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https://archive.org/details/elementsofethicOOmuir
THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS BY JOHN
H.
MUIRHEAD,
LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL IHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED (NEW IMPRESSION)
LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, 1906
W.
PRINTED BY HAZE LL, WATSON AND VINEY, LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
PREFACE. THIS manual has been written with a to the wants first
and
difficulties
of students.
instance, the substance of
course of lectures.
special
it
In the
was given
Though attempting
view
to
in
a
deal
with the most recent phases of ethical problems, it
does not profess to treat them in an original
manner, but merely to apply to their solution ideas which, owing to the labours of the best thinkers
time and country, are now common Those of my readers who are acquainted with the course of modern thought in the field of Moral Philosophy will readily recognise the debt I owe to Kant and Hegel in Germany, and their
of our
own
property.
most distinguished exponents, T. H. Green and Professor
those
who
Edward
Caird, in
best hope in writing this if
they are stimulated by
to these
Great Britain.
are as yet beginners in philosophy,
manual it
will
For
my
be realised
to apply themselves
and other perennial sources of philosophic
inspiration.
viii
Preface
who
Students
are
familiar
nental literature on the subject
the absence of of
Wundt,
The
with recent Conti-
may be
to the ethical writings
all allusion
Steinthal, Paulsen, Hoffding,
and
others.
reason of this omission, as well as of the general
character of the references, has been to
surprised at
burden a book which
is
meant
my
desire not
for a special class
of English readers with references to authors to
whom
may
they
not have ready access.
In the preparation of these sheets for the press, besides the assistance
Editor of this obligations
to
series,
Mr.
proof,
proof
and whose I
have to acknowledge
my
S.
Mackenzie, of Trinity
who
read the whole of the
J.
College, Cambridge,
have obtained from the
I
I
criticisms
upon portions of the But my chief
found extremely valuable.
who read my manuscript and made many help-
thanks are due to Miss M. the whole of
ful suggestions,
S. Gilliland,
both as to the matter and the form
of treatment.
London, January,
1892.
;
PREFACE TO THE SECOND
EDITION.
In preparing a second edition of the Elements of Ethics,
I
should have preferred to re- write the whole
but, besides other obvious reasons,
me
it
was pointed
had already been accepted as a text-book considerable inconvenience would out to
thus
be
that where
caused
had to content
to
it
students.
I
have therefore
myself with such additions
were compatible with retaining the text as as possible in
its
previous form.
The
as
much
additions
consist chiefly of fuller allusions in the footnotes to prominent
landmarks
in the history of Ethics,
and of short passages inserted
in the text at points
where the remarks of
have shown
critics
me my
argument might reasonably be misunderstood.
Of
these corrections and additions several have been
suggested to
D. G. Ritchie.
me by
the friendly criticism of Mr.
Preface to the Second Edition
X
Since the appearance of the S.
Mackenzie has written
of Ethics," which treats of
first edition,
his excellent "
many
much
and ought to be read as a sequel to
London,
October 1893.
J.
of the problems
touched upon in this handbook with fulness,
Mr.
Manual greater it
CONTENTS. BOOK
I.
THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. CHAPTER
I.
THE PROBLEM OF
ETHICS.
PAGE §
I.
How
can there be a problem at
all ?
.
3.
6
§ 3.
General description of the conditions under which the problem rises • Historical illustration from the case of Greece
§ 4.
Illustration
§ 5.
Objection to the study
§ 6.
Effect of the study of ethics
§ 2.
.
.
.
.
.
from our own time
*
.
.
.
9
.10
.
12
on our general view of
CHAPTER
life
14
.
17
II.
CAN THERE BE A SCIENCE OF ETHICS? § 7.
Difficulty in the conception of such a science
§ 8.
Practical difficulty in the conception of a science of
§ 9.
What may
conduct § 10.
.
20
.
.21
be expected of a science of ethics ? Comparison of ethics as so interpreted with Intuitionist
and Theological
26-
ethics
CHAPTER
III.
SCOPE OF THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.
§11. §12.
In what sense ethics differs from the natural sciences Ethics as a " practical " science
§ 13.
Has
.
ethics to
with what § 14.
do with what ought
is ?
to
.
Distinction between ethics and politics
... ...
30 36
.
40?
.
be rather than
.
38
Contents
xii
BOOK
II.
MORAL JUDGMENT. CHAPTER
I.
THE OBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT. §
15.
What
is
conduct
§ 16.
Apparent exceptions
§17.
What
§
18.
is
PAGE 45 46
?
to this definition
.
will?
48
........
Relation of desire to will and character
.
.
.51
§ 19. § 20.
Will and
§ 21.
§ 25.
motive or consequent the essential element in comduct as the object of moral judgment? Meaning of motive Motive and intention . . Bearing of results on question between motive and consequent Will and motive
§ 26.
Summary
§ 22. § 23.
§ 24.
self
Conduct and character
53
54
Is
... .... .61
.
.
.
.
.
...
CHAPTER
57
58
61
63 64
II.
THE STANDARD OF MORAL JUDGMENT— MORAL LAW
... ?...... ....
§ 28.
The two general forms of moral judgment Which of these is prior
§ 29.
Three stages
§ 30. § 31.
(1) Morality as obedience to external law (2) The law as internal conscience .
§ 32.
Intuitionalism as an ethical theory
§ 33. § 34.
Mistaken objection to Intuitionalist view Elements in conscience
§ 35.
Defects of conscience as ultimate standard
§ S^.
(3) Morality as determined by end General characteristics of the end
§ 27.
§ 37. § 38.
in reflective analysis
—
These
...
67 68
.
73
.
•
.
.
.
.
.
.74 .77
....84 78
79
.
.
.
.
85
moral end the basis of commonly recognised attributes of the moral law Moral and Political Law characteristics of the
.
§ 39.
65
66
89 91
Contents
BOOK
xiii
III.
THEORIES OF THE END
CHAPTER THE END
I.
AS PLEASURE. PAGE
§ 40.
Problem
§ 41.
What
§ 42.
Ancient forms of the theory
§ 43.
The The
§ 44.
arising out of results hitherto reached
meant by saying judgment is pleasure is
theory in
•
.
99 100
modern times
sanctions of morality
§ 45.
Pleasure and happiness
§ <6.
Do
101 .
.
pleasures differ in quality
.
.
.101
.
?
§ 47.
How are pleasures calculated in respect to their value ?
§ 48.
Modern forms
§ 49.
Characteristic
§ 50. § 51.
Elements of value in pleasure theory Fundamental error of the theory based on inadequate
§ 52.
Is pleasure the only
§ 53.
Met by
of the pleasure theory difficulties
in
these
....
several forms
.
104 106 107 109
of
in
Hedonism .
.
.
.
analysis of desire
istic
97
that the standard of moral
argument
114
motive?
.
distinction
113
.
.
Re-statement of Hedon.
*
between " pleasures
" idea of pleasure
.
.116 and
"
118
CHAPTER THE END
.
in idea "
II.
AS SELF-CONQUEST,
§ 54.
Opposite theory to foregoing
§ 55.
Historical forms of theory
§ 56.
The
...
122
• .
123
theory recognises right as distinct from expediency
124
§ 57.
Value of this view of man's nature in the history of thought
126
§ 58.
Self-conquest as a practical principle
§ 59.
Criticism of theory
.
.
.
'
...
.
.128
... .
.
130
Contents
xiv
CHAPTER
III.
EVOLUTIONARY HEDONISM. § 60.
Utilitarianism and evolution
§ 61.
The
...
human
organic view of
society
PAG* 136 these
corrects
errors § 62.
On
138
moral laws are empirical
Utilitarian theory
the
generalisations <§
63.
§ 64.
141
Importance of theory of evolution in the
field
Difficulties in evolutionary ethics
BOOK
,
of ethics •
143 •
147
IV.
THE END AS GOOD. CHAPTER I. THE END
AS
COMMON GOOD. 163
§ 65§ 66.
Current distinction between self and society
164
§ 67.
Relativity of this distinction
165
§ 68.
Further illustrations of dependence of individual on
§ 69.
Ethical import of these facts
§ 70. § 7i-
Appeal
170 to
172
moral judgments in support of conclusions
.
175 178
§ 72.
CHAPTER
II.
FORMS OF THE GOOD. 183
§ 73. § 74-
Has our argument been
§ 75-
Virtues and institutions
§ 76.
Requirements of
§ 77.
Limits of
§ 78.
The interdependence of the
§ 79-
Suggested classification
whole
... ..... .
•
.
.
classification
........ The main heads
classification.
exclusive.
a circle ?
classification
.
185
188
190
not mutually
.......
195
virtues extends through the
.
197 201
2
xv
Contents
BOOK
V.
MORAL PROGRESS. CHAPTER
I.
THE STANDARD AS RELATIVE. § 80.
Differences of standard which
§ 81.
Essential
in
differences
we may
neglect
.
.
standard involving ethical
problem § 82. § 83. § 84.
The The
unity of the form of virtue
209 210
relativity of the standard as condition of its validity
2
Further
CHAPTER
Clue to solution of problem in idea of progress law of progress .
§ 92.
Summary
§ 93.
Further questions
§ 90.
.
.
.
........ .
.
.217 .218
.... .... —
Illustration of the general
§ 91.
§ 89.
.
.
.
•
.
CHAPTER THE STANDARD
•
.
.
•
The
Consciousness as active principle in knowledge
.
The
.
.
§ 97.
Conscience and consciousness
.
.
question involves metaphysical considerations
§ 98.
Relation of conscience to social environment
§ 99.
Is the ideal social or personal ?
struggle
for
1 01.
§ 102. § 103.
The Economic
How
existence as the
.
.
....
unity of the world as postulate of thought
progress
factor in progress
233 234 236 238 240 242
cause of moral
.
.
this account requires to be supplemented Concluding illustration from the Reformer and Martyr
Bibliography
223 225 227 229 230
III.
§ 94.
The
219 221
AS IDEAL.
§ 95. § 96.
§ 100. §
II.
AS PROGRESSIVE.
Progress of humanity as a whole Moral progress in nations Evolution of a universal moral order Courage Illustration from particular virtues. Temperance
§ 87.
§ 88.
1
214
difficulty
THE STANDARD § 85. § 86.
PAGE 207
.
244 247 248 253 257
BOOK
I
THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS
i
;
CHAPTER
I.
THE PROBLEM OF §
How can there be a Problem at all ?
1.
Philosophy, said
Plato, begins in
who wonders why her wax wags
kitten
ETHICS.
The
wonder.
doll shuts
child
eyes, or her
its
has already set forward on the path that
its tail,
and
leads to philosophy
The
science.
differences
among
depend merely which we have carried our wonder
us that distinguish learned from ignorant
upon the extent
to
whether we are content to acquiesce in superficial answers, or
still
find our
new question
wonder
and press on with a
unsatisfied,
so soon as our
first is
Thus,
answered.
astronomy begins in the wonder and perplexity caused
by the contradictions and confusions of the apparent
The
movements of the heavens. have succeeded one another nican, the
Newtonian
—the
—have
various systems that
Ptolemaic, the Coper-
differed only in the relative
satisfactoriness of the solutions they
have
kind of wonder
is
How
does
it
why should
is
?
How
The
express itself?
subject-matter of ethics
is,
which ethics begins
that in
what does that wonder attach
does
it
?
first
To rise ?
question of the precise
deferred.
Here
I
there be a science of ethics at 3
The What
offered.
question I propose to discuss in this chapter
would ask all,
rather
Bx
Ethics
4
than what the science of ethics
absurd to ask why
It
is.
I
may, indeed, seem
know what it "what" is a good deal determined by the " why." At the same time, it must be admitted that some of the definitions and results, reached in a But
is.
should exist before we
it
in this case the
later part of this essay,
are
taken for granted in this
chapter and the next.
Etymologies rarely help us
much
in acquiring accurate
conceptions of the present use of words. often as not misleading.* give
will
what
its
us
considerable
derivation
character.
We
(rjOos)
They
are as
In the present case, etymology Ethics
help.
precisely
is
implies, the science of moral
are, 'moreover, further
helped
if
we
our etymology a step further back, and recollect that is
carry rjOos
we name under which our science was Moral Philosophy, t we find that this means
connected with
e#os,
custom or
habit.
Similarly, if
revert to the older
known,
viz.,
the philosophy of mores, which signifies in Latin, primarily
customs or habits, secondarily the habits of moral agents in respect to
then,
moral action,
that ethics
is
i.e.,
character.
Assuming,
the science of character,
character means, according to
its
or habits of conduct,! our question
and
that
etymology, customs is,
How
does that
any one who should define Politics, in terms of its etymology, as the science of civil life, and should go on to argue that politicians were those who possessed this science, would clearly make a great mistake. Whately {Logic, p. 1 1 8) would convict him of the " Fallacy of Etymology." t Compare " Physics" and " Natural Philosophy." Character, " in our modern view, carries with it greater in% wardness than this definition seems to contain. This s quite in conformity with the more subjective aspect which all questions of ethics assume in modern discussions as compared with ancient. Here it is immaterial whether we define character as nabit of conduct or as habit of will. See below, p. 52. * E.g.,
i 1
Ch
The Problem
I]
"wonder," which attach to national
The
oj Ethics
the source of
is
all
5
science,
come
and individual habits of conduct
very statement of this question suggests a
For
culty.
at first
actions
were
ceased
to
perplex us
conduct which
had
cause us any trouble.
All
of
part or
shown psychologically
habits can be
diffi-
might appear as though habitual
it
that
just
to
?
to
be themselves
the completed form of answers to practical problems,
The
habit
solution
on
of moving one's the
of
problem
limbs in walking balancing
of
movement
become
a habit, the solution
is
longer troubled with the problem it
one.
is
self-restraint in
complete.
we
;
We
are no
are not even con
Similarly with habits of conduct
in a nation or individual.
called
the first
and then on another, and executing a When it has at the same time.*
one leg
forward
scious that
is
oneself
The
habit, for instance, of
matters of the body, which the ancients
Temperance,
is
the solution of the problem of the
relative claims to satisfaction of apparently contradictory
impulses,
e.g.,
habit, or
man to go to the home to his wife.
the impulse of a
house, and the impulse to go
element of character,
it is
to perfection, so that the! perfectly
public-
As a
that solution carried
temperate
man
is
no
longer conscious of any conflict or problem as he passes i
the tavern.
There may, of course, still rise questions as conduct determined by the habit.
to the
Thus may remain for the temperate man to decide how much he may drink, at what time, what kind of liquor, details of the
it
and so
on.
But these are not ethical questions
* That this is an acquired art any one can sec a baby's ineffectual efforts on the nursery floor.
in the
who watches
Ethics
6
sense above referred
[Bk.
They
to.
1
are a matter of insight
in the circumstances of a particular case, corresponding
of when, how far, and how fast we hundred such questions may rise in a
to the questions shall walk.
A
man's mind
in a day,
to face with
the
without ever bringing him face
This
ethical question proper.
latter
does not refer primarily to the details of an act under a habit, but to the habit
courage,
How
temperance
?
It
itself.
are just, courageous, temperate
And
?
not,
is
What
but,
What is
acts
justice,
the difficulty recurs
so
:
can habits of conduct, which are themselves solu-
tions of practical
problems in the
life
of a nation or
an individual, ever become the subject of that doubt and perplexity from which science springs ?
The answer
briefly
is,
that so long as the solutions are
adequate to the existing circumstances, there
is
i.e.,
so long as
a congruity between the habits of conduct of a
nation or individual and the practical problems of
life,
On
so long the ethical question remains in abeyance.
the other hand,
it
is
the appearance of
of which the early habits
offer
no
new problems,
solution, that
To
throws doubt upon the validity of custom. this
is,
let
life
first
how
stages into which,
us consider the several
in this respect, the
see
of progressive nations naturally
falls.
ยง
2.
General Description of the Conditions under
which the Problem For the purpose into three.
in
rises.
hand we might divide these
First, there is
stages
the period of the formation
of the moral habits of a people, the growth of
This corresponds in the individual's of childhood and early youth.
It is
life
its
morality.
to the period
the period of
its
Ch.
The Problem of Ethics
I]
7
Next we have the period of
education.*
sponding to early manhood.
This
action, corre-
period in
the
is
which a balance or equilibrium has been established
between
the
various
within
reside
that
forces
the
equilibrium exhibits itself in the harmony of classes, the u balance of the constituExternally,
nation.
tion,"
the
this
reconciliation
of
Internally,
interests.
it
means the adequacy of the moral aptitudes and habits of the people, both in force and variety, to meet the calls of
its
daily
The
life.
habits,
which
in
the pre-
vious stage were, so to speak, in the gristle, have
hardened
into
a
system
of
traditional
morality,
now the
maxims of which are embodied in the received moral code, and entrenched behind national institutions of State and Church. I have called this the age of action, because
it
corresponds
generally
to
the
period of a
and most brilliant achievements. Civil discord is meantime at an end, and the nation is Lastly we thus left free to expand its power abroad.t nation's best energies
have the stage of
reflection.
The balance
of internal
powers, which was the characteristic feature of the second stage,
Chief
is
undermined by the development of new
among
gone hand
in
these
is
forces.
the intellectual progress that has
hand with the enlargement of the
nation's
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
* The mode of this education the evolution of moral habits under the pressure of social necessity the rise of institutions of family, state, and church, corresponding to them and the embodiment of directions for their maintenance in moral and legal codes would require separate treatment, for which this is clearly not ;
;
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
the place.
f As examples of this stage might be mentioned the Jewish nation in the time of David, the Athenians in the age of Pericles, the
Romans
after the establishment of internal
ment of the long-standing quarrel between
peace by the
patricians
settle
and plebeians.
8
Ethics
experience, as
its
power extended.
Corresponding to
new
interests, industrial,
this progress will
be the
literary,
philosophical.
artistic,
[Bk. I
rise of
These have
place for themselves in the national
life.
do at the expense of existing and formulas. The new wine has
usually only tions
The
into the old bottles.
A
spirit is
to find a
This they can habits, instituto
be poured
contrary to the form.
period of intellectual and political ferment sets in
;
the
marked by doubt, perplexity, and hesitation it is disconcerted by the apparent baselessness of the forms and institutions upon which society has hitherto seemed
age
is
;
to rest; religion
the moral law, the fabric of the constitution, itself,
seem shaken
to their
foundations
;
the
only choice for individuals seems to be either to close their eyes to the contradictions of the present,
and seek
refuge in the old habits of faith, or to set forward on a
new
untried path of revolution and anarchy.
But
and
this is
repel.
an alternative which cannot
To
admit
it is
ligence which discerned the
new problem, and
in the last resort to morality
seen,
is
only another
name
which once were new. is
had
to ethics,
fail
to startle
to prove traitor to the intel-
itself,
for the solution of
It is at this
therefore
which, as we have
problems
stage that recourse
which opens a third alternative between
simple acceptance and simple rejection of the morality
and
institutions of the past.
Ethics proposes to try to
whence they came, and what It blinks no difficulty which the spirit of they mean. scepticism suggests. It ignores no claim which tradition But it goes its own way, regardless of puts forward. understand them.
It
asks
both, with a deeper doubt than
scepticism, because
doubts the conclusions of scepticism, and a deeper than traditionalism, because
it
it
faith
believes in the reason
Ch.
The Problem of Ethics
I]
which traditions embody, and which
what power they
§
3.
still
9 is
the source of
possess.
Historical Illustration from the Case of Greece.
decomand traditions, owing to the growth of national life, and of the rise out of this decomposition of a rational system of morals and polity, founded upon the effort to understand current forms and, by revealing both their value and their inadequacy, to prepare the way for progress is to Historically, the best illustration, both of the
position of national habits
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
be found
in the actual origin of the
the age
in
the
place
of the to
give
Sophists
in
science of ethics
Greece.
This
is
not
any detailed account of the state
of opinion out of which the great systems of Plato and Aristotle grew.*
It is sufficient,
in illustration of
what
has been already said, to remind the reader that the Sophists lived at a time of great political, industrial, intellectual expansion.
Athens, from a small city
and
state,
had become the head of a great empire. New ideas, new interests, new demands, had produced a vague restlessness and dissatisfaction with older forms of thought and life. In the hands of the Sophists the criticism which was the life and breath of the time spread from attacks on external forms and abstract theories to the ideas of right and wrong, justice and injustice, piety and impiety. By their means a general sense of the contradictions that were latent in the traditional morality came to
pervade the educated classes in Athens.
A
condition
of doubt, uncertainty, and general perplexity was created, * See Sidgwick's History of Ethics] Grant's Aristotle, Vol. L, Essay ii. ; Erdmann's History of Philosophy, Vol. I., pp. 69 foil
r
o
Ethics
fBK.
I
out of which in due time rose, under the influence of Socrates, the
first
sketch of a science of morality.
Illustration
§ 4.
from Our
Own
go
Athens
But we do not require
to
to
Time. in the time
of the Sophists to find an illustration of the rise of a science of ethics. referred
just
in nothing
and
to in
Our own time, resembling the age many other respects, resembles it
more than
this
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;that
numbers of the educated
large
is
it
a time of moral
new demand among
political unrest, resulting in a
classes
to
understand
the meaning of the moral code under which they
and the
institutions that support
To mention
it.
live,
only
a few of the contradictions and seemingly irreconcilable antitheses which criticism has
and
harass
our
made
age,
in the field of religion,
place, faith
perplex
and reason, science and
private judgment.
In
politics
are
"the
asserted
duties of citizenship. "
tinctly
and
the
religion, authority
there
" the rights of
the
is
On
state.
man
"Man
the cause celebre of the century.
in
is,
first
the opposition between
between the individual and the side
apparent, and which
there
and
antithesis
the
one
on the other
"
versus State"*
Coming
to
more
moral questions, we have the conflict between
is
disself
and the greatest happiness of the greatest number, pleasure and duty, freedom and necessity, law and liberty, and other sharp-horned dilemmas that start from the ground of our common life when the light of criticism is turned upon it. For all these and similar contradictions no solution is possible, except upon condition of a thorough-going others,
self-interest
* See Mr. Spencer's booklet with this
title.
Ch.
I]
The Problem of Ethics
it
and
social morality,
analysis of the basis of individual
the origin, the meaning, the authority of the moral habits
of civilised man, and the social, political, and religious institutions in It is
which they have entrenched themselves.
under pressure of these and kindred
the science of ethics has taken a time.
It is
new
difficulties that
start in
our own
indeed true that ethics has always been more
modern times as a department of Under its older name of moral philosophy
or less studied in
philosophy.
has always had an honoured place in systems of meta-
it
What
physics.
is
characteristic of our time in this regard
not the rise of a
is
that has
come
new
study, but the
new significance The practical
to attach to an old one.
importance of the science of ethics, as offering valuable aid towards the solution of problems that vex our daily
has
life,
come
to
be more
fully
recognised.
other evidences of this recognition the rise of societies to promote
its
Among
may be mentioned
study,* the institution
of the International Journal of Ethics^\ and generally the place that
is
now claimed
for
it
as
no longer a subordi-
nate branch of philosophy, but an independent science. ยฃ The validity of this latter claim I shall have occasion
Meantime it may be noted as new importance attaching to the attempts have been made to detach it from
hereafter to examine. ยง
an
illustration of the
study that
the cumbrous adjuncts of logic and *
metaphysics, and
There are Ethical Societies in London, Cambridge, Edinburgh, York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and elsewhere, all of recent
New
growth.
f First published October 1890 (Fisher Unwin). \ On the general question of the dissolution of the ancient partnership between philosophy and its various branches, see the excellent article
by James Ward, Mind, Vol. XV., No.
ยง See pp. 32
foil.
58.
;
Ethics
12 to present
it
as a science in
in the complexity of
importance of
its
its
[Bk.
no respect
I
differing, save
subject-matter and the practical
conclusions,
from
empirical
other
sciences.*
ยง It
is
which
Objection to the Study.
5.
upon
is
this ground that we must meet the objection sometimes brought against moral philosophy from
the practical side.
wanting those to
Since Aristotle t there have not been
whom
the discussion of the validity of
moral distinctions has appeared to have an " unsettling n effect upon the student. It has been thought to undermine his belief in the absoluteness of these distinctions and even where, as in Utilitarianism, their validity is strenuously maintained, philosophy has yet been accused
of setting aside the immediate authority of conscience or Divine law in favour of the secondary
end of human
happiness, and so, by encouraging the tendency to reflect
upon common duties, of opening the door to and self-deception. The answer to this and all similar objections is clear and decisive. In the first place, it is no longer a question, as is assumed by those who urge them, whether we shall and
refine
casuistry
consent, or refuse to consent, to the discussion of ethical
problems.
The
spirit
of the time has taken the choice
and the doubts and difficulties which beset the common interpretation of moral responsibility are the commonplaces of current literature. No educated person can escape them. It is merely a question whether out of our hands
*
;
See Leslie Stephen's Science of Ethics, pp.
Alexander's Moral Order
f
Who
and Progress,
6,
7.
Also
p. 80.
thought the study unsuited to young men.
Ethics,
I. I
S.
The Problem of Ethics
Ch.
I]
we
shall
for
encounter them in the
a solution to isolated
purpose of the
spirit
student
scientific
of amateurs trusting or with the serious
afierfus,
a systematic view of the whole
13
who may hope It
field.
to reach
might indeed
I omit to mention a third alternative. For have there not been some, and those the finest
be suggested that
of their time,
spirits
who, like John Henry Newman,
have been earnest seekers particular field
and
to
fortify
after truth,
have preferred to themselves
fall
against
"beyond these voices the
to
is
it
there
is
yet in this
the perplexities
reason in a monastic seclusion, where
while
and
back upon authority
it
of
claimed that
is
peace"?
I
reply that
undoubtedly possible thus to shut our eyes
issues
stake,
at
and renounce the attempt
to
moral ideas,
re-establish intellectual order in the field of
a solution which is not likely to satisfy the bolder and more energetic spirits upon whom the hope of the future depends. Those who adopt this course do not really get " beyond," they only get away from these this is
voices.
It
wound
in the
by the
is
scientific reason,
like the spear of Ithuriel,
has
itself
and it is scientific reason which, must heal the wound which it
made.
Similarly,
from the side of particular duties
be pointed out that to
set aside the
to act in accordance with a
probable effects of our action,
moral rule
be assumed by those
On
the contrary,
it
is
in
not always
who make
may be
it
ought to
immediate impulse
careful analysis of the conditions of the case,
to
The
a retrograde, not a forward step.
moral peace of the age has been inflicted
favour of a
and of the
evil,
as
is
a form of conscientiousness
we Nor has it
which, in the complex state of civilisation in which live requires in
apt
the above objection.
every way to be encouraged.
;
Ethics
14
anything in
common
It is
J
with the casuistical desire to find
in the circumstances
duty.
[Bk.
an excuse
for neglect of
an obvious
only because this reflective effort to under-
stand the significance of our actions has been too un-
common
it has come to be associated immoral attitude of mind. It is true, as we hereafter see, that moral philosophy and casuistry
with
in the past that
this
shall
as a reasoned system alike begin in the perception that traditional rules are
but the casuistical
an insufficient guide to moral action
which seeks
spirit,
in the difficulty of
estimating the results an escape from the duty of action,
had not to wait
for
the reflective
moral philosophy nor
of asserting itself;
for the opportunity
will the denial of the rights of
reason in this
have any
field
suppressing or restraining a tendency which the
effect
is,
in
in fact,
outcome of moral insensibility, not of intellectual It might, on the contrary, be reasonably main-
alertness.
tained that the habit of forecasting
of conduct with a view to estimating the view before us, is
is
the its
consequences
value, which,
on
encouraged by moral philosophy,
the best preservative against that self-deception for
which casuistry ยง 6.
If
is
only another name.
Effect of the Study of Ethics View of Life.
on our General
now, reverting to our definition of ethics as the
we may
science of moral habits, the reader ask what
expect to be the general effect of such an investigation
on our general view of the nature and authority of these answer that that effect will be twofold. First,
habits, I it
will necessarily
be partly destructive.
in saying that science
supplements, and
is
critical.
classifies
This
is
implied
It criticises, corrects,
the distinctions of
common-
Ch.
The Problem of Ethics
I]
sense.
Some
so specifically.
and
:
of
a criticism
is
it
found to do
some effete some crude notions of the and moral sanctions, will have
familiar distinctions,
injunctions,
nature of moral authority to
this
Ethical science will be
common-sense. prohibitions
does
science
All
'5
For moral
be given up.
law, like statute law,
constant alteration and accretion.
As these
grows by
alterations
and accretions take place more or less unconsciously, little care is taken to revise and readjust what went before.
various
And
many
just as
times, without
contradictory laws, passed at
reference to one another,
may
remain on the statute-book, so the moral code of any period may contain many elements loosely compacted
and imperfectly reconciled with
one
another.
result of the application of scientific criticism will
be
and
like the revisal
Similarly, in
reference
codification of statute law. to the social institutions that
support the moral law,
we may expect
have a negative and
critical side.
that our results will
These
moral code, are an unconscious growth. of animal needs.
organs
life,
Yet,
life.
One
there
of the
and rudimentary community may survive from a former state are
first
be the perception of
survivals
results of ethical science will
this fact.
Lastly, with regard to the authority
law
is
critical
of this
based,
tc
we may
expect,
in
on which the moral
the
first
instance,
a
and apparently negative result. As man's notions authority were formed in the ages of poetry and
mythology, we ft
the
the parts of animals, so in a
forms and institutions of
also, like
Like the organs
they were evolved in response to vital as
among
The
to these
may
expect the ordinary notions about
be tinged with the colour of their
origin.
It is
a
necessjjy part of the work of science to criticise them.
i6
Ethics
In
[Bk.
these respects, science "
all
On
critical."
nothing
is
if
is
it
i
not
the other hand, ethics has a positive and
To
reconstructive side.
explain
is
not to explain away,
Its startingaway to explain. If in its first role point is the reality of duty and right. as critical it seems to be attacking these, this is only the
neither
is
to
explain
superficial aspect of its
work.*
In
its
deeper aspect
comes, not to destroy, but to
it
is
reconstructive.
It
does so by separating the essential from the unessential,
the
It
permanent from the
form of moral and those
which
are
transient, the spirit
social institutions.
connected
organically
nature and with one another,
it
By
gives
fulfil.
from the
leaving only
with
human
them a value and
a sanctity which, as merely traditional forms, they never
could possess.
Ethics
reconstruction possible
the unessential, in essential.
is ;
thus a criticism which makes it
Here and there when it does
negative, but, " the cutting
strips off the irrelevant
and
order to get a firmer hold of the it
presents us with a bold
so, this is
found only
to
be
edge of a positive."
* In all scientific education there is a stage in which destruction seems to be the chief work of science. Plato calls it the " puppy
dog
" stage.
Ch.
Can
II]
there be a Science
CHAPTER
of Ethics
17
y
II.
CAN THERE BE A SCIENCE OF ETHICS ยง
7.
?
Difficulty in the Conception of such a Science.
In the preceding chapter a sketch has been given of the circumstances in which the practical need for a science of ethics arises, the general nature of
kind of answer to
that
may be
its
problem, and the
expected.
We have now
convenient starting-point in developing the
to seek for a
science
it
But before we do so several preliminary
itself.
difficulties that rise in
connection with the very idea of a
science of this kind require to be noticed.
Accepting the general definition (given on
p.
ethics as the science of character or conduct, in
sense,
we may
Science,
it
truths.
It
is
ask, can
said,
traces
we speak
has for effects
general laws as to the
way
its
to in
4) of
what
of such a science
?
subject-matter necessary their
causes,
formulates
which these causes
act,
and
from these generalisations, or the combinations of them,
The
proceeds to deduce new consequences. these processes
No to
is
especially
distinctive
last
of
of a science.
science is considered complete until it is shown be possible to predict particular effects from the
known laws
of their causes.
According to
this idea of 2
i8
Ethics
a science,
it
becomes
at
TBk.
once evident
assuming
that, in
the possibility of a science of character and conduct,
assume
phenomena
that these
definable causes, that
i
we
are the effects of certain
possible to formulate general
it is
laws of their origin and course of development, and that
when
the science
is
we
perfected
shall
be able to make
them on the ground of Thus at the very outset we
confident predictions regarding
our previous generalisations.
seem
make
to
human
certain assumptions as to the nature of
character and conduct, the discussion of which
has always been
one of the chief subjects of moral
For
is it not contended by a large and powerful school of writers that " character and conduct
philosophy.
are precisely that which
are
cannot be explained as the
of discernible and calculable forces
resultant
dependent upon the human
chiefly
have no right
at the outset of
They
?
will,
and we
our investigation to
make
an assumption which prejudges the question as to the
freedom of
If the will
volition.
ception of a science of ethics is
is
free, the
falls to
whole con-
the ground
:
there
a variable and incalculable element in character and
conduct which of the
ception
aU
vitiates
This objection
possible to treat
is,
its
results."
based upon a miscon-
however,
nature of the
science.
human conduct
non on the same plane
It
is
as a natural
indeed
phenome-
as other physical events, such
as the motions of the planets, or the evolution of species.
The aim to
of the science
agents
in
the course
specific it
will
upon
this supposition will
human
circumstances, and thence
deduce
laws
of
the
action
take in nations and individuals upon
the recurrence of the same conditions. this
kind
difficult
be
of
formulate general
as
it
A
science of
might prove to be to work
it
Ch.
Can
ii]
out in detail, certainly
there be a Science of Ethics ?
conceivable,
least
at
is
would
it
proceed upon the assumption that the freedom
of the will
is
may be neglected But such a science would
a delusion, or at any rate
purposes of the science.
for
and
19
is
not
primarily concerned with conduct as a fact in space
and
have
little
or nothing to
do with
Ethics
ethics.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; something
done here and now, following from the past, and succeeded by certain results in the future. It is concerned with the judgment upon conduct, the judgment that such and such conduct is The distinction is important, and may be right or wrong. time,
certain causes
made
On
in
the basis of a general classification of the sciences.
the one hand,
we have those
sciences which are con-
cerned with facts or phenomena of nature or of mind, actual occurrences which have to be analysed, classified,
and explained. sun
is
such a
The movement of the earth round the Astronomy may be taken as the type
fact.
of this class of sciences.
On
the other hand, there are
those sciences which have to do primarily, not with facts in space It
and time, but with judgments about those
might be
said, indeed, that all facts present
facts.
themselves
moves round the sun " is a fact, but it is also a judgment. There is a distinction, how ever (to go no deeper), between a judgment of fact and a judgment upon fact, corresponding to the distinction between "judgment" in its logical sense of "proposition" and " judgment " in its judicial sense of " sentence." It is with judgment in the latter sense that ethics has to do. to us as judgments.
"
The
earth
r
It deals
with conduct as the subject of judicial judgment,
not with conduct merely as a physical it
might be argued that
all
fact.
judgments are
facts,
Similarly
and
that
a moral judgment only differs from other facts in being
more complicated.
This of course
is
true, but
one of
"
20
Ethics
[Bk.
the chief elements in this complication to a standard,
and
it
is
is
the reference
element to which
this
call attention as distinctive
i
I
wish to
of the fact with which our
On the ground of it ethics has be classed with what has been called " normative sciences, to which Logic, or the science of the judgment science has to deal. to
of truth or falsity, and Esthetics, or the science of the judgment of beauty or ugliness, belong. Ethics has to do with the norm, or standard of right and wrong, as logic has to do with the standard of truth, aesthetics with the It is concerned primarily with the standard of beauty. laws that regulate our judgments of right and wrong,
only secondarily with the laws that regulate conduct as
an event
in time.*
Practical Difficulty in the Conception of a Science of Conduct.
ยง 8.
There
is
a second objection that
such a science from the practical said that ethics
is
asked, does
of people
who
It
taken to has been
the science of the laws which regulate
our judgments of right and wrong.
may be
may be
side.
it
come about
But how then, it mass
that the great
are perfectly innocent of such a science,
yet confidently pass such judgments on themselves others over,
?
It is
and
these judgments of ordinary people, more-
from which presumably the science of ethics pro-
start, and it is these it proposes to investigate. But what hope can there be of finding any law or reason embodied in popular judgments, obviously arrived at
poses to
without any relation to laws of judgment previously
known and acted upon ? The answer to this difficulty has * See note
at the
already been given
end of the chapter.
1
Ch.
Can
II]
of Ethics
there be a Science
The
in the previous chapter.
2
f
objection springs from the
failure to distinguish between an unconsciously acquired art, and the science which analyses the principles which
underlie
Just as the art of speaking or of reasoning
it.
may be acquired by those who have never seen or heard of a book on grammar or logic, so the art of moral judgment and moral conduct may be acquired by the unconscious processes described above a science of ethics
even dreamt
is
upon the
science of conduct will react ethics has
on morality,
of answer that
merely to
desire
I
14
which, though so obvious
to
before
5)
How
The kind
be given to
foil.).
the
far
what influence
art,
another question.
is
may be expected
already been alluded to (pp. section
(p.
of.
it
has
In the present
emphasise a distinction
when
stated, is
obscured in
current language.
ยง
9.
If
may be Expected
"What
we now come
chapter,
and ask
in
what sense there can be said to be
a science of moral judgment, serious
of a Science of Ethics?
closer to the question of the present
we open up a
Although the
difficulty.
full
more
still
import
of
our
answer can only be apprehended after the claim that is
now
to be
made on
behalf of ethics has been justified
by the detailed exposition of the theory
may be
itself,
permissible to state here generally what
still
it
we may
expect as the result of the present inquiry.
Before attempting to do to
define
more
clearly
so, it is necessary,
a science in the strict sense that
it
should do for
as our type,
from
the
and
ask,
ordinary
however,
than we have yet done what
us.
is,
and what we require take astronomy
Let us
Wherein does the scientific differ way of looking at things ? In
Ethics
22 the
place,
first
observes
it
[Bk.
I
In astronomy
accurately.
every one knows that the heavenly bodies change their position with reference to the earth
Science demands, in the
first
and descriptions of these changes. observed, and
classifies
Secondly, science
phenomena thus them according to their most
kinds
different
distinguishes
and one another.
place, accurate observations
of
the
It will, for instance, in
significant differences.
astronomy
very soon arrive at the distinction between our
and planetary system, and more this
it
will distinguish
have cooled
distant
moons from
sufficiently to
functions
ended here,
a science at
and
It
all.
Within
planets, planets that
permit of
surface from those that have not,
own sun
suns.
life
and so
on.
upon But
their if its
it would hardly merit the name of must not only accurately observe
it must explain. By this it is not meant may not be sciences which do no more than the phenomena with which they deal. The " comparative sciences " suggests that there may
classify
:
that there classify
phrase
and by the
be,
this
conception of a science
further illustrated
is
of sciences, such as biology and
stages
earlier
psychology, which, in their later development have far
outgrown
What
it.
is
meant
is
that
refuse to rest in such a limitation.
down
satisfied,
as
Comte and
we must always
We
can never
sit
other Positivist writers
exhort us to do, with the mere discovery of likenesses
and to
differences
between phenomena; but are forced
look beyond these external
for a principle,
in the
light
relations,
of which
and
we can
to
seek
explain
them.
is
Without entering into any detailed discussion of what meant by " explanation," which is a question for logic,
&ot for ethics,
I
may
define shortly what I wish the reader
Ch.
Can
II]
there be a Science of Ethics
by
to understand
this term.
To
23
?
phenomenon
explain a
or occurrence, in the proper sense of the term,
it
is
not
popular language implies, to find the cause or
sufficient, as
agency which produced
it.
Even the account given by
the
older books on logic, which define explanation as the
more general
process of finding a laws,
Explanation includes
inadequate.*
hausted by
A
it.
when
explained
sum
more general
law, or
under which the occurrence may be subsumed, this,
but
is
is
not ex-
thing can only properly be said to be
it is
seen necessarily to flow from the
of the conditions which the science in question takes
into account.
But these conditions, when accurately
apprehended, are never merely a series of successive
phenomena, or even an aggregate of coexistent phenorelations of the parts or members of an In such a system it is to organic system to one another. be observed that each separate element which calls for explanation appears at once in the twofold relation of cause and effect conditioning and conditioned; so that this distinction, which is commonly assumed as the basis of mena, but the
explanation,
may be
under which we are
said to have disappeared in the
finally
form
required to think of the several
We may
phenomena under
investigation.
go a step
and, setting aside the definition of
further,
explanation as the
sum
accordingly
of the conditions, substitute for
more accurate one. A phenomenon is in this sense only fully explained when enough is known of the it
a
still
particular system in question to permit us to
the
phenomenon
in the light of the
known
the other parts, and therefore as a coherent
To
the whole. *
For
Logic,
this
Book
take a simple instance, the
kind of explanation in
III., ch. xii.
;
its
apprehend relations of
member
three forms, see
Bain's Inductive Logic,
of
phenomenon
Book
Mill's
III., ch. xii.
"
Ethics
24
dawn
of the
[Br.
when
explained in the sense described
is
I
be the necessary result of the sum of conditions which we know as the planetary system in
we
see
to
it
;
when we know enough of the mutual the various members of the planetary system,
other words, relations of
and the laws of
their motions, to see that these involve
the turning of our part of the earth to the light of the
sun at a particular
moment
manner we
in the
call
the
sunrise.*
By
this third stage, therefore, in the scientific
of any phenomenon, is
shown
ism.
to
It is
shown
known group of facts. As
to
be " required prevail
to
in
so explained,
;
Of course
known
so
sarily *
A
it is
reality
;
involved in still
the
that
requires that
the
field
or
seen to be neces
the particular group
and ultimately
fact
it
by the conditions
a particular
other words, to be
in
to other groups,
any
"
involved in these conditions so soon as
what they mean truth.
account
the process by which
be a coherent part of a system or organ-
previously
sarily
we mean
to the
is
a
we
realise
necessary
itself related
whole system of
complete explanation of
we should see constitution
it
to
of the
be necescosmos as
simpler example of this process of explanation would be
The "exthe adjustment of a piece in a child's picture puzzle. planation " of its apparently strange shape and jumble of coloured surface
only found
is
when
its
place has been assigned to
it
in the
With the above statement of the explanation in general we may compare Comte's view of required for the explanation of social phenomena in
organic structure of the whole. nature of
what
is
particular.
It is
more
significant, as
to his frequently expressed
in
general
(see
p.
22).
it is
in manifest contradiction
view of what we may look for in science Social phenomena, he says (JPos. Pol.,
Vol. II., p. 95), are explained in the scientific sense of the word when they "have been connected with the whole of the existing situation
and the whole of the preceding movement.
;
Ch.
Can
II]
necessity of
a perceived
limited sphere,
On
tions.
a Science of Ethics
25
t
Science however, qua Science, contents
a whole.
with
there be
e.g.,
spatial,
itself
data relatively to a
its
mechanical, or chemical rela-
the other hand, the ultimate relations of these
spheres to one another, and to reality as a whole,
is
the
point of view distinctive of Philosophy, the difference
being that Science, as such, is content with the relatively complete explanation which consists in showing how particular
phenomena
group of organic
flow necessarily from a particular
relations, as in
astronomy or biology
Philosophy requires us to see the same phenomena in organic relation to the world as a whole.
Returning from tion to understand ethics it
a science.
is
this digression,
what
is
its
are
in a posi-
that
data, as in the current tables
of the different forms of moral judgment it
now
not merely in the sense that
It is so,
observes and classifies
we
meant by the statement
also aims at explaining them.
Its
known as
function
these forms as necessarily flowing from the
is
duties
to exhibit
known con-
and social life of man. To the unreflective, moral judgments appear to be somewhat isolated phenomena, without relation to one another or
ditions of the individual
to other facts of experience.
wise
strictly
events,
there
correlated
appears
Upon
the field of other-
and comprehensible to
be intruded
facts
and
arbitrary
pro-
nouncements of condemnation or approval. It is the work of ethics, on the other hand, to bring these judgments into organic relation with one another and
known
to strip them of ; and clothe them with the livery of reason, by showing them to be necessary postulates of that organism of relations which we know
with the
facts
of experience
their apparent arbitrariness,
as
human
society.
26
Ethics
[Bk.
Comparison of Ethics as so interpreted with Intuitionist and Theological Ethics.
§ 10.
The
we
if
contrast
shortly with two other views
it
have been held as to the nature and
ethical
classification of the utterances of
The
Sense.
description
what
wrong which we
pronouncements
call
moral judgments,
presence of certain conditions
(e.g.,
we can to right
as
is
and
Moral
called
is
only ultimate account which
of those
said,
is
of
limits
Attempts have been made to
investigation.
limit the scope of the science to the
it
more
nature and extent of this claim will be
obvious that
I
give,
and
that in the
one's neighbour's
purse and a desire for money) moral sense pronounces certain
judgments
not one's own).
and
(e.g.,
that
classification of these
explain
them.
They
wrong
judgments.
to take
what
It
cannot further
should, of course, admit the existence of what
an important part of
regard faculty.
as
it
It
is
upon an innate feeling or analysis. As against this view
called moral sense or feeling, is
is
rest
instinct that defies further
we
it
Ethics has to do with the description
is
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the consideration of which â&#x20AC;&#x201D;but we should refuse
ethics,
to
an unanalysable utterance of a special
has an origin, a history, and a place
the other data of the moral
life
which
it
is
among
the function
Similarly, its dicta (though it is not of ethics to unfold. how a " sense " can speak as well as feel) are
at all clear
not isolated utterances (as such they would be wholly
what significance they have an objective system of mutually
unintelligible), but derive
from
their relation to
related parts or elements.
Another view traces the moral judgments or decrees which are the subject-matter of ethics back to the will
Ch.
Can
ii]
They
of an external authority.
man
of Ethics
there be a Science
are
27
?
communicated
to
partly through conscience, partly through revelation,
but in both cases are in the
last resort to
be explained
by a direct reference to this Supreme Will, not to human It is not necessary to enter life and experience as such. on disputed points of theology to see that, whatever the connection between morality and religion (and
may
very close one)
be, this view
amounts
is
it
a
either to a
denial of any science of ethics in the proper sense of
word, or to the logical fallacy of petitio principiu
the
be meant that no account can be given of the good and the right, except that they are the will of God, there is an end of all inquiry. We may be told by conscience and revelation what is right, but to the If
it
question of science,
Why
to accept this authority
other
the
and the
hand,
is
right
it
there
?
is
?
why am
be meant merely
it
bound
I
no answer.* that
on good
If,
the
become known to us through the direct upon our minds and consciences, we know that this is right, that wrong, because right
action of another will i.e.,
that
God
tells us,
for theology
the truth of this account will be a question
and metaphysics
"
;
but, true or false,
it
does
mere Will, Decree or Law of and wrong, then are these latter words of no significancy at all. For thus, if each part of a contradiction were affirmed for truth by the supreme Power, they would consequently become true. Thus if one person were decreed to suffer for another's fault, the sentence would be just and equitable. And thus in the same manner, if arbitrarily and without reason some beings were destined to endure perpetual ill, and others as constantly to enjoy good, this also would pass under the same denomi* As God be
nation.
Shaftesbury puts
it,
If the
said absolutely to constitute right
But
to say of anything that
foundation as this
is
it is
to say nothing or to
Inquiry concerning Virtue, Book
just or unjust on such a speak without meaning."
I., Pt. iii.,
ยง 2.
28
Ethics
[Bk.
We
not help us to the solution of the ethical question. are
still left
God
wills
it,
we
bility
right ?
is it
God
or does
the former case
are
Why
to ask,
will
it
Is
because
right
it is
because In
right ?
are back at the denial of the possi-
we
of any science of ethics; in the latter case
beginning of our investigation, and our
at the
still
explanation of the judgment of right I
it
claim then for ethics that
it is
is still
to seek.
a science in the
same
sense as any one of the physical or material sciences.
aims
i
It
moral judgments, as astronomy aims
at explaining
motions of the planets, or geometry
at explaining the
the properties of figures, by showing their place in a
system which cannot exist as a consistent whole existing
at
all)
it
to a
decree of a divine for
Thus, to anticipate,
without them.
the judgment that theft
merely referring
(or,
cannot be recognised by reason as
other words,
in
other people's
wrong
is
is
not explained by
moral sense or feeling, or to the
will,
but by showing that disregard
property
is
inconsistent
system of mutual relations which we
call
with
social
that
life.
Note.
The
distinction
drawn
in ยง 7
between natural and normative
is
not proposed as the basis of a philosophical classification of the sciences.
(For such a
classification, in
which ethics, or the Science of
Good appears as the last term in the series, see Plato's Republic, Book VI., p. 507 foil., and for an elaborate modern expansion of
the
Comte's Positive Philosophy, Miss Martineau's English AbridgI.) The distinction is adopted in the text to emphasise the point under discussion, and must not be pressed. More especially I must warn the student against imputing to me the view that ethics aims at laying down rules, or offering direct instruction for the conduct of life. That the study has important practical bearings, I have already implied in Chapter I. that many suggestive practical it,
ment, Vol.
;
Ch.
II]
Can
there be
a Science of Ethics
?
2<j
hints are to be found in writers upon ethics, and even that for the work of the preacher and teacher of morality it constitutes by far
the most important intellectual preparation, I willingly admit; but just for this reason I
hold
it
to
be
all
the
more important
to obviate
misunderstanding by drawing a clear line of demarcation between the scientific analysis of moral judgments and the system of practical instruction that
may be founded upon
of this question see next chapter.
it.
For the further discussion
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Ethics
30
CHAPTER
[Bk.
I
III.
SCOPE OF THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.
In what sense Ethics
§ 11.
differs
from the Natural
Sciences.
Having
indicated in what sense ethics
resemble other sciences, define
general
its
respects
differs
it
is
may be
remains for
me
said to
further to
character by pointing out from them. It differs from
natural sciences in that (1) It
it
what
in all
the
a rule
or
:
regulative.
Ethics
deals
with
standard of judgment, not with physical events and the causes which determine them.
This has been already
and need not now detain however, a further distinction which it explained,
us. is
It
involves,
of the utmost
importance to note. (2) It treats
man
as conscious.
Seeing that ethics deals
man upon himself upon the assumption that man is not merely a part of nature and the blind servant of her purposes, but is conscious of being a part, and of being with judgments consciously passed by
and
others,
it
rests
subject to her laws.
way
He
not only behaves in a certain
in presence of particular circumstances, as
may be
said to "
but he
is
behave
" in the
conscious of his behaviour in
himself and others.
It
is
oxygen
presence of hydrogen, its
relation to
on the ground of
this con-
Ch.
sciousness
any
3i
Scope of the Science of Ethics
ill]
that
he passes judgment upon it. Hence human conduct and
attempt to treat the science of
character
doomed
merely a branch of material science
as
ethics cannot
is
" explanations " in the field of
The
to failure.
be in terms of the laws and hypotheses
that are applicable in the field of physical science.
The
laws of motion or the principle of the conservation of force
are
here out of court.
conduct may be described but the important thing
as a
is
It
true
is
mode
that
human
or form of energy,
the "form,"
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
is
it
conscious
and that makes all the difference. Nothing has created more confusion in the history of science than the attempt to take principles which successfully explain phenomena in one field and apply them to those of another to which they are inapplicable. It was thus energy,
that the Pythagoreans thought that the laws of abstract
number were adequate the physical world
;
to explain the concrete facts of
the atomists that the hypothesis of
was sufficient to explain and thought. And though we
indestructible, material atoms, all
phenomena
of
life
have given over these attempts in their cruder forms, yet
we
ciple
to
are
still
in
liable,
our enthusiasm for a prin-
which we have victoriously applied
in
one
field,
overlook fundamental distinctions of subject-matter,
and apply
it
in
a
field
where
levant or only relatively valid.*
it
is
We
altogether
irre-
are in continual
* As a prominent instance of this mistake at the present time we might take the tendency to apply the law of natural selection, as it is observed to operate in unconscious nature and among the lower animals, to the life of man as a conscious and intelligent
member free
from
of a social system. this error.
A
treatment of the moral
Even Mr. Spencer
is
not altogether
great deal of the antagonism to the scientific
life is
phenomena upon inadequate
probably due to attempts to explain principles.
its
Ethics
32
[Bk.
j
danger of forgetting that the world does not consist of facts all upon the same plane and explicable by same axioms and definitions, but disposes them in
groups of the
an ascending
resembling rather a spiral column,
series
from each new round of which we view the
and
before us from a higher plane
lie
we may here
In regard to ethics
angle.
as to state the view, hereafter to
so far anticipate
be proved, that
from the sciences that stand next below
and natural
ethics
society,
treats
it,
that while these
history, in
related to his environment
organically
him
of
facts that
a different
at
treat
in
differs
biology
man
as
nature and
conscious
as
it
viz.,
of
that
relation.
more
(3) It is
distinction
is
two already mentioned. (p.
Another
closely related to philosophy.
important.
flows naturally
It
from the
has already been observed
It
25) that the explanations of particular sciences are,
after
all,
explained clearly
or the
No
relative. till
its
phenomenon
or
fact
fully
is
relations to all the world beside are
known and
But
defined.
whole system of things,
So
of any particular science.
a subject of investigation at
philosophy or metaphysics,
all
far all,
the
the world beside,
not the subject-matter
is
as it
it
is
science
can be
made
the subject of
of sciences.*
But while philosophy alone deals with complete or explanations, yet relatively,
and
in their
own
final
field,
the
explanations of the particular sciences are regarded as
might be
valid.
It
of the
fifth
for
said,
proposition
instance,
of the
first
that
the truth
book of Euclid
independent of the conclusions of philosophy as to
is
*
Which, however, ought not
sciences, but only as
"an
on their subject-matter.
to
be thought of as opposed
to the
unusually obstinate effort to think clearly
"
Ch.
Scope of the Science
Ill]
the
nature and reality
think
oj
Ethics
33
and no one would
of space,
worth while seriously to question the
it
state-
ment that mathematics is independent of metaphysics. But the question may be and has been put with reference to ethics, Is it in like manner independent of philosophy
The
?
opinion that
older
was
it
methods of
treating
it
it
was commonly spoken
Modern
moral philosophy.
of as
apparently were of
thinkers as
not,
nomenclature and
have emphasised
indepen-
its
Recent writers even go out of their way to disown all connection between ethics and metaphysics. But besides the general connection which there is between all the sciences which deal with some particular
dence.
space
with
world
of the
aspect
;
which deals
mathematics,
(e.g.,
dynamics, which deals
bodies
with
in
and philosophy or metaphysics, which deals with the nature and reality of the world as a whole), motion there
;
is
in the case
This
nection.
view of the
of ethics
a more particular con-
we take
manifest whether
is
or
first
the point of
second of the distinctions
of the
already mentioned.
For
(a)
moral judgments are thought
we have
to
be
absolute.
do with moral judgrrents, and these judgments are judgments of value the value Ethics,
seen, has to
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
of conduct
or
character.
Now, whatever they be
they are apparently, at
reality,
solute, not
merely of relative value
thought and asserted that conduct
merely
relatively,
certain
end
live) as
desirable
relation
to
or
not
i.e.,
(e.g.,
is
;
for
usually
is
according as we choose to regard a not, but
absolutely,
our individual views of what
desirable
it
good or bad, not
the good of the society in which or
in
in
judgments of ab-
least,
particular
is
we
without
i.e.,
desirable
circumstances.
3
This
Ethics
34 apparently
is
[Bk.
meaning of duty and
the
with pleasure or
commonly thought
to
right as contiasted
In other words,
utility.
1
morality
is
be required by the nature of
things as a whole, not merely by the circumstances in
which w e happen to r
it
is
true there
ethics
more
man
its
And
even
if it
be
false
it
is
can be proved without
falsity
in the universe,
and
Man s consciousness }
of himself as a member of society
This intimate con-
involves a reference to a cosmic order.
may
nection between ethics and metaphysics illustrated
from the
do, not only with
fact that in the
man
For
man
further be
former we have to
as related to
social environment, but with
relationship.
his relation to
and purpose.
central principle (b)
if
or less overt reference to a philosophical doctrine
Df the place of its
how
see
to
Clearly
true or false.
is
a most intimate connection between
is
and metaphysics.
difficult
not necessary here to
It is
live.
decide whether this opinion
his material
as conscious
this consciousness, as
and
of this
may be
easily
shown, involves a reference to the whole world besides, as a cosmos or order in which he has a place.
In being
conscious of himself as a citizen of a particular or as a
member
of the
human
brotherhood, he
state,
is
also
conscious of himself as a citizen of the world, and as a
member
And
of a cosmos of related beings.
impossible to think of himself as a
member
circle of relations, e.g.> of the family,
himself as a state, so is
it
member
it is
without thinking of
of a larger circle,
e.g.,
a society or
membei member ot
impossible to think of himself as a
of society without thinking of himself as a
a universal or cosmic order.
moreover, in this all
just as
of any lesser
His thought of himself,
latter aspect, overflows, as
his other thoughts about himself,
it
were, into
transforming and
Scope of the Science of Ethics
Ch. Hi]
moulding them
such a way that
in
of any of the lower forms
treat
it
35
impossible to
is
of consciousness,
e.g.,
his social consciousness, without taking the higher into
account.
of course possible for the
It is
moment and
purposes of science to abstract one aspect or form
for
of consciousness, such as the consciousness of ourselves
members
as
ness
of a particular society, from our conscious-
of ourselves in general, just as
it
possible to
is
abstract a particular form or aspect of space or of force
But when we come
from space or force in general.
to analyse our social consciousness into
elements, and ask, as nature and contents
?
we do we find
in ethics,
its
constituent
What
that the answer
are
its
depends
upon our answer to the wider question, as to the nature and contents of consciousness as a whole, in a far more intimate way than does the question of the
of the
properties
triangle or
the
electric
upon the question of the nature of space or general.
of
with
will
itself.
remain
unaffected
whether
we
one school of metaphysicians that our
knowledge of space another that
mind
in
Thus, to take a single instance, the science
mathematics
believe
current force
it
is
given
from without, or with
an a priori form contributed by the
is
But no one could say that our ethical form of social consciousness which we
analysis of that call
conscience
will
remain
unaffected
whether
believe with the Epicureans that the world
is
we
an acci-
dental concourse of atoms, or hold with the Stoics that it is
may be ics,
We
are thus
natural
sciences
the reflection of divine intelligence.
led to the conclusion that, while the
said to
be
practically
independent of metaphys-
the conclusions of philosophy as to the nature of
the world at large and man's relation to
it
are of the
36
Ethics
utmost importance to
While
this
is
so,
subject-matter.*
its
may be convenient and even
it
an elementary
necessary, in
treatise
the present,
like
to consider the subject-matter of ethics with
reference
possible
as
i
and cannot be neglected
ethics,
complete exposition of
in a
[Bk.
the
to
philosophical
as
little
questions
Little harm can come of this course, so we know what we are about. It only comes be misleading when we confuse the temporary con-
involved.
long as to
venience of neglecting these questions with the per-
manent for
possibility of
doing
so.
To
assert that
we may
purposes of investigation abstract from metaphysical
considerations
is
one thing
our ultimate results
is
;
to assert their irrelevance to
quite another.!
Ethics as a "Practical" Science.
§ 12.
has sometimes been distinguished from the
Ethics
natural sciences
on the ground that
On
they are theoretic. tinction
found to be a
is
it
is
practical while
examination, however, the dissuperficial one.
It is true,
indeed, that ethics stands nearer to our everyday
than do,
for
very name, as
ground sophy.
instance,
we have
astronomy or physiology. seen, implies this,
It
is
*
The
f
precise point at
upon our notice
On
this
the science of conduct (7rpaÂŁis) and the affect
it.
therefore be said to be of immediate
selves
Its
and on
has sometimes been called practical philo-
it
judgments which more deeply
may
life
Its
conclusions
and universal
which metaphysical questions press thembe noted below. See p. 216 and 233.
will
the relation of philosophy to science in general,
see the
Logic of Hegel (Wallace's Eng. Tr.), pp. 9-12 ; and cp. Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics^ pp. 41 foil., where there are some excellent
remarks on
its
relation to ethical
and
political science in particular.
Scope of the Science of Ethics
ch. ni]
sense which cannot be claimed for the
a
interest in
37
does not carry us
For
far.
as a science ethics
is
it
But
mentioned.
conclusions of the sciences just
may
easily
this
be shown that
astronomy or
just as theoretic as
physiology, while, as furnishing the basis for the scientific practice of the arts,
and of healing,
of navigation
e.g.,
these sciences are just as practical as ethics.
The which
idea that there can be such a thing as a science
comes from
purely theoretic
is
thinking of the natural sciences
our habit
means
elaborated in books which are chiefly useful as a
In the early stages of the
of intellectual training.
was impossible.
tory of science such a mistake interest in the laws of nature
of his interest in his
ends.*
true that there
It is
began to develop that the condition of it
is
all
11
came a time when man which
higher achievement in science.
the
sciences,
the
is
Yet
practical interest
has in the subjugation of nature, there
danger that
it
may become
most viz.,
Novalis said,
*
Causes
to practical
equally true that, just in proportion as scientific
man
Even
purposes.
disinterested curiosity"
research becomes divorced from that
his-
Man's
was then only the reflection
own ends and
were only interesting as means
in nature
of
systems of truth
as
and
abstract
metaphysics "it
bakes
See Hoffding's Psychology,
pedantic or
or
no
p.
theoretic
of
philosophy, bread,"
is
a
is
dilettante, all
while,
not
t
the as
without
240 (Eng. Tr.).
f Mr. Casaubon's Key to all Mythologies in Middlemarch appears to have been of this character. One cannot help a suspicion that
much
of the erudition of the present time, which,
as
Hegel once said, <r finds most to be done where there is least to be got from it," is in the same condition. On the whole subject see Note at end of Book IV. below.
Ethia
38
[Bk.
I
important bearing on the practical problems of every-
day
life.
On
the other hand,
notion
the
that
ethics
is
less
come from
theoretic than any other science can only
the tendency, already remarked upon, to confuse theory
with practice in the field of conduct
ments about morality
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; ideas
and judg-
in the study or in the class-room
with moral ideas and moral judgments in the concrete
circumstances of daily
Has Ethics
§ 13.
life.
do with what Ought to Be
to
rather than with
what Is?
Closely allied with the views just criticised that
not less misleading.
is
Ethics,
from the natural sciences in
that,
This distinction,
it is
them
as they
maintained,
is
The former
what
is
is
the law of what
is,
ought
based upon
and moral
the fundamental antithesis between natural law.
differs
while they deal with
things as they are, ethics deals with to be.
another
is
said,
is
it
the latter of
to be.
Now
it
is
undoubtedly true that
for
the individual
the mpral law represents something that ought to be as
opposed
The
is.
to physical law,
law of gravitation
between the pen
relation
earth which attracts I
by
On
is
I
is
a statement of what
a statement of the actual
hold in
my hand and
writing
is
my
But
no more than
this
is
reader, whatever the actual fact to say that, as
by
this
be obvious to the student, these two are laws different
sense.
express
I
a statement of what ought to be
relation to
the
the other hand, the law that
be perfectly sincere in the opinions
shall
my
it.
which
may
be.
time must
in a
In the one case we have a
my
wholly
scientific
generalisation from the observations of facts, in the other
Ch.
Scope of the Science of Ethics
Ill]
we have a rule or maxim flowing from such What corresponds to moral law in
39 a generalisathis sense
tion.
is
the practical rule deducible from the conclusions of any particular science,
e.g.,
the rules of health which are
On
deducible from the conclusions of physiology.
the
other hand, what corresponds in ethics to the theoretic conclusions of science are the definitions, classifications,
and explanations of which
I
the preceding chapter.
is,
It
gave a general account
we
search for the conclusions there sketched out
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; science, â&#x20AC;&#x201D; but
from judgments of what ought to be, the distinctive
mark of the
its
progress the science
the closest contact with concrete
relative to
what
is
as to
relations,
thing as a moral law, any
in
we
more-
step,
shall
see, in
is
its
to
aim
true a
to
show
be are always
they imply at every point the actual
;
revealed in social
relations
it
what ought
existence of a moral order,
known
as
deals with
it
facts, in just as
Thus
sense as any other science.
how moral judgments
is,
start
constitutes
this
At each
these judgments as actual facts. over, in
in
indeed, true that in the
apart from which, as
there
more
than, apart
of the bodily organs
what we might
call
it
is
could be no such
to
from the
one another
the physiological order which
reveals itself in them, there could be any laws of health in the ordinary sense of the term.
In criticising the distinction which
it has been sought between ethics and other sciences, on the ground of the difference between the " ought " and the
to
establish
"is,"
I
have not meant to deny
obliterate
the latter antithesis.
categories
may be
tion
of
them
is
or
in
However
related to one another,
ultimately
possible.
I
any way
to
closely these
no
identifica-
have merely
wished to point out that the distinction between them
Ethics
4°
not applicable as a principle of division
is
among
the
sciences themselves.*
§ 14. It
Distinction between Ethics and Politics.
remains to distinguish ethics from a science with
which
it
may seem
to
have been confused, when we spoke
man as a member of The connection between them is obvious. They both deal with human conduct and character. They both treat of these in connection with the end of human good, and therefore as the subject of moral judgment. They both conceive of them as subject of the former as having to do with
society, namely, politics.!
to laws, carrying with
The
difference
is
them
judicial rewards
that while ethics
is
and
penalties.
concerned with the
analysis of conduct and character as the subjects of moral judgment (i.e., as right and wrong), simply, politics has to do with the analysis of those external forms and institutions
which lay down
in outline the fields in
conduct primarily manifests church, profession,
precede
politics.
etc.
Only
itself, viz.,
which right
the family, school,
Hence ethics may be said to we have arrived at a clear
after
*
See Dewey's Outlines of Ethics, pp. 174 foil. Also art. by the author, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. L, No. 2. f The word is here used in its ancient and honourable, not in its somewhat degraded modern sense. Just as "Ethics" is preferred " to the more ambitious title of " Moral Philosophy," so " Politics may be preferred to " Political Philosophy," but in both cases it is The hybrid to be understood that a science, not an art, is intended. term, u Sociology," seems likely to assert a place for itself. I under-
same
word
as meaning the theory of society in general, including and growth, whereas politics is the theory of civilised society organised as a state. On the distinction between Society and State, see D. G. Ritchie's Principles of State Interference, Appendix.
stand the its
origin
Ch.
Scope of the Science of Ethics
ill]
41
conception of the inward nature of right conduct can
we hope
to settle the question as to
The foundation
conditions.
of
a
proper external
its
true
of
criticism
must be laid in a true criticism of subject to a supreme law or purpose, is.,
political institutions
human
as
life
in ethics.
Note. Although
I
have followed in the textlof the preceding section itself between moral and
the distinction suggested by language science,
political
recognised
mode
I
may be
permitted here to suggest that the
of treating them apart from one another
is
the
temporary circumstances, and may be very misleading. any rate significant that the greatest thinkers have either
result of It is at
them separate treatment, or placed them in the closest Thus Plato's Republic is as much a treatise on moral as on political philosophy in the modern sense of the word Aristotle's Ethics is to be taken, as he insists, only as introductory to his Politics ; in modern philosophy it has been frequently noted that Hegel, the most encyclopaedic of philosophers, has no ethics apart from the trenchant analysis of society which refused
connection with one another.
;
he gives us in the Philosophy of Right. The truth seems to be, that modern intuitionalism and modern hedonism (both, it is to be observed, forms of individualism and of English growth) are responsible for the present abstraction from
fashion of treating ethical questions in
their political correlatives.
Finding as they do
the principle of moral obligation in the individual mind, whether as the seat of
" innate ideas
" or the percipient of
they have assigned to ethics, as
its
pain and pleasure,
chief subject, the discussion of
such questions as the nature of conscience and the freedom of the will.
More
especially are the popular forms of utilitarianism
re-
sponsible for raising into prominence the discussion of the nature of motive, and of the relation of pleasure to the moral end, and thus imposing upon the writer upon ethics the task either of re-establishing or confuting in his own way the conclusions at which they have arrived.
But
it is
to
be hoped that a deeper consideration of the
questions at issue will soon
mistake to look to what
is
make
it
generally clear that
purely individual in
man
as the
it
is
a
ground
of his moral judgments or the source of his prevailing motive, or
Ethics
42
[Bk. i
even to conceive of the individual in any way as arbitrarily selecting the principles which are to guide his conduct.
The motives under much more
the influence of which each of us habitually lives are
by that mysterious confluence of impulses which we call the spirit of the age, and which, as consisting of elements borrowed from the present constitution of society, current ideas upon rights of person and property, and the prevailing conceptions of the end or purpose of social effort, it is the duty of accurately represented
social or political philosophy to analyse.
acknowledged,
it
will pass into the
now understood
may be
When
this is generally
anticipated that the distinction in the text
background, the questions that occupy ethics as
being referred partly to psychology, or the science
of the individual mind, partly to politics, or the science that treats
of
man
as a conscious participant in a
common
life.
BOOK
II
MORAL JUDGMENT
CHAPTER
I.
THE OBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT.
What
ยง 15.
We
Conduct?
is
to do with conduct and from a physical or experi-
have seen that ethics has
character,
and
that
it
differs
mental treatment of the phenomena of that
its
subject-matter
is
human
a form of judgment
we must meant by conduct and
action in
upon them.
Before proceeding further
try
idea of what
character.
is
to get a clear
seems natural to define conduct as " human action." And this is a good definition if we understand properly what is meant by " human action." For instance, breathIt
ing
a
is
human
conduct, for in
action, but this
we do not
is
clearly not included in
distinguish a
action
man
is
not distinctively
human
good and a bad
In other words, the
automatic actions of this kind. at
all.
It
belongs to
an animated mechanism, not as man. Nor do we mend matters by adding " conscious n to action, and identifying conduct with conscious action. I am as
conscious
of winking
my
eyes
them, and of starting when
I
when
these actions are not yet conduct. 45
the
sun strikes
hear a sharp sound, but
They
are
known
t
Ethics
46
m
CBk.II.
As such they
psychology as reflex actions.*
are
shared in by the lower animals, and are not distinctively
The element
human. volition.
action
that
wanting
still
is
will or
is
Between the merely reflex and the voluntary which constitutes conduct there is all the
difference that there
(to take
is
between the blinking of the cat
movement difference
my pen
of
and the
The
across this sheet of paper.
that the latter
is
our previous example)
in the sunshine
is
so that
willed,
we may
define conduct as voluntary action.
ยง 16.
Apparent Exceptions
to this Definition.
Against the view that moral judgment attaches only voluntary action,
to
might be urged that we pass
it
moral judgments on many actions that are not voluntary,
e.g.,
explained
on if
habitual
How
actions.
is
to
this
and conduct is always voluntary action ? The answer that though the habit may have become so strong have completely mastered the
to
be
moral predicates attach only to conduct,
will,
longer be said to be responsible for
is,
as
and we can no consequences,
its
when each repetition of the action So that, while we cannot strictly be said
yet there was a time
was voluntary.
be responsible
to
event, seeing that
responsible for
it
for the habitual it
is
act
an isolated
as
not a voluntary
one,
as an instance of a habit
been voluntarily acquired, and which we ought *
On
we
are
which has to
have
the distinction between reflex action, instinct and volition,
Eng. Tr., eh. vii., and for a full discussion of the " instinctive germs of volition," Bain's Senses and Intellect, Cp. Wards art. in Ency. Brit, on " Psychology," p. 73. pp. 246 foil. see Hoffding, Psychology
f
On
the distinction here
drawn between conduct and
Lotze's Practical Philosophy, pp. 23
foil.
action, see
Ch.
The Object of Moral Judgment
Ij
In other words,
checked before it became inveterate.* what we really judge in such a case voluntary acts whereby the habit has Contrariwise,
if
47
is
the
become
series
of
irresistible.
conduct and voluntary action are to difficulty might be
be taken as equivalent terms, the raised that
many
actions are clearly seen to be voluntary,
and yet are not commonly reckoned the subject of moral judgment.
while the artisan
be
is
blame him this is
it is
all
thought that
when he
lays
they are not conduct
down
his tools.
may
his acts
conduct
:
which we apply moral attributes
(that in virtue of
only begins
conduct or made
work, though
at his
strictly voluntary, yet
as
Thus
We
to
him)
do indeed
being dilatory or careless in his work, but
for
thought to be on the ground of his breaking his
contract with his employer, not on the ground of the work Similarly, in the higher fields of the artist
itself.
scientific reasoner or experimentalist,
we do not
and the
generally
The
distinction, howand cannot bear investigation. The conduct of the hand and eye and intellect in daily work is as much moral conduct as the voluntary dealings with ourselves and others outside that
think of their labour as conduct. ever, here
An
work.
urged
artisan or an artist or a writer
" do his best "
man.t
is
Matthew Arnold it,
who does
not
not only an inferior workman, but a bad
Conduct then embraces not merely a section of
man's voluntary of
entirely arbitrary,
is
life
;
it is
said of
but the w hole of T
* See Aristotle's Ethics,
not " three-fourths of
it,
life
or
life," as
any other vulgar fraction
so far as
it is
human
life
at
all.
Book III., ch. v., where this point is and once for all solved in the above sense. f Carlyle once said of a joiner who was doing a job in his house in Chelsea that he " broke the whole decalogue with every stroke of his hammer." raised,
Ethics
48
What
ยง 17. It
remains to ask what
[Bk.
II
Will ?
is
which
this Will or Volition is
human action within the reach of moral judgment. The investigation of the phenomena of will as a side or aspect of the human mind is one for psychobrings
Here
logy rather than ethics.*
it
must
suffice to give
a short statement of the results reached by psychology, as far as they are necessary for the right understanding
of what follows.
This
will best
analysing
it.
be done by taking a simple instance and
Let us take the voluntary action of rising
and going nearer to the fire. What does this involve ? (i) Let us say it involves a feeling of pain arising from the sensation of being cold.
Feeling
conscious action, and by feeling
This
or pain.
is
is
involved even in
is
an element in
all
meant simply pleasure the most unemotional
actions, as in the investigation of a scientific problem.
were no element of
If there
feeling, of pleasure in the
thought of the acquisition of knowledge or of pain in unless we had an would be impossible. In the case chosen for illustration it is obvious enough that there is an element of feeling, and that on the supposition that the action we have under analysis is
the thought of being without in
interest
the
it),
voluntary this feeling makes It involves the incipient
proportion as this different
from the
moment shows There
is
is
There *
itself felt distinctly as
my
is
is
new elements at
end of
at fire
fire.
the
same
also. It is
(2)
im-
that are here intro-
the idea of the
See note
In
recognised as
which
of moving to the
warmth of the
mine.
feel cold."
I
state
state of the cat
desire of the
(a)
(*.&,
judgment, "
realised
signs
portant to note the
duced,
it
activity itself
fire
this chapter.
and
its
heat
Ch.
The Object of Moral Judgment
I]
49
in a particular direction and at a particular distance and of myself as warmed by it. (6) Side by side, and
contrasted with
cold
self,
this,
there
the idea of
is
feeling curiously
compounded
fire,
present
of the pain of the present
and the pleasure or interest (c) But if these two were all,
state
my
the contrast producing a heightened state of
idea of the
fire
in the idea of the
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
if
the rise of the
were immediately followed by
enjoy-
its
ment, as putting on the wishing-cap in the story means possession of the thing wished
s^h
thing as desire or
for,
It is
will.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; there
would be no
the fact that there
is
resistance to be overcome, something to be done, that
Desire
the condition of both.
is
is
a state of tension
created by the contrast between the present state of the self
and the idea of a future
desire
there
not
is
will,
may be
as
state not yet realised.
may be
a conflict of desires in the mind,
in our illustration, the
But
seen from the fact that
conflict
as,
between the desire of
on with my work and the desire of getting up and going to the fire. (3) This is the stage of deliberagetting
tion* in which
two
more
or
the
mind weighs,
mutually
Finally, Will, or Volition
concentrated on the
is
exclusive is
as
in
objects
a
balance,
of
desire.
the act by which attention
one object of
desire,
to
the
the others. Hence there is further involved (4) the " act of choice? "decision," or " resolution/' the essence of which is that I identify myself exclusion
of
in anticipation
with a particular
object
and with the
may
particular line of action required to realise
it.
be, however, that the actual
deferred to
*
With
realisation
reference to the object or end.
been taken, there deliberation as to means. resolution has
is
At a
is
It
later stage, after the
usually a subsidiary process of
4
5o
Ethics
a future
a
time,
In
letter.
till
I
have
case
I
am
e.g.,
this
which means hung up meantime in a resolution,
be called into
to
shall
upon
man
arrive.
life
We
have made a is,
as
were,
it
suspended animation,
state of
again
to
the idea
that
a book or
finished
said
when
the
proper
moment
do indeed pass moral judgments
resolutions,* but is
[Bk. II
they are only provisional.
A
not good because he makes good resolutions,
nor bad because he makes bad ones. the resolution passes into conduct that
It is it
only
justly
when
becomes
the object of a moral judgment, f *
And
f
How
even on desires.
See Matthew's Gospel, v. 28. from the completed act has become respect to good resolutions. It is not, perhaps, very
far the resolution is
a proverb in creditable to
human
nature that a similar reflection with regard to
bad resolutions does not make us more charitable to persons who are caught apparently on the way to a crime. Hoffding {Psychology, Eng Ed., p. 342) quotes the case of a woman who, having got into a neighbour's garden for the purpose of setting fire to her house, and been taken almost in the act, swore solemnly in court that she knew she would not have perpetrated the act, but hesitated to state upon oath that she had abandoned her intention when she was surprised. With this we may compare the passage in Mark Rutherford's story of Miriam's Schooling, where, speaking of Miriam's temptation to take her own life, he says: ''Afterwards the thought that she had She was been close to suicide was for months a new terror to her. unaware that the distance between us and dreadful crimes is much greater often than it appears to be." On the other hand, the mere wish for a result (e.g., Tito Melema's wish for his father's death in Romola) may contain already in itself, all unknown to the conceiver The occaof it, the fully formed resolution and the act as well. sion only is wanting for the wish and the deed to spring together.
On
the nature of will in general
see
W.
James's Principles of
Ward's loc. cit. Green's Pro leg. to Ethics, Book II., ch. ii. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 360 Bradley in Mind, No. 43 ; Appearance and Reality, p. 463 n. ; foil. Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics, pp. 250 foil. Psychology, ch. xxvi. of will and desire ;
;
;
;
Ch.
The Object of Moral Judgment
I]
Relation of Desire to Will and Character.
§ 18.
The not,
5ÂŤ
chief difficulty in considering an act of will does to the analysis of
however, attach
into
it
elements,
its
we
but to the question of the manner in which
are to
conceive of these elements as related to one another in the concrete act.
Thus
common
a
is
it
an isolated
as
desires,"
mistake to think of a desire
We
element.
"following
our
our
speak of
"having our
"controlling
desires/'
though they were something separate
desires," etc., as
from ourselves, acting upon us from without, or con. trolled
by us as an unruly horse
by
is
conception of the relation between the basis
(since
the
desire
will),
a
by something other than
gotten
desires
that
character,
are
It is
they
self that
itself
is
free
always for
owing
become
to
objects
reader
to
apprehend
conduct, but
it
is
it
is
this
self to
the
desire
* See Plato's
PhctdruS) § 253.
that
whom value
and thus is
always
whom
section
on
the
nature
so in virtue of his intellectual
depends
they
an object of desire to the
moral needs, acquirements, and capacities. words,
and
of desire,
for-
is
their having a
even their very existence,
Thus
objects.
It
objects,
dependent upon the character of the are
i.e.
The
choice.
inaccurate.
always relative to a self for
objects are
they have value.
their
at
and independent of
outside
force
however,
for
is
determined oy the strongest desire, is
conception,
these
This
rider.*
and desire
of the anti-libertarian doctrine, that conduct
at all times
is
its
will
upon,
and
is
of
and
In other organically
well-known simile of the charioteer and the horses,
Ethics
52
[Bk. Il
who
related to, the character of the person
understand
and an
him which
does not possess
it
for
in the street, precisely in virtue of the difference
of their respective itself in
desires to
This section has a significance
book.
attraction for
man
the
this
characters.
the object of his desire
His character
reflects
he thinks he
sees, in
;
more
the idea of himself as having read the book, a desirable self than his present self
:
whereas to the
man
book and the paragraph and awakens, consequently,
the street the sight of the
in
no such reflection, no such desire. These considerations bring out two points which are
gives back
of
the
utmost
human
First,
importance
tendencies propelling
They
are
always
for
man
a
theory
the
mere
of
desire.
irrational forces or
way and more or less
that
this
objects
As such they
conceived.
in
desires are not
way.
definitely
are to be distinguished from
mere appetites or propensities which are shared by the Secondly, these objects are related to
Jower animals. a
self,
and
that in
two ways,
(a)
They
are organically
related, as just explained, to the character of that
So
far
from being the creature of
be said to create his own
desire,
each
self.
man may
desires, in the sense that, as
he
himself changes by development of his intellectual and
moral powers, he changes the character of the objects
which for a
him
interest
related to the self
self,
that
is
or which he desires, in that
is
it
Hence
desired.
whether we
say, e.g.,
myself to be
in possession of that object
this
book, or
I desire
I
{b)
They
are
the realisation of them it
is
indifferent
desire that object, or I desire ;
I desire to
read
a self that has read this book.
The
essential point to note
fore
all will
(inasmuch as
is
will
that all desire,
depends upon
and there-
desire), carry
Ch.
The Object of Moral Judgment
I]
with
them a reference
Their object
to self.
53 is
a form of
self-satisfaction.*
Will and
ยง 19.
The mistake
Self.
of conceiving of will and desire as con-
trolling or controlled
from without
connected with the
is
more fundamental one of conceiving of the will and the As the former self as externally related to one another.
may be said to be the characteristic fallacy of those who oppose the common doctrine of the freedom of the will, the latter may be said to be the characteristic misThe latter often speak take of those who support it.t 'as though the self had, among its other faculties, alr>o a which was
will,
free in the sense of
being able to act
independently of desire, and of the character which, as
we have
seen, reflects itself in desire.
already said be true,
ground *
all
cases be self."
foil.,
calls attention
in
pp. 76
not isolated
phenomena
system of desires 4
we have
that, as
If
what we have
on the dependent
shall suspect this view,
already seen, will
is
" In desire what is desired Mr. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics,
Cp. Bradley's Ethical Studies p. 62,
must
'
we
;
;
to the important fact that desires are
each
to yield to
it
is
of our character " yields to
side
an element in a universe or that one such system or another through it the lower
means
;
upper hand of the higher self or vice versa. f It is not possible, perhaps not desirable, to enter, in a text-book like the present, into a full discussion of the vexed and difficult question of the freedom of the will. The above remarks are rather self gets the
warnings against
initial
errors in approaching the subject than a
difficulties. For a critical discussion of between Libertarians and Determinists, see Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book I., ch. v. ; and for development of a view similar to that in the text, Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, Book II., ch. ii. ; Works, Vol. II., pp. 308 foil. See also Mackenzie,
detailed
solution
the points
op.
cit.
,
ch.
at
viii.
of
issue
its
Ethics
54
on
and
desire,
We
desire
character. will
The
will
by the
the
It
self.
above sense.
self in the
the self apprehended as consciously
is
moving towards the It
and
related to self
is
cannot be too careful to avoid thinking of the
as possessed is
all
[Br. II
realisation of
an object of
desire.
thus differs from conduct as the inward does from
the outward
from the expressing
looked
aspect
of
the
itself
in
conscious
from the outside,
at
same
it is
Looked
fact.
the fact apprehended
inside,
action
is
at
that of a self
with a purpose;
Hence
conduct.
it
will
be indifferent whether we say that moral judgments attach to conduct or to the will (or self) that realises conduct.
itself in
Conduct and Character.
ยง 20.
In defining the subject-matter of ethics, we said that it
was conduct and character
;
but hitherto we have
not been in a position to set these two in their proper relations to
We have now, however, reached which we may criticise the common
one another.
a point of view from
For these ideas are founded which we have just been
ideas of that relationship.
upon an
error similar to those
criticising.
as
we have
They assume
that the will, of
just seen,
only the outer side, stands to
is
which conduct,
the character in a merely external relation difference being that, while
is
It will
shoals
;
the only
conceived of as
as
it
of the billiard ball
pendent
it is
by a natural cause {e.g., as the motion determined by the cue), by others conceived of as capable of acting in an inde-
determined by the will
by some
line
of
is
its
own, without relation to character.
help us to steer our way between the rocks and of this
controversy,
which
will
be recognised
by the student as that between Necessarianism and
Ch.
The Object of Moral Judgment
I]
Libertarianism,
we keep
if
clearly
55
before us two dis-
tinctions often overlooked.
In the
first
place,
there
is
distinction between and inherited charac-
the
the so-called natural tendencies
such as quick temper or indolent disposition, which are the raw material of moral training, and these same as elaborated and systematised by will and intelteristics,
ligence in that peculiar
mode which we
call character
former, as isolated elements of character, may in a sense be said to be " given," and to be independent
The
of will
though, as a matter of
;
fact,
they never
come
whose conduct may be made the object of moral judgment, except in a form which they owe to the reaction of will and intelligence upon them. Character, on the other hand, is the acquired habit of before us in a being
regulating these tendencies in a certain manner, in relation to consciously
acter it
is
conceived ends.
from without, but
is
the habitual
regulates that system of impulses
looked
In other words, char-
not something separate from will and acting upon
mode and
in
w hich r
desires
will
which,
at subjectively, is the field of its exercise.*
is the distinction between character as and static at the moment of action, and character as something that grows and changes from moment to moment.
Secondly, there
relatively fixed
In
its
former aspect volition must be conceived of
determined by character; the individual act must
as
be taken as the expression or embodiment of character. If it be not so taken it is difficult to see in what sense
we can speak sible *
or
Hence
in ordinary language of a
accountable for his actions.
man as responThe theoretic
character has been defined as a " habit of will."
Mill calls character
"a
completely fashioned will,"
J.
S.
Ethics
56 justification
[Bf.
of moral responsibility
that a man's voluntary actions to the moral qualities of the
is
II
the presumption
may be taken as an man himself. Any
index other
hypothesis as to the relation between character and
conduct
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;whether
be that of the determinist, who
it
supposes actions to flow from previous conditions, as physical effects follow
who
libertarian,
upon
their causes, or that of the
from character as a
the will
isolates
mysterious power of unmotived choice
human responsibility. On the human action is only one of a series
a
which
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
is
incompatible
former hypothesis
with
of natural effects,
would be as absurd to hold the agent accountable as it would be to hold the sun accountable
for
it
for heat or the clouds for
On
rain.
sition acts of choice are traced to
the latter suppo-
an abstract force or
conceived cf as without organic relation to the
entity,
concrete
or
self
who
personality
alone
can be
the
subject of moral censure or approval.*
On
the other hand, looked at as in process of forma-
growth,
or
tion
determined by habits
conduct
of
multitude
must be conceived of as As already pointed out,t our
character
volition.
the
are
result
of
of past actions, which in the
were voluntary.
whereby he
If
any one objects to
an
indefinite
first
instance
this
account,
asked to conceive of character as
is
determining and determined by the
answer by pointing out that
this
will,
we
at
once
shall best
apparent contradiction
not peculiar to the relation of character and the
is
individual act
The * foil.
life
On ;
:
it
is
of a plant
simply a law of growth generally. furnishes
us
with
an analogous
the subject of responsibility, see Alexander, op.
Bradley, op.
\ § 16 and
n.
cit
Essay
I.
;
cit.,
Dewey, Outlines of Ethics
>
pp. 333 p. 160.
Ch.
The
I]
Object of
Moral Judgment
At any moment of
instance.
determined by
growth
its
previous state
its
;
while,
57
the
plant
is
on the other
new shoot (which corresponds to the volitional reacts upon and changes, or, in other words, deter-
hand, the act)
remember
must, however,
man
themselves as such, is
while in the plant the
that,
determined are unconscious of
and the
determining
We
growth of the parent plant.
mines, the future
(and herein
conscious of himself as
at
lies
his
freedom)
once determining and
determined by his character.* Is Motive or Consequent the Essential Element in Conduct as the Object of Moral Judgment?
ยง 21.
There
remains a serious
still
difficulty in
connection
with the above account of the object of moral judgment.
The duct
object of moral judgment, ;
aspects
:
it is will,
and an external
and
and
of an object.
On
volve consequences itself,
in realising
question
one
?
Is
it is
factor.
volves feeling
out of
it
has been said,
con-
is
but conduct, according to our definition, has two action
On
desire,
;
it
involves an internal
the one hand, as will
it
the other hand, actions obviously in:
in action the will goes, so to speak,
and
implicates itself in an external world, its
rises,
in-
which again involves the idea
object produces
Which
an
effect.
of these factors
is
Hence
the
the important
conduct judged to be good or bad in respect
of the feelings and desires involved in the volition, or in
which are involved
respect to the consequences
action?
The
controversy has
become
historic,
in the
some
philosophers maintaining that the Tightness or wrongness of an action depends *
upon the
For discussion of the sense
fixed, see Bradley, op.
cit.,
in
Essay
motive^ others
upon the
which character can be taken as Note B.
I.,
J
Ethics
On the
consequences.
[Bk. II
one hand
Mill asserts, "
J. S.
The
motive has nothing to do with the morality of the act."*
On
the other
wrongness motive
The
which
for
maintained that "the Tightness or
is
it
of an
act
it is
much upon
very
The answer
upon our conclusions
quences which we
to
shall agree to
call
kind of conse-
good,
much
ambiguity of
the
relation to conduct,
upon
ue. f
What will
Meantime
subject discussed in future chapters.
be observed that
depends
clearly
it
as to the
the answer we give to the question, " standard " of moral judgment ? which
some
the
question cannot be fully answered at this stage
of our investigation. in part
depends
done."t
is
the
be the it
may
of the difficulty turns on the
word motive, upon which, in its we are now in a position to throw
light.
§ 22.
Meaning of Motive.
It will be generally agreed that the motive is that which moves the will. It may therefore be looked for
in
one or other of the conditions which we found on These conimplied in any act of will.
analysis are
ditions are chiefly two
these are feeling,
we
and there
that feeling that there
—feeling and
to look for motive is
?
desire.
(i)
a sense in which
it
In which of
Some have
said in
must be admitted
the moving spring of action. It is certain no voluntary action which is not preceded
is
is
* Though it has much to do with our estimate of the actor. See Utilita?'ianism ch. ii. ; Autobiography , ch. ii. (pp. 5° foil.). f See Butler's Dissertations II. (Bohn p. 336). J For an early and acute discussion of this problem in its modern form, see Godwin's Political [it tice, Bk. II., ch. iv. i
Ch.
I]
The Object of Moral Judgment
by
feeling.
Putting aside the element of pain involved
and therefore
in all desire,
in volition,
it
59
clear that
is
the pleasure-seeker must have a feeling of pleasure in
moved
the thought of a future pleasure before he can be to pursue
benevolent
Similarly the
it.
man must
feel
pleasure in the thought of other people's happiness, the scientific
man
in
the thought of the truth to be dis-
covered, before the will of either can be set in motion.
But
it is
no
less clear that this feeling
motive
is, it
is
agreed by
all
cannot be the motive
For whatever else a
of an action in the sense required. that
it
end or
implies an
aim representing something that is to be realised, e.g., a future pleasure to ourselves, a good to others, or a truth to
be discovered, and not merely something that is This may is the feeling in question.
already realised, as
be otherwise expressed by saying that, while feeling as an element in desire may be said to be the efficient cause of action, a motive a reference
to
a
final
generally admitted to imply
is
cause.
Moreover,
it
is
to
be
observed in connection with the question placed at the
head of the preceding section *hat feeling, in the sense has in itself and as feeling no moral
just explained,
qualities whatsoever.
It is
only in virtue of
tion with certain objects that
Thus
it
its
connec-
acquires such a quality.
the feeling of pleasure in the thought of a pleasure
good nor bad. Its moral quality depends wholly on the kind of pleasure which is thought is
of.
as a feeling neither
Similarly the feeling of pleasure at the thought of
a particular act of well-doing or a particular scientific investigation has
upon
over any other feeling.
its
It
own
right
no moral
only derives
its
superiority
right to
approbation from the object which kindles
it
;
moral
in other
words, from the end or aim towards which the desire
6o
Ethics
of which
an element
it is
is
[Bk. Ii
directed.*
cannot be simply the desire. " moved," and, as
of an object self
;
we have
(3) Is
motive of the action still
be asked,
motive before the has identified
said to
is
moved by
it is
towards an object not yet attained which
might
by
itself
then
clear that
it
be
the idea
in fact, that projection of the feeling
it is,
dition of volition. real
It is
Desire
seen,
May we
(2)
look for the motive in the desire?
then
In a sense
?
is
the con-
this idea of the object the it is,
but a question
Is this idea of a desired object a
has chosen it, or only after the will with the object and been " moved "
will
itself
By some motive has been taken, in the former mean the idea of any object presented to the
it ?
sense, to
mind
as desirable.
tion this usage
Popular language would seem to sanc-
when
it
though several ideas were fighting
as
seeing that the motive
moved
not
is
speaks of " a conflict of motives,"
until
it
is
that
chooses,
for mastery.
which moves, and the
But will
seems more correct to
it
define motive finally as the idea of the object which, through congruity with the character of the
self,
moves the will.t
* It
might be said (Martineau seems to say so, Types of Ethical Theory, Part II., Book II., ch. vi., § 1) that malevolence is a feeling
which ing.
is
It
unconditionally bad. is,
as the
word
But malevolence
On
relation
see
7,
the whole subject of the Dewey, op. cit., pp. 5, 6, the words there cited.
t
On
pp. 90
The view
more than a
feel-
between feeling and motive, Also below, p. 1 10, and
10. 108.
the subject of motive, see Green, op.
foil.
is
indicates, a "desire for evil" to another.
in the text has
move
been
cit.,
Book
criticised as
II., ch.
though
i.,
it
from any felt interest a mistake which it is pointed out was dealt with by Aristotle, in it who rightly maintains that the mere conception of an end cannot be a motive (biavoia avrrj ovOkv Kivei ct\\' rj eveKa rod /cat irpaKTLKi], I do not, however, admit that the statement Ethics, VI., ii., § 5). in the text involves this fallacy, and regard my own view as in subimplied that an idea can
to action apart
—
stantial
agreement with that of Aristotle.
Ch.
The Object of Moral Judgment
I]
61
Motive and Intention.
ยง 23.
Further to clear the ground of preliminary
difficulties
which beset the question of the relation of motive and consequent to one another and to moral judgment, we
must
clearly distinguish
Bentham formulated
between motive and intention.
by defining motive is done ; whereas
this distinction
as that for the sake of
which an action
the intention includes both that for the sake of which,
and that
in spite of which, anything
is
done.
Intention
The former may be
thus wider than motive.
is
to include the latter, but not vice versa.
said
For while the
end or consequent for the sake of which the action is done is, of course, intended, it is only part of the intention, and is sometimes distinguished from the other part as the " ultimate intention."
On
the other hand, the
consequences of the intermediate steps or the means adopted, though part of the intention, are the motive.
Thus
said to intend the child's
the motive.
is
not part of
who punishes his child is The good of the child good.
the father
But he
also intends
the pain, however, though
to cause the child
pain
;
tion,
cannot in any sense be called the motive or reason
why he punished him. Or who sells his coat to buy a is
to
do
buy the bread. It is part
so.
coat, but this
It
is
it
is
part of the inten-
take the case of the loaf of bread.
man
His motive
also part of his intention to
of his intention also to part with his
cannot in any
intelligible sense
be said to
be the motive of his conduct. ยง 21.
Bearing of Results on Question between Motive and Consequent.
If
we now revert to the question with which we we perr^ive that the antithesis upon which the
started
62
Ethics
controversy turns
in reality a false one.
is
consequent are not the
really
The motive
manner supposed.
is
sequent as apprehended and willed.
in
the ultimate con-
accordingly
It is
whether we say that the motive or the con-
indifferent
sequent
Motive and
opposed to one another
the
is
object of moral
judgment, so long as
we understand what we are speaking about. Thus we may say that an act is good because the motive is good but we shall be careful to note that by motive we mean, not a mere feeling, but the end with which ;
the will identifies reveals that
it
is
to the act this
itself in
the action, and by so doing the other hand,
we may
say
the consequences which give moral character
we
but again
;
true only
is
On
character.
its
if
be careful to note that
shall
by consequences we
consequences as preconceived,
i.e.,
as
mean,
first,
intended,
and,
secondly, those of the intended consequences for the sake
of which the act final
is
cause of the
sible for
done,
act.
i.e.,
the idea of which
A man
is
the
cannot be held respon-
consequences which he did not foresee, except
in so far as
he
Nor
be judged good or bad on the ground of
is
he
to
is
responsible for not foreseeing them.
which was his intention So judged, the regicide for the cause of freedom would be condemned, the tyrant
that part of the consequences
merely and not his motive.
who saved
a victim from drowning to burn
him
at the
Only when we have taken into account the act as a whole, and answered the questions, (1) whether the consequences as a whole are good or bad, stake would be justified.
(2)
whether these consequences were the end aimed at, right to found our moral judgments upon them.*
have we a
* It has been said that most of the great historic controversies have turned on the ambiguity of words. The present seems an
Ch.
The Object of Moral Judgment
I]
§ 25.
it
63
Will and Motive.
As
a further consequence of our definition of motive
will
be seen that what was said in a previous section
on the relation between
will
and desire
applies, mutatis
mutandis, to the relation between will and motive.
motive
is
the idea of the wider object desired,
Since
and since
upon the character of the same may be said of the motive.
the object desired depends self that desires, the
This
is
isometimes expressed by saying that a
stitutes " his
own
that the motive
the
will,
And
motive.
is
" con-
this is true in the sense
not to be conceived of as external to
or as something that acts
The mind and
from without.
man
upon
will of a
or appeals to
man
it
are already
expressed in his motives, so that in being determined
by them he
in
is
sense determined by himself.
strict
Hence we may
pass from
instance in point.
After
judgment on a man's conduct
making the
intention {Utilitarianism, ch.
ii.,
distinction
n.) Mill
between motive and
goes on to maintain that,
while the motive has nothing to do with the morality of an action, the intention certainly has. But, on looking closer, we find that he means by intention "what the agent wills to do" which, taken in
the narrower sense of the ultimate intention explained,
is
precisely
what we have seen to be the proper meaning of motive. From this he distinguishes motive as " the feeling which makes him will so to do," which is precisely what we have said motive ought not to mean for the feeling, as feeling, has no moral quality whatsoever. Mill's opponents {e.g., Martineau, see Types of Ethical Theo?y, p. 274) use the words in the same sense as he does, but are certainly wrong in maintaining that the motive conceived of as a feeling or affection is that which is primarily the object of moral judgment. For a classical statement of the true relation of motive and consequent the inward and the outward in conduct see Logic of Hegel, Wallace's Eng. Tr., pp. 219-221 and for the further discussion of the question raised in the text, and of other difficulties that rise out ;
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
;
of
it,
Green, op,
pp. 34-46.
cit.,
Book
IV., ch.
i.,
init.
;
Mackenzie,
op. cit. f
64
Ethics
[Bk. II
and character to judgment upon his motive, for in doing so we do not pass from judgment upon will to judgment upon something foreign to it. In judging a man's motive to be bad, we pass condemnation on the character or habit of will for being such that this could be a motive to
it.
ยง 26.
Summary.
Returning from the discussion of these
may sum up far as
is
Conduct,
Volition, or act of Will,
of conduct,
may be
which
defined as the
is
i.e.,
voluntary action.
the distinctive
movement
towards the realisation of an object, conceived of
its
own
we
The
they are important for our main investigation.
object of moral judgment
The
difficulties,
the conclusions arrived at in this chapter, so
being, as well-being or as good.
mark
of the Self
of,
as a state
Judgment
on conduct may therefore, with equal justice, be said to be judgment upon will, or upon the self which is As, moreover, Character,
expressed in the act of
will.
properly understood,
simply the general habit of
determining
is
in its particular actions,
it
attach with equal propriety to character.
Motive of an action feeling (which,
of
will,
is
not, as
will
moral judgments Finally,
commonly supposed,
though undoubtedly present
the the
in every act
has as feeling no moral quality), but the idea
of the object in which the self satisfaction.
Hence,
as
is
moved
to look for
organically related to the self
(being, in fact, only possible as a motive to a self of such
and such a
character), the motive
is
also with
regarded as a proper object of Moral Judgment.
justice
"
Cm.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
CHAPTER
II.
THE STANDARD OF MORAL JUDGMENT
If, in
LAW.
we we perceive at once On the one hand we speak of or " wrong," and on the other as And these two forms seem to imply Looked at from the side of its ety-
seeking for the standard of moral judgment,
with an analysis of
that this
twofold.
is
conduct as " right " "
— MORAL
The Two General Forms of Moral Judgment.
§ 27.
start
«5
" bad."
good " or
different standards.
mology, right
is
its
form,
connected with Lat. rectus
or " according to rule" *
Similarly the
most nearly corresponding to
=
"straight
word
in
right, A1A07 (Dike),
Greek
with the
8iWos (dikaios) and the adv. SUrjv (diken = in early Greek simply " according to rule "), is connected with the
adj.
root
die,
Germ,
to point or direct.
gut,
is
On
the other hand, good,
connected with the root
gat/i,
found in Gr.
ayaOos (agathos),t and meaning serviceable or valuable for
an end.
we have a circle of words referring to the phenomena of the moral life, and bearing obvious Similarly
*
Cp. jus and jubeo, from
yu
(the root also of fetfyytipu and iugutri),
to bi d.
f Cp.frugi. 5
;
66
Ethics
[Bk. II
one or other of these fundamental ideas. we have the vocabulary of right e.g., " duty," that which is owed or which we are bound to do; " obligation," that which binds us " ought " or owed to
affinity
On
the one hand
:
;
"responsibility," tribunal, etc.
On
a legal
before
answerableness, as
hand we have the vocabufor an end e.g., in " virtue,"
the other
goodness or
lary of
the
or
fitness
:
of fitness in a man, corresponding to Gr.
quality
apery (arete), from root ar, found in apapto-Ku (ararisco), to fit or join together ; " worth," or value for an end, etc.
Which
ยง 28.
of these
is
Prior ?
There thus seem to be two standards, or at any rate two different ways of conceiving of the same standard, that of a law
be
raised,
relation
and
an end; and the question may is prior, and what is their
that of
Which
of these
one another?
to
the conception of end, as in importance, being that
at the
individual or
is
is
the nation,
is
prior
rests,
yet
Whether
in time.
first
while
that
on which the other
the earliest idea of morality
which
is
shall hereafter see,
comes
the conception of law
we look
The answer we
we
find that
of a species of conduct
imposed upon us by a law.*
Thus each
of us,
at his first introduction into the world, finds himself in * This, of course,
does not prevent us from admitting that at
the outset moral and political laws must have been recognised as
serving
Book
some
Cp. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics,
social utility.
III., cb. iii.:
" There
is
an idea which equally underlies the
which is prior, so which must have been
conception both of moral duty and legal right to speak, to the distinction at
work
in the
minds of
between them
men
;
;
before they could be capable of recog-
nising any kind of action as one that ought to be done.
tices.
common
.
.
.
This
is
This is true even of religious pracTheir claim to respect must in the first instance have been
the idea of a
good."
:
Ch.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
the presence of a law which he
is
67
conscious he did not
make, and which seems to require from him an uncon-
The same
ditional obedience. first
idea of morality
is
is
The
true of nations.
Nor
of obedience to law.
this
is
idea confined to the primitive stages in a nation's de-
Probably the prevalent idea among the vast
velopment.
majority of the inhabitants of civilised countries, at the
present day,
that morality consists in doing
is
what
right, or
human guidance by shall see, there
is
a Superior Will.
Now
while, as
is
for
we
a sense in which morality consists in
obedience to an authoritative law, yet our
be to examine
what
accordance with a law laid down
in
is
this
first
step must
popular notion as an account of the
ultimate nature of the standard of moral judgment.
ยง 29.
Three Stages in Reflective Analysis.
In doing so we shall find that there are three clearly
marked
stages of reflective analysis, representing respect-
ively the
degree in which the
upon the contents of
human mind,
morality,
in reflecting
has been able to rest
(1) In more and among individuals at a later stage of development who have not outgrown primitive notions?
satisfied
with
this primitive conception.
primitive times,
the
law
is
conceived of as external.
will
At a
later
Cp. Sir Alfred Lyall's Asiatic Studies, p. 56:
their serviceableness.
"It
(2)
almost always be found that they [religious practices]
are really founded not, as they are
upon some
selfish material
interests,
and are
usually supposed to be merely whimsical super-
what will please the gods or as to what is right and But it remains true that this origin is very soon forgotten
stitions as to
proper."
the law becomes, as
it
were, fossilised, and, resisting the forces that
might have adapted it to new circumstances, is handed down as an unchangeable system of divinely given commandments.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; 68
Ethics
when
period, tenable,
it
shown
reflection has
is
[Bk.
this notion to
II
be un-
sought to supplement the defects of the
and to free the individual from bondage an external authority, by appealing to the internal law
traditional code,
to
of conscience.
(3)
While
at a later stage still these
two
forms of "legal" morality come to be recognised by reflection
way
give
as unable to bear the light of criticism, to a
new conception
altogether,
and
whereby the
is seen to be related to an end, which as intrinsically good and desirable determines ultimately our judgments of good and bad, and through them of right and wrong. We cannot do better, at this stage in our analysis, than
law
avail
by observing the
ourselves of the help afforded
course which, as a matter of
fact,
man's reflections on the
nature and contents of the moral law have tended to take.
(l)Morality as Obedience to External
§ 30.
The react
defects revealed by reflection,
upon merely
traditional codes
of as " given," are chiefly these
when
it
Law.
comes
to
which are conceived
:
Such codes are found to contain elements which, though they are commonly regarded as of co-ordinate (a)
Thus
authority, are clearly of unequal importance.
cere-
monial are bound up with moral injunctions, moral and
A
religious with political.
confusion and
its
the history of the Jews. lation
notable example of the former
subsequent correction
is
to
be found
The burdensome ceremonial
which had been insisted upon by the
in
legis-
traditionalist
and sustained by the same authority the moral * begins in the time of Amos and Hosea,t
as of equal importance
as
*
An
interesting survival
Fourth Commandment. t See Amos v. 21 foil.
;
is
to
viii.
be found in our own time in the
5 foil.
;
Hosea
vi. 6.
Ch.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
69
through the force of altered circumstances and a higher
and more
moral
reflective
feeling, to
be recognised as
a matter of quite secondary importance, irrelevant,
to morality.
if
not entirely
New
In the teaching of the
known, the ceremonial has dropped As an example of the way in which political entirely away. duties may come to be recognised as distinct from and Testament, as
is
well
subordinate to moral and religious duties,
Greek drama of Antigone.
Its interest
we have the to the
moral
marks the recognition by the writer, and the Athenian people whom he addresses, of the inadequacy of a merely traditional and aphoristic code to meet the varied demands of the moral philosopher*
In individual
life.
distress
and
in the fact that
lies
which the
life it is
conflict
it
unnecessary to
illustrate
between a moral
the
command
political or paternal authority frequently creates in
persons to
whom
moral duty has been presented solely
or chiefly in the form of a system of external rules.
But the
(b)
conflict is not
confined to elements so
obviously distinct as the ceremonial or political and the moral.
Within the laws recognised as moral, contradic-
The commandment " Thou shalt commandment "Thou shalt do no murder, "t "Thou shalt not lie" with "Thou shalt do no injury to a fellow-creature." The
tions necessarily rise.
may come
not steal
99
practical
needs of
in
though conscious reflection is and emphasise the unconscious of changing circumstances. Thus the inchanges in Athens had already sapped the
traditional
not
slow
criticism dustrial *
to
life
into conflict with the
are sufficient to reveal this defect
morality,
follow
See Caird's Hegel (Blackwood),
p.
6
;
Jebb's Antigone, Introd.,
p. xxi.
f See Plato's Republic, ยง 331 and whole passage.
Ethics
70 traditional
before
code,
the
[Bk. II
of the
criticism
sophists
came to assist and accelerate its disintegration. There are two ways in which the would-be conservators of a traditional code may, under these circumstances, en-
deavour to meet the
They may
difficulty.
make
the code so as to
it
co-extensive with
try to stretch
life.
In other
words, by inventing a system of explanations and exceptions they
variety
may attempt
to find a rule for every possible
of circumstances.
rabbis to
whom we owe
legalism.
It is that
This
is
the
method of the
the minute regulations of Jewish
which was adopted by the Jesuits
in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the express
view* of maintaining the religious authority of the Church amid the general defection from its moral code. In this form it was mercilessly exposed by Pascal in his Provincial Letters (1656), who in his own way asserted in France the main position of Lutheran Protestantism by appealing to the inner witness of the heart against the sophistry of an authoritative and casuistical morality.t *
" They believe
"
for the good of religion that and he puts into the mouth of a Jesuit, as an explanation of the grand object of his society, " never to repulse any one, let him be who he may, and so avoid driving
they should govern
it,"
all
says Pascal,
consciences
"
;
people to despair." f For a forcible contrast between the casuistical spirit of the Jesuits and the Protestant conception of aii inward light revealing a
H. Green's Lectures on the English CommonThe modern view of casuistry III., p. 282). " The place of every man has been well expressed by Burke determines his duty. If you ask, Quern te Deus esse jitssit? you will be answered when you resolve this other question, Humana qua universal law see T.
wealth,
I.
(Works, Vol.
:
parte locatus
es
in re ?
I admit, indeed, that in morals, as in all
things else, difficulties will sometimes occur. cross one another.
Then
Duties will sometimes
questions will arise,
W
Which
of them
is
to
be placed in subordination ? T hich of them may be entirely superseded ? These doubts give rise to that part of moral science called
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Cm.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
The
1
chief theoretic
preserve in this
objection against
way the authority of a
that, in the first place,
it is
the
7
attempt to
traditional
code
for every conceivable complication of circumstances,
secondly, even although
were possible to do
it
is
impossible to provide a rule
so,
and and
to bear these rules continually in mind, this could only
mean
the destruction of morality, which would thus be
reduced to the unintelligent acceptance of authoritative
commands. Another way
among many
is
to seek for
one chief commandment
Thus the doubts and diffiwere settled in the Christian Church
lesser ones.*
culties of the faithful
though necessary to be well studied by those who would become expert in that learning, who aim at becoming what, I think, Cicero somewhere calls artifices officiorum ; it requires a very solid and discriminating judgment, great modesty and caution and much sobriety of mind in the handling, else there is a danger that it may totally subvert those offices which it is its object only to methodise and reconcile. Duties at their extreme bounds are drawn very fine, so as to become almost evanescent. In that state some shade of doubt will always rest on these questions when they But the very habit of stating these are pursued with great subtilty.
casuistry, which,
extreme cases
is
not very laudable or
safe,
Whigs (Bohn, Vol.
On
*
great
because in general
it is
New
to
Old
"Which
is
the
the misunderstanding
it
in-
not right to turn our duties into doubts."
Appeal from
III., p. 81).
a celebrated occasion
commandment?" was
when raised,
the question,
volved was shown by the selection in reply of one that could not
by
its
feel,
commandment at all, being a direction to In reality the answer went beyond the idea of law,
very nature be a
not to
act.
and substituted
for
it
a principle of action.
It
expressed this prin-
show was conceived also in terms of an objective end. It was " the Kingdom of God" which "is within you." The distinction between Rule and Rational End corresponds to that between " the Law " and " the Gospel," between the ten words and the good word or the word about the Good,
ciple in subjective terms of feeling (love), but other passages
that
it
Ethics
12
CBk.
B
by advancing the doctrine of Passive Obedience, according which the supreme duty was implicitly to accept the decisions of king and pontiff as the oracles of God. The demand for such a commandment springs from a truer to
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the
instinct,
instinct,
namely, to seek a principle of
unity which will introduce order and subordination into
So
the multiplicity of the traditional code.
wrong
in that the principle that
right.
It is
is
an external one.
still
this
way the doctrine
it
is
sought
It unifies
by suppressing and
and
vitalising the parts.
destroying, not by co-ordinating
In
far is
just referred to
meant
in this
country the suppression of the inward witness of conscience against untruth and injustice in favour of the
duty of obedience to the powers that be. another example, the golden rule that
Or, to take
we should
love our
neighbour as ourselves has been referred to in the above note as a principle of conduct rather than a
But
ment.
it
command-
has frequently been interpreted by devout
Christians in the latter sense,
and
in this case
it
obviously
room for conflict and contradiction between its Thus I have heard it seriously argued that it terms. only commands us to love our neighbour as ourselves, leaves
the
implication being that when, as often happens, a
conflict
arises
advantage,
which
is
we
between our own and our neighbour's require
a further guide.
The answer
merely authoritative decides in favour of one side
and settles the dispute by making an arbitrary one of two apparently contradictory maxims. The discovery, on the other hand, of a principle which will mediate between them, and give each its place in or the other, selection of
an organic system of
duties,
is
the problem of rational
ethics. (c)
A
further difficulty
is
raised
by
reflection
upon the
t
Ch.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
nature of the moral
which
to a law
as appears according
If,
life itself.
view we are considering,
to the
this consists in
merely "given,"
is
73
obedience
does not require
it
much insight to see that, however august the authority upon which it rests,* this authority itself can only be In other words, the grounded on a force majeure.
man takes in it can only be an indirect one, made artificially to attach to it by means of
which
interest
having been
and promised rewards.
threatened punishments
what
this again
is
but the destruction of morality
may
whatever else morality ledged by
who
all
be,
upon
reflect
it it
universally acknow-
to
be something more will
on the ground
superior power.
its
§ 31.
These
(2)
Law
The
difficulties
it
as Internalâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Conscience.
has been sought to meet by repre-
senting the standard of moral
The
form.
law,
not really the external law at
is
or this only in so far as
law of conscience.
inner
the authoritative
may
contain
judgment under another
has been said, that constrains us in
it
the field of conduct all,
For
is
than slavish submission to a superior of
But ?
it
finds a response in the
It is
irrelevant
matter,
of conduct;
contradictory lines
this
of appeal.
court
inner law that
The
and enjoin but
we
without an inward witness and guide, that for all
emergencies, and
is
is
external law
are is
at
times
not
left
sufficient
the ultimate standard and test
of moral judgments. *
To
the Greek, Themis (Law) was the daughter of Uranos
(Heaven).
The Jews,
as
is
well
known, traced
their
moral code to
the legislation of Sinai.
f
On
Ethics
the subject of this paragraph generally, see Ziegler's Social
Lecture
II,
Ethics
74
We
must therefore examine,
[Bk. II
\v.
the second place, the
And
claim of conscience to be ultimate and supreme.
we shall have to ask more particularly what is here meant by conscience. By conscience is here meant the intuitive faculty of first
moral
judgment, with the characteristic feeling
accompanies intuitive,
exercise,
its
It
that
claimed that
is
does not arrive at
it
i.e. f
(a)
its
it
is
through
results
any process of reasoning, but acts immediately. Acts of fraud and cowardice are condemned instinctively; acts
of truthfulness,
stinctively It
temperance, are
courage,
approved,
(b)
It
as
in-
said to be underived.
is
cannot be analysed into simpler elements, being an
ultimate
irrespective
or
interest
among all and among course,
human
of
fact
authority of
of
secondary
all
pleasure,
all
the peculiar
our allegiance
It
universal.
well
as
ages and classes.
By
this
that
found among these
it is
such as
considerations,
is
lowest as
races,
meant
(c)
the
Hence
command
nature.
judgments, which
its
developed form, any more than
is
It
the it
in
found
is
highest,
is
not, of
an equally
the faculty of dis-
criminating colours, or of reasoning; but that whatever
development the faculty may or may not subsequently undergo,
it
these are in ยง 32.
same sense as are the and just as universal as
innate in just the
is
faculties of sight all
and
hearing,
normally constituted
human
beings.
Intuitionalism as an Ethical Theory.
Historically,
as
we have
already
seen,
was by
it
appealing to the inner witness of the heart that Pascal
sought
to
misleading
moral
law.
recall
view
the
mind of Christendom from a
of the
Pascal,
nature and
however, was
contents
content
of the
with the
Ch.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
contained in
protest
famous Letters against the
his
practical evils of the Jesuit
speculative
interest,
system
and, being without
;
develop
to
failed
of an inner witness into a reasoned
This task was
philosophy.
and was undertaken as a of
the
the
of
aid
any innate
A
of self-love.
assumed by the
ethical
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; 1679)
to dispense
on the purely natural
review of the various forms
known
would be impossible within the
limits of this
idea
the
of
from
developed
it,
beginning
of the
came
theory which thus
existence and has since been
Some
casuistry
of right and
principle
wrong, and to found morality instinct
the
to
attempt of the English
the
to
a later generation,
to
left
principle
his
system of moral
reply, not
Thomas Hobbes (1588
philosopher with
but
Jesuits,
75
succession
of
Shaftesbury
eighteenth
as
handbook.
who have
writers
and
into
Intuitionalism
Butler
century to
the
at
James
Dr.
may be gathered from appended to it. I must
Martineau in the present day, the bibliography which
here
content
myself
is
with
pointing
out
Mill's description of this theory as that "
supreme wherever the
that
J.
S.
which reigns
idolatry of Scripture
has
texts
abated and the influence of BenthanVs philosophy has not yet reached " * represents the general truth
emphasised between
in this chapter, viz., that
the
view
which
it
stands
midway
morality
identifies
with
obedience to a code of commandments received by tradition
and the view which seeks to some intelligible principle.
expression of
find in
The
it
the
value of
the doctrine, as Mill rightly apprehends, consists in the first
instance
superficial
in
its
being a reaction against the
view of the origin of moral judgment. *
Essay on Comte and Positivism,
p. 71.
first
Mill,
Ethics
76
however,
fails
we have
seen, this
that
in
the
notice
to
claim
other
theory has upon
immediate origin
its
[Bk.
it
which,
our notice,
comes before us
II
as
viz.,
as a
vigorous protest against the attempt to identify morality
with
any
himself
form of
hereafter,
philosophy
the
has
however
egoism,
of
under
still
the
influence,
inherited
from
Being
refined.
we
shall
which
thought
of
line
as
Hobbes,
see
English
could
Mill
hardly be expected to find any merit in such a protest.
Were
I writing a history of
English Ethics
it
would be
necessary to take note of the defects and contradictions that characterise *
Thus
the
would have
it
representatives of this
various
forms
it
has
assumed.*
be pointed out that the two leading school in England, Bishop Butler and Dr. to
James Martineau, exhibit opposite merits and opposite Butler, whose psychology is much in advance of his time,
defects.
rightly
perceives that affections ought not to be distinguished as selfish
and
unselfish, or
sense at others,
made
the object of moral judgment in any proper
apart from the objects (wealth, power, happiness of
all
etc.)
to
moral quality.
which they attach and which give them (See,
e.g.,
Sermon VIII.,
init.).
On
their
the other
hand Butler fails to maintain the intuitional point of view throughout, and even admits that the suggestions of 'reasonable self-love, which takes into account the rewards decreed by the Deity in a future life for those who keep His revealed commandments, may be accepted as a working substitute for the voice of conscience. (See Sermon III., fin.) Dr. Martineau, on the other hand, consistently refuses to compromise the disinterestedness of actions prescribed by conscience by admitting considerations derived from the nature of the object or consequences in any ethical It may, however, be questioned whether this form. consistency
is
not purchased at the expense of psychological accuracy.
For when we come to Dr. Martineau's account of the actual judgments of conscience we find it maintained, in opposition to Butler and the analysis on p. 59 above, that these are immediate pronouncements on the relative value of feelings, affections, or "springs of action," without reference to the objects to which they attach. (See Types of Ethical Theory, Part
II.,
Book
I.)
The Standard of Moral Judgment
Ch.
II]
It
must
be
here
sufficient
to
77
objections
consider
may be urged against this point of view generally, as it comes before us in the popular thought which
own
of our
time.
Mistaken Objection
§ 33.
In criticising
this,
which
known
is
as the Intuitionalist
view of the standard of moral judgment,
irrelevant it,
viz.,
that
an argument that
that the
easily
important
it is
Thus we must put
not to mistake our ground.
View.
to Intuitionalist
aside as
frequently brought against
is
judgments of conscience do not possess character which
recognisable
They may
attributes to them.
easily
this
theory
be mistaken,
it
is
argued, for various less dignified judgments and feelings
Thus, conscience
mere sense of
is
frequently not distinguishable from
propriety, reverence for custom, or fear of
committing an offence against etiquette.* not seem to be true.
An
But
this
does
appeal to consciousness seems
reveal a clearly distinguishable line of demarcation
to
between
the
which
as
is
two
much
phenomena,
failure
to
distinguish
a matter of intellectual as of moral
obtuseness.t
There *
"
white
are,
You lie,
ride
however, insurmountable
difficulties
using another man's season ticket, or you
or speak an unkind
to such things, never winces.
word
tell
in a
and conscience, if a little used But you bow to the wrong man in the word, or you tip over a glass of water, your shortcoming all day long ; yes, Such an impartial judge is the feeling ;
street, or you mispronounce a and then you agonise about from time to time for weeks. of what you ought to have done."
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Royce's
Religious Aspect of
Philosophy, pp.53, 54. f The case, of course, of survivals such as that mentioned p. 80 in
which what has come to be a mere convention
(or a moral obligation,
is different.
is still
mistaken
Ethics
78
accepting this theory as a
final
[Bk. II
account of the standard
of moral judgment, and these state.
As a
preliminary
further
than
I
must now proceed
I
to
necessary to go a step
is
it
have hitherto done in the analysis of
conscience.
ยง 34.
It
is
clear,
Elements in Conscience.
when we
reflect
upon
that conscience
it,
involves at least two distinguishable elements, is
an intellectual element.
Nor is
Judgment.
this
Conscience
judgment merely
merely a judgment of
is
(a)
logical.
It is
not
It is a
It is also judicial.
fact.
There
a faculty of
judgment upon fact. This judicial attitude of conscience Conscience in its is a prominent characteristic of it. usual manifestations seems to be engaged in a species of
judicial
this
Older writers delighted in
investigation.
metaphor, which they worked out to show
common
language seems to imply, conscience
lawgiver, accuser, witness,
and judge.
"commands," conscience
said,
is
that, as
once
at
Conscience,
" accuses,"
it
is
conscience
" bears witness,' conscience "aoquits" or " condemns." 7
They might have added, that
it
is
as
we
shall
also executioner, seeing that
" stings " peculiar to
immediately see, it
punishes with
So prominent is this function of judging, that by some it has been held to be its It is thought to be in a peculiar chief or only one. sense the voice of reason, and has been elevated into the position of a special faculty, which under the name it.
of the moral faculty, or the faculty of moral judgment,
had a prominent place assigned
to
it
in
however, that
the
older
this is
not
the only element, or perhaps the most distinctive.
It
text-books,
(b)
It
is
clear,
Ch.
II]
79
characteristic feeling that
the judg-
involving a
as
is
The Standard of Moral Judgment
ments of conscience come most home especially marked, as
is
to
to us.
be expected,
in
This
is
judgments
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
upon past conduct, the feeling of remorse, as is well known, being one of the most violent of human emotions. Hence some writers have gone to the opposite extreme from those who would exclude feeling altogether, and claimed for conscience that it is wholly a matter of emotion.* This view seems to gain some support from popular language, which substitutes " moral sentiment v and " moral feeling " for conscience, and endows them with
That
latter.
accurate use of language
may emphasise to above, give
but as feeling
is
§ 35.
(a)
is
view involves the
this
to in-
obvious, inasmuch as feeling
and, in the metaphorical sense referred effect to the it is
judgments of conscience, cannot pronounce them.
dumb and
Nevertheless the side of the
which
we have seen
the judicial attributes which
all
belong to the
here emphasised
is
phenomena of conscience
a true and important one.t
Defects of Conscience as Ultimate Standard.
The elements of feeling and judgment may stand Returning once more to
in contradiction to one another.
the criticism of the Intuitionalist theory, the
difficulty
first
thus
:
So long
as the
of conscience just described are in *
"The
we may
state
two elements
harmony with one
approbation of praise and blame cannot," says
Hume,
{Inquiry concerning Principles of Morals, § 1), "be the work of judgment, but of the heart, and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but
f
On
pp. 153 foil.,
an active feeling or sentiment."
the general subject of conscience, see Alexander, op. foil.
and
;
Dewey,
op.
cit.,
pp. 182
authorities there cited.
foil.
cit.
Also below, pp. 234
—
—
So
Ethics
another,
—so —
long,
accompanies the of an
act,
conduct of
that
is,
rt*K. II
the appropriate
as
practical
little
may
difficulty
But suppose,
life.
as
is
is
accompanied by a
resemblance to remorse. a conflict
?
we
?
follow
enough.
*
life.
which
we
say, "
qualms
yet,
are
we
is
must
simple
the conservative element it
continues to attach
conduct in the form of remorse,
"
on
to explain such
conflicting elements
In the present case
to certain lines of
the
feeling bearing a close
Psychologically, the explanation
It is that feeling is
human
in
How
and which of the
arise in
frequently the case,
that reason approves of a line of conduct
being chosen,
feeling
condemnation
intellectual approval or
or, as
of conscience, even after reason, the
and revolutionary element in life, has pronounced innocentt The ethical ques-
radical
in their favour as morally tion,
however,
still
remains,
Which
of these elements has
the more authoritative claim upon us?
answer to
this
may be (whether we
the instinctive feeling, or
we
shall
have
to
Whatever our
take our stand upon
upon the
rational judgment),
go further, and seek
for
a reason for
our preference in the ultimate nature of conscience, £&,
we
shall
have to seek a standard of judgment as between
the elements of conscience *
The
itself. J
reader will supply instances for himself.
between reason and feeling which some of us first
we
The contradiction when
will recollect,
permitted ourselves to take a row or attend a concert on
is a good example from contemporary life. f Another instance is the feeling that continues to keep us attached to institutions after we know them to bp useless, or to individuals after they have ceased to merit our regard. % Shaftesbury acknowledges this when he admits, in an interesting passage, the possibility of disturbing and impairing the natural sense and inconsistently e.g., by an immoral religion of right and wrong the good of our species proposes as a counteractive a high ideal of or public." Inquiry concerning Virtuet I. 3, § 2.
Sunday,
—
' 1
1
Ch.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
8
But secondly, within the of judgments. of the element of conscience which we described
{b) Relativity
field
judgment, serious
as
What,
may be
it
common
answer
difficulties
is,
that they represent
recognised principles of right and wrong
the :
cheating, unchastity are to be reprobated
honesty, temperance
other words
it
is
themselves
present
asked, are these judgments
are subjects " middle
the
intuitively discerned.
But
of the universality which
is
so,
we saw above
behalf of the judgments of conscience
main which the theory demands, we universal agreement on the
as that lying, truthfulness,
of approbation.
axioms
if this
;
" *
In
which are
what becomes is claimed on
?
Instead of the
lines of
moral obligation
find a perfect chaos of
and and wrong
contradictory principles at various times places, t
The
?
generally
and the standard of
right
be sought to meet
this
in various is
still
to
seek.
If
it
different
some
difficulty
by giving a
answer to our question, and maintaining with
that "
though undoubtedly
men
differ in different
ages and countries as to what they judge to be right
and wrong, yet they are all agreed as to the fact that there is a right and a wrong, and this is what is declared to be innate," this is to give up the whole position. For it amounts to the assertion that we know intuitively that there tell
is
a standard, but that intuition
us what the standard
is
helpless to
is.
* What Aristotle calls the major premise of the practical syllogism "All lying is wrong " ; the completed argument being, " This would be a lie, therefore this is wrong." t See the classical proof that there are " no innate practical :
principles."
Book
I.,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;Locke's
ch.
iii.,
Essay concerning Human and Book V., ch. ii., below.
Understanding,
6
82
Ethics If,
finally,
hended of
be said that wtiat
is
intuitively appre-
not right and wrong as such, but the true end
is
human
it
[Bk. II
life,
we have passed
new theory
to a
altogether.
We
have passed from the theory that the standard of moral judgment is ultimately to be conceived of as a Law, and we have substituted for it a theory of the End. In this
form Intuitionalism can no longer maintain
itself as
For whatever end we suppose
an independent theory.
thus to be intuitively revealed, the task of ethics
before us,
viz.,
to
show
that moral
is
judgments do not
still
rest
on a number of isolated intuitions, but are organically end or good. On the other hand, on any
related to an
theory
we may
of the end,
worthiness
is
admit that
very well
intuitively discerned, in the sense that
the necessary postulate of morality, and
is
not in the
its it is
last
resort susceptible of other proof.* (c)
The authority of tlie law still external.
In discussing
the conception of morality as obedience to external law,
we saw *
that difficulties rose, not only from the
For an acute discussion of
demand
different interpretations that
may be
put on the intuitionalism doctrine, see Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book L, ch. viii. Professor Sidgwick regards happiness as the
supreme end (Book
III., ch. xiv., ยง
2),
and thus claims
to
be a
With the utilitarian point of view, however, he unites elements drawn from intuitional and theological ethics. Thus he Utilitarian.
maintains that, while in virtue of the constitution of our sensitive nature, agreeable
and
satisfied
consciousness
standard of the value of actions,
informs us that another's happiness {Ibid., ch. xiii.
and
cp. p.
1
13 below).
it
is
is
is
the only ultimate
reason or intuition that
of equal value with our
own
When again he comes to discuss
the question of the coincidence between virtue and happiness he
seems to find ultimate support for the claims of conscience against the suggestions of egoism in the conviction of a divinely appointed moral order (Book IV., ch. vi.). As he takes too little care to combine these different points of view in a systematic whole, his theory does not entirely escape the reproach of eclecticism.
Ch.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
83
upon us, both practically and theoretically, to some principle of unity in the particular injunctions
forced find
of which
external,
of
it
If the
law
can only be recognised by
man
of
authority.
its
sanctions, that
its
but also from the consideration
consists,
it
of the nature
is,
merely
is
virtue
in
the pains and penalties which
are decreed by another as the price of disobedience
;
was seen to be the destruction of morality, and To the substitution for it of a long-sighted prudence.
and
this
meet
this objection
merely external, but us into its
it
is
was suggested that the law is not the voice of conscience. This led
some account of conscience, with the
injunctions have been seen to
one another
just as
lie
outside
and therefore leave
as those of external law,
us with our explanation or principle of unity
We have
result that
much still
to seek.
now, therefore, to ask, in the third place, with
reference to the authority of the law on the intuitional theory,
whether
it
in the sense
made
has really been
being called the law of conscience
demanded, the law must be seen
our own, not merely the law of some part of the law of a part only,
obedience to
it
on the part of the
obedience to something which
name
for the
whole
:
in a particular way, or
is it
inhabits the
intents
Now
final
is,
that, as
it is
self,
and
after
all,
Our question, on
this
judging and feeling
same body,
objection to the theory that
commonly maintained,
all
we must
conscience
it leaves the
external in the sense just explained.
yet to
?
rest content in ethics with the intuitions of is
really
If
only a part, connected indeed
and purposes a stranger there our
be
to us.
Is conscience,
self,
with the self in that
it
self
external.
is
therefore, resolves itself into this
theory, the
" internal "
external to the
is still
it
by
internal
To be
?
law
Conscience
is
still
not
84
Ethics
explained, as
on any
judging of
own
its
[Bk. II
true theory
it
must be,
as the self
acts,* but (as the very phraseology of
the intuitional theory implies) as a special faculty. It is the " Faculty of Moral Judgment," an innate and inex-
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
plicable
power of moral discrimination,
human
the rest of
from
sitting apart
consciousness, like the priestess in the
oracle at Delphi, and authoritatively imposing its decrees upon the human will. The whole conception may easily be shown in psychology t to be contrary to the teaching
of science sition
;
and blame, viz., imposed law. § 36* It is
the
now seen
is
it
to contradict the presuppo-
implied in the whole vocabulary of moral praise that morality
is
Morality as determined by End.
(3)
indeed possible to correct
demand made upon
be said that conscience
and
this
theory so as to meet
in the last paragraph.
it
is
to legislate for the parts.
as a conscious
free obedience to a self-
It
may
the whole or true self claiming Its
claim
is
the claim of the self
rational being, to judge
manifestation of itself in voluntary action.
any particular Its
voice
is
the
or of the self as a whole, which, as
voice of the true
self,
addressed to the
false or partial self of particular desires
and passions, rightfully assumes the tone of command, and has built up in connection with the varied circumstances and desires of life that system of authoritative
commandments known sists in *
obeying
as the moral law.
this voice.
Morality con-
Man's freedom
just
means
See below, p. 238.
f The human mind cannot be treated, as in the older text-books, as an aggregate of " faculties." The elements of mind, viz., feeling thought, will,
organic
etc.,
way than
are related to one another in a closer
this
mode
of conceiving them represents.
and more
The Standard of Moral Judgment
Ch.
II]
his
power of being moral,
of reason or of his true tion,
clear that
it is
of obeying the imperative
making
But, in
self.
we have passed beyond
its
place the
There is indeed a moral law which is and supreme ; but it is now seen to be so
an End.
authoritative
not by indefeasible right of relation to the true self, as
man, seeks to
The
this correc-
the conception
of the standard as Law, and substituted in ideal of
85
its
own, but in virtue of
the
its
End which man, qua
realise.
following books will be occupied with the further
end which is the standard of moral Meantime we may conclude this part of the discussion by noting some of the general characteristics definition
of the
judgment.
of this end, as these flow from the conclusions already reached, and
may prove
theories about
ยง 37.
(1) It
is
useful as tests both of current
and of the view hereafter
it
be
set forth.
General Characteristics of the End.* important to observe that
ethics with a conscious
being, to
possible object of desire.
Hence
we
whom
ethics
opposed to an empirical science.
as
to
is
are dealing in
the end
is
a
a teleological
It deals
with a
final
cause or consciously conceived purpose, not merely with
an
efficient
cause or general tendency of things.
connected with
and
Closely
be confused with it, there is the science of biological evolution, which shows how efficient causes have been at work in bringing human consciousness to the birth as the soil out of w hich morality springs. But it is a mistake to refuse, as is freethics,
liable to
T
quently done, to recognise that in passing from biology *
The remaining
portion of this cnapter
is
not essential to the
main argument, and may be here omitted by the student who to follow closely in
its
track.
desires
t;
86
Ethics
[Bk.
science.
we are passing from an The mistake is made
there
a sense in which biology
to ethics
that
is it
deals with the
II
empirical to a teleological possible by the fact that also teleological, in
is
tendency of organisms to adapt
themselves to environment
;
and
thus, through the law
of natural selection, to develop forms of
life
which we,
with a reference to the end of consciousness and social
But there is an important difference call higher. between the end with which biology and the end with life,
which ethics and
viz., that in the one case politics deal worked out by beings who are unconscious of it in the other it is an end which is consciously conceived. To overlook this distinction, and to attempt to solve ethical problems by the methods of empirical science, is :
is
it
one of the chief causes of confusion
in
working out the
doctrine of the end. (2)
That
it is
the fact that is
it
a good, and a personal good, follows from
it is
a consciously conceived end.
an object of
"object of desire terms.*
desire, and, as 99
we have
and "personal good
99
As such
already seen, are equivalent
mean
This must not, of course, be taken to
end is necessarily self-interest. We shall have abundant occasion hereafter to deal with this fallacy. Meantime, it is sufficient to warn the student against confusing two totally different things, viz., personal good and personal advantage. Whatever the end may that the
be
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; whether
only
happiness, or duty, or perfection
become an
recognised as desirable, us.
The
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
it
object of choice to us in so far as
difference
i.e.,
can it
is
a personal good, or good for
between a
selfish
and unselfish theory
* Qitidqaid petitur petit nr nib specie boni.
f In addition to what will hereafter be said, see the excellent treatment,
Dewey,
op. cit. y § xxxv.,
and the
authorities there cited.
Or.
The Standard of Moi-al Judgment
II]
of ethics
is
to
the
not that on the former the end
on the
personal,
self at
conceived as
is
impersonal good, or as no good
latter as
The
all.
87
difference
lies
in the
account
which they severally give of the nature and contents of the personal good. (3)
is
from the
It further follows
shown above,
it is
has been
fact that, as
the end of the self as a whole, that
intrinsically good.
good
It is
in itself not as a
it
means
Other ends, such as health,
towards any further good.
wealth, learning, are goods of the self under particular
aspects
as a physical being, as wealth-producing, truth-
:
seeking; and hence good.
further
of
that
good.
realising
in It
Hence
anything higher.*
tribute to
which he
cannot, for
the will of God.
it
cannot consist
not possess interest for man,
of anything which does as
means to a man, as man, cannot con-
are contributions or
The end
will
find
his
personal
be mere obedience to obedience cannot in itself be
instance,
Such
Those who represent the supreme duty do not suppose that it can. They tacitly assume that man's chief end is his own happiness, and that this will best be secured in this world and the next by the course of conduct they recommend. The view really undermines morality by substituting for it a
an object of interest or desire. obedience to the
long-sighted
God
of
will
prudence.
It
is
as
accordingly
a true
in-
which makes the higher moral feeling of the
tuition
C-hurch
now
insist that
the relation of
God
to
man
is
not that of a master imposing a law upon his servant,
but that of a father to his children latter
as
opposed
to
the
* Cp. Aristotle's account of the
:
the essence of the
former being that a father end as
self-sufficing (Nic. Ethics, I.).
88
Ethics
[Bk.
claim upon the obedience of upon the reasonableness of the law,
recognises that his children rests
enjoining conduct which (4) It
is
his
as
for their good.
only stating the fact of
is
n
goodness
intrinsic
its
way to say that the end is summam bonum. But we must be careful not to mistake the meaning of the expression. It does not mean that the good
in another
can be conceived of in any sense as a
goods or
of a number of
activities,
to
moment
It
does not require
daily
Human
satisfactions.
much reflection to discover that we are intelligent beings, does
important ends, but
more
trace
is
number of
them
up
beyond
In a like sense, the good for
a mere
sum
self,
of isolated satisfactions, but
which
all
we
life,*
to the aim, purpose, or final
lives.
in reference to
not
a system of ends, each of which
the case of a "consistent" all
our
isolated equally
or less consciously subordinated to one
until, in
it,
moment
each directed from
consist in the pursuit of a
is
of particular
does not consist
towards the satisfaction of a separate desire.
so far as
life,
sum
life
is
finally
end of our
as such,
the
is
final
not
end
others have their place and value
assigned to them.
At the same time we have thinking of the good as though of
some supreme or highest
tyrannising over the desires. exercises
is
not, so to speak,
to avoid the mistake of it
were the satisfaction
principle distinct from
and
The supremacy which it exercised in its own interest
from the interests of the particular desires. " Reason," says x\ristotle, " rules the desires like a consti-
as separate
tutional statesman," *
On
i.e.,
as their representative,
and
for
the other hand, one of the most charming characteristics
of children and of non-moral beings
important.
is
that all their ends are equally
Gh.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
iij
the good of the whole, not for
from
interest separate
moment
other hand, itself in
own, but
as
in a
made up
the one hand, to
its
one another
related to
own good
human
having an
is
self is
desires, with separ-
these desires organically
system or whole.
of them, varying from
one or other of these
it is
as
In other words, the
theirs.
not something different from ate interests of
its
89
dominant
is
It
is,
on
moment ;
on the
the principle of unity which expresses
them, dominating them and bringing them into
that unity
which we
call personality.
from the desires and
activities
It is
which
it
nothing apart unifies; these,
on the other hand, would be mere blind
instincts
of
propensities apart from that principle or organic relation self. Hence the good of more than the good of any
through which they become a the self or whole, while
of the particular parts
it is
or desires,
cannot be secured,
except through the relative satisfaction of each of them.*
ยง 38.
These Characteristics of the Moral End the
Basis of
commonly recognised Attributes
of the
Moral Law. These
*
characteristics of the
end explain the
peculiari-
which are commonly recognised as distinctive of
ties
The conception
of the
librium of the elements of
may be
Summum Bonum human
as a
harmony
or equi-
nature comes to us from Plato.
It
on the one hand, with the Hedonists' view, which makes good consists in a sum of satisfactions, and, on the other, with Kant's, which makes it consist in satisfying the demands of reason, regardless of desire. Recently it has been worked out with much skill by Mr. Alexander in the first part of his Moral Order and Progress. It is, however, a mistake to suppose, as Mr. Alexander seems to do, that mere formal equilibrium of function, ^apart from the satisfaction of the self of which it is the condition, can ever of itself
contrasted,
be the end, or (even
standard of moral
effort.
if
the distinction
is
a legitimate one) the
"
Ethics
9°
moral law.
So long
as
we
[Bk.
interpret moral
judgment
merely a judgment of conformity to law,
it
Hence we were
have seen,* inexplicable.
is,
II
as
we
as
forced to
conclude that such judgments, while prior in time to
we
those of value, as being the form under which
make acquaintance
On
importance.
with morality, are later
cancel
showing that
its
pre-eminence
logical
its
claims;
practical
its
it
On
away.
the contrary, of
showing the reason of showing that the end
is
its
its
the source of the practical rules
to
is
is
not to
establish
traditional attributes,
by
Thus,
in
claim to them. of which
the source, as other ends
the
it
supreme, we have established
the supre7iiacy of the law
(e.g.,
not to
law by
utterances have reference to an end, as
law in possession
the
is
the
explain
to
the principle of unity which underlies them,
explain
first
ethical
other hand, to depose the idea
the
of moral law from
in
maxims
of logic).
in
practice
it
is
correct reasoning) are
(e.g.,
On
from them same ground we
that flow
the
may claim that the law is absolute or " categorical. As the end is one which man, as man, is called upon to realise, it carries with it a law or maxim from which there all
other
pression
have
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; " Be
no escape, the a
established
showing that *
is
law,
namely, of which
moral laws are only the particularised
it
is
man."
t
Finally,
we may claim
ex-
to
law of liberty by not imposed from without, but flows
its
dignity
as
a
Pp. 72, 73, where we saw that this interpretation involved us by requiring us to make morality a means to a
in contradictions,
further end.
f Hegel's well-known formula shall hereafter see,
addition.
"and
is,
"
Be a
person," to which, as
respect others as persons"
is
we
a necessary
— Ch.
The Standard of Moral Judgment
II]
from the conception of an end which
and
intrinsically
These (1)
Moral and
Political
Law.
end explain further the between moral and political law.
characteristics of the
distinctions
Moral laws are more authoritative than
ments, conscience than political
judges the
bad
latter,
phenomenon (2)
declaring
is
legal enact-
Morality
institutions.
be bad or good.
to
unfortunately a
A
common
a bad moral law is a contradiction in ; Moral law extends over a wider field than
It takes
political.
them
law or institution
political
terms.t
self-imposed
good.*
§ 39.
familiar
is
91
departments
account of
all
conduct, not of
already
drawn % between ethics and
politics
is
a
some
This follows from the distinction
only.
of
science
the
politics.
external
For as
conditions
of
—practical
government takes account only of those kinds of conduct which endanger these conditions. These conditions are not morality, the corresponding art
indeed
confined,
as
a
popular
represents, to protection of person
philosophical
and property,
dogma
—such
* For the practical value of moral rules as " tools of analysis," see Dewey, op. cz't., pp. 203 foil., and on conceptions of rule and end,
Sigwart's Logic, Eng. Tr., p. 529. f The practical steps that ought to be taken in consequence of
such an unfavourable judgment upon any particular law or institution
depend upon circumstances. The obvious formula in a is: agitation for reform plus temporary conformity. If any one thinks he can best agitate by refusing to conform, and taking the consequences, he may be admired for his moral zeal, but he will be punished for his political disobedience. The justification will be that more moral harm would come from leaving the law unvindicated than from punishing an enthusiast for reform. % See note on p. 40. will, of course,
country like our own
— Ethics
92
a
limitation
life,
—
they embrace family and everything that admits of
purely arbitrary,
is
education, recreation,
public organisation in the interest of morality. details of
conduct within the
if
for
(3)
A
side this field, multiplicity.
no other reason than
moral end as an inward
the
balance or equilibrium of desires has to dp with conduct in it
out-
lie
their infinite
deeper difference directly connected
the character of
with
Yet the
circle of these conditions,
within the family, the school, the theatre,
e.g.,
n
[Bk.
that political law
is
external consequences, or
its
goes deeper merely takes account of intention.
if
It
takes account of such visible effects as theft of property,
On
neglect of wife and children, etc.
the
invisible
most
of
things
civilised
mind
the
the other hand,
recognised by
are
governments as outside of
their sphere.
the inward motive and
Morality regulates
as well as the outward effect,
disposition
—the conduct of the under-
standing and the imagination as well as conduct towards property or children.
"Thou
steal,"
shalt
It says
not
not only "
but
kill,"
Thou shalt not "Think no evil,"
"Flee vain and foolish imaginations." Political enaot ment can maintain property, the currency, the family, public education
;
it
cannot secure that the citizens shall
use these institutions in the for
pressed in the
men
common
and
spirit
which they were intended,
—a
purpose
saying that you cannot
The
moral by act of parliament.
for legislation
for the
truth which
which apparently has
this
regulation or suppression of public-houses
is
ex-
make
justification
aim
—
is
e.g.,
the
not that
by means of it we may make certain persons conform moral demands, e.g., abstain from intoxicating liquor, bat that we may improve the conditions of the moral life
to
for the
community
at large,
e.g.,
for the
neighbours or the
Ch.
II]
The Standard of Moral Judgment
children of the toper.
The man who
93
abstains merely
because owing to the state of the law he cannot get liquor is
obviously not moral.*
* A story is related of Connop Thirlwall, who on one occasion became involved in a discussion with the late Dr. Christopher Wordsworth, Bishop of Lincoln, when the latter was residing at
Trinity College,
about the retention of enforced attendance at
"It is a choice," said the Bishop, "between compulsory religion and no religion at all. " " The distinction," replied Thirlwall, "is too subtle for my mental grasp." The same might be said of compulsory morality it is equivalent to no morality at all. On the general subject of the relation between Law and Morality, see Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book I., ch. ii. ; also Elements of Politics, ch. xiii. and on the apparent permanency of the legal as compared with the moral code, Alexander, op. tit. p. 2S6.
chapel.
:
;
,
BOOK
III
THEORIES OF THE END
CHAPTER
I.
THE END AS PLEASURE. ยง 40.
Problem arising out of Results hitherto reached.
Returning
to the point we reached in examining the make conscience the ultimate standard of moral judgment, we may now state the problem which
proposal to
will
occupy us in the immediately succeeding chapters.
We
there found that the moral judgments implied in
the utterances of conscience are only intelligible as the
judgments of a
among
self
which, as
the principle of unity
more than any one of judgment upon them, and demands each and all give way when, as may
the particular desires, and
them, claims to that they shall
sit
in
frequently happen, their satisfaction
The
its
own.
it,
the Realisation of this
is
incompatible with
we provisionally expressed Self is thus the end which is
Satisfaction or, as
the standard of moral judgment. If
now we proceed
to inquire
nature and definition of this end,
more it is
closely into the at
once obvious
depend upon the conception of the nature of the self which is to be
that our conclusions will
we
entertain
97
J
98
Ethics
ÂŁBk. Ill
For there are different elements and according to our view of the relation of one another will be our notion of the nature of the
satisfied or realised.
in the self,
these to
self as a whole. Thus, there is an obvious distinction, which the earliest psychologists were not slow to note, between Thought and Feeling, between the active powers of thought and reason on the one side, and the
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
passive element of feeling which
comes and goes with
the varied experiences of the self on the other. tion, therefore, at
A ques-
once arose, traceable to the very dawn
of philosophy, Which of these elements constitutes the true nature
of the self?
Is
feeling
essential element, reason having for last
feeling or emotional self? or
sient
function in the
merely to minister to the satisfaction of a
resort
stituent in
the primary and
its
its
playing upon
effect
is
reason the vital con-
composition, while feeling its
only a tran-
is
In accordance
surface?
as one or other of these alternatives has been accepted,
throughout the history of philosophy, has been taken of the
par
ethical
excellence a feeling self, its
is
end.
summum
the view that If the
self
bonum,
it
is
has
been argued, must be a state of feeling if it is par end must be some form of rational ;
excellence reason, the activity.
The examination be of use
in
of these two historic theories will
helping us to a truer one, by teaching
us to benefit by the truth and avoid the mistakes of
each
The more
important, because the
more common,
which
this,
the critical part of our investigation.
will
is
the
accordingly occupy the main portion of
first,
the view that the
simplest terms,
it is
state of feeling
which we
call
Stated in
its
end is the agreeable
Pleasure.
— Ch.
The
I]
What
§ 41.
By
as Pleasure
its
pleasure
less,
One
produces.
it
line
another which, when
produces more pleasure
it
is
the
to
possible to produce
it is
that
;
of
meant that amount of of conduct is good re-
simplest form
conduct has value in proportion latively to
99
is meant by saying that the Standard Moral Judgment is Pleasure.
theory in
this
End
is
bad which,
it
being
possible to produce more, produces less pleasure.
There theory,
—
is
no
all
men
difference in motive, according to this
moved alike by the one motive, The difference is in the amount
being
desire for pleasure.
of pleasure which, owing to insight into the conditions of happiness and their previous actions tend to secure.
moral training, their
Thus, the intemperate
reprehensible, not because he pursues his
we
all
— but
not only do that, but
man
is
pleasure,
we cannot do anything
else,
because he habitually chooses courses of action
which involve large,
own
to himself, his family,
an amount of pain
far
and
to society at
exceeding the pleasure which
momentary indulgence gives to himself. When it him to create a balance of pleasure by restraining himself, he has done the reverse and created the is
possible for
a balance of pain.
Similarly the
pleasure or advantage,
— so far
liar
gains immediate
his act is good,
—but
the
pain and disadvantage ensuing to society, in increased suspicion, mutual distrust, impaired credit, etc., far outweigh the pleasure, and the conduct must accordingly be stamped as bad. The worst conduct is that which under the circumstances yields or, since there are many
—
counteracting circumstances, tends to possible
amount of happiness.
other hand,
is
yield
—the
least
That conduct, on the
best which tends to produce the greatest
sum-total of pleasure.
IOO
Ethics ยง 42.
[Bk. Ill
Ancient Forms of the Theory.
This theory of the end, in a more or developed form, has, as portant part in
made
its
that of
like
well
history
of
less
fully
known, played an imethical
thought.
It
appearance in the early morning of philo-
The
sophy.
the
is
character
whose influence, was rather due to his life and any system of doctrine which he
teaching of Socrates, Christ,
than to
propounded, contained a number of elements loosely held together.
Upon
his death these
fell
apart, as did
the different elements in Christian doctrine,* and were
made One of
taken up by different groups of his followers, and the basis of different theories of the end of these groups seized
upon the element of
life.
feeling,
and
under the name of the Cyrenaics t (from the city of Cyrene, to which Aristippus, the chief exponent of the doctrine, belonged),
became
the precursors of the later
and better-known school of Epicureans. that pleasure was the end, interpreting
They held mean
this to
moment, and using the theory as more than an excuse for self-indulgence. At a later time the theory was taken up by Epicurus, J who deepened and dignified it (i) by connecting it with the atomic theory of the nature and origin of matter as expounded by Leucippus and Democritus, (2) by supplementing it with a sensationalist psychology, and
the pleasure of the little
(3)
by interpreting pleasure so as to include the higher
social
and
intellectual enjoyments.
The noble
expres-
sion which was given to this theory of the nature of * E.g., Faith and Works as represented respectively by Paul and James, Universalism and Judaism by Paul and Peter f See Zeller's Socrates and Socratic Schools* J See Professor Wallace's Epicureanism, ;
.
Ch.
The
I]
the world and
human
poets, Lucretius,*
ยง 43.
The
is
End life
well
as Pleasure
by the greatest of the known.
doctrine has been revived in
who
differ
modern times
basis in philosophy
chiefly
from their predecessors
in antiquity (i) in seeking to provide
reflective
Roman
The Theory in Modern Times.
by English thinkers,
more
101
and psychology,
with a securer
it
(2) in enjoining a
form of pleasure-seeking,
(3) in
making
the doctrine the starting-point for enlightened theories
of social and political reform. first
The
discussion of the
of these differences belongs to a text-book of psycho-
logy rather
The development
than of ethics.
of the
theory in the direction indicated by the third difference coincides generally with the successive appearance of Egoistic, Universalistic, and Evolutionary Hedonismf to be discussed below, and need not further detain us here.
The it
second, however, requires
more
detailed notice, as
introduces us to a development which
of the
modern form of the
place at the point at which ยง 44.
theory,
and
we have now
is
characteristic
will best find
a
arrived.
The Sanctions of Morality.
Ancient Epicureanism, while emphasising the peace and happiness which have their source in the recognition of the universality of natural law, laid but
little stress
on
the physical consequences of conduct as a motive to morality. *
See
De Reruin
f For the p.
258,
As the
see,
name for
doctrine, moreover, was developed at a
Natura, Eng. Tr. (Munro) see below (p. 104). Besides the Bibliography, the history of
Constructive Ethics,
modern Hedonism, Courtney's and Sorley's
Sidgwick's History of Ethics, Ethics of Naturalism,
102
Ethics
[Bk. Ill
time when the older forms of pagan society were breaking up,
and men were seeking
satisfaction for their
longings in a species of spiritual individualism,
but
little
laid
it
emphasis on social approval as a source of
happiness, or social disapproval as a Finally, as
deeper
it
was a fundamental
the Epicurean that the gods, interest in
human
ther grave,
it
affairs,
no ended with appeal to the rewards and a motive for good conduct
and that man's
life
creed of
there were any, took
if
was impossible to
punishments of another
source of pain.
article of the
as
life
In modern times, however, the keener sense of
in this.
the relation between cause and effect in the physical plane,
the increased sensitiveness to public opinion resulting
from greater
social solidarity, together with the habits of
thought encouraged by the
common form
of the Christian
religion, suggest reasons for the
conduct commonly called
moral, which the supporters of
Hedonism have not been These reasons or per-
slow to seize upon and develop. suasives to
good conduct are the
so-called "sanctions of
morality," the enumeration of which
addition to the
By
is
a characteristic
of the pleasure theory.
the sanction of a legal enactment
penalty that ethics,
modern form
is
as just
annexed
is
meant the
to the infringment of
explained, the
meaning
is
In
it.
extended
td
include the pleasures which are the persuasives to conformity, as well as the pains
which act as deterrents from
disobedience to moral law.
sanction,
follow
The
sanctions of morality
There is the natural by which are meant the physical pains which
in this sense are mainly five
(i)
:
upon the disregard of
over-indulgence
of the
natural laws,
appetites.
political sanction, or the pains
(2)
e.g.,
There
in the is
the
and penalties attached by
law to such obviously " unfelicific " forms of conduct as i
Ch.
End
The
I]
assault,
theft,
libel,
as Pleasure
and the public rewards and
etc.,
honours bestowed upon the
There
the
is
respect, gratitude, etc.,
benefactor.
social
sanction,
social
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the
(3)
pleasures of social
which a favourable public opinion
and the pains of the disgrace attaching to forms of immoral conduct which do not come within the reach of the law as well as to those that do. (4) There is brings with
it,
Though
the religious sanction.
does not belong to
this
the catalogue of legitimate motives on a naturalistic theory
of ethics like ordinary
Hedonism,
yet in speaking of the
sanctions or external persuasives to morality founded on
the desire for pleasure and aversion to pain,
which
to take account of the influence
men and hope and
still
of reward in another
(5)
To
the moral sanction, by which
have exercised,
these
is
is
have occasion hereafter to discuss
shall
the presuppositions on which the whole theory
Meantime the
added, as a
meant simply the
good conscience and the pains of remorse.*
pleasures of a
We
necessary
continue to exercise, in the moral education of
the race and the individual. fifth,
life
it is
fear of punish-
it
is
sufficient to point
at length
is
founded.
out that to any but
Hedonist the phrase " sanctions of morality
suspiciously
which
like
issues
morality,
approved.
if
contradiction
a
from regard
for
in
these
sanctions
by that we mean conduct which It
may conform
" is
Conduct
terms.
is
is
not
morally
and be good conduct, but it is temperate because he desires to a certain type
externally indistinguishable from
not good.
The man who
is
the pleasures of temperance (whether these be earthly * For the theory of the sanctions of morality, see Bentham's Morals and Legislation, ch. iii. Mill's Utilitarianism, ch. iii. 5 Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book II., ch. v. ; Fowler's PrQ;
gressive Morality, chs.
i.
a
}L
104
Ethics
[Bk. Ill
or heavenly, physical or social)
is,
as Plato pointed out,
temperate by reason of a kind of intemperance. the will
man who
is
Similarly,
courageous from fear of the pains which
be the consequence of cowardice
reason of a kind of cowardice.
moral sanction,
i.e.,
to
courageous by
is
Appeals to the so-called
the pleasures of a good con-
science (or the pains of remorse), as a motive to good
conduct,
an
moreover, to involve
appear,
The
absurdity.
additional
upon the
pleasure in question depends
approval of conscience, and this in turn depends on the disinterestedness of the conduct,
i.e.,
upon the exclusion
To
of the idea of personal pleasure from the motive.
point therefore to the pleasure likely to result from such approval, as a reason for well-doing,
which,
if
to suggest a
confusion has been introduced into the discus-
which we now
sion of this theory in the forms under
know
it
motive
Pleasure and Happiness.
ยง 45.
Some
is
accepted, would render approval impossible.
by the
failure to distinguish
Assuming
and happiness.
state of agreeable feeling,
it
that they is
between pleasure both refer to a
not true, as
is
commonly
assumed, either that the terms are synonymous, or if
there be
a distinction,
raised to a higher
multiplication * In thus like so
many
or
happiness
is
that,
only pleasure
power by an arithmetical process of The distinction between
addition.*
becoming
affiliated
with .pleasure, happiness seems,
words, to have come
down
in the world.
Certainly
the Greeks would have objected to the assumption which underlies
modern Hedonism,
that pleasure and happiness are interchangeable
terms, or differ only as the less from the greater.
To them
rjdovrj
(hedone=pleasure) conveyed a wholly different idea from evdaifiovia (eudaemonia=happiness), and accordingly Hedonism would have represented a wholly different theory from Eudaemonism.
Ch.
End
The
I]
as Pleasure
105
them is founded on a qualitative difference in the modes of self-realisation which pleasure and happiness severally accompany, not merely on a quantitative Pleasure difference in the amount of the feeling itself. the
is
feeling
which accompanies the happiness
desires;
particular
accompanies the sense
momentary
of
refusal or failure to is
in terms of either
it
in
feeling
of
which
from the satisfaction
in spite of the pain of
them, the
satisfy
The
being realised.*
come
that, apart
and even
desires,
satisfaction
the
is
self as a
whole
propriety of describing the end
depends upon the conclusion we
shall
to in the sequel as to the legitimacy of describing
terms of feeling at
anticipate as to point
may prove impervious that there
is
Meantime
all.
out,
for the
to the
I
may
so far
sake of those
who
arguments there adduced,
less objection to expressing the
good
in
terms of happiness than in terms of pleasure pure and simple.
For while both descriptions of the end
identifying
it
err in
with agreeable feeling, the happiness theory
(Eudaemonism) has the advantage over the pleasure it refuses to consider the summum bonum as a mere aggregate of particular pleasures, and insists that it is pleasure for the self as a whole, t For the further benefit of those who are determined at all hazards to express the end in terms of feeling, it may be well to state that to advance another step and theory (Hedonism) that
call
Blessedness, which, Carlyle says {Sartor Resartus,
it
Book
II., ch.
leading *
On
still.
this
ix.), is
better than happiness,
Blessedness
distinction
the
may be
student
Dewey's Psychology, pp. 292-4. f Which, as we can never insist too aggregate of
its
parts.
is
is
less mis-
defined as the feeling recommended
often,
is
to
consult
more than a mere
io6
Ethics
[Bk. Ill
of pleasure which accompanies
which an existing harmony of
modes of conduct
a
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
in
higher conception of what a true harmony implies other words, in which the self as static
a progressive animal,
is
is
sacrificed to
Seeing, therefore, that man, as
the self as progressive.
man,
in
activities is sacrificed to
and
harmony
that
no
is
sooner established between himself and his environment than of
it is
life,
action
broken into by aspirations
after a higher
form
the theory which represents the emotional re-
of such aspirations and the activities resulting
from them as the
end,
while
theoretically
erroneous than that which defines lower form of feeling,
may
yet
it
in
not
less
terms of any
by reason of
implicit
its
admissions be less practically misleading.*
Do
§ 46.
A
difficulty
Pleasures differ in Quality?
suggested by the discussion in the pre-
ceding paragraph has risen within the school
whether pleasures
differ
itself as to
only in quantity, or in quality
There are those who hold that pleasures differ less, and that, in estimating the comparative value of two or more lines of conduct, w e have only to cast up the arithmetical total of the pleasures Others hold which they severally tend to produce. as well.
only as greater or
r
that pleasures differ in quality as well. carries us into psychology, in
which
The
field
controversy
the answer
is
seen to depend on considerations already set forth in a previous section (22), where *
it
was pointed out
that
it is
Cp. Mackenzie's Introduction to Social Philosophy, pp. 164 foil., distinction in the text is connected with that between
where the
simple consciousness, consciousness
of
self
e.g.^
as
of
momentary
states of pleasure or pain,
an individual and self-consciousness or
consciousness of self as partaking in a universal
life,
Ch.
End
The
I]
as Pleasure
107
impossible to consider feelings, qua feelings, as qualitatively differing
from one another.
It is
only in virtue of
the qualitative differences of the objects in connection
with which they rise that
we
moral quality to them.
Thus, on the hypothesis that
knowledge
is
are justified in attributing
a higher good than wealth or power, the
may be judged
to be higher But from the Hedonist's point of view knowledge can only be judged a higher end in so far as it is the source of a greater
pleasure of acquiring
it
than that of gratified vanity or ambition.
quantity of pleasure.
In other words, the qualitative
differences in objects are reduced to quantitative differ-
ences in the feeling of pleasure they produce.
To
introduce, therefore, into the pleasure theory qualitative differences
among
into quantitative,
feelings
which
to introduce
is
or lower in a scale
are
not resolvable
a standard of higher
of relative dignity or worth not
determinable in terms of greater or
less. It is to go beyond the conception of self as a subject of feeling, and to declare that there is another standard besides the
greater or less agreeableness of
its
experiences,
worthiness as experiences of a being feeling,
§ 47.
who
is
viz.,
their
more than
and may have higher ends than pleasure.*
How
are Pleasures calculated in respect to their Value ?
For those Hedonists who hold the simpler and more logical *
On
there p.
view that pleasures this
only in respect to
differ
controversy see Mill's statement of the doctrine that
are differences
of quality
among
pleasures,
Utilitarianism^
12 (ioth ed., 1888), and the earlier criticism of
Theory of Ethics (Abbott), p. 109 (4th ed.) III., ch.
i.,
op. cit., pp.
§§162 46
foil.
foil.
;
Bradley, op.
Also Alexander,
cit.,
;
it
Green, op.
in Kant's cit.,
pp. 105 foil.;
op. at., pp.
203
foil.
Book
Dewey,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
"
io8
Ethics
quantity the question enter into the
still
ÂŁBk. Ill
remains,
What dimensions must
calculation? what elements enter
the " pleasure calculus
" ?
We
into
calculate the size of a
room by the
three dimensions of length, breadth, and
What Bentham was
are the dimensions of a pleasure
height.
intensity,
ness.*
at
pains
duration,
to
Jeremy
?
them
formulate
as
six,
nearness, certainty, purity, fruitful-
With the exception of the two
last
these explain
themselves, and need not further detain us.
By purity
meant not any moral quality, but freedom from accompanying pain an intellectual pleasure may in this respect take precedence of a sensual, on the ground that
is
:
it
does not involve subsequent pain, as the
to do.
By
the fruitfulness of a pleasure
tendency to bring other
with
pleasures
latter is liable is
meant the
it,
as
when
keeping an engagement involves the pleasures of a good conscience and the future benefits that might accrue to the
good character
for
reliableness
which
is
thus
acquired, t
See Morals and Legislation, ch. iv. The seventh of the dimenhe enumerates, viz., extent, introduces a difficulty excluded from this paragraph. Bentham borrowed the idea of the pleasure By means of it he calculus from the Italian legalist Beccaria. thought that "the precision and clearness and incontestableness of mathematical calculation were for the first time introduced into the field of morals." Works, Vol. III., p. 287 Cp. Montague's Introduction to the Fragment in Government, p. 36. f The arithmetic of pleasure becomes more complicated when to the pleasures of this world are added the pleasures of the next. Thus Paley gave himself a longer sum by trying to combine the His pleasure theory with the orthodox Christianity of his time. naive definition of virtue, as "doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting life," has been wittily said to combine " the maximum of error in the minimum of *
sions
;
space.
Ch.
The
I]
ยง 48.
End
as Pleasure
Modern Forms of a
Difficulties
when we ask the
of the Pleasure Theory*
more fundamental kind arise Whose pleasure is meant ? "
still
question, "
Differences on this head have given rise to at least two different forms of logical
Hedonism.
Agreeing in the psycho-
each not only does,
doctrine that
but must,
pursue what at the time appears to be his own greatest of the pleasure
pleasure, supporters
differed as to the proper
which those
is
mode
theory have
the standard of moral action,
who maintain
that the
still
of formulating the end
end of
(i)
There are
rational conduct
is
no other than the pleasure of the individual himself. Moral judgments are the judgments that are passed upon conduct according as it is adapted to secure this end in the highest degree possible for the individual, This or, through his ignorance or folly, fails to do so. section of the school
Egoistic Hedonists.* salistic
known
is
(2)
as the Individualistic or
There
is
Altruistic or Univer-
Hedonism,t which takes the pleasure of others
also into account.
It is
important to note the precise
point in which this differs from the It
does not
desirable.
differ
It
introduces a
in its
former doctrine.
account of what
agrees that this
new element
is
is
pleasure.
into the
pleasure
ultimately It
merely
calculus.
In addition to the dimensions already mentioned,
enumerates
the extent
of
the pleasure
as
the
it
most
* Best represented perhaps in modem philosophy by Thomas Hobbes, though his individualism is more prominent than his hedonism. j- Represented in this country by William Godwin, Bentham, James Mill, J. S. Mill, and Professor Sidgwick in various degrees and in divers manners.
no
Ethics
important consideration of
be pointed
makes a
out,
upon the former view
and
according
now under
theory
m
need hardly
it
difference
own
his
individual as supreme, thereto,
This,
all.
vital
as
tributary
[Bk.
;
for
whereas
pleasure counts to the
that of others
consideration,
is
only sought
the form
to
and
of
the
familiar to every
one under the more popular name of Utilitarianism, pretensions
the
for
of the
"Everybody
cance.
individual
The
more than one."
of moral judgment
is
sink
into
to count for one,
is
pleasure which
is
insignifi-
and nobody the standard
not the greatest pleasure of the
but the " greatest pleasure of the greatest
individual,
number," calculated upon the basis of the equality of the claims of
all.*
* As has been Book III., ch. iii.,
well pointed out in Green (Proleg. to Ethics, ยง 214),
contention that the end
it is
is
this
democratic principle, and not the
pleasure,
which has made utilitarianism
so effective as an instrument of legislative reform. principle
is
How
far
the
consistent with the fact that individuals differ in capacity
for pleasure,
and that these
differences
would have
to
be taken into
account in a distribution designed to produce the greatest sum total of happiness, however made up, may be questioned (see Bradley's
Ethical Studies, p. Philosophy, pp. 212
1
10,
foil.
does not seem to
itself
{Utilitarianism,
phrase
"
p.
greatest
n.
fin.
;
Mackenzie's Introd.
to
Social
Montague, op. cit., p. 40). The formula occur in Bentham's writings, though Mill
;
With regard to the 93) attributes it to him. happiness of the greatest number/' commonly
associated with Bentham, though he seems to have preferred " greatest happiness " alone, it is interesting to notice that it is
traceable so far back as Hutcheson, the Scotch Intuitionalist (see
Montague, J. S.
Mill
op.
cit.,
p.
34
The term Utilitarian is claimed by own discovery. It is not a particularly
n.).
(op. cit., p. 9) as his
The word " utility " denotes merely the property of some end ; it conveys no information as to the nature oi the end itself, and is therefore not particularly appropriate as a happy
one.
serving
description of a special theory about
it.
Ch.
The
Ij
End
as Pleasure
III
Characteristic Difficulties in these several Forms of Hedonism.
§ 49.
(i) Egoistic
A
Hedonism.
detailed
criticism of the
two chief forms is beyond the It must here be scope of the present handbook.* sufficient to refer to characteristic difficulties which attach
pleasure theory in
its
to each.
The
way
stumbling-block in the
of
the
Egoistic
may
Hedonist, over which he has always tripped, and
now be
said to have fallen to rise
no more,
is
the obvious
outrage which is committed against the moral sentiments and benevolent impulses by the attempt to explain them
The may be made to do so either directly, as by Hobbes followers,f who sought to resolve altruistic im-
as modifications of the selfish desire for pleasure.
attempt
and
his
pulses, such as those
and benevolence, hope ; or indirectly, who sought by means of the
of compassion
into reflex forms of personal fear or as
by the
later Hedonists,:}:
principle of the Association of Ideas to explain
how virtue,
* Besides the authorities referred to (p. 258), the student will find
exhaustive discussion of
the
Hedonistic
hypothesis in
Book III., chs. i. and iv. Book Alexander's Moral Oi'der and Progress, pp. T96 Proleg. to Ethics;
Mackenzie's
Dewey,
op.
;
Introduction cil.,
17
pp.
made between "pleasure
to foil.
as
Social
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; where the
Essays III. and VII.
;
foil.
;
J.
iv.
;
S.
Philosophy, pp. 202, 226 the important distinction is ;
(only)
" pleasure as criterion " of moral value
Green's
IV., ch.
;
object
of desire"
and
Bradley's Ethical Studies,
Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II.,
p. 229. t " Self-love," says Larochefoucauld, " lingers with strange objects
only as the bees with the flowers, in order to draw from them what it
requires."
Quoted by Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, Eng.
Tr., p. 244.
% E.g.
,
Hartley and the Mills.
112
Ethics
which
[Bk. Ill
pursued only on account of the personal
at first is
pleasure or the exemption from pain which
pursued
own
for its
descendants of
be
difficulty of explaining
has led the lineal
basis
this
may
to
school to acknowledge, besides the
this
impulse of sympathy as a co-
the altruistic
egoistic,
The
sake.
conduct upon
altruistic
secures,
it
by a confusion of means and end, come
afterwards,
ordinate principle of action.* (2) Universalistic Hedonism,
or Utilitarianism, has
had
Universalistic
difficulties of its
which
ition
Hedonism, to
contend
how, on the presuppos-
with, the chief being to explain
pleasure
own
shares with the former view that his
it
the only object that any one can desire,
is
own it
is
possible to desire the greatest happiness of the greatest
number.
The
difficulty
did not
who
the father of Utilitarianism,
omenon
trouble Bentham,
explained the phen-
own undoubted benevolence, by saying man " whose selfishness happened
of his
was a
that he
much
airily
selfish
have taken the form of benevolence."
to
In another
passage he assigns their respective places to egoism and altruism
alone
good
in
for
the
characteristic
serve
will
"
No
own
*
e.g.,
.
person,
solve
it
J.
to
.
Each
feelings as
Hoffding, op.
very
found by the
why
:
the general happiness .
.
.
desires his
is a good and the general happiness therefore .
The attempt made by
and sympathetic
Mill,
except that each person
happiness. that
to
tried
is
S.
in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism
reason can be given
desirable,
is
He
knot.
famous argument
saying that "self-regard
though sympathy
diet,
His successor,
dessert."
a tougher
this
for
cit.,
person's happiness
evolutionary writers to explain egoistic
developments from a
pp. 247
foil.)
qualitative distinctness in their fully
common
root (see,
does not, of course, alter their
developed forms.
Ch.
good
a
The
I]
End
to the aggregate
as Pleasure
of
though one were to argue
all
(to
113
This
persons."
is
as
borrow Carlyle's famous
comparison), that because each pig desires for himself the
amount of a
greatest
limited
quantity
of
pigs'
wash, each necessarily desires the greatest quantity for every other or for
all.*
Latter-day utilitarians,
who
are
naturally .dissatisfied with such an argument, prefer to
renounce the dogma that personal pleasure
is
thing desired, and so are free to maintain, as
some do,t
the one
that we ought to desire universal happiness because The ultimate desirableness of the Reason bids us. greatest general happiness is thus made to rest upon the But what, we still ask, is Reason ? dictum of Reason. and why should I listen to her voice ? The theory in
present
its
form leaves us with these questions
un-
answered. J § 50,
Elements of Value in Pleasure Theory.
While these objections seem which the theory has taken, that this view of the
it
fatal to
the several forms
ought not to be forgotten
end has usually had to maintain itself and is thus not without
against equally one-sided theories,
value as a protest against their falsehood. *
Thus
it
has
Upon which
logic under
ingenious mode of argument see any book on head "Fallacy of Composition, " and cp. Bradley, op. cit.i
foil.; Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics, ch. vi., § 9. f E.g., Professor Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Book III., ch. xiii. J For further criticism of this view which, as opposed to the older
pp. 103
or psychological form of the
hedonism," see Green's Proleg. Bradley, op.
doctrine, has to Ethics,
been called " ethical
Bk. IV.,
ch., iv. §.
364
foil.;
pp. 114-117 ; Mackenzie, op. cit. ch. vi., §§ 6 foil. If we fairly face the question in the text we are necessarily led to a conception of the self as essentially rational. But this annihilates
the
cit.,
%
presupposition upon which the Hedonistic theory rests (see
P- 93).
s
%
H4
Ethics
[Bk.
in
always been opposed to the theory, to be dealt with in the
next chapter, which invests mere resistance to desire with
and which tends
peculiar merit,
its
emphasise the ascetic
to
or negative element in the moral
at the
life
expense of
positive side as a form, not of self-denial, but of self-
satisfaction or self-realisation.
law and
anism
and
politics,
at the
political
inestimable. It may indeed be Bentham, Godwin, Place, Grote, were inspired by the Hedonistic, as
reform
is
far
Austin, J. S. Mill,
what
to
might
be
But
elements in their theory.
when
utilitari-
beginning of the present century to legal
questioned* how
opposed
Similarly, in the field of
the service of the founders of
called it is
Democratic,
the
certain that, at a time
other theories by their conservatism and mysticism
seemed
to favour the
maintenance of established abuses,
the Hedonistic writers brought forward an apparently
simple and intelligible standard, by which the
utility
of
laws and institutions might be estimated.
Fundamental Error of the Theory based on
ยง 51.
inadequate Analysis of Desire.
The
error of the hedonistic theory, in
logical,"
which
relative functions
in the
moral
its
which
it
is
its
"psycho-
logical form,f consists in the
assigns to reason
The end which
life.
value in conduct It is
also
is
is
and
feeling
the standard of
supposed to be given immediately.
the end, not only of man, but of
all
sentient creation.
* See above, p.no n. t In spite of Mr. Mackenzie's criticism of the view of ethical nedonism implied in this phrase (op. cit., p. 97), I retain it in the Modern hedonism has its source in the view that pleasure is text.
the only object of desire. attract,
When
this psychological
dogma
the theory ceases to be a plausible one, and
only a matter of time
when
it
it is
shall disappear altogether.
ceases to
probably
Ch.
End
The
I]
"All sentient beings,"
it
law of their nature."
The
and non-rational beings
"5
as Pleasure
is
lies
said, " desire pleasure
difference
by a
between rational
not in the character of the
object of desire, but in the relative degree in which they
possess the capacity for
the
means of
its
its
enjoyment and apprehend Similarly,
attainment.
consist
nominally rational, differences
among
in
beings
the relative
perception which they have of the means whereby the
may be
greatest sum-total of pleasure
words, the function of reason
is
and immedit no end
regulating action in view of an end which iately
by
given
Reason
feeling.
In other
realised.
that of directing
gives
is
:
merely prescribes the means to the attainment of one which, on appearing upon the stage,
and
universal
it
finds already
Accordingly, the rationality or
inevitable.
value of conduct has to be judged, not by the character of
its
end or
by
object, but
suitability as a
its
means
towards the realisation of that which alone has value,
viz.,
agreeable consciousness or pleasure.
In
all this
there
is
a fundamental misconception as to
the relation of thought or reason to desire, which our analysis of the latter has already furnished us with the
means of
correcting.
We
have already seen that the idea
of the object (in the example
we employed,
warmth), as affording satisfaction to the essential
element in
all
that
the idea of self,
was an
properly called desire.
is
This means that reason does not simply accept the object given it by a natural impulse or propensity, and set about devising
say that
means for its makes the
it
It would be truer to inasmuch as there can be
realisation.
object,
no object of desire without it. Comparing this conclusion with the view under consideration,
we
see (i) that an
"object of desire" can
u6
Ethics
[Bk.
in
only exist for a being which thinks and reasons as well as feels,
and
that
it
is
an abuse of language to
say, as
the Hedonist has done from time immemorial,* that sentient beings desire pleasure.
value
The
(2)
human
of conduct for us as
all
rationality or
cannot,
it
is
now
be measured by the extent to which it tends The to realise an object given irrespective of reason. question is, how far an object which, ex hypothesis is a seen,
state of feeling,
shown
can
satisfy
be more than
to
who has
a being
just
Merely to put
feeling.
been this
question suggests a suspicion of the unsatisfactoriness of
We
the Hedonistic answer.
saw
at the outset that this
theory was based upon the assumption that the self was
When
primarily and essentially Feeling.
be groundless
;
when,
in
the mental
which we have in ethics primarily
this is shown to phenomenon with
to deal, viz.,
human
work which is more than feeling, we may reasonably doubt whether the end, which is the standard of the judgments of value we pass upon human conduct, can be a form of feeling. If, as we were previously led to believe, the end is the realisation of the self as a whole, and if, as we now see, this self is more than feeling, it is impossible to hold that it can obtain the satisfaction which it demands in what is admittedly a mere form of feeling. desire,
ยง 52.
it is
seen that a self
is
at
Is Pleasure the only
Motive? Ke-statement
of Hedonistic Argument.
The above argument,
however,
may be
acquiesced in
without shaking the reader's conviction that pleasure the only motive of action.
pains
to
make *
the
Thus
above
after taking the
objections
See Aristotle's Ethics* Book X.,
plain, ch.
ii.
is
utmost I
have
Ch.
it is
may be
very true, but you
me
my
me
or because
me
that
pleased
that of the martyr
only subtler or
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; are
more
really
closer inspection
action,
that I have only it
extreme cases of so-called
is
" All you
:
succeeded in performing a
and disinterested
invariably reveals to I pleased,
reply
to convince
fail
to act
that I have at last
self-denying
117
from any other motive than own pleasure. Even when I flatter myself
possible for
desire for
as Pleasure
met with the following
frequently been
say
End
The
I]
me
done
because
it
Even
so to do.
self-sacrifice
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
as, for instance,
seen on further scrutiny to be
eccentric forms of self-pleasing.
It
not necessary to maintain that, in such a case, the
object
is
any form of sensuous pleasure, either
world or the next.
All that
is
argued
is,
in this
that the course
of action which the martyr chooses must, in
some way
incomprehensible to ordinary mortals, have pleased him
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
is
in fact only his peculiar
way of 'enjoying
himself.'
In this respect saint and sinner, martyr and pleasureseeker, are alike
the only reason each can ultimately
:
one form of
give for preferring it
life
to another
him greater pleasure." we might meet this objection,
gives
Now
as
it
that
is,
is
some-
times proposed to do, by merely pointing out that it " It rests on an ambiguity in the English word " please." pleases me to do a thing " may mean either " It gives me pleasure to
do
distinction *
phrases
it,"
into
amcenum
or simply " I choose to do
may be
est
their
and
clearly indicated
corresponding
placet,
noun-adjectives amcena placita
= things
=
Latin
things that give pleasure,
chosen or resolved upon.
On which
equivalents,
which gives respectively the
the above contention the word "please" *
This
it."
by translating these
see Sidgwick, op,
cit.^
Book
is I.,
Now
and
if
in
used in the ch. iv.
n8
Ethics
latter
sense
if in
;
saying that I always do what I please,
or what pleases me, I simply I
choose to
to
be
false
;
act,
[Bk. Ill
mean
I
always act because
the statement cannot indeed be said
only meaningless.
it is
equivalent to
It is
saying, I always choose because I choose.
With
the
all
appearance of assigning a reason, the sentence assigns
no reason
at
all.
If,
on the other hand,
be meant
it
that I always act because the action will please
because of the pleasure
it
comprehensible indeed, but
is
precisely that against
is
it
me, or
statement
give, the
will
which the batteries of our argument have
in the last few
sections been directed.
But
my is c
this
mode
of meeting the objection only leads
opponent to a more careful statement of
It will
give
be regarded just
me
*
to
pleasure
'
and
'
I
It
choose have come to 1
my contention On a closer
as different, but the point of
that this
is
scrutiny,
is
a superficial distinction.
choose
find pleasure in/
'
is
which
for pleasure from.'
seen to be the same thing as in turn
merely means
Or, putting choice aside
only determination by the strongest desire, to
"
it.
obvious, of course," he will say, " that the statements
my
interpretation),
what
I
contend
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; as
i.e.
'
to
hope being
(according
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; is,
that
idea of a thing pleasant, and to desire the same, and that to say so
is
it,
find
to
the
one and
are
merely another way of
saying that the only object of desire §63.
to
by the greatest pleasure, where and confining our-
several courses present themselves selves to desire,
'
is
pleasure."
Met by Distinction between "Pleasures
in Idea,"
and " Idea of Pleasure."
To meet to
this
look more
form of the objection,
closely
than
we
it
is
necessary
have hitherto
done
at
Ch.
The
ij
End
as Pleasure
phenomenon of
previous occasion of the
touched on the relation to
Thus
there
is
one of
as
it
in all desire
in being without the object of desire.
it,
there
now
It is
neces-
and contrasted
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; "the
Strictly defined,
elements in desire) gives
constituent
This pleasure
"interest"
constituent
its
the pleasure which the idea of the object
is
(another of the us.
we
We
a feeling of pain
sary to observe that besides this pain,
with
desire,
of feeling in general.
it
saw that feeling enters into elements.
In treating on a
of pleasure to desire.
the relation
119
is
known
it is
language as
in ordinary
which the object
interest
excites."
the feeling of the value which the
object has for the self.*
Now which
may be admitted may be said
it
this feeling
may even go
further,
that to
there
and admit
a sense in
is
to action.t
We
for argument's
sake
move
that the idea of the course of action chosen,
martyr, gives
him
other possible course.
one
thing, to
But
chooses his
own
quite another.
is
pleasure, or
to
make
admission
this
exclusive of the other.
moved by
is
the desire for
If the pleasure that act, it
cannot
at
idea of pleasure of course
may move
moves us
one and the
same moment be excited by the idea of a
The
is
Indeed, the one contention
be excited by the idea of an the
by the
contend that in choosing that course he
pleasure,
is
e.g.,
greater pleasure than the idea of any
us,
pleasure.
but then
the pleasure becomes an object of desire, and must in
* Mr.
Bradley defines pleasure generally as
self-realisedness" p. 234).
or
"affirmative self-feeling"
As an element
in desire,
it
"the
feeling
of
{Ethical Studies^
might be defined as the feeling
of anticipated self-realisedness, or the feeling of the congruity of the object with the natural wants or habits of the
f See
p.
59 above,
self,
120
Ethics
turn excite a present pleasure. pleasure which
moves
(if it
[Br. Ill
It follows
cannot be the pleasure aimed at that
we
are always
before the
moved by
mind equivalent
can be no motive save desire
To
then that the
be pleasure which moves) ;
nor
is
the contention
the pleasure of the idea to maintaining that there
for pleasure.
pursue the question further, and to ask in what
said to be moved by the pleasure of the and whether it is true that we are always moved to action by the idea which excites the greatest pleasure, would lead me too far from my present subject. Enough has been said to show the groundlessness of the
sense
we can be
idea,
hedonistic contention as to the nature of the end.
Note. It does not fall within the limits
of this
handbook
to
make
from the theoretical conclusions arrived at in the course of the argument. Yet our view of the place that ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain in education so obviously practical deductions
depends upon our general view of its value as an element in life, that it may not be out of place to point out in a sentence or two the significance for practice of the above criticism. Reflection suggests that there are two attitudes of mind towards life in general, which by their respective predominance distinguish, not only different individuals, but different times and moods in the same individual. There is that in which objects and activities are looked at with an eye to their effect upon our own personal pleasure or happiness ; and there is the attitude of interest in the objects and activities simply as elements or conditions of a worthy human In the former case we aim at producing a feeling in ourselves, life. in the latter at achieving an
of these two attitudes of mind
admits of discussion.
And
objective it
is
Which
end or purpose.
desirable to
cultivate hardly
yet if the hedonist contention be valid,
be true that the end or chief good in life must in the last resort be described in terms of satisfaction or enjoyment quantitatively considered, without reference to the comparative worth or if it
dignity of the objects in which satisfaction
is
sought,
it
would
Ch.
The
I]
seem
End
as Pleasure
to follow that a rational system of
directed
to
121
moral education will be
the encouragement of the conscious and consistent
which the greatest sum-total of individual be found. In other words, the former and less desirable of these two attitudes of mind is in danger of being stamped with the approval of a distinguished school of ethical That this is not an imaginary corollary of hedonistic thinkers. pursuit of those objects in
happiness
is
teaching
strikingly illustrated
Mill.
is
There
to
is
no
more
by the singular experience of
suggestive
passage
biography than that in which Mill records the disastrous his
own
J.
S.
in philosophical effects in
case of the direct application to practice of the hedonistic
theory in which he was brought up.
(See Autobiography, pp. 141 -3 might be thought that Mill's example and the experience of practical educationalists would by this time have purged this leaven from educational theory ; but that traces of it still linger, if not in formal maxims yet as a pervading spirit, is obvious to those who are acquainted with the writings of leading They will probably, moreover, theorists in this department. continue to linger there so long as they find a shadow of support in popular philosophy. (On the above contrast see Mr. Bryant's Studies on Character Essay on Moral Education ; for some excellent hints on the general question of the place of pleasure and pain in education see Miss Gilliland's Art. in the International Journal of Ethics, Vol. III., No. 3.) of fourth edition.)
It
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
122
Ethics
[Bk.
hi
chapter I examined the theory which
is
CHAPTER
II.
THE END AS SELF-CONQUEST. Opposite Theory to foregoing.
ยง 54.
In the
last
on the conception of the
founded
and one
prevailing to
In
antithesis to
in
many
It is
it.
opposed to
authoritative
and
is
On
satis-
sum-total
proceed to consider stands
in
direct
founded on the view that the
as essentially
being
I
respects
predominating element in the
imperative.
the greatest
i.e.,
chapter
this
which
theory
of securing the greatest
desire
such a subject,
of pleasure.
primarily
animated by the
essentially a subject of feeling,
faction
a
self as
self
desire,
is
which,
reason,
asserts
itself
in
the
demands of the moral theory the end of man as a rational
categorical
this
unconditional obedience to this imperative, as
the law of his inner being or true
self.
Pleasure, so far
from being the end, cannot enter into our conception of the end of action without vitiating any claim which
may
otherwise have to be considered virtuous.
to be
must be done out of reverence for the it, and without respect to the conAs opposed to the theory that the end is
good an
act
reason which enjoins sequences.
it
In order
Ch.
The
II]
End
pleasure for pleasure's
as Self- Conquest
123
been
sake, this theory has aptly
called the theory of duty for duty's sake.*
ยง
Historical
55.
Forms
of Theory.
This theory has taken various forms, reappearing from age to age, and gaining importance from to the rival view.
its
Thus, when the Socratic
antagonism circle
broke
up into what are known as the minor Socratic schools, and the Cyrenaics asserted the doctrine that the end was to seize the pleasure of the moment, they were opposed by the Cynics,t who taught that, on the contrary, pleasure was an evil, and that the true good consisted in independence of desire.
At a
later date
all
forms of passion or
the Stoics proved themselves
superior to their Cynic precursors in presenting a dignified
view of
phasis they laid
human
upon the
and
personality,
active
life
more em-
in the
but they were in
;
fundamental agreement with them in holding the chief
good to be meant the
in
accordance with reason, by which was
life in
which passion and desire played the
life
smallest, reason, or, as they expressed largest part.
Under
in Christian morality
it,
" nature," the
like influences the ascetic
were developed.
It
elements
was as a protest
pagan morality that and anchorites, and later the whole monastic system, had their value. In our own
against the easy-going naturalism of
the exaggerations of hermits
* See the admirable contrast
between these two views in Bradley's See also Dewey, op. cit.,
Ethical Studies, Essays III. and IV. pp. 78
foil.
f The school is represented in popular thought by Diogenes, who, however, had little to do with developing its fundamental tenets. The Cynics, it has been well said, made the feeling of reasonableness,
the Cyrenaics the reasonableness of feeling, the
of conduct
principle
Ethics
124 century the current
[Bk.
Hedonism has found
its
hi
corrective,
since the time of Kant, in the theory set forth in so
notable a form * by that philosopher, absolutely good thing
Good
viz.,
that the only
which has been interpreted to mean will determined by reverence for reason as revealed in the moral law and untainted by is
the
Will,
any lower motive.t
The Theory recognises Right
ยง 56.
as distinct from
Expediency. It
must be recognised
at the outset
that this theory
is
not open to the objection which common-sense morality
has always brought against Hedonism, that the distinction between what
On
right
is
it
and what
confounds is
prudent.
the contrary, the theory before us stretches the dis-
tinction to the point of denying
Opposed
them.
are self-seeking,
to the desires,
it is
any relation between
which by
held that there
is
their very nature
another principle
of action which is radically distinct from and may determine us independently of them. The suggestions of desire may doubtless conflict with one another, and reason, in the sense of reflection, may be called upon to This regulation of conflicting arbitrate between them. desires in such a manner as to secure the sum-total of But desire, as selfish advantage is known as prudence.
a whole,
is
maintained to be by
its
very nature in never-
ceasing conflict with reason as such, and virtue consists in * See Kant's Theory of Ethics (Abbott).
f Corresponding to this philosophical theory we have, in ordinary life, the test which many well-intentioned, but usually somewhat ineffective persons, habitually apply to their
"Am
conduct as a
test
of the
I doing this because I like to, or because purity of their motives, it is right ? " the assumption being that one cannot like what is right
and be
all
the better for doing
so.
Ch.
The
II]
End
as Self-Conquest
125
denying altogether the claim of the former to determine the action of the rational
from the
will.
Right thus stands out clear
Let these
taint of all prudential considerations.
once enter into the motive of an moral rectitude
With this and morality
and
its
claim to
destroyed.
is
qualitative is
act,
between prudence
difference
connected the absoluteness with which
So
ordinary moral consciousness invests the moral law.
long as the so-called summiim bonum
only differs
in
quantity from the particular goods which are the object of particular desires, it is difficult to see where an " ought/
an absolute or categorical imperative, can come
i.e.,
The end
in.
which such an imperative has meaning must be a universal one, i.e., one which it is reasonable to demand that all should pursue. It cannot in reference to
be conditional on that the
their " liking to."
Now
it is
quite true
Hedonist represents the greatest pleasure as a end, but then the form which the greatest
universal
is by its very nature Granted that the so-called " middle axioms "
pleasure takes to each individual particular.
of morality, kill," etc.,
mode
"Thou
shalt not steal,"
"Thou
shalt
not
are generalisations from experience as to the
best fitted on the average for realising this end, they
have authority for the individual only on the hypothesis that there are
no other modes, and
greatest pleasure
is
that his idea of the
the idea of the average man.
Obedi-
ence to them can never be required unconditionally.* "
You
ought to do this " can have no meaning, as an
unconditional
command,
The
"Yes, provided
*
rejoinder,
Hence
to
the I
consistent
Hedonist.
recognise that action as
the tendency of the older Hedonist writers to represent
the middle axioms as the invention of government. interest of the stronger."
Virtue
is
"the
126
Ethics
my
a means to
[Bx. Ill
but I don't," puts an But on the theory under discussion it is different. Reason is the same for all. Being, moreover, that which is distinctive of man, it speaks in the name of his true or permanent self, as opposed to the
end
greatest pleasure
;
to the matter.
transient phases of appetite
with the lower animals.
To
of liberty.
and passion which he shares
Its
law accordingly
disobey reason
special birthright of freedom,
is
to
is
the law
renounce man's
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the freedom
that consists
submitting to a self-given law, and refusing to be
in
enslaved by the alien authority of a merely natural inclination.
not therefore open to the individual to
It is
plead the peculiarities of his sentient nature in excuse for disregarding the imperatives of reason.
authority
to
is
deny himself part or
These are
To deny
binding upon him as a rational being.
lot in the
their
kingdom
of
humanity.
§ 57.
Value of this View of Man's Nature in the History of Thought. of this uncompromising attitude towards
It is in virtue
the lower of
life
life
of desire that this theory, and the view
founded upon
it
(in spite of their one-sidedness),
have exercised so important an influence upon thought
and
life.
The to
theory that the essential element in man, or that
which he
is
called
upon
to give effect,
is
his reason, has
usually risen into prominence in the history of civilised
nations at periods when, owing to external misfortunes or the decay of national institutions, the world has offered little
that could satisfy man's higher aspirations.
was notably so
at
the
time of the
This
rise of the Stoic
Ch.
End
The
II]
as Self-Conquest
127
philosophy, when, owing to the decay of free national
among
life
the Greeks, the individual found himself thrown
back upon the resources of to the sense of
human
no longer be found
his
dignity
in civil
own
inner
life
for support
and freedom which could and political life. It was
even more conspicuously so during the early ages of the
Roman
Empire, when, in a rich and highly cultured
men were slaves but one." To have kept under such circumstances the heroic view of life, as
society, " all
alive
the Stoics did, was no small service to humanity.
But there are other and more traceable to this view of
was
common
to all
mankind,
of on what was particular, individual
practical benefits directly
By
life.
viz.,
viz.,
laying stress
his
circumetances and foundations
theory laid the
capacities, this
on what
his rationality, instead
new view of the relations of men Hence it was in the Stoic schools that
for a
one another.
to
the idea of the
brotherhood of man, as opposed to the partnership of took root, and was
citizens, first
made
the basis of the
and free.* It and not to the general acceptance of this idea was
denial of the distinction between slave
might be said that Stoicism that
it
was
due. This
is
doubtless true
conceived
it
in a mystic
reflective
and
first
f but that the early Christians
and emotional, rather than a
practical form,
human
slavery as a
;
Christianity
to
is
seen in the fact that
institution rouses
no
protest in the
writers.
But
his rational nature is not only that
man to man
:
it is
also that
which unites
which gives to each
his separate
* The first protest against the institution of slavery seems to have come from the Cynics. See Newman's PoUHcs of Arisiotle, Introd. p. 140.
t See pp. 251, 252.
128
Ethics
dignity as a man.
[Bk.
In emphasising
foundations of the conception of thus provided, for the
first
it,
in
Stoicism laid the
human
personality,
time, a secure
and
basis for a
Hence it was that a which as a principle of morals has too often been stark and barren, blossomed in the field of politics consistent theory of legal rights.
doctrine,
under the fostering care of Stoic thinkers into the great
Roman Law.
system of rights and obligations known as
Self-conquest as a Practical Principle.
§ 58.
In actual practice the theory that lays the emphasis upon duty, as opposed to inclination, contains an important
element of
truth,
which
naturalistic theories of the
action have always tended to overlook.
For
it is
end of
undoubt-
edly true that at a certain stage in moral development, both in the individual
element sists in
is
and
in the race, the negative or ascetic
the prominent one.
All moral progress con-
subordination of lower to higher impulses, and at
a certain stage
it
may be more
important to conquer the
How
lower than to give effect to the higher.
far
it
is
possible to effect this conquest without appeal to higher
and
more
positive
principles
of action
instance, sensual impulses can be <the
abstract
made
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;how
far,
for
to yield before
announcements of reason that they are
"wrong," without assignment of further reason or without
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
appeal to the higher interests and affections for the educator.
in self-restraint
to
What
and
is
certain
self-denial,
conceive of circumstances
element
will
be
totally absent
is,
and in
from
that
it.
is
is
it
which
to say of the desire to enjoy pleasure,
readiness to suffer pain
a question
is
that morality begins
impossible
this
negative
Whatever we are it
an element in
is
certain that
all virtue,
and
Ch.
The
II]
that there
End
as Self-Conquest
more danger
is
1
29
for the individual in indulging
the former than in over-cultivating the latter.*
The
defect of the ascetic theory
is
not that
lays
it
emphasis on the negative aspect of morality, but that treats that aspect as the final one.
mere resistance
consist in it
did, the satisfaction of
it
Self-realisation cannot
to the suggestions of desire.
one element
would mean the destruction of another reason would mean the annihilation of
in ;
human
If
nature
the realisation of
feeling
and
desire.
Seeing, moreover, that virtue consists in free determina-
by reason, and reason
tion
is
not otherwise definable on
this theory save as the antithesis of desire, the virtuous
man, so
*
from being independent of desire,
far
pendent on
its
At a time when
hedonistic,
it is
is
de-
continued resistance for the opportunity
ethical theories are anti-ascetic rather than
delightful, in a scientific treatise, to
passage like the following on the practical value of
come
across a
" As we may,
&<tkt]<tis
a final practical maxim, relative to these habits of the will,
:
Keep the faculty of effort alive in That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary points ; do every day or two something for no other reason than that you would rather not do it so that, when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may find you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test. Asceticism of this sort is like the insurance which a man pays on his house and then, offer something like this
you by a
little
:
gratuitous exercise every day.
:
The
goods.
tax does
him no good
never bring him a return. paid
it
will
But,
if
and possibly may
at the time,
the
be his salvation from ruin.
fire
does come, his having
So with the man who has
daily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition,
and
a tower
when everything
self-denial in unnecessary things.
fellow-mortals are
He
rocks round him, and
winnowed
will stand like
when
like chaff in the blast."
his
softer
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Prof. William
James' Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., p. 126. Cp. the interesting remarks on his own education in Mill's Autobiography, pp. 52 foil., Co?nte
and
Positivism^ p. 146 (second edition.)
the paragraph generally, cp.
Dewey
op.
cit,,
On
the subject of
pp. 94, 155, 156.
9
Ethics
[Bk. tii
of realising himself in conflict with lives in the life
victory over
it
of
its
it.
would involve
its
Virtue, in fact,
Final and complete
antagonist.
own
destruction along
with the destruction of desire.* This, which might be called the " paradox of asceticism," is the explanation of the failure which has attended
a practical scheme of
life
attempts to organise
all
upon the
basis of this theory.
In the absence of an inspiring positive ideal of human life, those who have been in earnest about the matter have alternately been occupied with the vain attempt to cancel in themselves (failing, as
human
healthy
all
interests, or
they were bound to do, to realise this ideal)
with counselling t that retirement from the conflict which
death alone can this ideal
hand, to
offer.
The
fall
§ 59.
we
upon
life.+
Criticism of Theory.
practical difficulty suggested
theory was, as *
whom
back, with true cynical indifference,
the lowest forms of sensual
The
less earnest spirits to
has been offered have tended, on the other
saw, that
it
fails
by the hedonistic
to afford
any secure
This one-sidedness might be further illustrated from the depend-
ence of the ascetic for the feeling or sense of self-realisation upon the consciousness of what he
is
not rather than of what he
is, t.e. t
Hence, that which in ordinary cases is the approval of conscience becomes in him an odious species of spiritual pride. This is illustrated in the wellknown stories of Diogenes and Antisthenes, as when the latter called Socrates' attention to his rags, and provoked the reply, " I see
upon the contrast between himself and
others.
thy pride through the holes in thy cloak."
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Cp.
Shakespeare's
Timon of Athens : Timon. " Thou art proud, Apemantus." " Of nothing so much as that I am not like Timon." Ap. t As did the Roman Stoics. % As was illustrated by the history of the Cynics (see Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools) and the medieval monasteries.
Ch.
The
II]
End
as Self- Conquest
131
foundation for the distinction between right and wrong. of " right " (duty, obligation, responsi-
The vocabulary
ought) seems to have no place in psychological
bility,
The
Hedonism. as
we have
If
no
act
do
it,
be said to be the reverse of this life of humanity.
provide for the ordinary daily
It fails to
to
objection to the opposite theory may,
just seen,
is
morally right which
is
done because we
then, not only because I
have no more cakes and conduct which in the
am
virtuous
but a stain
ale,
common
cast
is
intercourse of
life
desire
am
I to
on
all
springs
spontaneously from the ordinary affections of love and pity,
hope and
errors
The
fear.
the place which
is
at all,
the
means
nature. but, in it
but
is
confined to the function of prescribing
In the other case
human
end
the
for realising
denying
assigned to reason by each
In the one case reason gives no
of the two theories.
end
source of those two opposite is
it
set
by the sentient
provides indeed an end,
desire a place in the
good
life,
denies the only means by which the ideal end can
ever
pass
into
But while the view before
actuality.
us presents these points of contrast with the preceding
one
in regard to the function
reason,
it is
in
assigns to thought or
it
fundamental agreement with
it
in holding
that reason stands outside the object of desire,
On
it.
the other, the object
conceived of as given
is
and
the one theory, as
only externally related to
by the
appetitive or purely irrational part of our nature
only object of desire
man
is
is
pleasure,
and
is
on
:
the
in desiring pleasure
determined by his sentient or appetitive nature
alone.
In criticism of this view of the relation of reason to
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
it must be pointed out (1) that there can be no object of desire, in the proper sense of the word
desire
:
Ethics
132
which
not constituted such by reason
is
was involved recognise
and
[Bk. Ill
our analysis of desire.
in
it is
refuse to
between appetite
to confuse the distinction
The
desire.
lower animals have appetites and are
determined by them, but we have no reason to ute to
On
This
itself.
To
them the power of conceiving
man
the other hand,
also
is
attrib-
objects of desire.
said to have appetites,
out these are only the raw material of desire, as sensation may be said to be the raw material of perception. So soon as we become conscious of them as elements which compete for the determination of our conduct, they have ceased to be mere appetites in becoming desires, just as the sensation of which we are conscious as an element in knowledge is no longer a mere
sensation, but an object of perception.
As there can be no
(2)
desire without the conscious
thought or reason, so there can be no activity
activity of
we understand such
in a thinking or rational self (as activity) without desire.*
The
idea that there can could
only have arisen in the confusion just criticised between
and
appetite
reason
It is perfectly true that
desire.
may
oppose the blind impulses of animal appetite, and that such
opposition must always be the
moral
life.
is
But
therefore the
that
it
is
the
this
life
life
does not
which which
is
is
mean
first
step in the
that the rational
undetermined by
life
desire, but
habitually regulated with a
view to the satisfaction of the higher or more universal as
opposed
in
its
*
to the lower or
more
particular desires.
highest and apparently purest manifestations,
Kant,
it
should be noticed, just saved himself from the psycho-
logical heresy of supposing that there can,
reason as
by the
Even as, for
itself
an object of supreme
feeling of reverence.
by conceiving of the law of
interest stimulating to action
Ch.
The
II]
End
as Self- Conquest
instance, in the search for truth, reason interest,
by feeling and
i.e.,
133
determined by
is
The
desire.
rational
life,
such a case, consists not in acting independently of
in
desire,
—
this
impossible,
is
—but
in
lower or more particular desires
amass wealth
for
subordinating the the
(e.g.,
oneself and family)
and more universal
the
(e.g.,
to
discovery
desire
the
to
higher
and
of truth
the benefit of the species). (3) If
be asked according to what law or principle
it
this relative
subordination of desires
not according to the principle, laid of
criticised,
is
be
to
down by
effected,
if
the theory
by reason alone, we are
determination
brought back to the question of our present investigation,
— the question of the standard of the
relative merit
Without yet attempting to sumupon the whole question, I may
or value of conduct.
marise our results
here point out that, even from the side of the lower life
of the so-called animal appetites,
without a witness.
we
are not left
For these appetites, even
the
in
lower animals, are not the blind chaos of lawless elements
which the theory we are considering supposes them to be.
They
are already organised according to a law or
reason of their own,
— the law, namely, of
the subordin-
ation of those which are less important for the ends of
the individual or the species
(if
you
like,
the lower) to
more important (if you like, the higher). course, meant that the life of the lower animals
those which are It is not,
or of
of
man
in his " natural " state is explicitly rational,
that the so-called " animal impulses " themselves
present
us
with a chaos
of disorderly
but
do not
elements,
but
already constitute a system, in which a relative subordination this
to
end
an implicit end is
to
is
be defined
distinctly traceable. is
as
much
How
a question for
Ethics Diology as for ethics.
It
may
r
at this point
BK.
Ill
be described,
in biological language, as adaptation to environment, or
the establishment of equilibrium between function and the field in which
end
this
The
life.
it is
upon
called
one form or another
in
man and
between
difference
of creation
not that law, which
is
aware of reason
such
it
;
^r,
as
it
is
all
pursue sentient
the lower orders
only implicit reason,
is
manifests itself in him, but that he
first
To
to act.*
the law of
is
first
becomes
sometimes expressed,
becomes aware of itself in him. It is, of that in becoming conscious of himself as this law, or as called upon to realise this end
first
course, true
subject to
man
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
he has eaten of and knows good and evil. But this does not mean that he has to evolve the law of duty and of right from his own inner consciousness. It only means that he is henceforth called upon to pursue consciously the end which sub-human nature pursues has lost his primitive innocence,
the tree of knowledge,
Unconsciously,
to
make
explicit
in
reason already implicitly contained in (4)
Hence the end
or standard of
his
own
life
the
it.
good action cannot be them
the suppression of the desires, but co-ordination of as each in
its
place capable of contributing to realise the
end of the whole, yet
strictly
the constitution of human
higher desires
is
subordinate to
life,
it.
Such
is
that the satisfaction of the
only possible by means of the relative
satisfaction of the lower.
Thus
the gratification of the
desire for knowledge, to revert to our previous example, is
only possible in any society, and, in a sense, by any *
The
question whether this equilibrium
individual, or of the tribe or species social),
analysis.
will
come up
in another
(i.e.,
is
that of the particular
whether
form at a
it is
later
individual or stage
in
this
Ch.
End
The
II]
individual,
as Self- Conquest
i3S
on condition that the more primary instinct and secure the means of subsistence
to acquire property
desires bring with
Hence it is that even the lower The them their own justification.
function of reason
is
has been
satisfied.
not to eliminate, but to transform
them.* *
and sions
On
the subject of this section, see Bradley, op.
for exhaustive criticism of
cit.,
Essay IV.
;
Kant, who, although in his conclu-
he goes beyond the onesidedness of his premises, has worked
out this view more fully and systematically than any one else in
modern philosophy.
Caird, op.
cit.,
pp. 202-9, 226-8.
Cp. Dewey, op.
Mackenzie,
pp. 57-70.
op. at.,
Vol. II.,
tit
.
Book
II., ch.
ii.,
esp.
pp. 84-96, also pp. 23, 24
;
Ethics
136
[Bk. Ill
CHAPTER
III.
EVOLUTIONARY HEDONISM. ยง 60.
The
utilitarian
some
theory has recently been taken up by
of the leading exponents of biological evolution,
chiefly
a
Utilitarianism and Evolution.
Mr. Herbert Spencer, and has from them received
new form, which we must next consider.
It is
to observe the precise point of divergence
important
between the
newer and the older form of the pleasure theory. The latter, e.g., by Mr. Spencer,
objections urged against the
do not concern the nature of the end, or the
last resort, is
This
is
still
that which, in
the standard of value in moral judgments.
the same.
"
No
school," says that writer,
" can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling, called
enjoyment, happiness. time, to
some being
by whatever name, gratification, Pleasure, somewhere, at some
or beings,
in the conception." *
is
But while
an inexpugnable element this
is
so,
the presuppos-
on which the older form of utilitarianism rested, and the method which it employed, are thought to be open to serious objection.
itions
*
Data of Ethics,
ยง 15.
Cp. Appendix, p. 307 (5th ed.).
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
Ill]
Thus,
it is
pointed out that the older form
*37 is
founded
The on an erroneous conception of man's nature. writers who founded and developed utilitarianism, in its earlier forms, started from a conception of the relation of the individual to his social environment which, in view of the results
now
established,
is
quite untenable,
(t) It
regards society as an aggregate of individuals, mechanically cohering, like atoms or molecules in inorganic matter.
The weakness
of this point of view
the question was asked
which
society,
It
all.
was
on
became obvious when
the atoms or molecules of
this theory, consists,
meet
to
how
this
came
together at
question that recourse was had
myth of the " Social Contract," who had previously lived and in order to in isolation, at length came together secure the greater good of self-preservation, contracted themselves out of their natural rights to freedom and by
earlier writers to the
according to which individuals,
;
equality.
(2)
Corresponding to
this
conception of society
we have the con" ception of fixed and equal " lots " of happiness.
as
an aggregate of homogeneous
units,
We
must conceive of happiness " as
" (according to this theory)
a kind of emotional currency, capable of being
calculated
and distributed
in
i
lots/
definite value independently of
individual.
.
.
.
which have a certain
any special
taste of the
Pains and pleasures can be handed
about like pieces of money, and we have simply to
how to gain a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain."* (3) It looks at society as static. The atoms are relatively constant. It is true that they
calculate
vary according to the circumstances of birth and education
;
but these variations
are, as
it
were, accidental and
* Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 360.
of the Benthamite formula, op.
cit.>
pp. 220
Cp. Spencer's criticism foil.
Ethics
138
On
individual. (4)
The
the aggregate, they remain the same.
happiness or pleasure, to cause and distribute
amount
which so as to secure the greatest
number
greatest
the moral end,
is
main
Its
human
constitution of
are
features
fixed
static-
by the
nature as at present empirically
to us.*
The Organic View of Human Society
ยง 61.
the
to
similarly conceived
is
of as relative only to the capacities of individuals ally considered.
known
in
[Bk.
corrects
these Errors.
For
this "
"
atomic theory
ness,
modern science has
back,
it
of
you
teaches, as far as
human
nature and happi-
Go
substituted the organic. will, in
the history of the
come
race or of the individual, you never
to anything
that in any degree corresponds to the " individual " of
the
older
member
theories.
of
We
some kind of
a society, but
is
know man but
never
He
society.
what he
a
in virtue of his relation to
it.
the individual and society
is
is
The connection between
as
not only exists in
not merely external and mechanical, but internal and All that
organic.
of
mind and body,
makes him what he are inherited,
a previous state of society.
which are the springs of
i.e.,
The
and
desires
and
tribe as the field
must not be supposed that
some of
instincts
powers
him from
presuppose some
all
are equally responsible for these errors.
of
to
his actions
sort of organised society of family * It
his
is, all
come
the older school of Utilitarians J. S. Mill is clearly conscious
these defects in the earlier doctrine,
and points them out
with admirable lucidity in his suggestive essay on Bentham {Essays
and Dissertations,
Vol.
I.).
Here, as in other parts of his philosophy,
the great interest that attaches to Mill's writings
is
due to the
that he has outgrown formulae with which, however, he cannot
up
his
mind
to part.
fact
make
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
/II]
The
of their satisfaction. is
139
education which he receives
only possible by means of such social institutions as the
language, the family, the school,
he wins
prizes trade,
workshop.
The
the property he acquires in
in battle,
can only be secured to him in virtue of some form
of social law and social justice, however rudimentary.
In a word, his
life
takes
form
its
at every point
from
the relation in which he stands to his social environment. All this
is
expressed in the scientific doctrine which
has superseded the myth of the social contract as the
ground of explanation of the phenomena of morals and politics.* "A full perception of the truth," says Mr. Leslie Stephen, "that society
but an organic growth, of whose growth
it
is
not a mere aggregate,
forms a whole the laws
can be studied apart from those of
the individual atom,
modern a structure which by the distribution and postulate of
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; that
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;supplies
the
speculation." its
most
characteristic
" Society, in fact,
nature implies a certain
relations of classes.
is
fixity in
Each man
is
found with a certain part of the joint framework, which is
made
of flesh
but which
* I
is
and blood instead of bricks or timber,
not the less truly a persistent structure. "t
scientific writers had an equal hold an organism, and expounded it with equal insight. As a matter of fact, a history of the doctrine would show that writers greatly differ in these respects. Mr. Spencer, who might be said to have been the founder of it, holds it with a feeble grasp (see D. G. Ritchie's criticisms, Principles of State Interference, I. and II.), and expounds it (Essays, Vol. I.), in an external way, as though it were an interesting " analogy" or metaphor. On the other hand, Mr. Stephen, as quoted in the text, has made a great advance on all previous statements of this truth in this
speak in the text as though
of the notion that society
is
country.
f Leslie Stephen's Science of Ethics, pp. 29, 31.
;
Ethics
140
But society
is
[Bk. Ill
not only an organism in the sense that
the form of the individual
determined by his
life is
members
tion to the whole, as the various
rela-
are by their
relation to the body,* but in the sense that, like other
organisms,
grows and develops by reaction upon
it
environment.
This growth
differentiation
and
is
integration, the
structure acquiring
becoming more
greater complexity, and the individuals
dependent upon one another. is
its
a simultaneous process of
The end
of the process expressed in various ways as " increase," " develop-
ment,"
"greatest totality,"
Mr. Spencer, " reaches
its
of
"Evolution," says
life.
when
limit
individual
life
is
the greatest, both in length and breadth* Finally, the law of social evolution
tion in other fields
the law of evolu-
is
that society survives which, owing
:
to the constitution of
its
parts
and members, and
their
faithfulness in the discharge of their individual functions, is
best adapted to
its
of the environment the struggle for
environment.
(e.g.,
It is
of one tribe
end of
in
existence) which explains the survival
of those communities in which conduct to the
the pressure
upon another
social preservation,
i.e.,
is
best adapted
furthers the health
Hence, "social and strength of the tribe or nation. evolution means the evolution of a strong social tissue the best type is the type implied by the strongest tissue." t
When these results
are applied to the theory of pleasure,
We
might as well regard the members of our animals," says Mr. James Ward, " as suppose man *
*
from humanity." f Mr. Stephen prefers "social tissue" to
own body as man apart
is
"social organism,"
because a nation has not the unity of the higher organisms. It is limited by external circumstances, not, like them, by internal constitution.
See
op. cit., ch.
iii.,
ยง 31.
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
ill]
and of moral judgment founded upon to imply important consequences.
141
it,
they are seen
Pleasure
is
seen to
depend, not upon the constitution of the individual considered as an isolated atom, but upon the " organic balance
of the individual's
"
own
as
instincts,
this
" Pleasure
determined by his relations to society.
is
is
not
a separate thing, independently of his special organisation.
and
.
.
.
Each
instinct, for
example, must have
their respective provinces
general organic balance. that certain
pleasure
;
pain,
and others
this is a prima-facie reason, at least, for
avoiding one and accepting the other.
imply a remedial process,
pains
turn,
We may undoubtedly point out
modes of conduct produce
and
its
must be determined by the
But, again,
while
some imply
others
disease; and the conduct which increases them may therefore either be wise or foolish in the highest degree." * Similarly, the fact of growth
and evolution
in the social
organism involves a revision of our conception of hap-
Development implies the acquisition of new and desires. Hence the happiness (resulting from the satisfactions of desires) which satisfies at one " Happiness itself stage ceases to satisfy at another. changes as the society develops, and we cannot compare piness.
instincts
the two
more
societies
at
different
stages,
as
if
they were
or less efficient machines for obtaining an identical
product." ยง 62.
On
Hence
the Utilitarian Theory Moral Empirical Generalisations.
the further criticism of the
by utilitarianism that ralisation
it is
empirical.
Laws
are
method recognised Morality
is
a gene-
founded on collated instances from ordinary * Science of Ethics ; p. 365.
Ethics
I42
HI
[Bic.
experience as to the best means of producing the greatest
To
sum-total of pleasure.
hand, morality It is " ties
is
the evolutionist, on the other
the condition of health in the organism.
the definition of
some of the most important
of the social organism.'
7
property of the social tissue for its health.
"
Thou
The
shalt not
"The " *
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the property that makes
imperatives, "
commit
quali-
moral law defines a
Thou
shalt not steal,''
adultery," are not to be justified
on the ground that the greatest happiness to ourselves and others may be shown by appeal to experience to result from obeying them (this may or may not be so demonstrable), but on the ground that they are essential " This to the vitality and efficiency of the organism. represents the real difference between the utilitarian and the evolutionist criterion. The one lays down as a the happiness,
criterion
the other
the
of the
health,
society."
The two
are
however,
not,
really
the contrary, the health of society
the condition of
its
It
severally
On
opposed.
only valuable as
The difference between Hedonism is not in the ultimate
happiness.
evolutionary ethics and
end they
is
recommend, but
in the
proximate one.
does not concern the object to be reached by man, but
the
method of reaching
it.
The end
best attained by keeping
that
is
and
fixing
attentiori
upon the
it
is
happiness, but
in the
conditions.
admit," says Mr. Spencer,t " that happiness
mate end
to be contemplated,
I
background, " is
While the
do not admit that
should be the proximate end. ...
I
conceive
it
I
ulti-
to
it
be
the business of moral science to deduce from the law s of r
life
and the conditions of existence what kinds of action * Science of Ethics, pp. 148, 168.
f Data of Ethics, §
21.
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
Ill]
and what kinds
necessarily tend to produce happiness,
Having done
produce unhappiness.
143
this, its
are to be recognised as laws of conduct,
conformed
to
deductions
and are
be
to
to irrespective of a direct estimation of happi-
ness or misery."
Finally, as illustrations of the blunders
which the application of an empirical or direct
into
method may lead formidable
list
Spencer has drawn up a
Mr.
us,
of mistaken efforts at legislation for the
greatest happiness of the greatest
number
within
the
past few decades.*
So
far
we have
the criticism of the older utilitarians
Let us now examine the value of the criticism, and the position which the critics have left to themselves.
by
their evolutionist brethren of to-day.
Importance of Theory of Evolution in the
§ 63.
Field of Ethics.
The
value of the results which issue from the applica-
tion of the theory of evolution in the field of ethics can
hardly be overrated. that
that
we owe more
a few of the gains it,
we may note
:â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
(1) // It
To mention
or less directly to
makes individualistic presuppositions untenable.
shows the theories already
criticised to
be as unten-
we have seen that they view These theories in
able from a biological as
an
ethical point of
r
.
are from all
their
forms are individualistic, Le.t the self whose satisfaction is
the ethical end
rate
as
not
is
conceived of as isolated, or at any
essentially
Cyrenaics, while
related to society.
urging the pleasures
course, took care to
add that one was
of living together "like a *
See The
Man
stranger."
Thus the
of social
inter-
to practise the art
The Epicureans
versus The State, pp. 7 foil (Stb e&).
Ethics
144
[Bk.
hi
extolled in this respect friendship, the most subjective
and accidental of
all
The same defect modern Hedonism. In
social bonds.*
hardly needs illustration from
the older forms, as in Hobbes,f the self
may
satisfaction society, but
actually crossed in
is
is
one whose
not only be attained independently of
the existence of society.
In
already seen the shifts to which
completeness by
its
later
Hedonism we have
its
supporters are re-
duced, to stretch their egoistic basis so as to cover the facts of
ordinary morality and social
The same
feature
appears in
life.
all
the forms
of the
opposite theory with which we made a passing acquaintance in discussing " duty for duty's sake." The Cynic
and the Stoic aimed
at
as of other instincts
and
cultivating a
being independent of the
form of unsociableness which has passed
a byword, the latter living in times
into
and
social,
desires, the former deliberately
when
social
no longer offered scope for the higher of the soul, and men were forced to seek in
political life
aspirations
the inner
life for
the satisfaction that the world denied
them.
Similarly the " world " with which the Christian
ascetic
waged war included the relationships of and state and even to Kant, society
society, field
of
family,
;
the reign
of
interests
hostile
to
true
is
the self-
determination. J *
See Erdmann's History of Philosophy, Vol. L, pp. 90, 185. starts from the axiom ho?no homini lupus. % Of course it is impossible to secure the independence aimed at by those who adopted this attitude. Diogenes, however poorly he thought of society, was glad, at any rate, to have the contrast, only possible by means of it, between himself and others. Simeon Stylites does not appear to have been indifferent to the admiration of byIn the nobler forms of the theory, notably in Kant's standers. philosophy, its individualism is always on the verge of breaking down.
f
Who
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
ill]
On of as
each and
of these theories, society
all
is
conceived
mechanical union of mutually
of a
consisting
M5
each of which pursues an end to
repellent particles,
which the others stand
at best as
On
means.
the other
hand, the individuals are conceived of as independent of society, and only submitting to fuller life
its
restraints
on the
they might otherwise enjoy, in virtue either of
necessity or of the greater general security to the vital
and property that
interests of persons
Amid much
confusion
it
brings.
be shortly referred
(to
evolutionist writers have helped to bring that the " self," in
whose
satisfaction
one form or another the end,
attempt to define
it
in
terms of
its
home
to),
the truth
upon these theories is an abstraction. No
is
individual nature as only
accidentally related to society can henceforth succeed. (2) It
shows how moral ideas have had a
history.
Its
contribution to the proper understanding of the history
of moral judgments and of forms of virtue has been
not less valuable.
Just as the application of scientific
ideas in the field of sociology
makes the older forms,
both of naturalistic and rationalist theories of the end, untenable, so the application of the historic
method
to
the theory of conscience, and the forms which morality takes in different countries
and times, puts Intuitionalism*
* Mr. Spencer professes to have reconciled scientific with intui" The evolution hypothesis enables us to reconcile tionalist ethics.
opposed moral
theories.
.
.
.
For
.
.
.
the doctrine of innate powers
of moral perception becomes congruous with the utilitarian doctrine,
when
it is
seen that preferences and aversions are rendered organic
by inheritance of the
effects
of pleasurable and painful experiences
Data of Ethics
see whole passage, with p. 124 which cp. Social Statics, Introduction (and see Dewey, op. cit. p. 69). This kind of reconciliation reminds one of the cynic's witty interpretation of the manner in which the lion and the lamb shall lie down in progenitors."
',
;
t
together, according to prophecy.
10
Ethics
146 out of court.
[Bk.
In view of the facts brought forward,
in
it
can no longer be maintained that the judgments of conscience are innate and underived principles, related to the circumstances only as the field is
to
They
be given to them.
are
which
in
shown
to
be
effect vitally
related to the stage of development at which the society whose morality they represent has arrived, and to have had a history in time like all other forms of conscious life.
" relativity
The
of
the
standard
be the
will
subject of a future chapter, and need not further detain
us here. (3) It ethics.
throws new light on the place of pleasure in flood of fresh light has been shed on the place of
A
pleasure in biological evolution, and on the physiological
causes which have led to
its
being, as
we have
already
to be, the " feeling of self-realisedness."
defined
it
shown
that,
inasmuch
It is
as creatures tend to persist in
pleasurable activities, those will tend to survive in the struggle for existence in in
further in
which pleasurable
harmony with the environment, and life
;
those,
on the other hand,
which pleasurable
activities are
therefore tend to
will
tend to perish
activities are hostile to the organ-
ism by being unsuited to
its
In
environment.
this
way
on the whole, will come to be the accompaniment of activities which tend to the survival, pains of activities which tend to the destruction of the organism. In man that which corresponds to the former species of activities is, of course, moral conduct; that which pleasure,
corresponds to the
latter,
immoral conduct.
follows that moral conduct tends to be
pleasure, immoral conduct by pain.*
The
* See Data of Ethics, ยง 33.
Whence
it
accompanied by gain to ethics
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
ill]
generally from this account of pleasure
is
147 to
be measured
by the strength of the tendency, which has asserted
itself
in all ages, to regard pleasure as a delusion of sense,
by
nature hostile
its
writers
the
to
moral
life.
and
Evolutionist
have done good service in showing not only that commonly the sign of normal
pleasure and happiness are
and healthy
but also tend to promote
activity,
and
to increase the vitality
The Hedonistic hypothesis
The
support in biology. theory
this
Evolutionary Ethics.
Difficulties in
ยง 64.
(1)
which
it
and questions which
has formed with the pleasure theory (see
The Hedonistic assumption that
had brought new fore, first
new
ivhich it favours finds no
difficulties
centre round the uncritical alliance
raises
by Mr. Spencer,
facts
and so
it,
efficiency of the organism.
it
is
p. 125).
so confidently embraced
might be supposed that biology
We
facts to its support.
may, there-
ask whether biology has brought to light any
which might support the main contention of
Hedonism that pleasure is the only thing Now, so far is this from being the case, that the conclusions of biology go on all fours with the results of our previous criticism of this theory. They show that impulse and desire precede the feeling of pleasure, and not vice versa. Pleasure indeed follows upon successful pyschological desired.
effort
:
it is
the sign of
it
;
but the impulse or desire to
exercise the function precedes sure, not vice versd.
pleasure, in the
not desire * viz.,
This
is
it
and conditions the
human
life
it
plea-
the object gives us
instance, because
because
we
desire
gives us pleasure.*
it
We
;
we do
may, of
the explanation of the so-called " paradox of Hedonism,"
that the only
Mill's
first
In
way
Autobiography
to secure pleasure
p. 142).
is
not to aim at
It is really its refutation.
it
(see
For an
Ethics
148 course,
make
organs
(e.g.,
[Bk. Ill
We may
the pleasure our object.
use the
of taste and digestion) in order to enjoy
And no
the pleasure of the exercise of their functions.
harm
will
be done so long as a pernicious habit In the
contracted.
latter case
show her disapproval of of the word,
this,
which
it
be replied
that,
and
an not
is
therefore,
it
is itself
vice versa.
not
in the strict sense
altogether.
It
itself is
even
escape from pain.*
effort to
or longing
is
on occasions
though desire must precede
the feeling of pleasure, yet desire uneasiness,
is,
will
"preposterous" use of the organ, by
a
impairing, perhaps destroying,
Nor can
Nature
its
the result of felt
most primitive form,
For the natural
again the condition of the is,
of course, true, as
instinct
felt
we have
pain,
already
seen,t that the "tension" between the pain of the present
and the pleasure of the anticipated realisation of is an element in the phenomenon of desire, and that this tension may itself be said to be predominantly painful. What is maintained, however, is, that this pain is in the case of instincts and natural appetites conditional upon them, and not vice versa ; state
the object desired,
early statement of this truth, see Butler's Sermons, XI. particular appetites
:
"That
all
and passions are towards external things them-
from the pleasure arisingfrom them, is manifest from hence; that there could not be this pleasure were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion there could selves, distinct
:
be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an See also affection or appetite to one thing more than another/' Hume's Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix I. fin. On the paradox of Hedonism see Bradley, op. cit., pp. 91 foil. * As Locke {Essay concerning Human Understandings II., 21, Cp. Ward, ยง 29 foil, 2nd ed.) and the modern Pessimist contend. loc. cit., p. 74.
f See pp. 48, 119.
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
Ill]
149
while in the case of fully developed desire
superseded in the
tends to be
it
of consciousness by objective
field
ends bearing a qualitative relation to the subject with
whose good they are for the moment identified. Escape from pain is of course a possible motive of action, but it is emphatically not a normal one, and in the case of the higher desires can hardly be said to have a place at all. (2)
On
"
the Hedonistic assumption, " Increase
cannot be proved
of Life But setting this psycho-
to be desirable.
logical question aside,
and admitting that there may
be other objects of desire besides personal pleasure,
it
contended by the supporter of the view under discussion that the ultimate end which all seek is the
is
still
What
greatest pleasure. life "
of
gives value to that
which, as the end of evolution,
man
tion of the " completely adapted
evolved society," brings with
Now,
is
is
to
"increase
be the por-
in the completely
the increase of pleasure which
it
it.
in reference to this contention,
whether, as a matter of
fact, this
it
might be asked
" increase of
life "
does
Are the more highly developed nations and individuals "happier" than the less
bring increase of happiness.
developed
?
It
might indeed be argued that the greater
the variety of powers and capacities developed in kind, the greater the capacities of enjoyment. just the point that influential
is
contested
;
and, as
fairly
of *
Without subscribing
doubt
is
known, an
as has
other truths by
to
knowledge increaseth
may
Pessimism,* we
whether more highly developed powers
mind and conscience Which,
well
philosophy has been built upon the opposite
theory, that " he that increaseth
sorrow."
is
man-
But that
its
been
necessarily
wittily observed,
uselessness."
"
bring with
if it
be
them
true, differs
from
Ethics increase of happiness.
It
is
[Bk. Ill
quite certain that they are
apt to throw the individual or the nation possessing
where the
into situations
be required
man
sacrifice of
them
happiness seems to
so that, as Mr. Stephen admits, to exhort
;
may be " to exhort him to acquire a faculty which will, in many cases, make him less fit than the less moral man for getting the greatest amount of
a
to virtue
happiness from a given combination of circumstances."
And
generally
may be questioned
it
two dimensions of belonging to
it
at its
breadth,"* there ever
we
whether, besides the
which Mr. Spencer mentions as highest development, " length and
life
is
not a third,
depth, which, what-
viz.,
are to say of the others,
may be
a minus quan-
regards pleasure, and anything that could go by
tity as
name of happiness.t Nor can it be said in reply
the
that the pain
developed types involve
highly
which
maladjustment,
ex
is
which such
the result of social
hypothesi
is
excluded in a
where a perfect equilibrium between function For, again, and environment has been established. society
hypothesis
this
shown
is
open
equilibrium
?
to
grave doubt.
Can
it
be
towards such a state of stable Is such a " completely adapted man " as
that progress
is
Mr. Spencer supposes J a possible conception? That progress means the establishment of equilibrium between *
Data of Ethics
,
p. 25.
f "Odd," says the doctor in Margaret Deland's clever novel Sydney^ 11 that it is the sight of trouble which makes me want to for the deeper you live, the more trouble you live more earnestly ;
suppose trouble is a man's birthright, and instinct makes him seek it." Cp. passage quoted from Romola, in Green's
have.
But
Pro leg.
to Ethics, p.
I
404
n.
\ See the whole chapter on " Absolute and Relative Ethics " in Data of Ethics with which may be compared the earlier and more ,
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
ill]
151
ever higher and more differentiated functions in society and the individual is undoubted; but it is equally undoubted that in each case the equilibrium is established only to be broken into again by new forces which have to be equilibrated, new differences that have to be
Of an
reconciled.
absolute and final equilibrium of the
kind demanded, from which pain and conflict
The
excluded, evolution knows nothing. to
in nature
it
progress. is final
is
Where
death.
there
will
be
only analogue
is
life
there
is
In death alone (individual or national) there
Here alone there
equilibrium.
is
no change and
development in the organism, requiring readjustment to an environment which is different because the organism is different. In regard to social progress, we have no warrant for believing that individual aspiration after a higher form of
life
than the environment admits of will
not keep pace with the progress already attained, and that struggle will
and
sacrifice,
with the pain that they involve,
not be the permanent portion of the more highly
developed,
i.e.
the
more moral,
But even though we admit the so completely adapted to
its
individuals.* possibility of a society
environment, and consisting
of wills so completely harmonised with one another, that every element of pain, even that expressed by the word obligation,t will disappear,
it
might
still
be questioned
uncompromising statement of the same doctrine, Social Statics, Part L, ch. i. For a criticism of it see Bradley's Appearance and Reality, pp. 42 1 -2; Sidg wick's Methods of Ethics, Book L, ch. ii., See also p. 152 n. ยง 2, and art. in Mind, XVIII., pp. 222-6. below. *
The above argument must
prove that development Hedonistic hypothesis,
it is
is
not be interpreted as intended to
not desirable, but merely that, on the
not possible to prove
I See Data of Ethics, ยง 46
fin,
its
desirableness,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Ethics
[Bk. Ill
one which man, as man, can
whether such a society
is
take as his ideal.
be true that
it
man by
his nature
the strain and accompanying un-
that
progressive,
is
If
pleasantness of the endeavour to realise himself in ever
higher forms
a necessary element in his
is
merely a transitory accident essence of
man
to
;
if it
life
be true that
and not
it is
of the
be " hurled
From change His
then the
soul's
scientific
to
change unceasingly,
wings never furled,"
Utopia of Mr. Spencer may prove, as
a moral ideal, to be as uninviting and inoperative as the
economic paradise of M. Godin* or Mr. Bellamy, or the " Nowhere " from which Mr. Morris brings us news.t (3) Defect of Method having its source in failure to Science of Causes and Science of Ends. A and more serious question is suggested by the claim that is put forward by evolutionary ethics to be " rational," as opposed to the older form of utilitarianism, which is " empirical. "J For when we inquire what the
distinguish third
critics
we
have to say in turn of the evolutionists* theory,
find that this
is
precisely the objection
* See Gronlund's criticism,
Our Destiny
)
ch.
i.,
which they
§ 8.
f Besides the other advance (mentioned p. 139 n.) which marks Mr. Stephen's presentation of evolutionary ethics, it possesses the
Utopian lumber-room of ethical speculation. il The attempt to establish an absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness is in ethics what the attempting to square the circle or to discover perpetual motion is in geometry or mechanics " (Science of Ethics, Mr. Alexander (Moral Order and Progress, pp. 266 foil.) p. 430). criticises it even more severely, as founded on a misconception of Cp. Ethical Studies, the meaning of "adaptation to environment." further advantage over Mr. Spencer's in relegating absolute or ethics to the
p.
84 n. \
Data of Ethics,
1st Ed., p. 312,
and elsewhere.
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
Ill]
urge against to the view
it
:
it is
empirical or experimental, as opposed
which they themselves support.*
In order to understand the force of
objection
this
it
more precisely than we have what is meant by the claim put
necessary to inquire
is
hitherto
done
into
forward by the evolutionist writers to have advanced
beyond empiricism, and basis.
Mr. Spencer
As opposed that
all
is
to
have
on a
set morality
to early or empirical science,
may be
developed science
rational
meaning.
at pains to explain his
he points out
characterised as a
priori or rational, "if the drawing of deductions from
premisses positively ascertained by induction called."
He
astronomy
:
illustrates the distinction
" During
its
is
to
be so
from the case of
early stages, planetary
astronomy
more than accumulated observations respecting the positions and motions of the sun and planets, from which accumulated observations it came consisted of nothing
by-and-by to be empirically predicted, with an approach
would have But the modern
to truth, that certain of the heavenly bodies
certain
certain
positions at
times.
science of planetary astronomy consists of deductions
from the law of celestial
gravitation,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; deductions showing why the
bodies necessarily occupy certain places at certain
Now the kind of relation which thus exists between ancient and modern astronomy is analogous to
times.
the kind of relation
which
I
conceive exists between
the expediency morality, and moral science properly so called."
The
distinction here referred to
the student of logic-t
*
A
See SorleyV Ethics of Naturalism, ch.
structive Ethics, p. 273,
t See especially
ix.
and elsewhere,
Mill's Logic,
is
familiar to
simpler instance of
Book
III., ch. ix.
;
it
is
the
Courtney's Con*
Ethics
between the discovery by direct experiment,
difference e.g.,
[Bk. Ill
upon a
billiard
two forces of a given
that
ball,
magnitude acting upon
a given angle
at
it
movement bearing a
another produce
relation to their respective direction
and amount, and
known law
the inference, drawn from the
one
to
uniform
certain
of the effect
of each of the forces taken singly, as to what will be the
law of their joint
Now
to
is
it
The former
effect.
generalisation, the latter
is
be observed that
within the field of what are sciences,
is
an empirical
a deduction. this
commonly
distinction
lies
called the natural
the sciences which deal with the laws of
i.e.,
causal connection between natural
phenomena.
It refers
modes of arriving at these laws. By the term empirical is meant the method of simple observation, without analysis of the phenomenon under investigation to different
into
its
elements
constituent
ratiocinative, or a priori\ the
from the
;
by the term deductive,
method which proceeds
supposed laws of the action of each
real or
constituent taken separately to deduce the law of their action
when combined.
But there in
which
is
it is
another sense of the word " empirical
i.e., with results effected by a opposed to those which deal with ends or
a
efficient causes,
vis
as
final
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;with the
*
applied to those sciences which deal with
the thought or idea of a
effects of
tergo,
causes
ter??iinus
ad quern. In this sense all the sciences, which deal with phenomena as such, are empirical those, on the other hand, which deal with phenomena as intended, i.e., as ;
consciously conceited in reference to an end, are teleological or rational.
and biology
in
Instances of the former are physics
all
latter, ethics, politics,
their
branches;
instances
and the theory of
art,
of
the
knowledge,
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
Ill]
and
This all-important
religion.
been
Entangling themselves tion
that
by
recognised
sufficiently
men
of
those of animals, by pleasures causes\ instead of
not
writers.
the outset with the assump-
at
the actions
has
distinction
evolutionist
determined,
are
and pains
by the idea of an end,
cause, they have confused the issue,
as by i.e.,
and are
like
efficient
by a
final
open
still
to
the charge of being empirical, though in a different and
more it
"The
serious sense.
has been well said, "
doctrine of evolution
when added
only widens our view of the old landscape
enable us to pass from
1
to
'
is
1
itself,"
to empirical morality,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;does
ought/ or from
not
efficient
more than the telescope can point beyond the sphere of spatia quantity." * We have already seen how the moral laws which
to final cause, any
are the " data of ethics " can only spring from
We
a conception of an end.
such an end must be a personal good, tion or satisfaction
how
this
The
self.
pleasure
greatest
" increase
of
life."
Lastly,
last result is practically
by the evolutionist, when for
the realisa-
i.e.,
we have seen cannot be sought in any mere
of the
satisfaction
state of feeling.
such
have further seen how
the
But
he proposes
end of " in
to
health "
social
he has
also
or
element of
rejecting this
error in the older utilitarianism,
accepted substitute
dropped the
that the end must be a form of personal good.t It is perfectly open to him to point out, as none have done so admirably, that
element of truth which
* Sorley, op.
cit.,
Ethical System,"
p. 273.
it
represented,
Cp. Sidgvvick's
viz.,
art.
on
"
Mr. Spencer's
Mind, XVIII.
f For criticisms founded on this defect see Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 74-85 ; Dewey, op. cit., pp. 71-8.
Ethics
156 the " person " cannot
[Br. Ill
be conceived of as an isolated
atom, and that the end cannot be the isolated
gratifica-
one or of any number of such atoms ; but this only means that the " good " of the individual must be It cannot mean that the good is also a common good.
tion of any
not a personal one. that
If
does, the theory simply
it
means
impossible to deduce any moral law from the
it is
conception of end,
have any science of ethics
to
i.e.,
Yet
the proper sense.
this
which evolutionary ethics, exponents, has landed us. clusions
in
precisely the difficulty in
is
in the writings of its leading
Our
objection to their con-
not that they apply evolution to conscience
is
and morality, or
themselves of biological conceptions
avail
in interpreting the
phenomena
of
human
life
in general,
but that they cling to the empirical point of view, and so fail
to get the full <ÂŁ
"health,"
meaning out of
their
own
The
results.
"adaptation/' or what not, "of the
vitality,''
social organism," are valuable
formula
define the contents of "the good."
in helping us to
As anything more,
they are abstractions without relation to the moral end.
What is
(1)
works
is
required to complete the evolutionist theory
once and ;
(2) to
individual
is
tion that his
for all to
add
to
its
renounce Hedonism and
all its
empirical demonstration that the
essentially social a teleological demonstra-
good
a previous chapter
is
essentially a
we showed
the former; the next chapter
the will
common way
in
good.
In
respect
to
deal with the latter
desideratum.
Note. In illustration of the defect of evolutionary ethics which is pointed out in the text, the important admissions made by Mr. Stephen in his section
"
on
When we
Self-Sacrifice, op.
say to a man,
'
cit.,
This
p.
426 onward, may be quoted
is right,'
we cannot also
:
say invariably
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
Ill]
and unhesitatingly, 'This
be
will
for
*57
The
your happiness.'
hearted and grovelling nature has an argument which, from point of view,
Not only
right always,
own
not only victorious in practice, but logically
is
unanswerable.
do
cold-
its
—a
is
impossible to persuade people to
it
matter of fact as to which there
is
not likely
—
be much dispute, but there is no argument in existence which if exhibited to them, would always appear to be conclusive. A thoroughly selfish man prefers to spend money on gratifying his own senses which might save some family from misery and to
He
starvation.
prefers to
do
How
can
he causes feel
it,
there
is
we argue with him ?
the
If to point
it
us say, even at the cost of
so, let
breaking some recognised obligation
By
?
— of telling
successful
no reasonable being who has
all
experience, that in a vast
so feeble
and intermittent
or stealing.
make him and we may hold that at least, the germs of sym-
not,
;
who
is
absolutely inaccessible
But neither can we deny, without
to such appeals.
lie
out were the same thing as to
method might be
pathetic feeling, and therefore no one
of
a
pointing out the misery which,
number of
as to supply
flying in the face
cases the sympathies are
no motive capable of encoun-
tering the tremendous force of downright selfishness in a torpid nature.
Shall
we then appeal
some
to
extrinsic
ger of being found out, despised, and punished?
motive— to
the danUndoubtedly, that
But if for any reason the man is if he is certain of escaping detection, or so certain that the chance of punishment does not outweigh the chance of impunity, he may despise our arguments, and we have no more to offer. Against some people, in short, the only effective arguments are the gallows or the prison. Unluckily, they are arguments which cannot be brought to bear with all the readiness desirable, and therefore I think it highly probable that there will be bad men for a long time to come. ... By acting rightly, I admit, will be effective as far as it goes. beyond the reach of such dangers
.
.
;
.
even the virtuous
man
do not deny
be a real
sometimes be making a sacrifice ; and I I only deny that such a state; ment will be conclusive for the virtuous man. His own happiness is not his sole ultimate aim. There is scarcely any man, I believe, at all capable of sympathy or reason {sic), who would not, it
to
will
sacrifice
.
in
many
.
.
cases unhesitatingly, sacrifice his
own
happiness for a
suffi-
cient advantage to others" (pp. 429, 431). In this passage the following points are worthy of notice : (1) That Mr. Stephen still lingers by the notion that happiness (though not necessarily the individual's) is the end.
(2)
That while
it
is
true that the happiness of
'
Ethics
[Bk. Ill
the individual and happiness of others normally coincide, yet they
come to one another, we can never be sure that they are one and will follow the same path. That which unites them in the good Man "is sympathy, 'V.*., a feeling.
are different, and however near they
Hence, to one who has not the feeling, there is no argument for which would appear conclusive. To which the reply is, " Of course not, if the connection between others' happiness and one's own is a feeling." You cannot tell a man he (3)
unselfish adherence to the right
ought to have " Ought," in
this feeling.
fact,
It is sufficient that
he has not got it. But what if
has disappeared from our vocabulary.
the end is not properly described as happiness, but as well-being or good and the connection between individual and social good is not the subjective one of feeling, but, as Mr. Stephen inadvertently himself suggests, the objective one of " reason " ? Supposing that pleasure, whether egoistic or altruistic, is not his end, but that it is in virtue of his being rational, not in virtue of his feeling sympathy\ that we appeal to a man to set aside selfish considerations, we are no longer left to seek for " arguments " to convince him that in following the " right " he is securing his own greatest happiness. We do not appeal It is on the ground of to his sentient nature at all, but to his reason. his being a rational self, incapable by his very nature of finding satis;
faction in gratified feeling, that we are justified in setting aside all " arguments " founded on comparison of pleasures, and appealing directly to an
shown
to
Apart from this rational self, which can be and therefore only capable of finding a common good, there can be no categorical imperative
"ought."
be essentially
satisfaction in
social,
and no morality. The form into which W. K. Clifford threw the evolutionist doctrine marks a stage of advance both upon Mr. Stephen's and upon Mr. Spencer's statement of it, in that he comes nearer than either to the view that right is founded upon the contrast between a true or In the following passage extended, and a false or constricted self. he applies his doctrine of "the tribal self" to solve a similar diffi" If you want culty to that which Mr. Stephen discusses above. to live together in this complicated way' (called society), your ways must be straight, and not crooked ; you must seek the truth, and Suppose we answer, I don't want to live together love no lie.' with other men in this complicated way ; and so I shall not do as you tell me/ that is not the end of the matter, as it might be with For obvious reasons, it is right in this other scientific precepts. case to reply, Then, in the name of my people, I do not like you, '
*
*
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
4
Ch.
Evolutionary Hedonism
Ill]
and to express
this
dislike
159
by appropriate methods.
And
the
descended from a social race, is unable to escape his conscience, the voice of his tribal self, which says, In the name " of the tribe, I hate myself for this treason which I have done offender, being
1
9
(Essays
and
Lectures, "
On
the Scientific Basis of Morals
").
We
have here got beyond the pleasure theory ; we have further exchanged the empirical for the teleological point of view, in so far as the " self" is made the centre of interest. All that is wanted is to ask what is implied in the idea of such a self. This, to a certain extent, Clifford does in his Essay on <{ Cosmic Emotion,*' where it is shown to imply a consciousness of a universal moral order. His early death probably lost us the opportunity of seeing evolutionary ethics discarding in propria persona the worn-out raiment of the empirical philosophy.
.
BOOK
IV
THE END AS GOOD
i
CHAPTER
I.
THE END AS COMMON GOOD. § 65.
We
Summary
may now sum up
of Results.
the results which our analysis and
have hitherto enabled us to reach
criticism
standard of morality
Moral law
is
is
primarily an
:
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
(i)
end, not
The
a law.
from the conception of a
valid as flowing
moral end, which cannot be mere obedience to law, whether supposed to be given by another or by the form of conscience.
As
self.
all
for its aim,
The end
(2)
is
an
self in
ideal of
a
some form of good consciously conceived good may be
voluntary action has
and
all
described as realisation of self in one form or anothei,
conduct which
good
is
judged
to
conduct whose end
is
be absolutely, is
i.e.,
morally,
the highest good, which
may be described as the realisation of the highest The summum bonum is to realise the summits ego. The ideal self cannot be realised in the state of
again self.
(3)
pleasant
consciousness which
results
complete satisfaction of the desire in the
from
from the most
for pleasure
;
nor yet
most complete determination by reason apart
all
desire
;
but in the subordination of the desires 163
164
Ethics
according to the law of the Finally,
[Bk.
self as
an organic
unity.
IV
(4)
we have already made some headway, under
the
lead of the evolutionist writers, in proving that the self as thus defined
not an isolated atom, but
is
comprehensible as a
judgments
reflect a
member
only
is
of a society, whose moral
moral order already established in
its
But as the prejudice against the conception of the self as essentially social, and of moral judgments as only intelligible in relation to an objective environment.
moral order, chapter to
is
its
so inveterate, I shall devote part of this
further elucidation, as a preparation for the
further definition of the end.
Current Distinction between Self and Society.
§ 66.
The
current opinion*
is
that, while
it
requires a meta-
Hobbes to trace back all the elements and instincts of human nature to the egoistic desire for pleasure, it is yet possible to divide them psychologically into
physician like
two the
distinct classes altruistic,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the
egoistic, or self-regarding,
or other-regarding.
Of
the former type
and
we
have the instinct of self-preservation and of the acquisition of property.
Of
the latter
volence and sympathy. distinction
social
we have
Similarly, there
between man and the
types in beneis
the obvious
state,
the
in-
and society. On the one hand, we have the "rights of man." The individual is supposed to be born
dividual
into the world with certain natural rights belonging to
him
as
an individual.
These are the germ of that artificial rights with which in
system of conventional or
* Not unsupported by the highest scientific authorities, as when Mr. Spencer represents human nature as the battle-ground of two permanently antithetical forces of egoism and altruism.
Ch.
any
End
The
I]
Common Good
as
165
On
law courts invest him.*
civilised country the
him the enjoyment of his natural rights by means of the police and the law courts, the state has a certain limited right of taxation and che other hand, as securing to
One
control over individuals,
for the political philosopher
of the chief questions
is,
it
is
supposed, to define
the limits which the state must observe in
The
with the natural rights of individuals.
wisdom
of
in
this
field
sometimes declared to be
is
inasmuch
to recognise that,
interfering
quintessence
belong to man any connection with the
as rights
naturally
and not
artificial
organisation of society and state, the state has
really It
no business is
though
not
to
show
all.
these
that
distinctions,
relatively valid, as giving us different points it
may be
of
useful to look at psychological
social facts, are misleading
when taken
as absolute
final.
Relativity of these Distinctions.
ยง 67.
and
(1) Egoistic
in regard *
to interfere at
difficult
view from which
and and
in virtue of
The
altruistic passions
to the psychological
natural
rights of
man
and
Thus,
desires.
distinctions referred to
apparently are liberty, property,
and " Resistance of Oppression." See Declaration of the Rights of Man, quoted in Paine's treatise on the same. The
security,
Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of the State of California further adds the right of
"pursuing and obtaining
See Bryce's American Commonwealth^ Vol. sary corollaries of these
more
generally,
it
(Zurich,
"as an men."
happiness."
As
neces-
some add " access to the soil " ; others, to the means of production." Professed
might be expected
to be free of this individualistic leaven ; appears like a recrudescence of it when a Socialist congress
socialists
but
" access
(!)
II., p. 643.
1893) declares against attack
On
Bosanquet's
upon
their
all special
legislation for
freedom and equal
individualistic
survivals
in
rights, as
current
socialism
of Christendom^ Lecture on and Individualism Philosophically Considered." Civilisation
women
opposed to see
"Socialism
i66
above between egoistic and
show how
to
[Bk. IV
Ethics
>the
altruistic desires,
thought of
and
easy
is
it
and the thought of
self
one
another,
such
others
cross
manner
as to leave us with only a vanishing distinction
interlace
than the desire
think of
it,
we
see
for
how
thoughts
fly, e.g.,
emptied of these as
he
to his wife relations,
an egoistic good,
life
thinks
individual
himself, except so far as
is
it
being
rational
is
its
valuable to him.
It
moment
doubtful whether in a
constituted
But the moment we
life.
in a
makes
social significance that is
a
Thus, nothing seems more individual-
between them. istic
in
it
of peril a normally
even
or
first,
at
and i.e.,
His
When
family.
when
no good
of
all,
related to others.
is
life
is
appears only
it
It is just its
at all.
emptiness of social content that makes
life
appear so
worthless to the suicide.
On
the other hand, the benevolent desire for the
of others involves a reference to
self.
merely meant, as Professor Bain puts
By it,
this
that "
it
must retain a
sufficient
amount of the
not
sympathy
cannot exist upon the extreme of self-abnegation.
We
good
is
.
.
.
self-regarding
element to consider happiness an object worth striving for,"* but that, as has
been already so frequently pointed
out, the object of all desire it
is
is
a personal good.
only as involved in one's
own
that
Hence
one can desire
one's neighbour's good it is only as his good enters as an element into my conception of my good that I can :
make it an object of desire and volition. The inadequacy of such a classification of the elements of human nature into egoistic and altruistic is further seen in the difficulty which we should have in classifying the *
Mental and Moral Science,
p. 282.
Cm.
more
End
The
I]
Common Good
as
violent forms of passion
love in
its
purer forms
is
Yet
loved object.
it
may on
Thus
under either head.
commonly thought
emotion, having for
altruistic
167
its
object the
to
be an
good of the
occasions take forms into
which the good of the loved object does not enter as an
element*
Similarly revenge, which
this classification to
be
down
set
is
an
as
presumably upon egoistic passion,
nevertheless takes forms which involve the most complete self-abnegation, t
The Individual and
(2)
Society,
relations of the individual to society,
shown
In regard to the it
may
be on behalf
likewise
that the independent rights put forward
of the individual, by current individualistic theories, are, if
taken
may be
an arbitrary assumption.
literally,
asked, does the individual derive
has them,
it
may be
Rousseau, "is born free," habits,
to
case.
imply
i.e.,
and conventions of not the
tainly
by nature (the theory of " Man," said this).
said,
u natural rights " seems
The
Whence, it them? He
independent of the laws, society.
child
But
this
who comes
is
cer-
into the
world inherits everything he has from a previous state * In describing Romola's love for her dead father, G. Eliot says " Love does not aim simply at the conscious good of the beloved :
object at its
:
it is
own
not satisfied without perfect loyalty of heart
;
it
aims
completeness."
f Speaking of the passion that consumes Baldassare in the same " It is the nature of all human passion, the lowest as well as the highest, that there is a point where it ceases to be properly egoistic, and is like a fire kindled within our being, to novel, G. Eliot says
:
which everything else in us is mere fuel." Similarly hatred has been defined as " inverted love "; it is often like love in this, that "it seeketh not its own," dum alteri noceat sui negligens (quoted in a similar connection
by Hume, Principles of Morals, App. II.). Cp. Butler's Sermons, XI., Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II., p. 499.
[Hi-
Ethics
IV
He owes everything he possesses to a combination of forces and circumstances (national, local, of society.
over which he has had no was a favourite metaphor with the older individualistic writers to liken the soul of the newly
and
family
control.
influences)
It
born child to a piece of blank paper, on which, by
means of education, anything might be written, and so a perfectly independent and original character given to the individual. It would be a more apt illustration of its true nature to compare it to a word or sentence in a continuous narrative. The soul comes into the world already stamped with a meaning determined by its relation to all that
went before,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; having, in
a context in relation to which alone
understood.
It
other words,
character can be
sums up the tendencies and
of the past out of which
new form
indeed, a
its
it
has sprung,
or expression,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
traditions
giving them,
inasmuch as
it
on and developing
individual, but only carrying
is
an
their
meaning, and not to be understood except in relation to them.
Or
it
may be
freedom. that
man
gives
This, of course,
with
against
said that
Knowledge
education.
is
acquires these rights by
him power, true,
individuality,
but not in the sense
these advantages he acquires any rights as
On
society.
the contrary, the dependence of
the individual upon society in the sense claimed
is still
more obvious when we consider what is implied education. Thus it may be pointed out how absurd is
No
is
educate himself.
be said
to gain
or teacher
it
sometimes done, of a " self-educated one can be said, in any proper sense, to
to speak, as
man."
in
Nor indeed can any his
individual properly
education from another.
Pareri
can only help to open and interpret
to
;
Ch.
End
The
IJ
Common Good
as
169
That education has him the sources of education. thought of, and consciously is begun long before it goes on long after it is supposed to be completed. Intellectually riation of a
make
to
and
language
the
which
into
approp-
to last in the
first
in the
individual parent or teacher, but diffused
mind of any through
from
consists
it
body of knowledge, not contained
child
the
own
its
The
the
society
has not
child
ideas about the world, nor has the
make them
parent or teacher to language, which
of
literature
born.
is
for
it.
spoken
In
essentially a social institution,* there
is
already a storehouse of distinctions and generalisa-
is
by appropriating.
which the child begins
tions
thoughts adapt themselves to the mould which
prepared for them. in proportion
(a)
language has
They
the
(i.e.,
stage
of
advance which the society whose language sents)
;
persons (c)
(b) to
who form
its
of social acquisitions
name
man
at the
is
indeed
it
*
in
repre-
some obscurer
"The man who
its
less representative
book he puts and his list of authorities But in most cases it would
title
:
it,
more accurately
on the
has inherited from
Not
said to write a
beginning of
represent the fact
own
is
it
the written language of books. is
in the preface or at the end.
his authorities
T
immediate society have attained
parents and remoter ancestors.
his
w hich the intellectual
the degree of culture which the group of
to the cerebral organisation
This or that
here
be accurate and adequate
will
to the stage of accuracy
reached
Its
is
page,
corner.
he put the names of and stowed away his All that he has done, if
dares to think himself independent of others
cannot even put the blasphemous conception into words without
immediate self-contradiction, since the language he uses own." Comte, Pos. Pol. (Eng. Tr.), Book I., p. 177.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
is
not his
Ethics
170
fUK.
IV
that he can do, is to recast the material supplied him by the labour of countless generations. In this sense
all
Emerson
every one, as thing, "
even a house,
The same remarks Here, again,
it is
language with nursery
the
maintains,
is
apply to the child's moral education.
not we
who educate our
with
its
" spirit,"
its
moral
life,
forming or deforming
direct verbal instruction
is
family, the play-
upon the
to act it,
time when
at a
From
impossible.
infancy, to use a philosopher's
distinctions,
and, as Plato
laws,
would add, its pictures and songs, the ground, and the church. These begin child's
children, but
ready-made moral
store of
its
a plagiarist, every-
is
a plagiarism."
its
earliest
somewhat grandiloquent
expression, the child " has been suckled at the breast of the Universal Ethos." *
Further Illustrations of Dependence of Individual on Society.
ยง 68.
In industry this truth has a tion.
still
Thus we sometimes hear
made man."
All he does
it
is
we saw is
as impossible for a it
to
be
for
to look
no
further,
business be but for the police that secure
him the
the raw material, the
work
to
are the
it,
On
to
it
"make"
to educate himself.
would
who
title-deeds, the
community
his factory or
protect
it,
that supplies the labour
means of disposing of the product? all
the laws
markets that supply
the system of railways, harbours,
the share that *
him
man
to use the opportunities that society offers
Where,
to him.
applica-
But a moment's consideration makes
obvious that himself as
more obvious
in business of a "self-
these things, each in
its
etc.,
that
What
is
turn depending
the subject of this section, see Bradley, op.
cit.,
pp. 145-58.
Ch.
for
End
The
I]
and
existence
its
organised
what
is
them
?
as
on the
the wealth that
As a
is
where
final illustration,
These, at any
exception
we
in all this are
to
this
to
produced, and
draw the
man and
we might
rate,
it
of
many
social labour of
the share of the energetic individual
the respective rights of the
men.
171
upon a community
efficiency
wills, as well
generations, have in
Common Good
as
who
uses
between
line
of the state
?
*
take the case of great
might be thought, are an
dependence of the individual upon
They stand out in solitary and his time. independence of the society in the midst of which they live. If they have not made themselves, they seem to have been made by God, and to owe little or nothing Caesar, Charlemagne, Napoleon, to their environment. may thus be proved to have been makers of their social environment, instead of having been made by it. And indeed there is a sense in which this is true. Such men seem to contribute a new element to social progress, and his society
from what they found it. But when we look closer we see that they do so, not in virtue of that which separates them from their time, but of that which unites them to it. It is their insight into to leave the world different
the wants of the longings
and
over
They
it.
time, their
aspirations, that
sympathy with
them
gives
are closer to the spirit
its
blind
power of the time, and their
the moral order which that spirit represents, not farther
away from
it,
than
common
of their greatness.
*
It
is
This
people.
on
this
is
the secret
account that they
Cp. Mackenzie's Introduction to Social Philosophy\ ch.
150-154, where
it is
pointed out,
among many
of the general contention in the text, that the self-made is
man master only in his own right."
of no sect or school and calls no
being what Goethe
calls "
a fool
iii.,
pp.
excellent illustrations
man wno
succeeds in
[Bk. IV
Ethics
172
They sum up and
"represent" their time.* pression to act, as
the
its
tendencies.
It is
much
not so
give ex-
who The
they
of the time that acts in them.
spirit
permanent part of
their
work
(the establishment of an
empire, of a system of education, or a new social organiHe was sation) was " in the air " when the man arrived. only an instrument in giving effect to
§ 69.
(1)
The
illustrating
it.
Ethical Import of these Facts.
first
consequence of the truth
which
is
it
I
have been
of importance for us to note
is
end which is the standard of moral judgment is a social one the good is common good. A being who, like man, is a little higher than the animals, a little that the
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
lower than the angels, can only realise his so far as he realises the
a member, t
is
To
life
own
in
life
of the society of which he
maintain himself in isolated inde-
pendence, to refuse to be compromised by social relations, the surest way to
is
seek a
life in this
man
city,
fail
sense
is
to realise the
to lose
it.
good he
On
seeks. {
To
the other hand,
finds salvation in the duties of family, profession,
country.
To
lose his
in these
life
is
to find
it.
For
the social fabric of which he finds himself a part is only It is only the the fabric of his own life " writ large." other, or * Cj>.
objective
side, of
Ben Jonson's apostrophe
that to
which subjectively
I
Shakespeare as " Soul of the
Age." f Aristotle said that one god or a beast."
who
is
in
(
dependent of society
is
either
"a
J As a simple illustration of this truth, I may quote the case of a man whose vote I once solicited for one of several strongly opposed candidates for the School Board.
His answer was that he was an it by not voting at all.
independent man, and intended to prove
Ch.
The
I]
End
Common Good
as
173
described as the system of his impulses and desires, as controlled
and organised by
at first sight,
an
might seem,
It
an ignotum per ignotius
to
from the desires and impulses, which we know
refer us
as parts of ourselves, to the
and
his reason.
illustration of
duties,
through
which appeal
vague
field of social rights
to us only in a
secondary way
moral rules and social conventions, were
it
not for the knack that these rights and duties have of
Thus, corre-
grouping themselves in visible institutions.
sponding to the instinct of self-preservation and the
and
rights
duties
it
corresponding to the instinct
;
of propagation, the family trade
:
produced
involves, civilisation has
the police and law courts
:
of acquisition, property
and
of the pursuit of truth, the school, university, and
academy of science. Apart from these, and the rights and duties they represent, the individual life shrivels up into quite insignificant proportions
them
it
expands to the
full
;
* in connection with of
extent
its
recognised
capabilities.
The same of vice and
common
truth might be illustrated from the side
evil.
As the good of the
good, so his
evil is
common
individual
evil.
No
is
the
one can
neglect the duty he owes himself of finding the equilibrium
due proportion of their and disturbing the equilibrium of functions which constitute its health and well-being. The man who drinks away his wages, and upsets the equilibrium between desire for drink and desire for health, if he fails of no duty nearer home, deprives his trade or profession of an efficient of his instincts and desires in the
exercise, without failing in his duty to society,
*
Becoming, as Hobbes puts
short."
it,
" solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
Ethics
174
[Bk. IV
member, and so is a source of common loss and evil. just as we have the wholesome institutions of family,
And
trade, the universities, etc., corresponding to the
ous and proportionate satisfaction of natural
harmoni-
instincts, so,
corresponding to disorganisation in the system of desires,
we have cribs,
the morbid growth of brothels, gambling dens,
and
finishing schools.*
(2) It is only expressing the
particular
same
form to point out that the
truth in a self is
more
not merely
related to society in general, but that each particular self
way
related in a special
is
This way
born.
to the society into
not an ingenious metaphor, but a
is
The
ship.
which he
is
best described under the form, which
is
individual
vital fact,
of
member-
not less vitally related to society
is
Nor
than the hand or the foot to the body.
is it
merely
and protection upon society, as the hand or the foot is dependent for its nourishment upon the body, but he is dependent on his particular relation to society for the particular form of that each individual
its
dependent
it
performs in virtue
which makes the
It is the
function
hand a hand and the foot a his place and function in dividual what he
*
is
It is
common
To
realises
to
make a
distinction
If the above account
omit a duty
positive trespass.
seem
it is
makes the inhimself by enabling
society that
represented by his station and
and commission. ficial.
He
is.
In the same way
foot.
through him, to perform the particular function
society,
which
for life
special place in the organism
his individuality.
of
is
On
is
as
its
between
duties, t sins of omission
is true, this is
much a common
merely super-
evil as to
the objective forces of
good and
commit a evil that
to exist independently of the individual will see the suggestive
Mind and Art of Shakespeare, p. 247. Cp. Essays in Philosophical f See Bradley, op, cit., pp. 157-86. Criticism (Ed. Seth and R. B. Haldane). " The Social Organism."
passage in Dowden's
Ch.
End
The
Ij
Appeal
$ 70.
as
Common Good
175
Moral Judgments in support of
to
Conclusions.
We
have thus arrived
nature of the
judgment,
which,
self,
I formerly
a
at
new statement
of the
standard of moral
the
as
described as the permanent unity This, which
underlying the multiplicity of desire.
may
have appeared a somewhat metaphysical statement,
am now
every-day unity
I
able to translate into the familiar language of so
in
life,
amid
diversity
far
of inter-related duties in society.
It
as
assumes
have shown that
1
visible
which we
form a
call
remains merely to verify
of moral judgments by submitting
it
this
in that circle
man's station
this explanation
to the test of fact,
and asking whether moral judgments, which we have seen involve a reference to a true self or rational order
among I
instincts
and
desires, bear out the interpretation
have just given to that
carrying with
moral order as
That moral
essentially social
self as
them a reference
by
to a society or objective
well.
this is so
with regard to a large section of our
judgments
obvious.
is
untruthfulness, covetousness, are
Injustice, all
dishonesty,
judged bad on the
ground of the harm to others they involve.
So
fully
Dewey points esp. pp. 193, 209 foil. out that (1) the fulfilment of the duties of one's station, or, as he by Professor Henry Jones, calls
it,
"adjustment
to environment,"
only on condition that
can be taken as a moral idea,
means "willing the maintenance and development of moral surroundings as one's own end " ; (2) the function that is thus performed serves at once to define and to unite. It makes a man " a distinct social member at the same time that it makes him a member. Individuality means, not separation, but .
it
.
.
defined position in a whole' {pp. cit^ pp. 115
foil.,
137, 138).
[Bx. IV
Ethics
176
has this been recognised, that
proposed to resolve
has sometimes been
it
virtue into right relations with
all
common name
our fellow-men under the
But
Benevolence, or Truth.
is
it
universally present
social
reference
ments,
when we come
is
moral judg-
in
to consider the so-called indivi-
and the duties we are
dualistic virtues
of Justice,
not so clear that this
said to
owe
to
ourselves.
In the next chapter
how
in detail
be
will
have occasion to remark
I shall
Here
these involve a social reference.
sufficient to take
what
regarded as the
is
it
first
duty we owe to ourselves, the duty of self-preservation.
And
that
it
" social
to
" bind a
may
not be obscured by obvious reference
which may
ties,"
man
to life,"
family,
we must suppose
solved,
and
life
to
in
a particular instance
such as his duty to his wife and all
these ties have been dis-
have been to
of social significance.
What,
it
all
appearance emptied
may be
asked,
is
implied
judgment that suicide is wrong in such a case ? Ex hypothesi there are no relations that can have any claim upon the would-be suicide. He is without friends, money, trade, or the hope of acquiring them. Here, if anywhere, it might be supposed our judgment In parting with his life, he is refers to the individual. in our
merely parting with his own. matter,
it is
If there
to society,
and therefore
with what
is strictly
* This, of course,
is
his
society has
own
is
a duty in the
There
merely a duty to himself.
no
is
no duty
right to interfere
affair.*
constantly urged in defence of suicide
;
and
if
we
take up the position that certain duties rest on the value which
life
has to the individual alone,
it is
difficult to see
can be. Hence individualistic theories of have always tended to justify suicide.
what answer there
ethics,
e.g.,
Stoicism,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Ch.
The
I]
To well
all
Common Good
as
society in
this
known,
End
177
most civilised countries, as is enough, with the police-
rudely
replies,
It man's baton, the prison, or the lunatic asylum. said that this is no sufficient answer
may indeed be
to the claim that
be wrong.
Its
we have
already
this
For
not without ethical justification.
own
has a right to take his
life,
own to take. His has been made ali that it is, of his
by
society.
He
if
carries
on
his
life
because no
life
man
what was
is
as has
joint
as a joint
no man
man
has a
has been given him, and
been already shown,
cannot morally part with
sent of a society which
it
without con-
owner with him
concern
:
in
He
it.
he cannot dissolve
the partnership without the consent of his partner in
Perhaps in the case selected society fully
*
neglected
its part.
So
:
" Society
is
wrong, and
at pleasure
;
is
indeed a contract.
Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest
be dissolved
it.*
may have shame-
far society is
Cp, Burke's famous description
be But
interference in this case
its
said in the earlier part of this chapter be sound,
life
not
right.
seen reason in the nature of
himself for believing that is
may
matter
any true standard of
conformity with
in
For the State may
put forward.
is
judgments in
may
but the state ought not to be considered as
nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper
and
coffee, calico or tobacco, or
some other such low concern,
to
be
taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence ; because it is not a partnership subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.
It is a partnership
in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue
As the ends of such a partnership cannot be many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." Reflections on
and
in all perfection.
obtained in
the Revolution in France,
12
i 78
Ethics
[Bk.
IV
responsible for the state to which matters have come,
but
this
does not absolve the individual from his duty to
Two
society.
wrongs do not make a ยง 71.
Duty
to
right.
Humanity.
Nor do we alter the social implication of moral judgment by saying that the duty in such cases is not to the state or community to which he belongs, but to God or to humanity, for this only brings into view a wider aspect
of the moral order than that which considered.
Thus, to take the
latter
we have contention
hitherto first,
speak of our interest in humanity as the ground of only to extend our conception of what
gation
is
in the
moral order which we
is
implied
It is to
call society.
to
obli-
con-
beyond the limits of any particular time and country, and as progressively realising itself over the whole world and through the ages. The existence of such an order is not doubted by the historian. ceive of
it
as reaching
History, in the ordinary sense,
which ticular
it
takes,
is
and the changes
the record of the form it
undergoes, in a par-
Universal history
age or country.
is
the record
of these forms and changes as organically related to one another, and to the whole which
we
the growth or
call
evolution of civilisation.*
Loyalty to the moral order in this sense loyalty to the narrower circle of duties it
for the individual.
On
*
latter.
to humanity,
For a sketch of history
It is
in this sense, see Hegel's Philosophy oj
of view, though with fuller details ;
is
not possible to
and leave undone our duty
History (Bonn's Library); and, written from a Vol. II.
involved in
the other hand, the former
impossible apart from the
do our duty
is
which represent
:
Positive Polity, Vol. III.
less reliable point
Comte's Pos. Phil, (Eng. Tr.),
Ch.
End
The
I]
"telescopic
Jellyby's
humorous description of tricities
179
Dickens has made us laugh over But in his philanthropy.''
to our neighbour.
Mrs.
Common Good
as
the novelist
that lady's humanitarian eccen-
only emphasising the truth which
is
when he
the philosopher expresses in different language
no other genuine enthusiasm for humanity than one which has travelled the common highway of reason the life of the good neighbour and reminds us that "there
is
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; â&#x20AC;&#x201D; and
can never forget that
the honest citizen
it
is
still
only a further stage of the same journey," t
Duty
§ 72.
In the same way
it
duties in question as
to God.
may be shown that to speak of the owed to God and not to society is
mode
a perfectly legitimate
so long as
of expression
we understand what we mean by it. Thus, it cannot be meant that in using it we are introducing a new conception of
be
too
the ground
often
repeated
of obligation.
that
always a personal
cannot
It
ground
the
of
moral
a
moral
obligation
is
order.
may, however, be legitimate to express
It
interest
in
this
truth in the language of religion as well as of ethics.
In the
latter
which
is
we
confine our view to the moral order
by particular
represented
humanity as a whole. our view
ment
still
further,
But
and
it
is
societies,
possible
to
or
by
extend
to conceive of the establish-
and the sovereignty of conscience as elements in the end or final cause of a cosmic process. In doing so we pass from the point of view of morality to that of religion, but no further of moral relations
t T. H. Green's Introd. Works, Vol. L, p. 371.
to the
Moral Part of Hume's "
Treatise,"
";
i8o
Ethics
change
involved.
is
It is
[Bk.
indeed sometimes supposed
which are not included
that there are religious duties
the catalogue of moral duties, and that in
in
iv
passing
from morality to religion we not only change the point of view
from which duties are regarded, but extend
the range
The
But
of our obligations.
particulars
this
or
society
the religious
deny or
ceremonial
But
it
man may Of
It
others
and other
may be quoted
instances.
observances
If this
of duty
indeed true that
recognise duties which
morality which gives
religion.
is
these prayer, fasting,
ought to be observed that
rites for
if it
duty to God.
neglect.
a mistake.
we speak
of obligation, are the same whether to
is
of conduct, not less than the ground
it is
them
as
the import of these
their
importance
for
import be recognised by the individual
be acknowledged,
for instance,
that they serve an
important end in purifying the affections or capturing the will,*
they are not only religiously but morally obligatory.
Apart from such recognition, not only are they irrelevant to the moral,
and therefore
be an actual hindrance
to the religious
life,
they
may
to both.
then no difference, it might be asked, between and morality ? Matthew Arnold, as is well known, sought to answer this question in his famous definition Is there
religion
of the former as only " morality touched with emotion.
But this, it must be confessed, does not carry us far. Emotion is not a distinctive mark of religious conduct. All conduct, as we have already seen, is touched with emotion, f otherwise it would not be conduct at all. *
Cp. Pascal's pious exhortation
c 1
to begin
by sprinkling holy
water and observing ceremonies," for that "the rest would follow,
and Hoffding's remarks upon it, Psychology (Eng. Tr.), t See analysis of Desire, p. 48.
p. 76.
'
Ch.
The of
The
I]
End
as
Common Good
181
distinction lies not in the presence of an element
emotion
in religion
which morality
without, but in
is
the kind of emotion present in either case, and this again
depends on the kind of thought which accompanies the performance of a duty. duty, the view
moral or also
It is
we take of we
way we think of the
the
that constitutes
started,
an act of
simply
it
Thus, to return to the
religious.
duties from which
it,
class of
self-restraint or
might be said to be simply moral
self-preservation
were done out of sympathy with the
lives
if it
and purposes
of a special group of our fellow-creatures, without further reference to what
same
is
for
The
implied in such a fellowship.
would be religious if furthering a cosmic purpose, or act
it
were conceived of as
as charged with
a universal moral order that
is
meaning
being consummated
upon the earth. It may indeed be feasibly maintained no good conduct is entirely without reference to some such universal end ; but in so far as the distinction between morality and religion is permissible at all, it must be explained as one between two views that may be taken of moral conduct, not between two different kinds of conduct, or two different standards of moral that
judgment. Note.
The historical genesis of the view presented in the text would form an interesting chapter in the history of ethics. It may be said to be the view from which ethical thinkers set out in the beginning It is firmly grasped by Plato, who at the end of the book of the Republic suggests the true definition of virtue as a social function, and in the later books treats society, though with
of philosophy.
first
certain limitations, as a spiritual organism.
Aristotle,
who
is
some-
times erroneously represented as an individualist, develops these ideas in the Ethics significance
(see
and
Politics with still greater insight into their
especially
his
remarkable
criticism
of
Plato,
Ethics Politics,
Book
II).
The
history of
[Bk.
modern
ethics
may be
IV
said to be
the rediscovery of this fundamental truth, and the presentation of
it
form enriched by the experience and purified by the discussions We have already noted the part of the intervening centuries. played in this process of rediscovery by the scientific writers of our own time but they were anticipated by the philosophers of the Among these, Hegel and Comte, early part of the present century. working independently in Germany and France, will always be Comte's presentation of the acknowledged as master builders. " organic " doctrine, otherwise full and striking, suffers irredeemably from the want of a sound basis in psychology and metaphysics, and from the fantastic embellishments of Positivist ceremonial, so that the classical foundations of the newer thought must always be in a
;
sought for in his
German contemporary.
Fortunately, the English
no longer debarred by the uncouthness of Hegel's own His "nuggets" have been writings from the study of his ideas. broken down by the enthusiastic labours of younger thinkers in our own country, and have now become current coin in every field of speculation. In the present chapter I have merely handed them on. student
is
Ch.
Forms
II]
oj the
CHAPTER
Good
II.
FORMS OF THE GOOD. 73.
§.
In looking
Recapitulation.
for the basis of
an end, which, as
moral judgment, we were led
must be sought in the idea of the end of conduct, must be an end
to the conclusion that
it
—
With these " data of ethics " viz. (a) moral judgments of right and wrong, good and bad ; {b) as involved in these, the conception of an end ; and (c) the definition of the end as a form of self-satisfaction, or, as we preferred to say, self-realisation we approached the for me.
—
criticism of theories as to the nature of the end. first
We
took up the older theories, which represent the end
respectively as self-gratification
and
self-surrender.
The
defect of these theories was not that they start from a
conception of the
based upon tion of it,
it
;
self,
and recognise moral judgment as start from the wrong concep-
but that they
—with the
judgment, they in
result that, instead of explaining reality
explain
it
moral
Hedonism expedient, and
away.
does so by identifying the right and the thus failing to explain how ai> H ought" or a categorical
Ethics imperative can
exist
theory that the end
at is
all.
Equally defective
the sacrifice of
apart from desire, there can be
theory not only
fails
no place
leaves
[Bk.
all
no action
to account for
;
The
so that the
in a strictly moral world for the eager
concrete
desires for the
on
the For,
moral judgment, but
passions and desires which are the life-blood of life.
is
desire.
IV
life
common
of social activity, as founded on
good of ourselves and
others, disappears
this theory altogether.
Both of the
theories, while thus differing in their conception
self,
agree in being individualistic.
problem they had
sent the
If
we
repre-
to solve as that of finding
the link of connection between moral judgments and the maxims of conduct which flow from them on the one hand, and the summum bonum on the other, we might say that they
were both right in perceiving that the
middle term, through which the solution was to be accomplished, was the self. The error, however, which
made
the problem insoluble for both, was that they con-
ceived of the self in an abstract way, apart from relations,
and thus robbed
it
its
social
of the content which might
have given us the desired connection.
Our
We
objection
to
evolutionary
gladly accepted from
the relation
it
ethics
was
different.
the organic conception of
between the individual and
society.
We
objected merely to the way in which this idea was applied in
ethics.
After dropping the individualistic theory,
we should have expected the writers in question to go on to a more thorough-going examination of the conception of self, which we saw to be the basis of moral Instead of this, they have allowed themselves away from the idea of personal good altogether, and have attempted to work out a teleological science,
judgment. to drift
Ch.
Forms of
II]
Good
the
185
or a science of consciously conceived ends, as though
its
object were the conflict of emotional forces empirically
given.*
In the
chapter
last
we endeavoured
to put ourselves
by showing that the self is only intelligible as the reflection of a moral order, which, for practical purposes, we found might be considered as right in this last respect,
represented to each of us by his station and his duties, so that " the good" for each comes to be expressible in
terms of his social relations
conduct It is
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
in other words, of
good
itself.
not pretended that this
is
more than a rough
statement of the end or standard of moral judgment.
Some
of the modifications and corrections which further
consideration renders necessary will be the subject of the following book.
Meantime,
I shall try to
give greater
by considering some of the chief forms of the good, which, as I have shown, will merely be forms of good conduct. But, before doing so, I must endeavour to meet an objection which is sure to occur definiteness to
it
at this point in
§74.
our argument.
Has our Argument been a
His not my argument, veloped with
all
asked, though de-
the appearance of consecutive reasoning,
only succeeded I started
may be
it
Circle?
after
all
in
involving us in a circle
?
out to explain moral judgments, in the sense of
deducing them from an end to which they should be seen
be organically
to
realisation of self *
related. ;
and
I
then defined the end as the question, " How is
finally, to
See the celebrated chapters (xi.-xiv.), on Egoism versus Altruism.
Ethics,
in
Spencer's
Data
ot
;
i86
Ethics
[Bk.
IV
the self realised ?"
I replied, on behalf of the average man, " By loyalty to the ordinary duties of the good parent and honest citizen." Starting from good conduct, and professing to explain what this is through the idea of
end, I have finished up by defining the end in terms
of good conduct.
We
thus seem, like the heroes of the
"marched up
the hill, and then marched down again." We have ascended from the idea of good conduct to the idea of end, only to descend again to the idea of good conduct, and are no further on than we were at the beginning. My first answer is Granting it to be a circle, it may be none the worse for that. No one complains of the guide who takes him up the mountain that he takes him back to the starting-point. The journey may have been of value, though he returns at the end of it to the same place. As a matter of fact, the same traveller never does return to the same place. He is " a different man " when he comes back, and the home he comes back to is a " different place." In the same way, it is possible that the reader who has followed this argument may seem to have come back to the point from which he started but he may have seen a good deal by the way, and may really have come back (as the writer hopes he has) with a quite different idea of what good conduct really is; i.e., he may have come back to quite a different point. But the objection is in reality founded on a false view of the nature of the moral end. It proceeds on the assumption that the end in reference to which conduct is judged to have value, the ideal which good conduct aims at song, to have merely
:
realising, is
The end
something
the artist would be.
be attained in
to
of man, as man, It is
is
the long run.
conceived of as the end of
something to be produced by
"
Ch.
Forms of
II]
Good
the
i8 7
a series of actions, each leading up to a standing to
in
it
Greeks were not slow notion,
and
Aristotle *
man,
as
(7rpafis
careful to point out that the
Lat.
actio))
not production
of heaven
language, this
is
that the
is
some day
to
come
=
(Trot^o-is
Lat.
;
completeness (the purity of
its
the end
results)
is
event
far-off divine
to pass.
not a means to a further end
its
conduct
Expressed in modern end or ideal in morals is
hourly realised in the good act
of
man,
for
within you."
means
not to be conceived of as " some
which
end It is
itself.
Similarly Christianity recognised that " the king-
/actio).
dom
perceive the fallacy of this
to
attained in the action
=
and
The
to end.
beginning of his treatise on ethics
at the
is
is
final result,
means
the relation of
It is
Such an
itself.
the end.
itself
it is
daily
and
act
In
is its
motive, the beneficence
The good
realised.
something to be hereafter attained
;
it
is
is
not
attained from
moment to moment in the good life itself. Hence somet have been content to define the good as the good
by which
will,
is
meant, not
ia
will
which acts
which in the indulgence of the particular desires that from moment to moment form the undercurrent of our daily lives is independently of
desire,
but
the
will
determined by a more or
habitually
less
consciously
conceived idea of a person whose satisfaction
be found
The
truth intended to be
expression
somewhere,
is
only to
emphasised by
this
mode
of
the truth that satisfaction does not exist
laid
realised in the * Ethics I., ;
is
mutual subordination.
in a certain order of their
up
must be and that the moral
in store for the future, but
good action
itself
;
I.
" the only uncomf E.g., Kant and T. H. Green, who held that ditioned good is the good will."
i88
Ethics
[Bk. IV
end is sui generis in this, that the distinction of end and means is a distinction within itself, in other words, has no proper place as a distinction here at all. We may therefore, have no further hesitation in defining the forms of good, or modes of self-realisation, as forms of good conduct, and vice versd.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Virtues and Institutions.
§ 75.
The
previous discussion has prepared us for a double
classification
of the duties or forms of good conduct.
These may be
according to the virtues or
classified
which lead to their recognition, the social institutions which guarantee a field for In the former they are considered subexercise.
qualities of character
or to their
jectively as habits of will
:
in the latter objectively as the
sphere in which the good will realises itself. It has been maintained * that the latter is the true classification,
inasmuch
as moral institutions provide us with a ready-
made map are " the
of the different parts of the moral
mode
in
which morality gives
various wants of mankind. " that,
as
we have
seen,
But
there
is
it
life.
effect
They to
the
has to be observed
corresponding to the
system of objective institutions a subjective system of impulses and desires, and that the virtues or aptitudes (dpcrat) for restraining
and so giving
and co-ordinating natural instincts, an organic whole, are
effect to the self as
just as natural a basis of classification as are the institu* As by Mr. Alexander, op. cit., p. 253. Though I have criticised one or two minor points in Mr. Alexander's remarks on the subject of this chapter, what he says on it is so valuable that the student is recommended to read the passage referred to in connection with
what
follows.
On
Op. cit., pp. 169-74.
the general subject of this section see
Dewey,
Forms of
Ch. Hi
Good
the
189
which are maintained by means of them.
tions
It
is
doubtful, moreover, whether in actual fact the difficulties
which are admitted to
any attempt
exist in
ive classification are not
felt
an exhaust
at
equally in connection with
the one system as with the other.
Granted, as
is
indeed
true in a general sense, that duties " naturally attach to
would yet more than
the institutions, and are defined by them,"
be
difficult
others the
it
say round what institutions
to
duties,
e.g.,
of courage, veracity, toleration,
naturally group themselves.
As
a matter of
fact,
a complete system of ethics would
good under both
require to exhibit the forms of as related
desires
known
as
human
system of instincts and
nature,
and on the other to the embodied in social insti-
objective moral order, as that tutions.
aspects,
to the
on the one side
is
In the one case we should be supplementing
our exposition of the principles of ethics by a more or elaborate psychological account of the
less
action.*
science
springs
of ethics
in
the
stricter
sense
a sociological
account of the principal forms which man, in his after a fuller expression of his true nature,
be the repositories of
to
his
handbook neither of these
this
of
In the other case we should be adding to the
the guidance of
common
efforts
has devised
moral acquisitions.t is
attempted.
language,
I
In
Following
have adopted, with
slight modifications, a classification of the virtues in its
main *
lines as old as Aristotle,
For such an account
Theory, Vol. II., pp. 128
see, e.g.,
merely with the view of
Martineau's Types of Ethical
foil.
It is characteristic of German as contrasted with English ethics have emphasised this side of the moral life. Perhaps this is natural where the state counts for so much and the individual for so
f
to
little.
igo
Ethics
showing how actual moral
TBk.
IV
and the judgments
that
correspond to them, flow from the conception of the
self
duties,
as set forth above.*
Kequirements in such a Classification.
ยง 76.
(i)
To
be of any use
our purpose, as thus defined,
for
the classification must neither be too general nor run into too great detail.
Thus Plato's celebrated classificaWisdom, Courage, Temperance,
tion of the virtues into Justice,
is
obviously too meagre, and, as has been well
said, " serves its
purpose only because justice
is
used to
On
include everything not accounted for by the rest." * Virtue has
been used in the preceding paragraph in
sense of the quality of character that
fits
its
proper
for the discharge of duty.
it is not opposed to duty, save as good character opposed to good conduct in general. The relation between virtue and duty is that of universal to particular, and may be illustrated by the relation of the State to the Individual. The character of a man's action, in reference to particular circumstances, is determined by the virtuous habit of will with reference to the particular form of desire that is called into exercise, just as the character of an individual citizen is determined by the character of the society to which he belongs. The performance of the duty has moral quality only in so far as it is the expression of a virtue virtue, on the other hand, only lives in the performance of duty.
In
this
sense
in general
is
;
It
should be pointed out, however, that the word
used in the sense of meritorious
a virtue of necessity." meritorious act
is
Here
act, it
is
as
is
when we speak
often loosely of " making
distinguished from duty, as the
distinguished from the act which
the meritorious act being that which
is
is
simply good
:
the result of a higher than
the average standard of virtue, whether in overcoming natural dis-
advantages, as
when we speak
of the diligence of a stupid scholar as
meritorious, or in achieving exceptional success ceteris paribus.
On
the distinction between virtue and duty, see Sidg wick's Methods cf Ethics, Book III., ch. ii., and on the subjects of the succeeding sections, ibid., chs. iii.-x.
concerning Virtue^ ยง
iv.
On
"Merit," see Shaftesbury's Inquiry
Ch.
Forms of
II]
the
Good
be the case, if, as has been shown to do with the regulation of the instincts and desires, the list of which is practically inexhaustible,* its Language, fortunately, prescribes forms will be legion. It indicates for us the mean in these two directions. a sufficient variety of moral distinctions, but makes no attempt to cover the whole field by having words for all the other hand, virtue has to
many
In
the possible virtues.
cases,
is
it
content with
general names, under which whole classes are brought.
Thus
self-control
of the
desire
is
;
for the regulation
of the desire to
But of these desires there are many
escape from pain.
according to the nature of the object desired
varieties,
(according as
feared
or
word
courage,
the general
pleasure
for
the
of
object
desire
is
the
pleasure of eating or of drinking, of seeing or of learnthe object of fear
ing, etc.,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;physical
or mental, near
Language has here
or distant, short or prolonged pain).
picked out a few prominent instances, as in connecting temperance with the regulation of the desire for strong drink, endurance
w ith the regulation of the impulse r
to
escape or mitigate continued pain.
A
(2)
second obvious requirement
for our
purpose
is,
main outline of the of the self. Only in this way
that the division should follow the
organic parts or relations shall
we be
should
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;"
Hence
dividing our subject as Plato required
we
at the joints."
(a)
we
shall
be right in rejecting the proposal
to divide virtues according to their supposed importance,
beginning with the " cardinal virtues,
through
*
all
For an
degrees until
we come
interesting fragment of such a
Principles of Psychology, Vol.
II., ch. xxiv.
5
'
and going down
to the lesser duties
list,
see William James's
Ethics
192
[Bk.
The
of social etiquette and politeness. case
IV
difficulty in this
that the relative importance of the virtues varies,
is,
not only from age to age in the history of the world, but
from
class to class in
any one community, and even from
Thus it has been well observed had its cardinal (or papal) virtue. Among the Greeks and Romans it was courage, or manliness (dpcrr;, virtus) among the early Christians it was individual to individual.
that each age has
;
charity
middle ages, chivalry
in the
;
century, benevolence;
Stephen
Leslie
;
in the eighteenth
perhaps,
to-day,
it
" organic justice."
calls
is
what Mr.
Similarly,
in
community virtues vary in importmore important in a soldier than in a and sincerity in a clergyman than in a
different classes in a
Courage
ance. tailor,
is
truthfulness
lawyer, toleration in a ruler than in a subject.
the
life
temptations,
make one
or
the
importance of his example,
a particular virtue
We
own may
temperance) the cardinal
(e.g.,
for him, while for another
(b)
Lastly, in
of the individual, the circumstances of his
it
may be
shall reject the distinction
different.*
which has been made
between determinate and indeterminate duties ; duties which there is a definite obligation to perform in a particular
to
way at a
particular time,
e.g.,
to abstain
from
theft
and
pay one's debts, and those which are of indefinite obliga-
tion,
and
in
which everything
individual.
is left
danger of a bad logical division)
mean
to
to the discretion of the
This distinction (and herein
that
is
lies
the practical
sometimes interpreted
there are two moral standards,
and
that
different degrees of obligation attach to different elements in the *
moral
life.
Thus
it is
supposed t that the "ordinary
For some excellent remarks on cardinal
virtues as basal elements
of good character, see Mrs. Bryant's Essays on Character, Lecture
I.
t See International Journal of Ethics, Vol. III., No. 3 Discussio*
Ch.
Forms of
II]
man "
sensible
and
keep
property,
his
Good
the
193
recognises an obligation to pay his debts
hands
off his
neighbour's person
but owns no similar
obligation
to
live
and up
e.g., by surrendering his comfort, money, or his leisure to the claims of charity or good citizenship. He exacts the former standard from himself and others, but with regard to the latter he lives and lets live. And common opinion, it is maintained,
to his highest ideal, his
reproach him with
certifies this distinction in refusing to
neglecting such works of supererogation, though
commend him as of them.
but he
is
it
may
a meritorious person for the performance
He is not perhaps so good as he might be, good enough, and everything that anybody has
any reason to expect.
The whole doctrine rests
duty
is
on which
distinction
however,
is,
illusory.
determinate in the sense that
a " bounden " duty.
it is
of as perfect obligation as any other.
it is
begin with,
all
a duty at
all
if it is
it is
If
comfortable
this
To
a duty to be charitable
In
this
sense
an indeterminate duty, or a duty of imperfect obligation, is
a contradiction in terms.
On
the other hand, there
is
an element of indeterminateness in all duty, inasmuch as the precise form that the duty takes must depend in each case upon the circumstances. it is
It is
quite true that
a determinate duty to pay one's debts, but the time,
the place, the manner, often even the amount, are matters left
to the discretion of the debtor.
Similarly, the
attempt to distinguish between things
which we blame a
man him
for
not doing triough
we
are not
and things which we praise him for doing but refuse to blame him for not doing, may easily be shown to be founded on a perverted so ready to praise
for doing,
view of the nature and grounds of moral obligation. *3
Ethics
194
What
lends colour to
it,
[Br.
of course, besides the valid
between duty and
distinction already explained (p. 190)
merit,
is
the line that
which
it
is
social
borrow
divide
to
The
there
if
Hence
is
duties
to be
former are the conditions
Aristotle's antithesis) of living at
of living well.
those
any and those which the good man acknow-
ledges over and above. (to
seems
necessary to observe
life at all,
W
all,
the latter
the former are those which, as
the rudimentary conditions of self-preservation, society exacts
on the pain of
who
man,
therefore,
and
maintaining
may be
fine,
imprisonment, or death.
A
confines himself to paying his debts,
harmless relations with
his
fellow-
good enough to be left alone by the police. But it would be more correct to say that he is as bad as he can be consistently with his own safety and that of the society to which he belongs. The law may not demand anything else of him ; morality certainly does. It requires not only that he should be good enough to elude the policeman or to be considered tolerable as a fellow-citizen, but that he should be as good as he can, or, in other words, live up to his highest creatures,
said to be
ideal.
Finally, I hold that this requirement, far
from being a
counsel of perfection not acknowledged in the every-day
world and by the ordinary sensible man, the is
common
is
in
harmony with
language and opinion of civilised society.
not held, for instance, that
when
a
man
It
has kept his
word, performed his part of a bargain, and abstained
from
theft in his business transactions,
he has done
all
that can be reasonably expected of him,
and
for the rest
may
man
recognises
please
himself.
at least
The
ordinary
Thus, he thinks he ought to be charitable He even in his judgments to his fellow-men.
further duties.
Ch.
Forms
II]
Good
of the
195
sometimes thinks himself called upon to give up
his
comfort in order to attend a political meeting or a committee of the poor law guardians.
If
he shows none of
these signs of spiritual grace and confines his efforts to
the elementary duty of keeping out of gaol, he
considered a "sensible
man n
at
all.
is
not
Other ordinary
people regard him, on the contrary, as a "suspicious
and upon him.* character,"
ยง 77.
find
their duty in turn to
it
keep an eye
Limits of Classification. The Main Heads not mutually Exclusive.
Before going on to suggest a classification which
may
some degree satisfy these requirements, it may be well to recall some of the results arrived at in the previous investigation, that we may know in what sense in
such a classification (1)
In
the
is
really possible.
we may remind ourselves qualities we are attempt-
place,
first
whose moral
that the self, of
ing a general description,
is
not an aggregate of parts
mechanically put together, and mutually exclusive of one another.
Each
part
is
organically related to every other
:
each therefore implies the other, as well as the whole through which will,
it
is
as the student
to note
how much
united to
it.
may observe
Thus, reason implies for
himself
if
he pauses
voluntary effort has been required in
* It is not in this respect without significance that in present-day usage the phrase " duties of citizenship" is appropriated not to the
primary but to the secondary duties described above. What has been said in the text must not be taken to mean that the good man is the man who always labours under a "sense of duty." On the contrary, by a familiar paradox, a man can only do his duty by forgetting to think about it, by interesting himself in the business on hand, and not in his motives for doing it.
— Ethics
196
[Bk.
IV
the act of comprehending the argument in the present Similarly will implies reason, while each
chapter.
only
is
comprehensible as a different aspect of one subject that
Hence, when
embraces both.* cation
common
—we
division.
another,
—
shall
tinguishing between elements or aspects of
In the case of the former,
we fact
morality.
all
undoubtedly true that
is
one another
to
an objective world
in
we
in the case of the latter
;
of persons
with relations
not
it
dealing primarily with the relations of things
are
events
or
classifi-
virtues, or Wisdom and Virtue know in what sense to accept the It cannot mean that these exclude one or that we are here doing more than dis-
and moral
intellectual
proper,
in the
proposed to draw a distinction between
is
it
difficult
show
to
to
of
are dealing primarily
But
one another.
it
is
that the virtues implied in right
dealing in each of these spheres, involve each other.
Thus,
in reference to the self-regarding virtues,
hardly
it
requires to be stated that they involve an element of
wisdom.
The common
dential "
implies
Even
teaches us that " discretion It
"pru-
description of thein as
this.
is
proverbial
philosophy
the better part of valour."
might have added the converse, that valour
better
wisdom
part of
or discretion, for
it
is
is
the
equally
true that "
It is
He
wants wit who wants resolved will
To
learn his wit to exchange the bad for better.''
hardly less obvious that the other-regarding virtues
of justice t (e.g.,
*
and
benevolence
of economic See Green,
Who,
Book commonly
op. cit.,
as she
is
presuppose knowledge
and physical II., ch.
laws),
ii.,
depicted,
is
while,
§§ 148
on the
foil.
blinded, not blind
Ch.
Forms of
II]
other hand,
Good
the
197
may be doubted whether
it
of truth,* divorced from sympathy with
and
any claim to be called a
aspirations, has
we
(2) If again
the
recall the
truth
pursuit
social
needs
virtue.
on which so much
has been said, that self and society are related to one another as particular and universal, and are therefore only
different
of the
sides
prepared to estimate the
reality,
and other-regarding
self-regarding
We
value.
one
common
we
shall
virtues at
be
between
distinction
its
proper
be ready to admit that these are
shall
same habit or quality of mind. Prudence and self-control are the necessary conditions of justice and benevolence. On the other hand, that which gives prudence and self-control a claim to be called virtues is aspects of the
the fact that they are the indispensable condition of social service
all
from the lowest to the highest.t
The Interdependence of the Virtues extends through the Whole Classification.
ยง 78.
But we cannot which we find to species Virtue,
our
in
The interdependence
stop
here.
exist
between the several of
classification
may be expected
summum
the
among
to prevail also
species of which these in turn are genera.
highest
genus
the lower If,
as
we
Cp. Mr. Bonar's The same is true, pamphlet The Intellectual Virtues (Macmillan), and note at the *
of course, of beauty.
end of f
and
this chapter.
For the
distinction in question see Mill's Liberty, Introduction
for the detailed illustration of the
the text, Spencer's
the reasoning underlie
it.
On
Data of Ethics, by the
vitiated
is
;
interdependence asserted in
chs. xi.
and
hedonistic
xii.,
where, however,
presuppositions
that
the practical dangers of emphasising the prudential
element in the self-regarding virtues, see the excellent remarks in ^gmte's Pos.
Pol.,
Book
I.,
ch.
ii.,
p.
78 (Eng. Tr.).
Ethics
have assumed throughout, human nature
an organic
is
whole, and not merely an aggregate of parts,
expect to find virtues,
is
separate department,
its
independent
unity, as
its
an error to distinguish,
is
the
Hence
units.
it
some have sought to do,* morality, such as wisdom and
as
between the main heads of self-control,
we may
equally impossible to treat the special
it
each of which, in
guarantee of
IV
[Bk.
and the other
virtues,
on the ground that
they do not correspond to any special groups of duties or observances, but are implied in is
certainly true that
on any
all
good
classification
actions.
It
these would
summa species, and as such might be considered generalised expressions for the various species which in turn should be subsumed under them. But this must not be interpreted to mean that there is
require to be treated as
any greater independence among the lower species than There is, of course, a greater among the higher. differentiation as
we descend, and the
relationships of
the various parts to one another are accordingly more
remote
but to press this distinction, so as to divide
;
aspects or elements of virtue from virtues proper,
is
to
deny the organic nature of virtue itself. It is as though in classifying the muscles of any organic body we were to
begin by separating off the respiratory, alimentary,
reproductive, and other systems, and, after baptising them " aspects of the muscular system as a whole, " were to refuse
them a place
in
a continuous
classification
along with the muscles of the special organs in each several group. It
is,
in fact, as impossible to
between the virtues *
(e.g.,
draw hard and
fast lines
of courage and temperance,
See Alexander,
cf. cit., p. 249.
Ch.
Forms of
II]
which are species of
species of intellectual virtue) as
between
line
It is just as
as
open
in
which are draw a hard and
society,
to
it is
and wisdom themselves.
self-control
to us to
199
between devotion to
self-control, or
knowledge and veracity
truth in
fast
Good
the
speak of these sub-species
elements or aspects of self-control or wisdom, as to
speak of self-control and wisdom as aspects of virtue
In order to be temperate a
as a whole.
courageous
in order to
:
be able to
man must be
resist the
allurements
of pleasure he must be willing to endure the pain the Similarly, in order to
resistance involves.
be courageous
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
he must be temperate, at least in his desire for those kinds of pleasure which he is called upon to forgo in facing danger,
e.g.,
the desire for
Not
life.
less is the
virtue of social veracity implied in the virtue of devotion
and knowledge. The latter is, as has been well said by the writer we have just been criticising, merely an enlargement of the former. It is the same
to truth in thought
virtue " exhibited, not in the
mere normal interchange
of ideas in language, but in the effort to represent things in thought as they really are in existence." * Similarly with the sub-species under the other-regard-
ing virtue
"begins
of benevolence.
home."
at
or child, friend
or neighbour,
aspect
of
duty to
charity
or
love
against
the
into
a vice.
saying,
"Charity,"
In other words,
of
humanity
are
told,
an essential side or
is
On
humanity.
we
duty to parent
the
the
is
hand,
other
best
guarantee
exclusiveness which turns family affection
The same
truth
illustrated
is
"Justice before generosity."
implied, presupposes justice.
* Alexander of.
On
by the
Generosity,
it
is
the other hand, justice
cit., p.
258.
— 200
Ethics
presupposes generosity, which
[Bk. IV
only justice adequately
is
conceived.* Finally,
to
take an
extreme instance,
might be
it
thought that the minor virtues of amour propre and politeness are clearly separable from those which refer to weightier matters of the law.
the virtue
of
magnanimity, t
But among the Greeks which corresponded in
some degree best
of
it,
to the first, was an essential quality in the men, while the vice corresponding to the excess viz., insolence (v/3pts), was a noticeable element
the
in
worst.
On
the
other
hand,
so
close
connection between manners and morals politeness has
been defined
as "
is
that, just
benevolence
the as
in small
—the cardinal virtue of the middle —might be defined as " politeness great ones."
things," so chivalry
ages
in
With these explanations and exceptions, the following table
may be taken as a rough sketch of the Good in some of its principal forms
of the
* It
exfoliation
:
is,
of course, the "adequate conception" which adds that
splendour to the act which
man who
we
publishes the ruin
indicate of the
by
calling
company
it
in
generous.
most of the stock might be said to be generous to the is only just, but he has an adequate conception of implies. On the distinction between ideal justice, of here speaking, and legal justice, see Bradley, op. cit. corresponds to equity as conceived by Aristotle
:
public.
He
what justice which I am
The former
see Rhetoric,
ch. xiii. (Welldon's Eng. Tr.) ; Ethics, Book V., ch. x. See Aristotle's famous description of the Magnanimous Man
Book L, f
The
which he holds
(Ethics, III.).
spl
o to
202
Ethics
[Bk.
IV
Note.
The
between the moral and the intellectual virtues, i.e., between devotion to duty on the one hand and devotion to truth and beauty on the other, suggests problems which the relation
cursory treatment it has received in the text (pp. 195, 196) hardly can be said to solve. Thus it might be asked whether it is meant that the ground upon which devotion to art and science is deemed is the social usefulness of these pursuits. If this be so, it would appear from what has already been said of the relation between motive and morality, self and society, that those only who
a virtue
in the studio or laboratory are contributing to a recognised
good are worthy
artists
Whereas
or truth-seekers.
human
notoriously
it is
the case that the condition of the highest achievement in either field is
that truth
and beauty should be pursued
without regard to any ulterior object.
for their
The
own
sakes,
and
a real one,
difficulty is
and may be shown to involve problems that lie outside the limits Thus it would I have laid down for myself in the present treatise. lead us to inquire, with regard to the ultimate relations of truth and beauty to one another, and of both to goodness, whether these three are really different from one another, as the above objection seems whether they are not ultimately recognisable as one reality, the disinterested pursuit of them Such an as different but co-ordinate forms of self-expression. Even inquiry would obviously have been out of place in the text. here I can only give the conclusions to which I believe it would to presuppose, or
different aspects of the
lead us
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; connecting them with the results
tion into
of our previous examina-
the nature of the good with a view to suggesting the
solution of the above difficulty. I
have already defined the good as
means the human daily
The
life,
spirit
self-realisation.
Morality
taking flesh in the ordinary activities of
may also be said to reveal itself. we have already seen to be its relations of the moral order that we call
so that, in realising,
it
condition of this self-revelation
recognition of the objective
We have now to
add that the apprehension of the law of which we call the world of nature and of history is as essential a condition of self-realisation on the side of intellect as the apprehension of moral law is on the side of the will. Hence it is that in the study of natural science, and still more obviously in the study of history and psychology, though we may appear to have gone outside of ourselves, wc are, in reality, only society.
that objective order
investigating the contents of the
human spirit
itself (cp. p.
237 below),
;
Ch.
Forms of
II]
the
Good
In the same way it may be shown that art world that lies outside of ordinary human as
common
world of lies
its
is
not concerned with a
interests.
Art does not,
language would sometimes seem to imply, create a own apart from ours it reveals to us the world that :
within us and about us.
than
is
203
that of science
medium which
itself.
Its function is It differs
chiefly employs.
it
Its
not less interpretation
indeed from science in the appeal
is
emotional rather
Yet all true art, like true science, is ideal in that it serves to deepen our insight into the meaning of nature and of human life, and so to enlarge our knowledge of ourselves. If now, after these reflections, we return to the difficulty with which we started, we may note: (1) that it is a mistake to isolate truth and beauty from human good they can only be admitted as rational ends in so far as they are elements in it. (2) While little is undoubtedly to be hoped for from the man who pursues science or art with a constant view to the economy of labour that ought to be practised in regard to what is merely a means to a further end, yet just as little is to be looked for from the man who in the pursuit of either of them forgets his relation to the larger world that embraces both. (3) The motive which constitutes an act good is never, as the preceding objection seems to imply, good in general, but is always some particular form of good. (4) Scientific and artistic activity under the conditions just mentioned being, as we have seen, such particular forms of good, are approved by mankind at large on the ground of the common interest which all have in the free play of thought and imagination, quite apart from any immediate public utility which may accrue from them. On the difficulty here discussed, see Green, op. cit., pp. 312 and 415 Alexander, op. cit., pp. 123-6, 182-6, 257-9 ; Dewey, op. cit., §§ xxxix. and lxxiii Lotze, op. cit., p. 61. On the more general question of the relation of Intellectual to Moral virtue, see Aristotle, Ethics, Book VI. ; and of Art to Morality, Plato, Republic, than
intellectual.
:
;
;
Book
III.,
esp.
§
401
Aristotle,
;
Poetics
(Cassell's
National
pp. 23 and 39 ; Bosanquet, Introduction to HegeTs Philosophy of Art, esp. pp. 58, 105 foil. ; Essays in Philosophical Criticism, " The Philosophy of Art," by Professor W. P. Ker
Library),
Dewey, Psychology, pp. 195-201. Mackenzie's op. cit., p. 56., Manual of Ethics, p. 29, and ch. xvi. For literary expression of the same truth,
see,
e.g.,
Sir
National Library)
;
Philip
beginning of the Faerie
Browning, passim,
Sidney's Defence of Poesie (Cassell's
Spenser's Letter to
Queene (Globe
esp. the latter' s
Sir
Walter Raleigh at Ruskin and
Edition);
Era Lippo
Lippi.
BOOK V MORAL PROGRESS
CHAPTER
I.
THE STANDARD AS RELATIVE. ยง 80.
We
Differences of Standard
which we may Neglect.
have hitherto treated moral judgments as though
they were universally applied in the same way,
i.e.,
as
though there were only one good and one right, which all. The moral standard has been is the same for conceived of as something fixed and absolute, and even worked out into some detail in a system of virtues and duties representing the outline of a common ideal. Within this fixed standard indeed we have recognised Thus it was pointed out that, inasmuch as differences. the form under which each realises himself is prescribed for him by his station and its duties, this may be different for different classes and even for different individuals. The duty which the doctor at the bedside of a nervous patient recognises to verbal truthfulness
is
different
in a court of law.
from that of the witness in the box
But
this
may be
called a difference
flowing from the very nature of the standard as a social one, rather than a difference in the standard
merely a difference of emphasis recognise,
among
and need not cause any further 207
itself.
duties
It is
which
difficulty.
all
208
Ethics
Nor
[Bk.
v
the absoluteness of the standard, as hitherto
is
defined, affected
distinguished
by the kind of differences which, as
from those just spoken
differences within the standard.
They
of,
we may
call
are the result of
the co-existence of different standards in the same com-
Thus
munity.
standard of morality in a circle of
the
racing-men or of horse-dealers recognised by a
that
Christian
will
be different from
Even
congregation.
within the latter there will be differences, as between
those
who permit themselves to smuggle silk or tobacco Custom House or to take a ticket in a raffleancl those who do not. Yet the difference is more
at the sale,
apparent than
It
real.
the result of local depressions
is
rather than of serious divergence of standard.
case
of the
standard
by the
and
horse-dealer
the
raffler,
fact
that
it
is
possible
to
higher
is
shown
" convert "
them.
rather latent than non-existent, as
is
In the
the
Differences of this kind, which have been called differ-
ences within the standard, cause no difficulty to ethics, and may be disregarded. In any time and country there is sufficient agreement as to the contents of the moral standard to lull suspicion in the unreflective as to more
fundamental contradictions.
Another interesting form of variation is where different Thus, on co-exist in the same individual.
standards
being asked a question, a man will unblushingly reply with the query, " Do you ask me as a lawyer (doctor, stockbroker, that
he
is
etc.),
or as a friend?" admitting thereby
the happy possessor
different standards,
and intends
of at least a pair of to use the
other, according to circumstances.* *
Vol.
Op., the I.,
amusing passage
pp. 294-6.
in
W. James's
one or the
No more
difficulty,
Principles of Psychology,
Ch.
The Standard as Relative
I]
however, need be caused by
this
case
than by those
of
many
standards will
The man when closely
already discussed.
probably admit, a
man
209
"a man's and that there is a supreme standard him as sharing that distinction with his pressed, that
for a' that,"
which applies
to
neighbours.
Essential Differences in Standard involving Ethical Problem.
ยง 81.
It is
times
the comparative study of the moral codes of different
and
standard
for ethics,
reveals
the fact
that the
relative in the sense that
makes a
difficulty
countries that
is
and causes
practical alarm for the authority
of the moral imperative.
times and
known
first
the civilised
Not
to
nations
go beyond of Europe,
historical it
is
well
among the early Greek communities, the exposure of infants who were weak or deformed was not only deemed consistent with humanity, but advocated that,
as necessary for the in the
maintenance of the community and
interests of morality.
In the middle ages per-
secution for religious opinion differing from that of the
majority was
a highly
not only permitted, but approved of as
commendable form of
religious
At the
zeal.
present day, on the other side of the Channel, leading
statesmen
may meet
to kill without in
in duel with the intent to
maim
or
any way losing caste or outraging the
public conscience.
Nor
is
this variation in the
standard in different times
and countries confined to virtues which, like humanity and toleration, might be regarded as of secondary importance for the maintenance of society it extends also to those which are usually regarded as primary, and as lying :
at
the foundation of
all
social
life.
The
children
14
at
"
2IO
Ethics
Sparta were taught to steal
who
[Bk.
in the
:
v
well-known story of
and permitted it to tear his bosom rather than let it be discovered, the crime was, not to steal, but to be found out. In the lives of the saints among the Turks, as Locke informs us in his the child
stole a fox
celebrated chapter entitled " ciples," the
No
Innate Practical Prin-
primary virtue of chastity had no place.
In respect to these and similar varieties of standard, is
not, of course,
enough
it
to say that all respectable people
The point is that they are these anomalies. not anomalies, and that " all respectable people " in the
condemn
time and country in which they were practised approved
them. our
It
own
would be a gross
historical injustice to apply
standards in such cases.
Spartan boy must be judged by his
The own
of the
virtue
standard, not
by that of the shiny-faced urchin who creeps unwillingly to school in
We
have
an English
village
:
different thing in different times Is there then,
it
and
it
is
heroic.
goodness
is
a
countries.
might be asked, no such thing as an
absolute standard of morality
many and
so judged,
to recognise that in this sense
different?
And
?
Is morality not one,
are those justified who,
but
upon
basis of the latter hypothesis, draw the practical conclusion that, as opposed to what is " conventional or " expedient " for a community, there is no such thing
the
as
"right"?
ยง 82.
The for the
The Unity
of the
Form
of Virtue.
previous course of our argument has prepared us
answer to
this question.
At the very
was shown that morality cannot consist a fixed code
of rules.
As opposed
outset
it
in
obedience to
to
this
view,
I
:
Ch.
The Standard as Relative
I]
21
I
showed that morality is the conduct prescribed by an end other than the momentary satisfaction of desire, which end may tion
(/.<?.,
indifferently
be described as the
realisation), of the self as a
whole
{i.e.,
satisfac-
the better
or as the maintenance according to opportunity of
self),
the social system, which
is
only the other or objective
This end is the principle of unity which underlies and " explains " the manifold imside
of this
better
self.
peratives in which the moral law expresses as
the
it is
common
itself,
inasmuch
root or stem of which, as the last
chapter tried to show, they are exfoliations.
We
have now only to apply these results to the
question before us, in order to see that, underlying the
apparent diversities in the contents of the moral standard, virtue
is
at all times
good, whether
Wherever we
one and the same.
have moral judgment approving a
among
the rudest
of conduct as
line
band of savages or
in
those circles which in the most highly moralised countries in the
world recognise the highest moral standard,
it
is
upon a more or less consciously recognised contrast between a permanent and a transient self between the satisfaction of a higher, or true self, and of seen to
rest
a lower, or apparent one.
Take,
for instance, the
savage who,
when
the enemy's
hamlet has been taken by his tribe and the booty
is
in
his power, instead of seizing the largest share
he can
and escaping
to the solitary
woods,
restrains
impulse in order to await his chiefs
his
enjoyment of
it
in the
own
and the subsequent distribution by the lot. What does this mean ? It means that he restrains the instincts of his lower nature in view of a good, which in so far as he reflects upon it he recognises as his better choice,
self, viz.,
the social self which at this stage
is
represented
212
Ethics
[Bk.
by the rudely organised society of the nomadic
Or
revert
to
boy
is
to
our previous illustration
approved by the judgment of
:
v
tribe.
the Spartan
time and
his
country because he sacrifices the pleasure-seeking, pain-
avoiding
self,
who would have done
with the matter by
throwing away the fox, to an idea of a higher good,
which he represents to himself perhaps
as
" pluck" or
" endurance," but which has value only in so related to a moral
is
order, loyalty
recognises as part of his true
From
these examples
it
undoubtedly true that morality
and under
different
it
self.
be seen
will
far as
which the boy
to
circumstances,
country from the same root
while
matter or content varies
while
it
is
springs in every
it
age and
that,
from age to age
differs
in other words,
;
its
form or essence
The Relativity of the Standard
as Condition of
its
remains the same.* ยง 83.
its Validity.
But we may ^go further than
this.
For
it
further follows
from the argument in the previous chapters that the *
The above argument may be
further illustrated
beginnings of morality in sub-human forms of Spencer's
article,
lished
his
in
Nineteenth
book on
the outpost elephant
white ants in
life.
from
the
(See Mr.
Century, February 1890, since pubIn these, as in the devotion of
Justice.)
(cp.
Professor
Drummond's
description of the
Tropical Africa) to the interest of the herd,
have a shadow of human morality.
we
dreaming of morality. What makes the difference, of course, is the power of conceiving the higher or common good. In saying so I do not intend to deny that the lower animals may have the rudiments of such a conception of a higher
self.
All I
mean
is,
that
Nature
it
is
is
the possession of such a
rudimentary conception, and not the mere empirical fact that the lower animals exhibit such conduct, that justifies us in speaking of
sub-human
justice, or
any other sub-human
virtue.
Ch.
The Standard as Relative
l]
moral standard
relativity of the
his special circumstances, but
not only compatible
is
with the existence of a law which
213
is
absolute for each in
a necessary condition
is
of the obligatoriness of morality and the validity of moral
judgment. certain
We
limits,
have already seen how
this is so, within
with respect to individuals living in the
same age and country. Duty with each of us was seen It is to be relative to his station and circumstances. this relativity which makes it duty for me, A law which did not apply to me, in virtue of
my place in upon me
the organism
of society, could not be binding
at
It is
all.
only an extension of the same principle to say that
because morality circumstances,
The
place.
and
always,
is
t'hat it is
idea that
it
is
in all places, relative to
binding at any time and in any it
otherwise comes from our
is
habit of conceiving of the moral law as isolated from the social circumstances in
which
rose,
it
and
as therefore
The we
varying arbitrarily in different times and countries. error
is
corrected by recollecting that the variations
not accidental, but are
are discussing are
organically
related to the circumstances of the time to which they severally belong.
Thus, to go no further than our previous instances, the practice of exposing infants
was justified which comes
at
a
to the
necessary), in order city-state
time
when
same
(especially females*) it
thing,
was necessary
(or,
was supposed to be
to maintain that peculiar form of
which flourished
in
Greece and
when
Italy.
When
had perished, when higher ideas of the position of women began to prevail, and when it became obvious that the outrage to the circumstances changed,
*
See Meri.vale's History of the
and 303 n.
city-states
Roman Empire,
Vol. V., pp. 56
Ethics
214
[Bk.
V
humanity that was involved in the practice was a greater
burden thrown upon the community by the necessity of maintaining an apparently useless population, not only was exposure discountenanced, but the public conscience was awakened to the duty of social evil than the
making provision
for their support.*
from a time when, owing
Similarly, intolerance dates
to the intimate relations
between State and Church
in the oaths of soldiers),
it
seemed
to
be of
ance that no religious scruples of non-conformists of the Christian soldiers in the interfere with the
Roman
due performance of
(e.g.,
import-
vital
(e.g.
armies) shoul J
social obligations.
Intolerance ceased to be a virtue, and began to pass category, f when, among other began to be seen that freedom of thought
over into the opposite changes,
it
contributed more to the
common good
life
varies
tion,
the
in
we have seen
proper
(if it is to be and not mere blind must represent " a quality
sense,
obedience to a traditional law),
of the social tissue," must vary with
ยง 84.
But
perhaps
difficulty.
See the
Further does
this
Law
in the
it.
Difficulty.
not
Granted that there
lying the variations *
artificial
from age to age in the course of natural evolu-
morality, which, as
morality
than any
As, then, the form of social
unity of religious belief.
is
altogether
meet
the
a unity of form under-
matter of moral obligation,
of Constantine,
quoted,
Gibbon,
II.,
p.
142
(Smith's edition).
f Cp. the definition of badness as a survival, Alexander, op. cit., On the whole subject of this chapter and book the student
p. 307. is
recommended
to consult
Book
III. in the
same work.
Ch.
The Standard as Relation
I]
and,
that
further,
the
variations
215 necessary
a
are
in-
cident in anything that can rightly be called a moral standard, a further question
If the social
remains.
still
which the variations spoken of depend
on
changes
are themselves only accidental circumstances dependent
on
efficient
causes empirically discerned (and hitherto
nothing has been said to show that they are not), morality
comes, after all, to be nothing but that kind of conduct which supports one or other of the accidental changes It is
much,
of
underlying
unity
in
phantasmagoria of social forms.
in the
course,
have established
to
this
and to have proved that " the good " for the individual depends upon the good of the society of which he is a member. But if these " goods " are only, after all, varieties of adaptation to environment varieties of standard,
and are not united
blindly determined by natural causes,
with one another in any order so as to suggest the idea
of a universal or absolute good, there
is,
after
all,
no
ground for the obligation to adopt the moral standard of any one of them rather than of another, except the accidental
circumstance
probably
fit
us for the conditions of
that into
which we have been born rather than those of
any other. all,
to
And,
if this
our inherited aptitudes
that
be
life
so, morality turns out,
contends,
The as
it
after
be relative in the sense for which the sceptic viz.,
of resting
upon no objective and
moral order, but only upon one which effects
that obtain in
is
universal
relative to the
of accidental circumstances. difficulty
here suggested
a real one, involving
is
does at lea^t two distinct questions which press for
an answer
in the interest of the higher
morality, perhaps of religion
remind us of what was said
itself.
in
an
forms of practical
They
both, indeed,
earlier chapter of the
2l6
Ethics
[Br.
V
impossibility ot separating ethics from the study of the
nature of the world as a whole, and man's relation to it.
Nor, as we shall
see, shall
we be
able altogether to
escape without paying tribute to the spectre of metaphysics that has dogged our steps throughout. time, however,
it
to face with
and
it,
will
Mean-
be possible to avoid coming face
to carry our explanation of the data
of ethics a step further than
we have
hitherto done,
by inquiring whether, amid the variety of forms the moral standard has been seen to take, any principle of unity
is
discernible in the light of which they
may be
seen to be more than isolated phenomena on a back-
ground of
unintelligible change.
Ch.
The Standard as Progressive
II]
CHAPTER
217
II.
THE STANDARD AS PROGRESSIVE. ยง 85.
Clue to Solution of the Problem in Idea of Progress.
The
question with
may be with
which we ended the
stated in a form which will
make
chapter
last
its
connection
the results of our previous analysis plain to the
student.
In seeking for an explanation of moral judgments,
we traced them back
to a principle of unity variously
described as the end, standard, or ideal of conduct, in the light of which
they were seen to
and
related to one another
to the life of
be organically
man
as a social
A
new difficulty, however, rose when, on further investigation, we found that, so far from there being one
being.
universally
recognised
standard,
there
exists
most
a
bewildering variety in the standards or ideals that
have agreed to recognise. whether fact,
this variety
or whether
all
We
must be accepted
as an ultimate
these different standards
be susceptible of explanation
men
were thus driven to ask
in the
may
same sense
not
as the
variety of the moral
was found
to be,
judgments under any one standard by being shown to have their place as
mutually related parts or elements in an organic whole.
2l8
Ethics
v
[Bk.
a word, any larger conception of morality
Is there, in
possible than that implied in the definition of
it
as a
any one time or place, in of which we may be enabled to establish a
quality of the social tissue at
the light
between conduct that supports any particular
relation
moral order, and some more universal end or purpose traceable in
human
history ?
For the clue to the answer
we have not
stated,
when
to the question,
far to look.
It is
so
given in the con-
ception of progress rendered familiar to us by evolutionist
Progress means change estimated in terms of
writers.
approximation to an end,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the
end being the principle
of unity which harmonises and explains the successive History, as contrasted with annals or chronicles,
steps. is
the record, not simply of change, but of progress and
As applied
growth.
evolution has
made
to the life of nations
but also with the law of growth.
law
is
that societies
and
societies,
us familiar, not only with the idea,
Popularly stated, that
advance through successive stages
of simultaneous differentiation and unification to ever
higher and richer forms of § 86.
life.
Illustration of the General
This law hardly requires has formulated
it
Law
of Progress.
Mr. Spencer
illustration.
in well-known terms to the effect that
" an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity
is
transformed
into a definite, coherent heterogeneity," profusely illustrating
it
in the fields of biology
the general course
be
from
organisms
and
social
of biological evolution
such
as
the amoeba,
life.
is
Thus seen to
which are
homogeneous and almost structureless, through fishes and reptiles, to the highly differentiated structures of A similar progress the mammals, and finally of man.
Ch.
The Standard as Progressive
113
219
traceable in the development of the social organism.
is
At
this
first
members its
and undifferentiated ; all the and hunt, and fight. But with all
simple
is
alike fish,
homogeneity,
still
is
it
little
internal coherence.
ised,
the
functions are not special-
of one
parts are comparatively independent
With
another.
comes
division of labour
entiation into castes
and
with
a loose organisation,
The
and
classes,
greater differ-
at the
same time
and coherence, as As these become mutually dependent on one another. greater interdependence, greater unity
evolution proceeds the different forms of industry again differentiate into smaller
groups or specialised industries.
Similarly, the military forces are separated into depart-
ments, as of the home and foreign service, the army the government into central and and the navy, etc. municipal, and each again into legislative, executive, and judicial. ;
Progress of Humanity as a Whole.
ยง 87.
A
world
may be seen to and in the human
at
large,
take place race
as
the
in
a whole.
hand, it is indifferent how For the present it is sufficient
For the purpose we have
we
among
process similar to that which takes place
individual nations
in
describe this process.*
to note that history, at least in the West, bears witness to
a progressive enrichment of
human
and countries have contributed total of the
society as
Comte,
sum-
elements that enter into the constitution of
we know
that
the
Fetichist, presents
along with the *
Various periods
life.
their share to the
first
it.
Thus
earliest
it
is
period,
pointed out,
which he
e.g.,
calls
by the
us with the elements of the family ideas of property
Hegel conceived of it
and
settled industry.
as the evolution of
Freedom.
220
Ethics
Greek
civilisation,
as a type of the
[Bk.
which Comte
in like
manner analyses
second or polytheistic period, but which
has received more appreciative treatment from thinkers,
brought the
highest possible
v
free,
perfection.
self-governing
Rome,
it
city
German to
the
has frequently
been pointed out, contributed the conception of law and order and, by exhausting the regime of offensive militarism, prepared the way for a union of Western Europe under the moral conceptions supplied by Christianity.
Under
the influence of Feudalism and the mediaeval Church,
women
take a new position, slaves become serfs, serfs become the agricultural labourers and the city employes of modern times, with at least the elements of freedom. The growth of trade and settled industry caused the rise of the middle class and paved the way for the transition
from the military to the industrial period of the world's history.
When
the
time was ripe these new forces
asserted themselves against the restraints of the Feudal
system.
The middle
classes obtained recognition as
an
and in the anarchy of transition important weapons have been placed in the hands of the working classes by extensions of the franchise, the freedom of the Press, of public meeting, and of trade combination, by the aid of which it is hoped
integral part of the body-politic,
they
may be
able to
become
full
partakers in the heritage
of Western civilisation.
Nor
is it
necessary Jto strain the meaning of the law
mulated above to see that If,
to
it
for-
applies to this evolution also.
go no further back, we take the state of Europe in
the eighteenth century, previous to the outbreak of the
French Revolution and the modern national movement, said to have the elements of the new order
we may be
held in solution, and constituting a relatively homogeneous
Ch.
The Standard as Progressive
11}
22
1
whole under the nominal sway of the successor of the
The changes
Caesars.
be represented,
first,
that
have since taken place may
movement
as a
of disruption
and
The one of consolidation. former may be said to have begun in the great American War of Independence, and to have been continued in disintegration, secondly, as
Europe
in the national
the anti-Napoleonic
in
Empire, modern Greece,
movement, which took reaction,
going on pari passu with this
growth
of
its
rise
German
and Hungary, and cannot
Italy,
be said to have even yet spent the
created the
But, secondly,
itself.
movement, we have
sympathy, industrial co-
international
and a community of intellectual interests, symbolised by such modern phenomena as international operation,
boards
of
arbitration,
labour
conferences,
exhibitions, postal unions, laws of copyright
So
industrial
and of
extra-
Europe and America of to-day, in spite of the development of greater internal differences, are more united than ever before. dition.
that the
ยง88. If
now we
pass from these indications of the growth
in the civilised social
and
world as a whole of a richer form of
support,
we have
seen,
we may expect
development,
to
must
significance
each stage be
a
corresponding
indicating at least a tendency towards a
to
the
separate
in the progress,
explanation of which
Confining
at
find
universal standard or ideal, which, as
developed
moral ideas and
political organisation to the
habits which, as its
Moral Progress in Nations.
we
ourselves
it
varieties
may be
unifies
that
and gives
have been
said to furnish the
are in search. to
the
history
of
particular
222
Ethics
nations, is
it
[Bk.
v
not difficult to show, not only that there
is
a definite progress
the moral standard, but that
in
progress here obeys the law of progress elsewhere.
Thus, to take a well-known example,
show
it
not
is
diffi-
pari passu with the progress of the Jewish nation from a rabble of fugitive slaves to cult
to
that,
a great and highly civilised progress from the
Decalogue to the highly later
there
nation,
is
spiritualised
morality of the
A similar
prophets and the Sermon on the Mount.
progress
is
traceable from the traditional
morality of early Greece to the
The
the philosophers.
a moral
elements of a standard in the
first
and proverbial morality of
reflective
progress, moreover,
is
one from
We
incoherent homogeneity to coherent heterogeneity.
on the one hand, a movement towards greater
have,
differentiation, as when the principles laid down in the Ten Commandments expand into the greater detail of the Sermon on the Mount (e.g., the principle Thou
shalt not kill being
daily
life),
traditional
or
when
extended to minute particulars of
the
fxrjSlv
Greek morality
ayav (nothing in excess) of
differentiates into the elabor-
ate table of the Aristotelian virtues.*
hand, we have a coherence.
To
movement from
movement towards
this
On
the other
greater unity
and
corresponds in Jewish ethics the
the externality of the law to the " inwardThe law is " contained "
ness " of the Christian teaching. in the
golden rule
(i.e., is
seen to be related to the
or principle that underlies
it
spirit
as the particular to the
viz., love to God and to our neighbour. same way in Greek morality the integrating movement is plainly seen in the writings of the philosophers, who merely sum up the higher tendencies of their
universal),
In
the
* See Ethics,
Books
III.
and IV,
The Standard as Progressive
Ch. Uj
when they
time
of the good
exhibit the various forms
which constitute the
common
223
standard as flowing from
a conscientious interpretation of the duties of a good citizen.
§ 89.
Evolution of a Universal Moral Order.
Bur this is not enough enough to know that, in
for
our purpose.
It
is
not
particular times or nations,
changes in the moral standard are determined by such a law of progress. We have to go further, and ask whether in morality as a whole throughout the the
history
The to
it
of humanity any such progress
question
A
sufficiently wide.
only be given
could
morality.*
is
in
a
is
discernible.
complete answer
general
history
of
In writing such a history the historian would
be met by a
difficulty
which
is
not
felt
in
treating of
the evolution of morality in a particular age or country,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;namely, that the process paratively
is
not completed.
velopment of Jewish and Hellenic morality light,
It is
com-
easy to place the various stages in the de-
because
it is
in their true
possible to trace the leading features
of the Jewish and Hellenic ideals as these fulfilled them-
But where are we to find such fulfilHere we must be satisfied with tendencies towards an ideal, into the nature of which we may have more or less insight, according to the degree of our intellectual and moral culture, but which at best is rather an object of faith than of sight. Without committing myself to any speculative descripselves in history.
ment
in a universal history ?
tion of the general features of the moral ideal that *
For suggestive contributions
Phil., Vol. II., Pos.
European Morals.
is
to such a history see Comte's Pos.
Pol, Vol. III. (Eng. Trs.)
;
Lecky's History
oj
#
Ethics
[Bk.
working
itself into
shape as the
civilised
humanity,
I
may
try to
v
common
standard of
illustrate
the
general
how
ideas of
progress by noting in the briefest outline
moral obligation have expanded, and new virtues have
budded in the stem of human life. Looking at the growth of morality clear that the outlines of the
determined
at
in
general,
it
is
moral ideal must have been
each of the various stages of
civilisation
by the point which the corresponding social developments had attained. Corresponding, therefore, to the first
stage mentioned above (p. 219)
of the
private affections
home and
piety, loyalty to
and
the
first
exchange.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the
development
have the virtues of
filial
hearth, respect for old age,
germs of honesty and
To
truthfulness
in
these are added, in the second period,
and
respect for civil battle-field,
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; we
sense
military authority, courage in the
of justice
public assembly, and
all
in
room and
the council
those nameless elements which
go to constitute the characteristic Hellenic virtue of public tribal
the
spirit.
By means
code of early outline of the
fair
to the Christian type in the
in the
Roman
of these the narrow family or
civilisation
Greek
became expanded
ideal.
The
steps
have often been traced.
from
into this
Already
Republic we have to note a difference
fundamentally important matter of the position of
the wife and mother, and the comparative respect with which foreign nations and institutions are treated by Roman conquerors. The cosmopolitanism developed
under the Empire, the worship of the Virgin, the consecration of labour in the monasteries, and the new position
assigned to
manufacture and commerce,
present a further advance on Greek exclusiveness.
the cardinal virtues of courage and
wisdom
are
re-
To
added
Ch.
The Standard?
iij
as-
Progressive
The
humanity, charity, and industry. of the
modern over the mediaeval
denied by the laudator temporis established
225
superiority, finally,
ideal
is
sometimes
but
is
sufficiently
acti,
by the single instance of the growth of
the virtue of toleration (see above, p. 214). Whether the modern movement is not of the nature of a return to the Greek ideal, which in general tion as it
opposed
must be
described,
to the reader to
left it
is one of self-realisaone of self-suppression, If it is so to be decide.
to the mediaeval
must be admitted
that
we
return enriched
with the gains of the intermediate centuries.
Illustration
§ 90.
I
may
to illustrate the general nature of
try further
by considering the growth that has taken
this progress
place
from Particular Virtues.â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Courage.*
within
the
field
of one
or two of the cardinal
Thus we may take the
virtues themselves.
courage at two successive stages in part of the
common
its
virtue of
development as
stock of moral ideas.
It is
the
which the ancients delighted to honour, and of which Plato and Aristotle have given careful and typical virtue
Among
delineations. t
which
the
Greeks
it
appears as the
concerned with resistance to fear in the presence of danger and death. But when we compare the Greek conception of it with our own, we become conscious of the same kind of difference which we saw virtue
is
above characterised forms of organic
As has been * I take
life.
all
It
higher as compared with lower
has become more differentiated.
well pointed out,t our conception of the
many
hints
in the ensuing illustrations
suggestive treatment of this subject, Proleg. to Ethics ,
from Green's
Book
III.
t See Republic, III., § 429, and Nicomachean Ethics, III. \ Green, loc. a'f., p. 279.
15
6, 9.
226
Ethics
[Bk.
kind of pains in reference to which the virtue
is
ex-
Besides danger and death
hibited has greatly widened. in battle, there
is
v
the danger to health and
life
in the
and the fever ward, which makes the foreign missionary, the slum sister, and the
mission
field,
the city slum,
among
ourselves as the
was among the Greeks.
In these cases
hospital nurse as heroic types citizen
soldier
perhaps the difference class
them
all
not so great but that
is
under the old
title
of courage
sphere of the virtue widens, parts of
away and appropriate
we should but, as the
tend to break
new names.
to themselves
the conception of the
as
it
;
Thus,
kind of pains in reference
which fortitude may be exhibited widens so as to embrace not only physical pains, but those which bear but a remote resemblance to them, not only those which may be inflicted by enemies, but those that spring from
to
disagreement and misunderstandings with one's friends,*
we have what
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;that
which
is
for
practically a
new
variety of the virtue
want of a better name we
call
moral
courage.
With
this differentiation,
which corresponds to the
extension of the area covered by the virtue,
may be
teresting to note that there
greater integration, corresponding
the consciousness of relation
which the virtue
is
*
As examples
ot
in-
go a
For
it
is
just the
human proopening up new fields for
felt
gress in general, which, while
is
deepening of
to the
significance.
its
it
said again to
to bear to
the pains in question
may
betaken those of
by the majority of a particular class or profession upon an offending member, e.g., by a church upon a clergyman who denounces its corruptions, or by the press upon an
the social ostracism inflicted
editor
who denounces forms
winked
at.
of social immorality that are generally
Ch.
The Standard as Progressive
ll j
new forms
exercise, places the
its
227
thus generated, as well
as the forms previously recognised, in closer relation to
one another, and have been
at a
A
to virtue as a whole.
how
loss
to class the
Greek would
forms of virtue
which we have mentioned above as typical of our own time. He could hardly have denied that they were like courage,
but without the fully developed notion of
human brotherhood he would have found
it
difficult to
invent a formula which could have given the clue to
We, on
the underlying identity.
recognising to
new forms
be extensions of
it,
time,
we
as only a particular
nise
it
which alone
it
has meaning.
interpret the virtue of courage itself
We
form of virtue in general.
virtue take in presence of the obstacles, both
common human
still
moral and
by the environment to the realisation good." *
Temperance
ยง 91.
In
recog-
only "the form which individual and social
as
physical, presented
of the
them only
required by wider conceptions of
that " society " in relation to
At the same
the other hand, while
of the virtue, perceive
further illustration of this truth
we may quote
the virtue which the Greeks called Temperance, but which
we should
call Self-control.
Along with extended ideas women, has
of cur duty to humanity, and especially to
gone the application of the virtue obvious instance of the former the
word
"
temperance
viewed as a duty to oneself or to
*
I
am
new
An
relations.
the appropriation of
a special form of self-control,
society at large as
the state.
self-control in matters
(1st ed.).
" to
to
is
From
much
as to
the general virtue
for
of sense, self-control in matters
indebted for this definition to
Lux Mundi,
p.
496
228
Ethics
of drink has broken away,
an independent
itself as
[Bk.
and
set up, as
it
v
were, for
Similarly, the range of
virtue.
the virtue of self-control in matters of sex has immensely
Under
widened.
the position of
influence of
the
women which
new conceptions
of
were contained in germ in
new emphasis came to be laid on the virtue in question, which, under the names of chastity and chivalry, is more than any other the keystone of the modern form of social organisation.*
the Christian religion, a
With
this differentiation
the case of courage, a
has gone hand in hand, as in
new conception
of the relation of
these forms to one another, and to virtue as a whole,
corresponding to the
movement
take our previous instance,
it
Thus, to
of integration.
was
so long
difficult to see,
Greek community, what was the precise relation of chastity to
as the view
was confined to the narrow
field of the
the other forms of temperance and to virtue as a
Accordingly, as
Greek
well
is
literature,
known
to
character of the average good citizen. plays with
unnameable forms of
its
to seek in the
Even
as the
public."
As
Socrates
corresponding vice,
while Plato proposes a special exemption from
ments
T
any one familiar with
was the virtue most
it
w hole.
its
require-
reward of the youthful heroes in his " Rea matter of
fact, in
the so-called military age,
These examples, it may be noted by the way, are a further comment on Mr. Spencer's conception of an absolute ethics, and a state of society where all sense of duty, as involving pain, will disappear. As already pointed out, his theory is based on he notion that the environment is something definite and fixed. But, as we have just seen, our conception of the environment, and the obstacles it presents to the realisation of the good, changes with the deepening of our conception of the nature of the good itself. Hence it *
involves as
much pain
(perhaps more, see above,
p.
226
n.
)
to
be
courageous or chaste to day as in Athens in the fourth century B.C.
With
progress "
more
is
required of us."
Ch.
and
229
The Standard as Progressive
II]
in military circles in industrial ages,
tended to
fall
into the background.*
It is
has always
it
only in view of as
members
of a universal fellowship and joint-partners in a
common
a higher conception of the rights of
women,
good, that the true significance of the virtue, and the relation of
its
various forms to one another
come
universal moral order,
§ 92.
and
Summary.
Similar illustrations of the view for which I
drawn from the
tending might be
to the
into sight.
rise
am
con-
of the virtues
of humility, mercy, truth, tolerance, class justice, esprit
de corps,t etc., but sufficient has perhaps been said to show that the actual standard at any particular period, while undoubtedly relative to the special circumstances of the time and country,
is not on that account an isolated and accidental phenomenon, but takes its place as a stage in the evolution of a universal moral order, from
relation
its
to
*
"It
which
The
significance.^
in
the last resort
practical conclusion
it
derives
to
which the
its
not without reason that the earliest mythology united
is
Ares and Aphrodite."
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
9 (Bohn's Library, one of the features remarked upon by Spencer as characteristic of the military age. See Collins'
p.
62)
;
Aristotle, Politics, II.,
see the whole passage.
This
is
Epitome, ch. f
A
above
xxii., § 315. simple example of the process of differentiation spoken of
is
the Latin pietas, which
is
now
represented by several
under involuntary social relations in our table (p. 186). Max Miiller somewhere mentions a people (the Hawaiians) who have only one word {aloha) for love, friendship, virtues,
chiefly those classed
gratitude, benevolence,
%
and
respect.
The "universality" which
thus opposed to the "relativity"
is
of the standard must not be misunderstood
already said, to be " the
it
cannot, of course,
same
for all "
:
duty
mean is
After what has been
that morality can ever
duty just because
it
is
come
different
230
Ethics
[Bk.
preceding discussion points
is
any particular stage
not merely on the
rests,
v
that moral obligation at call to
maintain a particular form of moral organsation, but to maintain and forward the cause of moral order as a
whole.*
Further Questions.
ยง 93.
But before we can regard this conclusion as satisfactorily we have to encounter the second of the two questions with which we were threatened at the end of Duty or obligation, as I have already the last chapter. established,
had occasion repeatedly interest in a
we recognise it
may be
or has
is
in
it
have just been describing, only the lines which
it
it is
if,
as
is
code.
Nor can
We
it
to
man
become.
come
to
whose evolution we
commonly added,
not of
which
same
?
If,
is
at
work
as
is
claimed,
been determined throughout by the mean
the
"
have already seen
conception of a
him
in
in both cases the
process has
for all.
upon
follows coincide with those
biological evolution, but the cause
the
reflected
asked, can such an interest
attach to the moral order, the law of
producing
it is
as "good,"/.*., as the revelation to
of what he himself truly
But how,
on a personal
to point out, rests
moral order, which when
final
finality " of
sufficient
or absolute ethics.
any conceivable moral
reason It
to
distrust
the
cannot even mean
merely the "ubiquity" of the highest recognised standard, though undoubtedly an element in it. The moral order which is
this is
being evolved must be conceived of as universal, chiefly in the sense that it represents the demands of the universal or rational element in
human
nature.
My
meaning
will
become apparent
in the light
of considerations which I reserve for the next chapter. * The endeavour to further evolution, especially that human race, has been put forward by scientific writers as
duty."
It
old ones.
would be better
to say that
it is
of the a " new
a fundamental aspect of
Ch.
The Standard as Progressive
II]
natural law of adaptation to environment the
and
fittest,
may be
and
survival of
thus explicable without reference to any
is
free self-determination it
231
on the part of man,
in
what sense,
asked, can the result of the action of this
biological law, viz., the existing moral order, be said to
represent such a good
To answer
?
we should
necessary that
this question,
more
enter
fully
than
it
is
we have
yet done into the question of the source or spring of the
moral evolution
whether
I
have been describing, in order to see as has just
true,
is
it
been suggested, that
in
accepting the evolutionist's statement of the course that
moral evolution takes, we necessarily accept his account of the cause that explains
Simply
enlargement
it.
then, is whether the and enrichment of the moral standard,
stated,
the
question,
which we have observed to be taking place, iently explained as the result of a
is
suffic-
mechanical process
of adaptation to environment, determined, like biological
and following the by purely natural causes or
evolution, at each step from without,
course laid
down
whether there action
seeking
is
for
it
;
not also required a reference to the
each stage of a self-conscious
at its
good
as such,
the raw material of relations, in the
its
intelligence,
and evolving step by step from surroundings a system of social
maintenance and development of which
good may be found. The question, it will be is an important one at the stage of our argument at which we have arrived. For if the evolution is after all merely natural, the objections which we have
that
acknowledged,
ourselves
urged against the
scientific
or
evolutionary
doctrine of the standard of morality will be found to apply after
and
all,
in a
though
at
somewhat
a later stage
of the
different form, to our
investigation
own
account.
Ethics
232
LBk.
v
Unless the results of the progress can be shown to be elements in a more or
less
clearly
conceived end or
good, obligation, which we have seen to depend on the relation
between conduct and personal good,
is
still
without a foothold, even on the supposition of a universal
moral order. If
we
are to bring together the results just obtained
with those of our previous argument, we cannot refuse to
consider this
difficulty.
en.
mi
The Standard as Ideal
CHAPTER {THE
ยง 94.
HI.
STANDARD AS
Part
233
IDEAL,
I.
The Question involves Metaphysical Considerations.
The the
difficulty started,
last chapter,
but
left
shortly stated,
morality generally
is
unsolved, at the end of is
Whether progress
:
in
explicable in terms of efficient causes
as the result of adjustment to environment, as ordinarily
interpreted
or whether
;
an end or ideal more or subject, to
whom
less consciously
conceived by a
changes in the environment and the
rendered
adjustments
does not involve a reference to
it
necessary
by them are merely So stated, the
the opportunity for further self-realisation.
question introduces wide issues, which I cannot hope in
the
last
chapter of a text-book like the present to treat as
they deserve. require
to
Thus, to be
satisfactorily
be discussed
in
answered,
it
would
close connection with the
general question of the relation of the self or conscious subject as a whole
which constitutes
its
This, however, would bring
me
to the world
object or environment.
into dangerous proximity with the metaphysical discussions
which
at the outset I
abjured
;
so that I
seem
caught in the dilemma of either abruptly ending
ment
in the face of
an unsolved
difficulty, or
to
be
my arguusing my
Ethics
234 last
tbk.
v
new ground and pass beyond the imposed upon myself. I shall not deceive
chapter to break
limits
I
the reader, but confess to
him my
intention of choosing
The shock
the latter alternative.
to
him
will,
be mitigated by the recollection that in the three sections
we have admittedly been thorny region.
the borders of that section I shall ask
him boldly
perhaps,
last
two or
prospecting on
In the following
to step across with
me
and take a look at things at home from the other side, at the same time promising not to lead him further into
dangerous wildernesses than
its
to get a clearer view of the point
the path by which
ยง 25.
is
necessary in order
we have reached and
we have come.
Consciousness as Active Principle in
Knowledge.
The
old-fashioned view of the relation of the conscious
subject to the external world latter is
is
impressed upon
it
is
that the
knowledge of the
from without.
The
subject
the passive receptacle of feelings, sensations, and ideas
which come to
it.
Progress consists in the storage,
classifi-
and acquired power of recalling and utilising these A little reflection, possessions at the proper moment. however, is sufficient to dispel the illusion on which this cation,
view
is
based.
Thus, to take the lowest element in
knowledge, sensation,
it
books to point out that
is
a
commonplace of the
text-
in the last analysis the so-called
external world reduces itself to stimuli imparted to the
physical organism.
In a certain sense
that differences in sensation stimuli,
in
the
which
depend on
in turn resolve
rapidity
of the
it
may be
said
differences in the
themselves into differences
vibrations
which cause them
Cm.
The Standard as Ideal
Ill]
2
35
Vibrations of a low rate of rapidity* affect us through the
sense
of touch,
of
a feeling
as
When
jar.
the
some 20,000 per second we have a of sound. Above 40,000 per second we no
rapidity reaches
sensation
longer hear them.
When
they reach a
much
higher
number we begin to have sensations of colour, beginning with red, and passing through the chromatic scale to Above a certain point they are too numerous violet. to be responded to by the visual apparatus, and light In
disappears. that, as
it
all
which the point
to
be observed
has been well put, "out of what
is
is
in itself
an undistinguishable, swarming continuum, devoid of distinction
a world
emphasis,
or
full
our senses ?nake for us
.
.
.
of contrasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt
changes, of picturesque light and shade."
So that even on the plane of the senses which we share with the lower animals, the world of knowledge is not so much a revelation of an external universe as a revelation of
own nature as sentient beings. Coming to the subject or self, as a conscious principle of unity amid the variety of presentations, we may see that this is even more obviously true. It is not, of course, contended that the mind can evolve knowledge from its inner consciousness, any more than sensations our
can
call
stimuli.
themselves into being without aid from external
What
is
asserted
is,
that
it
does not approach
the world as a passive receptacle, or, according to the
well-known metaphor, a tabula rasa, on which the world
be known imprints
to
itself.
From
the outset
it
is
principle
comes
as a system of signs, like the signals received
*
an
of interpretation, to which the world
active
by
Perhaps below ten vibrations a second. (Wundt says that eight
vibrations are heard as a sound.)
Ethics
236
[Bk.
v
the clerk at a telegraphic depot, rather than as a reflec-
by the
tion in a mirror, or the impression imprinted
seal
upon the wax. Moreover, the standard of interpretation and the world which it builds is furnished by itself up out of the material supplied it from without * is a ;
memorial to the fundamental principles
work
to the
it
the
to
{i.e.,
brings with
it
chief features
of
its
own
inner nature), rather than to any world that exists inde-
pendently of
it.
The Unity of the World as Postulate of
ยง 96.
Thought.
The
detailed account of these principles
the subject-
is
matter of philosophy as the theory of knowledge and It
reality.
that
sufficient
is
for
the primary feature
scious self from its
of
transient
its
experiences.
Even
it is
Hence
fundamental principle
the
is
con-
that
most
its is
it
This
it
brings with
of the signs supplied
it
it
it
it
to
from withunity or
even at its most demands that knowledge shall cor-
the
is
elementary stage, If
ele-
a unity in a
they should form an intelligible
that
respond.
a
is
not (apparently) to the lower animals.
the interpretation
whole.
in
world of such a self
stage, the
sense which
out
distinguishes
merely sentient subject
a
" personal identity " as the underlying unity
asserts
mentary
our purpose to point out
which
ideal to which,
has no other unity to the mind of the
savage or the child, the world at least possesses the unity of being in
succession
one space, its events in one order of But this order is not something
in time.
* I use the
popular language in permitting myself to speak of
signs, material, etc.,
coming from without.
Metaphysics, of course,
has something further to say on this externality.
Ch.
The Standard as Ideal
Ill]
given.
It is
the mind's
first
effort to
2 37
embody
its
ideal
Advance, moreover, does not come from without by the mere heaping up of in
the data
of experience.
experiences.
It is
an advance
to higher forms of unity
among them, and this advance is by the demand which its own makes upon
forced
upon the subject
nature, as active intel-
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the
demand, namely, to sec in more perfect embodiment of the ideal of unity which itself supplies. From this point of view, therefore, progress in knowledge has to be looked at rather as a progressive revelation to the self of its own nature than as the unfolding of an external ligence,
it,
the so-called external world an ever
world to an observing subject.*
From
all this
two results follow,
(i)
The
sciences, as
they exist at any time, are not to be looked at as the
mere accumulation of generalisations from experience and the deductions which are drawn from them, but as actual embodiments of mind. They are the best up-todate account which mind can give of itself the reflection or mirror of its inner nature so far as revealed upon this
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
* " Nervous signs," says Bowne (quoted, James's Principles of Psychology, L, p. 220), " are the raw material of all knowledge of the outer world. But, in order to pass beyond these signs into . .
.
we must posit an interpreter who back these signs into their objective meaning. But that interpreter, again, must implicitly contain the meaning of the universe within itself, and these signs are really but excitations which Inasmuch as by cause the soul to unfold what is within itself. common consent the soul communicates with the outer world only through these signs, and never comes nearer to the object than such signs can bring it, it follows that the principles of interpretation must be in the mind itself, and that the resulting construction is primarily only an expression of the mind's own nature. All reaction a knowledge of the outer world,
shall read
is
of this sort ;
Note
at
it
expresses the nature
end of preceding book.
of the reacting agent."
Cp.
Ethics
238
(2) Progress
globe.
and events are the
[Bk.
comes from
within.
New
of political revolutions
is
What
objects
primary
occasion, not the cause or
source, of intellectual development.
Aristotle says
true of scientific progress
the outcome of great causes and small occasions. fall
V
:
it
is
The
may be the occasion of the discovery of may be said to have remade the world for men but the cause is in the ideal of a self-
of an apple
a law which scientific
;
consistent system of planetary movements, as that was
conceived in Newton's mind. sciousness were
the
seat
So
generally, unless con-
of an ideal of a completely
unified world of mutually related parts, progress, in any
would be impossible.
intelligible sense,
new
far as the
own
It is
only in so
materials are interpreted in the light of
its
and are seen by the mind further to fill out and illustrate the ideal it cherishes of completed knowledge or of a completely knowing self, that there principles,
can be said to be growth and progress
§ 97.
Now
in
knowledge.*
Conscience and Consciousness.
conscience
is
only another side of consciousness.
It is in
the field of practice what consciousness
field of
knowledge.
This fundamental identity
the
is
we have of ourselves, as realised in conscience (also activity we call knowledge
the sense
mode
of
;
dependence of the mind
* Practically this
upon
its
in the
already
Consciousness {con-
indicated in the words themselves. scire)
is is
ability to see in the
new
in intellectual progress
facts a further revelation of itself
takes the form of the familiar statement that intellectual effort de-
—
pends upon interest, interest being the emotional satisfaction which an object gives us as a possible means of further self-realisation. Cp.
Dewey,
section, § xl.
op.
cit.,
§§ xxxiv.
foil.
;
also
on general subject of
this
Ch.
The Standard as Ideal
Ill]
conscire
;
cp.
Old Eng. inwit)
is
selves as realised in conduct.
239
the sense we have of ourHence we may expect to
up between them
find interesting analogies cropping
in
respect to the relations discussed in the last paragraph.
Of
these
world of
it is
here important to note (1) that the objective relations is to conscience what the exter-
human
nal world of experience
is
to consciousness.
Just as
we
saw that, apart from the interpreting and constructive power of the human mind, the external world is merely a chaos of nervous movements, so, apart from the interpreting power of conscience, the relations tions of society are
meaning.*
(2)
the former case
As is
and
institu-
mere physical
facts
the
of interpretation
principle
without moral in
the ideal which the conscious self
cherishes of a unified world of experience, representing its
own complete
realisation as a principle of knowledge,
so the principle which conscience brings to the interpretation of external circumstances
is
of moral relations, representing principle of conduct.
(3) As,
the ideal of a system
own
its
finally,
come from demand of the
realisation as a
progress in know-
ledge was shown not to
without, but to be
the result of the inner
self for a
more and
* The question is sometimes asked whether any sane person is wholly devoid of conscience. I am not here concerned to find the answer to this conundrum, but merely to point out that in proportion as any one approaches such a limit, moral relations and institutions tend to lose their meaning for him. To Hedda Gabler, in
Ibsen's play of that name, moral sacrifices are simply unintel-
ligible.
She does not understand those who make them.
dislike of such persons
{e.g.,
of her aunt)
is
Her
merely the dislike of a
what she thinks stupid and unreasonable. If she had more conscience, her dislike would have turned into hatred. For in that case she would have recognised them as persons whose conduct was a standing reproof to her own almost clever girl to
had a
little
fiendish selfishness.
â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Ethics
more
embodiment of
perfect
[Bk.
its
ledge, so progress in morality has
adjustment of the
self to
know-
ideal of unified
spring, not in
its
V
mere
changing circumstances, but in
the interpreting, constructive power of conscience finding in
new circumstances
tion of
its
the occasion for the further realisa-
ideal of rationalised
and unified conduct.
Relation of Conscience to Social Environment.
§ 98.
now we
return from this somewhat abstract disand ask what is its bearing on the question with which we started, viz., the relation of the subjective If
cussion,
element in morality
(i.e.,
conscience) to the objective
(i)
new
(i.e.,
and institutions), we have to note That the above argument has confirmed from a
social conventions
:
point of view the doctrine developed in a previous
chapter,
viz.,
that the system of social institutions,
which the individual finds himself, objective desires
constitute
we have
because, as reaction
upon
we may now create out of
upon
inward is
it
nature.
It
so
is
the result of the
environment of a self-conscious,
his say, it
his
just seen,
" conscientious " being,
who
or,
conscious
nature, as
his notice.
It thus
comes
as a species of objectified conscience.
intelligence
to the individual It supplies
him
with an objective expression of the chief contents the
ideal
to
him.
of
which he himself, as sharing the intelligence
and conscience embodied
make
as
seeks to
a system of relations corresponding to
the ideal which his forces
among
only the other or
of the organic system of impulses and
side
that
is
For, in the
witness of his
first
own
is called upon immense value to
in these forms,
Practically, this
actual.
place,
he
is
is
of
not
left to
the subjective
reason to interpret the demands of
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Ch.
The Standard as Ideal
ill]
These are already writ large in the social which he is born, or, as we previously
conscience. relations
into
expressed
may
own
correct his to
Unless
Conscience,
subjective judgments.
liable to
itself, is
its
and its duties. Secondly, him with a standard by which he
in his station
it,
these relations present
if left
241
run into
all
kinds of caprice.
judgments are constantly checked by a
refer-
ence to actual social requirements, as by a kind of " double entry,"
may
it
be transformed from a
easily
guarantee of social solidarity into a principle of isolation
and anarchy.* (2) But, while the social
environment
is
thus an in-
valuable aid to the individual conscience in interpreting its
own
ideal, the
A
environment.
conscience is always reacting on the man's " station and its duties " is not
the fixed quantity "
we
bed of Procrustes
"
adapt himself ; rather to adapt itself to him.
are apt to suppose. to it
It is
not a
which he has permanently to is a " leaden rule " which has
The good
life
is
not, except in
a society of Podsnaps, a treadmill of recurring duties,
keeping a
man
environment.
in a state of stable equilibrium with his
a "
moving equilibrium," changing and arise, which conscience own way as " further calls." f New in-
It is
expanding as new circumstances interprets in terests
its
develop from the old ones, which, conscientiously
pursued, tend to change the whole aspect of his environ-
ment. % *
It
While, therefore,
it
is
true that a man's duties
has been observed that Intuitionalist thinkers,
ethical analysis begin
and end with conscience, tend
vidualists in politics,
f
As Lowell has it
New occasions teach new duties Time makes ancient good uncouth," instance is when a man marries. *
'
%
A
familiar
;
who to
in their
be
indi-
Ethics
242 at
[Bk.
any particular moment may be expressed in terms
v of
definite social relations, yet, as a being with a conscience
a moral ideal), he can never find adequate expression
{i.e.,
for himself in
them, but has to seek new occasions for
He
the exercise of his virtue or excellence as a man.
has "ideas beyond his station."
and the society
in
which he
ing their lead into
a richer form of
§ 99.
A
new
life for
lives
Progress for himself
depends upon
himself and others.*
Is the Ideal Social or Personal ?
question might here be raised as to whether the
ideal
which
is
thus seen to be the source of progress
primarily one of a better form of social
is *
These two aspects of the moral
life
a literary expression in Mazzini's essay
Europe"
life ;
its
have found so admirable "On the Condition of
two necessary manifestations
in relation to others.
... The
;
life
considered singly
individual and society are
not only because they are two great facts which cannot be
abolished, ciliate,
a
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
society are
sacred
or
life
(see Essays, Camelot Series, p. 286), that I cannot from quoting him: "Life is one: the individual and
refrain
and
his follow-
social combinations, resulting in
and which consequently we must endeavour
to
con-
but because they represent the only two criteria which
we
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;namely, conscience
and tradition. The manifestation of truth being progressive, these two instruments for its discovery ought to be continually transformed and perfected ; but we cannot suppress them without condemning
possess for realising our object, the truth,
We cannot suppress or subalternise one without irreparably mutilating our power. Individuality, that is to say, conscience, applied alone, leads to anarchy society, that is to say, tradition, if it be not constantly interpreted and impelled
ourselves to eternal darkness.
;
upon the route of the
by the intuition of conscience, begets Truth is found at their point of intersection. It is forbidden, then, to the individual to emancipate himself from the social object which constitutes his task here below, and forbidden to society to crush or tyrannise over the future
despotism and immobility.
individual."
Jh.
The Standard as Ideal
Ill]
higher
Different answers
of personal character.*
type
probably be given in
will
243
the case
of different indi-
Where sympathy and imagination
viduals.
are active,
the inner call tends at once to be translated into terms
On
forms of social well-being.
of higher
the other
where sympathy and imagination are but the will strong and the purpose earnest, the hand,
come
demand
rather in the form of a
more
of motive and
The advantage
dangers.
that goes along with
by the
is
and sustained
inspired
new
the
earth.
that the cultivation of qualities of char-
on which,
acter,
is
its
the enthusiasm
is
new heavens and
vision of the
The danger
Each of these
advantages and
of the former Effort
it.
its
may
for greater purity
consistent character.
forms of conscientiousness has
sluggish, call
in the last resort, all social well-being
depends, should be neglected for the sake of "quick returns " in the shape of increase of general happiness.
The advantage being
itself that
the end,
it
of the latter
which, in so
must wish
responding danger of
that the will
is
bent on
general well-being
The
other wills to be.
that the essentially social character
wholeness
(in
the sense explained in
Book
The two
should be sacrificed to holiness.
Purity of will
is
whom
only possible
in the higher interests of
the other hand, unless
we
IV.)
attitudes,
however, can never be entirely separate in any one
we judge morally good. to one who is absorbed
On
is
cor-
forms of goodness should drop out of sight, and
all
that
is
all
is
far as
are to suppose
it
life.
possible
*
For the points of contrast and the fundamental identity in the and the reforming type of character, see Green's Prolegomena, Book IV., ch. v. and on the subject of conscientiousness generally,
saintly
;
323-37 Martineau, pp. 156-60 ; Dewey, op.
ibid.,yip, op.
cit.y
Vol.
;
cit.,
ยง
II.,
lxiii.
pp. 59
foil.
;
Alexander,
Ethics
244
V
[Bk.
to gather- " grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles, " social
progress cannot be safe in the hands of those in
whom
the desire for social improvement does not involve a
keen sense of personal of the kind of
life
responsibility,
required in those
and a high
who
ideal
claim to be
its
prophets and evangelists.
Part
II.
The Struggle for Existence Moral Progress.
ยง 100.
The reader
will
as the Cause of
have already perceived that the answer
to the question with
which we closed the
involved in the foregoing argument.
It
last
only further to illustrate what has just indicating
how
chapter
remains for
is
me
been said by
the ordinary account of the evolution of
morality requires to be supplemented, in order to bring it
into
harmony with the view
I
have taken throughout
of the nature of moral judgment
In doing so
obligation. tionist's
I shall
treatment of the origin
is
fairly familiar to
to
it
and the ground of
assume that the evoluand growth of morality
the reader, and that a short allusion
will suffice.
In this treatment attention part
which the struggle
for
is
called to the important
existence and the law of
natural selection have played in the evolution of morality.
Thus,
it
is
shown how
at the
outset the pressure of
environment forced the members of hostile closer union arity,
tribes into
with one another, developing social solid-
and with
it
the virtues on which
it
depended.
Progress was conditional on the survival of those tribes
whose members best responded to the social requirements thus forced upon them, and on the consolidation
The Standard as Ideal
Ch. Hi]
and propagation of the form of
245
social organisation
and
the standard of morality corresponding to this response.
In
this
way, to take familiar examples, the Judaic organi-
sation asserted itself triumphantly against the Canaanitic
the
Greek maintained
ultimately, in
ancestral rival in the East
;
against the Persian,
the
Roman
superseded the
In modern times, the Protestant has, on the
Greek.
whole, been victorious over the Catholic
and
;
and the conquests of Alexander, overcame its itself
industrial over the feudal
common
In the
and
the democratic
;
military.
account of the
mode
in
which the
law of natural selection acts in the sphere of morality, the
emphasis has usually .been laid on the analogy
between
social
has been
and
made
the two cases.
is
attempt
from evolutionary writers,* by
whom
pointed out that, whereas in the case of the lower
animals and of
ment
Little
Recently the subject has received more
careful treatment it
biological evolution.
to note the characteristic differences in
man
in the earlier stages of his develop-
survival of the fittest
is
purchased
the price of
at
the destruction of the unfit, in the later stages of social
evolution illustrate
this
is
less
and
less
the
case.
Thus,
to
from our previous examples, the conquest of
Canaan by the Jews does not appear, in spite of the and prophets, to have been followed by the extirpation of the inhabitants of the land. Nor were the conquests of the Greeks and reiterated instructions of priests
Romans enemies.
followed, as a rule, by the annihilation of their
The
reason of this difference
is
that with the
Mr. Alexander, whose application of the law of natural is an original contribution to the subject. See Moral Order and Progress^ pp. 353 foil., and International Journal of Ethics, Vol. III., No. I. * E.g.,
selection to the progress of the moral ideal
t
Ethics
246
[Bk.
growth of humanitarian feeling the
one between
and moral
social
not to
is
exterminate,
overspread
Alexander
of the con-
" convert "
the
when
or
his ideal
East in
the ;
be
upon him. As a rule he when Greek culture and modes of thought
conquered by imposing succeeds, as
The aim but to
to
between
ideas, rather than
nations as physical aggregates.
queror
came
conflict
V
(to
the
track
take a
armies
the
of
modern
of
instance) the
expeditions of the Revolution armies under Napoleon carried the ideas of the French
Republic through the
length and breadth of Europe.*
In other cases the ideal
of the conquered coalesce with or even overcomes that
on the con-
of the conquerors, as w as notably the case r
quest of Greece and Judaea by
of
Rome
by the Goths.
itself
The still
Rome, and
conflict of ideals within a particular society serves
better to illustrate this distinction.
swords have
If
not yet been beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks, they have at any rate on the
field of party
warfare been exchanged for the pen, the platform, and
The end
the garden party.
means
well said,
So
far
is
victory as before, but the
and education (which, as has been only an organised method of persuasion).
are persuasion is
from exterminating, or even
injuring,
opponent, a victorious party heaps coals of *
Substituting,
e.g.,
in
political
its
fire
upon
his
Germany, the Code Napoleon for the had previously existed. At the
feudal system of land tenure that
present
moment we have
in
Alsice-Lorraine an interesting conflict
proceeding between the French and German ideals of
life
and
As Mr. Gladstone once pointed out, the justification retention of these provinces by Germany will be its power
organisation.
of the
of morally assimilating them with
upon them. f In which cases
itself, i.e.,
of imposing
Victi victoriinis leges dederunt.
its
ideal
Ch.
The Standard as Ideal
iiij
head by educating his children presumably the better ideas.
The Economic Factor
ยง 101.
To
in
complete
247
the victorious and
in Progress.
sketch of the evolutionary account
this
of the action of " natural law in the spiritual world,"
it
remains to be pointed out how, in the view of certain
economic
moral progress
writers, all the great steps in
are connected
with
which the necessity of
changes
adaptation to material environment has brought about.
Thus, the spread of humanitarian feeling and ideas in the early
Roman
empire
claimed as the result of the
is
changes which followed upon the break-up of the older agricultural
basis
of society
in
Italy
and throughout
the world, the development of vast industries directed
Roman princes, and the universal system of trade and finance introduced by Roman capitalists. Similarly, the change from slavery to serfdom is ascribed to changed With conquest the supply of slaves material conditions. by
As
had ceased.
the internal
traffic
thus
became abridged
the tendency manifested itself to transform slaves into an
hereditary possession attached to a particular family feudal estate. ages,
The
and
release of the serfs in the middle
which by some
is
claimed as a step in moral
progress, only followed the break-up of the social system
which had rendered
it
necessary for the baron to support
crowds of small owners or
So
far
crofters
from being a moral movement,
upon it
appearance, in England at
least,
of peasant
Slave-emancipation,
recent
times, was,
discovery slavery
proprietors.
that
the
in
like
the
soil.
presents the
of a cruel expropriation
manner, the
in
result
more of the
system of industry founded upon
was an unprofitable one, and unable to compete
Ethics
248 with free labour.
awakened
known
well
and
all
to
effete
to
all
multiply
had
v
examples,
the moral enthusiasm
are declared to have
break-down of an is
not
Lastly,
the French Revolution
[Bk.
it
their roots in the
system of national finance, as
Book of
readers of the Second
Carlyle's History of that event.
How this Account requires to be Supplemented.
ยง 102.
Now
if
these facts are put forward as representing the
external or material aspect of moral progress, their im-
The
portance can hardly be exaggerated.
much
bears
study of them
the same relation to ethics as physiology
does to psychology.
As the study of the nervous system
and of the brain throws important light on the origin and evolution of mind, so the study of the external conditions of moral progress may be expected to throw important light on the origin and contents of morality. If,
however, they are put forward as a complete account
of the origin and growth of moral ideas,
reason
the
in
As
guard.
can
changes.
shall
find
moral ideas men, and in neither simply consequences of material
ideas these are in the mind, as
in the conscience,
case
we
preceding argument for being on our
be
they
So
of individual
far
from external changes being the cause
of them, these changes are only operative as occasions
of progress
in
so far as
they are
interpreted
by the
reason and conscience of individuals in the way explained above.
Thus, the struggle to
for existence has
promote the survival of
organisation rendered
may be
said to
tribes
undoubtedly tended
whose
them the
and coherent and accordingly
solid
fittest,
be one of the conditions of the evolution
of those virtues which, like
loyalty
to king
or chief,
Ch.
The Standard as Ideal
Ill]
went to support
must have been the constituting
or
by
the
loyalty
;
this
only one
is
Before the solidarity
truth.
loyalty,
and before the loyalty, some idea in the mind
common
individual of a
of the
But
this organisation.
the 0^/side of the
side,
249
purpose to be served
it.
of course, maintained that at the early stage
It is not,
of evolution referred to we are to look for a
oped conscience any more than
Nor
reason.
conscientious
subserves
it
conduct,
the
rational
made
always, or even usually,
is
object of conscious
the
developed
implied that, even in the case of what
styled
strictly
is
purpose
is it
fully devel-
for a fully
Just as
reflection.
a
may seem
cathedral, or a political constitution,
city,
to
a
grow
spontaneously out of the isolated and undirected labours
many
of
and
generations,
to exhibit a unity of plan
which none
}^et
progress
afterwards be seen rational purpose
the artificers can be said
of
have conceived, so the
to
may
and serve a
may be seen
to
consciously
ends of order and
social
be served by individuals who are
only in the vaguest way conscious of the relation of their actions to them.*
What
contended
is
for in the
above example (and
the parallel instances just referred to
support the contention) ness at
with
all (i.e.,
human
is
so far as
we can
history), there
*
As an
historical
the
Roman
Empire.
is
rightly interpreted
say that
involved in
instance the student
The
if
that, so far as there is conscious-
we
its
may
are dealing
presence more take the
magistrates and generals
who
rise
of
laid the
foundations of that great superstructure were only in the vaguest way conscious of any world-wide purpose that was to be served
by to
it.
The
rationality
have been brought
the poet Vergil.
of the whole process can only be said
to clear self-consciousness
by the genius of
— 250
Ethics
than a mere stances
response
instinctive
adaptation
or
something more
is,
[Br.
altered
to
V
circum-
This new environment. case of the loyal member of a
to
in the
the community, an interpretation of the circumstances as
an occasion
as
man.
internal worth
an end which belongs to him end is conceived of in terms of which case the circumstances would
to realise
Whether
— in
this
be interpreted as an occasion for exhibiting the qualities
—
and developing the character of a man, or of social good in which case the conduct would seem to be demanded by the
—
" Relations dear, and all the Of father, son, and brother it
does not matter.
The
point
is
charities "
that this conception
is
there in however vague a form as an ideal, and, as such, is
the vital element in the stage of progress represented
by our
illustration.
Similarly
in
the
other
examples which were cited
The Jews were no doubt
above.
forced into closer
union under their theocratic government by the pressure of their environment,
and the necessity to present a solid But to interpret this neces-
resistance to their enemies. sity in
terms to which the
to formulate the duties
human
could respond,
spirit
which were involved in the main-
tenance of their peculiar form of organisation as elements in a national
life,
and incorporate them
in
such a body of
moral and religious precept as we find in their
literature,
required the interpreting, idealising reason of successive generations
of law-givers, judges,
and
priests.
humanitarian ideas began to spread after quest had broken
Greek
;
down
Again,
Roman
the proud isolation of
con-
Jew and
but before the new conditions introduced by the
Ch.
Tlie
Ill]
Pax Romana
Standard as Ideal
251
could become the occasion of a moral
advance, they required the moral enthusiasm
of the
Christian apostles* and the reflective insight of the Stoic
philosophers to interpret of organisation
owing to
is
them.
The
likely to survive the
Protestant
Roman
superior adaptation to the environment
its
part of that environment spirit for liberty
is
just the
demand
form
Catholic,
of the
;
but
human
of thought and conscience as an essential
element in the ideal of personal good.
form of government
is
The democratic
undoubtedly that which
is
best
adapted to modern conditions, and may be expected to
and propagate itself; but it was the moral enthusiasm for the " rights of man " at the end of the last survive
century and the beginning of
down
democracy, f seen
this,
and not the breakcreated modern we have already mankind protested
of an economic system, which
how
against
With regard
to slavery
the moral consciousness of
as early as the time of the Cynics (p. 127).
it,
In the middle ages, though emancipation was undoubtedly accompanied by a general change in the material
conditions
*
of
life,
it
was promoted and consolidated
Cp. George Eliot's fine saying,
developing thought
is
" The great world -struggle
continually foreshadowed in the
of the affections seeking a justification for love
and
of
struggle
hope."
This
and revolutionary function of the affections may be compared with what was said (p. 80) of feeling as a conservative radical
element in
life.
" the matricide of democracy," in f Napoleon has been called that while it was the democratic movement in Europe which may
be said to have given him birth, he did his best to strangle it. He might have succeeded if democracy were the effect merely of adaptation to environment, and not an elemental force in human nature,
whose expression
in suitable social forms
delay, but cannot prevent.
an individual
may
Ethics
252
[Bk.
by the Church in the interest of humanity.* negro-slavery that
was
it
modern
in
times,
economically played
labour before
its
abolition came,
the apprehension of this
out
and
So of indeed,
true,
is
form of
a
as
apart from
that,
general abolition
fact, its
among
nations might have been delayed for several
civilised
Yet
generations.
may
it
been made,
this
whether,
economic failure had itself have been sufficient
would
in
the
crust
break through
be doubted
well
even after the discovery of
to
It
its
prejudice and habit,
of
behind which the institution was entrenched, but moral
the
which
enthusiasm
any rational interpretation of of
v
for
accompanied, and,
on was independent
history,
it.
Wherever, then, as
in all these cases,
we
have, accom-
panying changes in the material conditions of existence, an
human
extension and enrichment of the moral
standard in the sense explained in the preceding chapter,
be traced, in the last resort, to the reaction upon the changed circumstances of human intelligence applying, in the method characteristic of it as such, a this is to
higher standard than
form of *
is
as yet represented
by any existing
social organisation.!
So early
as the fourth century Justinian declares his legislation
be pro libertate quam et fovere pracipue nostro numini pecaliare est. to
et
Romanis
tueri
See
art.
legibus
et
on Slavery, EncycL
Brit., pp. 134-6.
t Pos.
On
the contention
Phil,
II.,
Government, ch. that
nine
in
pp. 280 i.,
where
"one person with a
who have
the preceding paragraphs see Comte's
foil., it is
and 370, and
Mill's
belief is
only interests."
a social power equal to ninety-
And
cp.
Bonar's Philosophy
Economics in their Historical Relations, Epilogue
Manual of Ethics,
p. 278.
Representative
pointed out in a well-known passage
;
and
Mackenzie's
The Standard as Ideal
Ch. Hi]
253
Concluding Illustration from the Reformer and Martyr.
§ 103.
That this is so we may expect to become more and more obvious as the ideas with which the study of ethics makes us familiar begin to permeate popular thought, and new reforms are claimed in the name of a rational Under these circumconception of human well-being. stances the social reformer and his brother the martyr for ideal causes in the past will be more clearly recognised as the interpreters and administrators of human nature. As the power to explain the phenomena of their lives
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
their manifest disregard of all standards of
senseâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;may I may
individual or social utility in the narrower
be taken as the criterion of any ethical theory,
close this discussion by submitting the view set forth in the preceding pages to this test.
That the " naturalistic satisfy
it,
we may
sions of the
take
" theory of ethics
most candid of
we have developed, on
its
On
exponents.*
the other hand, these
who
sits
who might be
him,
quo"\ and due season." But
status
is
opposed
cally *
fully
He
to the majority
is
the
around
described as "the children of the accordingly as " one born out of
this
does not imply that existing forms
are meaningless to him.
most
should
I
closer than his neighbours
to conscience in the sense above explained.
child of the ideal, as
the view
phenomena
The reformer
are perfectly comprehensible.
define merely as one
has failed to
upon the authority of the admis-
On
the contrary,
it
is
he who
understands them, for he can see them as organi-
related
to
the ideal which he cherishes, bearing
See Mr. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 428, 430.
f M. Arnold's libellous definition of the English aristocracy.
Ethics
254
same
the
or
development
in his
he works
own mind and
Loyalty, however, to
disciples.
for
bear to
On
creations.
the status quo to which, in
its
that of his party
ancestral
wisdom
not with him consist in blind acceptance of
does
V
relation to primitive conceptions of that ideal
as the institutions or reforms fuller
[Bk.
its
the contrary, such blind acquiescence in treason to the idealising, innovating spirit
is
own
its
As
day, the status itself was due.
has been well remarked, the opponents of useful reforms are drawn from the
same
class as at the outset blindly
resisted the establishment of the
form or institution
to
Those who build the sepulchres of the prophets and garnish the tombs of which they themselves blindly
cling.
the righteous are the children of those
On
who
slew them.
the other hand, in demanding the reform of institu-
tions as they are, the reformer
is
only demanding
room
a fuller expression of the ideal which they represent,
for
and apart from which they are meaningless. He may be waging war against the forms and institutions which previous
reformers
doing so he
is
have battled to
establish,
but in
only carrying on the work which they
began, reacting on the given
conditions
as
he now
reacts.*
The
true reformer thus feels himself the representative
of those It
*
who have gone
" Those alone
tinue
before.
the very stuff of his
is
or
Their ideal
conscience.
is
are worthy to be called successors
carry into
effect the
his ideal.
His deepest
who
con-
undertakings which former times
is utterly unmerited by blind which have long ceased to bear any relation to their original purposes, and which their own authors if now living would disavow." Comte, Pos. Pol., I.,
have
left
followers
p
281.
unfinished
;
the
title
of obsolete dogmas,
Ch.
The Standard as Ideal
ill]
interest
is
to realise
parison any hold
it.
No
upon him.
minor
interest has in
him
in
working for
opportunity, they are valueless to
of
it
(as
they
will
if,
in
him only
in so far
Apart from such
it
him
if
;
they rob him
order to retain them, he
tempted to deny the supremacy of
life
in this sense
be to find
it.
may be
is
his ideal), they
may
To
love
even become an object of hatred and disgust. his
com-
Friends, fortune, station,
self-culture, life itself, are of value to
as they aid
255
to lose
it
;
to hate
it
may
Bibliography
2 S7
BIBLIOGRAPHY Of some of much
the chief
English works on Ethics (arranged as
as possible accordi?ig to Schools
and Dates),
L Early Intuitionalism. Shaftesbury, ($rd)
with notes. Butler,
Earl (1713);
Characteristics, ed. Hatch,
1869.
Bishop Joseph. Sermons (1726); Dissertation on (Both in Butler's Analogy and Sermons,
Virtue (1729).
Bonn's Library.)
System of Moral Philosophy (1755). See T. Fowler's Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. 1883. Theory of the Moral Sentiments (1759). Smith,* Adam. Hutcheson, Francis.
II.
Later Intuitionalism.
Review of Chief Questions and
Price, Richard.
Diffiaclties
of Morals (1757). Reid, Thomas.
McCosh.
Outlines of
Moral Philosophy
(1793); ed.
1863.
Outlines of Moral Philosophy (17'93); McCosh. 1869. Whewell, William. Elements of Morality (1848). 1864.
Stewart, Dugald.
Calderwood, Henry.
Handbook
of
Moral Philosophy
ed.
(1872).
1888. *
him of
There are other elements to the Utilitarians.
all
in
Adam
The same
is
Smith's ethics which relate
true,
though in
lesser degree,
the earlier writers here mentioned.
17
;\
Ethics
2S8
Martineau, James.
Types of Ethical Theory, 2
vols. (1885).
1886. Porter,
The Elements of Moral Science.
Noah.
1885
Egoistic Hedonism.
III.
Elementa Philosophic de Cive (1642) De or, the Elements of Law, Moral and
Hobbes, Thos.
Corpore Politico ;
^Leviathan (165 1). 1885. The Fable of the Bees (17 14).
Political (1650).
Mandeville, Bernard de.
IV. Utilitarianism.
Essay concerning the chs. iii. and iv. (1690).
Locke,* John.
Book
I.,
Hartley, David. t
Hume, David. (1739-40). (1751).
o?i Man (1748). Human Nature, Bks.
II.
and
III.
Enquiry conccmi?tg the Principles of Morals Works; ed. Green and Grose, 4 vols. 1882.
Paley, William (1785).
Understanding
1868.
Observations Treatise of
Essays, Literary, Moral, ,
Human
.
and Political (1742). 1875. and Political Philosophy
Pri?iciples of Moral
1859.
Bentham, Jeremy.
Introduction
and Legislation
Principles of Morals
to the
1876.
(1789).
Edited in 2
from Deontology (posthumous).
vols,
Works by
J.
separate
Bowring
(1834).
James.
Mill,
(1829). Mill,
John
Analysis of the
Human
Mind,
chs. xvii.-xxiii.
1878.
Stuart.
Utilitarianism (1863).
1871.
Mental and Moral Science (1868). Sidgwick, Henry. Methods of Ethics (1874). 1890. Hodgson, Shad worth H. Theory of Practice, 2 vols. Fowler, Thomas. Progressive Morality. 1884. Bain, Alexander.
Gizycki,
v.
G.
*
Locke
Manual of
Students
adapted by Stanton is difficult
Coit.
to class.
Fowler's Locke {English
Men
1872.
1870.
Ethical Philosophy ;
1889.
See Sidgwick's History of Ethics
of Letters), ch.
be. init.
.
Bibliography
Evolutionary Ethics.
V.
Darwin, Charles.
259
Desce?it of
Man
(1871),
clis.
i.-v.
and
xxi.
1883.
Data of Ethics
Spencer, Herbert. Clifford,
W.
K.
Lectures
Stephen, Leslie.
Science of Ethics.
1886.
(1879).
1882.
Moral Order and Progress.
Alexander, Samuel.
VI.
Cudvvorth, Ralph.
1887.
(1879).
and Essays
Early
1889.
Idealists.
Etema land
Inimitable Morality (posth.
1688).
Cumberland, Richard.
VII. Caird, jr
The
Critical Philosophy of Ka?tt (1877),
189O.
Green, T. H.
Prolegomena
Bradley, F. H.
W. R. Courtney, W. Royce, Josiah. J.
to
Ethics (1883).
Ethical Studies.
Reality\ chs. xvii. Sorley,
Mackenzie,
Legibns Naturoz (1672).
Nineteenth-Century Idealists.
Edward.
2 VOls.
De
Boyle Lectures (1704).
Clarke, Samuel.
and xxv.
1876.
I
1887.
Appearance and
(1893).
Ethics of Naturalism. L. Constructive Ethics.
1885. 1886.
Religious Aspect of Philosophy 1887. S. Introduction to Social Philosophy. 1890. .
Manual of Ethics.
1
893
Lotze.
Practical Philosophy.
Dewey,
J.
1890.
Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics.
1891.
History. Sidgwick,
H.
Outlines of the History of Ethics (1886).
1888.
See also Blackwood's Philosophical Classics for English Readers (1880-89); Sonuenschein's Library of Philosophy (in progress).
INDEX Conduct, Nature
A. Alexander,
214, 245, 259.
American War, 221. Aristotle, 12, 41, 47, 60, 81, 87, 88, 172, 181, 187, 194, 200,
222, 225, 229.
Arnold, Matthew, 180, 253. Art and Morality, 203.
of,
45.
Relation to character,
S., 89, 188, 198, 199,
Conscience, 73 folL; 2 3$ foil, Conscientiousness, 243. Consciousness, 234. Courage, 191, 199, 224 foil. Cynics, 123, 127, 130, 144, 251. Cyrenaics, 100, 123, 143.
Asceticism, 129, 144.
D.
B.
Bain, Alexander, 166, 258. Benevolence, 196, 199, 201. Bentham, 76, 148, 258. Bradley, F. H., 119, 200, 259, and passim. Bryant, Mrs., 121, 192.
Burke, 70, 177.
Desire, Analysis of, 48 foil. and appetite, 132. ,,
Dewey, John, Duties, 192
175,
and passim.
foil.
E.
Economic
Factor in Progress,
247. Eliot, George, 150, 167, 251. Emerson, 170.
Butler, 76, 148, 257.
C.
End, Moral, 85 foil., 187. Epicureans, 100. Ethics, Problem of, 3-16.
Caird, E., ill, 135, 259. Cardinal Virtues, 191. Carlyle, 105, 113.
,,
Modern,
4.
Ceremonial, 180.
Objection
Character, 55. Charity, 228.
Nature of science of, 18 foil., 30 foil. and morals, 21, 28. and metaphysics, 32, 216,
Chastity, 199, 225. Christ, 71, 100. Christian Ethics, 87, 123, 208, 220, 222, 224, 228. Clifford, W. R., 158.
Comte, 22,
187,
24, 28, 169, 178, 182,
197,219, 223, 254.
to,
12
foil.
233. .
.
and politics, 40 Eudaemonism, 105. Evil, 173, 214.
Exposure, 213.
folL
Index
262
K.
F.
Kant, 107, 124, 132, 135, 144,
Feudalism, 220.
187.
Free-will, 53, 55, 56.
French
Revolution,
220,
246,
248, 251.
Lecky, W. E. H., 223. Locke, 81, 148, 210, 258.
Generosity, 200.
Miss M.
S., viii., 121.
God, Duty to, 179. Godwin, William, 58, 109, Great Men, 171.
H.
M. Mackenzie,
viii, x, 53, 2 59> an d passim. Magnanimity, 200. Manners, 200.
106,114,
l
Modern,
101
>
Morality, Origin
184.
Paradox
James, 109, ill, 258. Mill, J. S., 55, 58, 62, 76, 107, 109, no, in, 112, 114, 121, 129, 138, 147, 197, 252, 258. Mill,
foil.,
of,
hi, 112, 180. Humanity, Duty to, 178. of,
,,
Absolute,
of,
foil.,
Subhuman,
,,
212. of,
45
foil. ,,
I.
,,
Standard
Individualism, 137, 138, 167 Institutions, 173, 188. Intention, 61.
,,
Moral law, 68
,,
foil. ,,
,,
and
of, 65.
Progress, 221 of,
58
Napoleon, 246, 251. Newman, J. H,, 13.
J.
P.
Paley, 108, 258. Pascal, 70, 75.
foil,
foil.
foil,
intention, 61.
N.
James, William, 129, 2c8, 237. Jones, H., 175.
foil.
foil.
Motive, Meaning
241.
65
Form
238 foil.,
of,
,,
85
Justice, 196, 199, 20J.
210
229.
Moral Judgment, Object
219.
Hutcheson, no, 257.
Intolerance, 214. Intuitionalism, 26, 74
foil.
,,
79, 148, 258.
Interest, 48,
4
185, 202, 211. Relative, 207 foil.
Hoffding, 43,
Progress
of,
Nature
,,
258.
Hume,
I
257^
184. Hegel, 41, 90, 178, 182, 218. Hobbes, 75, 109, 144, 164, 173,
,,
7
Mazzini, 242. Merit, 190.
109 foil., 183. Evolutionary, 136 ,,
S.,
J.
Martineau, James, 63, 76, 189,
Habit, 5, 46. Happiness, 104. Hartley, ill, 258. Hedonism, Ancient, 100.
foil.,
Lotze, 46, 203, 259. Lowell, 242.
114.
Green, T. H., 66, 101, 179, 187, 225, 259, and passim.
â&#x20AC;&#x17E;
foil.
Civil, 91.
,,
G. Gilliland,
L.
Law, Moral, 65
Indecc Pessimism, 148, 149. Plato, 28, 41, 51, 104, 181, 191, 225. Pleasure, as standard of moral
judgment, 99 foil, and happiness, 104. Quality and quantity
,,
Politics, 4, 40.
Progress,
Stages in a nation's, 6 foil.
Law
218. Prudence, 197, 201. ,,
Slavery, 220, 247, 252. Adam, 257. Society, Nature of, 138. Evolution of, 219. ,, Socrates, 100. Sorley, W. R., 153, 155, 259. Sparta, 210, 212.
Smith,
Spencer, H., 136, 139, 140, 142,
107.
of,
263
of,
143, 145, 150, 197, 212, 218, State of Society, Stephen, Leslie,
152, 153, 164, 228, 229, 259. 40.
137, 139, 140, 142, 152, 156, 192, 253, 259. Stories, 123, 127, 144, 150. Struggle for existence, 244. Suicide, 176.
R.
Reform, 253.
Summum Bonum,
Resolve, 49, 50. Responsibility, 56. Rights of Man, 165, 167, 251. Ritchie, D. S., 59, 139.
88, 89.
T.
Temperance, 191, 199, 2or, 227.
Royce, J., 77, 259. Rousseau, 167.
Theological Ethics, 27.
U. S.
Utilitarianism,
Sanctions of Morality, 102 Science,
Function
of,
22
no,
112, 136
foil. foil.,
237.
Veracity, 199, 201.
and philosophy, 25. and morality, 202. Self-control, see Temperance.
Virtue and Merit, 190, 196.
Serfdom, 220, 247. Shaftesbury, 29, 80, 257. Sidgwick, H., 82, 109, 258, 259, and passim*
Ward, James,
,,
Printed by Hazell, Watson
&
W. Will, 53
Wisdom,
Vinty, Ld.,
46, 50, 140.
foil.
196, 201, 224.
London and Aylesbury.
foil.
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