Guide on Article 8 of the Convention – Right to respect for private and family life
former goalkeeper with the German national football team (see also Egill Einarsson v. Iceland (no. 2), §§ 36-37, and § 39 and the references cited therein).
2. Protection of individual reputation; defamation 180. Reputation is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life (Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], § 83; Chauvy and Others v. France, § 70; Pfeifer v. Austria, § 35; Petrina v. Romania, § 28; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, § 40). 181. In order for Article 8 to come into play, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and be made in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], § 83; Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], § 72; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 76; Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], § 112; Balaskas v. Greece, § 40; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), § 31; Miljević v. Croatia, §§ 61-62; De Carvalho Basso v. Portugal (dec.), § 43). This requirement pertains to both social and professional reputation (Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], § 112). There must also be a sufficient link between the applicant and the alleged attack on his or her reputation (Putistin v. Ukraine, § 40). In cases that concerned allegations of criminal conduct, the Court also took into account the fact that under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, individuals have a right to be presumed innocent of any criminal offence until proven guilty (Jishkariani v. Georgia, § 41). 182. The Court did not find a violation of Article 8 in a case concerning an audiovisual recording which was partly broadcast without the applicant’s consent, because among other things, it criticised the commercial practices in a certain industry, rather than the applicant himself (Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland, § 52). On the other hand, a television report that described the applicant as a “foreign pedlar of religion” constituted a violation of Article 8 (Bremner v. Turkey, §§ 72 and 84). 183. The Court takes into account how well-known an applicant was at the time of the alleged defamatory statements, the extent of acceptable criticism in respect of a public figure being wider than in respect of ordinary citizens, and the subject-matter of the statements (Jishkariani v. Georgia). University professors specialising in human rights appointed as experts by the public authorities, in a public body responsible for advising the Government on human rights issues, could not be compared to politicians who had to display a greater degree of tolerance (Kaboğlu and Oran v. Turkey, § 74). However, indivdiduals who are not public figures may nevertheless expose themselves to journalistic criticism by publicly expressing ideas or beliefs likely to give rise to considerable controversy (Balaskas v. Greece, § 50). A private person can also enter the public domain by virtue of his or association with a public person, and thereby become susceptible to certain exposure, but the domestic courts should exercise a degree of caution where a partner of a public person attracts media attention merely on account of his or her private or family life relations (Dupate v. Latvia, §§ 54-57). 184. The Convention cannot be interpreted to require individuals to tolerate being publicly accused of criminal acts by Government officials, who are expected by the public to possess verifiable information concerning those accusations, without such statements being supported by facts (idem, §§ 59-62). In the same vein, Egill Einarsson v. Iceland, a well-known figure in Iceland had been the subject of an offensive comment on Instagram, an online picture-sharing application, in which he had been called a “rapist” alongside a photograph. The Court held that a comment of this kind was capable of constituting interference with the applicant’s private life in so far as it had attained a certain level of seriousness (§ 52). It pointed out that Article 8 was to be interpreted to mean that even where they had prompted heated debate on account of their behaviour and public comments, public figures should not have to tolerate being publicly accused of violent criminal acts without such statements being supported by facts (§ 52). 185. At the same time, the case-law under Article 8 does not require States as a general rule to provide a right-of-reply procedure for redressing grievances (Gülen v. Turkey (dec.), § 64). In that case, the Court held that the exercise of the right of reply, as stipulated in Turkish law, was part of an ex-
European Court of Human Rights
47/161
Last update: 31.08.2021
