Liberal Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: The Role of the Judiciary, Natural Resource Sector, and Local Government in Consolidating Peace

Sophie Wirzba Edited by Marie Fester & Ashton Connor Mathias

The existence of reforms and programs does not necessarily guarantee the development of positive peace — nowhere is this clearer than in Sierra Leone.

ABSTRACT This paper explores the prospects of consolidating lasting peace in Sierra Leone following the civil war by focusing on the judiciary, natural resource, and local government sectors in Sierra Leone. Liberal peacebuilding reforms in Sierra Leone have created negative peace, but not the positive peace necessary to truly consolidate lasting peace. This paper explains the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding in three sectors by showing how liberal goals of formalization, macroeconomic stability, and decentralization in Sierra Leone fail to address long term injustices. This paper argues that the judiciary, natural resource management, and local government have the potential to contribute to a resurgence of pre-war grievances due to international reforms carried out, but also have the potential to help resolve grievances if reformed with positive peace in mind.

INTRODUCTION

On the surface, the case of Sierra Leone’s 1991-2002 civil war appears to be a rare example of successful post-war peace, which gave rise to a new peacekeeping paradigm of security and development for years to come. 1 However, a closer examination of this case reveals continued corruption, political marginalization, and rent-seeking among other continued grievances, despite copious international peacebuilding efforts following the war. The success of these efforts is largely limited to the achievement of negative peace, rather than lasting positive peacebuilding successes. The narrative of success despite positive peacebuilding failures does not bode well for future or current peacebuilding initiatives looking to follow the model of Sierra Leone, as relapse back into civil war is often common during the peacebuilding process; this paper argues that building positive peace is key to preventing civil war relapses. 2 The inadequate development of positive peace in Sierra Leone is signaled by widespread concern that the root grievances of the conflict have yet to be addressed by liberal peacebuilding efforts, which I explore in the subsequent sections. 3 This paper begins by providing a brief context of the war in Sierra Leone, including an abridged timeline of the war, a description of the combatants, and a summary of emerging international attitudes on post-war peacebuilding at the time of the war. I then describe what constitutes the concepts of negative peace, positive peace, and liberal peacebuilding efforts. Following, I provide a general overview of what role they have played in Sierra Leone’s post-war peacebuilding process. Next, I go into greater depth about the impacts of these efforts on three specific sectors, and how these sectors can be utilized for positive peace construction. First, I discuss how international efforts in judiciary reform have systemically neglected to produce policies that adequately address the significant role of informal justice in Sierra Leone, thereby inadequately addressing pre-war grievances related to this sector. Second, I argue that the recent influx of international aid to Sierra Leone’s natural resource sector has raised expectations for the sector’s productivity and impact on the country’s development disastrously high. By focusing on corporate and government profits, the primarily macroeconomic

agenda of international efforts has neglected the improvement of individual livelihoods it intended to create. Last, I identify the relationship between topdown, internationally-funded efforts to decentralize governance and their impact of fostering elite domination of state services through new institutions of local governance. I find that liberal peacebuilding efforts have failed to adequately address pre-war grievances in Sierra Leone by examining efforts in the judiciary, natural resource, and local government sectors. These liberal-style reforms have failed to produce positive peace to complement and legitimize existing negative peace in Sierra Leone, which I argue is crucial to consolidating lasting peace in Sierra Leone.

CONTEXT

The civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group invaded Sierra Leone, supported by regional groups from Liberia and Burkina Faso. 4 The war ended in January 2002, when the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone declared the war finished. 5 This official ending of the war was largely supported by peacekeeping efforts by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group. 6 The RUF was largely made up of unemployed, threatened, or otherwise troubled youth. 7 The other primary combatant in this conflict was the Sierra Leone Army, however, many other local and regional groups were also involved. 8 The rebel movement was largely rooted in grievances regarding lack of access to services, economic mismanagement, exclusion by elites, and corruption. 9 This conflict was primarily maintained through the exploitation of diamonds and other minerals, which were illegally sold to fund the rebel movement. 10 The Kimberly Process – which certifies the origins of traded diamonds – was designed in response to prevent the sale of diamonds mined to fund violent non-state actors. 11 Many of these innovative solutions were based in emerging perspectives of the 1990s and early 2000s that emphasized the complementarity of security and development, resulting in increased concern for human security in post-conflict management. 12 Importantly, the war in Sierra Leone took place while these perspectives gained international traction. 13 Development actors were attracted to post-conflict Sierra Leone, motivated to work quickly to resolve the conflict, making it ground zero for the testing of new human security paradigms. 14 The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) – created in 1997 during the heyday of the security-development paradigm – would take these new ideas to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone in its £27 million Justice Sector Development Program. 15 This program was aimed at developing and reforming Sierra Leone’s justice sector through various initiatives from 2005- 2011. 16 These efforts included police service training, the establishment of Family Support Units (FSUs) to address domestic violence, and the training of community mediators. 17

NEGATIVE PEACE, POSITIVE PEACE, AND LIBERAL

PEACEBUILDING

Negative peace is defined as the absence of violent conflict. 18 This was achieved in Sierra Leone through the work of peacekeeping missions, however, these did not guarantee long-term civil or peaceful social relations. By contrast, positive peace is a more fluid concept, which entails the development and reform of systems that can take place in the absence of violence to address power asymmetries, marginalization, and poverty. 19 These different forms of peace can often be viewed as interdependent, where positive peace cannot exist without negative peace. Liberal peacebuilding efforts can be present prior to the establishment of negative peace, but the bulk of their objectives typically take place after it has been established. The presence of liberal peacebuilding goals in state-building has greatly increased over the last twenty years, spanning many countries. 20 At its core, liberal peacebuilding can be described as efforts to create a liberal-democratic state, with the “rule of law, protection of human rights, good governance,” and a market economy with limited government intervention in the wake of conflict. 21 While these programs generally claim to desire positive impacts on human security and development, they are typically motivated by the prioritization of macroeconomic development and economic liberalization. 22 This has been described as “Trickle-down peace”, which assumes that that “a lack of violence (negative peace) and an improved macro-economic framework (‘economic peace’) will flow down to the community and individual level, manifesting as increased personal physical, economic, and even food, security.” 23 However, the reality is that these elements of human security and positive peace often do not materialize after the implementation of liberal principles. This is often in part due to their application of a “one size fits all” approach, relying on standardized solutions to complex local problems. 24 International actors often overlook local history and culture in favour of quick-fix securitization and democratization. 25 Such quick-fix policies have been the case in Sierra Leone’s justice sector, which is a bifurcated legal system rooted in colonial policies. 26 In Sierra Leone, the legal system is divided into the high courts which administer English law, while customary law is often administered in local courts and informal settings. 27 This system results in differing experiences and outcomes for participants depending on the type of law applied or court used, which is often ignored by international actors, as is explored in Section IV.

Despite this, it is not the case that all international actors attempting to assist in peacebuilding and postwar reconstruction are completely ignorant of local realities. As I explore through the case of the UK’s DFID program in Section III, the problem is often that awareness of local realities does not necessarily manifest as strong policies that take them into account. 28 Policies also often ignore local informal institutions that are created prior to or during the civil war to fill gaps in state services, despite their demonstrated ability to survive adversity. 29 However, strong positive peace policies are crucial because it is the populations supported by positive peace efforts who provide legitimacy to the institutions which maintain negative peace.

65 McGill Journal of Political Studies | Winter 2020 THE JUDICIARY A 2007 UN Peacebuilding Commission report identified justice sector reform as a key area in which peacebuilding in Sierra Leone was facing serious difficulties. 30 Despite efforts to reform this sector, international actors continue to disregard informal justice mechanisms in policy creation, which has led to little improvement in justice accessibility for disadvantaged communities and demographics. 31 While the actors behind these reform efforts are often aware of the significance of informal justice mechanisms, this awareness is often translated into misguided policies that attempt to formalize the informal. 32 Formalizing the informal entails attempting to codify existing institutions that exist often without written procedural rules (although informal institutions are not without their own forms of structure), appropriating the function of the informal institution and attempting to codify the procedure by which that function is performed. These policies largely represent a shallow understanding of culture and power relations in these communities, which often leads to the reinforcement of barriers and unequal power relations that disadvantaged groups already face. 33 These themes can be largely illustrated by the case of the UK’s Department for International Development’s Justice Sector Development Program, specifically the initiative of FSUs.

On the surface, justice and security sector reform has been moderately successful in the post-war period: police brutality and corruption among police forces has fallen, and new justice initiatives such as Family Support Units to curb the post-war rise in domestic violence were created and have been widely praised. 34 However, the existence of these reforms and programs does not necessarily guarantee their utility or comprehensiveness. Issues with the formal legal system such as “extortion and bribe-taking by officials; insufficient numbers of judges, magistrates, and prosecuting attorneys; absenteeism by court personnel; and inadequate remuneration for judiciary personnel” have not been eradicated according to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 35 The practices of extortion and bribe-taking raise high financial barriers for average citizens to access the system. 36 Rural access to the legal system is also a challenge given few rural branches of the formal courts. 37 Thus, the formal legal system is inaccessible to approximately 70 percent of the population. 38 Inaccessibility of the legal system has existed since the codification of the dual legal system under indirect British colonial rule, as defined in Section III, and have become further entrenched by successive regimes as a tool for elite domination and ethno-legal inequality. 39 Mirroring the formal system is the informal customary system, made up of various types of chiefs, secret societies, and village headmen who lead technically illegal courts where they hear cases and impose fines among other functions. 40 Informal courts can play an important role in allowing disadvantaged and rural groups to access justice. However, this informal system is often discriminatory, with chiefs and secret societies imposing what is viewed as unfair fines and promoting practices that do not prioritize women’s rights. 41 These practices result in grievances among citizens whose only access to the judiciary is through informal mechanisms. 42 In response to the continuation of these conditions following the

war, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission identified judicial reform as a key step to preventing a resurgence of war. 43 A key player in reforming the justice sector has been the UK Department for International Development. For DFID, justice reform funding and technical support have largely focused on the formal system. 44 This is illustrated clearly by a large gap between investment in formal legal action — specifically international criminal prosecutions — and local judiciary needs. 45 While the DFID Justice Sector Development Program (JSDP) did attempt to acknowledge the role of informal actors by engaging with the customary legal system, the context in which it took place exemplifies a priority of international interests in security over the local need for reform and therefore can still be classified under the liberal peacebuilding agenda. 46 While well-intentioned, intervention into the customary system made several missteps with regards to the addressing of pre-war grievances related to this sector. Firstly, DFID only worked the Local Courts. 47 Local Courts are relied upon less than other actors, due to reported barriers to access. 48 The focus on Local Courts led to reforms being implemented in smaller pockets of the customary system, limiting the program’s broader impact across the entire informal system. Consequently, pre-war grievances related to corruption, understaffing, etc, were somewhat addressed, but the key dimension of accessibility was not. 49 The focus on specific actors (Local Courts) also excluded valuable perspectives from chiefs and secret societies, who have their own unique areas of jurisdiction. 50 For example, secret societies often have special significance for women, providing policing which is often related to behavioural standards for women and enforced through customary law. 51 The cultural significance of informal actors like secret societies contributes to many women choosing them as their preferred policing option instead of formal initiatives such as Family Support Units. 52 Neglecting engagement with certain informal actors did a disservice to the JSDP, obscuring them from potentially understanding the specific characteristics and history that make informal institutions useful to many people.

This ties into their second mistake: prioritizing formalizing the informal. The informal system was long preferred for its flexibility and accessibility, both of which are lost through institutionalizing their rules. 53 By approaching the informal system as a second choice alternative to the barriers of the formal system, this program failed to harness the preferable qualities of informal justice. For example, in her book Justice and Security Reform Justice and Security Reform: Development Agencies and Informal Institutions in Sierra Leone, researcher Lisa Denney explains the importance of the involvement of “subjective and personal” attributes in adjudicating cases in rural Sierra Leone. 54 Denney emphasizes that these attributes help in determining the trustworthiness of the defendant and identifying the “interests of the disputing parties”, which allow for foresight on potential repercussions on the community. 55 Neglect for considerations such as these has led to concerns regarding the efficacy and fairness of the judicial sector remaining unaddressed. This exemplifies the tendency of liberal peacebuilding to overlook local cultural nuances, includingaccessibility barriers in Local Courts, which resultantly has failed to address a key pre-war grievance of many Sierra Leoneans. By failing to utilize this sector to create positive peace, development actors have left negative

peace vulnerable.

THE NATURAL RESOURCE SECTOR

Economic grievances played a large role in the rise and perpetuation of the civil war: economic shocks and mismanagement created the downturn of the natural resource economy in the decade prior to the civil war. 56 This downturn left many poor youths without livelihoods, allowing the RUF to attract them to conflict as a means to survive, which only further deteriorated the economy. 57 While some aspects of natural resources’ role in the civil war (specifically illicit exploitation funding the conflict) have been addressed through post-conflict regulation, a recent large influx of external development aid has the potential to reignite pre-war grievances. This is due to two factors: the tendency of this aid to focus on macroeconomic gains rather than improving sustainable livelihoods for locals, and its current trajectory of raising expectations of this sector beyond achievability. Both of these factors may lead to disappointment over unimproved or worsened economic conditions. To provide context to these factors, I will discuss the mining industry and, briefly, agriculture. However, themes like lack of consultation with communities, disregard for power structures, and promotion of exceedingly high expectations are also present in the management of other resources.

The likelihood of the use of diamonds to fund conflict in Sierra Leone was greatly reduced following the civil war, in part through the creation of international diamond origin certification processes such as the Kimberly Process. 58 However, illicit diamond mining still maintains a strong presence in the industry. 59 This has hindered revenue generation from this sector, which is needed by the government to help break its dependency on outside donors and fund neglected basic social services like education and public works projects. 60 Despite the negative impacts of lost government revenue from these practices, many miners have no other options. Sierra Leone lacks a significant manufacturing or service sector, and many youths in Sierra Leone are uneducated, narrowing their remaining options for sustainable livelihoods. 61 The mining industry itself can be prohibitively expensive to enter, with mining licences often multiplying in cost after passing through traditional community leaders and mine officials, making illegal mining attractive. 62 Artisanal mining productivity is also decreasing, lessening total opportunities and therefore increasing economic desperation among youth. 63 International actors have been leading a crackdown on regulations such as these licences, motivated by a desire to reduce the sector’s potential to fund future conflict, for the government of Sierra Leone to have access to this lost revenue to service their debt, and to quickly become a productive player in the international free market. 64 While macroeconomic-focused goals can be valuable for Sierra Leone overall, the execution of these agendas scarcely put a strong enough emphasis on wellbeing-centred policies that are crucial for addressing the pre-war grievances of average Sierra Leoneans through the creation of sustainable livelihoods. Macroeconomic policies also tend to ignore disadvantaged natural resource workers in other ways, typically giving power over operations in

the sector to political elites and mining companies. 65 This arrangement of power in the natural resource sector has historically led to exclusion, corruption, and rent-seeking behaviour by elites, inspiring further discontent with international interventions by those negatively affected. 66 By targeting natural resource sectors for development without addressing the concerns of individuals directly impacted, international actors have disregarded the lived experiences of these Sierra Leoneans. 67 The RUF capitalized on the grievances of unemployed and poor youth, and by failing to provide greater employment options for Sierra Leoneans, the peacebuilding process will not be able to prevent conflict relapse based in these grievances. 68 Both the mining and agricultural sectors are plagued by poorly regulated companies that repeatedly over-promise and under-deliver. 69 These promises fall on eager ears, since the desire for quick and visible progress to jump-start the economy is common in post-conflict societies. 70 High expectations have been further inflated to “near mythic proportions” in Sierra Leone because of the large role natural resources played in funding the conflict. 71 This is also bolstered by how often the potential of this sector is promoted in the discourse of peace in Sierra Leone. Both government and international experts have been accused of “inflating revenue projections to justify resource extraction”, a dangerous practice if these projections cannot be met. 72 Failure to meet expectations can contribute to perceptions of political incompetence and corruption, which could stoke discontent. This was noted in a 2010 assessment by UNEP, which also noted that the civil war had significantly damaged agricultural land and water, undermining the institutional capacity of the sector. 73 This destruction compounded with unsustainable natural resource practices also described by the study may make it even more difficult for the natural resource sector to meet expectations, leading the assessment to warn that many of the risk factors prior to the civil war were not sustainably addressed. 74 While local communities and their leaders often do not have technical experience with the field desired by employers, they should be involved in the consultation process and their concerns incorporated into any project design to incorporate traditional knowledge of land and local economies into the project, and further promote positive peace and sustainable livelihoods. 75 Investment into sustainable and transparent resource practices that consult with both urban and rural communities will not only directly address economic grievances and demands for accountability, but may also help to fund improvements in lacking basic amenities, which also have the potential to undermine unstable negative peace. 76 In the case of the natural resource sector, the desire for this sector to succeed is clear among both local individual Sierra Leoneans, as well as larger, often international actors. However, heightened regulation of artisanal miners without investment in alternative livelihood options for miners who are excluded from the sector does not address the economic grievances that drove the conflict. The frustrations of these excluded miners are compounded when they are within the context of an unfulfilled promise of economic prosperity by corporations and the government. This has left these individuals vulnerable to manipulation

by rebel groups as was seen prior to the war in Sierra Leone, threatening Sierra Leone’s negative peace.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

In this section, I examine how liberal local government reform aiming to promote government decentralization since the civil war has solidified elite domination of both preexisting and new institutions within rural communities. Before the civil war, there was an overwhelming sentiment that rural communities were being neglected by the government, as was evidenced by large disparities in state spending. 77 This was in part due to lack of access to the judicial sector and state services, as well as the subjugation of young men to the commands of rural chiefs, who were not subject to any central government oversight. However, postwar reforms aimed at the decentralization of state services have given control over these services corrupt rural elites, giving rise to new grievances regarding rural governance. To provide context to these pre and post-war grievances, I largely discuss the chieftaincy system as the primary mechanism of local government, as well as Local Councils implemented through post-war reforms.

Disparities in the provision of state services to Freetown versus the rest of Sierra Leone has existed since colonialism, however, it is a particularly salient issue in the context of the civil war. 78 Lack of access to state services to young people was a contributing factor to the civil war, as noted by an Overseas Development Institute Report, saying, ‘‘the more considered view is that years of government neglect of education and other state services have helped to create a large cohort of unemployed and barely literate young people, easily conscripted by both political and criminal organizations.” 79 The post-war objective of decentralization aims to address rural service deficiencies by dispersing these state-provided services —typically concentrated in Freetown— across the nation, providing opportunities through the development of the education, healthcare, and sanitation sectors. However, corrupt and imbalanced local government can be an obstacle to this, as colonially-entrenched financial practices of unpaid ‘community work’ among others contributes to the disproportionate accumulation of wealth by chiefs and other wealthy elites. 80 Chiefs and other elites often manipulate their role’s functions to maintain their status, despite the unfavourable odds of their geographic location, often at the expense of their constituents trying to escape the cycle of rural poverty. 81 In the case of education, chiefs will use their inflated funds from corrupt practices to send their children to school, which in turn gives their children, and therefore their whole family, an advantage over the rest of the poor rural youth. 82 This cycle of poverty and elite privilege in public services has only been solidified by the fact that IMF spending caps have prevented the expansion of education. This has allowed elites to maintain an edge over the rest of the population, taking advantage of the zero-sum nature of the system under these caps. 83 Elite privilege is not only constrained to accessing traditional state services but also is prevalent among social relations as well. However, these social privileges also contribute to local governance being built on financial inequality between the rural poor and the elite, which have been able to flourish without central

government oversight and monitoring. This is specifically exhibited through the use of women as social and political currency by chiefs and wealthy men. 84 Wealthy men are able to buy women through bride prices and dowries, holding these women over the heads of the non-wealthy young men who cannot afford the steep bride prices set by elites. These men are either forced to pay the elevated dowry or make “heavy commitments” to obtain a bride, an important form of social capital for many. 85 This practice serves two functions: further reinforcing the financial power imbalance between elites and non-elites (further constraining access to state services), and maintaining a cultural dependence on chiefs to administrate these traditional marriage laws and customs. The combined cultural and financial dimensions of this power imbalance make it particularly resilient, because of its capability to breed both resentment and dependence, making reform incredibly complex. 86 The existing power imbalance over access to state services gives local elites the incentive and means to capture decision-making power in new donor-funded Local Councils (LCs). 87 Elite capture occurs when “elites control, shape or manipulate decision-making processes, institutions, or structures in ways that serve their self-interests and priorities, typically resulting in personal gain at the expense of non-elite and community.” 88 LCs were implemented to perform some of the functions that the chiefs were traditionally looked at as providing, as the chieftaincy’s actual functioning capacity has greatly diminished over the past 30-40 years. 89 LCs were created by the 2004 Local Government Act which had strong backing from international donors, who anticipated the councils to fill a much-needed gap in local government functions. 90 However, this eager attempt at quick-fix decentralization greatly underestimated the resilience of power relations in these communities. The concentration of new responsibilities and powers in LCs provided a tantalizing new opportunity for chiefs and elites to leverage their existing asymmetrical power to further strengthen their positions. Given that LCs now control much of the revenue that funds the Chieftaincy system, councils were primarily viewed as upgrades in power, rather than better opportunities to provide services to their communities. 91 International backers of reforming and improving local governance oversimplified the problem of local power relations, assuming that the creation of new democratic and local institutions would automatically result in an effective and representative system, a similar issue seen with judicial access in Section IV. However, the issue is not that the existing institutions would be preferable to the new liberal ones, it is that the nature of the new institutions leaves them vulnerable to capture by the same elites the reforms try to sideline. 92 While the exact structure and future of decentralization is still widely debated, it is essential for the government of Sierra Leone as well as involved international actors to put mitigating elite capture and promoting transparency of these institutions at the forefront of this movement. 93 Accordingly, in 2011, a new Decentralization Policy was adopted by the government of Sierra Leone attempting to attempt to address these issues. 94 However, issues such as aid volatility, detection of elite capture, and high expectations of these LCs peacebuilding capacity of international actors remain largely unaddressed. 95 Until these issues are prioritized by the gov-

ernment and the international actors invested in decentralization, the prevalent policies to increase the functions of local government are doing less than is likely necessary to promote positive peace and thereby successfully avoid a resurgence pre-war power asymmetries and abuses. If these issues are not addressed, they will continue to threaten negative peace.

CONCLUSION This paper illustrated how liberal peacebuilding efforts have failed to adequately promote positive peace, thereby neglecting an important aspect to stabilization and consolidating peace. This is largely due to the creation of policies that failed to acknowledge and incorporate the importance of local realities, and that over-focus on macroeconomic policy rather than individual livelihoods. Furthermore, these areas need to be prioritized by peacebuilding efforts to adequately address and remedy the pre-war grievances that may otherwise resurface, and that these themes are not specific to Sierra Leone, but to liberal peacebuilding. In Sierra Leone, focus on the formal judicial system has failed to account for the financial barriers many people face when trying to access justice, as well as cultural preferences for the specific structure of the informal system. The natural resource sector has become a false beacon of hope for many Sierra Leoneans, with expectations that mining and agriculture will provide jobs for the unemployed youth that were center stage throughout the civil war. However, a massive influx of liberal aid has set expectations catastrophically high, which may reproduce the dissatisfaction that played a role in leading to the civil war. This may also be encouraged by the decline in artisanal mining and the rise of corrupt private companies, which assist in the liberal goal of bolstering the industry to pay back war debt but do little for local ex-combatants that need jobs. Finally, disregard for deeply entrenched cultural power imbalances has left newly institutionalized Local Councils vulnerable to elite capture, further solidifying elite vs. non-elite power imbalances. These institutions will continue to crystallize these relations by providing elites with greater access to resources and power. Liberal peacebuilding efforts in the judiciary, natural resource, and local government sectors in Sierra Leone have failed to adequately address pre-war grievances of largely rural individuals. Thus, reforms have failed to produce positive peace to complement and legitimize negative peace in Sierra Leone, which is crucial to consolidating lasting peace.

NOTES 1 Lisa Denney, Justice and Security Reform : Development Agencies and Informal Institutions in Sierra Leone. Law, Development and Globalization, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 19. 2 George Frederick Willcoxon, “Why Do Countries Relapse into War? Here Are Three Good Predictors.” The Washington Post. WP Company, March 29, 2017. 3 Richard Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone.”, African Affairs 105, no. 418 (2006): 30. 4 Mary Kaldor and James Vincent, Case Study Sierra Leone: Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries, (United Nations Development Program Evaluation Office, 2006). 5. 5 Kaldor and Vincent, Case Study Sierra Leone, 8. 6 James Dobbins, Laurel E. Miller, Stephanie Pezard, Christopher S. Chivvis, Julie E. Taylor, Keith Crane, Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, and Tewodaj Mengistu. „Sierra Leone“ In Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building, 151-78, (RAND Corporation, 2013), 160.

7 Witness to Truth - Volume Two (Chapter 2: Findings).” Sierra Leone TRC. 40. 8 Dobbins et al., “Sierra Leone”, 153. 9 Witness to Truth - Volume Two (Chapter 2: Findings).” Sierra Leone TRC. Accessed April 12, 2019. 30-31. 10 UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Assessment; Technical Report, February 2010, Switzerland, Geneva, 22. 11 UNEP, Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Assessment, 14. 12 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 21. 13 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 21. 14 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 21. 15 British Council, “Justice Sector Development Programme.”, British Council. Accessed February 29, 2020. 16 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 22. 17 British Council, “Justice Sector Development Programme.”. 18 David Curran and Tom Woodhouse. “Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: What Can Africa Contribute?”, International Affairs 83, no. 6 (2007): 1055. 19 Curran and Woodhouse, “Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Le- one”, 1055. 20 Stein Sundst⊘L Eriksen, “The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State Building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (2009): 205. 21 Eriksen, “The Liberal Peace Is Neither”, 213. 22 Joseph Hanlon, “Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Preconditions for War in Sierra Leone?” The Round Table 94, no. 381 (2005): 459-72. 463. 23 Carla Castañeda, “How Liberal Peacebuilding May Be Failing Sierra Leone.” Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 120 (2009): 236-237. 24 Eriksen, “The Liberal Peace Is Neither”, 211. 25 Eriksen, “The Liberal Peace Is Neither”, 211. 26 Edward Sawyer, “Remove or Reform? A Case for (Restructuring) Chiefdom Governance in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone.” African Affairs 107, no. 428 (2008): 393. 27 Sawyer, “Remove or Reform?”, 393. 28 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 96. 29 Pierre Englebert and Denis M Tull. “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas About Failed States.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 106-39. 119. 30 Curran and Woodhouse, “Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone”, 1060-1061. 31 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 95. 32 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 112. 33 Mohamed Sesay, “Hijacking the Rule of Law in Postconflict Environments.” European Journal of International Security 4, no. 1 (2018): 41-60. 34 Lisa Denney, “Reducing Poverty with Teargas and Batons: The Security-Development Nexus in Sierra Leone.” African Affairs 110, no. 439 (2011): 285. 35 Christine Cubitt, “Responsible Reconstruction after War: Meeting Local Needs for Building Peace.” Review of International Studies 39, no. 1 (2013): 102. 36 Cubitt, “Responsible Reconstruction after War”, 102. 37 Cubitt, “Responsible Reconstruction after War”, 102. 38 Sesay, “Hijacking the Rule of Law in Postconflict Environments.”, 10. 39 Sesay, “Hijacking the Rule of Law in Postconflict Environments.”, 13. 40 Sawyer, “Remove or Reform?”, 393. 41 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 76. 42 Cubitt, “Responsible Reconstruction after War”, 102. 43 Cubitt, “Responsible Reconstruction after War”, 102. 44 Sesay, “Hijacking the Rule of Law in Postconflict Environments.”, 12. 45 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 96. 46 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 96. 47 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 109. 48 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 107. 49 Dobbins et al., “Sierra Leone”, 166. 50 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 109-110. 51 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 87. 52 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 87.

53 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 112. 54 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 113. 55 Denney, Justice and Security Reform, 113. 56 Dobbins et al., “Sierra Leone”, 158. 57 Dobbins et al., «Sierra Leone”, 158. 58 Michael D. Beevers, “Governing Natural Resources for Peace: Lessons from Liberia and Sierra Leone.” Global Governance 21, no. 2 (2015): 227-46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24526163. 241 59 Sigismond A. Wilson, “Sierra Leone’s Illicit Diamonds: The Challenges and the Way For- ward.” GeoJournal 76, no. 3 (2011): 191-212. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41148450. 192. 60 David Jensen and Stephen Lonergan, Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. (London: Routledge, 2012), 645. 61 Jensen and Lonergan, Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 644. 62 Wilson, “Sierra Leone’s Illicit Diamonds”, 199. 63 UNEP, Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Assessment, 60. 64 Cubitt, “Responsible Reconstruction after War”, page 109. 65 Beevers, “Governing Natural Resources for Peace: Lessons from Liberia and Sierra Le- one.”, 236. 66 Beevers, “Governing Natural Resources for Peace”, 236. 67 Beevers, “Governing Natural Resources for Peace”, 231. 68 Beevers, “Governing Natural Resources for Peace”, 231. 69 Jensen and Lonergan, Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 650. 70 UNEP. Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Assessment. 57. 71 UNEP. Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Assessment. 57. 72 Beevers, “Governing Natural Resources for Peace”, 239. 73 UNEP. Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Assessment. 45. 74 Jensen and Lonergan, Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 644. 75 UNEP. Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Assessment. 70. 76 UNEP. Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Assessment. 60. 77 Cubitt, “Responsible Reconstruction after War: Meeting Local Needs for Building Peace.”, 97. 78 Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace”, 40. 79 Hanlon, “Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Preconditions for War in Sierra Leone?”, 460. 80 Sawyer, “Remove or Reform?”, 390. 81 Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace”, 33. 82 Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace”, 33. 83 Hanlon, “Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Preconditions for War in Sierra Leone?”, 461. 84 Sawyer, “Remove or Reform?”, 391. 85 Sawyer, “Remove or Reform?”, 391. 86 Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace”, 32. 87 Melissa T. Labonte, “From Patronage to Peacebuilding? Elite Capture and Governance from Below in Sierra Leone.” African Affairs 111, no. 442 (2012): 95. 88 Labonte, “From Patronage to Peacebuilding?”, 91. 89 Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace”, 34. 90 Sawyer, “Remove or Reform?”, 401. 91 Labonte, “From Patronage to Peacebuilding?”, 102. 92 Fanthorpe, “On the Limits of Liberal Peace”, 45. 93 Labonte, “From Patronage to Peacebuilding?”, 98. 94 Labonte, “From Patronage to Peacebuilding?”, 113. 95 Labonte, “From Patronage to Peacebuilding?”, 113.