARQ of 4th

December, 2020. The terms of that letter were reproduced in the Philip Lee

letter of 12th January, 2021. Essentially, Mr. Schrems would be afforded an

opportunity to make submissions to the DPC, initially framed by reference to

the issues set out in the PDD but Mr. Schrems would also be invited to set out

his views in relation to FBI’s submissions in response to the PDD. Mr.

Schrems would also separately retain his right to make submissions as part of

his reformulated complaint. The parties also agreed to certain disclosure

restrictions.

(4) There was an agreement that certain materials exchanged between the DPC

and FBI would be made available to Mr. Schrems on agreed terms.

(5) The parties agreed that the Court would be asked to rule on the issue of costs

in Mr. Schrems’ proceedings once it delivered judgment in FBI’s proceedings. 106. In their written submissions and at the hearing of the proceedings, the DPC and Mr.

Schrems also agreed to reserve their rights to make submissions in response to any arguments

which might be made by FBI at the hearing of Mr. Schrems proceedings concerning

“simultaneous regulatory investigations”. In the event, FBI did not make any oral

submissions on this issue on 13th January, 2021. In light of the terms of settlement agreed