49 if not all, of the information sought in the MHC letter of 29th October, 2020 was at least potentially relevant and ought to have been provided by the DPC. That does not, however, mean that the DPC was in breach of its duty of candour and that is an issue which I consider later in the judgment. 10. Resolution of Mr. Schrems’ Proceedings 104.
FBI’s proceedings were listed for hearing to commence on 15th December, 2020. Mr.
Schrems’ proceedings were listed to commence on 13th January, 2021. Mr. Schrems participated fully as a notice party at the hearing of FBI’s proceedings. Submissions were made on his behalf both in support of and against some of the grounds advanced by FBI. Shortly before the hearing of Mr. Schrems’ proceedings were to start on 13th January, 2021, I was informed that those proceedings had settled, subject to an outstanding issue between the parties on the question of costs. 105.
The terms of settlement were set out in a letter from Philip Lee to ARQ dated 12th
January, 2021. Although not directly relevant to the issues which I have to decide in FBI’s proceedings, the terms on which Mr. Schrems’ proceedings were settled are peripherally relevant and set out how the DPC intends to proceed, depending on the outcome of FBI’s proceedings. In brief summary, the Philip Lee letter of 12th January, 2021 noted that Mr. Schrems’ proceedings were resolved, save as to costs, on the following basis:(1)
In the event that the Court decides in FBI’s proceedings that the DPC can proceed with its own-volition inquiry and, subject to the terms of such orders as may be made in FBI’s proceedings, the DPC will “advance its handling of [Mr. Schrems’] complaint and the own-volition inquiry from the point at which the Court delivers judgment”. It was agreed that each process would be progressed thereafter “as expeditiously as possible in accordance with [the DPC’s] obligations under relevant provisions of the GDPR and the 2018 Act”.
