Games of Thrones: The US and Russia’s Intervention in Syria’s Civil War From 2011-Present

Bo Peter Zhang Edited by Stefan Rookwood

It is all too unfortunate that the two powers must establish their interests atop corpses who died for Syria’s peace…

The Syrian civil war is arguably one of the bloodiest conflicts the 21 st

century has seen. Much of its geopolitical complexity lies in the added involvement of great foreign powers in the region. This paper will explore three motives that drove the United States and Russia’s intervention in Syria. The first is external, or reasons driven by Washington and Moscow’s strategic interests on the international stage beyond their own borders. The second is internal, or how the two powers’ intervention in Syria had direct ramifications on their domestic politics, such as electoral success. Finally, an assessment of the two powers’ rivalling relationship in the conflict will be considered. It would, of course, be too naïve to assume that these three factors alone shaped the United States and Russia’s intervention in the region. These three factors would appear to have been the chief instigators behind the two great powers’ attempt to both prolong and evolve what was once a Syrian conflict into a conflict of global scale, so as to pursue and satisfy their own agendas in the international “game of thrones.”

INTRODUCTION 2 020 marks the 9 th year of Syria’s civil war. 1 Today, there is no consensus on its fate. Some sources speculate the conflict will end soon, while others, claim that it has ended already. In any case, a conflict that began in March 2011 with peaceful protests for rights and reform as a part of the Arab Spring movement has since transformed into one of the most violent confrontations in the post-Cold War Middle East. 3 When pro-democracy demonstrations broke out in the Syrian city of Deraa in March 2011, protestors knew little of the repression they would soon face. In the wake of the toppling of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria quickly ordered his forces to crush domestic dissent to prevent suffering a similar fate. Within weeks, Assad’s forces killed and imprisoned thousands of demonstrators, whom he declared “terrorists of the state.” 4 Consequently, protests demanding the president’s resignation erupted nationwide. As the tension between the government and civil society boiled, calls for overthrowing Assad also grew. Both sides began deploying ever more radical and violent methods, marking the start of a civil war that was to last until the time of writing.

In the early days of 2011, few anticipated that a civil war between Assad’s regime and local rebels in Syria would escalate into a conflict in which international powers, especially the US and Russia, vied for power. Indeed, what was once a Syrian civil war has morphed into a conflict of global dimensions. Three factors, in particular, help to explain American and Russian interventions in the conflict. The first factor to consider is the two powers’ external motives, or reasons driven by Washington and Moscow’s strategic interests on the international stage beyond their own borders. Second, their internal motives, or how the two powers’ intervention in Syria directly impacted their domestic politics. Finally, an assessment of the two power’s rivalling relationship amid the conflict will be considered. It becomes evident that the US and Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war was a deliberate attempt to prolong the conflict, in order to pursue and

wipe out its bases in the region. This counter-terrorism view became more overt in 2017 when President Trump declared that the US has “very little to do with Syria other than killing IS.” 13 In any case, the US’s support for these local groups was not futile, insofar as its own goals were considered. In particular, its work with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), consisting mainly of Kurdish fighters called YPG, was relatively successful. Since the SDF’s founding in 2015, the US had dropped countless tons of arms and ammunition from assault rifles to mortars, as well as advisors from the US Special Forces to SDF bases, under General J. Votel’s command. 14 Indeed, the SDF became one of the most effective forces that helped defeat the IS in north-eastern Syria.

In contrast to the US, Russia has, since Cold War days, had a “political base” in Syria – a historic presence that is maintained through Kremlin’s ties to Assad’s security elite. In fact, the Carnegie Moscow Center scholar, Alexey Malashenko, reflected that Syria-Russia relationship is “the last remnant of Soviet politics in the Middle East.” 15 Despite their historic tie, Moscow did not clarify its support for Assad until mid-2015. Still, Russian support for Assad’s regime has always been present, if only implicitly. Even when Russia supported the US-led UN resolution demanding that “Assad relieve Syria of chemical weapons,” it was in reality “an escape valve” for Assad’s regime to avoid a punishing blow initially suggested by the US. 16 Thus, what exactly were Russia’s external motives for intervening in Syria’s civil war? This paper focuses on two aspects: military strategy and arms sale – both factors rooted in “Russia satisfying its own global stage perception.” 17 To start, because of their historic tie, President Assad is one of Russia’s closest, and perhaps Russia’s only real ally in the Middle East. Therefore, a regime change following Assad’s downfall, as advocated by the US, would critically damage Russia’s interests in the region as it would lose its key foothold in the region. 18 In terms of military strategy, Russia would lose Tartus, its only port in the Mediterranean. This would, according to Russia’s Interfax-AVN military news agency, limit its “options for the continuous presence of Russian [naval operations] in more distant oceans.” 19 To confirm how vital the port was to Moscow’s interests in the region, in 2017, Russia and Syria signed agreements to “indefinitely prolong” Moscow’s control of the strategic port. 20 This meant Russia would hold sovereignty over the territory, which would only further justify and legitimize its intervention in the region.

The second external motive for Russian intervention lies in its arms trade interests in Syria. Between 2007 and 2011, Russia supplied Syria with 72 per cent of its arms imports. 21 The exact supply since the start of the civil war is unknown, but an increase should be expected. These arms deals, according to Sorenson, are “more about strategic allegiance and perceived political dependence and less about profit.” 22 Rather than a sign of weakness, the deals were an effective strategy that subjected Syria more tightly under the Russian sphere of influence. Not only did these arms deals keep a Middle Eastern doorway open for Russia, but they also enhanced the perceived client-patron relationship between Syria and Russia. 23 Of course, such a relationship is possible only if Assad’s regime remains intact. This, too, justifies the greater presence of Russian

satisfy their own agendas in the international “game of thrones.”

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA’S EXTERNAL MOTIVES In regard to the United States,the Obama administration, in 2011, tried to “stay out” or “minimize” its role in Syria. The Obama Administration believed that an extensive military intervention would pose a threat to both the current balance of power in the region and the US’s own positioning on the global stage. 5 This attitude is best reflected through American decision-makers’ attempt to learn from the mistakes of its 2003 invasion of Iraq. According to a Foreign Policy piece written in 2018, which assessed Washington’s psychology at the start of the war:

Many [policymakers] looked at the 2003 invasion of Iraq and decried how it destabilized the region, damaged relations with Washington’s allies, and [undermined] the U.S. position in the region. It seems lost on the same group that U.S. inaction in Syria did the same. 6 For the US, it was clear from the beginning that the Syrian situation presented a dilemma: interfering may lead to another Iraqi fiasco, while staying away meant it was going to watch regional instability escalate. Either choice would have undoubtedly spoiled relations with America’s regional allies, diminishing its influence in the region and on the global stage. In any case, this dilemma, which followed from the Iraqi lesson, helps to clarify the US’s inaction early on in the civil war. This political impasse was all to change in two years.

US military intervention in Syria began in 2013 in the wake of Assad’s use of chemical weapons. 7 Cruise missile strikes against Assad’s territories were carried out shortly thereafter. After the attack, President Obama told CNN in an interview that what he has “seen [is of grave concern], something that is going to require America’s attention… it’s getting to some core national interests that the US has.” 8 While Obama did not specify these “core national interests,” his reaction revealed that the US’s intervention would be, at least in part, motivated by its own gains. Even if the US’s missile attacks signalled its condemnation for Assad’s violation of human rights, by 2013, the US’s external motive for intervening shifted to containing the Islamic State’s influence in the region as the Islamic State took control of “large swaths of territory and has taken the war into Iraq.” 9 Other than its usual airstrikes, the US funded local rebel groups, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA). 10 Simultaneously, the US Department of Defence and CIA began recruiting Syrian fighters for their own ends. The New Syrian Army was created as a result. 11 The local recruits were explicitly told that their objective was “not to topple the Assad regime but to fight only the jihadi groups like the IS forces.” 12 Behind the US’s conflicting interest with local fighters, Washington’s true motive for intervening in Syria is again emphasized: to contain, first and foremost, the Islamic State’s influence in the region, as opposed to aiding its people for humanitarian or democratic regime change purposes. This is not to say that the latter is to be dismissed as a viable motive entirely, but simply that it was of lesser consideration than the former when confronted with the realpolitik of the day. Indeed, the US’s focus in Syria has henceforth been to defeat ISIS on the battlefield and

operations in Syria in contrast to the US. More specifically, through this connection, Russia gained influence over Syria’s military sectors. According to Matthew Crosston, a professor at Brown University, “Moscow hopes to bind Damascus to its own military-industrial complex. Russia wants to move beyond simply reequipping Syria’s missile defence systems and instead become the foundation for the country’s missile umbrella.” 24 It becomes evident, then, that Moscow plans to be Damascus’s sponsor on the international stage, thereby becoming Assad’s “indispensable friend.” 25 In any case, the Syrian arms trade was crucial in shaping Moscow’s decision-making. Roy Allison, an Oxford political scientist, takes this claim further, suggesting that Putin presents himself as the “cheerleader-in-chief” for the recent rise in Russia’s share of global arms sales. 26 Naturally, Russia’s military cooperation with Syria helps perfect the picture of Putin’s Russia as a “reliable” arms supplier. Above all, this military alliance is an assertion of Russian dominance in the Middle East.

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA’S INTERNAL MOTIVES

By turning to the US and Russia’s internal motives, or more specifically, their domestic-driven interests to intervene in the Syrian crisis, it becomes evident that both powers had their national audiences in mind. At the onset of the Arab Spring in late 2010, the US’s foreign policy in the Middle East was, broadly speaking, “moderate.” 27 In the words of then-Secretary of State John Kerry, this meant that the US supported regimes “defined by [their] adherence [to] democratic process and to an all-inclusive, minority-protecting constitution.” 28 Thus, in light of Assad’s crackdown on protestors, the US quickly promised to the international community its commitment to making the Syrian president step down. The US, however, did little to “walk the walk,” due to the myriad risks associated with intervention. 29 So, what were the US’s internal motives for its initial reluctance to intervene in the Syrian crisis? Why did the US step up its role as the crisis escalated? The answer to this first question has a simpler answer: the US, as discussed in its external motive earlier, feared another Iraqi fiasco.

Moreover, domestically, Washington was aware that most American taxpayers would be unwilling to spend money on yet another “bloody and unwinnable conflict.” 30 If anything, a second military campaign of Iraq’s scale would have been even less popular with voters, as there was no homeland attack (9/11) as a precursor to justify America’s direct involvement in Syria. This inaction displayed by the US is plausible, considering there was also an internal motive – or rather, need – for President Obama to fulfill his campaign promise to reduce military involvement in the Middle East. Up to this point, containment policies – or strategies to stop the expansion of the conflict – have been the preferred method for Syria. According to Daniel Byman, a fellow at the Brooking Institute, containment was far less “costly than aggressive options like direct intervention.” 31 Additionally, the containment policy did not require a large-scale military presence, which was precisely what Obama had in mind to fulfill his campaign promise. In any case, the initial reluctance that the US had towards Syrian intervention was internally motivated to appeal to its domestic population, the Americans voters. America’s unusual indifference to the Syrian changed by August 2013, when

it launched missiles against Assad’s regime in response to his use of chemical weapons. 32 It would appear as though this military intervention in Syria contradicted Obama’s earlier pledge to reduce military activity in the region. In reality, this was a calculated move on Washington’s part. Here, the US’s rhetoric, one that is centred around countering humanitarian concerns and rights violations under Assad’s regime, could be seen as an instrument to legitimize intervention in Syria. After all, if the US government was doing its part to relieve mass-refugee flows and internal displacement in an embattled country, it would receive some praise among its voters.Upon hindsight, it might have even helped in raising Obama’s approval ratings. Still, this may seem yet another excuse for the US to intervene in the conflict, similar to the way in which it legitimized the invasion of Iraq in 2003. There are fundamental differences between Iraqi and Syrian interventions, however. Contrary to the revenge-oriented rhetoric in the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq, here, the US is trying to play the role of “global police” so as to both restore peace for Syria, and more crucially, “kill IS.” 33 Still, in both settings, American rhetoric to help embattled Syria and salvage its population was designed for domestic audiences in order to justify its internal motives for intervention.

Meanwhile, on the Russian side, there were strong speculations that Russia’ s pro-Assad position in the Syrian crisis reflects “instrumental concerns about state cohesion within Russia domestically and its near neighbourhood.” 34 It is out of this consideration for domestic politics, more than any deep solidarity with the Syrian leadership, that has maintained Moscow’s alignment with Damascus. 35 The most obvious motive among these internal, domestic concerns was resisting Islamic terrorism. Since the early days of Syria’s civil war in 2011, Russian officials have justified their position in the crisis as a “bulwark of international and regional order” against the potential spread of transnational Islamist networks. 36 Here, the term “transnational” provides insight into Russia’s internal motive. According to the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mouallem, speaking at a conference with his Russian counterpart, Lavrov, in 2013, “one of al-Qaeda’s branches is conducting the main combat actions in Syria and it has brought into Syria militants from places including Chechnya.” This was the very place where Russia launched a war against, in the 1999-2009 Chechen War, in an attempt to suppress its separatist tendency. 37 In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood became viewed by Moscow as a terrorist organization precisely because of its supposed role in the North Caucasus during the Chechen war. This fear that Islamist influence might once again threaten Russian control over its North Caucasus region only adds credibility to Moscow’s incentive to contain Islamist violence in Syria. This view helps to explain Russian intervention as a means to secure its own domestic stability. Still, non-Russian political commentators from the West speculate about the extent to which this was an indispensable motive behind Moscow’s intervention. For example, Fiona Hill, the Foreign Affairs writer-turned-presidential advisor wrote an article in March 2013, entitled, “The real reason Putin supports Assad: mistaking Syria for Chechnya,” in which she stated that Russia was merely using terrorism as an excuse to secure its only political base in the Middle East, as established earlier in this paper. 38 If this were true – which is impossible

to determine with certainty – then it would, ironically, be similar to the American rhetoric deployed to justify its own intervention in Syria.

Beyond the terrorism-induced motive to intervene, two other civil motives also played a role in shaping Russia’s intervention in Syria: the Orthodox Church and Russian citizens living in Syria. Many Russian politicians have claimed that Putin was heavily influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church, which in turn lends support to Kremlin. 39 Since the beginning of the civil war, the Church feared that Syrian Christians, “most of whom are Orthodoxy, would be persecuted if Islamist factions came to power in Syria.” 40 This is convincing speculation, as it aligns with Russia’s hardline approach towards Islamists of any faction. The second civil factor concerns Russian citizens living in Syria. In 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov claimed that there were “several tens of thousands of Russian citizens living in Syria who were unable to evacuate [amid] the civil war.” 41 Not only were they mostly married to Syrians, but about half of these Russian citizens living in Syria supported the opposition, according to the Kremlin. 42 This means that the failure to protect its own nationals in foreign spaces would weaken Putin’s popular, hardline image and credibility before the Russian public.

US-RUSSIA RELATION IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Finally, it is essential to assess American-Russian relations amid their intervention in Syria’s civil war. In comparison, Russia undoubtedly had a greater stake in Syria than the US. Crosston asserts that Syria was Russia’s only real ally in the Middle East, making it arguably more heavily invested in Syria. 43 In fact, Russia’s stakes were so high that it would even compromise its already tense relations with the US. For example, when the US called for a regime change in Syria at the UN in 2011, Russia was the only member to veto this US-led resolution. 44 In February, 2012, Russia vetoed yet another “strongly worded draft resolution” to depose Assad in opposition to all 13 other Security Council members, with the exception of China. 45 Russia’s justification for vetoing, according to Foreign Minister Lavrov, was that relying on foreigners to help countries overthrow regimes was dangerous and contagious, and would ultimaelty be “an invitation to a whole array of civil wars.” 46 Both acts of vetoing served as a direct confrontation against the US on the international stage, adding a subtle layer of Cold War proxy rivalry between the two great powers.

Beyond the word battles, however, it was clear from the start that the two powers shared polar opposite views regarding Syria’s fate. When the Arab Spring first broke out in Syria, the American media portrayed the situation as a “groundswell of grassroots democratic ideals,” while Russia viewed it as a threat, to the extent of “a potential Great Islamist Revolution,” according to one Kremlin spokesperson. 47 Further, when Putin met with Obama in 2012, he had apparently justified authoritarianism and scoffed at democracy promotion in the Middle East. 48 It is no wonder, then, when reporters like Alexander Golts of Moscow Times argued that “Putin identifies with Assad… He is firmly convinced that democracy, the rule of law and human rights are all [but] contrivances that allow the West to control weaker nations.” 49

Nonetheless, despite its stakes at hand, Russia shared the US’s commitment to counter terrorism. Indeed, this paper has provided plentiful evidence regarding both powers’ willingness to combat the Islamic State. It is crucial to note, however, that Russia takes a broader view of what it considers to be terrorists than does the US, which, in turn, reignites the old ideological battle between the US and Russia in terms of what constitutes as the “enemy of the state.” Their respective definitions would be leveraged as weapons of ideological warfare against their intended targets; in this case, against each other. Russia is more inclined to Assad’s definition of terrorists, essentially any armed groups which oppose his regime, in contrast to the US or UN definition, consisting of mainly the IS and Al-Qaeda. 50 Naturally, Russia did not welcome the US’s support for local rebels such as FSA and SDF. President Putin’s spokesman, Dmitri Peskov, even commented that American action to support local rebels “created a serious obstacle for building an international coalition to fight it and to effectively resist this universal evil,” – by which he meant terrorism according to Russia’s standard. 51 Of course, the US did not share Russia’s view on this so-called “universal” evil; after all, it considered only the IS and Al-Qaeda – and not local rebels who opposed Assad – as its targets. Regardless of their various motives and rhetoric for justifying their intervention in Syria’s civil war, one final view was held true for both the US and Russia: Syria was just a “temporary place for [them] to fight. They have little interest in ceasing to kill and destroy, as Syria was not their country, and thus their mere presence mostly contributed to the intractability of the conflict.” 52 What Sorenson does not consider here is the subtle implication that Syria was not just a temporary place for them to fight the rebels, but fight each other, as the two great powers compete for international influence in proxy-lands. Indeed, Syria was no more than a chessboard on which the two powers competed for their own gains, whether on the international stage or within their domestic sphere.

CONCLUSION In sum, amid the chaos of the Syrian civil war, the United States and Russia played pivotal roles in shaping the conflict it has become today. Whether or not American and Russian foreign intervention in the Syrian Civil war was a deliberate attempt to prolong the conflict so as to satisfy their own agendas is of course open to debate. The three factors considered in this paper – the two powers’ internal, external motives and their relationship to each other – provides some theoretical ground for arguing that this is indeed the case. While it is all too unfortunate that the two powers must establish their interests atop corpses who died for Syria’s peace, spectators ranging from world leaders to students of politics have much to learn from the lessons of the US and Russia’s interventions in Syrian civil war. After all, those who forget history are condemned to repeat it.

NOTES 1 BBC News, “Syria Profile – Timelines,” BBC News, January 2019. 2 The Economist. The Economist Newspaper. Accessed February 20, 2020. 2 3 Daniel Byman, “Containing Syria’s chaos,” The National Interest, No. 140, December 2015, 30.

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